Floor Statements

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I do want to rise in support of the Kyl amendment No. 4892 and echo the sentiments expressed by my colleague from Tennessee about the good work of the Senator from Arizona. He has been a tireless advocate for modernization. It is something that needed to happen, irrespective of whether there was a treaty, but it certainly became a condition in order to have a treaty. If you are talking about reducing the number of your nuclear weapons, you certainly want to improve the quality of the ones you have.

Unlike other nuclear powers, the United States has not had an active modernization program for our nuclear deterrent.

We have heard from people who recognize the importance of modernizing our nuclear deterrent. I will not reiterate all of those, but I wish to point out, Secretary Gates said recently--he couldn't be any more clear that nuclear modernization is a prerequisite to nuclear reductions when he said:

To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a

credible deterrent and reduce the numbers of weapons in our

stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile

or pursuing a modernization program.

Similarly, Thomas D'Agostino, the head of the National Security Administration or NNSA said nuclear modernization is a prerequisite to nuclear reductions, stating: `` . . . as our stockpile gets smaller, it becomes increasingly important that our remaining forces are safe, secure and effective.''

In the same speech I just quoted from by Secretary Gates, he pointed out: ``Currently, the United States is the only declared nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead.''

It is difficult to overstate the dire condition of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Its physical infrastructure is crumbling and its intellectual edifice is aging. The Strategic Posture Commission, chaired by William Perry and James Schlesinger, found that certain facilities of the nuclear weapons complex are ``genuinely decrepit'' and the complex's ``intellectual infrastructure . . . is in serious trouble.''

I met with experts throughout the Senate's consideration of New START, and they confirm for me the accuracy of these descriptions. I might say to the Presiding Officer, whose State is home to Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories, we were able to visit those along with Senator Kyl, the Senator from Tennessee and others, and had an opportunity to observe some of the facilities and buildings which are referenced in this amendment. It is absolutely clear, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that we have to make the necessary upgrades and improvements if we intend to keep our nuclear arsenal modern and prepared to deal with the threats we might face in the future.

The idea that the modernization of the U.S. nuclear complex and delivery force is an absolute prerequisite for nuclear reductions envisioned in New START has been clear to the Obama administration throughout the New START process. In fact, in December of 2009, 41 Senators wrote to the President and said in that letter:

Funding for such a modernization program beginning in

earnest in your 2011 budget is needed as the United States

considers the further nuclear weapons reductions proposed in

the START follow-on negotiations.

Just to be clear, what is modernization? This includes improvements to the physical elements of the nuclear weapons complex. It involves the warheads and delivery vehicles themselves as well as facility infrastructure. Modernization also requires maintenance of the intellectual capacity and capabilities underlying that complex; namely, the designer and technical workforce.

The amendment, as proposed by Senator Kyl, makes clear in the resolution of ratification how critical modernization is to the United States while it is reducing its nuclear arsenal. First, the amendment places a condition in the resolution of ratification requiring the President to submit an annual update to the section 1251 report. The 1251 report is something annually that comes up here that gives us an update on the nuclear weapons arsenal. Now we will have, thanks to the amendment adopted earlier, a certification with regard to the necessary investment in delivery vehicle modernization, which is an issue I addressed in an amendment earlier in this debate and a critically important one. The Senator has already addressed that in a previous amendment that was accepted by the proponents of the treaty. That was an important step forward.

This particular amendment deals with the facilities and is also critically important. What it will do is require, in the 1251 report, that the President, when he submits his 10-year plan with budget estimates for modernization of the U.S. nuclear complex, that he also presents an accelerated design and engineering plan for the nuclear facilities and a commitment to funding those.

So this amendment, such as the one that would call for modernization of the delivery vehicles, is a critical part of the nuclear complex we have, of making sure it is reliable, that it works, and that it is ready and prepared for whatever challenge may face us in the future. As I said earlier, there are many of the experts, and you talk to the Lab Directors themselves, who recognize the importance of making the investments that need to be made in this if we are going to keep that nuclear arsenal ready.

I wish to read one other quote again. Deputy Administrator D'Agostino said:

Our plans for investment in and modernization of the modern

security enterprise are essential, irrespective of whether or

not the START treaty is ratified.

I suspect before all is said and done, the START treaty will be ratified. But in any event, this process needed to be undertaken irrespective of whether there is a treaty because it is that important to the future of our country and our national security.

Again, if I might point out, very briefly, what this amendment does, the resolution of ratification must clearly call for a condition that the President will provide an annual update to the section 1251 report in that as a condition the President will certify prior to entry into force of the treaty that he intends to accelerate the design and engineering phase of the chemical facility and the uranium processing facility, request full funding for both of those facilities upon completion of the design and engineering phase of the plan, and an understanding that failure to fund the modernization plan would

constitute a basis for withdrawal from the START treaty.

This is, again, a fairly straightforward amendment. The Senator from Arizona has done, as has already been noted, a superb job of putting on the radar screen of all Members of the Senate the essential and critical nature of getting this issue of modernization addressed. He deserves great credit for doing that. I appreciate the work of the Senator from Massachusetts in cooperating with him in this treaty process to have these amendments and this language accepted because it is essential.

I think it will make not only this treaty stronger, but it will also make the nuclear complex that much stronger. And that, of course, is absolutely essential when it comes to America's national security interests.

So I support the amendment of the Senator from Arizona. I hope it will be accepted and adopted in the resolution of ratification, and that before this treaty is adopted this essential issue will be not only addressed, as it is in the underlying treaty, but addressed--that language even strengthened and made more durable by these amendments.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Casey.) The Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amended No. 4920 be made pending.

Mr. President, if I might, given that, speak to the amendment. I regret that the amendment can't be voted on. The process has been fairly open. A number of amendments have been considered. This amendment was filed sometime this afternoon. It deals with an important subject, which is germane to the debate that we are having with regard to the New START treaty.

One of the predicates for improving the START treaty is the so-called reset of our relationship with Russia. Of course, the President, as recently as November 18, 2010, made a statement, which is in this amendment:

``The New START Treaty is also a cornerstone of our

relations with Russia'' for the reason that ``Russia has been

fundamental to our efforts to put strong sanctions in place

to put pressure on Iran to deal with its nuclear program.''

Accordingly, the advice and consent of the Senate to

ratification of the New START Treaty is conditioned on the

expectation that the Russian Federation will cooperate fully

with United States and international efforts to prevent the

Government of Iran from developing a nuclear weapons

capability.

What this amendment does is to provide some assurance that all those intentions and statements actually come to pass. It would require the President to certify to the Senate the following:

Prior to entry into force of the New START Treaty, 1, the

President shall certify to the Senate that (i) the Russian

Federation is in full compliance with all United Nations

Security Council Resolutions relating to Iran; (ii) the

Government of the Russian Federation has assured the United

States that neither it nor any entity subject to its

jurisdiction and control will (I) transfer to Iran the S-300

air defense system or other advanced weapons systems or any

parts thereof; or (II) transfer such items to a third party

which will in turn transfer such items to Iran; (iii) the

Government of the Russian Federation has assured the United

States that neither it nor any entity subject to its

jurisdiction and control will transfer to Iran goods,

services, or technology that contribute to the advancement of

the nuclear or missile programs of the Government of Iran;

and (iv) the Government of the Russian Federation has assured

the United States that it will support efforts at the United

Nations Security Council and elsewhere to increase political

and economic pressure on the Government of Iran to abandon

its nuclear weapons program.

That would be a commitment, a certification, that would be issued prior to the entry in force of the treaty by the President each year, and on December 31 of each subsequent year a similar certification would be issued by the President. In fact, if the President fails to certify, then it would require that he consult with the Senate and submit a report on whether adherence to the New START treaty remains in the U.S. national security interest.

I say this because I think there is a direct connection and correlation between this treaty and the efforts of the Russians that we assume the Russians are going to commit to in terms of putting pressure on Iran regarding its nuclear program and not doing things that would put in jeopardy the security of the region.

I have to say, obviously, this has a big impact on our great ally, Israel, as well as the whole region. It would be very destabilizing if the Iranians have a nuclear weapon. So I think the effort made by the administration to ``reset relations with Russia,'' bears directly on this treaty. As I said, it was stated clearly by the President as recently as November 18, where he recognized that important relationship. I simply say this amendment, I don't think, is anything that anybody would not agree with. All it does is require not just a statement that this is going to be part of our ongoing relationship with Russia, but it provides an assurance, a certification that the administration would make to the Senate before the treaty would enter into force and each year subsequent to that with those basic issues.

The issues are fairly straightforward. It simply requires a condition that the Russian Federation is in full compliance with all U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to Iran and the government of the Russian Federation assures the United States that neither it nor any entity subject to its jurisdiction and control will transfer to Iran the S-300 air defense system or other advanced weapons systems or any parts thereof or transfer such items to a third party, which will in turn transfer such items to Iran.

While the S-300--for the time being, Russia has refrained from doing that. There are concerns and reports that Russia has recently provided Tehran with a new radar system allegedly through third party mediators from Venezuela and Belarus. So the concern about that coming into Iran through some third party is also something that I think is of great concern to America's national security interests as well as those of our allies.

Mr. President, the amendment, again, is very straightforward. It requires a certification before the entry into force of the treaty, and then each year thereafter about those basic conditions that the Russians be in compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, that they would not try to get the S-300 to the Iranians, directly or indirectly, and they would continue putting pressure on the Iranians with respect to their nuclear program.

