District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007

Madam Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 260, I call up the bill (H.R. 1433) to provide for the treatment of the District of Columbia as a Congressional district for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

This is an historic moment indeed. I am honored to lead the floor management of a bill that we have been waiting so long to debate and hopefully move forward from the House of Representatives.

This is an important moment in American history. We must now act to discontinue the disenfranchisement of citizens in the Nation's Capital. We must act to complete the important unfinished business of our democracy.

All of you here are all too familiar with the struggle for D.C. voting rights. I remember Chairman Emanuel Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, when the House gave the District a vote in 1967. I remember Delegate Walter Fauntroy's and Senator Ed Brooke's pursuit of the District's representation in 1978. I have now had the privilege of working with the distinguished gentlewoman, the Delegate from the District of Columbia, Eleanor Holmes Norton, a tireless, relentless, brilliant advocate of the effort that brings us here today.

Right now we are attempting to resolve what could not be resolved before, through the bipartisan efforts of so many. Mr. Davis of Virginia, Mr. Cannon of Utah, Mr. Matheson and Mr. Bishop have gotten us this far today, but I would be remiss if I did not name the former chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Jim Sensenbrenner, who helped bring us so close to passage of this legislation in the last Congress. I thank all of you for the important work that has led us to this great and wonderful day.

Now, the bill before us today has a novel proposal, but it is one that we have seen before. We are now here today to finish the important work on this measure that we almost completed when we adjourned the last Congress. We are here today to finish the job.

As the only democracy in the world where citizens living in the capital city are denied their representation in the National Legislature, we come here to repair this obvious defect. Nearly 600,000 people who call the District of Columbia home, who pay taxes, who fight and die in the military, do not have a vote in the Congress. They do not have a vote in the Congress. That is what brings us here today. I am talking about people like one of its citizens, Andy Shallal, a local business owner and an Iraqi American.

Thousands of American soldiers, including District residents, have given their lives in fighting for democracy in Iraq. Because of their sacrifice, Andy can vote for the national legislature in Iraq but is denied a vote for his own Member of Congress in Washington, District of Columbia.

So District residents like Andy and all those who share the responsibilities of U.S. citizenship deserve voting representation in this Congress, and I believe that most in this body agree with me. I believe that H.R. 1433 is a sound policy response to this inequity. While some have raised questions and we have debated, we have had constitutional scholars from across the country join us in analyzing the way that we have put this measure together. I am totally and confidently satisfied that we have a bill that passes constitutional muster. We have a bill that can finally end the disenfranchisement of District residents.

The legislation relies obviously on Article I, section 8, clause 17, which provides Congress with the authority to give the District a vote. The Supreme Court has held that Congress's exclusive authority over the District is ``national in the highest sense.'' The D.C. Circuit Court has held that the Congress has ``extraordinary and plenary power'' over the District. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has found the District Clause to be ``sweeping and inclusive in character.''

Distinguished conservatives, we emphasize that this is not a partisan measure. Thoughtful scholars like Viet Dinh, judges and scholars like Ken Starr, whom I have never cited or quoted before now, and our former colleague Jack Kemp, just to name a few, agree that the Congress has the power through simple legislation to give the District of Columbia a vote.

We have used the District Clause to treat the District like a State repeatedly: for diversity jurisdiction, for 11th amendment immunity, for alcohol regulation, for interstate transportation, for apprentice labor, for the collection

of State income taxes, the list goes on and on. Surely, we cannot say that we cannot give them, the District residents, a vote in the same way that we have handled so many other matters.

I am confident that we can pair the District of Columbia with Utah and give Utah an at-large seat. Article I, section 4 gives Congress ultimate authority over Federal elections. The one person, one vote principle will be left intact. No vote will be compromised or diluted. None of their vote will be lost, nor will it be expanded. Utah voters will be given an equal opportunity to elect an at-large Representative on a temporary basis and a District Representative.

This fight has been long, 200 years too long. We can debate this issue to no end, but at the end of the day, if District residents remain disenfranchised, we ought to be ashamed. We have a sound, bipartisan proposal before us, and I am happy to entertain the discussion on both sides of the aisle that will proceed at this time.

I want to thank those of our Republican colleagues in the House who have already seen fit to make it clear that they, too, will be joining with us to make this a bipartisan solution to an old problem. I am proud to think and hope that D.C. disenfranchisement will come to an end.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 10 seconds, and I include for the Record the 25 legal scholars of constitutional authority who have already weighed in on this bill, plus the former elected officials and former Senators and Members of Congress and Presidential appointees that have all examined this with great care and find that it is not constitutionally defective.

DC Vote,

Washington, DC, March 12, 2007.

25 Legal Scholars Support Constitutionality of DC Voting Rights

Dear Representative: DC residents pay federal income taxes,

serve on juries and die in wars to defend American democracy,

but they do not have voting representation in the Congress.

This lack of representation is inconsistent with our

nation's core democratic principles. Justice Hugo Black put

it well in Wesberry v. Sanders in 1964: ``No right is more

precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the

election of those who make the laws under which, as good

citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic,

are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.''

Congress is currently considering granting voting rights to

Americans living in Washington, DC. Lawmakers have been faced

with questions about the constitutionality of extending the

right to vote to residents of a ``non-state.''

As law professors and scholars, we would like to address

these questions and put to

rest any concerns about the constitutionality of extending

the right of representation to residents of the District.

While the language of the Constitution literally requires

that House members be elected ``by the People of the Several

states,'' Congress has not always applied this language so

literally. For example, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens

Absentee Voting Act allows U.S. citizens living abroad to

vote in congressional elections in their last state of

residence--even if they are no longer citizens there, pay any

taxes there, or have any intent to return.

To fully protect the interests of people living in the

capital, the Framers gave Congress extremely broad authority

over all matters relating to the federal district under

Article I, Sec. 8, clause 17 (the ``District Clause'').

Courts have ruled that this clause gives Congress

``extraordinary and plenary power'' over DC and have upheld

congressional treatment of DC as a ``state'' for purposes of

diversity jurisdiction and interstate commerce, among other

things. Article III provides that courts may hear cases

``between citizens of different states'' (diversity

jurisdiction). The Supreme Court initially ruled that under

this language, DC residents could not sue residents of other

states. But in 1940, Congress began treating DC as a state

for this purpose--a law upheld in D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer

Co. (1949).

The Constitution also allows Congress to regulate commerce

``among the several states,'' which, literally, would exclude

DC. But Congress' authority to treat DC as a ``state'' for

Commerce Clause purposes was upheld in Stoughtenburg v.

Hennick (1889).

We believe, under the same analysis of the Constitution,

that Congress has the power through ``simple'' legislation to

provide voting representation in Congress for DC residents.

Sincerely,

Sheryll D. Cashin, Georgetown University Law Center; Viet

D. Dinh, Georgetown University Law Center; Charles J.

Ogletree, Harvard Law School; Jamin Raskin, American

University Washington College of Law; Samuel R.

