Mr. President, I wonder if I could add a word to my two distinguished colleagues. I have had the good fortune--and it is good fortune--to have visited every State in the United States and the territories in my nearly 82 years of wonderful…
Mr. President, I wonder if I could add a word to my two distinguished colleagues. I have had the good fortune--and it is good fortune--to have visited every State in the United States and the territories in my nearly 82 years of wonderful life that the good Lord has given me. I would think every American would deem, every American who has a feeling for the outside and the magnificent beauty of nature, that their education would not be complete unless they visit Alaska and see with their own eyes and breathe the air, see the water, all the magnificent beauty. I have enjoyed a number of trips to Alaska, largely sponsored by my dear friend Senator Stevens, through the years. We have been there together many times, many times in connection with the U.S. military, which finds a wonderful home in Alaska. Alaskans have taken such good care of them.
But you have a great strength. Those of us in the Senate are proud to serve with two fine Senators from the great State of Alaska.
Mr. President, I ask at this point in time if I could address the FISA bill. Is that the pending business or may I ask to speak on that business now?
So it is appropriate at this time to deliver remarks with regard to that bill?
I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, this is one of the most important subjects I have had the privilege of addressing in my 30-some years in the Senate. I and many others will rise in connection with this bill in support of the FISA Amendments Act. It is a critical piece of legislation for America's present and future security. It achieves an important balance between protecting civil liberties and ensuring that our dedicated intelligence professionals have the capabilities they need to protect this Nation.
Currently, Admiral McConnell is Director of our intelligence system. I have had the privilege of knowing him for over 30 years, working with him. We are fortunate that he and General Hayden and many others are carrying the torch for our Nation's intelligence. They have worked very hard on this piece of legislation, as has my dear colleague from Missouri, Senator Bond. I am on the Intelligence Committee. He has done a splendid job in negotiating the conference--hopefully, what will be a settlement. He was supported by our chairman, Senator Rockefeller. It has been a team, with the two of them achieving the juncture we are at now in the consideration of this bill.
The bill ensures that the intelligence capabilities provided by the Protect America Act, enacted in August of 2007, remain sealed in statute. I cannot overemphasize how important that is to ensuring our Nation's security. I wish to underscore, once again, the importance of legal protection for the telecommunications carriers that have voluntarily--underline voluntarily--come
forth for the private sector and have assisted our Government with the terrorist surveillance program, commonly referred to as TSP, which was originated and authorized by the President under appropriate sections, in my judgment, of the Constitution, particularly article II.
I wish to emphasize that I was privileged to be Secretary of the Navy in the period of the 1970s, when the All-Volunteer Force was conceived. That force of young men and women, each of whom raised their hands and said, I volunteer to serve in uniform, is not unlike the issue today with elements of corporate America, the private sector, who have come forward to volunteer to assist this Government in performing the intelligence responsibilities undertaken which guarantee the freedoms and safety we enjoy every day here at home. The extensive evidence made available to the Senate Intelligence Committee shows that carriers that participated in this program relied upon our Government's assurances that their actions were legal, authorized by the President, and in the best interests of the security of our Nation.
In brief, our Government provided the carriers with essential assurances, and the carriers responded to our Government's request for help. These carriers must be protected from costly and damaging lawsuits. Such lawsuits could end the current level of participation in the vital intelligence programs by these carriers and will likely deter other companies and private citizens who might like to step forward and volunteer in helping us protect ourselves by virtue of the essential intelligence we must monitor and collect every day. After all, these carriers are corporations in most instances, if not all. They are beholden, the executives of these corporations, to the stockholders. That is the system of free enterprise we have in the United States. Consequently, they, on behalf of their stockholders--and the stockholders could be the pension funds, could be a stock held by any number of people and entities in our system of Government--are coming forth simply asking for codification of assurances having been given by the Government so they can go back to their stockholders and explain that: We are doing this to protect America. We now have, by virtue of the actions of the Congress, signed and sealed by the President, the law that will protect your interests in this country from lawsuits which have no foundation in law.
