Madam President, the Senate now returns to the consideration of S. 2248, the FISA Amendments Act. As I said in December when we debated the motion to proceed to this bill, I believe this legislation is critical to our Nation's security.…
Madam President, the Senate now returns to the consideration of S. 2248, the FISA Amendments Act.
As I said in December when we debated the motion to proceed to this bill, I believe this legislation is critical to our Nation's security. That phrase is thrown around a lot--``our Nation's security.'' It does have meaning. To protect America from the panoply of threats we face around the world, we must know what our enemies are planning and what they are doing. We get that information through our intelligence agencies, and one of the most useful sources for them is communications intelligence.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, gives the Government the authority, with court approval, to collect communications intelligence inside the United States. Unfortunately, the law has not kept pace with the incredible advances in telecommunications technology of the last 30 years.
As this debate proceeds over these coming days, it is important for all Members to understand why FISA exists and why it is necessary for us to update it. The Congress passed FISA to protect Americans inside the United States from inappropriate eavesdropping by the Government. The FISA statute created a system that allowed the Government to go to a special court and show probable cause that someone inside the United States was an agent of a foreign power. If it agreed, if the court agreed, the court then issued an order allowing the Government to collect the intelligence.
Over time, the flow of global communications changed. The nature of these communications changed. The system of fiber optic cables carrying international communications grew, and wireless technology began to dominate our domestic system. This was a marked change from the communications architecture that existed in 1978, when FISA was started, when local
calls were transmitted over a wire and international ones usually went via satellite.
As technology changed and America became the hub for international communication, our intelligence agencies were presented with collection opportunities that were never envisioned--never even thought about in 1978. But because of the way that FISA was drafted, they were unable to take advantage of the new opportunities to collect significant intelligence inside the United States against targets located overseas.
After September 11, 2001, the President chose to deal with the problem unilaterally and created a warrantless surveillance program that relied on, to my mind, questionable legal justification. I think that was a mistake. I believe the President should have sought, and would have received from Congress, the necessary changes to FISA to accommodate the international communications he wished and needed to target.
The public disclosure of the warrantless program ultimately led the President to seek approval from the FISA Court and then to seek additional authority from the Congress, which is where we are.
Our first attempt to address this issue was the Protect America Act passed last August. That legislation allowed our intelligence community to undertake the collection needed to monitor terrorist communications, but the PAA, as we shall call it, is flawed legislation that does not achieve the balance between protecting security and preserving our civil liberties, which is so essential. It provided an expanse of new authority to collect intelligence inside the United States, with little court involvement or oversight from the Congress.
But we had the foresight to include in the PAA--the Protect America Act--a 6-month sunset. That 6-month period allowed us the time we needed to craft a bill that does achieve this important balance: security and civil liberties. It gives the intelligence community the authority it needs to keep us safe, and it puts in place the safeguards needed to protect America's liberties. That is the bill the Senate is now considering; i.e., S. 2248.
This bill was reported to the Senate last October on a strong bipartisan vote under Senator Bond and myself, Vice Chairman Bond and myself, by a vote of 13 to 2. Vice Chairman Bond and I worked hard to craft a bill that would garnish support from both sides of the aisle and that would have the support of the administration, leaders of the intelligence community and, most importantly, would achieve our twin goals of protecting the security and privacy of Americans. I should say at this point we went to great lengths to check all our bases in this process. We didn't do this in a cocoon and we didn't do it in a partisan way. We reached out to the experts, whether they were inside the administration or outside the administration. We wanted to do it so we could make this legislation as effective as possible.
But, as with any legislation, this bill is not perfect. I have welcomed the input from others as we have moved forward. On this point, I must particularly acknowledge the work of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary and Intelligence Committees shared jurisdiction over FISA. The Judiciary Committee also happens to be led by two individuals with considerable knowledge and experience with these issues from the perspective of both committees. It may not be known to all, but Senator Pat Leahy served as vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the mid-1980s, and Senator Specter served as chairman in the mid-1990s. I appreciate the time and thought they have put into this legislation.
The Judiciary Committee considered the Intelligence Committee bill on sequential referral and has reported a proposed amendment to our bill. That amendment is now the pending amendment. The Intelligence Committee bill and the Judiciary Committee amendment take a similar approach to addressing the underlying problems with FISA--not a huge difference. The Judiciary Committee included several provisions that I think further improve the already robust protections for privacy contained in S. 2248. We were enriched by working with them.
