Floor Statements

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, yesterday I spoke to the events of January 8 in Tucson, AZ, specifically referencing the people we are honoring by the resolution that is before us today. At 2:30 this afternoon, we will have an opportunity to act as a body, Democrats and Republicans from all parts of our country, to recognize the people who were injured, the families of those who were killed, and, of course, the heroes of the tragic Tucson shooting.

On that morning of January 8, Representative Gabrielle Giffords arrived at a Tucson Safeway store for her ``Congress on Your Corner'' event. She was there to meet with constituents, which is something she enjoyed doing very much. This was the first such event of the year. She had hosted others previously.

She was joined by members of her staff. Among them were Pam Simon, Ron Barber, Gabriel Zimmerman, and Daniel Hernandez, an intern. They stood alongside as Congresswoman Giffords greeted her constituents who had lined up to speak with her. One of those individuals was Judge John Roll, chief judge of the U.S. District Court of Arizona, a personal friend of mine. Like most mornings, he had attended mass. Then he decided to stop by the Safeway to thank the Congresswoman for her assistance in dealing with the court's overwhelming caseload. Also attending the event was 9-year-old Christina-Taylor Green, who, like Congresswoman Giffords, had recently won elected office. This third grader had recently been elected to the student council by Mesa Verde Elementary School. Dorothy Morris and her husband George, a retired marine, were attending the event together. And Phyllis Schneck, a great grandmother who spent the winters in Tucson but was actually from New Jersey, was there as well, as were Dorwan and Mavy Stoddard. As all of these people were waiting to speak to Congresswoman Giffords, a gunman approached and shot the Congresswoman in the head, then turning his gun on the others in line. Gabriel Zimmerman, Judge Roll, Christina-Taylor Green, Dorothy Morris, Phyllis Schneck, and Dorwan Stoddard were all killed. George Morris, Mavy Stoddard, Pamela Simon, Ron Barber, and the Congresswoman were injured, along with eight others.

Those who were killed had much more to offer in their lives.

Gabe, the Congresswoman's director of community outreach, was only 30 years old. He was engaged to be married. According to news reports, he was killed while rushing to assist others. He worked closely with my Tucson staff.

Judge Roll was not only a very distinguished and respected jurist but was known most of all in the Tucson community for his kindness and courtesy. He was killed as he tried to protect Ron Barber, who had been shot just moments before.

Christina-Taylor Green, as I mentioned, was only 9 years old, a third grader.

Dorothy Morris was married for 50 years to George, and he was injured trying to protect his wife. The couple has two daughters. I met one of them when I visited with George in the facility in which he is recuperating, where I was last Friday.

Phyllis, like others in this group, was a volunteer at her church. She was also known for her cooking.

Dorwan Stoddard I mentioned was also a church volunteer, and he, too, was shot as he dove to the ground to cover his wife, who escaped with wounds to her legs. I had an opportunity to visit with her again Friday as well.

As we know, the gunman was prepared to take more lives. His plans for more bloodshed were thwarted by brave and selfless citizens. Their stories have been documented in the media in the past few weeks, but a few of their heroic acts are worth recounting here.

After a bullet grazed his head and took him to the ground, Bill Badger, a 74-year-old retired Army colonel--and in good shape, I might add--got up and he helped hold the gunman down until the police arrived.

Anna Ballis was shopping that morning at Safeway. She was leaving the store when the shooting began. According to reports, she rushed to the aid of Barber after a bullet hit an artery in his leg. Anna is the mother of two U.S. marines who have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan multiple times. I mentioned yesterday visiting Ron Barber in the hospital, holding Anna's hand, repeating over and over again how she had saved his life.

Such multiple acts of bravery and kindness.

Daniel Hernandez was in the gallery at the State of the Union speech last night. He is a 21-year-old intern for Congresswoman Giffords. He rushed to her aid right after the incident. He had some training in first aid and applied pressure to her wounds, which prevented her from bleeding more than she did. He stayed with her even after emergency service personnel arrived.

Sixty-one-year-old Patricia Maisch grabbed the magazine of additional ammunition the gunman was hoping to reload in his weapon and then administered first aid to a shooting victim.

Steve Rayle, a doctor and former emergency room physician, helped subdue the gunman until law enforcement arrived, and then he, too, helped to care for the injured.

As the gunman was trying to reload his weapon, Roger Salzgeber wrestled him down from behind.

Joseph Zamudio ran toward the scene from a nearby store when he heard the shots being fired and helped subdue the gunman again until law enforcement officers arrived.

We are obviously grateful for these acts of bravery. We are proud of the people I have mentioned but also all of the emergency workers who quickly arrived on the scene and provided lifesaving aid and comfort to the injured in the very crucial moments following the attack.

I must mention also the incredible team of professionals, the surgeons and other highly skilled personnel at University Medical Center. We are proud of that facility in southern Arizona, and they certainly showed their competence in dealing with all of the wounded and some who died.

It has now been more than 2 weeks since the tragedy, and the families who lost loved ones are obviously still grieving. We all pray that they find comfort in the days ahead, and we hope and pray that the wounded will soon make full recoveries. In recent days, we have received some good news in that regard as those who were wounded are beginning to recover and leave the hospital. Our friend and colleague Gabby Giffords, although she remains in serious condition, we are heartened to hear positive reports from her doctors, and we wish her the very best as she begins a new phase of her recovery in Houston.

The tragedy in Tucson was a shock to us all. It is difficult to comprehend that such horror could be visited upon such fine individuals and their families. In some respects, however, we see once again how it has brought out the best in good people.

In honor of the victims and the heroes of this tragic event, Senator McCain and I ask our colleagues in the Senate to pass S. Res. 14. We can do little to bring solace to those who lost loved ones, but we can affirm that this body is united in its grief for the fallen, its admiration for the heroes, and prayers for the injured.

Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, my State has lost an outstanding jurist, a true and able public servant, and a great Arizonan in Judge John M. Roll. In his honor, my Arizona colleague, Senator McCain, and I propose naming the soon-to-be constructed Yuma Federal courthouse the ``Judge John M. Roll United States Courthouse.''

Judge John Roll was the top proponent for the addition of a new courthouse in Yuma, which is intended to help deal with the vast number of Federal cases in the underserved Yuma sector. He was involved in nearly every aspect of its approval, working tirelessly to overcome the many obstacles that arose during the process and spending countless hours poring over designs and meeting with architects and contractors. Without Judge Roll's energy and enthusiasm the project may not have been accomplished.

We name special places after special people not just to thank them, although we do, but to honor the qualities that make them exceptional and distinct.

I had the privilege and honor of working with Judge John Roll for many years. He was known for his fairness to all who appeared in his courtroom, both plaintiffs and defendants. As chief judge, he was a vigorous advocate, working to guarantee the Federal courts in Arizona were capable of handing their extraordinary caseload. In fact, he died protecting the life of a member of Representative Gifford's staff with whom he had just been discussing the need to designate the need for more judges as a judicial emergency.

We are eternally grateful for his many years of public service. I believe naming the courthouse in his honor befits the rich legacy he leaves behind.

I urge my colleagues to support this legislation in honor of my friend Judge John Roll.

Mr. President, my State has lost an outstanding jurist, a true and able public servant, and a great Arizonan in Judge John M. Roll. In his honor, my Arizona colleague, Senator McCain, and I propose naming the soon-to-be constructed Yuma Federal courthouse the ``Judge John M. Roll United States Courthouse.''

Judge John Roll was the top proponent for the addition of a new courthouse in Yuma, which is intended to help deal with the vast number of Federal cases in the underserved Yuma sector. He was involved in nearly every aspect of its approval, working tirelessly to overcome the many obstacles that arose during the process and spending countless hours poring over designs and meeting with architects and contractors. Without Judge Roll's energy and enthusiasm the project may not have been accomplished.

We name special places after special people not just to thank them, although we do, but to honor the qualities that make them exceptional and distinct.

I had the privilege and honor of working with Judge John Roll for many years. He was known for his fairness to all who appeared in his courtroom, both plaintiffs and defendants. As chief judge, he was a vigorous advocate, working to guarantee the Federal courts in Arizona were capable of handing their extraordinary caseload. In fact, he died protecting the life of a member of Representative Gifford's staff with whom he had just been discussing the need to designate the need for more judges as a judicial emergency.

We are eternally grateful for his many years of public service. I believe naming the courthouse in his honor befits the rich legacy he leaves behind.

I urge my colleagues to support this legislation in honor of my friend Judge John Roll.

Madam President, I would like to call timeout from this partisan discussion to speak for a moment about the events in Tucson of January 8. It is the first opportunity I have had to address my colleagues about the tragedy of that day. The theme I would like to discuss is the goodness of people because if I have gotten any lesson from this, after meeting and talking with all of the people whom I could who were involved in this tragedy, the overwhelming notion of the goodness of people is what I am most left with.

Tomorrow, Senator McCain and I will offer a resolution in support of the victims of the shooting, offering condolences to those who were lost and their loved ones and our prayers for the recovery of those who were injured and expressing appreciation to those who engaged in real acts of heroism. We will have time more formally to talk about it when we do that tomorrow, but I wanted to share some thoughts from my heart based on my interaction with the people over the last 2 weeks after this event occurred.

It begins with the proposition that Tucson likes to call itself a town, not a city. It is over half a million people. But you are all familiar with communities which, though large in numbers, seem small because people work together, they play together, and they have a sense of community and of helping and working with each other. That is Tucson, where my wife and I both attended the University of Arizona. The Safeway where this event occurred is only two blocks from my Tucson office, and the head of my Tucson office and his staff were at the Safeway that Saturday morning shopping, and they left about 7 or 8 minutes before this occurred.

Judge John Roll, who was a very close friend and attended Mass virtually every morning, had just come from Mass and had decided to come to the Safeway to express his appreciation to Representative Gabrielle Giffords. They were friends. Among other things, he wanted to tell her he appreciated her signing a letter, along with Representative Grijalva, that supported the Arizona Federal District Court in its desire to be named an emergency district by the commission that does that for the Federal courts because of the overwhelming caseload in that court.

Judge Roll, though he had significant administrative responsibilities, kept a full caseload himself because to do otherwise would have been to put part of the burden onto his colleagues. So he was really carrying two separate loads, administering a very busy court, and at the same time acting as a judge on all of his cases.

One of the things he and I had been working on--in fact, Senator Barrasso, Senator LeMieux, and I had lunch with Judge Roll the Friday after the election to talk about how we could strengthen the courts, especially because of the crushing caseload from drug and immigration cases because that is the district that is right down on the border. Part of his work, which I was working with him on, was to try to find ways to ameliorate the load of this court and potentially get some additional magistrates, if not judges, to help handle the caseload.

When Representative Giffords decided to hold this ``Congress on Your Corner'' event, many of the people on her Tucson staff went with her to the event. They are very devoted to her. I

do not know anyone who enjoys meeting with constituents more than Representative Giffords. So she had several staff people there too. When the gunman came, he immediately headed for her. His intention was obviously to do her harm, but right after shooting Representative Giffords, he began to shoot the people on her staff and the others waiting in line to talk to her.

This is where some of the goodness of the people comes out. I mean, I talked about the goodness of the people. Judge Roll did not have to say ``thank you'' to Representative Giffords, but he went out of his way to try to do that. When Ron Barber, the head of Representative Giffords' Tucson staff, was shot, Judge Roll, the cameras show, pushed him down under a table and put his body over Ron Barber's body and thus took the bullet that killed John Roll. Talk about the goodness of people.

At his funeral, everyone in Tucson and in Arizona who knew Judge Roll spoke not just of his abilities as a jurist and his public service but his goodness, his love for his wife Maureen, their three sons, their grandchildren. Incidentally, three of his grandchildren spoke. It was so moving when they talked about the love they had for their grandfather, who took a lot of time with each of them to teach them how to swim, to play basketball, and so on. The goodness of people.