We know too that the nuclear reactor in Bashir is now producing plutonium. Russia has fueled a nuclear reactor there that is now producing plutonium in Iran. That ought to be of great concern to everybody here as we pass judgment on this treaty, which is obviously important to our relationship with Russia, but also bears on the relationship we have with other countries around the world.

I think anybody in the foreign policy community that you talk to today, when you ask what is the most dangerous threats the United States and its allies face around the world today, Iran and nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran top that list.

So the efforts that we make to persuade the Russians to put pressure on the Iranians and make sure there isn't anything going on there that would destabilize or put in peril America's national security interest is certainly an objective we have.

This would require the President certify that those things are taking place rather than relying on the statements and good intentions of the Russians. I wish, again, that I could get this amendment pending and get it voted on. I think it is important to have the Senate on record with regard to this issue. I regret that the amendment has been objected to.

I appreciate the opportunity to at least raise the issue, and I certainly hope it is something that the administration and our leaders in the Senate and the entire military establishment of this country pays close attention to in the days ahead. This issue will not go away. I think it bears definitely on the treaty.

With that, I will conclude my remarks and say I wish we had an opportunity to get a vote on it.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I say to my friend from Massachusetts that if he would allow me to vote on the amendment, I would try to break that 35-vote threshold that we have seen, to blow through that cap.

I appreciate the fact that the Senator shares the concerns I have about Iran. All I would say is I think what this provides is an additional safeguard as we move into this process and we have this treaty and a clearly established connection between what is a great threat, a regional threat and, I would argue, a threat beyond the region, certainly to our national security as well, the Iranian threat, and the relationship we have with Russia and this treaty and the good- faith effort that we are making through this treaty with the Russians to reset, that this would provide an additional level of assurance that they are, in fact, cooperating and that they are following through on the commitments they are making to the administration and to us as we debate this treaty.

Again, I will not belabor the point. The point has been made. I do think this is a germane amendment. I take issue with the chairman's contention that it is not. But at this particular late hour and with his objection to this, I know I am probably not going to have an opportunity to have this amendment voted on, but I hope the issue continues to stay front and center, in front of this body and before the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee on which I serve.

Mr. President, I wish to speak to an amendment I have pending at the desk, but before I do that, I wish to make some general observations as well about where we are with regard to this process because there has been a lot said about Republicans not wanting to vote on this or trying to delay this. But I think one would have to admit that we have now talked about missile defense, which I think is a very valid issue with respect to this treaty. There are very significant areas of disagreement with regard to how it treats missile defense. We have had a discussion about tactical weapons, which, in my judgment, also is a very important issue relative to our national security interests and the interests of our allies around the world. We have had a debate about verification, about which the amendment of Senator Inhofe is currently pending. Those are all very valid and substantive issues to debate and discuss with regard to this treaty.

The amendment I will offer will deal with the issue of delivery vehicles, which is something that is important as well where this treaty is concerned.

So I would simply say that it is consistent with our role in the U.S. Senate to provide advice and consent. If it were just consent, if that is what the Founders intended, we could rubberstamp this. But we have a role in this process, and that role is to look at these issues in great detail and make sure the national security interests of the United States are well served by a treaty of this importance.

So I think the words of the treaty matter, and I think the words of the preamble matter. I am not going to relitigate the debate we have already had on missile defense, but I believe that if we have language in a preamble to a document such as this, not unlike the preamble we have in our Constitution which is frequently quoted, it has meaning. To suggest that the preamble doesn't mean anything, that it is a throwaway and has throwaway language, to me really misses the point. Obviously, it matters to someone. It matters greatly to the Russians, and I don't think, if it didn't, it would be in there. That is why I believe that having this linkage between offensive strategic arms and defensive strategic arms in the preamble--it is in there for a reason. Somebody wanted it in there, obviously, and I think it certainly has weight and consequence beyond what has been suggested here on the floor of the Senate.

I would also argue as well that the signing statement we have already talked about where the Russians made it very clear in the signing statement, in Prague on April 8 of 2010, that the treaty can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities qualitatively or quantitatively--if you tie that back to article XIV of the withdrawal clause of the treaty where it talks about being able to withdraw for exceptional circumstances, you can certainly see the pretext by which the Russians may decide to withdraw from this treaty.

So missile defense is not an inconsequential issue. It is a very important issue with regard to this treaty, and the amendment that was offered on Saturday and voted on attempted to address that. Unfortunately, that failed. I hope we have subsequent opportunities to get at the issue of missile defense because I certainly think it is an unresolved issue in my view and in the view of many of us.

For those watching this debate who may be unfamiliar with some of the terminology used in these arms control treaties such as the term ``delivery vehicles,'' it is important to understand that delivery vehicles simply means the nuclear triad of systems: bombers, submarines, and land based intercontinental ballistic missiles or ICBMs. This triad of delivery vehicles is very valuable because it is resilient, survivable, and flexible, meaning that if, God forbid, we suffer a nuclear attack, those who attacked us can never be sure that they have knocked out our ability to respond with a nuclear strike. Obviously, without the means to deliver nuclear weapons, an adversary would not take seriously our ability to respond to a nuclear attack. As the numbers of delivery vehicles goes

down, it becomes more and more important to make sure they are modernized and that they work as intended. And as numbers get reduced, it begins to have an impact on whether we can effectively retain the triad, making it more likely that our nation would have to eliminate a leg of the triad.

On July 9, 2009, at an Armed Services Committee hearing, I asked GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, about the administration's commitment at that time to reduce our strategic delivery vehicles to somewhere in the range of 500 to 1,100 systems, and to specify at what point in this range would he become concerned that delivery vehicle reductions would necessitate making our nuclear triad into a dyad. General Cartwright responded that he ``would be very concerned if we got down below those levels about mid point,'' meaning that he would be concerned if the negotiated number fell below 800 delivery vehicles. This treaty caps delivery vehicles at 700, substantially below the number that General Cartwright stated a year and a half ago.

Now, the treaty makes this odd distinction between ``deployed'' and ``non-deployed'' delivery vehicles, and the treaty's proponents will point out that the total cap for the treaty is 800 ``deployed and non- deployed'' systems. And of course, there is a letter from General Cartwright in the committee report accompanying the treaty stating that he is comfortable with the distinction between deployed and non- deployed delivery vehicles, and the overall limits to delivery vehicles. But it is important to understand that the administration has not articulated how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the number of 700. Instead, the administration has presented a plan for how it will deploy 720 delivery vehicles. And that is the motivation behind this amendment. I find it very troubling that the administration has yet to articulate how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the number of 700. The comprehensive plan for delivery vehicle force structure the administration was required to present to Congress under section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 Defense authorization bill, known as the 1251 report, provides a very troubling lack of specificity concerning force structure under the New START treaty. Specifically, the administration's fact sheet on the section 1251 report explains that the U.S. nuclear force structure under this treaty could comprise up to 60 bombers, up to 420 ICBMs, and 240 SLBMs. The only number that is a certainty in the 1251 report is the number of SLBMs. I hope the members from states with bomber bases and ICBM bases will pay attention to this important point. Since deployments at the maximum level of all three legs of the triad under the explanation provided by the administration's 1251 report add up to 720 delivery vehicles, it is mathematically impossible for the U.S. to make such a deployment and be in compliance with the treaty's limit of 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Clearly, additional reduction decisions will be made with respect to U.S. force structure under this treaty, and obviously those reductions will come out of bombers and/or ICBMs.

Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen acknowledged in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2010, that further reductions would still be required to meet the treaty's central limits. They went on to argue that because the United States will have 7 years to reduce its forces to these limits, they did not find it necessary to identify a final force structure at this point; meaning the Senate will commit the United States to a delivery vehicle force of 700 without knowing how that force will be composed.

Compounding this problem of not knowing what the final force structure will look like is the fact that the Obama administration conceded to Russian demands to place limits on conventional prompt global strike systems by counting conventionally armed strategic ballistic missiles against the 700 allowed for delivery vehicles. For those who are unfamiliar with prompt global strike, it is simply a program that would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. Development of these systems is an important niche capability that would allow us to attack high-value targets or fleeting targets, such as WMD, terrorist, and missile threats. A recent Defense Science Board report states that ``the most mature option for prompt, long-range, conventional strike is the ballistic missile'' and that ``Building on the legacy of these [intercontinental ballistic missile] weapon systems provides a relatively low-risk path to a conventional weapon system with global reach.'' Yet this treaty will not permit us to develop this low-risk concept for conventional prompt global strike without it having an impact on the central limits under this treaty of 700 delivery vehicles.

To be very blunt, this treaty was so poorly negotiated that for every ICBM or SLBM deployed with a conventional warhead, one less nuclear delivery vehicle will be available to the United States. This one-for-one reduction in deployed nuclear forces is one we can ill afford at the levels of delivery vehicles allowed under this treaty. When the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Chilton, testified before the Armed Services Committee on April 22, 2010, he specifically said that we could not replace the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons with a conventional capability on a one-for-one basis or ``even ten-for-one.''