I intend to support amendments to incorporate many of these changes into the underlying bill, which is the Intelligence Committee bill, and even though I cannot support everything in the Judiciary Committee substitute amendment, nevertheless, there is very good material there.
Before I discuss possible amendments, let me take a few minutes to walk through the bill before us today. I apologize, but I think this is necessary as we begin this debate on what is a highly complicated and somewhat arcane subject.
In crafting this legislation, the Intelligence Committee set out to accomplish four main goals.
First, we wanted to ensure that activities authorized by this bill are only directed at persons outside the United States. The bill requires the FISA Court to approve targeting procedures designed to accurately make the determination of whether someone is outside the United States. For individuals inside the United States, the existing procedures under FISA continue to apply. Individual court orders, FISA orders, are still required.
Secondly, our bill improves the protection of information from or about a U.S. person. Unlike the Protect America Act, this bill provides for court review of the so-called minimization procedures. These are procedures used to shield information about Americans who may be overheard or mentioned in the conversation of foreign targets.
Court review of these procedures is central to the protection afforded under FISA. But the FISA Court's role was left out of the Protect America Act.
Third, the bill includes a new protection for U.S. citizens outside the United States. The Intelligence Committee rejects the proposition that Americans lose their privacy rights because they travel or work elsewhere in the world.
Under current law, the intelligence community can target U.S. citizens outside the U.S. solely on the authority of the Attorney General. Our bill requires an order of the FISA Court before an American can be targeted, regardless of the American's location. This is a concept that both committees endorsed, and it enjoys bipartisan support. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell also endorsed this in testimony before the Intelligence Committee. This is an area of law, however, that requires careful attention to avoid, as the Director described, ``unintended consequences.''
Both the Intelligence Committee and Judiciary Committee approaches need further refinement. Therefore, I believe we have reached an agreement on a bipartisan amendment that would reconcile the approaches of the two committees and resolve the concerns of the administration. Vice Chairman Bond and I will offer this modification as part of the managers' amendment.
Finally, the Intelligence Committee bill adds significant new oversight authority to collect inside the United States against foreign targets. The new oversight will be conducted by all three branches of Government.
The bill includes a series of annual reports to Congress on the authorized collection, including instances of noncompliance; inspector general reviews by the Justice Department and the Intelligence Committee; and FISA Court review and approval of acquisition and minimization procedures.
Beyond these steps to update FISA, the other major component of the bill passed by the Intelligence Committee--and, unfortunately, not included in the Judiciary Committee amendment--is liability relief for companies that may have helped the Government collect critical intelligence after the September 11 terrorist attacks.
I understand this is controversial. But everybody should know that this is an issue the Intelligence Committee has considered very carefully. We had a number of hearings on this subject. In reviewing the record of correspondence from the administration to these companies, I and most members of the committee became convinced that companies acted in good faith. They relied on the legal conclusion of the Nation's most senior law enforcement official, and they provided assistance because they wanted to help stop terrorist attacks.
The companies received letters, and I tried very hard to convince Steve Hadley--Director McConnell very much approved of this--to make it possible for every Member of the Senate to have those letters that the companies received from the National Security Agency, so Members could understand that this was not some kind of a game, that this wasn't ``wordsmithing.'' What these letters stated was that the companies' assistance was ``required,'' that the requested assistance was based on an order of the President, and that the Attorney General had certified the legality of the order. And then the NSA Director, as I say, required, compelled these companies--there were various uses of words, but they were all very firm, leaving no wiggle room--to comply. And they did. They did it because they were told to do so by the highest authorities in the land. They did so because--I believe it is possible to say this--there are a lot of big corporations that are very patriotic.
Private companies should be allowed to rely on this assertion from these high officials. They should be allowed to do that. Our longstanding legal structure is specifically designed not to force a private company to second guess the Government in these circumstances. I know many colleagues on the other side believe that the President acted with his constitutional authority when he established this program. I believe the legal foundation for this program was questionable at best and was part of an overarching legal framework that sought to dramatically alter the balance of power between the branches of power in favor of the executive. But that is a dispute that needs to be settled between the President, the Congress, and the courts. We should not allow private companies who simply wanted to come to the aid of their country, or were required or compelled to do so, to be caught in the crossfire of this disagreement.
A bipartisan consensus of the Intelligence Committee supported the narrowly drawn liability relief included in the bill. We did not include the open-ended immunity sought by the administration that would have prevented suits against the Government, or Government officials who knowingly broke the law.