Representative Giffords' staff was there. They liked her and were very willing to be with her on a Saturday morning when they could have been doing something else with their families.

Gabe Zimmerman, just 30 years old, was one of those staff people, and he, too, lost his life. My staff in Tucson really enjoyed working with Gabe. Now, I am a Republican, they are Republicans, and Gabe is a Democrat working for a Democratic Representative. That did not matter to them. They really enjoyed working together for the same constituents. And I will tell you, my Tucson staff has taken his loss very hard.

There were others from his staff who were there, one of whom is an intern we are going to see this evening. He is going to be sitting in the President's box. His name is Daniel Hernandez. We saw him at the ceremony in Tucson at the University of Arizona on Wednesday after the shooting. He was one of the people who immediately went to Representative Giffords' aid and continued to staunch her bleeding. The goodness of people--his unselfish act to help her.

Pam Simon was another one of her staffers who were shot. I had a chance to visit with Pam in the hospital and then after. There she is with wounds. A bullet went in and out of her arm and another in her leg. She could not wait to get back to work, and she has done so now.

The other people who were shot there--Christina Taylor Green was the 9-year-old. The things that were said about her remind me so much of my granddaughter, my youngest granddaughter. The hugest heart you can ever imagine, athletic and yet studious, interested in government--all the things you would want in a young woman. President Obama spoke eloquently about her in his remarks on that Wednesday. She was taken to the event with a friend who just wanted to expose her to Representative Giffords and a little bit about our government.

Dorothy Morris. Now, I did not know Dorothy, but I knew her husband George. They had communicated with me, and I visited with George a couple of times after this event. He is a retired marine. I will tell you, he is having a hard time with this because he said that Dot, his wife, would follow him--in his words, ``She would follow me to hell.'' Well, she is obviously in a different place, and he is going to be as well. But the fact is, she did not particularly want to go that morning, but he is a Republican, he wanted to go talk to Representative Giffords because he thought he could talk to her just in the way that we do about issues and have a good conversation with somebody he did not totally agree with.

Dorwan and Mavy Stoddard. Dorwan was killed. His whole recent life was devoted to service at his church. I visited with Mavy at her home. Her two daughters were there and a very good friend of ours, Ed Biggers, from Tucson, who also attends their church. The kindness of all of those people and the way they talked about the others involved, as well as, as you can see, the members of family and friends helping each other, was, as I said, an impression that will stick with me forever.

Phyllis Schneck, who everyone agreed was a wonderful grandmother, spent her winters in Tucson--she lived in New Jersey.

All of these folks were human beings with friends, with family, with futures, and to have all of them taken from us is a real tragedy.

What can we take from that? At this time, I think I have gone almost 10 minutes. Tomorrow, I will mention some of the other heroes. I will take a second with some of them, though.

Bill Badger, a retired Army colonel, did not want to talk about his heroism, but he helped to subdue the assailant.

Anna Ballis, who has two sons, both of whom are U.S. marines who have done repeated tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, was in the Safeway, came out, and immediately began administering to Ron Barber. I went to visit Ron in the hospital at the same time Anna had gotten there, a few minutes before, and Ron was holding her hand the entire time, saying: This is the lady who saved my life. Just a tremendous act of selfless courage on her part and showing again the wonderful humanity of all of the people there.

Steve Rayle, a doctor, a former emergency room doc, was there and helped to subdue the assailant and so on.

There are many others. We will talk about some of the others tomorrow when we express more formally our views on this resolution. I know all of our colleagues will want to join us in supporting this resolution to let the folks of Tucson know we appreciate what they have endured here, we appreciate the heroism. Our prayers are with the victims, and our hearts go out to all of those who were injured in some way or other.

From this, among the lessons we learned is that people have innate goodness. We all have a side of us that we wish we did not have sometimes too frequently expressed on the floor of this body. But maybe for a little while, we can acknowledge the fact that there is goodness in everyone, and I saw so much of that in all of these people drawn from all over the community, different walks of life, different political parties, different ages. Yet when they came together, what was most obvious? It was their sacrifice and their goodness. I think that is something that should be a lesson to all of us.

Tomorrow, I will speak more formally, as I said, about this resolution. But I am deeply grateful for the expressions of condolence and support all of my colleagues have presented to me and to Senator McCain.

I call up amendment No. 4892, as modified. The modification is at the desk.

I am not asking at this time there be an agreement. I am simply saying that the amendment I want to bring up is the amendment I filed.

I will describe the modifications. They were made in an effort

to get agreement. If we cannot, that is fine, but I do think it makes it more palatable to Members.

May we have the amendment read.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, this amendment has to do with the modernization of our nuclear weapons enterprise. It is a subject with which we began this debate. As we get toward the end of the debate, it remains a piece of unfinished business with which I think we need to deal. Remember, the nuclear enterprise we are talking about consists primarily of the facilities that are used to work on our nuclear weapons, as well as the weapons and importantly the scientists who work in those facilities. They represent our National Laboratories, as well as other production facilities and related facilities.

The point I think is important for people to remember is that unlike all of the other nuclear powers in the world today, the United States does not have an active modernization program for our nuclear deterrent, a program which enables us, for example, to remanufacture a component of a weapon and replace an existing weapon with that.

The need for this has been made very clear by all of the people in the administration who have considered this, including Secretary of Defense Gates. The Secretary, remember, is, in effect, the customer for the Department of Energy, which is the Department responsible for producing these weapons. The budget we talk about is a Department of Energy budget, but it is really to produce weapons for use by the Secretary of Defense.

Here is what he said about the need to modernize the production complex, which is what we call that group of facilities, as well as the stockpile:

To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a

credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our

stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile

or pursuing a modernization program.

Each year, our Laboratory Directors and the Secretary of Energy are required to provide a certification to the President that certifies the status of the weapons in the stockpile and makes determinations as to whether those weapons are safe, secure, and reliable without the need for testing.

Each year, as we discussed in our closed session, there are reports about the status of these weapons. I will talk in a moment about the material we discussed in the closed session. But suffice it to say here that there is a great need for us to move with alacrity to bring up to date the weapons that are in our stockpile and that requires modernization of the facilities and related equipment to accomplish that task.

This will require a substantial investment over the next decade. Unfortunately, over the years, these facilities have been allowed to deteriorate, our capacity to atrophy, and our scientists to retire without doing what is necessary to bring these weapons up to date.

The current budget projection, as expressed in the 1251 report update, which was dated November 17, 2010, initiates that modernization but clearly cannot accurately predict future requirements. This is the problem we have dealt with here.

The report acknowledges that we have a problem and can estimate today what we think we can spend over the next few years--say, 5 years--but it is hard to estimate beyond that as to what the exact cost of this is going to be. I try to deal with that in this particular amendment.

The Laboratory Directors responsible for certifying our nuclear weapons recently wrote in a letter:

As we emphasized in our testimonies, implementation of the

future vision of the nuclear deterrent . . . will require

sustained attention and continued refinement.

In other words, each year they can get their estimates more accurate, as one might expect, and define more specifically what the exact requirements are. In this case, that generally means an increase in costs in one area or another. In fact, Vice President Biden, speaking to this precise problem, said:

[W]e expect that funding requirements will increase in

future budget years.

We know that is going to happen. The question is, can we be any more particular in the funding that we require. My amendment seeks to be a little bit more precise or a little bit more specific than the current language.

At the crux of this modernization program is a need for a firm commitment for the construction of two critical manufacturing facilities. They are called the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement, or CMRR, plutonium facility--that is at Los Alamos Laboratory--and the Uranium Processing Facility, or UPF at the so- called Y-12 facility at Oak Ridge, TN. Without these, the capacity to perform stockpile maintenance will be lost by 2020 and there will be no capability to modernize our aging stockpile.

For Members to recall briefly, these are, in many cases, facilities that go all the way back to the Manhattan Project, the project that created the atomic weapons that enabled us to conclude World War II. Some of these buildings were built as early as 1942, and they are not in good shape. In fact, when I was with one of my colleagues from Tennessee visiting the Y-12 facility, I asked one of the people responsible for a particular part of the facility what his biggest concern was. He said: My biggest concern is keeping this thing going for another 10 or 12 years. When you see the facility, you can see that. And that is no way to deal with the most sophisticated weapons that mankind has ever invented.

As I said, the current plan is a big improvement over what we had just a year or so ago. We got together with the administration and asked them to relook at the plan they had submitted and identify areas where there were deficiencies in funding or planning. They came back with an updated report that revealed funding requirements that had previously not been dealt with. There was a little over $4 billion in funding added to the first 5 years of the 10-year program we are looking at as a result.

But even there, there was an argument that there were uncertainties, they were only at a certain point in the planning of these two large facilities, and that those funds would be inadequate.

To note something for our colleagues and of which the Presiding Officer is very well aware, being one of the two Senators responsible for the Los Alamos facilities, he will recall both he and his colleague and others of us, in visiting Los Alamos, were told about the problems of building a facility there where there theoretically could be an earthquake in the near vicinity and the costs of construction have increased dramatically because of the physical needs to protect that facility against any conceivable kind of physical problem. That has increased the cost of the facilities, and they are trying to get a handle on how much they will actually be. They are pretty clear about a ball-park estimate, but a ball-park estimate is not quite good enough for these purposes, as we know.

I will conclude by saying I am a little distressed by the news stories. We cannot expect the news media to have gotten into the detail required to actually make policy. They put it in a political context that the administration put another $4 billion into the pot and why shouldn't that satisfy people like me.

Of course, that is totally beside the point. We are simply trying to get a better handle on how much money will

be needed and to be able to plan for that funding in a way that gets it to the facilities in the most expeditious way possible so that, A, we can complete the work that has to be done in time and, B, that will save a lot of money, about $200 million a year.

There is every reason to want to understand how much it will cost and get it done quickly. It is not about adding $4 billion. That does not begin to cover the cost of these items.

It is not a matter of some kind of negotiation that additional money was thrown in the pot and is that not good enough. It is a matter of continuing to focus as the cost of these facilities evolves and as the requirements evolve, so that Congress, with the administration's request in its budgets, can provide the funding that is necessary when it is necessary to get these facilities completed as quickly as possible in order to achieve our modernization goals.

There is no dispute about the fact that there will be additional money required. It is just a question of what to do about it.

The updated budget, while committing additional funds to repairing these facilities, will not be able to eliminate even over 10 years, for example, the more than $2 billion of documented maintenance issues. There are some things that are simply outside the budget and need to be dealt with.

My biggest concern in the updated modernization plan is actually that it added to the delays. What we should be doing is trying to telescope these projects as much as possible so we can meet the deadlines for the refurbishing of our weapons--or maintenance of our weapons, I should say--rather--than extending the time for the completion of the facilities. But unfortunately, that is what the latest report did. Instead of accelerating construction of these two most critical facilities, the CMRR and the UPF, the updated plan now delays completion to 2023 and 2024, respectively, rather than 2020.

As we recall from the executive session we had a couple of days ago, there was information presented as to why these facilities absolutely needed to be completed by 2020 in order to accomplish the life extension projects for some of our weapons.

Delay in these facilities will hamper efforts to perform these critical life extensions of our warheads and not inconsequentially add significant costs, again, primarily to keep these aging facilities operational.

As an example, we have to put a brandnew roof on the facility at Los Alamos even though the facility in 10 or 12 years is no longer going to be used because it will be replaced. But the roof is so bad that the work we have to do in there is affected by the weather, and so we have to build a roof. That is an expenditure one hates to make because in 10 or 12 years that building is not going to be used anymore. But that is the state of repair we are in.

Each year of delay adds to those kinds of maintenance costs. Senator Corker and I and Senator Alexander were told at the Y-12 facility that it is about a $200-million-a-year cost to keep these aging facilities going that we can eliminate if we can complete the construction of these two large facilities.