Treaty proponents will point out that there are other potential new conventional prompt global strike systems on the drawing board that may not fall under the treaty's limitations, such as a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle. But why are we tying the hands of future administrations that may need to quickly field such systems, especially since converting ICBMs to carry a conventional warhead are the most advanced systems we have right now on conventional prompt global strike?

The Senate should not ratify the treaty without knowing what kind of conventional prompt global strike systems may be counted and how that will affect our triad at the much reduced delivery vehicle limits. According to the DOD, an assessment on treaty implications for conventional prompt global strike proposals will not be ready until early 2011. If we pass this treaty now, Senators won't know the details on this important issue until the treaty enters into force, when it is too late. Adopting my amendment would provide a hedge against the issues that are raised by the conventional prompt global strike niche capability and its impact on the treaty's limit of 700 delivery vehicles. With a 700 delivery vehicle limit, conventional prompt global strike counting against that number, we will have fewer nuclear delivery vehicles, and this limit will be a disincentive to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike as a result. Moreover, why should we accept these constraints in a treaty that was about strategic nuclear weapons?

While we are required under the treaty to cut the number of delivery vehicles to the bone, Russia will not have to make any similar cut to their delivery vehicles, leaving one to wonder what we received in return for this significant concession. The treaty essentially requires the United States to make unilateral reductions in delivery vehicles, as Russia is already well below the delivery vehicle limits and would have drastically reduced its arsenal with or without this treaty. As CRS writes, ``[Russia] currently has only 620 launchers, and this number may decline to around 400 deployed and 444 total launchers. This would likely be true whether or not the treaty enters into force because Russia is eliminating older missiles as they age, and deploying newer missiles at a far slower pace than that needed to retain 700 deployed launchers.''

So I want to put a fine point on that, Mr. President. Essentially what we are doing here is we have about 856 delivery vehicles in our arsenal today. We are reducing that down to 700. So we are taking a significant haircut, a significant cut in the number of delivery vehicles that would be available to us. The Russians, on the other hand, are currently only at 620 launchers, delivery vehicles, which is already well below the 700. On the attrition path they are on, it would very soon be down to about 400 deployed launchers and 444 total launchers. So the United States has made huge concessions regarding delivery vehicles in this treaty, and the

Russians have conceded nothing on this point. It seems to me this is another area in which we made significant concessions and received very little in return.

Mr. President, we are binding ourselves to the number of delivery vehicles we negotiate with Russia, even though we have security commitments to extend our nuclear deterrent to more than 30 countries, while Russia has none. Given geographic realities, U.S. strategic nuclear forces are part of how the United States provides this extended deterrence. As we face an uncertain future, where other nations like China continue to modernize their nuclear forces, we will need to be able to hold more potential targets at risk to deter attacks. That means we need to be very careful about reducing delivery vehicle levels, and this amendment would simply use the administration's 1251 report force structure plan of 720 delivery vehicles as the ceiling for delivery vehicles under this treaty, rather than the current number of 700 reflected in the treaty.

Some of my colleagues will probably warn that even this modest amendment is a ``treaty killer'' amendment. But article II, section 2 of the Constitution says that the President ``shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties.'' When the other side admonishes us about ``treaty killer'' amendments, it becomes apparent that we are supposed to be a rubberstamp for this treaty, wanting us to provide our consent but not to provide our advice. It should be made clear what a ``treaty killer'' amendment is. It is any amendment seeking to remedy an issue with the treaty the Russians steamrolled us on during the negotiation process but which New START proponents do not wish to adopt because protecting American interests will annoy the Russians and perhaps jeopardize entry into force of the treaty.

One thing should be clear: The Senate cannot kill New START in the way some are suggesting. If the Senate gives its consent to New START with amendment to the text, that just means the treaty is sent to Russia for its approval with the amendment. The ball will then be in Russia's court. As CRS has outlined in its study on the role of the Senate in the treaty process: ``Amendments are proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty. . . . [They] amount, therefore, to Senate counter offers that alter the original deal agreed to by the United States and the other country.''

Simply put, an amendment to the treaty text would not kill the treaty, it would merely require Russian consent to the amendment as a matter of international negotiation. If Russia chooses to reject that amendment, it will not be the Senate that kills the treaty, it will be the Russian government.

As a side note, I believe it is important to recall that General Chilton's support for New START levels was predicated on no Russian cheating. He testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 22, 2010, that one of the assumptions made when the Nuclear Posture Review was completed was ``an assumption . . . that the Russians in the post negotiation time period would be compliant with the treaty.'' It has been pointed out many times now how Russia is a serial violator of arms control commitments.

In conclusion, reducing U.S. strategic nuclear forces, especially with delivery systems, is a very serious matter that has received insufficient attention. We have little to gain, and much to lose, if we cannot be certain that the numbers in New START are adequate. I think it is worth noting that former Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that ``as to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers specified are adequate though barely so.'' Again, this is a modest amendment that takes into account the administration's own force structure plan of 720 delivery vehicles. This amendment would simply use the administration's 1251 report force structure plan of 720 delivery vehicles as the ceiling for delivery vehicles under this treaty rather than the current number of 700 reflected in the treaty. In light of all of these issues, I ask my colleagues to carefully consider this amendment, and I respectfully ask for a vote in its favor.

Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. I simply say that with regard to maintaining a triad and a system of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, in order to do that, the 700-number ceiling makes that very complicated.

If you assume 420 ICBMs and 240 SLBMs, that leaves room for some bombers but not a lot of room. Frankly, if you go down from the 720 number to the 700 number, if you assume up to 260 bombers--that is, if you assume the 700 number and take it out of bombers, you would be down to 40 bombers, 96 B-52s and B-1s that are nuclear capable, nuclear weapons we use with nuclear-launch vehicles for extended deterrence around the globe. Going down to 40 would be a two-thirds reduction in the number of bombers we have to provide that type of extended deterrence. It strikes me that we are getting perilously close with this number to moving from a triad to a dyad.

Furthermore, we are tying our hands when it comes to our ability to have the necessary delivery vehicles at our disposal, if and when that time would ever come.

Again, this is a very straightforward amendment. It takes the number from 700 to 720. It is consistent with the 1251 report and what the administration says they can accommodate in terms of launch vehicles. I hope my colleagues will support it.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Massachusetts, we are prepared to debate. The Senator from Oklahoma wants to talk at length about the verification issue. I do not think we are prepared at this point to enter into a time agreement for any time certain on votes. Until we can get some indication from our colleagues who would like to speak on this amendment, it would be very difficult to do that.

Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Massachusetts, we do have others who want to speak, not only on this amendment but also on the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma. These, as I said, are very significant, substantive amendments that deal fundamentally with the issues that are important to this treaty. I do not think we are prepared at this point to cut off that debate. Until we get some indication from some of our colleagues about who else might want to come down and speak to either of these issues, I object to entering into any kind of time agreement.

I thank the Senator for giving me the opportunity to respond, if I might, to some of these issues.

One of the issues General Chilton, the Stratcom commander, I think testified to was an assumption there would be nobody cheating. As I said before, history is replete with examples of the Russians cheating on these agreements. And furthermore, what they agreed to was not--the treaty is 700, but what General Chilton and the nuclear force structure plan would call for is 720. It is 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, up to 420 ICBMs, and up to 60 bombers. Again that adds up to 720. All this amendment does is simply make consistent what the nuclear force structure plan as outlined by General Chilton and others would be with what the treaty requirements would be as well.

Again I want to make one point about this. I said this earlier but we have 856 launch vehicles, delivery vehicles in our arsenal today. The treaty calls for 700 so we are making a 156-delivery vehicle reduction to get down to the 700 number. The Russians today at 620 in effect are already below the 700 number and they are headed down even lower to somewhere in the 400 range. So we have made a significant concession with respect for delivery vehicles at no cost whatsoever to the Russians. I would point out also that the concern I have, as I said before, in taking a 720 number and reducing it to 700 assumes again that even if you keep 240 submarine-launched ballistic missile delivery vehicles, assume that, and if you assume 420 ICBMs, you would have to reduce the bomber inventory down to 40 to get under the 700 level.

I think most people understand it is the bombers, the heavy bombers that have given us the extended deterrence. They are visible, they are recallable, they are psychological, they are political. You put them into a theater, they loiter, they persist, and that is a powerful deterrent to those who would like to proliferate nuclear weapons. If we take our bomber fleet and we reduce down to the limits that would be talked about under this treaty, we are putting at great risk the triad. A lot of these bombers need to be updated and they are getting older. We need a next generation bomber which I think is going to be critical that that also be a nuclear bomber. But I think it is important to point out that this particular treaty relative to where we are today and to what our needs could be in the future, particularly as it pertains to bombers, the need for extended deterrence, we are reducing to a level that I think makes many of us uncomfortable and gets below the number that was prescribed in the nuclear force structure plan as had been outlined. The 720 as opposed to 700--the 700 number is well below where I think we need to be and does put in peril the triad which has served us well for a long period of time. In fact, in the early stage of the Cold War it was the heavy bombers that provided the bulk of the work. When we developed the ICBM, and SLBMs, now some of the bombers have been converted to conventional use and they have been doing a great job in that mission as well. But if we are going to have extended deterrence in the future we are going to have to have a very robust nuclear fleet that is nuclear capable, and a 700 number puts that in great jeopardy.

With that, I yield back to the Senator.

Madam President, it is my understanding that is correct; it is up to the 240 SLBMs, up to 420 ICBMs, and up to 60 bombers.