The committee's liability relief provision applies only to companies who may have participated in the warrantless surveillance program after September 11, 2001, until January 2007, when the whole matter was placed under FISA Court authority. That is why there can be no question about prospective; it is retrospective.
The question of whether the President had the authority to launch the warrantless surveillance program leads me to the issue of exclusivity. This is whether FISA is the exclusive means by which the President may authorize the surveillance of Americans for foreign intelligence purposes.
The President's justification for creating the warrantless surveillance program relied in part on a claim that the legislation authorizing the use of military force after 9/11 somehow gave him the authority to ignore the FISA statute. I don't buy this argument.
The President also claims he has the authority, as Commander in Chief, to approve surveillance even when statutes of this coequal branch of Government would prohibit him specifically from so doing. No act of Congress by itself can finally resolve the debate between Presidential and congressional authority.
We can make it clear, however, which statutes authorize the use of electronic surveillance. This is not academic. It is important to clarify this point for the future. When the Nation next faces a military emergency, we don't want Congress to hesitate while it debates whether its authorization to use force will have unintended consequences, such as authorizing the President to spy on Americans.
To avoid this situation, both the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees included provisions intended to clarify which statutes constitute the exclusive means for conducting electronic surveillance. I have worked with Senator Feinstein, who serves on both committees, and Senator Leahy on an amendment that will bridge the differences between the two bills and will settle this issue in a way that I think clarifies the statute.
Another important provision is the sunset. This bill provides a significant new authority, and it is essential--because it is a significant new authority in what is still emerging in the collection of intelligence--that we carefully monitor the implementation of this authority and revisit it to ensure it is working as we now envision.
The Intelligence Committee bill includes a 6-year sunset. The Judiciary Committee has a 4-year sunset. I will join with Senator Cardin and others in support of an amendment to incorporate the Judiciary Committee 4-year sunset into the underlying bill. Four years will ensure that the decision on permanency is made during the next Presidential term.
As we proceed with this debate, every Member should have the same two goals we had in the Intelligence Committee: providing our intelligence professionals with the tools they need to keep us safe, and establishing a system with sufficient safeguards to ensure that Americans' civil liberties are protected over the long term. I think the Intelligence Committee bill does that, and with a few changes it will be even stronger.
I yield the floor.
Would the distinguished vice chairman be willing to yield for a parliamentary matter?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time until 2 p.m. today be for debate prior to the vote in relation to the Judiciary Committee amendment, as modified, with no amendment in order to the amendment prior to the vote, with all time equally divided and controlled between Senators Leahy and Bond or their designees, with the 30 minutes prior to the vote divided as provided above, with Senator Leahy controlling the final 15 minutes and the vote will be at 2.
Mr. President, I wish to take a few minutes to describe to the Senate my views on the amendment reported by the Judiciary Committee, and why I will be opposing the amendment when we vote at 2.
First, I wish to repeat a few comments I made in my opening remarks when we debated the motion to proceed to S. 2248 in December.
From the beginning of the Senate's consideration of foreign intelligence surveillance legislation in 1976, the resulting law--the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978--has been the joint responsibility of both the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. FISA is, after all, a law that concerns both intelligence collection and judicial proceedings.
The bill now before the Senate, S. 2248, was reported to the Senate by the Intelligence Committee last October, and then sequentially reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee in November.
As a parliamentary matter, the measure as reported by the Judiciary Committee is the pending amendment to the bill reported by the Intelligence Committee.
I agree with a number of the recommendations of the Judiciary Committee. I have been pleased to work with members of the Judiciary Committee on modifications that address particular concerns that had been raised by the administration.
I will accordingly support individual amendments to add those recommendations, as modified when necessary, to S. 2248. These include a strengthened exclusivity provision, a 4-year sunset, court review of compliance with minimization procedures, and an inspectors general report on the President's warrantless surveillance program in order to ensure there is a comprehensive historical record of that experience.
While I support many aspects of the Judiciary amendment, I cannot agree with recommendations of the Judiciary Committee that may have an adverse impact on U.S. intelligence collection or collection analysis, and that are not warranted by a realistic concern about U.S. privacy interests.
If any of those provisions are offered as individual amendments, I will, of course, study them, but must reserve the right to oppose them.
I will illustrate my concern by describing two provisions of the Judiciary amendment.
The Judiciary Committee substitute contains a ``significant purpose'' requirement. This has been described as a way to prevent reverse targeting--that is, conducting surveillance of a person overseas when the real target of the surveillance is a person within the United States.