One-fourth of the newest increase of this $4.1 billion, of which I spoke, for the next 4 years does not even go to the buildings or the facility. It simply meets an obligation for unfunded pensions that have been allowed to accumulate over the years. The only good news about that is, I guess, they would probably have stolen the money from one of the accounts that directly deals with the modernization of our weapons in order to meet those unfunded pension obligations. So I am glad we were able to put the billion dollars in there. But when they talk about $4 billion more for science work on these weapons, that is not true. Fully one-fourth of it goes to meet these unfunded pension obligations.

There is a need for things outside the science, but clearly the science requirements are the key ones we are trying to get money to as much as we can.

The key point also is that the modernization is independent of the ratification of the treaty. It is true that as we reduce the number of warheads, there is even more of a requirement that we know the warheads we have will do their job because we do not have a backup warhead sitting in a storeroom, basically in the event something does not work if that is deployed right now. It is true that as we reduce the number, we have to pay even more attention to whether they are all safe, secure, and reliable. But it is also a fact that the modernization is independent of the ratification of the treaty.

During the hearings that were conducted on this treaty, all 16 experts who provided testimony spoke of the requirement for modernization. Many indicated it is a requirement irrespective of START. That is a point that has been made by others as well.

For example, former Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham in an op-ed recently said:

The Obama administration's decision to support increased

investment in the maintenance of our nuclear weapons lab and

stockpile is correct and long overdue . . . But the fact that

the administration has revised its policy for the better is

in itself no reason for any Senator to endorse START . . .

The START treaty and beefed up funding for our nuclear

enterprise are two separate issues that should remain

distinct.

The point was also made by the person responsible for this modernization program--Deputy NNSA Administrator Tom D'Agostino. He said: ``Our plans for investment in and modernization of the modern security enterprise are essential, irrespective of whether or not the START treaty is ratified.''

So this has to be done whether the treaty is ratified or not, and I think everybody acknowledges that fact.

So we believe the resolution of ratification needs to address these issues by providing a couple conditions, and we have modified the original language in order to try to get an agreement. If we can't, we will vote on it and see what happens, but I am hoping my colleagues will agree.

The first is something I know has been agreed to; that is, a condition the President will provide an annual update of the section 1251 report.

The administration is agreeable to this, and it is the way for Congress to be annually advised of the status of this construction, the status of the facilities, and what more may need to be done on that. Presumably, that will be provided at or about the time the budget is sent to Congress from the administration.

Secondly, a condition the President will certify, prior to entry into force of the treaty, that the President intends--so this is not a requirement that he has achieved a particular result, but he intends to accelerate the design and engineering phase, to the extent possible, of the CMRR and UPF.

In other words, we are not asking the impossible be done, just that to the extent we can possibly do it, we accelerate the design and engineering of these two facilities so they can get done on time, rather than with the delays.

Third, that the administration--or the President--request advance funding, including on a multiyear basis, for these two facilities--the CMRR and the UPF--upon completion of the design and engineering phase of the planning.

What that means is, we are not asking them to provide advance funding for the entire projects, as is done, for example, when we construct an aircraft carrier. We are not asking it be done now, when there are still some uncertainties about exactly what these facilities need and how much they will cost. Los Alamos is still being tweaked, among other things, as I said, because of the need to make it earthquake-proof. What we are saying is, upon completion of the design and engineering phase of planning, then the administration requests advance funding and on a multiyear basis.

What that means is--and this is frequently done with large Defense Department contracts, in order to get them done as quickly as possible and as inexpensively as possible--there are multiyear advances of funding so the money can be spent, let us just say hypothetically, within a 5-year period by the Defense Department for an aircraft carrier, for example. Instead of having the Appropriations committees each year appropriate a particular amount of money, and the work that is done can only be done within the constraints of that particular amount of money appropriated in that particular year, what they say is--and I am just

speaking hypothetically--the cost is, let's say, $4 billion, and we know it is going to take about 4 years to do this. Instead of saying: Well, we are going to do $1 billion of appropriations each year, what they say is: All right. You have $4 billion, and if you can get it done more quickly by spending this money more quickly, fine. That will save us money and it will get the project done quicker. If you can't, then you can't. But that money is set aside in an account for that purpose.

That is all we are asking be done here too. These two facilities are both, in terms of order of magnitude, about $5 billion facilities. They might be a little less. They are likely to be a little more-- potentially, in the neighborhood of $6 billion or so. Originally, when the administration presented its first 1251 report, the entire 10-year program was set at $10 billion. We knew that wasn't adequate. We went to the administration, they recalculated everything, brought their estimates up to date, and said: That is right, $10 billion is not going to be enough. We will add another $4 billion to $6 billion over the first 4 to 6 years.

Undoubtedly, the cost will increase above that, as has been testified to. My guess is, just in terms of order of magnitude, you are looking at roughly $20 billion over 10 to 12 years. We will know more each year this goes forward. But to construct these two facilities, if we could advance fund at least some money--let's say, 3 years' worth of the money--then it will be possible for the people who are responsible for the construction of those facilities, if they can get 15 months of work out of the first 12 months and spend more than 12 months' worth of money to get that done, that is great. They will have been able to accomplish their job more quickly. Each month that goes by adds costs to the program. So if we can provide them advance funding of some amount--we are not specifying it in here--they can probably get the project done more quickly and less expensively, and that should be a good thing. I think everybody agrees this would be the way to do it.

There have been two objections posited, to my knowledge. First, the Department of Energy has never done it this way. That, of course, is not the way for us to set policy. I saw my colleague on television this morning saying what we need is a plan. We are too focused always on what is right in front of our face. A lot of times, if we have a basic plan everybody knows we are trying to work toward, it is amazing how much you can accomplish in terms of the details. Well, this is the basic plan.

The Department of Defense does this every year because they have large-cost construction projects. The Department of Energy has never done it that way--except I am not sure that is true. Before there was a Department of Energy, the Manhattan Project was being built, and GEN Leslie Groves, who is sort of the father of the Manhattan Project, didn't have any problem at all about advance funding. He went to the President and the Congress and said: I need this money. They said: What do you need it for? He said: Don't ask questions, it is secret, and he got the money. That is an oversimplification, but he got that project done in less time than anybody could have possibly imagined because he had the resources provided to him to get it done.

So when they say it has never been done before, well, actually, it has been done before on this exact--on this exact--national defense item; namely, our nuclear enterprise. It is just that it was back in the early 1940s when people were not so, I guess, concerned about each year's budget and the appropriations that would accompany those budgets.

Secondly, the argument is made that--and this one may surprise folks--well, if we have, let's say, 3 years' worth of funding out there and that money is provided to the Department of Energy, the Members of Congress who are on the Appropriations Committee will grab that money-- or parts of it that are unspent--and apply it to other things.

Think about that for a minute. The very people responsible for funding these projects in the Congress, who know they have to be done and who have agreed to the advanced funding in the first place, I think are highly unlikely, after that money has been provided, to say: Well, we need money for some water projects or something so we will go grab some of that money that isn't spent. The whole reason it isn't spent is because you have provided multiyear funding for the project for efficiency purposes. So I don't think that is a reason for us to not advance funds.

I would like to call to my colleagues' attention--and I will let my colleague, Senator Corker, put this in the Record because I think either he or Senator Alexander might talk about it--a letter signed by Senators Inouye, Feinstein, Cochran, and Alexander, who presumably, in the next Congress, will be the chairmen and ranking members of the full committee and subcommittees responsible for this funding. This letter makes it clear they are committed to the full funding of the modernization of our nuclear weapons arsenal and that they are asking the President to submit budgets which will provide for the necessary funding for this and they commit themselves to support that funding.

That is important, and I don't think we can attribute a motive to Senators like this, who we all know are entirely trustworthy, that somehow after this money is advance funded, that Congress or appropriators are going to reach back and grab money they have already provided because they think there is another purpose they want to spend it for right now. So those are the reasons why I don't think that is a principled argument for why we shouldn't do this. Having this advance funding could complete these facilities on time, rather than with a 2- or 3-year delay, and we could save literally hundreds of millions of dollars.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record some additional quotations on the need for modernization from former laboratory Directors, an Under Secretary of Defense, the current Secretary of Defense, the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and there are many more we could produce.

I thank the Chair, and I will have more to say, but I will let other Senators speak.

Mr. President, I wish to thank both my colleagues from Tennessee for their very kind remarks. Actually, the place we have gotten, what we have achieved, is due to the efforts of a lot of people. It starts with Secretary Gates in the Department of Defense; Secretary Chu; Tom D'Agostino; his Deputy Director of NNSA, Don Cook; the Lab Directors who are incredible public servants. We visited with them. These are some of the brightest people in the country and the folks who work with them, many of whom, almost all of whom are about ready to retire, those people who actually designed and developed the weapons we now have. There are a lot of people who devoted their lives to what very few people know or understand. They are now being asked to do a very difficult and complicated job in very difficult surroundings.

Part of what we are asking for--it is not just a matter of convenience, as Senator Alexander said, it is a matter of absolute necessity that these facilities be capable of dealing with these complex weapons. That is why they are expensive, but they are absolutely needed. I thank both my colleagues for having devoted a lot of their own time and attention to this issue and in supporting the efforts of modernization so we can get this job done properly. I appreciate their remarks.

I also would like to proffer a unanimous consent request. I ask unanimous consent to yield 1 hour of the time allocated to the Republican leader postcloture to Senator Kyl.

I thank my colleagues.

Mr. President, I will comment more when I make my concluding comments, but what we have just done is to agree to provide a mechanism for the President to certify a way forward to fund the two large facilities that are part of the nuclear weapons complex in a way that we hope will provide for the most efficient way to build these facilities and to get them constructed as rapidly as possible.

The result of this is that, potentially, we could save hundreds of millions of dollars and construct the facilities at an earlier date than was originally intended. But to be clear, nothing in this amendment reduces the President's decisionmaking or flexibility. It remains his decision as to how the funding is requested and when it is requested.

Madam President, let me thank my colleagues for working hard to get this treaty passed and for being able to achieve that as well, people within the administration. I appreciate the cooperation some of us have had with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the ranking member and others who have worked hard to try to complete, in a very short period of time, what probably should have taken a lot longer period of time. But I appreciate their efforts to work with us in that regard.

I would like to, briefly, speak to three things: the process, the problems, and some positive results of the consideration of this treaty.

For those who are watching, I can tell you right now there is only one thing on the mind of everybody in this Chamber: How quickly are we going to get out of here. One colleague said: I have a plane to catch. How long are you going to talk? Will I be able to catch it?

That is understandable because every one of us wants to get home to our families. I know there were some snide comments expressed about my concern a week or so ago about the fact we were going to be into Christmas week. But now the reality is everybody wants to get out of here immediately so cut short your comments, put them in the Record, and so on.

When I predicted a couple weeks ago that I didn't think we had time to do everything the majority leader wanted to do and do it well, I had no idea how many things would be added to the agenda and how difficult that would be. Unfortunately, I think my prediction turned out to be correct.

I remember just 1 year ago when we were on the Senate floor doing the health care bill, one of the primary criticisms of it was the way it was done. I must tell you, with regard to the process of this bill, I am concerned about the precedent we are setting in the Senate, taking a lameduck session to jam so many things through, frequently without an opportunity to provide amendments or, when there are amendments, to simply have them all shot down without, I believe, adequate consideration.

We have done the tax legislation, the continuing resolution to fund the Government, the DOD authorization bill, the DREAM Act, don't ask, don't tell, the 9/11 bill is on the way, some judges, we passed a food safety bill almost in the middle of the night by unanimous consent without Members being adequately notified, and now the START treaty. In many of those situations, there was not adequate time--as I said, no amendments even allowed.