I would like to share a ``Dear Colleague'' letter which all Members of our Chamber some months ago received from the esteemed chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senators Rockefeller and Bond.
I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the letter be printed in the Record following my remarks.
The letter discussed the Senate Intelligence Committee's extensive and bipartisan review of the TSP, which included dozens of briefings, hearings, and interviews, as well as extensive document reviews. As a result of this more than 10-month comprehensive examination, the committee concluded--and I quote what was written and published to our colleagues by the committee--
Irrespective of one's opinion of the President's reliance
on Article II authority to justify the TSP, those companies
that assisted with the TSP did so in good faith and based
upon the written--
I repeat: ``written representations''--
from the highest levels of government that the program was
lawful. The Committee's bill reported out on a strong,
bipartisan vote of 13-2--
I wish to repeat that. That is a strong vote. I have served on the Intelligence Committee. This is my third tour of duty, you might say, given that we have, under our leadership, stipulated periods to serve. That is a big, strong vote. At one time, I was ranking member, as is Mr. Bond, of that committee, and that is about as strong a vote as you can get among the diversity of the wonderful people who have, throughout my years in the Senate, served on that committee.
[That vote] reflects our determination that companies that
cooperated with the government in good faith should be
protected from time-consuming and expensive litigation. It is
a matter of fundamental fairness.
End quote by the committee.
Another item which played a key role in my thinking about the issue was a thoughtful article published in a newspaper by private citizens with past distinguished careers in public service relating to intelligence. The first is Benjamin Civiletti, U.S. Attorney General under President Jimmy Carter; followed by Dick Thornburgh, U.S. Attorney General under President George Herbert Walker Bush; and Judge William Webster, a very distinguished gentleman I have known personally for many years, former Director of the CIA and former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Now, there are three diverse public servants, with different political backgrounds, but they came together for the common purpose of trying to strengthen America's intelligence system. The article, entitled ``Surveillance Sanity,'' appeared in the October 31, 2007, edition of the Wall Street Journal. I have spoken on the floor previously about this article and their contribution, but because of its direct relevance to the issue we are now deliberating on and hopefully will vote on today, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the article be printed in the Record following my remarks.
Let me share with you some of their thoughts. Regarding the Intelligence Committee's carefully crafted and limited liability provision, which is very similar to the provision in the bill currently before us, these three distinguished public servants--now private citizens--said:
We agree with the Committee. Dragging phone companies
through protracted litigation would not only be unfair, but
it would deter other companies and private citizens from
responding in terrorist emergencies whenever there may be
uncertainty or level risk.
Unfortunately, our committee has already heard testimony that without such protections, some companies believe they can no longer continue their cooperation and assistance to our American Government, particularly the intelligence sections.
Messrs. Civiletti, Thornburgh, and Webster also wrote:
The government alone cannot protect us from the threats we
face today. We must have the help of all of our citizens.
There will be times when the lives of thousands of Americans
will depend on whether corporations such as airlines or banks
are willing to lend assistance. If we do not treat them
fairly when they respond to assurances from the highest
levels of the government that their help is legal and
essential for saving lives, then we will be radically
reducing our society's capacity to defend itself.
That is very strong language, very clear language. I urge my colleagues, once again, to look at their article.
As the Senate considers this bill, it should reject any amendments which would put the carriers and their millions of shareholders in legal limbo, waiting while the Government litigates unrelated constitutional claims. Lawsuits against the companies would likely continue in the interim which would: have negative ramifications on our intelligence sources and methods; likely harm the business reputations of these companies; and cause the companies to reconsider their participation--or worse--cause them to terminate their cooperation in the future.
The Senate Intelligence Committee, by a vote of 13 to 2, stated its belief that the carriers acted in good faith and that they deserve to be protected.
Clearly the issue of whether the President acted within his constitutional authority in authorizing the TSP can and should be addressed in a separate context from this bill.
Even the exclusive means provision in this bill favored by my Democratic colleagues in the House and Senate acknowledges the President's constitutional authority in stating that certifications to companies for assistance shall identify the statutory provision on which the certification is based, ``if a certification . . . is based on statutory authority.'' This clearly indicates that the certification could be based on the President's constitutional authority.