Bagenstos, Washington University Law School; Brian L.

Baker, San Joaquin College of Law; William W. Bratton,

Georgetown University Law Center; Richard Pierre

Claude, University of Maryland; Sherman Cohn,

Georgetown University Law Center; Peter Edelman,

Georgetown University Law Center; James Forman Jr.,

Georgetown University Law Center; David A. Gantz, The

University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.

Michael Gottesman, Georgetown University Law Center;

Michael Greenberger, University of Maryland; Pat King,

Georgetown University Law Center; Charles R. Lawrence

III, Georgetown University Law Center; Paul Steven

Miller, University of Washington School of Law; James

Oldham, Georgetown University Law Center; Christopher

L. Peterson University of Florida, Levin College of

Law; Robert Pitofsky, Georgetown University Law Center;

David Schultz, University of Minnesota; Girardeau A.

Spann, Georgetown University Law Center; Ronald S.

Sullivan Jr., Yale Law School; Roger Wilkins, George

Mason University; Wendy Williams, Georgetown University

Law Center.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to point out that a constitutional amendment could take 10 years, who knows, to have a part of a State ceded back. The three methods that have been suggested by

the former chairman of Judiciary Committee, who has worked very hard on this, are, in effect, impractical.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased now to recognize the chairman of the Constitutional Subcommittee on the Judiciary, Mr. Nadler, who has done extraordinary work in this regard, 5 minutes.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds. I refer the former attorney general of the State of California to the list we have right now about 10 decisions in which reviews, under the constitutional authority, D.C. as a State.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished lady, a member of the committee and who has served with great distinction on the House Judiciary Committee for constitutional questions, Sheila Jackson-Lee of Houston, Texas.

Madam Speaker, if the gentlelady will yield, I ask her, why would we be asking for special standing, we in the Congress? Why would we be asking for an expedited review? Can't the courts decide who gets either of those two special privileges to come to the front of the line?

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute because the speaker from Texas, Mr. Gohmert, a valuable member of Judiciary, a highly praised judge, and a supporter of gun rights too, incidentally ignores a decision that just came out of the federal court, just recently, within weeks, Parker v. Williams, which held that the second amendment renders the District's gun ban unconstitutional--which I was sorry to hear, but he probably wasn't--in that ``a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed.''

The court held that D.C. was a State for purposes of the Constitution's second amendment.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the rest of my time.

The gentlelady from Los Angeles, California, has come upon the floor. I know she wants to speak on this, and I recognize Maxine Waters from California for 3 minutes on this subject.

Madam Speaker, I reserve my time.

Madam Speaker, we continue to reserve time.

Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 1 minute to the most patient Member in the House of Representatives, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Al Green).

Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 1 full minute to Rush Holt of New Jersey.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio, Dennis Kucinich, a distinguished Member of this body.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 1 minute to my good friend from Virginia, James Moran.

Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 1 minute to my friend the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).

(Mrs. MALONEY of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Watson) for the purpose of a unanimous-consent request.

(Ms. WATSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished former member of the Judiciary Committee, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Van Hollen).

Madam Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the Speaker of the House.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I will insert in the Record under yesterday's date, March 21, a CRS report handed to me by Eleanor Holmes Norton that validates the fact that the one man, one vote principle is not violated by the Utah creation of an at-large district.

Madam Speaker, we have had a lot of predictions from Members of the Congress who may be on the Supreme Court someday. They predicted unconstitutionality and constitutionality. Let's leave it up to the Court. But, remember, those challenging on the basis of unconstitutionality have the burden.

I close with this observation: The three recommendations we have had, a constitutional amendment; retrocession, giving D.C. back to Maryland; or statehood, are not going to work.

I urge support for this measure before us today.

CRS Report for Congress: Congressional Redistricting: The

Constitutionality of Creating an At-Large District

(L. Paige Whitaker, Legislative Attorney)

Summary

Among other provisions, H.R. 1433 (110th Cong.), the

District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007, would

expand the U.S.

House of Representatives by two Members to a total of 437

Members. The first of these two new seats would be allocated

to create a voting Member representing the District of

Columbia, and the second seat would be assigned in accordance

with 2000 census data and existing federal law, resulting in

the addition of a fourth congressional seat in the state of

Utah, which would be a temporary at-large district. This

report is limited to discussing only the constitutionality of

the creation of an at-large congressional district. While it

is not without doubt, based on the authority granted to

Congress under the Constitution to regulate congressional

elections and relevant Supreme Court precedent, it appears

that federal law establishing a temporary at-large

congressional district would likely be upheld as

constitutional.

H.R. 1433 (110th Cong.), the District of Columbia House Voting Rights

Act of 2007

Among other provisions, H.R. 1433 (110th Cong.), the

District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007, would

expand the U.S. House of Representatives by two Members to a

total of 437 Members. It specifies that the first of these

two new seats would be allocated to create a voting Member

representing the District of Columbia, and that the second

seat would be assigned in accordance with 2000 census data

and existing federal law, which would currently result in the

addition of a fourth congressional seat in the state of Utah.

This report is limited to considering only the issue of

the constitutionality of the creation of an at-large

congressional district.

H.R. 1433 (110th Cong.) was introduced on March 9, 2007,

and supersedes H.R. 328, which was introduced earlier in the

110th Congress. On March 13, the House Government Oversight

and Reform Committee reported H.R. 1433, by a vote of 24-5,

and on March 15, the House Judiciary Committee reported the

bill by a vote of 21-13.

Brief Constitutional Analysis

The U.S. Constitution provides the states with primary

authority over congressional elections, but grants Congress

the final authority over most aspects of such elections. This

congressional power is at its most broad in the case of House

elections, which have historically been decided by a system

of popular voting. Article I, Sec. 4, cl. 1 provides that:

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for

Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each

State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any

time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the

Places of chusing Senators.

The Supreme Court and lower courts have interpreted this

language to mean that Congress has extensive power to

regulate most elements of congressional elections, including

a broad authority to protect the integrity of those

elections.

The Constitution does not specify how Members of the House

are to be elected once they are apportioned to a state.

Originally, most states having more than one Representative

divided their territory into geographic districts, permitting

only one Member of Congress to be elected from each district.

Other states, however, allowed House candidates to run at-

large or from multi-member districts or from some combination

of the two. In those states employing single-member

districts, however, the problem of gerrymandering, the

practice of drawing district lines in order to maximize

political party advantage, quickly arose.

Accordingly, Congress began establishing standards for

House districts. Congress first passed federal redistricting

standards in 1842, when it added a requirement to the

apportionment act of that year that Representatives ``should

be elected by districts composed of contiguous territory

equal in number to the number of Representatives to which

each said state shall be entitled, no one district electing

more than one Representative.'' (5 Stat. 491.) The

Apportionment Act of 1872 added another requirement to those

first set out in 1842, stating that districts should contain

``as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.''