Madam President, to answer the question of the Senator from Michigan, that I believe to be the case. It is not proscriptive. All I am simply saying is if you make an assumption that you are going to take the additional 20 delivery vehicles out of the bomber fleet, you would take it from 60 down to 40 at a time when we have about almost 120 bombers in our inventory. That is a significant reduction in our ability to provide extended deterrence, and the bombers are the best form of extended deterrence.

Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?

The Senator from Arizona made some good points, I think, about the importance of the triad in maintaining our nuclear capability and deterrence.

I am interested in knowing if the Senator is aware that even if you assume the numbers that are in the 1251 report that would take the number of bombers down to 60--and it is up to 60, but the treaty calls for 700 delivery vehicles, which, if you took that out of bombers, would take you down to 40--that even taking it to 60 would cut in half the number of nuclear bombers.

Is the Senator also aware bombers are the best vehicle to enforce extended deterrence? The ICBMs, the missiles we have, our adversaries sometimes cannot see those. A bomber is visible. A bomber can be sent into theater. It has an impact, a psychological impact, a political impact. It is recallable. It is something that can be out there that makes those who would proliferate nuclear weapons even more concerned about the capability we have to respond.

The importance of maintaining that leg of the triad is, in this Senator's judgment, critical. It sounds like, from what the Senator is saying, he understands that as well.

I want to know if the Senator is aware that the limits that are imposed not only in the 1251 report but, more important, in the treaty would significantly reduce the number of nuclear bombers we have at our disposal today.

I guess the concern and observation the Senator raised I would make as well. With regard to a follow-on bomber, a next- generation bomber, much of our bomber fleet today--47 percent of it is pre-Cuban missile era. So they are older. They need to be replaced. We need a next-generation bomber. The question the Senator raised about the ambiguity coming out of whether a next-generation bomber would, in fact, be nuclear is a real concern because that would put at risk the existence of the triad, which I think allows us to maintain the flexibility, the versatility we have today in terms of nuclear deterrence.

So I would echo what the Senator from Arizona has voiced as a concern about this discussion of a next-generation bomber and whether, one, it will be done, and, two, it will be a nuclear bomber.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for yielding some time. We are going to vote on his amendment and on the amendment I have offered. Both address important subjects in the treaty. The Senator from Oklahoma is dealing with the issue of verification and pointing out the shortcomings in the treaty with regard to that very important issue. The amendment I will have voted on deals with the issue of delivery vehicles, which, in my judgment, is a critically important element in this treaty as well.

As I have said earlier today on the floor, what this amendment does-- it is very straightforward and it is very simple--is it just increases the number of deployed delivery vehicles, which are the bombers, the submarines, and the ICBMs allowed for in the treaty from 700 to 720.

In terms of background about why that is important--and I want to inform my colleagues in the Senate about why it is important we get that number up to 720--I asked at an Armed Services Committee hearing at what point between the range of 500 and 1,100 delivery systems that GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be comfortable and where we would avoid making our triad into a dyad.

He said: ``I would be very concerned if we got down below those levels about midpoint,'' meaning that he would be concerned if the negotiated number fell below about 800 delivery vehicles. They have made a distinction--the administration has--between deployed and nondeployed, that there are 800 there. And he has subsequently said he could live with a 700 deployed number. But the fact of the matter is that the concern that was voiced initially about dropping down below that midpoint level suggests that we need to at least increase up to where the administration's I guess you would call it their nuclear force structure plan settled, and that was 720 delivery vehicles.

So the amendment raises from 700 to 720 the number of delivery vehicles. As I said earlier in my remarks, if you look at what the 1251 report says, it says up to 60 nuclear-capable bombers, up to 420 deployed ICBMs, and 240 deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles on 14 submarines.

If you add up, up to 60 bombers, up to 420 ICBMs and 240 deployed SLBMs, you get a number of 720 delivery vehicles. That is what the nuclear force structure plan calls for. Yet the treaty specifies 700 delivery vehicles. So there is a 20-delivery vehicle cap there, which I think is important.

Frankly, if you ask the question about where would those reductions come from, obviously it would come from either ICBMs or bombers. People have suggested it doesn't have to come out of the bombers, but if you did take it out of the bombers, if you reduce the number of bombers from the 60 that is specified in the nuclear force structure plan to get down under 700, you would have to take the bombers from 60 down to 40.

As I said earlier today, we have about 96 B-52 nuclear bombers, about 20 B-2 nuclear bombers, and those are total deployed and nondeployed, the number we have in our inventory arsenal. We have about 94, I think, that are combat ready. But in any case, we are talking about a significant reduction in the number of bombers we could deploy at any given time under the treaty if you get it down to the 700 number.

The question as to whether that would come out of ICBMs or whether it would come out of bombers to get from 720 down to 700, it could be some combination of both. But the thing that concerns me about this is we have a bomber fleet that is aging. Most of our bombers today are pre- Cuban missile crisis-era vintage bombers--about 47 percent of them are. We need a follow-on, a next-generation bomber that will fill that role, that will be survivable in the types of modern-era defenses we are going to encounter, sophisticated air defense systems that are being employed by some of our potential adversaries around the world. So if you think about what we need in terms of a next-generation bomber, we need a field bomber and we need to do it sooner rather than later and it needs to be nuclear.

But when asked the question about whether the next bomber would be a nuclear bomber, the military and the administration have been very ambiguous on that point. They haven't been able to answer clearly, with any degree of certainty, about whether the next bomber, the follow-on bomber, would, in fact, be a nuclear bomber, which would suggest to me the commitment to the bomber wing of the triad is a lot less than it is to perhaps the other two legs of the triad.

That being said, let's assume for the moment that if we have up to 60 bombers, we have up to 420 ICBMs, and we have 240 submarine launchable ballistic missiles, we are talking about a 720 number, not a 700 number. So that is why I think this debate is important and why we are trying to be insistent in getting those two numbers to match.

The other point I wish to make is with regard to delivery vehicles in the treaty. We start out right now with about 856 delivery vehicles, if you add up ICBMs, submarine launchable ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. We will end up down at 700. So we are going to take about 156 of our delivery vehicles, reduce that, retire those, and get down to that 700 number. The Russians, on the other hand, start at about 620. So they are already well below the 700 number called for in the treaty. It has been suggested that through attrition they will probably get down to somewhere in the 400s in delivery vehicles. So this particular provision in the treaty costs them nothing. We give up 156 delivery vehicles. They give up nothing. In fact, they can come up to the 700 number. They could increase the number of delivery vehicles they currently have to come up to that 700 number.

So I think it is important to point out the difference that exists today and the disparity that exists between the Russian number of delivery vehicles and the number the United States has at our disposal and the number called for in the treaty and why that disparity is so important.

Just one final point, if I might, with regard to the nuclear posture of the country. We also have to defend not only the United States but about 30 other countries around the world that fall under the nuclear umbrella, under our deterrence. The Russians have none. So these delivery vehicle numbers become even more important, given the geographic realities the United States has to deal with in terms of our strategic nuclear forces and what they are expected to do in terms of providing extended deterrence not only to the United States but to many of our allies around the world.

So I think it is important in this treaty debate--this particular part of it--that we get a vote on this amendment. It has been suggested that if this amendment gets adopted, we will have to go back to the Russians. That is part of our goal of advice and consent in the Senate. If it were just consent, we would be nothing more than a rubberstamp. I think we have an important role; that is, to look at these critical issues, and where there are areas of disagreement, to provide our advice. I think, in a very straightforward way, we can vote on an amendment that would increase from 700 to 720 the number of delivery vehicles specified in the treaty. It is a very straightforward amendment and one that would then go back, obviously, to

the Russians, but it is certainly consistent with the Senate's traditional and historic role of advice and consent.

Former Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that: ``As to the stated context of the strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers specified are adequate, though barely so.''

Well, ``barely so'' does not seem to be good enough for me when we are talking about the important obligations we have in defending America's vital national security interests as well as those of many of our allies around the world. I don't think settling for barely enough or barely so is sufficient.

So I hope my colleagues will support this amendment. I think, as I said earlier, the triad is critical to our nuclear deterrence and maintaining both ICBMs and SLBMs, but then also having a very robust bomber component of that is critical. That is why investing in a next- generation, follow-on bomber that is nuclear is important. I think the ambiguity that surrounds the question, the uncertainty that surrounds the question about whether a follow-on bomber would be nuclear speaks volumes about the commitment to that leg of the triad, but it is also important to remember bombers are the best form of extended deterrence.

If you want to make those who would proliferate nuclear weapons pay attention, you send a bomber in. A bomber is very visible, it is recallable, it is survivable, and it brings great psychological and political advantage to our country when it comes to trying to discourage proliferation by other countries around the world.

So I hope my colleagues will support this amendment. It is an important amendment. The delivery vehicle issue is, to me, critical to this debate not only in terms of the numbers but also the modernization of those various elements of the triad. The triad, over time, has given us great survivability, great flexibility, and if ever called upon, we want to be as prepared as we possibly can be to encounter any nuclear threat that might exist to the United States. I hope my colleagues will support this amendment.

I will reserve my time and yield back now to the Senator from Oklahoma, who I think probably wants to continue to talk about the verification issues.

Madam President, it is my understanding that I have a minute in which to wrap up debate on this amendment; is that correct?