But, even if one did not agree that the President acted within his Article II powers, why would anyone want to punish the carriers for something the Government called on them to do and assured them was legal?
Individuals who believe that the Government violated the civil liberties can pursue legal action against the Government, and the bill before us does nothing to limit that legal recourse.
As stated so eloquently by Messrs. Civiletti, Thornburg, and Webster, I quote the following:
Whether the government has acted properly is a different
question from whether a private person has acted properly in
responding to the government's call for help. . . . Because a
private person cannot have all the information necessary to
assess the propriety of the government's actions, he must be
able to rely on official assurances about need and legality.
I strongly believe that the President did act within his Article II executive branch authority in authorizing this program. Even the exclusive means provision in this bill favored by my Democratic Colleagues in the House and Senate acknowledges the President's constitutional authority in stating that certifications to companies for assistance shall identify the statutory provision on which the certification is based ``if a certification . . . is based on statutory authority.'' This clearly indicates the certification could be based on the President's constitutional authority.
But even if one did not agree that the President acted--acted--within the confines of the U.S. Constitution--particularly article II outlines the executive branch's power under the President--why would anyone want to punish the carriers for something the Government called on them to do and assured them was legal? Individuals who believe the Government violated their civil liberties can pursue legal action against the Government, and the bill before us does nothing--I repeat: does nothing--to prohibit a citizen to bring that legal recourse against their Government, the U.S. Government.
As stated so eloquently in the Messrs. Civiletti, Thornburgh, and Webster document, I further quote:
Whether the government has acted properly is a different
question from whether a private person has acted properly in
responding to the government's call for help. . . . Because a
private person cannot have all the information necessary to
assess the propriety of the government's actions, he must be
able to rely on official assurances about need and legality.
I agree with the conclusions of these three eminent private citizens.
I would like to also call your attention to an important letter sent last week--June 19, 2008--to Senate and House leadership from the Attorney General of the United States and the Director of National Intelligence--that is GEN Michael Mukasey and ADM Michael McConnell-- two distinguished public servants now serving America.
Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record following my remarks.
These gentlemen said:
[P]roviding this liability protection is critical to the
Nation's security.
They confirmed that the intelligence community cannot obtain the intelligence it needs without--I repeat, without--the assistance from these carriers, companies, and other segments of the private sector. They noted:
It is critical that any long-term FISA modernization
legislation contain an effective liability protection
provision.
It should be clear from this letter that the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General of the United States could not support the bill without explicit retroactive legal protection for the carriers and other segments of the private sector.
It is for these reasons that I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 6304, the FISA Amendments Act, as passed by the House, and to vote against any amendments that intend to strip out or alter the critical civil liability provision or any other section of the bill that is essential to our intelligence community.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, February 1, 2008.
Dear Colleagues: The FISA Amendments Act, S. 2248, provides
limited and narrowly-drawn retroactive civil liability
protection to those telecommunication companies that
allegedly assisted the government with the President's
Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). An amendment has been
offered to this Act to strike these liability protections in
favor of ``substitution,'' a legal mechanism for replacing
the companies in the ongoing TSP litigation with the
government.
The Senate Intelligence Committee conducted a comprehensive
and bipartisan review of the President's TSP, including the
issue of carrier liability. The Committee reviewed numerous
documents, including the Department of Justice legal opinions
and the letters from the government to the companies. The
Committee held a number of briefings and hearings involving
government and company officials. The Committee also visited
the National Security Agency to see firsthand how the TSP
worked.
As a result of this extensive review, the Committee
concluded that, irrespective of one's opinion of the
President's reliance on Article II authority to justify the
TSP, those companies that assisted with the TSP did so in
good faith and based upon the written representations from
the highest levels of government that the program was lawful.