The Intelligence Committee bill already explicitly codifies the existing prohibition on reverse targeting. What the Judiciary Committee substitute actually does is turn the reverse targeting prohibition on its head. I fear it would impose a new affirmative requirement that the government must seek a FISA Court order when in the course of targeting a foreign person outside the United States the government incidentally collects the communications of U.S. persons.
This is unworkable and would create untenable gaps in our intelligence coverage without significantly enhancing the privacy of Americans. Incidental communications with or about Americans should be handled properly, through minimization--a process that
is strengthened in our bill. But the fact that there may also be a foreign intelligence interest when a foreign target is in contact with the United States should not be the cause of making it more difficult to undertake the surveillance of the foreign target.
The Judiciary Amendment also includes a provision altering the consequences of a FISA Court determination that there is a deficiency in the Government's targeting or minimization procedures under the new foreign targeting authority that will be enacted in S. 2248. Upon such a court determination, the Intelligence Committee bill would require the Government to either correct the deficiency or cease new acquisition.
The Judiciary Committee provision goes beyond the requirement that deficiencies be corrected or new acquisitions ceased. It would take the further step of preventing all use of information already acquired under the new procedure that concerns U.S. persons, unless the Attorney General determines that the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm.
The provision is impractical. And it creates risks that we will lose valuable intelligence.
The Judiciary Committee provision would require intelligence analysts to go through all of the intelligence that had been collected under the new process--presumably a very large collection of materials--to identify information that might be subject to the restriction and make sure that it had been not used in disseminated intelligence.
Even for minor deficiencies in procedures, this provision would therefore require the Intelligence Community to discard information that might constitute significant intelligence, and to focus its analytical resources on satisfying this provision rather than collecting and analyzing new intelligence. In my view, this allocation of resources makes no sense.
At the end of our debate this morning, the Senate will be asked to vote on the pending Judiciary Committee amendment as a whole, either by way of a tabling motion or directly on the amendment.
Although, as I have indicated, there are parts of the Judiciary amendment that I look forward to supporting, there are two reasons, with all respect to the members of the Judiciary Committee, why I cannot support the pending substitute amendment as a whole.
The first is that the form, and consequently the effect of the amendment, goes beyond what the members of the Judiciary Committee decided during their deliberations, and guts key parts of S. 2248 beyond any reasons agreed to by a majority of the Judiciary Committee.
S. 2248 has two substantive titles, in addition to a third title on transition procedures.
The first title addresses intelligence collection; it is the direct replacement of the Protect America Act.
The second title addresses the many lawsuits against telephone and internet companies for their alleged cooperation with the Government.
At its markup, the Judiciary Committee rejected, by a clear 7-to-12 vote, an amendment to strike title II on liability protection. Previously, the Intelligence Committee had voted against striking title II by a 3-to-12 vote. In short, while there may be good ideas, that certainly merit debate, about improving title II, there has not been majority support in the Senate for striking it.
Yet, notwithstanding the lack of support in either the Judiciary or Intelligence Committee for striking title II, the form in which the Judiciary Committee reported its amendment would do just that.
We will welcome a debate about improving title II, but on behalf of the Intelligence Committee--which voted overwhelmingly for title II--I must defend keeping title II in the base text before the Senate. For that reason alone, I must oppose the Judiciary amendment, even as I support individual elements of it.
Second, as I have previously mentioned, even with respect to title I, there are portions of the Judiciary amendment that I must oppose on the ground that they will have an adverse impact on intelligence collection or the use of intelligence that is not warranted by a realistic concern about U.S. privacy interests.
Accordingly, with great respect for my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, I will vote against the Judiciary amendment. I also look forward to joining them in urging the adoption of specific amendments to improve the Intelligence Committee bill.
Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself and Senator Bond and ask for its immediate consideration.
I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. President, the distinguished vice chairman, Senator Bond, and I have joined in a bipartisan amendment to S. 2248, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. The Rockefeller-Bond amendment perfects various details of the underlying bill but its main purpose is to provide explicit statutory protection, for the first time in the 30 years of FISA, for Americans who are outside the United States.
The amendment stands for the simple proposition that Americans, whether they are working, studying, traveling or serving in our Armed Forces outside the United States, do not lose their rights as Americans when it comes to the actions of their own Government. In 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified, including, of course, the fourth amendment, which protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure, there were 4 million Americans. That was it. Now that very number of Americans, 4 million, lives outside the United States and, of course, many millions more travel each year outside the United States.
Because this amendment is so important and because it has gone through so much development to reach the point at which we have now arrived, I would like to take, frankly, a few minutes to describe its origin and evolution, with the forbearance of my colleagues.
