Mr. President, I thank the chairman and Senator Warner. Let me read a portion of a letter from the Department of Justice first, and I will include it for the Record at the conclusion of its reading. This letter is addressed to Chairman Pat…
Mr. President, I thank the chairman and Senator Warner. Let me read a portion of a letter from the Department of Justice first, and I will include it for the Record at the conclusion of its reading. This letter is addressed to Chairman Pat Leahy of the Judiciary Committee. It begins by saying--it is dated June 6 of this year.
This letter presents the views of the Department of Justice
on S. 185, the ``Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2007,'' as
introduced in the U.S. Senate. If enacted, S. 185 would
remove the habeas corpus restrictions included in the
``Military Commissions Act of 2006.''
After a full and open debate, a bipartisan majority of Congress passed the MCA just last fall. The MCA's restrictions on habeas corpus codified important and constitutional limits on captured enemies' access to our courts. The DC Circuit upheld MCA's habeas restrictions in--the name of the case is Boumediene v. Bush--I will omit the citation--decided in 2007.
The provision of S. 185 that seeks to remove these
important limits ignores their history and their role in
protecting our Nation's security. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Johnson v. Eisentrager, a 1950 case, the
extension of habeas corpus to alien combatants captured
abroad ``would hamper the war effort and bring aid and
comfort to the enemy,'' and the Constitution requires no such
thing. The United States already provides alien enemy
combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with an
unprecedented degree of process, which includes judicial
review of decisions regarding their detention before the
Federal appeals court in Washington, DC. Repealing the MCA's
limitations on habeas would simply burden our courts with
duplicative and unnecessary litigation. For this reason, and
because repeal of the MCA's habeas provisions would delay and
disrupt the vital work of bringing enemy combatants to
justice, the President's senior advisors would recommend that
he veto S. 185 if the bill is presented to him for signature.
There is more of the letter, but I will submit it for the Record at this point.
I note that the amendment offered by Senator Leahy is virtually the same, if not the same, as the bill introduced. I am presuming that the President's senior advisers would, as a result, also recommend a veto of the bill if it included this provision.
Now, the Defense authorization bill is extraordinarily important to our troops. To add a totally extraneous provision amending a different bill to the Defense authorization bill, especially one which carries the suggestion of a Presidential veto, would be the height of irresponsibility on the part of the Senate. The substantive arguments of the Department of Justice with respect to habeas are correct, and the Senate should not, therefore, seek to amend another statute in the Defense authorization bill, thus inviting a veto of the bill.
Related to the habeas corpus provision is the amendment that is now pending offered by Senator Graham of
South Carolina. That amendment would strike a provision of the Defense authorization bill--section 1023--that also relates to the subject of treatment of detainees. Unfortunately, the way the committee bill was written, the bill that is before us right now, if we retain that language and we don't strike it, as the Graham amendment would do, we would essentially be returning to a law enforcement approach to terrorists that, frankly, failed us before 9/11 and obviously does not work in the post-9/11 context. We can't deal with all of the enemy combatants as criminal defendants. These people who are picked up on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be dealt with in the same way as criminal defendants in our court system. Senator Graham's amendment would strike these harmful provisions of the bill.
I wish to begin by reminding my colleagues of the evil nature of these terrorists and then go through the three particular parts of this provision that require removal.
First, a requirement that al-Qaida terrorists held in Iraq and Afghanistan be given lawyers--I mean, just imagine that; second, the authorization to demand discovery and compel testimony from servicemembers; and third, the requirement that al-Qaida and Taliban detainees be provided access to classified evidence. To state these three provisions of the bill is to recognize immediately why it is so harmful that they be included in this bill and why they need to be stricken, but focus for just a moment on the people we are talking about held at Guantanamo Bay and picked up in Iraq and Afghanistan.
At least 30 of the detainees released already from Guantanamo Bay have since returned to waging war against the United States and our allies. Of course, the provisions of section 21 are all designed to effectuate the release of some of these prisoners--some of these detainees. So 30 have already been released because we no longer deemed them to be a threat to the United States or our forces, but after their release, 12 of the released detainees have been killed in battle by U.S. forces or--well, by U.S. forces; others have been captured. In other words, we released them, they went right back to the battlefield, 12 of them have been killed in battle, others have been recaptured, 2 released detainees became regional commanders for Taliban forces, and 1 attacked U.S. and allies' soldiers in Afghanistan, killing 3 Afghan soldiers.
One released detainee killed an Afghan judge. One released detainee led a terrorist attack on a hotel in Pakistan and a kidnapping raid that resulted in the death of a Chinese civilian, and this former detainee recently told Pakistani journalists that he planned to ``fight America and its allies until the very end.''