The Committee's bill, reported out on a strong, bipartisan
vote of 13-2, reflects our determination that companies that
cooperated with the government in good faith should be
protected from time-consuming and expensive litigation. It is
a matter of fundamental fairness. The Committee rejected the
broad immunity proposal sought by the Administration. Our
limited immunity provision only covers assistance provided
from September 11th to when the TSP was put under court
authorization in January of last year. It does not provide
protection from criminal prosecution or extend protections to
government officials. Any litigation against government
officials will continue.
In concluding that civil liability protection for those
companies was appropriate, the Committee recognized that
allowing the current litigation to continue could: (1)
compromise our intelligence sources and methods through
ongoing discovery and other litigation proceedings; (2)
result in significant loss of business reputation or
financial loss for those companies that participated in good
faith; (3) jeopardize the personal safety of overseas
employees of these companies if it becomes known that the
companies assisted the government in fighting terrorism; (4)
put taxpayers' dollars at risk for dubious legal claims; and
(5) lead to reluctance by these and other companies to
cooperate with legitimate requests for assistance in the
future.
The substitution amendment sponsored by Senators Specter
and Whitehouse does not alleviate any of these concerns. Even
if the companies are removed directly from the litigation,
discovery would still be allowed to proceed against them. In
short, the conduct of the companies would continue to be
litigated, raising significant concerns that their identities
or details about their assistance will be disclosed. Given
the essential role that our private partners play in
intelligence collection, we believe that this is simply too
great a risk to our national security.
We believe, therefore, that the ongoing litigation against
the telecommunication companies should be brought to an
immediate close and that the Intelligence Committee's
bipartisan determination of good faith should stand. We urge
you to support the Intelligence Committee's bill and oppose
any effort to modify or strike its civil liability provision.
Sincerely,
John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman.
Christopher S. Bond,
Vice Chairman.
Exhibit 2
[From the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 2007]
Surveillance Sanity
(By Benjamin Civiletti, Dick Thornburgh and William Webster)
Following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001,
President Bush authorized the National Security Agency to
target al Qaeda communications into and out of the country.
Mr. Bush concluded that this was essential for protecting the
country, that using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
would not permit the necessary speed and agility, and that he
had the constitutional power to authorize such surveillance
without court orders to defend the country.
Since the program became public in 2006, Congress has been
asserting appropriate oversight. Few of those who learned the
details of the program have criticized its necessity.
Instead, critics argued that if the president found FISA
inadequate, he should have gone to Congress and gotten the
changes necessary to allow the program to proceed under court
orders. That process is now underway. The administration has
brought the program under FISA, and the Senate Intelligence
Committee recently reported out a bill with a strong
bipartisan majority of 13-2, that would make the changes to
FISA needed for the program to continue. This bill is now
being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Public disclosure of the NSA program also brought a flood
of class-action lawsuits seeking to impose massive liability
on phone companies for allegedly answering the government's
call for help. The Intelligence Committee has reviewed the
program and has concluded that the companies deserve targeted
protection from these suits. The protection would extend only
to activities
undertaken after 9/11 until the beginning of 2007, authorized
by the president to defend the country from further terrorist
attack, and pursuant to written assurances from the
government that the activities were both authorized by the
president and legal.
We agree with the committee. Dragging phone companies
through protracted litigation would not only be unfair, but
it would deter other companies and private citizens from
responding in terrorist emergencies whenever there may be
uncertainty or legal risk.
The government alone cannot protect us from the threats we
face today. We must have the help of all our citizens. There
will be times when the lives of thousands of Americans will
depend on whether corporations such as airlines or banks are
willing to lend assistance. If we do not treat companies
fairly when they respond to assurances from the highest
levels of the government that their help is legal and
essential for saving lives, then we will be radically
reducing our society's capacity to defend itself.
This concern is particularly acute for our nation's
telecommunications companies. America's front line of defense
against terrorist attack is communications intelligence.
When Americans put their loved ones on planes, send their
children to school, or ride through tunnels and over
bridges, they are counting on the ``early warning'' system
of communications intelligence for their safety.
Communications technology has become so complex that our
country needs the voluntary cooperation of the companies.