I ask unanimous consent to have a couple minutes to summarize a couple points. I had 5 minutes which I think just got burned.

Madam President, I will make a couple quick points before we vote on the delivery vehicle amendment, and the first one is this because it has been observed that this would impact Prompt Global Strike. The supporters of the treaty have said it will not impact Prompt Global Strike. The fact is that the 700 number of delivery vehicles--if, for example, we were to mount a conventional warhead on an ICBM to strike a target in some geographic area that is hard to hit and we need to get there in short order, the ICBM currently is the best way to do that. If we do that, it reduces the number of nuclear delivery vehicles we have one for one. If we were to do that on 20 ICBMs, we would mount conventional warheads on those, and it would reduce by 20 the number of nuclear delivery vehicles we would have. That is a fact in the treaty.

The final point I will make about the number 700, because it has been pointed out that military personnel in the country support that number, but I also want to mention that it is important to recall that General Chilton's support for New START levels was predicated on no Russian cheating. He testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 22, 2010, that one of the assumptions made was an assumption that the Russians in the postnegotiation time period would be compliant with the treaty. We all know it has been pointed out many times on the floor how Russia is a serial violator of arms control commitments. I think it is important, as we discuss the 700 number, that people bear in mind that number was agreed upon by our military commanders assuming there would be no cheating by the Russians.

There still is a conflict between the 720 called for in the nuclear force structure plan and the 700 in the treaty. All I am simply saying is, let's make those two numbers consistent. Let's get the 700 number up to 720.

With that, I yield back my time and ask for the yeas and nays.

I also request the yeas and nays on the Inhofe amendment.

Mr. President, I ask that the pending Inhofe amendment be set aside in order to call up my amendment No. 4841.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with, and that we resume consideration of the Inhofe amendment.

Mr. President, I wish to speak to the START treaty, more specifically to the McCain-Barrasso amendment which is the amendment that is currently under consideration and on which we will vote later this afternoon. I want to point out at the outset that you do not have to watch the news very often in this country to realize we live in a dangerous world. There are lots of countries around the world that are run by regimes that not only mistreat their own populations but would love to do harm to countries that are allies of ours, as well as to the United States. That is why a debate about an issue such as missile defense is so important. That is why this particular provision in the START treaty has drawn so much attention, so much concern by many of us who are concerned about the linkage it establishes between offensive strategic arms and defensive strategic arms.

The Senate made it abundantly clear at the outset of the negotiations on the New START treaty, specifically in section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization bill, that there should be no limitations on U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. The New START treaty not only contains specific limitations on those systems, but also reestablishes an unwise linkage between offense and defense that was broken when the ABM Treaty came to an end.

We were told as recently as March 29, by Under Secretary Tauscher, ``The treaty does nothing to constrain missile defense. This treaty is about strategic weapons.''

I quote again, ``There is no limit on what the United States can do with its missile defense systems.''

And then quote again, ``There are no constraints to missile defense.''

Those were all quotes made by Secretary Tauscher on March 29. But these assertions are incorrect in two ways. No. 1, not only are there specific limits on some missile defense options--and I note article V, paragraph 3 of the treaty text itself--but, second, when viewed together with the treaty's preamble, Russia's unilateral statement and statements by senior officials all provide potential for Russia to intimidate the United States by threatening to withdraw from the treaty if the United States seeks to increase its missile defense capabilities.

The treaty's supporters are going to argue that the limit on converting offensive silos for missile defense is meaningless because we don't have any such plans. But the question I come back to is simply this: Why is there a limitation at all on missile defense in a treaty that is meant to deal with nuclear weapons? Why did we concede to the Russians on this important point and can we be sure we will never have such plans. After all, we have converted offensive silos to defensive silos--for defensive purposes--in the past.

My own view is that particular provision in the treaty text is a direct linkage between offensive and defensive arms. Then you have the preamble and unilateral signing statements that I think are even more telling when it comes to that connection that is drawn between--that interrelationship between offense and defense.

Far more pernicious is the treaty's preamble and the two unilateral signing statements by the Russians and by the United States. The preamble states, ``The current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic arms of the Parties.''

The statement suggests that moving beyond current systems might undermine the viability and effectiveness of strategic systems and could provide grounds for withdrawal.

The administration says that either side can withdraw anyway. That is only partially true. The withdrawal clause in the treaty, as it has been in previous treaties, deals with extraordinary events and the preamble and unilateral statements make withdrawal more likely by building in an inevitable pretext.

So you have the preamble, the language in the preamble, you have the direct linkage in the treaty text itself, and then I also want to mention the other point which I think is equally important and that is the Russian unilateral signing statement makes clear Russia's legal opinion. Here is what it says.

The treaty between the Russian Federation and the United

States of America on the reduction and limitation of

strategic offensive arms signed in Prague on April 8, 2010,

can operate and be viable only if the United States of

American refrains from developing its missile defense

capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.

It further states:

The exceptional circumstances referred to in article XIV,

the withdrawal clause of the treaty, include increasing the

capabilities of the United States of America's missile

defense system in such a way that threatens the potential of

the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.

So the Russians have built into the treaty record their threat that improvement of U.S. missile defense creates the legal pretext for their withdrawal from the treaty. It can only be read as an attempt to exert political pressure to forestall continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses.

Was our response to that a firm rebuttal? The answer is no. Unlike the START I agreement where the United States said quite clearly that it did not agree with Russian statements linking that treaty to the U.S. status in the ABM treaty, we did not do that this time.

Instead, the State Department said, in response to the Russian unilateral statement:

The United States of America takes note of the statement on

missile defense by the Russian Federation. The United States

missile defense systems would be employed to defend the

United States against limited missile launches, and to defend

its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional

threats. The United States intends to continue improving and

deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend

itself against limited attack, and as part of our

collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key

regions.

So it would appear that the U.S. position does not contradict the Russian position in the slightest. What then to make of the U.S. missile defense plan previously announced by Secretary Gates, which talks about the deployment of SM-3 missiles in Romania by 2015, Poland by 2018, and then in 2020 the deployment in Europe of the new SM-3 2B missile for the defense of Europe and the United States against ICBMs; is this still our position or is it now the position set forth in the signing statement and as recently briefed to the NATO-Russia Council in Lisbon where the SN03 2B missile was portrayed quite clearly as being ``available'' rather than ``deployed'' in the year 2020.

It is clear to me the administration is already coming under considerable pressure by the Russians to limit its missile defense activities in the very near future. Past experience would suggest this administration may be willing to alter its plans to accommodate the Russians, as it did in the case of previous plans to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.

How will it respond if the President's prized accomplishment, the START treaty, is at risk? I think it is very clear from the language in the preamble, the direct linkage in the treaty itself, and what the signing statements say, what the Russians' intentions are with regard to this particular issue, which is why it is so important this amendment get adopted.

This amendment the Senators from Arizona and Wyoming have offered would simply strike the language in the preamble that is causing so much concern. We have heard arguments on the floor of the Senate since we started debate on the START treaty that the preamble is nonbinding; in other words, it does not mean anything.

In fact, it was said yesterday by someone on the other side that it is throwaway language. Yet at the same time, it has been argued by others on the other side that it is a treaty killer. It cannot be both. It cannot be a throwaway that is not legally binding and a treaty killer at the same time.

Essentially, what they are saying is, it means nothing and it means everything. That is a direct contradiction. That is why it is so important this amendment be adopted, which would clarify once and for all, or separate and decouple or delink this connection that exists in this treaty between offensive and defensive arms.

I think the amendment that is before us right now gets at the very heart of the matter, and we all know the Russians and Americans have different views on missile defense. But the attempt to paper over or even ignore these differences in this treaty sets the stage for future misunderstandings or confrontations as the United States continues its missile defense activities, particularly in Europe.

Confusion about U.S. plans is equally dangerous. This is not an issue on which there should be ambiguity, on which there should be confusion, and on which there should be this kind of a difference of opinion.

So I would simply say, as we come here in an hour or so to a final vote on the McCain-Barrasso amendment, that I think it is important for the Senate in our important role when it comes to treaty ratification to make sure we are doing everything that is in the national security interests of the United States and allows us in the best way possible to defend this country and our allies.

If we are limiting in any way our ability when it comes to the issue of missile defense, we are putting in jeopardy and at risk America's national security interests. So this treaty should not be approved. It should not be approved certainly until some of these changes are made, and we can start today by eliminating the linkage and the connection that exists today in the preamble by striking and deleting that language from the preamble of this treaty and making it very clear that the United States intends to preserve all options available to us when it comes to missile defense.

As I said before, this is something--this linkage was broken years ago under the Bush administration. We should not establish now the precedent of allowing those issues to be linked and to give the Russians an opportunity and an excuse to withdraw from this treaty if the United States decides to proceed with what is in its own best national security interests.

So I would urge my colleagues on this amendment--this is an important amendment. We will hopefully have debate on other amendments. I have a couple of amendments to deal with the issue of delivery vehicles which I think is also a very important part of this treaty. But there probably is no more important piece of this treaty than the issue of missile defense when it comes to the vital national security interests of the United States.