(17 Stat. 492.) A further requirement of ``compact

territory'' was added when the Apportionment Act of 1901 was

adopted stating that districts must be made up of

``contiguous and compact territory and containing as nearly

as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.'' (26 Stat.

736.) After 1929, there were no congressionally imposed

standards governing congressional redistricting; in 1941,

however, Congress enacted a law providing for various

redistricting contingencies if states failed to redistrict

after a census--including at-large representation. (55

Stat 761.) In 1967, Congress reimposed the requirement

that Representatives must run from single-member

districts, rather than running at-large. (81 Stat. 581.)

Both the 1941 and 1967 laws are still in effect, codified

at 2 U.S.C.Sec. Sec. 2a and 2c. In Branch v. Smith, the

Supreme Court considered the operation and inherent tension

between these two provisions. It does not appear, however,

that the question of congressional authority was in serious

dispute in this litigation. Rather, the Court noted in

passing that the current statutory scheme governing

apportionment of the House of Representatives was enacted in

1929 pursuant to congressional authority under the ``Times,

Places and Manner'' provision of the Constitution.

Consequently, it seems likely that Congress has broad

authority, within specified constitutional parameters, to

establish how Members' districts will be established,

including the creation of at-large districts.

It might be suggested that creating an at-large

congressional district in a state could violate the ``one

person, one vote'' standard established by the Supreme Court

in Wesberry v. Sanders. In Wesberry, the Supreme Court first

applied the one person, one vote standard in the context of

evaluating the constitutionality of a Georgia congressional

redistricting statute that created a district with two to

three times as many residents as the state's other nine

districts. In striking down the statute, the Court held that

Article I, section 2, clause 1, providing that

Representatives be chosen ``by the People of the several

States'' and be ``apportioned among the several States . . .

according to their respective Numbers,'' requires that ``as

nearly as is practicable, one man's vote in a congressional

is to be worth as much as another's.''

While it is not beyond dispute, it does not appear that the

creation of an at-large district under the circumstances

outlined in H.R. 1433 would be interpreted to create a

conflict with the ``one person, one vote'' standard. Under

H.R. 1433, each Utah voter would have the opportunity to vote

both for a candidate to represent his or her congressional

district as well as for a candidate to represent the state

at-large. Each person's vote for an at-large candidate

would be of equal worth. Further, each person's vote for

an at-large candidate would not affect the value of his or

her vote for a candidate representing a congressional

district. Accordingly, all Utah residents' votes would

have equal value, thereby arguably comporting with the one

person, one vote principle.

Based on the authority granted to Congress under the

Constitution to regulate congressional elections and relevant

Supreme Court precedent, it appears that a federal law

establishing a temporary at-large congressional district

would likely be upheld as constitutional.

Madam Speaker, I object.

Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to this motion to recommit.

This is the most startling double hypocrisy I have ever heard of on a bill of this magnitude. Very clever, whoever dreamed this up. The motion to recommit would deny everyone in this House the right to vote on whether citizens would gain the right to vote, and at the same time arm them with military-type weaponry that is being used in Iraq right now to destroy aircraft and bring down helicopters.

We would also repeal the District's strong ban on handgun ammunition that can pierce body armor worn by police officers and other law enforcement officials at a time when security has become a top priority in the District, making military-style assault weapons readily available.

Now, the most important person I have ever met in my life, with due respect to all the great people I have had the honor of working with as a Member of Congress, is Martin Luther King, Jr. If he is looking down on us now to see if we are working for justice and peace in our country, in our Capital and throughout the world, I am sure he would be as dismayed as I am by putting a gun control vote up for a motion to recommit.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Davis.

I thank the gentleman.

I now turn to the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Eleanor Holmes Norton, and recognize her at this time.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Conyers, may I pay tribute to you? It gives me such a privilege to be able to come to this floor with you as the chairperson of the House Judiciary Committee, along with the ranking member, who is a friend and colleague from Texas. But it is a special honor, and it humbles many of us, because a lot of us were not here for the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voter Rights Act of 1965. Many Americans think that that bill only pertains and helps people of color, but really what it does is it restores that legislation, the value and the preciousness of the right to vote for all Americans. I am gratified that Chairman Conyers, who has a history with restoring the rights of Americans to vote, now finds himself on the floor in the doorway of history to be able to reaffirm the Constitution.

And I heard my good friend, and I am glad that you will hear from my colleague from Texas, Congressman Al Green, who spent a few days on the bench and I think would recognize a Constitution when he would see it. But I think this is important, because if the American people are listening, there is some suggestion, what kind of irreverent actions are occurring on this floor? Why are we ignoring the Constitution? And I take great umbrage with that. I am sensitive to that. My very fabric of my existence is embedded in the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendment. I want the Constitution to be cherished, and I want it to be right.

So let me just recount for you why we can move from one section to the next, and it relates to the constitutionality of what we are doing. And I would only hope that my friends would not be rejecting this bill because, in fact, it is the District of Columbia. And let me remind America that Utah is given an opportunity for its citizens to be represented.

But in 1820, the Supreme Court held that Congress could impose Federal taxes on the District, and it was related to the provision in here that says

representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States. So we tax them based upon language in the Constitution that they equal the States.

Then in 1889, the Supreme Court found that the constitutional prohibition against State laws that interfere with commerce applies to States and the District of Columbia, again equating the District of Columbia to States.

And then in 1934, the Supreme Court found that Congress could treat the District of Columbia as a State.

So in the Constitution it says that: The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the people of several States.

But it also says that this Congress has jurisdiction in clause 17 under section 8 over the District of Columbia, and that is what we are doing here today. We are correcting a wrong, an ill. We are correcting a disease. We are equating this city to the rights of Iraqis, who are now able to vote for all of those they want to vote for, albeit it is in a troubled situation.

And so I would simply commend my colleagues to this, and to suggest that there was something wrong in the rule for not asking for an expedited Supreme Court review, my friends, the Supreme Court will be able to deliberate on this particular legislation in due time and be able to render a decision and expedited request warrants or suggests there should be a crisis. There was not an expedited request in the election of 2000, and the Supreme Court decided it in 4 or 5 days. For me, that was an emergency.

Let me thank the gentleman for his inquiry. He made a very good point: can't the courts reconcile the issues between the two parties on their own expedited time. They can. And that is the example I used with the issue in the election of 2000. As you well know, that case, Gore v. Bush, went to the United States Supreme Court on their own expediting, and a decision was made between four or five days.

My friends, this is a smoke-and-mirror issue. We welcome the Supreme Court's review. But today, we are holding up the Constitution, and I hope that as we hold it up, we will reflect upon those whose blood has been shed on behalf of this country, that we are giving them the right to vote legally, and under the Constitution.

Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1433, the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007, and thank the chairman of the Judiciary Committee for his leadership in shepherding this important piece of legislation to the floor. Today we remove a stain that has blighted our Nation for more than 200 years of shame and correct an injustice to the citizens of the District of Columbia.