Without it, our intelligence efforts will be gravely
damaged.
Whether the government has acted properly is a different
question from whether a private person has acted properly in
responding to the government's call for help. From its
earliest days, the common law recognized that when a public
official calls on a citizen to help protect the community in
an emergency, the person has a duty to help and should be
immune from being hauled into court unless it was clear
beyond doubt that the public official was acting illegally.
Because a private person cannot have all the information
necessary to assess the propriety of the government's
actions, he must be able to rely on official assurances about
need and legality. Immunity is designed to avoid the burden
of protracted litigation, because the prospect of such
litigation itself is enough to deter citizens from providing
critically needed assistance.
As the Intelligence Committee found, the companies clearly
acted in ``good faith.'' The situation is one in which
immunity has traditionally been applied, and thus protection
from this litigation is justified.
First, the circumstances clearly showed that there was a
bona fide threat to ``national security.'' We had suffered
the most devastating attacks in our history, and Congress had
declared the attacks ``continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat'' to the country. It would have been
entirely reasonable for the companies to credit government
representations that the nation faced grave and immediate
threat and that their help was needed to protect American
lives.
Second, the bill's protections only apply if assistance was
given in response to the president's personal authorization,
communicated in writing along with assurances of legality.
That is more than is required by FISA, which contains a safe-
harbor authorizing assistance based solely on a certification
by the attorney general, his designee, or a host of more
junior law enforcement officials that no warrant is required.
Third, the ultimate legal issue--whether the president was
acting within his constitutional powers--is not the kind of
question a private party can definitively determine. The
companies were not in a position to say that the government
was definitely wrong.
Prior to FISA's 1978 enactment, numerous federal courts
took it for granted that the president has constitutional
power to conduct warrantless surveillance to protect the
nation's security. In 2002, the FISA Court of Review, while
not dealing directly with the NSA program, stated that FISA
could not limit the president's constitutional powers. Given
this, it cannot be said that the companies acted in bad faith
in relying on the government's assurances of legality.
For hundreds of years our legal system has operated under
the premise that, in a public emergency, we want private
citizens to respond to the government's call for help unless
the citizen knows for sure that the government is acting
illegally. If Congress does not act now, it would be
basically saying that private citizens should only help when
they are absolutely certain that all the government's actions
are legal. Given the threats we face in today's world, this
would be a perilous policy.
Exhibit 3
June 19, 2008.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Speaker: This letter presents the views of the
Administration on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (``FISA'') Amendments Act of 2008 (H.R. 6304). The
bill would modernize FISA to reflect changes in
communications technology since the Act was first passed 30
years ago. The amendments would provide the Intelligence
Community with the tools it needs to collect the foreign
intelligence necessary to secure our Nation while protecting
the civil liberties of Americans. The bill would also provide
the necessary legal protections for those companies sued
because they are believed to have helped the Government
prevent terrorist attacks in the aftermath of September 11.
Because this bill accomplishes these two goals essential to
any effort to modernize FISA, we strongly support passage of
this bill and will recommend that the President sign it.
Last August, Congress took an important step toward
modernizing FISA by enacting the Protect America Act of 2007.
That Act allowed us temporarily to close intelligence gaps by
enabling our intelligence professionals to collect, without
having to first obtain a court order, foreign intelligence
information from targets overseas. The Act has enabled us to
gather significant intelligence critical to protecting our
Nation. It has also been implemented in a responsible way,
subject to extensive executive, congressional, and judicial
oversight in order to protect the country in a manner
consistent with safeguarding Americans' civil liberties.
Since passage of the Act, the Administration has worked
closely with Congress to address the need for longterm FISA
modernization. This joint effort has involved compromises on
both sides, but we believe that it has resulted in a strong
bill that will place the Nation's foreign intelligence effort
in this area on a firm, long-term foundation. Below, we have
set forth our views on certain important provisions of H.R.
6304.
Title I--Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Title I of H.R. 6304 contains key authorities that would
ensure that our intelligence agencies have the tools they
need to collect vital foreign intelligence information and
would provide significant safeguards for the civil liberties
of Americans.