So I hope Members will, when this vote comes up later today, vote in favor of the McCain-Barrasso amendment and make it clear that there is to be no linkage, no nexus, between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms so we eliminate once and for all the ambiguity that exists with regard to this issue and allow us to proceed to other amendments on the treaty.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, I too want to rise in strong support of the McCain-Barrasso amendment to strike language from the preamble of this treaty to link strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms. This language in the preamble is highly troubling, because it reestablishes an unwise linkage between offensive arms and defensive arms that was broken when the ABM treaty came to an end.

More troubling is the fact that the New START treaty contains specific limitations on missile defense in article V. Moreover, Russia's unilateral statement that the treaty can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively is also extremely troubling.

When viewed together, the New START treaty's preamble, the limitations on missile defense in article V, and Russia's unilateral statement, amount to a Russian attempt to find a leverage point and exert political pressure upon the United States to forestall deploying a robust missile defense capability by threatening to withdraw from the treaty if we seek to increase our missile defense capabilities.

The remedy for this concern is very simple. It is for the Senate to strike the offensive preamble language. That is why I wholeheartedly support the effort to strike this language from the preamble, as well as an amendment to strike paragraph 3 of article V of the treaty.

There have been conflicting statements made about the preamble and its significance. We have heard supporters of the treaty say that the preamble is a throwaway, and it means nothing. Then, on the other hand, you have got people saying that, well, if you change this, if you strike this language, it is a treaty killer. So we are hearing what are essentially contradictory statements that this means everything and it means nothing. That cannot be. So I would say it is critically important that we as a nation continue to quantitatively and qualitatively build up our missile defense systems. We know that rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea are rapidly building up their ballistic missile capabilities to eventually be able to strike our country.

We cannot let another nation have a vote on whether we build up our missile defenses. I am very confident that if Russia threatens to withdraw from this treaty when we seek to qualitatively and quantitatively improve our missile defenses, the administration will cave in to the Russians. We have already seen something such as this happen with the administration abruptly ending the Bush administration's efforts to build a third missile defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic. Why should we have any confidence that they will not do the same thing when something like this happens again?

That is why it is critically important that we remove this language from the preamble to eliminate any pretext by the Russians to threaten to withdraw from the treaty because we are improving our missile defense capabilities.

It is particularly galling that the administration inserted this missile defense language into the treaty, when one considers that Congress made it abundantly clear at the outset of negotiations on this treaty, specifically in section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 Defense authorization bill, that there should be no limitation on United States ballistic missile defense systems.

Specifically, we said:

It is the sense of Congress that the President should

maintain the stated position of the United States that the

follow-on treaty to the START treaty not include any

limitations on the ballistic missile defense systems of the

United States.

We also received repeated assurances by senior State Department officials that the treaty would do nothing to constrain missile defense. So I was surprised to see that the treaty ended up containing specific limits on some missile defense options in article V, paragraph 3, as I mentioned earlier, as well as this language in the preamble that we are currently considering in the McCain-Barrasso amendment.

When those of us who criticize this treaty point out that Russia may rely on language in the treaty's preamble as a pretext for withdrawal if the United States builds up its missile defense, the administration response is usually to say, the preamble is not legally binding.

Obviously if this language is not legally binding, then it should not be a big deal to delete it from the preamble. But it can be no accident that Russia used the words ``effective'' and ``viable'' in its unilateral statement that it would view American advances in missile defense as grounds for withdrawal from the treaty, thereby creating a textual hook to the treaty for its position.

The unilateral statement is certainly a sign of how Russia interprets the preamble. I believe, therefore, that there is ample reason to be concerned that this administration will not dedicate itself to deploying a robust missile defense that in any way irks Russia. In the preamble Russia has established a pressure point to dissuade this administration from improving our own missile defense system in a quantitative or qualitative way.

Therefore, it is extremely important that the Senate simply remove that preamble language. I wholeheartedly support the McCain-Barrasso amendment. I urge its passage, and ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor.

I would also simply say, again, that I do not think you can have it both ways. You cannot say that this means nothing, and at the same time that it means everything. If it is a throwaway, some language that does not mean anything, that is one thing. But if it is a deal killer for us to suggest that we ought to remove this language, which we think means something, that that is a deal killer, then somehow it means a lot more and it matters a lot more than I think the supporters and proponents of this treaty are letting on.

So I would ask that as we continue the debate, this issue be fully aired. I think we have a lot of people who have come down and talked about it. I think this is at least one amendment that I am aware of on the issue of missile defense. But I do know that in terms of the overall treaty and the concerns that some of us have about it, this issue stands out. The issue of missile defense, when you live in a dangerous world, is a critical issue when it comes to our national security. It is one that we need to take very seriously, and particularly, as has already been mentioned, the threats that we face from rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea. We cannot do anything that would lessen or weaken our ability to defend our country and our allies from threats from those types of countries.

I would say when it comes to this issue, it would make it a lot easier for those who are advocating support for this treaty if the McCain-Barrasso amendment were adopted. We simply delete it and strike this language, which, if it does not mean anything, should not matter all that much. And if it does mean something and it matters, I think that tells us everything we need to know about what the Russians' intentions are with regard to having that language in the preamble.

Couple that with the statements they have made in the unilateral signing statement, along with the article V language in the treaty itself. This is an issue of great importance, and we should not take it lightly, we should not minimize it. We need to have a full debate on it.

I hope we can stay on this issue. I know of the leader's plan to move tomorrow to some other legislative business. But if this particular agreement is that important to the administration and to this country and to the Senate, then we ought to be able to stay on this, and the legislative items, many of which are political items that are sort of what I would call check-the-box items that the Democratic leadership wants to get voted on, ought to be put off. We can deal with those issues another time, another year.

If we are serious about getting this treaty done, then we ought to stay on it, keep our focus on it, and allow the Senate to have a full, fair debate, open to amendments, and hopefully, ultimately, get this thing disposed of one way or the other.

I yield the floor.

I thank the Senator from Illinois for locking in the time. I want to start by saying here we are, jammed against the Christmas break with the majority using Christmas as a backstop to rush through an arms control treaty with the Russians and a trillion-dollar spending bill on a dual-track basis.

What that means is that we are considering, at the same time, two documents encompassing thousands of pages with very little ability to offer meaningful amendments or devote meaningful time to consider the full impact of these documents that will have a far-reaching and long- term impact on our Nation.

As I wrote recently in an op-ed that appeared in National Review Online:

New START misses one opportunity after another to maintain

a stable nuclear relationship between our two countries. To

remedy this will require significant time on the floor of the

Senate. Trying to force it through without ample time for

debate and amendments would amount to a Christmas gift to the

Russians.

I ask unanimous consent that the op-ed I wrote for National Review Online entitled ``Don't Force New START,'' dated December 9, 2010, be printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.

Madam President, the Nation's attention is fixed firmly on this travesty of an omnibus trillion-dollar appropriations bill which we should be debating now because the current funding resolution for the government ends tomorrow. We should not be debating a significant arms control treaty at this late date and trying to dual-track what I said earlier are thousands of pages of documents that need appropriate time on the floor of the Senate.

I want to speak, if I might, briefly today to the substance of the START agreement and my concerns about that agreement in its current form. First of all, I want to speak to the issue of missile defense.

The New START treaty not only contains specific limitations on missile defense in article V but also reestablishes an unwise linkage in the preamble to the treaty between offense and defense that was broken when the ABM treaty came to an end.

Moreover, Russia's unilateral statement that the treaty ``can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities, quantitatively or qualitatively'' is extremely troubling.

When viewed together, the New START treaty's preamble and Russia's unilateral statement amount to a Russian attempt to find a leverage point and exert political pressure upon the United States to forestall deploying a robust missile defense capability, by threatening to withdraw from the treaty if we seek to increase our missile defense capabilities.

The remedy for this concern is for the Senate to strike the offensive preamble language. That is why I would wholeheartedly support an effort to strike the preamble as well as an amendment to strike paragraph 3 of article V of the treaty.

Now, with regard to delivery vehicle modernization, and I want to speak specifically in that regard to bombers, nearly 2 years ago I began to have serious concerns about the administration's commitment to developing a follow-on bomber aircraft and its overall commitment to the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles. These concerns were aggravated by the administration's decision to terminate the development program for a new bomber and reexamine the need, the requirement, and the technology.

I was also troubled by Secretary Gates's statement on April 6, 2009, that we will examine all of our strategic requirements in light of post-START arms control negotiations, which leads me to be concerned that this administration would allow the Russians to have a say in whether we would develop a new bomber.

I was gratified to see that the Nuclear Posture Review determined that the United States should sustain the nuclear triad for decades.

However, as the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently stated in a report entitled, ``Sustaining America's Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike,'' the triad is in

danger of becoming a dyad by default because nearly half of the bomber inventory of the United States, 47 percent, predates the Cuban missile crisis, and the only aircraft the United States possesses today with reach and survivability to have a chance of successfully executing missions more than 1,000 nautical miles into enemy territory from the last air-to-air refueling are 16 combat-ready B-2 bombers.

Madam President, the B-2 was designed in the 1980s and achieved initial operational capability over a decade ago, and they will eventually lose their ability to penetrate advanced air defense systems. The need, the requirement, and the technology for the next- generation bomber is well understood. The need for a new long-range strike capability is urgent because the conflicts of the future will likely feature heavily defended airspace due in large part to the proliferation of relatively inexpensive but extremely sophisticated and deadly air defense systems. We have heard testimony before the Armed Services Committee from intelligence officials that Russia is the developer of most of these advanced air defense systems and is exporting those systems both to China and to other countries in the world.

