Mr. President, I shall be joined by a number of colleagues and the purpose of our taking this time is as follows: We have decided to put in an amendment to H.J. Res. 20, amendment number 259 which will be printed in today's record. This…
Mr. President, I shall be joined by a number of colleagues and the purpose of our taking this time is as follows: We have decided to put in an amendment to H.J. Res. 20, amendment number 259 which will be printed in today's record. This amendment mirrors S. Con. Res. 7, a resolution prepared by myself and others sometime last week, which expresses certain concerns we have with regard to the President's plan as announced on January 10 of this year.
This amendment, to H.J. Res. 20 is cosponsored by Mr. Levin, Ms. Collins, Ben Nelson of Nebraska, Mr. Hagel, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Smith, Mr. Biden, and as other Senators return to town, we may have further cosponsors.
We are concerned that the fighting rages on throughout Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad. It is very important that the Senate should, as the greatest deliberative body--certainly in matters of war and peace--in a prompt way address the issues regarding Iraq.
Our men and women in the Armed Forces are fighting bravely in that conflict, as they are in conflicts elsewhere worldwide. Our concerns are heartfelt, not driven by political motivation. As we gathered as a group in the past 2 weeks to work on this, we took note of the fact that the President, on January 10, in his message to the Nation explicitly said that others could come forward with their ideas. I will paraphrase it--the exact quote is in the amendment we are putting in today--that he would take into consideration the views of others. So in a very constructive and a respectful way, our group said we disagreed with the President and we gave a series of points urging him to consider those points as he begins to implement such plan as finally devised throughout Iraq but most specifically in Baghdad.
We are very respectful of the fact that the plan put in by the President was in three parts: a diplomatic part, an economic part, and a military part. We explicitly stated in the resolution our support for the diplomatic and economic parts, and we are hopeful it can be put together in a timely fashion. There is some concern as to whether the three main parts can progress together, unified, in this operation, given the short timetable to implement it. So two parts of the program we wholeheartedly support and so state in this amendment.
The concern is about the military section. We state the explicit nature of our concerns. Some Senators have suggested the resolution expresses matters which I can find no source whatsoever in the resolution for those complaints. Nevertheless, I will address in the course of this time each and every one of those concerns.
Indeed, on the weekend talk shows, one Senator said: My problem with the Warner proposal and others that criticize the surge is, what is your plan? All right. That is a legitimate question. I say that our amendment states a clear strategy. It says as follows:
The Senate believes the United States should continue
vigorous operations in Anbar Province specifically for the
purpose of combating an insurgency including elements
associated with the al-Qaida movement and denying terrorists
a safe haven.
Secondly, the primary objective of the overall strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation.
Next, the military part of the strategy should focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, supporting the Iraqi efforts to bring
greater security to Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security.
Likewise, another part of our amendment states:
The United States military operations should, as much as
possible, be confined to these goals and should charge the
Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating
sectarian violence.
The United States Government should engage selected nations
in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally
sponsored peace and reconciliation process. Overall,
military, diplomatic, and economic strategies should not be
regarded as an open-ended or unconditional commitment, but
rather, as a new strategy, hereafter should be conditioned
upon the Iraqi government meeting benchmarks that must be
delivered in writing and agreed to by the Prime Minister.
Then we spell out a series of benchmarks. Such benchmarks should include, but not be limited to, the deployment of that number of additional Iraqi security forces as specified in the plan in Baghdad, ensuring equitable distribution of resources of the Government of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the oil resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner, and the authority of the Iraqi commanders to make tactical and operational decisions without political intervention.
Further, some Senators have indicated, again incorrectly, that our resolution either fails to recognize, or disagrees with all aspects of the President's plan, namely the political and economic aspects, in addition to the military part of his plan.
In fact, our resolution acknowledges directly that the President's plan is multi-faceted. Our resolution states, whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new strategy, which consists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic, and military.
As such, our resolution disagrees only with the military aspect of the President's plan, and actually supports the diplomatic and economic aspects of his plan.
Finally, some Senators have suggested that our resolution either fails to support the troops, or threatens a cut-off in funding. Actually, our resolution does neither. It states forcefully our support for the troops: whereas, over 137,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United States Armed Forces, and are deserving of our support of all Americans, which they have strongly; whereas, many American service personnel have lost their lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor their families.
And our resolution, specifically protects funding for our troops in the field and states: the Congress should not take any action that will endanger United States military forces in the field, including the elimination or reduction of funds for troops in the field, as such an action with respect to funding would undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned missions.
In sum, our resolution aims not to contravene the Constitutional authorities as Commander-in-Chief, but, rather, to accept the offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007 that, ``if members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust.''
It is clear that the United States' strategy and operations in Iraq can only be sustained and achieved with support from the American people and with a level of bipartisanship in Congress.
The purpose of this resolution is not to cut our forces or to set a timetable for withdrawal, but, rather, to express the genuine concerns of a number of Senators from both parties about the President's plan.
It is not meant to be confrontational, but instead to provide a sense of bipartisanship resolve on our new strategy in Iraq. It follows many of the conclusions of the Baker-Hamilton report by focusing on what is truly in our national interest in Iraq, and spells those goals out in detail.