Court Approval. With respect to authorizations for foreign
intelligence surveillance directed at foreign targets outside
the United States, the bill provides that the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) would review
certifications made by the Attorney General and the Director
of National Intelligence relating to these acquisitions, the
reasonableness of the procedures used by the Intelligence
Community to ensure the targets are overseas, and the
minimization procedures used to protect the privacy
of Americans. The scope of the FISC's review is carefully
and rightly crafted to focus on aspects of the acquisition
that may affect the privacy rights of Americans so as not
to confer quasi-constitutional rights on foreign
terrorists and other foreign intelligence targets outside
the United States.
We have been clear that any satisfactory bill could not
require individual court orders to target non-United States
persons outside the United States, nor could a bill establish
a court-approval mechanism that would cause the Intelligence
Community to lose valuable foreign intelligence while
awaiting such approval. H.R. 6304 would do neither and would
retain for the Intelligence Community the speed and agility
that it needs to protect the Nation. The bill would establish
a schedule for court approval of certifications and
procedures relating to renewals of existing acquisition
authority. A critical feature of the H.R. 6304 would allow
existing acquisitions, which were the subject of court review
under the Protect America Act or will be the subject of such
review under the H.R. 6304, to continue pending court review.
With respect to new acquisitions, absent exigent
circumstances, Court review of new procedures and
certifications would take place before the Government begins
the acquisition. The exigent circumstances exception is
critical to allowing the Intelligence Community to respond
swiftly to changing circumstances when the Attorney General
and the Director of National Intelligence determine that
intelligence may be lost or not timely acquired. Such exigent
circumstances could arise in certain situations where an
unexpected gap has opened in our intelligence collection
efforts. Taken together, these provisions would enable the
Intelligence Community to keep closed the intelligence gaps
that existed before the passage of the Protect America Act
and ensure that it will have the opportunity to collect
critical foreign intelligence information in the future.
Exclusive means. H.R. 6304 contains an exclusive means
provision that goes beyond the exclusive means provision that
was passed as part of FISA. As we have previously stated, we
believe that the provision will complicate the ability of
Congress to pass, in an emergency situation, a law to
authorize immediate collection of communications in the
aftermath of an attack or in response to a grave threat to
the national security. Unlike other versions of this
provision, however, the one in this bill would not restrict
the authority of the Government to conduct necessary
surveillance for intelligence and law enforcement purposes in
a way that would harm national security.
Oversight and Protections for the Civil Liberties of
Americans. H.R. 6304 contains numerous provisions that
protect the civil liberties of Americans and allow for
extensive executive, congressional, and judicial oversight of
the use of the authorities. The bill would require the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to
conduct semiannual assessments of compliance with targeting
procedures and minimization procedures and to submit those
assessments to the FISC and to Congress. The FISC and
Congress would also receive annual reviews relating to those
acquisitions prepared by the heads of agencies that use the
authorities
contained in the bill. Congress would receive reviews from
the Inspectors General of these agencies and of the
Department of Justice regarding compliance with the
provisions of the bill. In addition, the bill would require
the Attorney General to submit to Congress a report at
least semiannually concerning the implementation of the
authorities provided by the bill and would expand the
categories of FISA-related court documents that the
Government must provide to the congressional intelligence
and judiciary committees.
Title I also includes provisions that would protect the
civil liberties of Americans. For instance, the bill would
require for the first time that a court order be obtained to
conduct foreign intelligence surveillance outside the United
States of an American abroad. Historically, Executive Branch
procedures guided the conduct of surveillance of a U.S.
person overseas, such as when a U.S. person acts as an agent
of a foreign power, e.g., spying on behalf of a foreign
government. Given the complexity of extending judicial review
to activities outside the United States, these provisions
were carefully crafted with Congress to ensure that such
review can be accomplished while preserving the necessary
flexibility for intelligence operations. Other provisions of
the bill address concerns that some voiced about the Protect
America Act, such as clarifying that the Government cannot
``reverse target'' without a court order and requiring that
the Attorney General establish guidelines to prevent this
from occurring. We believe that, taken together, these
provisions will allow for ample oversight of the use of these
new authorities and ensure that the privacy and civil
liberties of Americans are well protected.