H.R. 1433 would permanently expand the U.S. House of Representatives from 435 to 437 seats, providing a new, at-large seat to Utah and a vote to the District of Columbia. Based on the 2000 Census, Utah is the State next in line to enlarge its congressional delegation. The bill does not give the District statehood, nor does it give the District representation in the Senate. Rather, in H.R. 1433 Congress is simply treating the District as a congressional district for the purposes of granting full House representation, as it can pursuant to the grant of plenary power over the District of Columbia conferred by the Constitution in article I, section 8, clause 17.

At the outset, let me address the claim that H.R. 1433 is a weak foundation upon which to base the District's voting rights in the House because it is a statutory rather a constitutionally based remedy. The argument should be rejected for the simple reason that it makes the perfect the enemy of the good. It is like asking a person to remain homeless while she saves to buy a house even though she has enough money to rent an apartment.

Madam Speaker, let us not lose sight of one indisputable and shameful fact: Nearly 500,000 people living in the District of Columbia lack direct voting representation in the House of Representatives and Senate. Residents of the District of Columbia serve in the military, pay billions of dollars in Federal taxes each year, and assume other responsibilities of U.S. citizenship. For over 200 years, the District has been denied voting representation in Congress--the entity that has ultimate authority over all aspects of the city's legislative, executive, and judicial functions.

Madam Speaker, if a person can be called upon to pay Federal taxes and serve in the Armed Forces of the United States, then he or she should at least have the opportunity to vote for a representative who could at least cast a symbolic vote in this Chamber on critical matters facing our Nation--issues like war and peace, equality and justice.

Madam Speaker, taxation without representation is tyranny. It is unconscionable that more than a half million American citizens are being unconscionably denied a vote and a voice in the most important legislative body in the world.

As a supporter of freedom, democracy, and equality, I believe that it is long overdue for the citizens of the District of Columbia to have a Representative in Congress who can vote on the vital legislation considered in this body.

Madam Speaker, it is wrong that we must be reminded daily by license plates in the District of Columbia that ``Taxation without representation is tyranny.'' The people in Boston felt so strongly about this in 1775 that they rebelled in Boston Harbor, launching the ``Boston Tea Party.''

The principle that political authority derives from the consent of the government is no less applicable when it comes to the District of Columbia. Let us be clear. There is no dispute that hundreds of thousands of American citizens reside in the District of Columbia. We all agree that universal suffrage is the hallmark of a democratic regime, of which the United States is the world's leading exemplar.

None of us believes it is fair that citizens of the District of Columbia pay Federal taxes, risk life and limb fighting wars abroad to protect American democracy and extend the blessings of liberty to people living in foreign lands. In short, there is no moral reason to deny the citizens of the District of Columbia the right to full representation in Congress. The only question is whether Congress has the will and the constitutional authority to do so. As I will discuss, Congress has always had the constitutional authority. For the last 12 years, we have not had the will; but now we do.

Congress Can Grant Voting Rights to the District Under the District

Clause

As Professor Dinh argued in his powerful testimony before this Committee, Congress has ample constitutional authority to enact H.R. 1433 under the Constitution's ``District Clause.'' Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 17. The District Clause empowers Congress to ``exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District'' and thus grants Congress plenary and exclusive authority to legislate all matters concerning the District. The text, history and structure of the Constitution, as well as judicial decisions and pronouncements in analogous or related contexts, confirms that this broad legislative authority extends to the granting of congressional voting rights for District residents.

The District Clause, which has been described by no less a constitutional authority as Judge Kenneth Starr as ``majestic in its scope,'' gives Congress plenary and exclusive power to legislate for the District. Courts have held that the District Clause is ``sweeping and inclusive in character'' and gives Congress ``extraordinary and plenary power'' over the District. It empowers Congress to legislate within the District for ``every proper purpose of government.'' Congress therefore possesses ``full and unlimited jurisdiction to provide for the general welfare of citizens within the District of Columbia by any and every act of legislation which it may deem conducive to that end,'' subject, of course, to the negative prohibitions of the Constitution.

Although, the District is not a State for purposes of Congress's article I, section 2, clause 1, which states that Members of the House are chosen ``by the people of the several States,'' this fact is not dispositive of Congress's authority under the District Clause to give residents of the District the same rights as citizens of a State. Since 1805, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has the authority to treat the District like a State, and Congress has repeatedly exercised this authority. No court has ever sustained a challenge to Congress's exercise of its power under the District Clause.

Two related Supreme Court cases illustrate this point. In Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445 (1805), the Court held that the diversity jurisdiction provision of article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution excluded citizens of the District of Columbia. The Court observed, however, that it was ``extraordinary'' that residents of the District should be denied the same access to Federal courts provided to aliens and State residents, and invited Congress to craft a solution, noting that the matter was ``a subject for legislative, not judicial consideration.''

Congress accepted that invitation 145 years later and enacted legislation that explicitly granted District residents access to Federal

courts on diversity grounds. That legislation was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1949 in National Mutual Insurance Company v. Tidewater Transfer Company, 337 U.S. 582 (1949). A plurality of the Court led by Justice Jackson held that Congress could for this purpose treat District residents as though they were State residents pursuant to its authority under the District Clause. The two concurring justices would have gone even further; they argued that Hepburn should be overruled and that the District should be considered a State for purposes of Article III.

Tidewater strongly supports Congress's authority to provide the District a House Representative via simple legislation. As the plurality explained, because Congress unquestionably had the greater power to provide District residents diversity-based jurisdiction in special article I courts, it surely could accomplish the more limited result of granting District residents diversity-based access to existing article III courts. Similarly, Congress's authority to grant the District full rights of statehood--or grant its residents voting rights through retrocession--by simple legislation suggests that it may, by simple legislation, take the more modest step of providing citizens of the District with a voice in the House of Representatives. Indeed, since Congress has granted voting representation to residents of Federal enclaves in Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), and to Americans living abroad through the Overseas Voting Act, there is no reason to suppose that Congress has less ability to provide voting representation to the residents of the Nation's capital.

II. Congress May Direct the Next-Entitled State to Elect Its Additional

Representative at Large

H.R. 1433 also grants an additional congressional seat to the State of Utah as the next-entitled State and directs that State to elect its additional Representative at large, rather than creating an additional single-Member district. Congress plainly has the authority to do so. This statutory scheme does not violate the ``one person, one vote'' principle.

As the Supreme Court held in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), ``the command of Article I, Section 2 [of the Constitution], that Representatives be chosen `by the People of the Several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's.'' In that case the Court struck down a Georgia apportionment statute because it created a congressional district that had two-to-three times as many residents as Georgia's nine other congressional districts. The Court stated:

The apportionment statute thus contracts the value of some

votes and expands that of others. If the Federal Constitution

intends that when qualified voters elect members of Congress

each vote be given as much weight as any other vote, then

this statute cannot stand.