The protection of Americans outside the United States may have been the single most important piece of business left undone by the original FISA statute created in 1978. To fill that void, President Reagan issued an executive order, Executive Order 12333, that addresses the use of intelligence techniques such as electronic surveillance or unconsented searches against Americans abroad.
Executive Order 12333 requires that intelligence agencies have procedures and that those procedures protect the constitutional rights of Americans overseas. It also requires the Attorney General to determine that there is probable cause to conclude that the American overseas is an agent of a foreign power before the U.S. Government undertakes electronic surveillance or conducts searches abroad against that person. That was good but insufficient. In our country of laws, we do not usually leave it, outside of an emergency, to any Attorney General to decide alone whether there is probable cause for a search. That is a decision which we entrust to neutral judges.
Our bipartisan amendment--Senator Bond's and mine--makes sure Americans do not lose that important protection by setting foot outside the United States.
Vice Chairman Bond and I took the first step when we included, in our October Intelligence Committee mark, a provision concerning acquisition by the intelligence community of the communications of U.S. persons abroad.
We focused our proposal on the circumstance when the Government is seeking those communications from electronic communication providers within the United States. We did not address the targeting of U.S. persons overseas by intelligence community collection methods that are employed outside the United States.
The provision before the Intelligence Committee in its October markup would have allowed the Attorney General to determine that a U.S. person outside the United States was a foreign power, agent of a foreign power, or an officer or employee of a foreign power, and then target that person for collection. Under our proposal, the Attorney General would then have been required to submit that probable cause determination to the FISA Court for review.
But as the chairmen and ranking members of committees sometimes learn from their full membership of
their committees, important ideas may require broad solutions.
During our committee markup, Senator Wyden offered an amendment on targeting U.S. persons abroad that substituted two new sections in place of the language described above on targeting U.S. persons abroad.
First, the Wyden amendment required the Government to obtain a standard FISA order for electronic surveillance--known as a title I order--before the Government could target U.S. persons outside the United States by seeking their communications from providers in the United States.
Thus, rather than the new procedure described in our chairman and vice chairman mark, the amendment required a title I FISA application and order whenever the collection against an American abroad occurred with the assistance of a provider in the United States.
Second, the Wyden amendment required that the Government, when acting outside the United States, obtain a FISA Court order before targeting the communications of U.S. persons located outside the United States.
Specifically, it required a FISA Court order that there was probable cause to believe that the U.S. person who was the target of surveillance was, in fact, a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power before the Government employed surveillance techniques outside the United States. This second part of the Wyden amendment implemented an entirely new concept of law.
A court order has never before been required for foreign intelligence collection that is conducted entirely outside the United States, even if that collection involves U.S. persons. But while new, it quickly became evident it was an idea whose time had come. The Wyden amendment passed the committee with a vote of 9 to 6.
Yet, as often is the case for an initial amendment of such magnitude, it was also immediately clear that further work needed to be done before the proposal became law to make sure it worked well in practice.
During the markup, Senator Whitehouse, who is a member of the Judiciary Committee--and in his first year in this body has already emerged as a leading legal voice among us--stated he would be willing to work on the language of the amendment in the Judiciary Committee, on which he also serves, during the sequential referral process to ensure that it achieved its desired goal and did not result in unintended decreases in collection.
Senator Whitehouse, working with the Department of Justice, was largely responsible for the changes made to the provision on U.S. persons outside the United States that is included in the Judiciary Committee substitute amendment. It is a good amendment.
He focused his efforts to changes on the second part of the section, the portion relating to collection of electronic communications outside the United States. The provision requiring a traditional FISA electronic surveillance application for collection inside the United States remained mostly unchanged in the Judiciary Committee markup.
The Judiciary Committee amendment makes some necessary technical fixes to the section on collection outside the United States. It stressed that the FISA Court would only be permitted to assess the question of probable cause for collection outside the United States, not the methods of acquisition of the information, as any such inquiry might delve into very sensitive intelligence matters.
The Judiciary Committee section on collection outside the United States also made three other important changes:
First, the addition of emergency procedures, similar to those included in other parts of FISA, that would allow the Attorney General to acquire the information as long as a subsequent order is obtained; second, a more explicit, individualized review of minimization procedures; and, third, the addition of procedures to transition current acquisitions under Executive Order 12333 over to the new procedure.