When cloture was filed, I expressed concern we had only dealt with, I believe at that time, four amendments to the treaty itself. But we were told: Don't worry. We will still give you consent to do resolution-of- ratification amendments.

Unfortunately, not all of them were permitted by the majority and, in order to get as many as possible together, we had to consolidate 70 or so amendments down to a very few.

The other side announced at the beginning of the debate there would be no amendments on the treaty itself or the preamble. It turned out the amendments that were offered were all defeated, but we did have some amendments on the resolution of ratification. They, too, would have all been defeated or were defeated, except for the fact that we were willing to water them down and, therefore, had them accepted by the majority.

Now we have very little time to make closing statements because we are going to adjourn sine die, meaning this is the end of the Congress. We will not have time to actually prepare written statements for the Record. This is a very brief statement to discuss primarily some positive things because there is not time to lay out all the problems that I think those of us who oppose the treaty still believe are present in the treaty.

I agree with the comments the newest Member of the Senate, Mark Kirk, made just a moment ago. He is very well schooled in these issues, though a new Member of the Senate. I associate myself with a lot of the remarks he made. I think later, when we come back next year, we can chronicle the things that were said in the debates and have a pretty good record of how it all ended. But I fear more for the process because of the precedent set that serious matters, such as the ones we have debated and dealt with, including the treaty, were done in, to some extent, a slipshod way, to some extent in

which there was not adequate time to do what the Senate should have done.

I also fear for the precedent set with respect to treaty ratification. Essentially, on many of the issues that were raised--and I appreciate, I must say, colleagues have been kind to me in their compliments. I appreciate that very much. They were complimentary to me and my colleagues in saying we were raising important issues that needed to be vetted, but in each case this was not the time to do it, this was not the place to do it because if we dare change one comma in this treaty, it would require that it be renegotiated. There were some unspecified horrible results of the fact that we would have to renegotiate the treaty because the Russians wouldn't like what we did.

The precedent we are establishing is that the Senate is a rubberstamp. Whatever a President negotiates with the Russians or somebody else, we dare not change because otherwise it will have to be renegotiated, to some great detriment to humanity, and I don't think that is appropriate. I think our Founders, when they wrote into the Constitution an equal role for the Senate and the President, they meant it. That role is advice and consent. We gave some advice in the last Defense authorization bill. We said, for example, don't negotiate conventional Prompt Global Strike limitations and don't allow limitations on missile defense. Both those things were done against our advice. But we are being asked to consent notwithstanding.

It seems to me, if the Senate is to have a role in the future on these kinds of treaties, we better come to an understanding if we are going to be able to make some changes. I don't think anybody ever said the administration ever got anything 100 percent right. We ought to be able to make some changes or else we might as well avoid the process altogether because it is just a big waste of time. Eleven years ago when we considered the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and rejected that treaty, a lot of commentators said the Senate had finally put its mark on the process by conclusively demonstrating it would not be a rubberstamp and that would be a new era for the administration in the future, having to pay some attention to what the Senate said. I hope this new START treaty is an aberration, rather than the beginning of a new precedent.

I will just tell you this. If the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is brought forward again, there will be a different process. Rather than the situation which obtained here, in which I did not urge a single colleague to oppose this treaty until the time that cloture was filed on it, I will urge every one of my colleagues to oppose reconsideration of the CTB.

So the process is not good. I have to hope that the result of the way we handled it this year will not establish a new precedent. The problems of the treaty I wish to discuss in detail, but because my colleagues want to catch airplanes, I will not.

Let me focus then on the third and last element here, which is, some new things we learned from this treaty, and, frankly, some achievements that were obtained as a result of a lot of attention to it--being paid to it by our colleagues, a lot of great debate, particularly with respect to missile defense, modernization, and future arms control agenda.

One of the things I think we have made some progress on is that this may be the last arms control agreement for a while. Maybe we can get back to focusing on the real issues, issues of proliferation, of terrorism dealing with threats from countries such as North Korea and Iran.

It is fine to have yet another Cold War era type agreement with Russia. But the real issue is not between Russia and the United States, it is dealing with these other threats. So I suggest we move away from the distraction of agreements such as this, and on to what is a more contemporary challenge. I think as a result of the debate, that will be possible to do.

I would quote one of our colleagues, Condoleezza Rice, who served with great distinction as Secretary of State, and before that as National Security Adviser, wrote recently in the Wall Street Journal and she said:

After this treaty, our focus must be on stopping dangerous

proliferators, not on further reductions of the U.S. and

Russian strategic arsenals, which are really no threats to

each other or to international stability.

Presidential Adviser Gary Samore agreed, saying:

If Iran succeeds in developing a nuclear capability, that

would do more damage to the effort of the President to

achieve a nuclear free world than anything.

That is the real test of where we are headed. So I would hope the focus in the future will be on the illicit programs of Iran, of Korea, countries such as Syria, and potentially focusing on some of the supporters of these countries such as the country of China. These are the real challenges. I believe there would be bipartisan support in this body to address those challenges next.

But, secondly, I think as a result of focusing on our nuclear arsenal, which we had to do by looking at this treaty, we have also learned that we have a very big challenge in this country. And, fortunately and parallel with the treaty, we worked on this challenge, the issue of how we can modernize our nuclear facilities and nuclear force and the delivery vehicles of the triad that would deliver those vehicles.

I think we have all agreed we made significant improvement in that regard. The administration, I believe, has made a significant commitment to the modernization of our nuclear facilities. And the Senate, in various ways in dealing with this treaty, has done likewise, as well as through an exchange of letters that have been entered into by members of the Appropriations Committee, and we hope to work with our colleagues in the House of Representatives with whom we have not had enough contact on this issue. But hopefully, as a result of everything we have done, we will have an opportunity to fund the modernization, as it becomes clear more precisely what has to be done, to ensure that all of that is accomplished within the appropriate timeframe.

When we started out, we had a pretty woeful amount of money dedicated to the modernization of our nuclear facilities. Now we have a request from the administration of a total of about $85 billion over a decade to operate our facilities. That includes about $15 billion in new modernization spending.

With the 1251 report coming from the administration each year, we anticipate there will be further updates which will demonstrate additional progress we can make in the modernization. In addition, I mentioned the letter from the four key members of the Appropriations Committee in this body. We hope to work with Members in the House of Representatives likewise.

Finally on this matter, one of the last amendments that was adopted is a certification requirement, which is a change to the resolution of ratification that, to the extent possible, the administration will accelerate the planning and design of the two major facilities here and, where appropriate, request multiyear funding, of which my two colleagues from Tennessee who are, as usual, seated right here together, made a very strong point--that we could not only save a lot of money every year but also accelerate the construction of these facilities so we could complete the life extension programs for our nuclear weapons that are so critical.

A third thing I think we did, which is a very positive result, is to focus a little bit also on the other aspect of modernization; that is to say, the triad, our nuclear triad of bombers, submarines, and ICBMs.

The Secretary of Defense had made a decision at the outset of the Obama administration that we would cancel the decision on the next generation of bomber. It was very unclear whether it was the intention of our government to have a nuclear-capable bomber part of the nuclear triad.

Quoting General Chilton, who is the general responsible at Strategic Command on this, ``We need service programs that sustain the long-term viability of our land-based, airborne, and sea-based delivery platforms.''

One of the amendments that was adopted, amendment No. 4864, does require the President to certify that he intends to modernize or replace the triad, a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, nuclear capable, an ICBM, and an SSBN and SLBM--in other words, the submarine leg, which I believe the administration has already begun to move forward on.

Also it would maintain the rocket motor industrial base necessary to support continued production of ballistic missiles. This is very important, because even if you modernize the warheads, if you do not have modern delivery vehicles to deliver them, obviously you do not have a capable deterrent. And, of course, the Russians, who have the most capable system other than ours, are modernizing their delivery vehicles, especially their ICBMs and, as a result, I think we need to do that as well.

I am very pleased we have been able to resolve this question about a nuclear-capable triad. I look forward to clear and unambiguous statements from the administration in the future about this, and eventually getting a replacement for all three legs of the triad that need to be modernized.

Fourth, there was a lot of discussion here about missile defense. I think without the treaty having come up, we probably would not have spent the time and raised the issues with regard to missile defense that were raised. We had a disagreement here about whether--or the extent to which the preamble to the treaty and article V of the treaty and the signing statements created a problem with respect to further development of our missile defenses.

But through this debate, I believe, through commitments of the President in a letter that he wrote, through an amendment to the resolution of ratification and a lot of statements for the record during this debate, we are much further down the road in predicting that we will be able to deploy the kind of missile defense that is necessary to protect not just our allies in Europe, for example, but also the continental United States and the American people.

To conclude this point, any attempt by the Russian Federation now to reestablish a link between missile defense and strategic arms control will not succeed; that any argument that there is a legal right to withdraw from the treaty if we proceed with our deployment plans, as they will be communicated to the Russians, will not stand. So our friends in Russia do need to understand what we have done here. And we are making clear, as President Reagan once did, that U.S. missile defenses are simply not open to a discussion. They will not be part of future negotiations as well.

Finally, with regard to the Conventional Prompt Global Strike, I think we made some progress there. Very few people had ever heard the phrase, knew what it was. The Senate did give its advice in last year's Defense bill not to limit it. But, nevertheless, it was limited in the treaty. I think our debate about it here has helped to educate Members as to the need for this, something both the administration and many of us here in the Senate support. It is simply the capability to deliver not a nuclear warhead but a conventional warhead by an ICBM at a very long distance in a very relatively short period of time, to meet some of the new threats we are going to be facing in the future.

Unfortunately, Prompt Global Strike is limited in the treaty. Notwithstanding that unfortunate linkage, as I said, I think we have had an opportunity to obtain a more secure commitment from the administration on the deployment of the Global Strike capability, because the resolution of ratification now calls for a detailed report on our CPGS objectives prior to entry into the force of the treaty.

It will require the administration to consider treaty limitations, methods of distinguishing nuclear, nonnuclear systems, which are possible and should relieve any concern that the Russians have about the potential for a Prompt Global Strike weapon being confused with a nuclear weapon.

Apart from all of the things I just talked about there are other things in the resolution of ratification that will add some strength to the position that those of us who oppose the treaty have taken, including working through the Bilateral Consultative Commission, not being undercut by that commission, requiring an annual report certifying Russian compliance with the terms of the New START treaty, things of that sort.

I conclude that one of the things we will have to do proactively from here on out, in order to achieve some of the objectives that we have talked about here, is to work with our House colleagues who have not been a part of this process, to share with them the reasons we have concluded these things are important, to work together, the administration, my colleagues on the Democratic side and our side, to convince them each year of the necessary appropriations that will be required, among other things, for modernization of both the triad and-- I know my colleagues are anxious to leave. As a result, I will cut my comments short to make this point.

I again close, as I opened, by thanking colleagues for working under what are, frankly, very difficult circumstances, to try to compress everything into a very short period of time, to be on a START treaty at the same time we are parachuting in all manner of other issues and trying to get those resolved. This has not been easy.

For those colleagues who were patient and expressed desire to do things on the floor that we did not have time for, I appreciate their indulgences and appreciate the courtesies that everyone has extended. This has been very contentious, and yet the disagreements between us have never risen to any level beyond that which is totally appropriate for a serious debate in the Senate, proving again that while we can disagree or will disagree, we can certainly do so agreeably. I thank my colleagues for their willingness to do that.

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), and the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning).

Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning) would have voted ``nay.''

Mr. President, I support the nomination of Judge Mary Murguia to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Judge Murguia has served on the Federal district court in Arizona for a decade and has a distinguished record that has earned the respect of the legal community in Arizona.

Perhaps most telling is the high regard in which Judge Murguia is held by her colleagues on the district court; they come from different backgrounds and were appointed by presidents of both parties, but they all speak very highly of her.