``One person, one vote'' concerns arise when congressional districts within a State contain different numbers of residents, diluting the voting power of residents in the district with more residents. In contrast, here the proposed temporary ``at large'' district in Utah does not dilute the voting power of any Utah voter.

When Utah holds its at-large election for the new fourth seat, Utah voters may cast a vote in their existing district and in the statewide election for the fourth seat. While it is true that the statewide ``at large'' district will necessarily contain more residents than the other districts, the establishment of that ``at large'' district would create no constitutional dilution concerns. Each person's vote in the ``at large'' district would have equal influence, and the opportunity to cast that vote would not alter in any way the value of that person's vote in her own smaller district.

Nor does a potential ``one person, one vote'' challenge arise on the ground that Utah residents vote in two elections while residents of other States with single-member districts would vote only once. First, the Supreme Court has never held that the ``one person, one vote'' principle applies to the apportionment process. Indeed, the Court has held that Congress is entitled to substantial deference in its apportionment decisions. Second, the proposed at-large election does not give residents of the State more or less voting power than the residents of States with single-Member districts. The example cited by Richard Bress, one of the witnesses who testified before the Judiciary Committee in support of the bill, illustrates why this is so.

Suppose that State A and State B have roughly the same population and are each entitled to four Representatives. State A holds an at-large election for all four of its Representatives, while State B divides its Representatives and voters into four districts. State A's statewide district would have a population four times the size of each district in State B. As compared to the single-district voter in State B, the ``at-large'' voter in State A has a one-fourth interest in each of four Representatives. The single-district voter in State B has a whole interest in one Representative. But in both scenarios, each voter has, in the aggregate, one whole voting interest.

Similarly, as compared to a State with four single-Member districts, the voters in Utah's existing three districts would have proportionately less influence in the election of the Representative from their own district, but would gain a fractional interest in the State's at-large Representative. In short, Utah residents would have no more--and no less--voting power than residents of any other State.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, I believe H.R. 1433 is constitutionally unassailable. Granting voting rights to the citizens of the District of Columbia is a matter of simple justice. I know it is morally right. It is also long overdue. Let us end this injustice and be true to the better angels of our nature. I urge all Members to join me in voting for H.R. 1433.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I oppose this legislation because it is clearly unconstitutional. While the bill may be well-intentioned, as Members of Congress, we swear an oath to support our Constitution. We cannot gloss over its deficiencies.

At the Judiciary Committee hearing on this bill, Professor Jonathan Turley, someone the majority consults frequently for his views, said, ``Permit me to be blunt, I consider this act to be the most premeditated unconstitutional act by Congress in decades.''

Supporters of this bill claim Congress owes the authority to enact this bill under a broad reading of the so-called District Clause in Article I, section 8. However, Article I, section 2 says, ``The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States.'' Since D.C. is not a State, it cannot have a voting Member in the House.

This was an issue that was clearly raised, debated and rejected by the Founding Fathers. Alexander Hamilton offered an amendment to the Constitution during the New York ratification convention that would have allowed Congress to provide the District with congressional representation, but his amendment was rejected by the convention on July 22, 1788.

More recently in 2000, a Federal district court here in D.C. spoke on the issue, stating, ``We conclude from our analysis of the text that the Constitution does not contemplate that the District may serve as a State for purposes of the apportionment of congressional representatives.''

The House Judiciary Committee has already spoken on this point as well in the 95th Congress. Under the leadership of Democratic Chairman Peter Rodino, the Judiciary Committee reported out a constitutional amendment to do what this bill purports to be able to do by statute. The report accompanying that constitutional amendment stated the following, ``If the citizens of the District are to have voting representation in the Congress, a constitutional amendment is essential; statutory action alone will not suffice.''

Congress passed that constitutional amendment in 1978, but it failed to get the approval of three-quarters of the States over a 7-year period. In fact, only 16 of the 38 States required for its ratification supported the amendment.

So what is being attempted by the legislation before us today is something long recognized as requiring a constitutional amendment that the vast majority of States have already failed to approve. Proponents of this legislation cite a 1949 Supreme Court case called Tidewater, but the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service issued a report analyzing that case. It concluded that ``at least six of the Justices who participated in what appears to be the most relevant Supreme Court case, National Mutual Insurance Co. of the District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co., authored opinions rejecting the proposition that Congress's power under the District Clause was sufficient to effectuate structural changes to the political structures of the Federal Government.

``Further, the remaining three judges, who found that Congress could grant diversity jurisdiction to District of Columbia citizens despite the lack of such jurisdiction in Article III, specifically limited their opinion to instances where there was no extension of anymore fundamental right,'' such as the right to vote for a Member of Congress.

The unconstitutional approach of this bill is completely unnecessary. Most of the District of Columbia, other than a few Federal buildings, could simply be returned to the State of Maryland. That process of retrocession is clearly allowed by the Constitution. It would grant representation to those in Washington D.C., by a simple majority vote, and they would then have representation in both the House and Senate, an improvement over this bill that limits representation only to the House.

Any discrepancies regarding the number of electorates granted to D.C. by the 23rd amendment could easily be corrected through a constitutional amendment once D.C. Members were represented in Congress through retrocession. Madam Speaker, even conceding for purposes of argument the proponents' interpretation of the vast breadth of the District clause, this bill unfairly subjects many citizens to unequal treatment.

H.R. 1433 grants Utah an additional Representative that will run at- large or statewide. The at-large provision creates a situation this country has not seen since the development of the Supreme Court's line of cases affirming the principle of ``one man, one vote.''

Under this provision, voters in Utah would be able to vote for two Representatives, their district representative and the at-large representative, whereas voters in every other State would only be able to vote for their one district representative. The result would be that Utah voters would have disproportionately more voting power compared to the voters of every other State.

There is no question D.C. residents have fought bravely in wars and served their country in a variety of ways. That is interesting, even heartrending, but irrelevant to whether or not this legislation is constitutional.

I also ask this House to consider the serious, practical consequences of passing this legislation. The inevitable legal challenge to this bill could produce legislative chaos by placing into doubt any future legislation passed in Congress by a one-vote margin.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill because it is clearly unconstitutional, and, if enacted, could lead to years of protracted legislation.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.

Madam Speaker, I certainly agree with the majority leader on one point that he made and that is that Washington, D.C. is distinctive. However, it is especially distinctive because it is the only capital in the world that exists under the U.S. Constitution, and that is why this bill is unconstitutional.

Madam Speaker, I include for printing in the Record the Statement of Administration Policy in opposition to this bill.

Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 1433--District of Columbia

House Voting Rights Act of 2007

(del. norton (d) district of columbia and 17 cosponsors)

The Administration strongly opposes passage of H.R. 1433.

The bill violates the Constitution's provisions governing the

composition and election of the United States Congress.

Accordingly, if H.R. 1433 were presented to the President,

his senior advisers would recommend that he veto the bill.