I want to divide our time between colleagues. I will ask at this time that the distinguished Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Hagel, be recognized and that, following his comments, I shall be recognized again to give the remainder of my remarks. I say on a personal note to the Senator how much I valued our conversation over the weekend, together with our distinguished colleague from Maine, after which we decided today to put the language of S. Con. Res. 7 in as an amendment to the pending matter before the Senate.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that very point?
We had in our discussions, and Senator Collins joined in this discussion--that we could not conceive--and that I, this Senator from Virginia, could ever participate in a cutoff-of-funding in regards to this situation in Iraq.
But back to historical precedents. I have this volume, the ``Encyclopedia of the United States Congress,'' compiled by 20 eminent historians in 1995. And on this subject that the Senator addressed, they said the following:
Another informal power of the Congress in the foreign
policy field is the passage of resolutions by the House or
the Senate, often called a sense-of-the-House or sense-of-
the-Senate resolution. Although not legally enforceable, such
resolutions are often taken seriously by the President and
his foreign policy advisers because they are useful
indicators of underlying public concern about important
foreign policy questions. Moreover, as a general rule, the
White House wants to maintain cooperative relations with the
Congress and to give legislators the impression that their
views have been heard and have been taken into account in
policy formulation.
Clear documentation of the Senator's points in this very erudite resource of the history of the Congress. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, before the Senator leaves the floor, I have another point of history. I find this fascinating. I hope, hereafter, colleagues, pundits, and writers will at least recognize that, and I repeat it. Senate Historian documents confirm the Senate has been posing sense-of-the-Senate resolutions since 1789. Thus, our Framers of the Constitution and those who served in the early Congresses recognized the value of this type of resolution.
I yield the floor. I thank my distinguished colleague from Maine, again, for her steadfast support and advice throughout this entire process today, tomorrow, and well into the future.
Mr. President, I thank our colleague. I wonder if I could ask our colleague a question before she departs? She made reference to her trip and the discussions that she had with the senior commanders. I would like to bring to her attention testimony that came before our committee, of which the distinguished Senator from Maine is a member, at which time we heard from the Commander of the United States Central Command, General Abizaid.
In the course of his testimony to Congress on November 15, 2006-- right in the timeframe the Senator made her trip--I will quote him, General Abizaid. The general said:
I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, Corps
Commander, and General Dempsey--we all talked together. And I
said, ``In your professional opinion, if we were to bring in
more American troops now, does it add considerably to our
ability to achieve success in Iraq?'' And they all said no.
And the reason is because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's
easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I
believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from
doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own
future.
I say to my colleague, that quote captured my own visit, which was just barely a month before that, when I came back and I described in my public comments that the situation in Iraq was drifting sideways.
That was a very serious summary. But I said it because I felt obligated to our troops who were fighting bravely and courageously and with a level of professionalism that equals the finest hour in the 200- plus-year history of our military--and the support their families give them. I felt ever so strongly that we were obligated as a country to reexamine our strategy and I called for that reexamination of strategy and it has been done.
But I say to my colleague, General Abizaid's summary about the need for more forces, does that not summarize what you learned on your trip?
Mr. President, I thank our colleague. I wonder if at this point in the colloquy--and then I will yield the floor because I know other Senators are anxious to speak--but we, the United States, the military, and the taxpayers have trained and equipped over 300,000 Iraqi security forces composed of the professional Army, police, border security, and a group of others. The thrust of our resolution originally, and this one that is here, the amendment which is identical, was to give the Iraqis this opportunity, which the Prime Minister himself called for. He said: Give us the opportunity to show that we can do this operation.
That is the basis on which we drew up the resolution. And in our resolution we said two things: The responsibility for Iraq's internal security and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces. Then, specifically we said in the conclusion: The United States military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to the goals that are enumerated in the previous paragraph and should charge--I repeat--charge the Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence, and that is in the Baghdad operation.
So I think those facts, our resolution, now referred to as an amendment, absolutely parallels what we learned firsthand on our trips into that region.
Mr. President, I see other Senators are waiting. I see the distinguished senior Senator from Maine, Ms. Snowe.
Mr. President, I thank our distinguished colleague from Maine.
I ask for 2 minutes.
I thank the Senator from Maine. The Senator mentioned the bipartisan spirit. I am very pleased to state that Senator Levin, whom I spoke with this afternoon, Senator Ben Nelson, who has been with us steadily on this, and Senator Biden allowed with very extensive enthusiasm to
have their names attached as cosponsors.
I thank my colleagues who have come over and participated in this debate and others who have listened. I thank the distinguished Senator, my good friend from Nebraska, for working so hard on this amendment. We will fight on.
We may be idealists, but we will fight on for what we believe in and the integrity of this institution because we firmly believe, to the extent we can, forging a bipartisan consensus is the extent to which we can hopefully regain the full confidence of the American people on what we are doing in Iraq.
I agree with the President, we should not let it slip into a chaotic situation, but we do have some different constructive thoughts as to our strategy ahead.
I yield the floor.