Judge Murguia was approved by the Judiciary Committee by a vote of 19 to 0. That unanimous vote is an indication of the strength of her record.

Finally, as I mentioned at Judge Murguia's hearing, Judge Murguia's brother Carlos is the first Latino to serve as Federal district court judge in Kansas. Judge Murguia was the first Latina to be appointed to the Federal district court in Arizona and she and Carlos are the only brother and sister sitting as Federal judges in the United States.

I am confident that Judge Murguia is a person of integrity who will do her best to be a fair and objective judge.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Alexander), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Roberts), and the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Vitter).

Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning) would have voted ``yea'' and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Alexander) would have voted ``yea.''

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg).

Mr. President, I wish to make a comment. For the benefit of Members, what we are trying to do is to identify those matters we need to try to deal with in the 30 hours postcloture on the START treaty. If Members have amendments they need to deal with, I would appreciate it if they would either communicate with me or with Senator Lugar's staff or Senator Kerry's staff so that we can determine whether to get them on the list and where to plug them in. I would also suggest to Members that there isn't a lot of time left, and if they have comments they would like to make, now is the time to come to the Senate floor. There shouldn't be a minute of quorum call time here. There is a lot to do and not a lot of time to do it. So if Members have something, bring it to us. If they want to speak, they should come to the floor now or as soon as they can get here.

My goal is to get as many of the amendments as possible dealt with, if not with a vote then worked out by unanimous consent. What I have tried to do is to take a universe of about 70 amendments and to consolidate them into a much smaller group. So there are some specific subject areas that are not specifically dealt with. In some cases, the consolidations may not be technically related. For example, Senator LeMieux would like to add to one of the amendments his language dealing with tactical weapons taken from his treaty amendment but to conform it to a resolution of ratification amendment. So we may be even combining some subjects that don't necessarily relate.

The object here is to cover as much ground as possible within a limited period of time, and in order to do that we will need everybody's cooperation. Senator Kerry and I will then--and Senator Lugar, of course--primarily try to make sure everybody gets heard who wants to be heard.

If I can add, I understand Senator Shaheen is in order to speak next, and then Senator Risch is available to begin; am I not correct?

OK. His numbers are 4878 and 4879, so we can begin with one of those, if it is agreeable.

So, Mr. President, it would be in order to call up for consideration--I believe the first is amendment No. 4878, Risch amendment No. 4878.

Well, Mr. President, I said there shouldn't be any quorum call, but we are going to be a couple of minutes here. So I suggest the absence of a quorum until we are ready to go.

Mr. President, in response to the last argument that the Russians don't have any incentive to and we don't believe they are going to build the rail mobile system again, I ask, then: What is the big deal about ensuring in the treaty that if they do, they would be counted under the 700? What is the problem? The problem appears to be that the Russians don't have the same view of this as do my colleagues or the United States Government.

My colleague from Nevada quoted earlier from the Interfax report of October 29, 2010, where the chairman of the Russian Duma--parliament-- committee responsible for treaties, Konstantin Kosachyov, stated--in response to the argument we have just made, that the Senator from Nevada just made, that the treaty should include rail-mobile as part of the 700 limit--he stated, in response to that claim, and in response to the resolution of ratification of the Foreign Relations Committee, that U.S. claim compelled the Duma to stop action on the treaty. He said-- and I am quoting:

The Americans are trying to apply the New START Treaty to

rail-mobile ICBMs in case they are built.

That, obviously, means if he is saying: We would have to stop the Duma action on this if that is what the U.S. Government is going to claim, they are pushing back on this pretty hard. The question is, why? I do not know whether they intend to build the rail-mobile system. I do not much care whether they build it. All we care about is, if they do, it has to be included within the 700 limit.

Now, the report language of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirms the fact that they are not included. Here is what the report language says--and this is in direct contradiction to what was said just a moment ago--this is from page 17 of the report--

Nevertheless, while a new rail-mobile system would clearly

be captured under the Article II limits despite the exclusion

of rail-mobile launchers from the definition of mobile

launchers of ICBMs, those provisions that actually use the

defined term ``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' would not cover

rail-mobile systems if Russia were to reintroduce them.

``Would not cover.''

It goes on to say:

``Appropriate detailed arrangements for incorporating rail-

mobile ICBM launchers and their ICBMs into the treaty's

verification and monitoring regime would be worked out in the

Bilateral Consultative Commission.'' Under Article XV . . .

the Parties may make changes to the Protocol or Annexes. . .

.

We have discussed this in the past. If there is a dispute about what the treaty means, then you go to this dispute resolution group of Russians and Americans, and they try to talk it out and work it out. But there is nothing to say they will, and if the Russian chairman of the committee is already saying we are trying to insert something into the agreement that isn't there, I wonder how successful we would be in working it out.

The report concludes:

If Russia were again to produce rail-mobile ICBM launchers,

the Parties would work within the BCC to find a way to ensure

that the treaty's notification, inspection, and monitoring

regime would adequately cover them.

So it is clear that it does not. It is clear from the report that the language would not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to reintroduce them. It is clear we would have to rely upon the Russians' good offices, good intentions, to reach some kind of an agreement with us in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. There are no assurances that will be done.

Why are we willing to proceed with an agreement that has such built in ambiguity? Why say: Well, we will let that be worked out by the BCC when we could work it out right now? It is the same answer we get with respect to every one of these proposals: Well, the Russians would then demand to renegotiate the treaty.

I ask again: Is the Senate just to be a rubber stamp? We cannot do anything to change the treaty or the protocol, or just the resolution of ratification, which is what we are trying to do because the Russians would say no, and, therefore, we cannot do it?

I thought we were the Senate. We are one-half of the U.S. Government that deals with it. The other is the Executive. The Executive negotiated the treaty. Now, why didn't they include this language? We do not know because we do not have the record of the negotiations. What I am told is that it is because the Russians said they would not include it because the rail-mobile system would be unique to Russia, and we do not have such a thing. Therefore, there would be a lack of parity. You could not have such a unilateral provision. So if that is the case, either the

Russians do intend to develop these systems, and they do not want them counted, or there should be no problem with the Ensign amendment, which would ensure that they would be counted.

So you cannot read the report language and agree with what has been said--that the treaty covers these weapons--you cannot read it and believe they would clearly be covered by the inspection and notification and monitoring regime. In fact, it clearly shows that is not the case. What you have to believe is that this built-in dispute in the treaty may well arise if the Russians decide to proceed to develop such a system, and we would then--or would arise if they decide to do that, and we would be required to go to the BCC to try to work it out with them. That, obviously, builds in a conflict that is not good.

As I said before, when you have a contract between two parties, the first thing the lawyers try to do is ensure there are no ambiguities that could cause one side or the other to later come forward and say: I did not mean that. Then you have a legal dispute. But it is one thing to have a legal dispute about buying a car or a house. It is quite another to have a dispute like this between two sovereign nations.

I would note when the United States had a system we might develop, such as the rail-mobile--but we have not made a decision to do it; we certainly do not have it--the Russians knew we wanted to at least study the possibility of developing a conventional Prompt Global Strike capability--that is to say, an ICBM that could carry a conventional warhead rather than a nuclear warhead--and they specifically insisted that we include that in the treaty.

Now, you might say: Well, wait a minute. The Russians apparently argued that they did not want to include anything on rail-mobile because the United States did not have anything on rail-mobile, and that would be a lack of parity--it would be a unilateral restriction-- but the same thing is true with conventional Prompt Global Strike. The Russians have no intension of doing that, apparently. We might, just like for the rail-mobile, the Russians might. Yet they insisted a limitation be put on our conventional Prompt Global Strike--by what?-- by counting them against the 700 launcher limit--exactly the same thing that should be done with regard to rail-mobile.

So, apparently, if we might do something in the future the Russians do not like, we have to count it. But if the Russians might do something in the future we do not like, we cannot count it. Our only relief then is to go to this BCC and hope the Russians would agree to something in the future that they have not been willing to agree to today.

So all the Ensign amendment does is to clear up an ambiguity and avoid a future dispute between the parties. It is clear from the report that it is not covered now. Again, the language, ``those provisions that actually use the defined term `mobile launchers of ICBMs' would not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to re-introduce them.''

The report acknowledges that, therefore, in order to apply the inspection and notification and monitoring regimes, you would have to get the Russians to agree in the BCC. Why not solve that problem right now?

Again, we meet with the same argument we are always met with: Well, we do not dare change anything in here because the Russians would disagree.

I just ask my colleagues, again, is there any purpose for us being here? If every argument is, well, we do not dare change it because the Russians would disagree, so we would have to renegotiate it, maybe that suggests that there was not such a hot job of negotiating this treaty in the first place. If the Senate cannot find errors or mistakes or shortcomings and try to correct them without violating some superprinciple that is above the U.S. Constitution, which says that the Senate has that right, then, again, I do not know what we are doing here.

So I urge my colleagues to support the Ensign amendment, as with some other things we have raised, to try to avoid a conflict. Resolve the situation now while we still have time to do it rather than after the treaty is ratified when it is too late.

Madam President, might I pose a question to my colleague because I understand exactly the point he makes. He makes it accurately. I quoted the language that says that it would clearly be captured under article II limits. That is the committee's understanding, which is the point my colleague is making. But I go on to note that the exclusion of rail-mobile launchers from the definition means that it would not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to reintroduce them and, therefore, there would have to be work by the BCC to figure out how to deal with those under the inspection, monitoring, and notification regimes.

I understand that our committee says they believe they are captured. I see that in the report. What I am saying is, there is a dispute because the Russians do not appear to agree with that. I would just ask my colleague, how do you square, then, the Russian response? The chairman of their committee--you have dueling committees--in the Duma said:

The Americans are trying to apply the New START Treaty to

rail-mobile ICBMs in case they are built.

It appears to me what he is saying is, but they should not be doing that. In fact, his recommendation, I believe, was the Duma not take action on the treaty if that was our intent.

Yes, of course.

Madam President, if I could just close, and I actually had, I think, yielded the floor. So I appreciate the chance to make this final point.

All the Ensign amendment tries to do is clear up the ambiguity. My colleague says it is absolutely clear to him that they are included. I know the committee says they think it is clear. I do not think the Russians think it is clear, and I think there is a basis for an argument that it is not clear. Why not clear it up?

Before my colleague from Nevada closes, I know this whole argument is based on the proposition that the Russians wouldn't be crazy enough to think about doing a rail system again so we don't need to worry about it. What is all the fuss, is what my colleague said.

Well, here is a December 10--how many days ago is that now? I have forgotten. We are about to Christmas, but I have forgotten the date of today. It is from Moscow ITAR-TASS, English version. Headline: ``Russia Completes Design Work For Use Of RS-24 Missiles On Rail-based Systems.''

I want my colleague from Massachusetts to hear this. The Russians aren't crazy enough to think they could do a rail system. Here is the headline, December 10: ``Russia Completes Design Work For Use of RS-24 Missiles On Rail-based Systems.''

Just to quote a couple lines from the story:

Russia has completed design work for the use of RS-24

missiles railway-based combat systems, but implementation of

the project has been considered inexpedient, Moscow Heat

Engineering Institute Director Yuri Solomonov said. His

institute is the main designer of these missiles. Asked

whether the RS-24 missiles could be used in railway-based

systems, he said, ``This is possible. The relevant design

work was done . . . '' and so on.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Record.

Madam President, I am not arguing that this issue has been resolved within Russia as to whether to go forward. I am not arguing whether it is a good thing or a bad thing. I simply submit it in response to the argument that the Russians would be crazy to think about doing this. Either they are crazy or--well, in any event, I would never attribute that motivation to anybody, even somebody from another country. The fact is, they have begun design work on exactly such a project.

