Mr. President, I ask Senator Bond, the vice chairman of the committee, to yield me 10 or 11, potentially even 12 minutes. I appreciate my colleague yielding me time. Mr. President, Senator Bingaman, who I greatly respect in all ways, has…
Mr. President, I ask Senator Bond, the vice chairman of the committee, to yield me 10 or 11, potentially even 12 minutes.
I appreciate my colleague yielding me time.
Mr. President, Senator Bingaman, who I greatly respect in all ways, has offered an amendment altering the liability protections of title II. That is it. His amendment would postpone the implementation of the liability provisions of the bill until 90 days after the submission of the final report of the inspectors general required under title II.
Now, I appreciate the Senator's desire to have more information out there. But I want the Senator to contemplate, and the Senate as a whole to contemplate, what we are asking. We are talking about a year for the inspectors general to complete their reports.
Does it really work that way? Is it really a flat year? Are we going to send out Federal marshals to have them all do their reports on the exact day? Probably it will stretch a little bit. Maybe it will not; maybe it will.
But you cannot assume it will not. Then you have to add on 90 days. Then you can get to the question of the immunity. I am really baffled by that because what it, in effect, says is, we are almost certainly going to be going through a period of something, which I have not heard discussed today during this entire debate, and that is the actual collection of intelligence that involves highly classified material of a foreboding nature for a long period of time until the Senator from New Mexico and/or the Senate can be convinced that it is worthwhile to give immunity or to understand this program.
Now, I want to make an even more basic point: By inserting this amendment, requesting this amendment be passed, I hope the good Senator does understand that he is undoing a very carefully calibrated compromise between the Senate-passed bill and the House-passed bill that is on title II, taking months and months of negotiations to get to the point where Speaker Pelosi, for example, who was violently against the bill, and title II in particular, and Steney Hoyer, who was very much against title II, the immunity portion of the bill, where they could say, on the floor of the House: We think sufficient progress has been made in the negotiations that we will vote for this bill, which the House did by about 70 percent.
Now, that is going from the House not even considering title II. I mean, they considered and rejected it. It was a sea change.
It was a sea change, and one has to have been there to see how the change took place, the good faith bargaining on the part of Vice Chairman Bond, myself, our mutual staffs, working with the DNI and others, long hours and long days with which we have arrived at something which, if we pass this today, will go to the President to be signed. If we accept this amendment or, for that matter, accept the Specter amendment that follows, it will have to go back to the House, which will not take it up, which will not consider it, which will undo everything, and there will be no bill.
Is that important? Yes, it is. Why is it important? Because the chance of not being able to collect on extremely foreboding matters around this world will come to a halt, either because the PATRIOT Act terms have expired or because the companies will withdraw in disgust. In any event, the bill would be vetoed, as the vice chairman said.
So it would be the end of the bill. Therefore, I oppose this amendment.
As I will say about each of these amendments--well, I just did--it undoes everything that has been done for the purpose of making a perfecting amendment to satisfy a particular need of a particular Senator. I also must oppose this amendment because there is no reason for delaying the liability protection provisions. There is not a sufficient reason. It is true the Select Committee struggled to get access to details about the President's surveillance program for many months, but in the end we succeeded. We went from maybe eight, more likely four, sometimes six, to all four committees in the House and the Senate, Judiciary and Intelligence. We heard the necessary testimony. We went to the EOP. We read all the documents, and our chiefs of staff were allowed to do the same thing. We read the legal reasoning used to justify within the executive branch and the role of the private sector. We did all of that, not only our committee but also the House Intelligence Committee, and both Judiciary Committees spent considerable time looking at this issue. I am satisfied we have a basis for taking action now.
On national security grounds, we have to, in my judgment. We haven't talked about that today. We have talked about refined points of constitutional niceties and all the rest of it. I don't denigrate that, but there is something called the protection of the Nation. I take that very seriously. I take that very, very seriously. So a form of liability protection has passed the Senate and the House of Representatives a total of three times, once in the Senate and twice in the House. We should not now reverse these actions by passing the provisions of suspension.
Let me be clear. I strongly support the requirement in this bill for a comprehensive review of the President's surveillance program by the inspectors general. They will be very tough and very thorough and embarrass a lot of people. A report on their general review is one of the best ways to inform the American people about the facts. Litigation is an imperfect mechanism to bring facts to the public, rather a terrible mechanism, because of something called the State secrets privilege which is involved, which means the people can't know anything, that a lot of people dealing with the court can't know anything, that the companies can't know anything. It is a closedown. People have to understand that. It is not an open court. You are not getting a traffic ticket. It is a highly complex, nuanced matter which is rigidly guarded by rules. You could argue the rules, but there they are. Unfortunately, if this amendment passes, the fact that litigation is still pending may have the effect of limiting the amount of information that will be released to the public in the report of the inspectors general, the opposite of what the distinguished Senator wants. Certain facts that might be releasable if the litigation were resolved might be held back, if the Government anticipated a continuing need to assert the State secrets privilege in litigation, which it would.