Even under the procedures today, which give due process to these detainees and allow them to be released if we can no longer demonstrate they are a threat to U.S. forces--even under these provisions, at least 30 of the detainees have gone right back to the battlefield and are attacking us and our forces.
The provisions of section 1023 would make it very difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to detain committed terrorists such as this, people who have been captured while waging war against us. No nation in the history of armed conflict has imposed the kinds of limits this bill would impose on its ability to detain enemy war prisoners. War prisoners released in the middle of an ongoing conflict, such as members of al-Qaida, will return to waging war. That is the whole point of prisoners of war. In the war you capture people and hold them so they cannot return to the battlefield to kill your troops. We have already seen this happen 30 times with the detainees released from Guantanamo, as I said.
If section 1023 were to be enacted, we could expect more civilians and Afghans and Iraqis will be killed, and it may be inevitable that even our own soldiers will be killed by such released terrorists. This is a price our Nation should not be forced to bear.
I mentioned three specific general problems with section 1023. The first has to do with a requirement of the bill that al-Qaida terrorists who are held in Iraq and Afghanistan must be provided with lawyers. I cannot imagine that the details of this were known to the members of the committee when they put it into the bill. This could never be executed. It would require the release of the detainees; either they get lawyers or they have to be released. And here is why. The Defense bill requires that counsel be provided and trials be conducted for all unlawful enemy combatants held by the United States, including, for example, al-Qaida members captured and detained in Iraq and Afghanistan, if they are held for 2 years. We hold approximately 800 prisoners in Afghanistan and tens of thousands in Iraq. None are lawful combatants; all would arguably be entitled to a lawyer and a trial under this bill. This procedure would at least require a military judge, a prosecutor, and a defense attorney, as well as other legal professionals.
This scheme is totally unrealistic. The entire Army JAG Corps only consists of about 1,500 officers, and each is busy with their current duties. Moreover, under the bill, each detainee would be permitted to retain private or volunteer counsel. Our agreements with the Iraqi Government bar the United States from transferring Iraqi detainees out of Iraq. As a result, the bill would require the United States to train, transport, house, and protect potentially thousands, or tens of thousands, of private lawyers in the middle of a war zone during ongoing hostilities. That is impossible.
Think about this in the context of other conflicts, not just in Iraq or Afghanistan. In the context of World War II, anybody hearing this would think it is nuts. But the bill before us literally requires us to provide attorneys to these captured detainees in Iraq--tens of thousands of them. This proposal would likely force the United States to release thousands of these enemy combatants in Iraq, as I said, because there is no way you could provide all of the lawyers to them. Obviously, that would further jeopardize our military. By requiring a trial for each detainee, this provision would also require U.S. soldiers to offer statements to criminal investigators, needing later to prove their case after they captured someone. In other words, unlike today, when you are on the battlefield and you capture somebody and you hold them because they are a threat, but you are not putting them on trial, now you are going to put them on trial and you have to have the kind of evidence that would stand up in court. You have watched the TV shows with the clever defense lawyers. You know about, ``I object, Your Honor; that is not relevant,'' or ``that is hearsay.'' On the battlefield, who walks around with lawyers making sure Miranda rights are read and evidence is collected and statements are taken that will hold up in court when they are later tried? And they would need to carry evidence kits and cameras, means of identifying the person later on. Two years after you capture someone, the defense lawyer could say: Is that the person you captured? And if he says, ``Well, those guys all kind of looked alike to me when they were shooting at me, so I cannot be sure,'' well, the case will get thrown out of court. Or was there a chain of custody of the evidence? You would have to do that with the evidence taken on the battlefield or it would be thrown out in court. They would need to spend hours after each trial writing after-action reports, which would need to be reviewed by commanders. Valuable time, in other words, would be taken from combat operations and soldiers' rest whenever they capture somebody on the battlefield.
A horrible precedent would be set for the future. Aside from the war in Iraq, this provision would make fighting a major war in the future simply impossible. In World War II, we detained over 2 million enemy prisoners of war. It would have been impossible for the United States to have conducted a trial and provided counsel to 2 million captured enemy combatants. The bottom line, with respect to this provision, section 1023, the requirement of counsel for these detainees held in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that it would be impossible to implement. It is patently absurd and, as a result, it should be stricken.
The second point is authorizing al-Qaida detainees to demand discovery and compel testimony from American soldiers. I alluded to that a second ago. The underlying bill would actually authorize unlawful enemy combatants, including al-Qaida detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan, to demand discovery
and compel testimony from witnesses, just as we do in our criminal courts in the United States. These witnesses would all be the U.S. soldiers who captured the prisoner. Under the bill, an American soldier could literally be recalled from his unit at the whim of an al-Qaida terrorist in order to be cross-examined by him, or his lawyer, or a judge.