II. Title II--Protections for Electronic Communications Service
Providers
Title II of the bill contains, among other provisions,
vital protections for electronic communications service
providers who assist the Intelligence Community's efforts to
protect the Nation from terrorism and other foreign
intelligence threats. Title II would provide liability
protection related to future assistance while ensuring the
protection of sources and methods. Importantly, the bill
would also provide the necessary legal protection for those
companies who are sued only because they are believed to have
helped the Government with communications intelligence
activities in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
The framework contained in the bill for obtaining
retroactive liability protection is narrowly tailored. An
action must be dismissed if the Attorney General certifies to
the district court in which the action is pending that
either: (i) the electronic communications service provider
did not provide the assistance; or (ii) the assistance was
provided in the wake of the September 11 attack and was the
subject of a written request or series of requests from a
senior Government official indicating that the activity was
authorized by the President and determined to be lawful. The
district court would be required to review this certification
before dismissing the action, and the provision allows for
the participation of the parties to the lawsuit in a manner
consistent with the protection of classified information. The
liability protection provision does not extend to the
Government or to Government officials and it does not
immunize any criminal conduct.
Providing this liability protection is critical to the
Nation's security. As the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence recognized, ``the intelligence community cannot
obtain the intelligence it needs without assistance from
these companies.'' That committee also recognized that
companies in the future may be less willing to assist
the Government if they face the threat of private lawsuits
each time they are believed to have provided assistance.
Finally, allowing litigation over these matters risks the
disclosure of highly classified information regarding
intelligence sources and methods. As we have stated on
many occasions, it is critical that any long-term FISA
modernization legislation contain an effective liability
protection provision. H.R. 6304 contains just such a
provision and for this reason, as well as those expressed
with respect to Title I above, we strongly support its
passage.
III. Title III--Review of Previous Actions
Title III would require the Inspectors General of the
Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and of certain elements of the Intelligence
Community to review certain communications surveillance
activities, including the Terrorist Surveillance Program
described by the President. Although improvements have been
made over prior versions of this provision, we believe, as we
have written before, that it is unnecessary in light of the
Inspector General reviews previously completed, those already
underway, and the congressional intelligence and judiciary
committee oversight already conducted. Nevertheless, we do
not believe that, as currently drafted, the provision would
create unacceptable operational concerns. The bill contains
important provisions to make clear that such reviews should
not duplicate reviews already conducted by Inspectors
General.
IV. Title IV--other Provisions
Title IV contains important provisions that will ensure
that the transition between the current authorities and the
authorities provided in this bill will not have a detrimental
effect on intelligence operations.
Title IV also states that the authorities in the bill
sunset at the end 2012. We have long favored permanent
modernization of FISA. The Intelligence Community operates
more effectively when the rules governing our intelligence
professionals' ability to track our enemies are firmly
established. Stability of law also allows the Intelligence
Community to invest resources appropriately. Congress has
extensively debated and considered the need to modernize FISA
since 2006, a process that has involved numerous hearings,
briefings, and floor debates. The process has been valuable
and necessary, but it has also involved the discussion in
open settings of extraordinary information dealing with
sensitive intelligence operations. Every time we repeat this
process it risks exposing our intelligence sources and
methods to our adversaries. Although we would prefer that
H.R. 6304 contain no sunset, a sunset in 2012 is
significantly longer than others that were proposed and it is
long enough to avoid impairing the effectiveness of
intelligence operations.
Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on this
crucial bill. We reiterate our sincere appreciation to the
Congress for working with us on H.R. 6304, a long-term FISA
modernization bill that will strengthen the Nation's
intelligence capabilities while respecting and protecting the
constitutional rights of Americans. We strongly support its
prompt passage.
Sincerely,
Michael B. Mukasey,
Attorney General.
J.M. McConnell,
Director of National Intelligence.