The Constitution limits representation in the House to

representatives of States. Article I, Section 2 provides:

``The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members

chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,

and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications

requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the

State legislature.'' The Constitution also contains 11 other

provisions expressly linking congressional representation to

Statehood.

The District of Columbia is not a State. Accordingly,

congressional representation for the District of Columbia

would require a constitutional amendment. Advocates of

congressional representation for the District have long

acknowledged this. As the House Judiciary Committee stated in

recommending passage of such a constitutional amendment in

1975:

``If the citizens of the District are to have voting

representation in the Congress, a constitutional amendment is

essential; statutory action alone will not suffice. This is

the case because provisions for elections of Senators and

Representatives in the Constitution are stated in terms of

the States, and the District of Columbia is not a State.''

Courts have reached the same conclusion. In 2000, for

example, a three-judge panel concluded ``that the

Constitution does not contemplate that the District may serve

as a state for purposes of the apportionment of congressional

representatives.'' Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 46-47

(D.D.C. 2000). The Supreme Court affirmed that decision. And

just two months ago, Congress's own Research Service found

that, without a constitutional amendment, it is ``likely that

the Congress does not have authority to grant voting

representation in the House of Representatives to the

District of Columbia.''

Recent claims that H.R. 1433 should be viewed as an

exercise of Congress's ``exclusive'' legislative authority

over the District of Columbia as the seat of the Federal

government are not persuasive. Congress's exercise of

legislative authority over the District of Columbia is

qualified by other provisions of the Constitution, including

the Article I requirement that representation in the House of

Representatives is limited to the ``several States.''

Congress cannot vary that constitutional requirement under

the guise of the ``exclusive legislation'' clause, a clause

that provides the same legislative authority over Federal

enclaves like military bases as it does over the District.

For all the foregoing reasons, enacting H.R. 1433's

extension of congressional representation to the District

would be unconstitutional. It would also call into question

(by subjecting to constitutional challenge in the courts) the

validity of all legislation passed by the reconstituted House

of Representatives.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), a former chairman of the Judiciary Committee.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California, Mr. Daniel E. Lungren, a member of the Judiciary Committee and a former attorney general of the State of California.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gohmert), a member of the Judiciary Committee and the deputy and ranking member of the Crime Subcommittee.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my friend from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), a senior member of the Judiciary Committee.

(Mr. GOODLATTE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa), a member of the Judiciary Committee and also a member of its Constitution Subcommittee.

(Mr. ISSA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Jordan), a valued member of the Judiciary Committee.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King), another valued member of the Judiciary Committee, and also the ranking member of one of its subcommittees.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Garrett).

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to my colleague from Texas (Mr. Poe).

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Regula), a senior Member of this body.

(Mr. REGULA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Feeney), a former Speaker of the House in Florida.

(Mr. FEENEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Heller).

Madam Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, let me summarize the reasons we should oppose this legislation. D.C. is not a State, and the Constitution clearly limits representation in the House to States.

Supporters of this bill claim Congress has the authority to enact this bill under a broad reading of the so-called ``District clause'' in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. However, Article I, section 2 clearly says, ``The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the people of the several States.''

The bill unfairly subjects many citizens to unequal treatment as well. H.R. 1433 grants Utah an additional Representative who will run statewide or at large. The at-large provision violates the principles of one man, one vote. Voters in Utah would be able to vote for two Representatives, their district Representative and their at-large Representative, whereas voters in every other State would only be able to vote for their one district Representative. The result would be that Utah voters will have disproportionately more voting power than the voters of every other State, and that, too, is clearly unconstitutional.

In 2000, the Federal District Court in D.C. itself stated, ``We conclude from our analysis of the text that the Constitution does not contemplate that the District may serve as a State for purposes of the apportionment of congressional representatives.''

Furthermore, Madam Speaker, this unconstitutional approach is completely unnecessary. Most of the District of Columbia, other than a few Federal buildings, could simply be returned to the State of Maryland. That process of retrocession is clearly allowed by the Constitution. That process could grant representation in the House to those in Washington by a simple majority vote. D.C. voters could then be represented by both House and Senate Members, an improvement over the current legislation.

Madam Speaker, finally, and for many good reasons, the administration also opposes this legislation.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

I am, Madam Speaker, in its current form.

Madam Speaker, the motion to recommit I have offered contains a bipartisan proposal by Representatives Mike Ross and Mark Souder, the District of Columbia Personal Protection Act.

My colleagues on the other side of the aisle have suggested today that District of Columbia citizens have the right to vote in Congress. If that is the case, then they must also agree that the citizens of the District should have a constitutionally guaranteed right to possess firearms.

Currently, D.C. citizens are prevented from owning any handgun at all. Even those who lawfully own and store a rifle or shotgun are prohibited from using them to defend themselves, their families or their homes.

District law threatens honest people with imprisonment if they unlock, assemble or load their guns even under attack. Although the District has the most stringent gun control laws in the Nation, they still suffer from one of the highest murder rates. Since January 1 of this year alone, 35 people have been murdered in the District. Last year over 150 people were murdered, and 2,000 suffered gun assaults.

This violence continues unabated, despite the strict gun control laws. It is time to restore the rights of law-abiding citizens to protect themselves and to defend their families.

On March 9, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck down some, but not all, of the District of Columbia's gun control laws as unconstitutional. The court agreed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Justice Department and constitutional scholars, present and past, that the second amendment protects the right of individuals to possess firearms. This court decision, which will continue to wind its way through the judicial system, compels Congress to act now to protect all second amendment rights.

Mr. Speaker, the prohibition of firearms in the District of Columbia is as ineffective as it is unconstitutional. It is high time we rectify this wrong.

I urge my colleagues to support this measure.

Madam Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder), who in the last Congress passed a piece of legislation very similar to the motion to recommit that we consider now.

Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 260 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions). All time yielded during consideration of the rule is for debate only.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. ARCURI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 260 provides for consideration of H.R. 1433, the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007, under a closed rule. The rule provides 1 hour and 20 minutes of general debate, with 1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary, and 20 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

The rule waives all points of order against consideration of the bill except those arising under clauses 9 and 10 of rule XXI. The rule provides that the amendment printed in the report shall be considered as adopted, and the bill, as amended, shall be considered as read. The rule waives all points of order against the bill.

Mr. Speaker, this Nation was built upon the principle that it was patently unjust to require people to pay taxes to a government within which they had no direct involvement, what came to be familiarly called ``taxation without representation.'' The fact that approximately 600,000 U.S. citizens live under taxation without representation within the United States today is repugnant to our very notion of democracy and to those who fought and died in creating this great Nation. How can the United States deny democracy in its capital while it promotes democracy abroad?

These citizens pay billions of dollars in Federal taxes and have sacrificed their lives in Iraq and every other war since the American Revolution. This is taxation without representation at its worst, and it is completely undemocratic. No other democracy in the world denies to its citizens in its capital city the right to vote. We here in America, the symbol of democracy to so much of the world, must not deny that right to our citizens.