Newspaper columnist Stuart Taylor describes the questions such a right would raise:
Should a Marine sergeant be pulled out of combat in
Afghanistan to testify at a detention hearing about when,
where, how, and why he had captured the detainee? What if the
northern alliance or some other ally made the capture? Should
the military be ordered to deliver high-level al-Qaida
prisoners to be cross-examined by other detainees and their
lawyers?
It goes on and on. The questions abound. As the Supreme Court itself observed in Johnson v. Eisenstrager, which is the law on this subject:
It would be difficult to devise a more effective fettering
of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is
ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his
own civil court and divert his efforts and attention from the
military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.
This is the U.S. Supreme Court talking not long after World War II, when a question similar to this arose, and a Justice of the Supreme Court says it ``would be difficult to devise a more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him into account in his own civil court and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.''
It would be difficult to conceive of a process that would be more insulting to our soldiers.
In addition, many al-Qaida members captured in Afghanistan were captured by special operators whose identities are kept secret for obvious reasons. This would force them to reveal themselves to al-Qaida members and expose themselves, or simply forgo the prosecution of the individual, which is obviously more likely to happen. You simply could not do all of this, so you would have to forgo the prosecution and release the prisoner.
Clearly, Americans should not be subject to subpoena by al-Qaida. Think about that. That brings me to the last point--the requirement that al-Qaida and Taliban detainees be provided with access to classified evidence. You would have to give the enemy your classified evidence, the sources and methods of your intelligence operations, in order to prosecute them, which is what would be required by the bill.
Here is the exact language. The bill requires that detainees be provided with ``a sufficiently specific substitute of classified evidence'' and that detainees' private lawyers be given access to all relevant classified evidence.
When this bill was brought up in the Senate, some Members questioned whether this bill requires us to share classified information with al- Qaida detainees and their lawyers. I will direct this to specific pages and lines of the bill to show what it does.
On page 305, lines 16 through 21, the bill expressly provides that ``the detainee'' must be provided--I am quoting now--access to a ``sufficiently specific'' summary of ``the classified evidence that is submitted against the detainee.'' This language appears to mirror the Classified Information Procedures Act rules that apply to the use of classified information in Federal courts. Like CIPA, these procedures give a detainee a right to the substance of classified evidence. The Government might be able to redact some names or other information, but only if it still gives the detainee the substance of the evidence. And if the United States is not willing to compromise the evidence in this way, it cannot use the evidence.
Similarly, at page 305, line 5, the bill expressly requires that under its provisions, ``counsel for the detainee is provided access to the relevant classified evidence.'' I don't know how you can be any more specific than that. His lawyer gets to see relevant classified evidence.
Foreign and domestic intelligence agencies are already very hesitant to divulge classified evidence to the CSRT hearings we already conduct. These are part of the internal and nonadversarial military process today. Intelligence agencies will inevitably refuse to provide sensitive evidence to detainees and their lawyers. They will not risk compromising such information for the sake of detaining one individual terrorist.
In addition, the United States already has tenuous relations with some of the foreign governments, particularly in the Middle East, that have been our best sources of information about groups such as al- Qaida. If we give detainees a legal right to access such information, these foreign governments would simply, I presume, shut off all further supply of information to the United States. Why would they do otherwise? They don't want to expose their own sources, compromise their evidence, or expose even the fact that they have cooperated with the United States. By exposing our cooperation with these governments, the bill perversely applies a sort of ``stop snitching'' policy toward our Middle Eastern allies, which is likely to be as ruthlessly effective as when applied to criminal street gangs to potential witnesses to a crime in the United States.
Some of our best information is gained from foreign intelligence services who, like us, are trying to find out everything they can about these terrorists. Once they know we have to turn the information they gave us over to the terrorists, they are going to stop cooperating with us.
The argument I presented--that sharing classified evidence with al- Qaida detainees and their lawyers would badly damage America's efforts in the war with al-Qaida--was recently reinforced by several declarations that were recently introduced in the ongoing Bismullah litigation. These declarations were filed by the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the CIA, and by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, our three top intelligence agencies. Together, these statements confirm that sharing classified information with detainees and their lawyers would not only inevitably lead to leaks of sensitive information, but that it would violate American intelligence agencies' agreements with foreign governments and with confidential human sources--violations that would inevitably undermine these organizations and individuals' willingness to cooperate with the United States in the future.