Various past and present combatant commanders of the Pacific Command, Strategic Command, and Joint Forces Command have each testified in support of the capability the next-generation bomber will provide.

As Senator McCain summarized in his letter to the Foreign Relations Committee on the treaty, the 1251 plan and even the updated plan lack critical details about decisions related to the follow-on ICBM, the next-generation bomber, or a follow-on air-launched cruise missile.

General Chilton, the most recent STRATCOM commander, has spoken about how conversations about these matters need to start now.

Development of replacement delivery vehicles for all three legs of the triad need to begin during the life of New START. Decisions need to be made and development needs to begin within the next 10 years or replacement systems will not be available when current systems reach the end of their service lives. There is no assurance that the next long-range bomber will be nuclear capable. Therefore, I plan to offer an amendment which will require the administration to certify that the President has made a commitment to develop a replacement heavy bomber that is both nuclear and conventionally capable.

With regard to delivery vehicle numbers, on July 9, 2009, at an Armed Services Committee hearing, I asked GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, about the administration's commitment at that time to reduce our strategic delivery vehicles to somewhere in the range of 500 to 1,100 systems and to specify at what point in this range would he become concerned that delivery vehicle reductions would necessitate making our nuclear triad into a dyad. General Cartwright responded, ``I would be very concerned if we got down below those levels about midpoint,'' meaning he would be concerned if the negotiated number fell below 800 delivery vehicles. This treaty caps delivery vehicles at 700--substantially below the number General Cartwright stated a year and a half ago.

The administration makes this odd distinction between deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles and points out that the total cap for the treaty is 800 deployed and nondeployed systems. Of course, there is a letter from General Cartwright in the Record stating he is comfortable with the distinction between deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles and the overall limits to delivery vehicles. But the real number we are working with here is 700.

I think it is worth noting that former Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified to the Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that, ``as to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers specified are adequate, though barely so.''

With regard to this limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles, I find it very troubling that the administration has yet to articulate how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the number of 700. The administration has informed the Senate how it might field a force of 720 delivery vehicles, which Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen acknowledged in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2010, would still require further reductions to meet the treaty's central limits.

They went on to argue that because the United States will have 7 years to reduce its forces to these limits, they did not find it necessary to identify a final force structure at this point, meaning the Senate will commit the United States to a delivery vehicle force of 700 without knowing how that force will be composed. This problem is compounded by the fact that the treaty was so poorly negotiated, that for every ICBM or SLBM deployed with a conventional warhead, one less nuclear vehicle will be available to the United States.

The treaty essentially requires the United States to make unilateral reductions in delivery vehicles, as Russia is already well below the delivery vehicle limits and would drastically reduce its arsenal with or without this treaty. As the Congressional Research Service writes:

Russia currently has only 620 launchers, and this number

may decline to around 400 deployed and 444 total launchers.

This would likely be true whether or not the treaty enters

into force because Russia is eliminating older missiles as

they age and deploying newer missiles at a far slower pace

than that needed to retain 700 deployed launchers.

Therefore, in light of all these facts, I will seek to offer an amendment or two regarding the delivery vehicle numbers in this treaty. I am also working on several other amendments that I may seek to offer regarding prompt global strike and other issues.

Ultimately, this is a very significant treaty that deserves full and fair consideration, and we should not be jamming the consideration of this treaty up against the Christmas break. As I have indicated, there are substantial issues here that need to be fully vetted, and we obviously do not have the time to consider these issues this year. We should wait until next year to fully consider this treaty and have a full, free, and wide-open debate on this matter, with no restrictions on amendments.

Exhibit 1

[From the National Review, Dec. 9, 2010]

Don't Force New Start

The treaty should not be a Christmas present for Russia

Twenty-four years ago, Pres. Ronald Reagan traveled to

Reykjavik, Iceland, to negotiate an arms control treaty with

the Soviet Union. When the Soviets insisted that the treaty

must limit America's missile defense program, which was

designed to guard against intercontinental ballistic

missiles, Reagan walked away. He later explained, ``We prefer

no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United

States.''

Apparently times have changed. President Obama wants to jam

a deeply flawed arms-control treaty with Russia, known as New

START, through a lame-duck session of the Senate just to rack

up an accomplishment before the end of the year.

New START misses one opportunity after another to maintain

a stable nuclear relationship between our two countries. To

remedy this will require significant time on the floor of the

Senate. Trying to force it through without ample time for

debate and amendments would amount to a Christmas gift to the

Russians.

First and foremost, missile defense remains a major point

of disagreement between the United States and Russia, and

this treaty only makes the situation worse. Russia has

threatened to withdraw from the treaty if we expand our

missile-defense capabilities. It made a similar threat when

the original START was completed under the first President

Bush. At that time, President Bush said directly that our

missile-defense activities have no bearing on Russia's arms-

control obligations. I am concerned that President Obama's

response to the Russian threat this time is weaker.

Moreover, the treaty contains a direct limitation on U.S.

missile-defense-system deployments. Why does a treaty

ostensibly about offensive weapons mention missile defense at

all? It appears to have been included only to appease Russia.

Treaty proponents argue that New START furthers the legacy

of Ronald Reagan's vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

Let's be clear about one thing: President Reagan never would

have sacrificed missile defense on the altar of arms control.

Second, Russia has an estimated ten-to-one advantage over

the United States in tactical nuclear weapons, a situation

that was not addressed at all by New START. These are the

kinds of weapons that are most susceptible to theft or

diversion to emerging threats, including terrorists and rogue

nations such as North Korea and Iran. They are the weapons

Russia has reportedly moved closer to our NATO allies. One of

our top

goals going into negotiations on this treaty should have been

to close that gap, so why wasn't it mentioned? Because the

Russians didn't want to talk about it.

Third, treaty proponents argue that the Senate must rush

consideration of New START because we now lack the ability to

verify what Russia is doing. This would make sense if the

verification provisions in the treaty were something to be

celebrated and worth rushing into place.

However, New START's verification provisions are much

weaker than what we had under the previous treaty. This is a

serious concern, because experts say Russia has essentially

cheated in one way or another on pretty much every major

arms-control treaty to which it is a party.

What's more, as the expiration date of the previous START

approached last year, the administration promised it would

come up with some sort of ``bridging agreement'' to keep

verification efforts going until the new treaty could be

ratified. The parties never finished that agreement, and so

any verification gap has been created by the administration.

The Senate has a responsibility to consider treaties

thoroughly to ensure they are in our country's best interest.

It should not rush its duty now to make up for the Obama

administration's mistakes. We lose nothing by postponing

consideration of this treaty until the new Congress convenes

in a few weeks.

This flawed treaty has too great an impact on America's

national security to be taken lightly or rushed for the sake

of political pride.

Madam President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, today I wish to recognize Carol Twedt as she celebrates retirement from more than 20 extraordinary years of public service. Her earnest dedication to and enthusiasm for service to her fellow citizens has set an example for all to follow.

Carol's career began when she joined Jim Abdnor's successful Senate campaign against George McGovern in 1980. Her passion was pushed to a new level when Carol's husband Curt passed away at an early age in 1987. It was this event which prompted her to undertake the challenge of running for Minnehaha county commissioner. The level of courage and perseverance she demonstrated through her first campaign paid off with an overwhelming victory. In her five subsequent terms as a county commissioner, she has shown unceasing dedication and compassion to serving her constituents. Because of this remarkable resolve, Carol has made praiseworthy accomplishments in combating homelessness, improving juvenile services, and, above all, working to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of county operations.

Carol's service has benefitted the people of Minnehaha County over her many years of service. I would like to extend to her my heartfelt gratitude for her many years of outstanding service.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes.

Mr. President, I also wish to join with my colleagues today before I speak to the issue of the day and express my appreciation to Senator Gregg for his great service to this institution and to our country. I think it is fair to say there is nobody quite like Judd Gregg. He truly is one of a kind.

I remember when I first got here, I thought he didn't like me, and maybe he didn't like me, but I concluded that part of that was just his serious demeanor. He is a guy who means business. Once you get to know him, you not only appreciate that side of his personality, but you also gain an appreciation for the incredible wit and sense of humor he also possesses. I have had the opportunity to experience that on many occasions.

I think what the institution is going to miss the most--he is certainly someone who cares a lot about this country's future and the policies we put in place--is his abilities, his great skill and his great talent. It will be a real loss to the Senate because Judd Gregg has a mind like a steel trap. He is able to analyze with great effectiveness the issues of the day and to explain them clearly. He is someone in whom I have tremendous respect. He has been a great mentor, a great leader, and someone, as I said before, we are going to miss around here.

I can't say enough about how much I appreciate his service and the service and the sacrifice his family has made. He has served in public life for many years, both as a Congressman, Governor, and a Senator. His wife Kathy, similar to many of our wives, puts up with a lot of things. Judd, similar to me and many of my colleagues, I think, I would say probably married over his head or, as one of my friends said, outpunted his coverage. But we are grateful to his family.

We are going to miss the many contributions he has made, but probably none more than the passion with which he approaches this job and the passion with which he approaches building a brighter and better and stronger and more prosperous future for future generations. There has been no clearer voice on the issue of fiscal responsibility, no clearer voice when it comes to the important task we have in front of us, to insist that we take steps and we put policies in place that will make the country stronger and better for future generations.