The managers' amendment, offered by Senator Bond and myself, now seeks to complete this process by fully integrating the new procedure into the overall reforms contained in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and does so in a manner that maintains an effective system of intelligence collection.
In the course of doing that, we have sought to resolve, in conjunction with the Department of Justice and the intelligence community, several problems identified with the Judiciary Committee substitute.
The most significant changes in the managers' amendment have been made to the first part of the Wyden amendment: the requirement that the Government obtain standard electronic surveillance--title I--orders for the targeting of U.S. persons abroad that occurs within the United States.
That provision, as of this moment, remains a part of our base bill and will remain so until an amendment is adopted. As I will discuss in more detail, our proposed changes are required because the language of this provision, as reported out of both the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, would prevent certain types of important foreign intelligence collection.
First, the definition ``agent of a foreign power'' in FISA, which requires a U.S. person to have engaged in certain types of wrongdoing, is different than the definition of ``agent of a foreign power'' that has traditionally been used in overseas collection against Americans.
The Director of National Intelligence has therefore proposed, and we agree, that collection against a U.S. person abroad should be expanded beyond ``agent of a foreign power'' to ``an officer or employee of a foreign power,'' to cover the types of collection that have traditionally been allowed against U.S. persons overseas.
For example, the notorious Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia, who is now charged with crimes against humanity, is an American who was an officer of a foreign power.
Second, the Judiciary Committee provision did not deal with the issue of stored electronic communications or stored electronic data, the collection of which is dealt with under title III rather than title I of FISA and which are an important part of the acquisition system that is established by the new title VII that S. 2248 will add to FISA.
To address this issue, the managers' amendment that Senator Bond and I are proposing, after extensive technical consultations with the intelligence community and the Department of Justice, adds two sections to the new title VII in our committee's bill, and, in so doing, addresses the intelligence collection concerns identified by the Director of National Intelligence.
By placing all the relevant detail for collection against U.S. persons overseas in the same new title of FISA--title VII--that includes all other procedures for persons outside the United States, the managers' amendment provides a comprehensive, consolidated roadmap for all those in the intelligence community, the Department of Justice, and the FISA Court who will have the responsibility to implement our amendment.
In conclusion, I would like to underscore some major points.
As is evident from everything I have described, it is important to thank two members of our committee for their work on this issue of targeting Americans overseas.
Senator Wyden, obviously, is one of those. I wish to recognize his leadership at all times in this area. He recognized the importance of the issue and successfully offered an amendment at the Intelligence Committee mark-up that broadened the protections contained in our bill.
Senator Whitehouse has been indispensable contributor to the effort on this provision as well, quietly working out problems and making things work better. His work goes a long way toward ensuring that the provision can be successfully implemented by the intelligence community, which is key.
By adopting this amendment on a bipartisan basis, the Intelligence Committee--and now the vice chairman and myself in our managers' amendment--seek to ensure that Americans are protected from unwarranted surveillance, whether they are inside or outside the United States.
This is a significant new protection for U.S. persons. When the United States conducts foreign intelligence collection overseas on a U.S. person located outside the United States, currently only the Attorney General, not a court, makes a probable cause determination. I have said that. U.S. citizens have never before been entitled by
statute to court protection in this area. Now, hopefully, they will be.
Our bipartisan goal is clear: A court must be involved when U.S. persons are targeted for surveillance, no matter where those persons are located or how they are targeted.
We are also in agreement that our original committee provision and the work of the Judiciary Committee needed refinement to ensure it did not have unintended consequences that might limit the collection of foreign intelligence information. The purpose of our amendment is to make sure we do not reduce the scope of any current intelligence collection.
Our managers' amendment accomplishes this goal. Under the managers' amendment, if a U.S. person is targeted overseas by using a communications provider within the United States, FISA will now require that the Government submit an application to the FISA Court and obtain a FISA Court order. Although the process to obtain the order is tailored to address some of the operational concerns relevant to the issue of collection on U.S. persons located outside the United States, and consolidated in a new title of FISA, the procedures are as robust and protective of the privacy rights of U.S. persons as existing FISA procedures.
If the acquisition occurs outside the United States, FISA will now require that the FISA Court issue an order finding that there is probable cause to believe the U.S. person who is the target of the acquisition is an agent, officer or employee of a foreign power, without involving the FISA Court in the methods of overseas collection.
Those methods of overseas collection will continue to be governed by applicable executive branch directives, such as Executive Order 12333, which impose limits on intelligence agencies in order to protect the constitutional rights and other legal rights of Americans.
Mr. President, I urge the adoption of this amendment.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.