This bipartisan legislation would correct this injustice by granting the citizens of our Nation's capital with a voting representative in the House of Representatives.

Some of my colleagues have suggested that this legislation is unconstitutional, that we in Congress will be acting outside our power in enacting this bill. To this, I must respectfully and strongly disagree. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution clearly enumerates the powers of Congress. Among the powers listed in Article I, section 8 states that Congress shall have the power ``to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over'' the District of Columbia. Article I, section 8 also gives Congress the power ``to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper'' to execute its enumerated powers.

Further, in 1790, Congress passed the Residence Act, giving residents of the new District of Columbia the right to vote. Since the capital was still being established, citizens were allowed to continue voting in their States, Maryland and Virginia. Congress then took this right away by statute in 1800 when the Federal Government assumed control of the District of Columbia. In the political battles that followed, District residents were denied a vote in Congress. Certainly, if Congress can remove the right by statute, so too can it reinstate that right by statute.

In the landmark Supreme Court case McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall said: ``Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.''

Extending full representation in the House to residents of the District of Columbia is a legitimate end. It is within the scope of Congress' power to exercise exclusive legislation in matters concerning the District of Columbia and consistent with not only the letter of the Constitution but also the spirit in which the Constitution was written by our Founding Fathers, that is, ``taxation without representation is tyranny.''

I, for one, want to correct this grave injustice and provide the citizens of Washington, D.C. with the same rights afforded to every other citizen in this great Nation. Our actions today will do just that.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I respectfully disagree with my friend and colleague from Texas. I think he is trying to characterize this bill as an attempt to create statehood for the District of Columbia, which is not what this bill does. This bill attempts to do what the Constitution says that Congress can do, and that is, exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over the District. That is what we are doing here, and there is precedent to that.

In 1949 in the Tidewater case, the Supreme Court upheld a decision which allowed Congress to give diversity jurisdiction to the District of Columbia, and now, generally, diversity jurisdiction only can occur between States, and despite the fact that clearly the District of Columbia was not a State, they were able, through an enactment by Congress, to be given that status of diversity jurisdiction.

The District of Columbia is not a State. It is not being treated as a State, but rather as a district for the capital, for the Federal capital. So it does have a special and unique treatment, and I think the Founding Fathers realized that it would be different, that it would not be like a State, and, in fact, it was part of the history why they came and created a capital.

When they were in Philadelphia, they were not happy with the fact that they had to constantly appeal to the Pennsylvania Legislature for the right to do different things, so they intended to create a capital that they would be able to have jurisdiction over.

That was the historical reason why the District of Columbia was created. So the fact that Congress then gave itself, or the Constitution gave Congress the right to make laws and make rules for the District of Columbia is the reason why today we are introducing this bill.

So I believe that we are not attempting to give D.C. statehood, but, rather, to give it a right to vote in this body, which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of Congress and within the right of Congress to do.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material in the Record.

Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Yes, sir, we have two additional speakers.

Yes, sir.

Mr. Speaker, I would just like to point out, in listening to the debate, that when one looks at some of the decisions from the Supreme Court with respect to the steps that Congress, the powers of Congress, you can't help but think of Marbury v. Madison, which is one of the first great cases considered by Justice Marshall in the early Supreme Court.

In that case, the Supreme Court basically outlined what was the framework for the separation of power between the different branches of government. Basically, it set forth to Congress that it could not dictate to the Supreme Court or to the justice branch of government what the jurisdictions of or what their jurisdiction was.

Basically, what that decision came to recognize is the fact that within the particular branches of government, each branch has exclusive power and that only the Constitution can set jurisdiction.

Clearly, that is what we are doing here today. The Constitution makes it very clear that Congress has exclusive legislative right over the District. That is exactly what we are attempting to do today. We are attempting to give the District of Columbia the right to vote, as we are entitled to do, as the Constitution clearly enumerates that Congress has the right to do.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

I thank the gentleman from Georgia for his remarks. He talks about bipartisanship. Frankly, I can't think of an issue that is more bipartisan than giving each and every American the right to vote. That is exactly what we are attempting to do here today.

You know, I can't help but think as a new Member of Congress that when we came down back in January to be sworn in, and my daughter and my family were here, one of the first things that my daughter said to me was noticing on a license plate ``taxation without representation.'' She asked me what that meant and why they were talking about that because she remembered studying about it in school.

It is critical. It is so important to us as a Nation to practice what we preach. We are in other places in the world. We are fighting wars for freedom, and we talk about how important it is to give people the right to vote and to be free, and that is exactly what we are doing here today.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

We anticipate having our Speaker, and we continue to reserve the balance of our time.

I thank the gentleman from California, my colleague from the Rules Committee. And he points out that, yes, I think a legitimate question, how are we going to pay for this? I can't help but think that when it comes to giving people freedom and the right to vote, we must find a way to pay for it. In fact, we have spent $400 billion attempting to give the people in Iraq freedom and the right to vote. And if we can spend $400 billion in Iraq, then we can spend some money here to give the 600,000 people here in the District of Columbia the right to vote.

I yield to the gentleman from California.

I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

I would just like to point out that the gentleman from California says that he is not clearly not an expert on the Constitution, but I think he has a much better understanding of the Constitution than he admits.

You sound like you are strictly attempting to interpret the Constitution, a strict constructionalist. And that being the case, I think it is clear, a close reading of the Constitution gives Congress under Article I, section 8 exclusive legislation over all aspects of the District. So I think that it is clear in a strict reading of the Constitution that Congress has this ability.

I just would point out what I stated earlier. In the Tidewater case, the Supreme Court upheld the ability of Congress to designate the District of Columbia, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, as a special creature, as not a State, but standing in certain respects in the same way that a State does. I think it is clearly within the power of Congress to do this, and I yield.

Reclaiming my time. And I think I just have to answer that by saying if you look at historically why Congress actually created the District, it was so that it would have jurisdiction over the area which it sat, not for the reason that you indicate.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time we have remaining.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Davis.

Yes, Mr. Speaker. I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton).

Mr. Speaker, I would agree with the gentleman that if something is unconstitutional, certainly I would not support it, but I believe that this bill is constitutional, and I believe again Article I, section 8 makes it constitutional for Congress to pass this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I now yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton).

Mr. Speaker, this is all about fairness. And in the spirit of fairness that the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton) talks about, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions) for debate only.

Mr. Speaker, the nearly 600,000 citizens of Washington D.C. have waited far too long for equal representation in this Chamber. They have sacrificed their lives defending this great Nation, paid their fair share in taxes, and helped to build and run this great Nation.

We have an opportunity to correct this grave injustice and provide the citizens of our Nation's capital with the most important right of all, and that is, of course, the right to vote.

I want to commend the Delegate from Washington, D.C., for her tireless efforts that have brought us together on this historic day. It is that type of passion and commitment that further strengthens our democracy.