It is also important to note that this amendment, if it were to pass, the liability protection provisions that the Senator is trying to get at would not go away. In other words, if his amendment passed and we took this long delay, nothing would affect the progress of the liability legislation and that possibility. So it is an amendment which doesn't accomplish anything. The provisions would still go into effect after 90 days, unless new legislation is passed. Let's hope that doesn't happen. The new Congress, thus, might be launched into a contentious debate next summer, instead of working with the new President on a new agenda. That is the point of the Cardin amendment, that the date was changed to December 2012, so that the next President, whoever it might be--it is very close--will have a chance to review and perhaps act upon what we have done here in the next term, which is good. I urge defeat of the amendment.
I have one more thing to say, with the indulgence of my colleague. The senior Senator from Pennsylvania and I were engaged in earlier debate over the access Senators have had, both with myself and with the vice chairman, to the Government letter sent to the telecommunications companies requesting their cooperation during the period of 9/11 to January of 2007. The Senator from Pennsylvania lamented the fact that these documents were kept to only the members of the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees and not shared with the full Senate.
I share the view of the Senator that these documents should be viewed by all Senators, and I have advocated this very position to senior officials of the Bush administration for many months. But recognizing the administration's unwillingness to extend this access, the Senate Intelligence Committee did the next best thing. We were able to get declassified the relevant facts upon which the committee and, ultimately, the full Senate reached the judgment that a narrowly drawn immunity bill remedy might be appropriate.
For the record, our committee report, 110-209, accompanying S. 2248, the FISA amendments----
I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute.
And dated October 26, 2007, includes a lengthy declassified explanation of the committee's review and conclusions as well as a description of the representations made by the Government in the letters sent to the companies during the period of time covered by the bill. So for the past 8 months, this public report has been available not only to all Senators--here it is, I have labeled it, pages 8 through 12, right here--but to the general public as well.
I ask unanimous consent that that portion be printed in the Record.
I hope very much that the Senator's amendment will be defeated. I thank the Chair.
I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, with the goodwill of the vice chairman, he has granted me a couple of moments to enter a couple documents in the Record. We have had several good days of debate or good hours of debate on the FISA bill going back to before the recess. I guess that would be several months. In the course of a discussion of a bill as lengthy and complex as this, several arguments have been made that warrant response, but there isn't always time to give the response. In the interest of establishing an accurate legislative history to accompany the bill, as manager of the bill, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record a statement providing such clarifications and corrections.
I also point out, there was an op-ed piece in support of the FISA bill in today's New York Times which I call to the attention of my colleagues. It was written by Mr. Morton Halperin and entitled ``Listening to Compromise.'' Mr. Halperin, in addition to being executive director of the Open Society Policy Center, has a lengthy career of public service in both Democratic and Republican administrations.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record Mr. Halperin's op-ed in support of the bill as it appeared in today's New York Times.
Mr. President, I thank the Presiding Officer and yield the floor.
I yield as much time as the Senator requires.
Madam President, Senator Specter has offered an amendment altering the liability protections of title II. His amendment would require the district court to assess the constitutionality of the President's warrantless wiretapping program before it could dismiss cases against telecommunications companies that met statutory requirements for liability protection.
Although I appreciate the Senator's desire to ask the court to address the constitutionality of the President's program once and for all, he has picked the wrong mechanism to ask the court to answer his question.
First, Senator Specter's amendment would completely undermine, as I said before, the delicate compromise in front of us today. People say: Well, we are freshly back in town, newly minted, widely open. I am sorry, this was a bill which just got through on a thread, and it will probably get close to 70 votes, a compromise already accepted by the House with 70 percent of their votes, and I think that balances the protection of liberties and also does something I have stated I think is rather important; that is, it allows the collection of intelligence to continue in order to protect the United States of America.
Senator Specter's amendment also would require the court to consider a difficult constitutional question that otherwise would not be at issue in the cases.
Title II does not cover cases against Government actors. This exclusion was intentional. Cases against the Government for any unlawful or unconstitutional actions Government actors may have undertaken should be allowed to proceed. Arguments over the constitutionality of the President's actions can and should be litigated in those proceedings.
The amendment, however, injects this complicated constitutional question about the interplay of the fourth amendment and separation of powers into cases requesting civil damages from private companies. The amendment does not require that there be a relationship between the companies and this constitutional question. It does not ask whether the companies were aware of the scope of the President's program, nor does it ask whether the companies' actions were done in good faith or even whether they were legal. Indeed, if the court finds that the President's program violated the Constitution, the cases against the company will not be dismissed even if that company had no involvement in the unconstitutional components of the President's program.
Madam President, this is simply unfair. A company should not be subjected to liability solely because the Government acted unconstitutionally. A company should not be subjected to liability solely because the Government acted unconstitutionally. Any accountability and liability should be based on actions of the company, which is what title II is about.
Imposing this barrier to liability protection is also inconsistent with our expectation about the role companies are expected to play when they receive Government requests for information. Our existing statutory approach is based on the idea that the Government requires prompt cooperation from the telecommunications companies. Although we expect those companies to seek documentation from the highest levels of Government, they are not expected to assess the constitutionality of particular requests on which they lack, to say the least, complete information.