Madam President, obviously one of the purposes of these two amendments is to respond to one of the arguments that has been raised in support of this treaty. We have this wonderful new reset relationship with Russia, and were we to not ratify the treaty, that relationship would be frayed, and who knows how much Russia might react to it? It would be harder to get their cooperation on things. Those are all arguments that have been made.

I think one of the points of these two amendments is to show that the reset relationship between Russia and the United States has not produced all that much good behavior or cooperation on the part of the Russians. I earlier detailed all of the ways--at least a few--in which Russia had been very unhelpful to the United States with regard to Iran. I noted I think 2 days ago or maybe yesterday that in the U.N., they were trying to water down a resolution dealing with North Korea that we are working hard to try to obtain. They have been very difficult to deal with with regard to North Korea and Iran. At the end of the day, I think they only do what is in their best interest, in any event--not basing their decisions of what is in their best interests on some concept of a new friendliness with the United States.

I think part of the reason my colleague from Idaho offered these two amendments is to simply demonstrate that this new relationship isn't all that its cracked up to be if they won't even give us some equipment they confiscated when they invaded Georgia. That is not a major point in international diplomacy, and it certainly isn't a major point with respect to U.S. military capability. It is illustrative of something.

The point of the amendment is to say that you have quite a bit of time before this treaty enters into force. A lot has to happen. It is sent to Russia, the Duma has to deal with it, and so on.

Just return the stuff. Maybe that little gesture of good will would help to reestablish this so-called reset relationship in ways they have not been able to accomplish by getting Russian support with the U.N. resolutions and other actions with regard to sanctions on Iran and diplomacy with North Korea.

One can say it is not a big deal, this military equipment, but on the other hand, they say it will destroy the treaty if we have this particular amendment. The reality is that we are simply trying to make a point that the Russians have not acted well in a variety of situations. I cannot think of a better example than the invasion of Georgia, the continued violation of the cease-fire agreement they signed there, and the violation of the U.N. resolution.

I would reiterate, at the summit declaration--this is where the NATO members, meeting in Lisbon last month, joined together to call for a resolution to the problem, saying, ``We reiterate our continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders.'' And then they urge all to play a constructive role and to work with the U.N. to pursue a peaceful resolution of the internationally recognized territory of Georgia. And then the final sentence:

We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of

the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as

independent States.

That is the kind of cooperation we are getting from the Russian Federation these days. I appreciate the amendments brought forth by my colleague to highlight that fact.

What was the unanimous consent request?

Madam President, that understanding is fine. There are two Members who I think will be ready to go forward with their amendments immediately following the two votes at 6 o'clock.

Again, for benefit of the Members, it is my hope that we can continue to work through as many amendments as possible this evening, maybe have debate a couple at a time and vote, whatever the body desires. But perhaps we could continue at least to work through a few more amendments yet this evening.

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Coburn).

Mr. President, a point of inquiry before I begin. Is there a reason I should speak to either amendment No. 4860 or amendment No. 4893 first?

Thank you, Mr. President.

Amendment No. 4860

Then, Mr. President, with that, I would like to offer amendment No. 4860, SLCM side agreement, which I believe is pending at the desk. I would ask for its consideration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, this is actually a very straightforward amendment. It simply seeks to repeat in this New START treaty the same thing the then-Soviet Union and United States did in the previous START I treaty with respect to a particular kind of weapon--a Russian weapon called the SLCM or sea-launched cruise missile.

As part of START I, we reached a binding side agreement--a side agreement--because the Senate had said we needed to include these weapons in the treaty. So a side agreement was reached that they would limit a deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles or the SLCMs due to their impact on strategic stability, the point being that whether these sea-launched cruise missiles are deemed tactical or strategic, they actually have a strategic component, especially if they are sitting right off your coast and they are launched and they can hit your country. So that agreement was put into a side agreement between the then-Soviet Union and the United States.

But when this New START treaty was negotiated, there was no similar side agreement. So there were no restrictions on SLCM deployments. The side agreement in the START treaty limited both nations to fewer than 800 SLCMs with a range greater than 600 kilometers. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the administration committed to unilaterally eliminating our SLCM capability.

The United States will retire the nuclear-equipped sea-

launched cruise missile (TLAM-N).

Under Secretary Miller said:

The timeline for its retirement will be over the next two

or three years.

Now Russia is developing a new version of its SLCM, with a range of up to, approximately, 5,000 kilometers, which is a longer range than some of the ballistic missiles that are covered by the New START treaty.

So that is why we believe there should be a side agreement, just like there was in START I, that deals with these SLCMs. We are not going to have them, Russia is. Yet there is nothing in the treaty that would count their SLCMs against the total limit of warheads or delivery vehicles that are allowed under the treaty or in any other way deal with them.

The administration assures us we should not be concerned about a lack of a formal agreement. Secretary Clinton noted that the START I treaty did have a limitation on sea-launched cruise missiles and said that both parties ``voluntarily agreed to cease deploying any nuclear SLCMs on surface ships or multipurpose submarines.''

But today it is obvious, with the information about Russian plans, that there is going to be a great disparity between the United States and Russia. As I said, it is not obvious that saying one is tactical, as opposed to the strategic weapons that are otherwise limited by this treaty, is a very important distinction. I think it is really a distinction without a difference.

Steve Hadley, the former head of the NSC, said:

And if you're living in eastern or central Europe, a so-

called tactical nuclear weapon,

if you're within range, looks pretty strategic to you. So

what are we going to do about those?

As I said, he was the National Security Adviser.

Ambassador Bob Joseph, in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, said:

Every time I hear the term ``nonstrategic nuclear

weapons,'' I recall that no nuclear weapon is nonstrategic.

If you stop and think about it, that is certainly true.

So these weapons, which are very powerful, and can have a range of up to 5,000 kilometers, clearly need to be dealt with.

Now, we did not want to insist that they go back and renegotiate the treaty because we heard that argument before, so what we are suggesting by this amendment is simply to do the same thing we did in START I-- just have it be a side agreement where the two parties would agree to limit the number. Our administration would limit the Russians so they would not have a significant number of these particular weapons.

Just a point, by the way: In the event there are folks who do not believe the Russians intend to rely on their weapons such as the SLCMs, Under Secretary of Defense Flournoy said: The Russians are ``actually increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear weapons in their strategy.''

Secretary Gates has made the same point. He said:

Ironically, that is the case with Russia today, which has

neither the money nor the population to sustain its Cold War

conventional force levels. Instead, we have seen an increased

reliance on its nuclear force with new ICBM and sea-based

missiles, as well as a fully functional infrastructure that

can manufacture a significant number of warheads each year.

And the Strategic Posture Commission noted:

This imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons, which

greatly favors Russia, is of rising concern and an

illustration of the new challenges of strategic stability as

reductions in strategic weapons proceed.

The point has been made by many others as well.

So I think this is fairly straightforward. It would require the United States to negotiate a side agreement with Russia, very similar to the side agreement we had under START I, to deal with a weapon that we are no longer going to have, but the Russians are apparently developing a new version of, that has a pretty substantial range--5,000 kilometers. Clearly, it is very difficult to distinguish the difference between a weapon like that and the strategic offensive weapons that are otherwise dealt with in the treaty.

I hope my colleagues will recognize this is not a treaty killer, and it is something that needs t be addressed.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I am a little bit flummoxed here because I thought in a conversation I had a couple of days ago with Senator Kerry that side agreements might be all right; that we didn't want to amend the preamble or didn't want to amend the treaty but that we could perhaps do some side agreements. So we structured this as a side agreement just exactly as was done in START I.

On the Senator's time, I would be happy to.

Mr. President, there was no delay in the implementation of the START I agreement because of a requirement that a side agreement be entered into between the then-Soviet Union and the United States on SLCMs. So I don't buy the notion that this necessarily would delay anything.

Secondly, we are not talking about tactical missile limitations generally. All we are doing is talking about the same kinds of missiles that were the subject of the side agreement under START I. I suspect that part of the reason was because it is pretty difficult to distinguish as to whether these weapons are being used for a strategic or a tactical purpose. Senator Kerry has said they cannot upset the strategic balance. I simply totally disagree with that proposition. They absolutely can upset the strategic balance, depending upon where they are located or how they intend to be used. That is one of the reasons I suspect they were limited under the START I treaty.

My colleague said they can't threaten our submarine fleet at sea and they pose only a limited threat to ICBM sites. Well, that may be the opinion of our experts. They could sure threaten our submarine bases in Washington State at King's Bay. They could take out bases or other assets we have.

In fact, let me quote from a Russian article, the RIA Novosti Report of April 14, 2010, on the Graney class nuclear submarines:

Graney class nuclear submarines are designed to launch a

variety of long-range cruise missiles up to 3,100 miles or

500 kilometers with nuclear warheads and effectively engage

submarines, surface warships, and land-based targets.

Obviously, at 5,000 kilometers, as I said, that is a range longer than some of the ballistic missiles that are covered by the New START treaty. So these weapons--it is a little hard to characterize them as either tactical or strategic. I think it depends upon how they are used.

But the point is, if my colleague believes they can't threaten anything, then what is the problem with trying to set a limit on them? Well, obviously--or at least I assume obviously--the Russians don't want to do that. I assume we raised this, though we don't have the negotiation record, so I don't know whether it was raised. If it wasn't, why wasn't it? And if it was because we didn't think there was any threat to the United States, then I think it would be very important to ask some of our military folks why they think that is the case given the kinds of targets that could be held at risk here and given the fact that we apparently reached a different conclusion during the START I treaty implementation phase when the side agreement was negotiated with the then-Soviet Union.

So I don't think it would delay anything. We do posit it as a side agreement rather than an amendment. We just say that the administration should negotiate so that there wouldn't be a significant number of SLCM deployments by the Russians given the fact that we are not doing any.

I do have to say that I fundamentally disagree with the assertion of my colleague that this kind of weapon can't upset the strategic balance. If you have a weapon that can fly over 3,000 miles with a nuclear warhead, which could be just as big of a nuclear warhead as on a bomber or an intercontinental ballistic missile, with all of the targets on our eastern seaboard or western seaboard that would be held at risk for such a weapon--in fact, 3,000 miles--you won't have to be far off either of our two U.S. coasts to hit most targets within the continental United States.

This is a weapon that it seems to me we should be concerned about. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support calling for a side agreement that would deal with the SLCMs just as we did under the START I treaty.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, I will respond with about 30 seconds. Then I will be prepared to go to my next amendment. Perhaps I can reserve whatever time I have left on there to make a closing argument.

I really do sincerely appreciate the characterization of these issues we have raised as serious and important. I do appreciate that. I do think, though,

that it would be appropriate to have a better response than just that this will upset the Russians, they won't want to do it, so we will have to renegotiate the treaty, and that it will delay things and that will create problems.

The purpose is not to delay, as I said. I don't think the START I treaty was delayed when we reached a side agreement.

I think, in any event, the question is this: Should the United States delay, if that is what is called for, in order to improve the treaty in important respects? If it is conceded that this is an important aspect, then it seems to me that it is worth taking time to do it right.

Most of the arguments that have been made in response to the amendments we have raised boil down to: The Russians won't want to do what you say, and therefore we need to reject your amendment because it would require some renegotiation. I get back to the point I have made over and over: Then what is the Senate doing here? Why would the Founders have suggested we should have a role in relation to treaties if every time we try to change something, the argument is that you cannot change a comma because the other side wouldn't like that and that would require renegotiation?

There is nothing that serious about this treaty that it has to go into effect tomorrow. The Washington Post had an editorial, and they said that no great calamity will befall the United States if this treaty is not concluded before the end of the year. I think that is almost a direct quotation. There is no immediate national security reason to do so. I know the administration would like to get on with it, but no great harm will befall us if we take time to do it right. If we are not willing to do that, the Senate might as well rubberstamp what the President sends up because the argument will be that if we try to suggest changes, the other side will reject them and we could not possibly abide that.

I will reserve the remainder of time on this amendment.