The final point is that we already know, from hard experience, that providing classified and other sensitive information to al-Qaida members is a bad idea. During the 1995 Federal prosecution in New York of the ``blind sheikh,'' Omar Rahman, prosecutors turned over the names of 200 unindicted coconspirators to the defense. They were required to do so under the civilian criminal justice system of discovery rules, which require that large amounts of evidence be turned over to the defense. The judge warned the defense that the information could only be used to prepare for trial and not for other purposes. Nevertheless, within 10 days of being turned over to the defense, the information found its way to Sudan and into the hands of Osama bin Laden. As the district judge who presided over the case said, ``That list was in downtown Khartoum within 10 days, and bin Laden was aware within 10 days that the Government was on his trail.''
That is what happens when you provide classified information in this context.
In another case tried in the civilian criminal justice system, testimony about the use of cell phones tipped off terrorists as to how the Government was monitoring their networks. According to the judge, ``There was a piece of innocuous testimony about the delivery of a battery for a cell phone.'' This testimony alerted terrorists to the Government surveillance and, as a result, their communication network shut down within days and intelligence was lost to the Government forever--intelligence that might have prevented who knows what.
This particular section of the bill, 1023, repeats the mistakes of the past. Treating the war with al-Qaida similar to a criminal justice investigation would force the United States to choose between compromising information that could be used to prevent further terrorist attacks on one hand and on the other letting captured terrorists go free. As I said before, this is not a choice our Nation should be required to make.
Let me read a couple of the quotations I alluded to earlier from the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, GEN Michael Hayden, relative to the damage that would be caused by requiring this classified information to be turned over to the defendant or his lawyers:
. . . [M]uch of the information that is potentially
discoverable was provided to the CIA by foreign intelligence
services or discloses the specific assistance provided by the
CIA's global partners in the global war on terror. If the CIA
is compelled to comply with the Court's decision, the CIA
will be obligated to inform its foreign liaison partners that
a court order requires that the CIA provide this information
to the Court and detainee counsel. There is a high
probability that certainly liaison services will decrease
their cooperation with the CIA because of the extent that
their information has become enmeshed in U.S. legal
proceedings. . . .
He goes on:
[S]ome information discoverable under the Court's decision
originated with, or pertains to, clandestine human
intelligence sources. These individuals provide information
or assistance to the CIA only upon the condition of absolute
and lasting secrecy. Revealing this information--even to the
Court or to cleared counsel--would expressly violate these
agreements, and would irreparably harm the CIA's ability to
utilize current sources and to recruit sources in the future.
. . .
Let me read one other comment from General Hayden, the Director of the CIA:
. . . With over 300 detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, it
appears that compliance with the Court's decision will
require disclosure to several hundred--perhaps more than one
thousand--private attorneys who are not employees of the U.S.
Government and who are not trained in handling classified
information. With so many untrained individuals allowed
access to such sensitive information, I believe that
unauthorized disclosures, even if inadvertent, are not only
probable, but inevitable. The regulations controlling access
to classified information recognize that limiting the number
of people with access is a necessary step in safeguarding
sensitive information. The Court's decision would eviscerate
the U.S. Government's carefully conceived plan to keep its
most highly sensitive information compartmentalized and would
increase the likelihood of public disclosure.
I quote a comment from Robert Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in his affidavit to the court in the case I mentioned:
Disseminating human source information could reasonably
lead to the disclosure of their identities because often the
information provided by human sources is singular in nature.
In other words, he is the only person who knows about it, so when the information is divulged, then the other side knows exactly where it came from.
Back to Director Mueller:
The disclosure of singular information could endanger the
life of the source or his/her family or friends, or cause the
source to suffer physical or economic harm or ostracism
within the community. These consequences, and the inability
of the FBI to protect the identities of its human sources,
would make it exceptionally more difficult for the FBI and
other U.S. intelligence agencies to recruit human sources in
the future.
These are the kinds of irreparable harm that would result if the language of section 1023 remains in the bill. Not my words, but Director Mueller of the FBI, General Hayden, the Director of the CIA, and now I quote from the Director of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell. Admiral McConnell had this to say:
. . . [T]he Intelligence Community has many sources of
information that must be protected. For example, much of the
information at issue was provided by foreign intelligence
services or would reveal the specific assistance provided by
foreign partners in the global war on terror. Certain liaison
services will likely decrease their cooperation with the U.S.
Government if their information is caught up in U.S. court
proceedings.
One final comment.
. . . Human sources also provide the Intelligence
Community with critical information, but only upon the
condition of absolute secrecy. Revealing this information
would violate the sources of confidentiality we provide these
sources and would likely result in their minimizing or
ceasing altogether their cooperation. Such a disclosure would
harm the Intelligence Community's ability to retain current
sources and recruit new ones, and if we cannot recruit and
retain sources, the Intelligence Community simply cannot
conduct its business.
That is the point of Senator Graham's amendment to strike these provisions from the bill. They would irreparably harm our intelligence collection capability, which is the first defense against these terrorists. That is why the Graham amendment striking section 1023 should be adopted.
We have already bent over backward to provide the detainees at Guantanamo the ability to contest their detention and to have their detention reviewed and eventually even have it reviewed in the U.S. Supreme Court, and before that the Circuit Court of Appeals.
This is a very fair system, more fair than has ever been provided by any other nation in any other circumstance and more than our Constitution requires. So we are treating the people we capture in a very fair way.
What we cannot do is to take those same kinds of protections and apply them anywhere we capture someone in the foreign theater. And as I said before, never in the history of warfare have they been subjected to the criminal justice system of our country. To take that system and try to transport it to the fields of Afghanistan and Iraq would obviously not only be breaking precedent but is a horrible idea for all the reasons I indicated.
I ask my colleagues to give careful attention to the dangerous return to the pre-9/11 notion that these terrorists are, after all, only common criminals and we have to treat them that way. They have made no secret that they are actually at war with us, and we ignore this point at our peril.
I remind my colleagues that the Statement of Administration Policy on this bill says the President will be advised to veto the bill if section 1023 remains in the bill and refer again to a similar statement from the Department of Justice with respect to the habeas corpus provisions that would be added to the bill in the amendment of Senator Leahy.
I hope my colleagues will take all of this information into account when they consider voting on these amendments in this very important Defense authorization bill which we need to pass and the President will want to sign so we can do what is necessary to support our troops whom we have sent into harm's way.
I urge my colleagues to support the Graham amendment to strike section 1023 and not to support the additional habeas corpus rights to terrorists who attack our troops.
Madam President, I, too, wanted to echo the comments of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut. I am sure Senator Warner will be recognized many times between now and the time he finally takes his last vote in this Chamber, and as he pointed out, he has a long way to go before that time comes over the course of the next several months. But so many of us respect what he has done over the years as ranking member and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and his work will, in fact, be greatly recognized.
Madam President, I wish to make one quick point in response to what the Senator from Connecticut pointed out, recalling his very famous father, somebody who served in this body and served our Nation well in other capacities, including at Nuremberg, and his friend, Justice Jackson, the same Justice Jackson whom I quoted.
The Senator wasn't on the floor, but I quoted Justice Jackson in the Eisentrager case to point out that nothing could fetter our commanders more than to require habeas corpus rights for the German prisoners of war or the prisoners who were at issue in the Johnson v. Eisentrager case. Justice Jackson himself recognized that the procedures that were awarded to the 50-some war criminals at Nuremberg were not the same kinds of procedures that were being sought in the Eisentrager case. And the habeas corpus rights that would be granted under the Leahy amendment are far different from the rights that were granted to the Nuremberg war crimes defendants.
I think one question that would be interesting to ask of the proponents of the legislation is, if we simply took the rights that were granted to the war criminals tried at Nuremberg and gave those rights to the detainees at issue here, would that be a satisfactory result? I suspect the answer would be no because they are nowhere near the rights that would be included in the amendment that is pending.
So to cite Justice Jackson is to refer back to what he said in Eisentrager and recognize that nothing, according to him--and I agree-- would more fetter our commanders and our troops than granting habeas rights to prisoners or enemy detainees.
Madam President, I might make one further point. I am trying to recall how many defendants there were at Nuremberg. My recollection of the number tried for war crimes is that there were approximately 50. I may be off by a few on that number, but I think my point would still remain, which is that it is one thing to try 50 war criminals out of over 2 million POWs, and it is quite another to grant all 2 million the rights of war criminals. We have tried some of the detainees as the equivalent of war criminals in our courts--Padilla is one of them--but that is not to say we should hold the same criminal trials for all of the tens of thousands of detainees being held in Iraq or Afghanistan.
I will yield, yes.
Madam President, that is a great question, and the answer is that there have never been, in the history of the world, habeas rights granted to enemy detainees or prisoners of war in order to challenge the fact of their detention by either the United States or by the other country from which the great writ came--England. They have never been granted. So the answer is there is no precedent whatsoever. That is why, when colleagues say we want to restore habeas rights, that is an incorrect characterization. Enemy combatants and POWs have never had habeas rights to challenge their detention as a matter of being provided by our Constitution. Never has our Constitution been interpreted as requiring those rights.
I yield the floor.