I urge a ``yes'' vote on the rule and on the previous question.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

Madam Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence).

(Mr. PENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from

Georgia (Mr. Price) for the purpose of a unanimous consent request.

(Mr. PRICE of Georgia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

(Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, it is often said that if opportunity doesn't knock, build a door. With this bill, we are doing just that.

Using the materials at hand today, we can open a portal to full democratic participation that for too long has remained locked. The circumstances are right, the stars are aligned, and the proposal is sound.

Four years ago, we saw a confluence of events that set the stage for the compromise we have before us today. Two injustices met to create this opportunity to correct both. On the one hand, a long-ignored historical anomaly denies the citizens of the District of Columbia voting representation in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, a more recent problem with the census denies the citizens of Utah the additional House vote that a true count would have yielded.

As it happens, one jurisdiction is predominantly Democratic, the other predominantly Republican. The circumstances opened the way to a politically neutral solution to both problems.

Throughout our Nation's history, it has been just this kind of win- win compromise that, however rooted in the fleeting circumstances of the day, provide enduring solutions to seemingly intractable problems.

Each of us swears to uphold the Constitution, its letter and spirit. That living document is at its heart the most fundamental right of citizens in a democracy. All the citizens. So we rely on the plenary power found in the District clause to restore the full right of citizenship to our disenfranchised countrymen and women.

After researching every possible avenue to right these wrongs and give the citizens of the District of Columbia and Utah, the next State that is eligible for a vote under the formula, the representation to which they are entitled, we concluded the approach before us today is both constitutionally sound and politically viable.

The former is our sworn duty. The latter is a practical imperative.

In 4 years, I have found no evidence that any Member of this body seriously plans to attempt retrocession or campaign for a constitutional amendment. There is a good reason for that: they are politically not viable. Most Members, including me, don't waste their time tilting at windmills.

By now, every Member is aware of the constitutional arguments. I ask that you think carefully about what you hear today. Every first-year law student in this country learns that you can't just read the Constitution once over literally to figure out what it means. But that is what the other side's arguments are. That is where it stops, and that is where it starts.

Those opposing this bill ignore 200 years of case law and clear instruction from the Court that this is a congressional matter and requires a congressional solution. Under their literal reading of the Constitution, District residents would have no right to a jury trial under the sixth amendment because you have to be a State to have that right.

D.C. residents would have no right to sue people from outside D.C. in the Federal courts; only people from States have that right under Article III, section 2.

The full faith and credit clause would not apply to D.C. because that only applies to States under a literal reading of the Constitution.

And the Federal Government would not be allowed to impose Federal taxes on the District. The Constitution says direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States. Article I, section 2, clause 3.

But in each of these cases, the Supreme Court has held that Congress can consider the District a State for purposes of applying these fundamental provisions. If Congress has the authority to do so regarding these lesser rights and duty, there should be no question we have the same authority to protect the most sacred right of every American: to live and participate in a representative Republic.

It should also be pointed out that Congress granted voting representation in 1790 when it accepted the land that would become the Federal city. It then removed those rights, by statute, 10 years later. Those facts are undisputed. No amendment to the Constitution was considered necessary then. And those opposing the bill today will not explain, only assert, the claimed need for a constitutional amendment to reverse a decision that was made through enactment of a statute.

This problem should be solved. A lot of people today will talk about the Framers and tell us that the Framers intended for the Federal city to have no direct representation.

Do you really believe that if the capital had stayed in New York, the city would have been disenfranchised? Do you believe that if the capital had stayed in Philadelphia, the city would have been disenfranchised? Of course not, and neither should the people of Washington, D.C.

What we know is men and women who fought and died to create this country were willing to die for people who might disagree with them politically. D.C. residents are paying Federal taxes. They are fighting and dying in the Middle East to bring democracy to that part of the world.

This is no mere legal or political science exercise. It's a crisis. Your fellow Americans are being denied the full rights and benefits of representative government. We have before us this unique moment in our history, the opportunity to fulfill the promise of the Constitution and make our democracy whole again.

I hope we hear opportunity knocking, and I hope we hear the faint, but unmistakable whisper of conscience and of history, urging us all to seize the moment with courage and humility.

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 14, 2007]

Rights and Wrong

Historic legislation giving the people of the District a

vote in their national government is being debated in the

House of Representatives. Prospects for its passage have

never been better. The Democrats who control the House have

kept a promise to move the bill forward, but the

disenfranchisement of American citizens shouldn't be about

partisan politics. It should be about what is right and

wrong.

Indeed, the legislation working its way through the House

sprang from he sense of injustice of a Republican House

member from suburban Virginia. Rep. Thomas M. Davis III

believes it is grotesque that D.C. residents are denied

congressional representation. he came up with an ingenious

way to get politics out of the equation. Two seats would be

added to Congress--one for the mostly Democratic District and

the other for heavily Republican Utah. The bill is on a fast

track thanks to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and

Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.). The House Oversight

and Government Reform Committee approved the measure

yesterday, with every Democrat and six Republicans voting for

it. The Judiciary Committee now takes it up, and a battle is

expected.

It's hard to make a case for depriving people of a voice in

Congress when they pay federal taxes, serve on federal juries

and send family members off to war. It's also pretty

embarrassing that the Untied States, while preaching

democracy to the rest of the world, remains the only

democratic country where people in the capital city are

without representation. So opponents of D.C. voting rights

have latched onto the only argument they can make with a

straight face--that the bill is unconstitutional.

Former judges and constitutional scholars such as Kenneth

Starr, Patricia Wald and Viet Dinh, not to mention the

American Bar Association, believe the bill is constitutional.

They argue that Congress has repeatedly treated the District

as if it were a state and that this treatment has been

upheld. For his part, Mr. Davis has delved into history to

make a compelling argument that the lack of a vote was never

the aim of the Founding Fathers but rather an ``undemocratic

accident.''

We concede that serious people hold the contrary view. No

court has ever weighed in on the D.C. Voting Rights Act, so

the constitutional question is open. That, though, is an

issue for the courts to decide, in the event of a legal

challenge. It should not be an excuse for Congress to

continue to deny a basic right to more than half a million

people.

Let me just say to my colleagues, I think the gun ban in the District is ridiculous, and I would join with my colleagues in overturning it. The problem is this motion doesn't do that. Instead of bringing this motion back to the floor forthwith for a vote up or down to continue this resolution and send it to the Senate with the gun ban, it sends it back to the committee; is that correct, Mr. Smith? It does not send it back to the floor, this sends it to committee. So essentially this vote doesn't go anywhere. You can get your vote on gun rights, but it kills the bill, and that is the intention of this. And it is put there to put Members in a difficult situation. If you want to get a vote on District voter rights, you have to vote against this.

I would hope that we can have a free vote on the District gun ban later on. The courts have overturned it. I don't think it is a good law. But this doesn't overturn it because this kills the bill, and with it kills the amendment.

I would urge my colleagues to reject it.