Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. I understand that we can now begin the 30 minutes of debate running up to the vote on the Graham-Kyl amendment? Let me start by offering a few comments…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
I understand that we can now begin the 30 minutes of debate running up to the vote on the Graham-Kyl amendment?
Let me start by offering a few comments about why this amendment is important. But, first, to put it into context, we have made a lot of progress. We have come a long way toward securing the border and stopping the problem of illegal entry into our country. But we have a long way to go.
This amendment is designed to continue the progress that we have been making with funding that is necessary for that. Just to put a little context here, for example, in 1994 we had 4,000 Border Patrol agents for the entire border. We now have over 15,000. But we still know there are way too many incursions into the United States and more Border Patrol will help to end that.
We gave the Department of Homeland Security an extra $1.2 billion to pay for those Border Patrol agents, as well as fencing and vehicle barriers, detention space, and the like.
Secretary Chertoff just visited my State of Arizona last week. And he reports in addition to the Border Patrol hiring that I mentioned and the addition of some detention space they are on track to complete 70 miles of fencing by the end of this year. With the additional money this amendment will provide for next year, they will be able to complete at least 371 miles of fencing along the entire Mexican border.
This is not just a fence. Some people say: Well, if you build a 10- foot-high fence, they will come in with an 11-foot ladder. That is a cute refrain, but the reality is, this fencing I have seen built down on the Barry Goldwater Gunnery Range just east of Yuma is double fencing. They have to have a very heavy pile driver to drive these steel beams into the ground and attach steel flanges to the side. You cannot get through there. Now lizards and critters can get through, so from an environmental standpoint, it is actually a good thing, but people cannot get through. And, importantly, that, combined with vehicle barriers, which are also large railroad tie-type structures put into the ground to prevent vehicles from coming across, is particularly important because it is the vehicles that bring the drugs. Of course, they can bring larger numbers of immigrants. But the reality is, where you have vehicles, most likely you have weapons and you have drugs. And, of course, where that is involved, you are putting in danger the lives of our Border Patrol and other Federal officers and making it more likely that the value of the contraband coming across is going to be significant, thus driving these smugglers into more desperate measures to protect it.
Violence across the entire southern border has increased significantly. With the double fencing, there is a road in between. And the point of fencing is to slow down those who might find a way to get over the fence. The reality is, with additional vehicles, with additional Border Patrol, and this kind of fencing, what you can create is a situation where, by the time someone may have gotten over the first fence, the sensors and the cameras will have alerted Border Patrol, and they are stationed at close enough intervals that on the road in between, Border Patrol can get to the site and pick up the illegal entrants. So that is why this kind of fencing is so important.
As I said, with the money that is provided in this amendment that is before us right now, we will be able to complete at least 370 miles of fencing along the southern border by the end of next year.
We need additional detention space. In Del Rio, TX, in Yuma, AZ, there are programs already that apprehend illegal immigrants. When they have been apprehended more than once, they are put into detention immediately. Now, about 85 percent of the illegal immigrants just want to come here to work. The other 15 percent are criminals, and some are very serious criminals. You need to detain them.
But it is also helpful to detain those who have come across repeatedly to find work. Why? They cannot afford 60 days in jail where they are not providing for their families. And it is a great incentive for them to decide not to cross the border anymore because if they are going to get put in jail, then they are not going to be able to provide the money to their families that they came across here in the first instance to provide.
So those programs have reduced the immigration in those areas dramatically. But we need more detention spaces for this particular kind of detention. Again, this $3 billion will help to provide that. It can help to provide more prosecutors and public defenders and judges because once you have detention, of course, you also may have criminal trials and you may need to have the entire chain of the criminal justice system funded.
In addition, this funding that we will be providing in this amendment will help to improve the verification system that employers are required to use, the so-called E-Verify system, to make sure it is operating accurately at full capacity.