The ongoing litigation is complicated by classified information issues that make it virtually impossible for the cases to move forward. But if the cases could proceed without regard to the classified information at issue, the court would not consider the question of whether the President's program was constitutional. Instead, it would ask whether the companies were entitled to immunity based on existing law.
In addition, a case against any particular company is necessarily limited to the facts relevant to that company. The court would, therefore, not be provided a comprehensive look at the President's program in any of those cases.
We should not ask the district court to assess whether the President's program is constitutional when the answer to that question is unnecessary to resolve the underlying litigation between the plaintiffs and the carriers, and the court does not have sufficient facts to address that far-reaching question of constitutionality. We are talking about apples and oranges, but it is apples here that we are concerned with.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
May I respond to the Senator's observation?
I would say to my distinguished friend from Pennsylvania that Judge Walker's case is not, under any circumstance, going to be stopped by whatever happens here. It will not happen, and it will, therefore, continue. The bill only addresses cases against carriers, is the point I was trying to make. Judge Walker--his case is a case against the Government. This bill is not against the Government. It is against what happens to the carriers, or in this particular case whether they get liability. The Government is not the point. The carriers are the point. The case continues, and we have not intervened in a malicious or malevolent way.
That is quite an assumption to make, I say to the Senator.
I will just reply very briefly with three points, and when you are finished, I would like to yield to--or hopefully the vice chairman will yield to the senior Senator from Virginia.
The one point is that this is not a bill we are addressing here about the Government. We are doing it about carriers, and particularly in title II.
Secondly, I am interested in what the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee feels might be the result if we went the Judge Walker route regardless of its inapplicability, in my view, to this situation when it went through the appeal process.
I am not a lawyer. Right now I wish I were, but I am not. Usually, I am glad I am not. But it seems to me that you would be looking at a period of appeals going right on up to the Supreme Court that might last 3 or 4 years. I am not experienced in how long these things take. But this is a matter that might take that kind of time and that causes me to raise again the question I have raised several times with the vice chairman this afternoon: The only thing that we appear to be discussing in the Senate is rights and liberties. I think I have yet to hear almost any word about the security of the Nation and what the purpose of the Intelligence Committee is, what the purpose of intelligence is, what the purpose of collection is, how the collection is done, who does it, how important is it to how we gauge our situation in the world, where we need to deploy, where we need to be watching.
This is extraordinarily serious stuff but not a word does it get in the Senate, which is two-thirds made up of lawyers--and I honor every one of them. But we are picking at ``would the Constitution allow'' this or that. I am looking at something which to me is very clear. This is all about carriers, this particular bill. My name isn't Judge Walker. I haven't issued the opinion. If my name were Judge Walker, and it was an opinion, it would be about constitutionality. We are not addressing that in this bill.
The Senator earlier said: Look, we are here. Why not duke it out and get all the substitutes and arrangements and compromises back on the table again. I know that does work in some fashion. But I think the vice chairman and I and our staffs could say that what was achieved over the last month or so could probably never be achieved again, which is to get the House to agree. John Conyers is chairman of the Judiciary Committee, who was gracious and polite but unfriendly to this bill. There is the question of the Blue Dogs. You can say always these are questions--on farm bills, on steel bills, on automobile bills, on whatever bills.
This is a particular type of emergency based upon the fact that we are still, under my definition, under attack. Not that we have not been attacked, but we have been able to interdict, because of intelligence, some of those attacks--or all of those attacks. This is a very different matter than running an ordinary piece of legislation through the Senate.
If 20 or whatever Judiciary plus Intelligence is in the Senate--35, whatever that is. No, because there are some cross-memberships. Let's say 20. Understand, the others have not been read in. I have said they could have found out the information that has been available for a full year. Any Senator has the ability to go and read intelligence, if they wish to do that. It sort of implies that the Senate, as a matter of habit, comes to full agreement and full understanding that 80 out of 100, as opposed to 20 or 25 out of a 100, fully understand what is at stake in the amendments to a bill and then to the final passage of a bill.
I think the Senator knows that is not the way it works. I think the Senator, although he says we should not delegate, knows we delegate all the time.
I will. That takes various forms. Sometimes it will be that I am very much on the edge of how I am going to vote on something, and I go to a particular Senator--it might be the Senator from Pennsylvania--and say: I have this feeling and I have that feeling, I am right on the cusp of which way I should vote.
I will.
I wasn't talking about special expertise--I was talking about: We have not talked about the threat.
Yes.
My point.
If the Senator from Rhode Island would give me 30 seconds, I would be grateful.
The fact of the matter, I say to the senior Senator from Pennsylvania, is that there are 37 Members of the Senate who have been briefed on this matter--not 20 but 37. We decided to do a little bit of homework: Fifteen on the Senate Intelligence Committee, 19 on the Senate Judiciary Committee, that is 34--minus 4 crossover members; 2 leadership on each side, Senator Roberts and the Appropriations Committee chairman and, I suspect, vice chairman, plus Senator Levin and Senator McCain, who are ex officio.
That is not bad.