Amendment No. 4893

Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 4893, which I believe is at the desk, and ask for its immediate consideration.

I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, I would have preferred to deal with each of the subjects in this amendment individually because each one is very important. To accommodate the other side's desire to try to get as much done as quickly as possible, we consolidated some amendments, and there is a lot in this. I regret that we don't have time to get into detail about each one of them.

This amendment amounts to an effort to try to improve the verification of the treaty to deal with a variety of issues which have been raised in the past and which we believe are inadequately dealt with by the treaty. One of them involves covers, the kinds of things the then-Soviet Union and now Russians consistently put over the warheads so that it is impossible for our inspectors to see what is under them, to see how many warheads are under them. That has been a problem in the past.

On telemetry, we say the President should certify to the Senate that he has reached a legally binding agreement with the Russian Federation so that each party is obliged to provide full and unimpeded access to its telemetry from all flight tests of strategic missiles limited by the treaty. That is important because while we are not developing a new generation of missiles, the Russians are. We will be denied the telemetry of those missile tests if the Russians decide to deny it. Our intelligence community has told us that this is of great value to us in assessing the capabilities of Russian missiles. Under the treaty, they don't have to provide anything. They could provide telemetry on old missiles they are testing, and they don't have to provide any on any of the new missiles they are testing. We believe that should be done. The same thing with respect to any ballistic missiles deployed during the duration of the treaty.

Then we turn to the subject of inspections. There are different kinds of inspections, but we are talking here about type one inspections in which we say that the United States would consider it a violation of the deployed warhead limit and a material breach of the treaty if the Russians do one of two things: No. 1, any type one inspection that revealed that the Russian Federation had deployed a number of warheads on any one missile in excess of the number they declared for that missile; No. 2, any action by the Russian Federation that impedes the ability of the United States to determine the number of warheads deployed on any one missile prior to or during a type one inspection.

That gets to the issue of covers again. Why is this important? Because we are supposedly counting weapons in this treaty, warheads. There is a limit of 1,550 warheads. How can we possibly verify compliance if, when we seek to count the number of warheads on top of missiles we have designated and have a right to inspect, we can't count the warheads? You tell me how we are supposed to assume how many warheads there are on the top of that particular missile or why we should not deem it a material breach if they declared a certain number of warheads and it turns out there are more.

I think these are commonsense changes that would strengthen the verification provisions of the treaty.

It is too bad Senator Bond is not here tonight. He is the ranking Republican member of the Intelligence Committee. In the classified session we had yesterday, he talked about the deficiencies in verification under this treaty. This subject doesn't permit us to get into a lot of detail in open session.

We have heard a lot about past cheating by the Russians and the kinds of things that were done. What we are trying to do with these basic components is to make it less likely that the Russians would cheat, and if they do, it would less likely have an impact on the

key element of the treaty, which is the limitation on warheads of 1,550.

I will note a couple of things here that put this into context.

There have been allegations that there is better verification than ever before under this treaty. That is just not true. The verification provisions of this treaty are not as strong as under the START I treaty. There is an argument that they don't need to be for various reasons or the Russians weren't willing to allow them to be for various reasons. I don't think you can say the verification is better.

Former Secretary of State James Baker, who testified, said:

The verification mechanism in the New START Treaty does not

appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the

numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions

under START I. This complex part of the treaty is even more

crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than

were allowed in the past.

That is obvious. The more you get down to a smaller number, the more important cheating is, the more dramatic the effect can be, and the better verification you need.

Senator McCain said this:

The New START Treaty's permissive approach to verification

will result in less transparency and create additional

challenges for our ability to monitor Russia's current and

future capabilities.

Former CIA Director James Woolsey said:

New START's verification provisions will provide little or

no help in detecting illegal activity at locations the

Russians fail to declare, are off-limits to U.S. inspectors,

or are underground or otherwise hidden from our satellites.

Senator Bond made a comment that I have quoted before, which is this:

New START suffers from fundamental verification flaws that

no amount of tinkering around the edges can fix. . . . The

Select Committee on Intelligence has been looking at this

issue closely over the past several months. . . . There is no

doubt in my mind that the United States cannot reliably

verify the treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed warheads.

To conclude, the amendment would require the President to certify that he has reached an agreement with Russia on the nonuse of covers that interfere with type one inspections and accurate warhead counting during those inspections. It doesn't solve the problem of determining the total number of warheads Russia deploys, but it would reduce a method of deception Russia has used in the past.

On telemetry, the amendment would require the President to certify that he has reached a legally binding agreement with Russia that each party is obliged to provide the other full and unimpeded access to its telemetry from all flight tests of strategic missiles, including on new ballistic missile systems deployed by the Russians. They are free now to encrypt those tests. That makes it much harder to get information we have found to be very valuable.

Finally, with regard to the material breach, the amendment contains an understanding that the United States would consider a violation of the deployed warhead limits to be a material breach of the treaty. This would include any type one inspection that revealed the Russians had deployed a number of warheads on any one missile in excess of the number they declared for that missile or that they continued to use covers that deny us the ability to see exactly how many warheads they have on their missiles.

Mr. President, I hope my colleagues would recognize that verification is a problem under the treaty. This is a modest way to try to deal with specific aspects of that verification. I hope my colleagues would be willing to support the amendment.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

Might we also add that the second two votes would be 10- minute votes?

Might I inquire how much time remains on this side?

Mr. President, let me take 3, 4, 5 of those minutes. I appreciate my colleagues' compliments about important issues being brought up, and I also appreciate their concern that amendments of this significance would cause heartburn for the Russians and might well require them to want to renegotiate aspects of the treaty. I am trying to address that through the mechanism of the side agreement rather than amendment to the treaty or some kind of other more restrictive method. I thought that would be the preferable way to do it.

It is not my intention, as with the previous amendment, to delay things. I do not think it necessarily would. But I do appreciate that on a couple of these items the Russians would not likely want to renegotiate.

I am not so sure that would be the case with regard to the covers, this question of the kind of shroud or cover you put over the missile bus, the top of the missile that has the warheads since the treaty does deal with it, as my colleagues have pointed out, but I do not think it does so in a conclusive way.

The 2005 compliance report issued by the State Department to discuss compliance of the Russian Government with respect to the START I treaty had a couple of longstanding issues. The issue of shrouds was one that they characterized as of long standing. They had a very hard time getting that resolved with the Russians. In the end, there was a particular accommodation reached, but it took forever. And during that time, we did not have the kind of satisfaction we wanted.

We asked how disputes would be dealt with, and we get the same basic answer. That would go to the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the group of Russian and U.S. negotiators who are supposed to work these things out.

What I can see is a kind of repeat of what we had before. They like to cover these things up and that does not seem to me the way to enter into a treaty where we are supposed to be in agreement with our counterparts and yet we have unresolved issues we have to leave to another day to be resolved through a long and probably difficult negotiation process.

Also, my colleague from Massachusetts--these were his words; he was not quoting anyone--thought we had enormous certainty about this. I suggest I do not think the intelligence community would use a phrase such as ``enormous certainty.'' We cannot get into here the degree of percentage they attach to being able to know certain things under this treaty.

Suffice it to say that we are not absolutely sure we can do what needs to be done here, and I do not think characterizing it as ``enormous certainty'' would be an accurate way to do it.

Let me mention with regard to telemetry--first of all, let me correct one thing that is a little bit of misdirection and then agree with my colleagues on something else.

There is a suggestion that we can get telemetry on five missiles, and that is true if the Russians agree. In other words, they have to volunteer to do it. The five missiles they tell us about can be old missiles. They do not have to be new missiles. It is a fact there is nothing in this treaty that requires the Russians or the United States to exchange telemetry on new missile tests; that is to say, tests of missiles currently being developed. There are at least two the Russians are developing right now.

That leads to the second point. I think it is probably true the reason they did not want to agree to this is it would require them to give us very valuable information. Right now, they would not be getting any information from the United States because we are not testing missiles. But I ask, is that an asymmetry that is justified or that justifies a provision that says if you are not modernizing your forces and we are modernizing our forces, it is not fair to have us tell you what our missiles are like?

Under the previous treaty, both sides had to do that, and it gave both sides more confidence. The Russians are developing new missiles. Should we not have some understanding of the capability of those missiles? We are not developing any. It is almost as if the United States would have to be modernizing its forces too in order to be able to justify a provision that said we had to exchange telemetry.

Maybe the United States ought to get on with the modernization of our missile force so we can then go back to the Russians and say: You are modernizing, we are modernizing, now how about the exchange. To me that is not an argument to require the Russians not to provide us information. And in fact, when the shoe is on the other foot, that argument falls by the wayside, and we end up putting limitations in the treaty.

Here is an example. The Russians are not developing and do not seem to have any intention of developing something called conventional Prompt Global Strike, which is a fancy way of saying: Put a conventional warhead on top of an ICBM so you do not have to send a nuclear warhead halfway around the world to destroy a target.

We can see in today's conflict that we are not going to be engaging in a multiple nuclear exchange with another country but might well have a need based upon intelligence that does not have a very long shelf life that we want to send a conventional warhead to a specific target and that is something we would like to develop but the Russians are not interested in doing that. So did we say to the Russians: So because you are not doing it and we are, therefore, we are not going to have any limitation on this? No. We agreed, in fact, to a very important limitation. Any missiles we use in that regard have to be counted as if there were a nuclear warhead on top of it. So there is a 700-vehicle limit. That is all the number of missiles we can have. And yet any missiles that we put a conventional warhead on that have this ICBM range have to be counted against that limit.

Well, the Russians aren't doing it, so why did we have to agree to something they are not doing? That is asymmetrical. That is not parity.

So it is okay for the Russians to say: Hey, if we are doing something you are not doing, we are not going to be bound by anything in the treaty on it. But by the way, if you are doing something we are not doing, we are going to hold you accountable and bind you with a very important limitation in the treaty.

You see, the argument doesn't hold water. Russia and the United States are not acting exactly the same with regard to our weapons. So to argue that anything we are doing differently from the other shouldn't count in the treaty is suspicious. And, in any event, it turns out we don't make that argument.

Let me finish my sentence on this.

In any event, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. If we put a limitation on the United States on something they are not developing, then it is only fair to put a limitation on them with regard to something we are not developing.

Mr. President, I wish to speak briefly to that now, in direct response to my colleague from Michigan.

Mr. President, let me quote from the START I treaty, Text of Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification as Approved by the Senate:

The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the

START Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which

shall be binding upon the President: Legal and Political

Obligations of U.S.S.R.: That the legal and political

obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

reflected in the four related separate agreements, seven

legally binding letters, four areas of correspondence, two

politically binding declarations, thirteen joint statements .

. .

And so on. The two politically binding declarations are precisely the reference to the limitation of the SLCM numbers for both countries. I mean there is a dispute about whether it is legally binding in the same sense that the treaty itself is, but the heading of this is Legal and Political Obligations of the U.S.S.R., and it goes on to talk about . . .

The United States shall regard actions inconsistent with

these legal obligations as equivalent under international law

to actions inconsistent with the START Treaty.

And so on and so on. We believe these were binding and should be. It is no argument, however, to say that if somebody else didn't see it that way, therefore, what we are asking for here is not

a binding agreement. Whether you call it binding legally or binding politically, in any event, I wish to see it done, because there is no limitation on the SLCMs the Russians are planning to develop, and the submarine that is under development to carry them, and they could have a strategic value as well as a tactical value. They were a subject of the previous START I agreement and I think they should be a subject of this agreement as well.

Let me summarize. The first amendment our colleagues will be voting on is, I believe, the Wicker amendment, and then the second amendment is the amendment which would provide a side agreement for a limitation on the number of Russian SLCMs--the submarine launch cruise missiles-- and the third vote will be on the Kyl amendment relative to verification relating to covers on the ICBMs and telemetry on ICBM tests.