This is particularly important in my State because, frustrated by the lack of action by the Federal Government to have a good system, our State passed a law that will provide serious sanctions on employers who hire illegal immigrants. But they have to rely on the Federal system to make that determination. It is not, right now, in the best of shape. It needs to be improved. The capacity is there, but the ability to determine valid identity is not. So money in this bill will help to get the Federal system into a position that States could rely on in order to enforce their own State laws against hiring illegal immigrants.
So there is much more that this $3 billion provides. But I wanted to thank my colleague, Senator Graham, for his work in making sure, whether it is on the Department of Homeland Security bill or this bill, we make sure, one way or the other, that we will have the funding to continue to work to secure the border and to make sure that we can stop the illegal immigration into this country that has created so many problems for us.
I yield the floor.
I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, my colleague John McCain cannot be here today. He has a statement with respect to the Feingold amendment that I ask unanimous consent be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
I join my colleague Senator McCain in opposing the amendment and wish to read three paragraphs of his statement, and then the rest of it will be in the Record for all to see:
Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered by my good
friend, the Senator from Wisconsin.
The pending amendment would mandate a withdrawal of U.S.
combat forces from Iraq and cut off funds for our troops
after June 30, 2008. The one exception would be for a small
force authorized only to carry out narrowly defined missions.
The Senate, once again, faces a simple choice: Do we build
on the successes of our new strategy and give General
Petraeus and the troops under his command the time and
support needed to carry out their mission, or do we ignore
the realities on the ground and legislate a premature end to
our efforts in Iraq, accepting thereby all the terrible
consequences that will ensue?
That is the choice we must make, Mr. President, and though
politics and popular opinion may be pushing us in one
direction, we have a greater responsibility, the duty to make
decisions with the security of this great and good nation
foremost in our minds. We now have the benefit of the long
anticipated testimony delivered by General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker, testimony that reported unambiguously
that the new strategy is succeeding in Iraq. Understanding
what we now know--that our military is making progress on the
ground, and that their commanders request from us the time
and support necessary to succeed in Iraq--it is inconceivable
that we in Congress would end this strategy just as it is
beginning to show real results.
Those are the first three paragraphs of the statement from Senator McCain. I join him in opposing the amendment and express his regret at not being able to be here for this debate.
Exhibit 1
Amendment No. 3164 to the DOD Appropriations Act for FY 2008: Cutoff of
Funds for Iraq
(Statement of Senator John McCain, October 3, 2007)
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered
by my good friend, the Senator from Wisconsin.
The pending amendment would mandate a withdrawal of U.S.
combat forces from Iraq and cut off funds for our troops
after June 30, 2008. The one exception would be for a small
force authorized only to carry out narrowly defined missions.
The Senate, once again, faces a simple choice: Do we build
on the successes of our new strategy and give General
Petraeus and the troops under his command the time and
support needed to carry out their mission, or do we ignore
the realities on the ground and legislate a premature end to
our efforts in Iraq, accepting thereby all the terrible
consequences that will ensue?
That is the choice we must make, Mr. President, and though
politics and popular opinion may be pushing us in one
direction, we have a greater responsibility, the duty to make
decisions with the security of this great and good Nation
foremost in our minds. We now have the benefit of the long
anticipated testimony delivered by General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker, testimony that reported unambiguously
that the new strategy is succeeding in Iraq. Understanding
what we now know--that our military is making progress on the
ground, and that their commanders request from us the time
and support necessary to succeed in Iraq--it is inconceivable
that we in Congress would end this strategy just as it is
beginning to show real results.
We see today that, after nearly 4 years of mismanaged war,
the situation on the ground in Iraq is showing demonstrable
signs of progress. The final reinforcements needed to
implement General Petraeus' new counterinsurgency plan have
been in place for over 3 months and our military, in
cooperation with the Iraqi security forces, is making
significant gains in a number of areas.
General Petraeus reported in detail on these gains during
his testimony in both houses and in countless interviews. The
number two U.S. commander in Iraq, LTG Ray Odierno, has said
that the seven-and-a-half-month-old security operation has
reduced violence in Baghdad by some 50 percent, that car
bombs and suicide attacks in Baghdad have fallen to their
lowest level in a year, and that civilian casualties have
dropped from a high of 32 per day to 12 per day. His comments
were echoed by LTG Abboud Qanbar, the Iraqi commander, who
said that before the surge began, one third of Baghdad's 507
districts were under insurgent control. Today, he said,
``only five to six districts can be called hot areas.''
None of this is to argue that Baghdad or other regions have
suddenly become safe, or that violence has come down to
acceptable levels. As General Odierno pointed out, violence
is still too high and there are many unsafe areas.
Nevertheless, such positive developments illustrate General
Petraeus' contention that American and Iraqi forces have
achieved substantial progress under their new strategy.
The road in Iraq remains, as it always has been, long and
hard. The Maliki government remains paralyzed and unwilling
to function as it must, and other difficulties abound. No one
can guarantee success or be certain about its prospects. We
can be sure, however, that should the United States Congress
succeed in terminating the strategy by legislating an abrupt
withdrawal and a transition to a new, less effective and more
dangerous course--should we do that, Mr. President, then we
will fail for certain.
Let us make no mistake about the costs of such an American
failure in Iraq. Should the Congress force a precipitous
withdrawal from Iraq, it would mark a new beginning, the
start of a new, more dangerous effort to contain the forces
unleashed by our disengagement. If we leave, we will be
back--in Iraq and elsewhere--in many more desperate fights to
protect our security and at an even greater cost in American
lives and treasure.
In his testimony before the Armed Services Committee in
September, General Petraeus referred to an August Defense
Intelligence Agency report that stated, `` * * * a rapid
withdrawal would result in the further release of strong
centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous
results, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi
Security Forces; a rapid deterioration of local security
initiatives; al Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom
of maneuver; a marked increase in violence and further
ethnosectarian displacement and refugee flows; and
exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics,
especially with respect to Iran.''
Those are the likely consequences of a precipitous
withdrawal, and I hope that the supporters of such a move
will tell us how they intend to address the chaos and
catastrophe that would surely follow such a course of action.
Should this amendment become law, and U.S. troops begin
withdrawing, do they believe that Iraq will become more or
less stable? That the Iraqi people become more or less safe?
That genocide becomes a more remote possibility or ever
likelier? That al Qaeda will find it easier to gather, plan,
and carry out attacks from Iraqi soil, or that our withdrawal
will somehow make this less likely?
No matter where my colleagues came down in 2003 about the
centrality of Iraq to the war on terror, there can simply be
no debate that our efforts in Iraq today are critical to the
wider struggle against violent Islamic extremism. Last month,
General Jim Jones testified before the Armed Services
Committee and outlined what he believes to be the
consequences of such a course: `` . . . a precipitous
departure which results in a failed state in Iraq,'' he said,
``will have a significant boost in the numbers of extremists,
jihadists . . . in the world, who will believe that they will
have toppled the major power on Earth and that all else is
possible. And I think it will not only make us less safe; it
will make our friends and allies less safe. And the struggle
will continue. It will simply be done in different and in
other areas.''
Should we leave Iraq before there is a basic level of
stability, we invite chaos, genocide, terrorist safehavens
and regional war. We invite further Iranian influence at a
time when Iranian operatives are already moving weapons,
training fighters, providing resources, and helping plan
operations to kill American soldiers and damage our efforts
to bring stability to Iraq. If any of my colleagues remain
unsure of Iran's intentions in the region, may I direct them
to the recent remarks of
the Iranian president, who said: ``The political power of the
occupiers is collapsing rapidly . . . Soon, we will see a
huge power vacuum in the region. Of course, we are prepared
to fill the gap.'' If our notions of national security have
any meaning, they cannot include permitting the establishment
of an Iranian dominated Middle East that is roiled by wider
regional war and riddled with terrorist safehavens.
The supporters of this amendment respond that they do not
by any means intend to cede the battlefield to al Qaeda; on
the contrary, their legislation would allow U.S. forces,
presumably holed up in forward operating bases, to carry out
``operations against al Qaeda and affiliated international
terrorist organizations.'' But such a provision draws a false
distinction between terrorism and sectarian violence. Let us
think about the implications of ordering American soldiers to
target ``terrorists,'' but not those who foment sectarian
violence. Was the attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra a
terrorist operation or the expression of sectarian violence?
When the Madhi Army attacks government police stations, are
they acting as terrorists or as a militia? When AQI attacks a
Shia village along the Diyala River, is that terrorism or
sectarian violence? What about when an American soldier comes
across some unknown assailant burying an lED in the road?
Must he check for an al Qaeda identity card before
responding?
The obvious answer is that such acts very often constitute
terrorism in Iraq and sectarian violence in Iraq. The two are
deeply intertwined. To try and make an artificial distinction
between terrorism and sectarian violence is to fundamentally
misunderstand al Qaeda's strategy--which is to incite
sectarian violence. Our military commanders say that trying
to artificially separate counterterrorism from
counterinsurgency will not succeed, and that moving in with
search and destroy missions to kill and capture terrorists,
only to immediately cede the territory to the enemy, is the
failed strategy of the past 4 years. We should not, and must
not, return to such a disastrous course.
The strategy that General Petraeus has put into place--a
traditional counterinsurgency strategy that emphasizes
protecting the population, which gets our troops out of the
bases and into the areas they are trying to protect, and
which supplies sufficient force levels to carry out the
mission--that strategy is the correct one. It has become
clear by now that we cannot set a date for withdrawal without
setting a date for surrender.
Mr. President, this fight is about Iraq but not about Iraq
alone. It is greater than that and more important still,
about whether America still has the political courage to
fight for victory or whether we will settle for defeat, with
all of the terrible things that accompany it. We cannot walk
away gracefully from defeat in this war.
Consider just one final statement from the August National
Intelligence Estimate. It reads:
``We assess that changing the mission of the Coalition
forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization
role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and
counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from establishing
a safehaven would erode any security gains achieved thus
far.''
Should we pass this amendment, we would erode the security
gains that our brave men and women have fought so hard to
achieve and embark on the road of surrender. For the sake of
American interests, our national values, the future of Iraq
and the stability of the Middle East, we must not send our
country down this disastrous course. All of us want our
troops to come home, and to come home as soon as possible.
But we should want our soldiers to return to us with honor,
the honor of victory that is due all of those who have paid
with the ultimate sacrifice. We have many responsibilities to
the people who elected us, but one responsibility outweighs
all the others, and that is to protect this great and good
Nation from all enemies foreign and domestic. I urge my
colleagues to vote no on the Feingold amendment.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to send two amendments to the desk and lay aside the pending business.
The first amendment is No. 3144 and the second one is No. 3145.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendments be dispensed with.
These will be pending separately, not together.
Mr. President, I will be happy to speak. I believe the Senator from Delaware was going to speak. If he wants to speak now, I will be happy to defer to him.
Mr. President, I hope both of these amendments can be worked out, but we haven't been able to work the first one out yet. I will not take very long, but I understood the Senator from Delaware was here and prepared to talk about his amendment. I am happy to defer to him and discuss mine later.
Mr. President, I rise to speak on an amendment I offered a little bit earlier this afternoon, No. 3144. This amendment has been mischaracterized and, unfortunately, is obviously misunderstood. It happens to be in the missile defense part of the budget. I would be happy to have it included in a different part of the budget if it would make it clearer to people that it is not solely a missile defense program. In fact, in my view, the key value of a space-based test bed is not its ability to enhance missile defense but its unique ability to protect our satellites against a very significant threat posed to them at this time.
My colleague from North Dakota talked about a threatometer-- hypothetical, perhaps, but a rational way to examine prioritization for defense spending. If there is a relatively low-level threat, we might want to set a lower priority in funding to protect against it than a threat that is of higher possibility. By the same token, if almost everything you do in military activity is dependent on one thing and that one thing is vulnerable, you obviously want to protect that one thing. That is the priority we are not attaching to the defense of our satellites in space, which are critical, vital, of immeasurable importance, not just to everything our military does but a great deal of our economic activity as well. It is the ability to defend our space assets from attacks either on the ground or in space that the space- based test bed is significantly designed to do research work on.
Let us understand, the space-based test bed is merely a research tool to understand concepts that are first developed terrestrially on the ground and, if proof of concept is suggested as potentially valuable, lift it into space to see whether it works there as well, to see whether maybe a defensive system can be devised to protect our satellites in space or to provide protection against intercontinental ballistic missile attack and, if so, to have a program developed and designed and then researched and ultimately perhaps produced and finally deployed, all of which is years down the road.
All we are talking about is a proof of concepts basic research program of only $10 million in cost. To have it zeroed out because of some belief that we don't need to spend any more on missile defense misses the point.
Let me go back to what I was talking about. I received a briefing 2 days ago, a highly classified briefing that, frankly, scares me to death. But there is enough we can talk about that is unclassified to make the point. As I said, almost everything we do in military fighting these days in one way or another depends upon our satellites. Our troops communicating with each other, the Air Force dropping a bomb on a precise location, doing intelligence surveillance, the GPS system which is installed in virtually everything we do now--all of these things are reliant on satellites. That is not to mention all the communications and financial transactions and all of the other things we depend upon every day, every communication device--almost every. I shouldn't say ``every,'' but most of the communications devices we have, whether they are used in the military or in our private lives, the means of sending signals to do things back and forth, the airplanes that fly through the sky--we could go on and on about our society's dependence today on communication from satellites. We have to protect those satellites.
There are a lot of ways of attacking them. They are all relatively cheap. It is called asymmetrical warfare because a country that may not be able to beat us on the battlefield with tanks and planes and submarines and so on knows all it has to do is literally pick up the sand and throw it in our eyes and then we can't fight, no matter how big and strong we are. That is what they do if they knock out our satellite system.
How do you do that? There are a lot of different ways. The Chinese recently demonstrated to us a brute force way. They simply sent a missile up and blew up a satellite. They did that to one of
their old weather satellites. It left a lot of debris in the sky. There are laser technologies to lase the satellite, which can be done from the ground but more effectively, if you can, from space because there you don't have the air disruptions to divert the laser beam. You have directed energy. You have radio kinds of jamming or electronic jamming. This can be done either from the Earth or in the sky or, frankly, from space. Doesn't it make sense for us to have the capability to stop the destruction of our satellite system on the first day of a war where we rely upon all of that to do what we need to do?
Let me take a hypothetical. I don't mean to disparage any particular nation by engaging in a little bit of hypothetical war-gaming here, but it has been no secret that the Chinese Government would like to see Taiwan reunited, in their view--in any event, brought within the Chinese Government sphere. Both the Chinese military and the American military, as well as the Japanese and Taiwanese and others, have developed weaponry that would be useful in any kind of conflict that might evolve in that situation. But it is very clear that the Chinese have thought about how to keep the United States out of such a war for at least 2 or 3 days, giving them the time they would need to actually take over Taiwan. How do you do that? Well, we won't discuss all the ways it could be done, but the Chinese have developed certain weapons that would be problematic for the United States to deal with, one of which is an ability to attack our electronics and our satellites. Right now, we have very little in the way of defense against that. What the space-based test bed concept would do is begin to give us an understanding of what might be possible for part of that defense.
That is not the end of it. We still would have to protect against something like a jammer from the Earth or perhaps a laser from the Earth. But to the extent that a missile launched from the Earth against one of our satellites would pose a threat, space-based test bed research might be able to find a way to stop that. To the extent that it is a Chinese satellite in space, for example, we might be able to find a way to stop it.
It seems to me to make no sense to say that on a threat which may not be the most likely threat in the case of everyday happening but which would be absolutely devastatingly destructive if it ever happened--and it is not hard to postulate a situation in which it could happen--to say we are not going to spend any money on defending our satellites makes no sense to me.
I have heard that one of the reasons some groups are opposed to this is their fear that somehow or other we are going to weaponize space. Let's deal with that right now. First, an intercontinental ballistic missile against the United States or against one of our satellites is a weapon in space. We are not weaponizing space if we try to defend against that. That is a ludicrous argument. We wait until somebody else fires an ICBM against us and then we decide we better defend against that, and if we can somehow get something up into the atmosphere, well, that is a weapon in space, but it is probably a pretty good idea to stop their weapon in space. If we send up an interceptor missile, that is a weapon in space.
Suppose the Chinese decide, instead of destroying one of their weather satellites, they are going to destroy some of our satellites that provide the means of communication and the means of directing weapons and the means of identifying the battlefield and of surveilling it, they are going to destroy some of our satellites by sending up a missile that has already destroyed one of theirs, so it is clearly capable of doing so. Let's say we have found that we can, by using this test bed, provide maneuverability of our satellite so it can move out of the way, or we have found that we can actually add to it a defensive kind of laser or a defensive kind of jamming device that prevents the Chinese missile from actually hitting or destroying the satellite. Why wouldn't we want to do that even if it has some kind of a little steel ball in it that--because of the vacuum in space, it doesn't take a lot of force to get something moving at a very high rate of speed. You could eject that steel ball and have it intercept a missile that is coming up toward the satellite in order to destroy the missile before it can destroy our satellite. What is wrong with thinking about solving the problem?
We are not talking about developing anything. We are not talking about deploying anything. In fact, before you even do more research in space, it would have to be confirmed in concept on the ground. Is there such a fear of defending ourselves that we don't even want to think about how to do it in a situation where it would be critical to an attack against us? I don't understand the argument against this.
Let me make a couple other points. The deputy commander of STRATCOM said in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee last year:
Space capabilities have revolutionized the way we fight
today.
He went on to describe a variety of ways in which this is true. I have talked about some of them. I have noted that in the civil sphere, satellites enable our ATMs, the financial markets, our truck fleet management. I just met with the CEO of the largest trucking company in the United States, Swift Trucking. He said they have GPS satellite on every one of their trucks. They can tell exactly where every one of their trucks is at any given time, and this enables them to manage their fuel mileage so they are environmentally good. They don't exceed the speed limit. They can get them to the destination by the shortest route. All of this is done by satellite, as are credit card validations. Our first responders rely significantly on this. The next generation of air traffic control, I mentioned before. I could go on and on.
The general's point is that it is not just in military activity but our civilian life as well. But he makes the point that with regard to the military, loss of our space capabilities would be devastating to our military.
I mentioned China, but countries such as Iran and Libya have also attacked satellites in recent years, as have other countries. I mentioned jamming, direct descent antisatellite weapons, directed energy, laser weapons--all of these have been proven, at least conceptually. Over 20 nations now have ballistic missiles, and under the right circumstances, these can destroy satellites. They can also come through the atmosphere carrying a weapon and blow it up over American soil or they can create an electromagnetic pulse explosion in the atmosphere which would also explode electronics. Since the year 2002, there have been an average of 90 foreign ballistic missile launches per year. Last year, there were 100. This is not a theoretical concept; this is a capability many countries have and have tested.
Obviously, if we are trying to defend against a ballistic missile threat, having some capability in space could be very helpful. We would have to have the debate about weaponizing space at a future time, if a proof of concept through the space-based test bed were ever developed. That is a fight we could have. I would be happy at that point to engage my colleague, who has talked a little bit about that political issue, but it is very premature to talk about that in the context of what we are trying to do here today.
I mentioned the Iranians. They have a Shahab-3 missile with a range of 1,300 kilometers and another one with a range of 1,900 kilometers. According to our intelligence community, they could have long-range capability in just a few more years. This could evolve into any of the kinds of threats I just mentioned a little bit ago.
So what this space bed does is explore the survivability, affordability, the deployability, and the operability of the different types of capabilities that could be based in space. As I said, it begins with the terrestrial proof-of-concept stage that would take several years to complete. It would be years before orbital testing would even be considered, and the Congress will have all of that time to debate whether we want to move forward with any of these things. But at least we would be doing so with knowledge, with facts, with data, and not merely speculation.
Some fear that in one way or another the program might morph into something we do not want it to morph into. We cannot engage in that informed debate today. What this program would do is enable us to engage in that informed debate.
After one more comment, I will ask unanimous consent to have a letter printed in the Record dated July 6 of this year by GEN Henry Obering that talks about the need for the space test bed and describes at least what its capabilities would be, at least in the context of missile defense.
The last thing I want to do is I want to go back to the Chinese because they are among the countries that have demonstrated the most interest in taking out our satellites.
A Chinese military analyst recently wrote that space is ``the U.S. Military's `Soft Ribs', A Strategic Weakness'' and that ``for countries that can never win a war with the U.S. by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice.''
We already cut significant parts of our space program. The space tracking and surveillance satellites were cut $55 million under the SASC bill and $59 million by the Armed Services Committee bill. There is a classified program that exists that was further cut, and the Defense Department's Space Radar Program was cut significantly. The defense committee cut $200 million from the TSAT Program, which is a communications satellite for military communications traffic.
But General Obering has said the space test bed ``is a proving ground for concepts and integrated technologies. . . . Exploration of alternative implementation architectures is a critical part of the Space Test Bed. . . . Ultimately, policymakers will decide to deploy or not. However, the policy debate would be greatly improved if informed by a quantitative understanding of the issues. The Space Test Bed will provide essential decision support.''
So that is why we should not zero out this program. A very modest $10 million investment could help us begin a process of deciding whether concepts are worth pursuing. Given the fact that our satellites are almost absolutely vulnerable to a variety of different kinds of attacks, I ask whether my colleagues are willing to vote against a mere $10 million to begin the basic research to see whether there are not some ways we might want to eventually pursue to protect those satellites.
I hope my colleagues will seriously consider this amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter I referred to be printed in the Record.
Madam President, I wish to respond to four quick points made in reference to my amendment, which is amendment No. 3144. First, the chairman of the committee, the Senator from Hawaii, said we have funded many space programs, and he mentioned the Space Tracking and Surveillance System and Space Situational Awareness Programs. That is true, except that they cut $55 million out of the STSS Program. The key point is that those are situational awareness and tracking programs, not defensive programs. There is zero in here for the defense space test research program. That is what I am talking about--not situational awareness and tracking but an actual Defense research program.
Secondly, the Senator from North Dakota first responded to my argument and the fact that I had quoted General Obering's support by saying he is not surprised that the Kyl amendment is supported by a general, that they usually are because their careers depend upon programs. Frankly, I am astounded by this ad hominem attack. Let's attack the substance of the program, not the general who supports it. We cannot trust our generals? Is that what is being said? We ask them to devise ways of protecting us from attack, and that is the thanks they get.
Let's turn to the substance of the argument. Two primary points were made by the Senator from North Dakota. First of all, because the space- based test bed program could evolve into a space-based missile defense, regardless of its other benefits for satellite protection, we should not fund the program. Well, my first reaction is, God forbid that we would develop a program to defend us from intercontinental ballistic missiles. We would not want to do that. Of course, the point is there are years of decisionmaking between the time that a space-based test bed program evolves into concepts and potential programs and the research evolves into specific proposals and the time that the Senate would ever vote on them.
Does the Senator have such a lack of confidence in his ability to stop such a horrible thing--space-based defenses--that he is not even willing to allow a program to be funded to develop conceptual programs to defend our satellites in space, which presumably we all favor?
Finally, the last argument was, well, the nations of the world would be better to get together and have an agreement not to develop weapons in space. There are two answers to that. First of all, what is a Chinese missile flying through space to hit a satellite called? That is what they did. As the Senator from Florida and I discussed the other day, that they left a lot of space debris is a problem in the wake of that attack. What is a missile flying through space to hit another country's satellite called? Is that a weapon in space? Are we so afraid of defending our satellite assets that we don't want to defend against a satellite killer missile from a country coming up from the ground into space that hits our satellite? Would we not want to defend it from space?
That is a ludicrous argument. I don't believe we are going to get the countries of the world together to join in a treaty to have them forget programs
that they have already been developing--the Chinese in this particular case--because they want to have an asymmetric way of destroying our satellites.
The bottom line is this: The United States better get serious about defending our eyes and ears in space and now the satellites that direct so much of our military activity. Other countries have the ability to turn off the light. They know where the switch is. In times of war, we cannot be blind and deaf and be denied our space assets. And yet virtually by turning off the switch, other countries have that capability. Isn't it about time we begin the first steps of developing a capability against that?
I note, by the way, that the $10 million program out of a budget for missile defense of over $8 billion is hardly enough to color general Obering's claims that this would be a good program for us to begin research on.
I hope my colleagues, when this amendment is voted on, will think about the future, will think about the fact that they have plenty of opportunities to stop a program should it ever evolve into a space- based missile defense program. If they want to stop that, stop that, but don't use that as an argument to stop research on a satellite protection program.
Madam President, I was going to suggest that, and I appreciate the Senator's comments. I am aware of the situational awareness programs. The point I was trying to make earlier in response to the distinguished chairman of the committee is this is not a situational awareness program. This is a program that could actually result in the development of defenses for our satellites, a lot of different potential concepts.
The concepts that would protect the satellites from space, of course, are different potentially from the concepts that would protect them from the ground.
I am happy to have a different line in the budget, if that is going to solve the problem. But what I don't want to do is to have the money allocated simply for tracking or surveillance or situational awareness as opposed to researching development of potential defenses.
I wonder if my colleague will respond.
Madam President, if I may respond to the Senator, part of defending a satellite against an attack is being aware the attack is pending, is about to happen, or is happening. But if all you know is that I am being attacked and you are not capable of defending yourself, the knowledge you are being attacked is of little use. So this is not a matter of surveillance or situational awareness; it is a matter of developing defenses.
I guess I would put this question to my colleague: As an abstract principle, would my colleague favor or oppose the concept of a space- based defense of satellites of the United States that have military uses, in other words, a defense that would be perhaps based on the satellite itself to jam signals as some weapon homes in or that would create some kind of effective shield of electromagnetic pulse or other kind of electronic defense or even a kinetic kind of defense for the satellite if it is under attack, perhaps some kind of shielding against a laser attack? In other words, all different kinds of attacks that might come.
As a hypothetical matter, would my colleague not agree that it would be very useful and appropriate, even if those defensive capabilities are located in space, for us to be able to protect our satellites in that way or would my colleague consider those to be space-based weapons that are impermissible?
Madam President, let me say, first, I am aware of what is being done to protect our assets, and we don't, as has been said before on the floor of this Chamber, have defenses for our satellites in space today by an attack by another country. We have to work in this area. The space-based test bed is one of the places in which we could develop proof of concept that could be effective both for our satellites and, yes, also for an attack by a hostile missile because that is where this program started, it is in the missile defense budget. But that doesn't mean if I drop this amendment, for example, as the Senator is suggesting I do, that, therefore, we can forget about the need to protect our satellites because everything is taken care of. We have a need to develop concepts which include the ability to test, first, terrestrially and then in space, proof of concept that would provide for defenses, that would both protect satellites and protect against a hostile missile attack.
For the life of me, I don't see why my colleague can so confidently predict that my amendment will not have the votes to be adopted simply because on down the road many years from now it is theoretically possible that a concept would be developed to protect against a hostile missile attack with some kind of a space-based program.