So I wish to compliment as well my colleague from New Hampshire. I have heard from folks from other parts of the country. As someone who comes from the Midwest, I wish to say how much I appreciate Judd Gregg, the incredible contribution he has made, and I, similar to so many others, will miss him greatly.

Mr. President, let me, if I might, speak to the issue before us today. We are debating a tax proposal, and on January 1 of 2011, just 17 days from now, families and small businesses across this country are going to see their taxes go up if Congress doesn't take action on the tax relief proposal that is currently before the Senate. There are elements of this proposal I don't like. I think it is fair to say there are a lot of us here who, if we were able to write this, certainly wouldn't have written it in the fashion we have in front of us today. But letting the perfect become the enemy of the good will result in one thing and one thing only; that is, higher taxes across America in 2 weeks.

It is easy to stand on the sidelines and to criticize this proposal, and it is perhaps even politically expedient to stand on the sidelines and criticize this proposal. But let me make one thing very clear. Advocating against this tax proposal is to advocate for a tax increase, and that is something we cannot and the American economy cannot afford.

It would be great if we could wait a few weeks, until we have a changeover in the Congress. Frankly, I would be very happy to see a bill written a few weeks from now when the newly elected Republicans are going to be sworn in. But that is a luxury that doesn't exist because of this reality that we have--this deadline looming in front of us. If we wait for the perfect proposal, the perfect agreement, then American families and small businesses are going to pay higher taxes just 2 weeks from now. That is not a scare tactic, that is not political posturing, that is simply a fact.

Taking action now to prevent this tax increase would do a number of things. First, it would protect 21 million households from being hit by the alternative minimum tax in the year 2010. It would preserve relief from the marriage penalty. There are many provisions of the Tax Code today--some of which have been addressed in previous tax law, expiring tax law--that lessen the impact of being married. Ironically, in the Tax Code, we punish people for being married in this country. Taking action now would prevent job-killing tax increases on many of our small businesses across this country, and it would protect farmers and ranchers from the death tax that would confiscate over half the value of the family farm.

What happens if we don't pass this tax proposal? Well, according to a number of economists, we would see a drop in the gross domestic product from somewhere between 1.7 percent to 2 percent. That is according to a number of private economists. Even the Congressional Budget Office suggests we would see about a 1.4 percent negative impact in our economy, in the gross domestic product, if we don't take the action necessary to prevent these tax increases.

Failure to act now, according to the Tax Foundation, with regard to my State of South Dakota, would cost the average family in South Dakota about $1,700 a year in higher taxes. The average American household would be faced with higher taxes to the tune of about $3,000. If we don't take the steps that are necessary to address the death tax on January 1, the death tax kicks back in at $1 million--a $1 million exemption--and everything above that would be taxed at 55 percent. So imagine the impact on a farmer, a rancher, a small businessperson in this country, who is trying to pass on that operation to the next generation, and what this would mean in their ability to do that.

As I said earlier, this is not a perfect agreement, but no compromise is. The fact we are dealing with Democrats, who still run both the House, the Senate, and the White House, if we want to stop taxes from going up on everyone, then we are going to have to figure out a way to get that done. And if we stand around trying to debate the perfect, then taxes are going to go up on families and businesses and our economic recovery is going to stall out.

I think it is also important to note that it will send a negative message to the financial markets. If we don't take action to address this crisis looming in front of us on January 1, we can expect the 9.8- percent unemployment rate could go significantly higher.

I would simply argue that inaction is not an option, and advocating against this proposal is no different than advocating for higher taxes. I hope that my colleagues will see their way to support this today and to support it in big numbers. It will go from here to the House of Representatives, and they will look closely at the vote coming out of the Senate. I think it is fair to say, if and when it gets to the House of Representatives, it will pass provided the Senate sends a very strong message--a message I think consistent with the will of the American people. In fact, according to public opinion polls, one as recent as this morning, 70 percent of Americans believe and agree this tax proposal ought to be enacted and signed into law.

The real issue that I think affects our fiscal situation in this country isn't the fact we don't have enough revenue, it is that we spend too much. If we look historically--and it is an empirical fact-- at what happens when you lower taxes--look at John F. Kennedy, at Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush in recent history--anytime you lower marginal income tax rates, taxes on investment, you get more revenue, not less revenue. That is an empirical fact. You also get a growing economy. When you have a growing economy, it is obviously creating more jobs, and that is what we want to see happen. We want to get this 9.8- percent unemployment rate down.

I would argue that the issue we have in front of us with regard to spending and deficits and debt doesn't have to do with the fact we don't have enough revenue, it has to do with the fact that Washington spends too much, and that is where we ought to be targeting and focusing our efforts.

Historically, if you look at the last half century, I think the amount we spend for our government as a percent of our gross domestic product hovers somewhere in the 20\1/2\ percent range. Today, it is about 24, 25 percent we are spending on government as a percentage of our total economy.

We have complicated and added to that burden by enacting major legislation in this last year. The massive new health care entitlement program, when it is fully implemented, will cost on the order of $2.5 trillion. We have lots of other legislation that has moved through here. The stimulus bill passed earlier this year was $1 trillion of borrowed money, which didn't have the desired impact. The one thing we know with certainty is that--at least based on history--when you raise taxes, you get fewer jobs; when you lower taxes, you get more economic activity, more jobs for the American people and, frankly, more revenue. That helps to deal with the issue of the deficit and the debt.

In this particular proposal there is some new spending. There are unemployment benefits included. I would like to have seen that offset. I had an amendment that would do that, that would pay for the additional spending in this bill. We are not going to have the opportunity to offer amendments, but there will be a couple of motions offered by my colleague from Oklahoma, Senator Coburn--motions to suspend the rules and pay for the additional $56.5 billion in new spending as a result of extending unemployment benefits in the bill. I think that is important for us to do.

Since we got into this recession, we have spent, I think, about $124 billion, borrowed from future generations for these extensions that we continue to pass for unemployment benefits. This particular one would take us up to almost $180 billion in borrowed money to pay for these benefits. It makes sense, in my judgment, when you are spending new money, you should offset or pay for that. Frankly, I would like to see that as part of this proposal. It is not in there. As I said, I have an amendment to rectify that, which won't be considered because we are not being given the opportunity to offer amendments. But I will support the motion to suspend the rules and pass a pay-for for the unemployment benefit extension the Senator from Oklahoma will offer later.

All that to say again the real issue here, in my judgment, comes down not to an issue of revenue but it comes down to an issue of spending. I think the American people recognize that. I think that is why there is such broad public support for this tax proposal, because the American people recognize that you can't raise taxes in the middle of a recession and expect the job creators in this country--our small businesses--to create jobs. It is counterintuitive and it defies all empirical knowledge and experience that we have to suggest otherwise. On the other hand, the American people do believe that government has gotten too big, that it is growing too fast, and it needs to be reined in. That is where we have to attack the spending side of this equation. I believe when the new Congress is seated next year there is going to be an intense focus on this issue of spending, and it is high time that happen, because it is high time we get the debt and the deficit issue that will plague future generations under control. The real issue doesn't have to do with revenue, it has to do with spending.

So I would urge my colleagues to support this proposal. As I said earlier, it is not perfect--certainly not in my estimation, nor I think in the eyes of many people who have looked at this. But on the other hand, it does prevent us, on January 1, from seeing a massive tax increase--the largest tax increase in American history--start to hit American families and American small businesses. That is why I hope we will pass it out of the Senate with a big bipartisan vote.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Madam President, today I recognize McKenzie Haley, Miss Rodeo America 2011. McKenzie, a native of my own home State of South Dakota, was crowned Miss Rodeo America on December 4, 2010, at the National Finals Rodeo in Las Vegas, NV. McKenzie holds a long history of rodeo titles including Junior Miss Rodeo South Dakota 2004, South Dakota High School Rodeo Queen 2005-2006, Miss Black Hills Stock Show and Rodeo 2009, before being crowned Miss Rodeo South Dakota in July of 2009.

McKenzie will spend the next year attending more than 100 rodeos across the United States promoting and serving as a spokesperson for the sport of rodeo. McKenzie is a true ambassador and shining example of South Dakota spirit and values. I wish her all the best and congratulate her on her accomplishments as she embarks on her exciting journey as Miss Rodeo America 2011.

Mr. President, today I recognize Bailey Jean Carlsen, an intern in my Washington, DC, office, for all of the hard work she has done for me, my staff, and the State of South Dakota over the past several months.

Bailey is a graduate of Roncalli High School in Aberdeen, SD. Currently, she is attending Drake University, where she is majoring in sociology and law, and politics and society. She is a hard worker who has been dedicated to getting the most out of her internship experience.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks and appreciation to Bailey for

all of the fine work she has done and wish her continued success in the years to come.

Mr. President, today I recognize Edward M. Hill, an intern in my Washington, DC, office, for all of the hard work he has done for me, my staff, and the State of South Dakota over the past several months.

Edward is a graduate of Rapid City Central High School in Rapid City, SD. Currently, he is attending Georgetown University, where he is majoring in international politics and security studies. He is a hard worker who has been dedicated to getting the most out of his internship experience.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks and appreciation to Edward for all of the fine work he has done and wish him continued success in the years to come.