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. Shelby).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. Shelby).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri, (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. Shelby).

Mr. President, reserving the right to object.

I ask the Senator, will you go ahead and handle the unanimous consent agreement on the two amendments. I do not have to be here for that.

Madam President, I wish to talk about both the Thune amendment and the Inhofe amendment. With respect to the Inhofe amendment on verification, we are going to go into executive session of the Senate at 2 o'clock this afternoon, where there will be an opportunity for all Senators to examine classified materials that have been presented by our intelligence agencies, some of which relate specifically to the treaty and, in particular, the verification provisions in the treaty. It is too bad it is not possible for us to discuss with very much specificity the nature of the intelligence we will be discussing, but I will say I think it is a good thing we will be voting on the Inhofe amendment following that session, because a lot of the material we are going to be exposed to in executive session relates to the verification provisions of this treaty and past experience with verification.

That is about all I wish to say right now, except that I hope colleagues would attend that session because their vote on the Inhofe amendment would at least be partially predicated on their being briefed in that executive session.

With respect to the Thune amendment, I very much support it as well. The reason is because the whole point of this treaty was to reduce the nuclear

warheads and the delivery vehicles of the Russian Federation and the United States. That is the essence of the treaty. There is a lot more to it, but it reduces to 1,550 the actual warheads and reduces to 700 the delivery vehicles. There is a special definition or counting rule of those delivery vehicles that we don't need to get into here, but the reality is, it is 700 deployed delivery vehicles, with another 100 that could theoretically be deployed at a later date.

But 700 is the number. That is important for a couple of reasons. As we have talked about before, the Russians will actually have room to build up. There are a lot of different estimates over the number of delivery vehicles they are planning on having. But because missiles and bombers and submarines are expensive, the Russians could be well below that number in a few years. So that number does not help the United States at all. The Russians are already below it by at least--well, over 100--and they will be going lower than that.

One unfortunate consequence of that is they are MIRVing their ICBM delivery vehicles in a way that, obviously, is going to be much more destabilizing. Throughout the Cold War, both sides developed missiles that allowed them to put more than one warhead on top of a missile. The problem is, that is very destabilizing in a potential nuclear conflict because of the notion that you lose it if you do not use it.

So it was an incentive for either side to launch their missiles before the other side could attack them and destroy them. If you hit one missile silo and that missile in the silo has 8 warheads on it or 10 warheads on it, you have killed 10 warheads, not just one. Those warheads--the way they work is, when the missile gets up to the top of its apogee, those warheads are splayed out, and each one has a different trajectory down to potentially 8 or 10 different targets. So they are very destabilizing. The incentive is for the person doing the first strike to kill them all so the other side does not have that capability coming back at you.

Well, both the United States and the then-Soviet Union recognized how destabilizing this was and moved toward a single warhead per missile, which is much less destabilizing, obviously. Since one of the benefits of this treaty is allegedly the stability that comes from it, one is very troubled by the idea that, unfortunately, that is not the way it works. The treaty is much more destabilizing, not stabilizing, because of this incentive for the Russians to put more than one warhead on each missile. The United States, by contrast, is limiting our missiles to one warhead apiece. In a way, that puts us at a big disadvantage.

Another way it puts us at a disadvantage is we are above the 700, and we are going to have to retire a lot of our delivery vehicles to get down to 700. So the treaty is not symmetrical in this regard. They could actually build up to 700. We will have to bring down to 700.

It is also not symmetrical because our obligations around the world are much more diverse than are Russia's obligations. Russia will be defending Russia. The United States has an understanding with 31 other countries that our nuclear umbrella is available to them for their nuclear deterrence as well. So this requires a more sophisticated defense plan on our part as to how we would deliver various warheads to what targets, and it essentially expands the number of weapons we need.

So it is a big deal to get down to the number of 700. As Senator Thune has noted--and I will not repeat this--before the treaty was negotiated, a lot of our miliary people were testifying to various numbers that, obviously, led to the conclusion that 700 was way too low. Dr. Schlesinger has, for example, said that 700 might be barely enough.

The problem is, that, A, we are even going to go below 700 if we proceed with something the administration wants to do, many of us here want to do; that is, to develop what is called a conventional Prompt Global Strike. A conventional Prompt Global Strike is using an ICBM but with a conventional warhead on it, not a nuclear warhead, to strike at a target of potentially a rogue nation or some terrorist group or someplace where you have actionable intelligence that is of very short life. You want to destroy a target. You obviously do not want to use a nuclear warhead. But you want to get there fast, and it is a long way away. So you might need to use, essentially, the same kind of missile you would use to deliver a nuclear warhead.

Well, the Russians did not like that, so they said: If you do any of those, you are going to have to count them against your nuclear delivery limit. So if we did 25 of those, let's say, then instead of 700 vehicles to deliver nuclear weapons, we would only have 675. That is why the Thune amendment talks about going back up to 730, which, without getting into classified material, I believe represents a number that more closely approximates what people think is going to be necessary for the United States on into the future.

The other thing that is troubling about it is, the administration has yet to commit to a full triad nuclear capable. Even though they have said they are fully committed to the triad, which means bombers, submarines, and ICBMs, they have not been willing to say the new bombers we build will be nuclear capable or will have cruise missiles that can deliver a nuclear warhead.

So while they say ``triad,'' they are not willing to commit to anything but a diad. The problem with that is, there is much less stability and capability if you only have two ways of delivering your nuclear weapons. If there is something wrong with your ICBM force-- remember, about 2 months ago, the power went out in several States, and our ICBMs were actually down for--I have forgotten what it was--an hour and a half or something like that because they did not have any electrical power.

Well, obviously, nothing happened during that period of time. But a single point of failure is never desirable in the military context, where if one thing goes wrong, a lot of weapons or capability is taken off the table. The problem is, if you get down to just two ways of delivering these weapons, rather than the three we have today, you are going to be much less capable. Your deterrent is not going to deter as much. That is what Senator Thune is trying to get at.

Let's at least modestly increase the number of delivery vehicles we have. It is a modest amendment. It is an appropriate amendment. Yet as we have just seen from Reuters today--something we already knew but the latest iteration of it--``Russia warns U.S. not to change nuclear pact.'' In effect, what they are saying is, the Senate can debate all it wants to, but if it makes one change, changes one comma, one thing is different in the treaty, well, then what? Then, as my colleague, Senator Kerry, said, we would have to see if the Russians were willing to agree to it. Otherwise, they would have to renegotiate at least that part of the treaty.

Well, what is wrong with that? Unless you think the U.S. Constitution was stupid to give the Senate a role in this, it does not seem to me there is anything wrong with the Senate saying: You got about nine- tenths of it just fine, President Obama and President Medvedev, your negotiators. These negotiators are good, smart people and they are dedicated public servants, but they are not necessarily the last word. The Senate is the last word, according to our Constitution. We gave our advice. The administration did not take our advice in two specific ways, but yet they expect us to give them their consent to the treaty.

The reality is, the Senate should not be a rubberstamp. In the first START treaty, we said: You have not dealt with a subject here that needs to be dealt with--the potential for Russian submarine-launched cruise nuclear weapons. We need to have a side agreement on that. It did not blow up START. We did a side agreement. The world did not end when the Senate said no to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The predictions were that this was going to destroy our relations with Russia forever. It did not. Here we are today now told again: If you change one thing in this treaty, then Russia will not go along with it and our relationship could deteriorate significantly.

Well, if our relationship depends upon ratification of the treaty exactly like it is, then it is a lot weaker than the President and Vice President are making it out to be when they talk about this wonderful new reset relationship. Surely, it could stand the Senate making a modest change to the

treaty. If it cannot, then I do not buy the argument that this is a wonderful reset relationship.

So for my colleagues who say: We will not abide by any amendments to the treaty, I say: Well, then, you have just said the Senate is irrelevant in the treaty process. We might as well forget about having the Senate consider these treaties in the first place.

Senator Thune and Senator Inhofe have good amendments. I am looking forward to supporting both of them when we return from our closed session this afternoon. I urge my colleagues to do the same.

I would be happy to yield for a question.

Madam President, I say to Senator Thune, I was not aware it would be cut in half. I was aware it would be drastically reduced. That is a huge reduction, especially if the administration is unwilling to commit that we are even going to have a nuclear-capable bomber force in the next generation of our triad. They have been willing to say we have a great triad today. That is true as far as it goes. But part of that triad on the bomber force, for example, are B-52s that were designed-- when--back in the 1950s and built in the 1960s and 1970s.

We have to replace all three legs of our triad. The decision has been made on the submarine. That is a good thing. But the decisions have not yet been made on the ICBM or on the bomber force.

One of our concerns about modernization is that modernization of the nuclear warheads is fine--I mean, it is necessary. But if we do not also modernize the method by which we deliver those warheads, then modernizing our warheads is of little significance.

The final point to Senator Thune's question, of course, is that other countries, including Russia and China, are all modernizing both their warheads and their delivery vehicles. So the United States does not want to get caught in the position where we are down to very few workable weapons, especially the bomber force, which, as the Senator noted, can also be called back, unlike the missiles that are launched either from ground or from submarine. Once they are launched, they are launched. At least a bomber can be called back.

I will conclude by saying, I hope we have at least a short moment or period of debate following the closed session so both Senator Thune and Senator Inhofe can make a brief closing argument to remind our colleagues about what the debate has been all about. I regret more of our colleagues were not on the floor to hear the debate.

Madam President, I wonder if I might engage in a colloquy briefly with my colleague from Massachusetts and then propound a unanimous consent agreement.

Madam President, there are two votes scheduled on the Thune amendment and the Inhofe amendment. Have we locked in the LeMieux amendment yet?

Madam President, does my colleague anticipate that it is possible there would be a third vote tonight, depending upon whether Senator LeMieux is ready to have that vote?

At some point, just for the benefit of Members, there could theoretically be a third amendment tonight if Senator LeMieux is ready to have that vote and if there is no objection by any other Member.

The other point, I inform my colleague, is I have the exact numbers of the five amendments I would like to get pending. Let me make that request at this time. They are amendments Nos. 4900, McCain amendment; 4893, Kyl amendment; 4892, Kyl amendment; 4867, Kyl amendment; and No. 4860, Kyl amendment. These are all proposed amendments to the resolution of ratification.

I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to call up five amendments to the resolution of ratification; provided further that these be the only amendments in order to the resolution of ratification at this time; and I ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of the amendments solicited, the Senate then resume consideration of the treaty.

Before my colleague responds, I will also say this: I believe there are only four other amendments pending, and one of them is mine. I will agree to waive my right to bring that up. I cannot say for the others, and I need to talk with those Members during the vote. I do not know whether they would want votes on their amendments. In any event, there are no more than three of them. So it is a locked-in number.

No. I am saying one is mine, and I would eliminate it now.

If that was the impression, I do not think I can do that. But in any event, I did not try to do that. There are four all told. I would eliminate my one, and there would be a fixed number--only three possibilities after that.

It would be the only Kyl amendment remaining pending to the treaty.

I can tell my colleague that the amendment I would be agreeing not to bring up is amendment No.

4854. I misspoke when I said it is pending. It is filed to the treaty.

I am not willing to withdraw my request. What I am afraid of, quite frankly, is that we are not going to be able to get unanimous consent before a cloture vote on the treaty and we are going to be iced out here.

I have propounded a unanimous consent request. I will be happy to read it again. If there is an objection, fine. I want to get agreement on this, if at all possible.

I would be happy to. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to call up five amendments to the resolution of ratification; provided further that these be the only amendments in order to the resolution of ratification at this time; and I ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of the amendments solicited, the Senate then resume consideration of the treaty.

Madam President, I appreciate the explanation. That ordinarily would be information given to the two leaders, and we did not do that in this case. I do appreciate this.

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback).