Floor Statements

Mr. President, I wanted to deliver these remarks on the same subject of health care earlier in the week. I had been back home in Arizona during the July recess and had spoken to many of my constituents about the subject. I didn't have the opportunity to address this subject until today. I note that health care is very much on their minds. They have been asking a lot of questions. My constituents have been following the health care debate, and the majority I have spoken with are very much in favor of reform.

I think all of us in this body realize there are things we have to do to lower the cost of health care and ensure everybody has an opportunity to be covered.

I can also tell you they are very concerned about the reforms that have been proposed by the President. They wonder whether they, in fact, will work to their best interests. Cost is an issue that has come up repeatedly when I have spoken with my constituents. They want to know why we have to spend so much money in order to--allegedly--save money and how much it will cost. I tell them it is projected to cost at least a trillion dollars. This is not a fanciful figure; this is what the two bills pending before the Senate are being scored at, meaning that the Congressional Budget Office has said that is about how much they are going to cost. The ultimate price tag could be even higher because in the case of one of the bills, not everything that is going to be in it has already been scored by the CBO, and as to the Finance Committee bill, it is still very much a work in progress.

The usual reaction people have to a trillion dollar-plus health care bill is that they cannot believe we would want to spend that much money or that we can't afford to spend that much. They know already that there are only two ways the Federal Government can pay for such a massive program: one, either borrow more money or, two, impose new taxes or some combination of the two. Naturally, they don't like either alternative.

Most Arizonans think Washington has already borrowed more money than taxpayers can handle, after the President's $1.2 trillion stimulus bill, the $400 billion Omnibus appropriations bill, and the $3.4 trillion, 10-year budget. Now we hear talk about adding an additional trillion dollars on top of that. The folks in Arizona think that is just too much. In fact, by the end of the fiscal year, our publicly held debt will be about 57 percent of our gross domestic product, and deficits of a trillion dollars a year are projected for the next decade. We just got the statistics for the deficit this year. It is already at $1.1 trillion. By the end of the year, it could easily be another half-trillion dollars above that. This will drive the debt to at least 82 percent of the gross domestic product by 2019. To give you an idea of what that means, the GDP is how much money we make as a country. It would be the same as saying that for a family that has an income of $100,000, its credit card debt is $89,000. Try paying off an $89,000 credit card debt on a $100,000 income. The interest payments on the debt will soon make up the single-largest item in our budget. So, obviously, when we talk about spending another trillion dollars we don't have, my constituents are very wary of this. They are wary about the debt, and, to say the least, they don't think it is fair for Washington to pass another trillion-dollar bill, with the costs being transferred to our children and grandchildren--especially after what happened with the stimulus, which has, frankly, included a great deal of waste and obviously has failed to contain unemployment.

A lot of folks have expressed skepticism that spending another trillion dollars is the right way to reduce health care costs. Frankly, I agree with them. Somebody has to pay the trillion dollars. They are also concerned about the new taxes that have been proposed to pay for this because, in fact, part of this trillion dollars is proposed to be paid for through new taxes. There have been all kinds of ideas proposed, such as a tax on beer, soda, juice, and snack food. Those are really small items, but they hit people right where it counts when they go to the grocery store.

There is also a new value-added tax idea. This hits the small business men and women, who are especially concerned because of the new taxes that some are suggesting they should pay--as much as a 10 percentage point increase in the amount of taxes they would have to pay. This is important because, in our economic downturn today, we know it is small businesses that are going to create the jobs that will bring us out of the recession. This would not be just a job killer but an economic growth and recovery killer with that kind of tax imposed on these folks.

My constituents want to know--and, frankly, I want to know--if the President will fulfill his campaign pledge not to raise taxes one single dime on the middle class and whether he will veto any legislation that includes the kinds of taxes of which I am speaking that would fall directly on families. They believe and I believe there ought to be a different way to achieve the health care we want--in other words, without this new round of spending and taxes.

They have heard the President argue in his pitches for Washington to change our health care system that if we spend

all this money on health care now, we will somehow save money later. Americans have some commonsense questions about this claim: How will the government actually do this? Will their health care be rationed? If they are privately insured, will they be able to keep the health care they already have? Eighty-five percent of persons are already insured and are happy with what they have. Yet proposals in the pending legislation would cause many of them to lose that insurance and go onto government programs. That, of course, then raises questions like rationing, as I have discussed many times before.

A Washington-run health care system would likely try to suppress costs by denying or delaying care. Administration officials are already talking about using comparative effectiveness research for this purpose. This is not a fanciful or hypothetical notion. As we know, this is exactly what has happened in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom, two countries with government-run health care systems. In a ``20/20'' health care segment, they reported that Norwood, Ontario, holds a lottery each week to give one winner a trip to a family doctor. The show filmed the town clerk pulling a name from a box and calling the name of an elated winner. Is that what we want in the United States? The average emergency room wait in Canada is 23 hours-- if you are even considered sick enough to be admitted. In Britain, in 2007, the government set a goal to reduce the average wait time to see a physician to fewer than 18 weeks. That is 4\1/2\ months waiting to see a doctor. Do Americans want that?

That is how government-run health care works: You make something free and demand soars. To reduce costs, bureaucrats deny or delay treatment or tests or procedures they deem too expensive. The way it works is simple: You set a budget of how much you are going to spend on health care every year. It doesn't matter how sick your folks get; it has to fit within that budget. Think about that for your family. Say you set a budget and you are going to spend no more than $5,000 on health care this year. A good friend of mine in Arizona had an automobile accident; it was very serious. He had to have his spleen removed. He is still in recovery, and it is obviously going to cost a lot of money--more than $5,000. Well, if he set a budget and said that is all he is going to spend, what is he to do? Does he not get the treatment he needs as a result of that accident? You cannot reform health care or reduce costs by rationing care to patients.

One of the things Republicans will insist on is that the way we do the reform doesn't hurt what we already have, which is a system that allows you to get to the emergency room and allows you to see a doctor. You can choose your own doctor. If you have insurance, you get to keep it. We don't want to take care of the few who are unable to get insurance today in a way that requires us to change what everybody else has, if it is already working for them.

It is true that you won't find the words ``ration'' or ``denial'' of care or ``withholding coverage'' in these bills. Obviously, they don't state it that way. But the results are precisely what are required by the policies in the bill. The results are easily masked by all kinds of terminology, but the rules, the forms, the legal obligations, and the provider reimbursement schemes all result in the ability of the government to tell you whether something is going to be covered, whether you and your doctor think it is necessary for your care or not.

I have heard some respond by saying that at least in the Canadian system they may ration care, but everybody has access to a doctor. Not true. The Fraser Institute, a Canadian think tank, released a study this year that found that 1.7 million people--out of a country of 33 million--were unable to see a physician in 2007. That number does not include those who have a doctor but are on a waiting list.

As I said earlier, many of my constituents also worry about losing their current coverage if a new Washington-run health care system is implemented. True, they have heard the President say repeatedly that if you have health insurance, you get to keep it. But they have also heard the other side of the story, and I have read at least one of the bills--in fact, there are two specific provisions--that render this statement untrue--that if you have health insurance, you get to keep it. Not true. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that just part of one of the proposed plans shows that millions of people would lose their existing coverage and be told to enroll in government health care. The Lewin study specifically mentioned 119 million people who would be shifted from their current employer-provided coverage onto the government plan.

Many of my constituents also want to know if the President would veto legislation that has the potential to cause Americans to lose the private insurance they currently enjoy.

There is a final concern, and this concerns me. It goes to America's seniors. We have made some very strong commitments to our seniors through the Medicare Program. Our seniors obviously are more susceptible to needing health care. They have a greater number of health concerns than younger Americans. And we have said to them: We will, through Medicare, ensure that your health concerns will be taken care of. They are obviously very concerned about rationing if Medicare were somehow to be cut in order to raise money to solve the problem for others in our society. That is precisely what at least one of these bills proposes to do--cut Medicare and take that money and apply it to the new costs that we are going to be incurring as a result of this so- called health care reform.

Seniors are worried these cuts in Medicare will adversely affect their ability to get care. They also fret that adding the 47 million uninsured Americans--which would be just for starters--to health insurance rolls, including government insurance rolls, would impact the care they now receive by crowding the system. In other words, leading to wait times, rationing for them or even potentially denial of care. We must not implement a new health care system that would suddenly erode the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries.

My constituents want high-quality, patient-centered health care. Most already have good health insurance for themselves. They are concerned about its cost. They are also concerned that there are some who need to be insured who are not. But what they want to hear are fresh new ideas about how to achieve this result without, in effect, throwing the baby out with the bathwater; without adversely affecting the system that currently takes care of them, whether it is seniors being cared for in Medicare or it is the vast majority of Americans who are already insured and like the insurance they have. They do not want us to rush a costly new plan through the Congress.

I think the President was correct when he said: If we don't do this quickly, we might not do it at all. Well, what did he mean by that? In effect, what he was saying is that if the American people have a long enough time to study and debate exactly what is being proposed, they may not like what they see. I think that is exactly what is happening here.

There is a bill that is going to be marked up next week in the House of Representatives, and I don't think the American people are going to like what they see in that bill. We have a bill that has been marked up in the HELP Committee in the Senate, and much of my criticisms go to that particular bill. There is one section in that bill, for example, that spends $400 billion over 7 years to subsidize health care for families making between $66,000 a year and 80,000-some dollars a year. Is that what we want to cut Medicare to pay for?

As I said, the more Americans understand the details of these bills, the more questions I think they are going to ask. We owe it to our constituents to allow them the time to understand it and to ask us those questions. I want to be able to go back to Arizona and say: All right, here are the three bills--or two bills or however many there are--and here is what they do. Do you like it or not? If not, how would you change it? We need the time and the ability to get the reaction from our constituents if we are going to be true to our position as representatives of the people.

So when the President says: If we don't do this quickly, we might not do it at all, he is probably right. But it is better to get it right; to take our time

to do it right and not make mistakes, than to rush something through that is going to add $1 trillion in new spending; that is going to potentially impact the coverage we already have, potentially impact Medicare for our seniors and perhaps not achieve the results we want. This is one of the most important things this Congress--the American Congress--will have done in years. It is complicated, it is hard, and we have to get it right.

One of the first things a physician learns in medical school, when confronting a patient to see what is wrong with that patient and to begin the treatment, is to, first, do no harm. It is possible to do harm to a patient. So the physician, first of all, is admonished: The body is a wonderful thing, it recovers pretty well; don't do anything to harm. The same thing is true with our economy and with the policies with respect to health care. There are a lot of good things being done in health care--physicians are working very hard to take good care of us, most people have good insurance, seniors rely on Medicare. Let's not do harm to what we have in order to take a small segment of our population and make sure they can get insurance.

That is the primary position we are taking when we say: Let's don't rush this. Let's do it right. At the end of the day, we can all be proud of the fact that we have reformed our health care system to reduce, not increase, some of the expenses and to ensure that those who don't have insurance can, in fact, be covered.

I said I wished to give these remarks earlier in the week, having talked with a lot of my constituents in Arizona. I also wished, toward the end of this week, to comment on the President's trip to Russia. He is going to be returning home soon, and his trip to Russia produced some very important announcements, which I wished to discuss today.

President Obama's Visit to Russia

I am going to switch subjects now and discuss the President's trip to Moscow and his summit with the President of Russia.

The most significant object of that summit, as we know, was the discussion of further strategic arms reductions. I personally believe it is important that the verification and confidence-building measures of the 1991 START agreement not expire without some measure to continue them, possibly including a legally binding replacement treaty. I know that is one of the purposes of the President's visit. But I am also cognizant of the fact that a follow-on to the 1991 START agreement does not address the most current threats to the United States and the West; namely, those posed by nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The two subjects are barely related.

For example, the threat from Iran and the history of Russian support for the Iranian nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program is well known. It is probably even going on today. This should have been at the top of the President's agenda with Russia, if, in fact, he is going to address the threats that are most currently before us, rather than a decades-old arms control agreement with Russia.

Additionally, there is the ongoing nuclear weapon ambitions of North Korea. Some press reports suggest it may be sharing its technology with countries such as Syria and Burma. Given the well-known willingness of these rogue states--and I speak of North Korea and Iran--to support terrorism, their unchecked nuclear ambitions will surely hasten the day when terrorists are able to acquire nuclear weapons. I believe nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are the greatest threats to our Nation today, and we should be focused much more on those threats, as I said, than going back and negotiating an arms control agreement with Russia, which obviously is not a current threat to the United States.

The main focus of the President's trip when he was in Moscow appears to have been on the subject of a strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia. That being the case, the Senate has a great responsibility--if the administration seeks our advice and consent by submitting the treaty to us for ratification--to understand what the proposal is and to provide our advice to the President before it is negotiated and, if appropriate, our consent to ratify. Obviously, the Constitution requires this process of advise and consent when it comes to treaty making.

Here are some of the questions I think we need to answer. First of all, what does the United States get from such a new treaty when it appears that the Russians are on their way to reaching the levels of weaponry announced without a treaty? They are going to do it anyway.

Second, why has the United States bent to Russian demands to take tactical nuclear weapons off the table when the Russians have a 10-to-1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons over the United States and have openly talked in their military doctrine about using tactical nuclear weapons in conflict?

How will the administration provide for the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces, including the warheads and the complex of infrastructure that sustains them and the nuclear weapons delivery systems, the bombers and the missiles and submarines that must accompany any START ratification process? That is perhaps the most critical question of all.

A number of these questions and recommended courses of action have recently been articulated by some of this country's leading experts on arms control and nonproliferation policy, including Ambassador James Woolsey, Dr. Fred Ikle, Ambassador John Bolton, and many others.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, at the conclusion of my remarks, a document entitled ``U.S.-Russian START Renewal Negotiations: Guidelines to Protect U.S. Interests.''

I thank the Chair.

I also urge my colleagues to study materials recently released by the New Deterrent Working Group involved with the Center for Security Policy, a respected think tank here in Washington, that has studied these issues for years; and also a very objective and important guide for how we should approach our thinking on these negotiations from the Hudson Institute. These are outstanding compilations of expert opinions for Senators to familiarize themselves with as we head into a treaty ratification process. They are too lengthy to insert in the Record, but I am happy to provide these papers to any of my colleagues who would like to read them.

Another important question concerns missile defense. Just before the summit, it appeared the White House was taking a strong line in refusing to accept Russian demands to link missile defenses with a follow-on treaty. The Russians have said: We are not even going to talk about the START numbers unless we can also talk about U.S. missile defense. The Russians don't like it. They would like to have us put some limitations on that. The administration recognized not only should there be no constraint on the development of missile defenses, but, moreover, any treaty--any treaty--that limits U.S. missile defenses would be dead on arrival in the Senate if we tied the two subjects together.

This past week, I joined Senators Wicker, Johanns, McCain, Hatch, Lieberman, Ben Nelson, and Begich in sending a letter to the President in which we confirmed that ``linking missile defense plans to offensive force negotiations runs contrary to American strategic interests and would undermine our security.''

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the letter to which I just referred.

Notwithstanding what I have said, buried in the joint understanding--which has now been made public--reached by President Obama and Medvedev is inclusion of the following language suggesting an accession to the Russian demand to include missile defense in the follow-on treaty:

A provision on the interrelationships of strategic

offensive and strategic defensive arms.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Joint Understanding be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

This last statement is a dangerous connection to make and one the administration must not negotiate. U.S. missile defenses exist to protect against ballistic missile threats by rogue regimes and the threat of accidental or unauthorized launches. They are not about Russia. Consequently, we should not allow Russia to attempt to limit our defenses, and that is what I fear these words from the Joint Understanding may allow to occur. Such a linkage in the START agreement will be rejected by Members of the Senate.

I would also like to call attention to a curious statement by the President which was quoted in this past Sunday's New York Times:

It's naive for us to think that we can grow our nuclear

stockpiles, the Russians continue to grow their nuclear

stockpiles, and our allies grow their nuclear stockpiles, and

that in that environment we're going to be able to pressure

countries like Iran and North Korea not to pursue nuclear

weapons themselves.

The fact is, the United States has not been growing or even modernizing its nuclear stockpile. Why did the President make such a false statement? Yes, the Russians are growing theirs, at least modernizing it. Britain and France are modernizing their stockpiles, though not growing them, as far as I have seen in the press. India, Pakistan, and North Korea are all growing their stockpiles; and, of course, we are all familiar with Iran's actions. All of this has occurred in the absence of the United States growing its stockpile. What the President said is not true. In fact, it has all occurred while the United States has undertaken substantial nuclear force reductions. We haven't modernized our nuclear weapons, and we haven't conducted an underground nuclear test for 17 years. One would think this history would put to rest the naive assumption that the U.S. movement toward disarmament will be reciprocated by other nations, including those that threaten our national security.

I would also like to submit for the Record a Wall Street Journal op- ed written by Steve Rademaker, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation in the last administration. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks that letter.

Mr. Rademaker correctly observes:

The critics are not impressed that by 2012 the U.S. will

have reduced its deployed strategic warheads by 80 percent.

They will not be satisfied if the U.S. reduces by 99 percent.

So long as there is one nuclear weapon remaining in the U.S.

inventory, he says, they will point to this as the root cause

of nuclear proliferation.

As I indicated a few moments ago, there are real concerns facing the Senate at this time as we consider the START follow-on treaty. It is imperative that the President understand the true situation as he negotiates with his Russian counterparts.

This is all the more important as we begin to understand the highly significant reductions the administration apparently wants to negotiate in a follow-on agreement. According to the Joint Understanding from which I quoted before, the President plans to reach an agreement that represents a significant departure from current force levels.

I note that the 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear force level--actually on the high end of that range--was considered the minimum force level required for deterrence and assurance just last year when the Departments of Energy and Defense issued an unclassified white paper, ``National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.''

Given yesterday's announcement, I am curious to understand how estimates of necessary force levels could have changed so dramatically in the 10 months since that paper was issued. I am also very concerned about the implications for our triad and for our conventional arms modernization, if we lock in a launcher limit at anything close to 500.

The triad is the combination of our strategic bomber force, our intercontinental ballistic missiles based on land in silos, and ICBMs in submarines. Those are the three parts of our strategic triad. If we were to reduce the numbers as dramatically low as this paper would indicate, it is very clear the triad would be jeopardized; that is to say, not all elements of it would have the weaponry to be part of our strategic deterrent.

Moreover, these numbers would suggest that parts of this triad can be used for conventional purposes. Bombers can drop high explosive bombs. They don't just drop nuclear weapons. A missile--we have a lot of cruise missiles that send high-explosive warheads to their destination. It doesn't have to be a nuclear warhead. If we reduce the number of delivery systems down below a certain level, we not only impact our strategic nuclear deterrent but also our conventional deterrent and conventional capability.

This may be very advantageous for Russia. In fact, Russia is headed to a low level anyway because of their economy. But I believe it is a grave risk for the United States and our allies. I think these are issues that will warrant the highest level of scrutiny by the Senate. We can't be rushed in our work. These are very important existential questions.

I note that the Senate had over 425 days between the signature on the START I agreement and the eventual ratification of that treaty. There were 1,119 days between the signing and ratification of START II. And the Chemical Weapons Convention allowed the Senate 1,563 days of review, deliberation, and debate. The last successful arms control treaty with the Russians, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT, permitted the Senate 287 days to review.

I say again, there is no need for a rush. As the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday, July 8:

The White House Coordinator for Weapons of Mass

Destruction, Security and Arms Control, Gary Samore, said on

Sunday that the Administration may have to enact certain

provisions of a treaty by executive order and on a

`provisional basis' to meet the December deadline.

Clearly, there are options available to ensure that the Senate has all the time it needs to thoughtfully consider a treaty and to make sure a nuclear weapons modernization program is in place and funded before the Senate proceeds to ratification of the START follow-on.

Mr. President, according to press reports, Russian President Medvedev has indicated that his nation would like to reduce the number of strategic launchers several times below the number currently permitted under START. This is reflected in the launcher limits outlined in the Joint Understanding.

This sounds good, but it is unclear that Russia is actually giving anything up.

In recent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dr. Keith Payne, a former official of the Defense Department and a member of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture, cautioned ``We should be very careful about moving toward lower launcher numbers because it would provide significant advantages for the Russian Federation, but significant disadvantages for U.S. strategy.''

As Dr. Payne noted in his testimony, Russia's strategic ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers will drop dramatically with or without a new arms control agreement.

Specifically, Dr. Payne stated: ``within 8 or 9 years, the number of Russian strategic launchers will have dropped from approximately 680 launchers (some of which already are not operational) to approximately 270 launchers simply as a result of aging of their systems and the pace of their modernization program. In contrast, the service life of existing U.S. systems extends several decades.''

Dr. Payne continues: ``Despite spending up to 25% of the Russian military budget on the strategic forces, Russia's strategic nuclear forces will decline steeply with or without arms control.''

Consequently, Russia isn't giving up anything by agreeing to these reductions. At the same time, reductions in delivery vehicles could have consequences for the U.S., in terms of prompt global strike capabilities nd conventional strike modernization.

Dr. Payne also wrote about these facts in a recent Wall Street Journal piece, and I ask unanimous consent to print it in the Record as well.

Additionally, in order to get a follow-on START agreement with Russia--one that appears to be much more to Russia's advantage than ours--we have also decided we will not seek to get the Russians to give up a very real advantage they possess: their tactical nuclear weapons, also known as nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

While the United States and Russia have a rough equivalence in their strategic nuclear weapons, there is a significant imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons that favors Russia.

This imbalance is exacerbated by the fact that Russia maintains an active nuclear weapons production complex, while the United States does not.

According to the recently concluded report of the bipartisan Perry- Schlesinger Commission, there is a growing asymmetry between United States and Russian nuclear weapons capabilities thanks to a longstanding problem whereby the Russian Federation has maintained far greater numbers of tactical nuclear weapons than the United States.

According to the commission, the Russians have approximately 3,800 of these weapons, while the United States has only a few hundred.

And according to a recent CRS report, the Russians may have as many as 8,000.

Despite this asymmetry, we are told that the forthcoming START follow-on will not deal with Russian tactical nuclear weapons, at Russian demand.

Yet, it is clear that our allies who rely on our extended deterrent are increasingly concerned.

For example, the Perry-Schlesinger report stated: ``The combination of new warhead designs, the estimated production capability for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery systems such as the Iskander short-range tactical ballistic missile (known as the SS-26 in the West), open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.''

And according to that report, ``The United States should not cede to Russia a posture of superiority in the name of deemphasizing nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy. There seems no near-term prospect of such a result in the balance of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. But that balance does not exist in nonstrategic nuclear forces, where Russia enjoys a sizeable numerical advantage. As noted above, it stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations west of the Urals. The United States deploys a small fraction of that number in support of nuclear sharing agreements in NATO. Precise numbers for the U.S. deployments are classified but their total is only about five percent of the total at the height of the Cold War. Strict U.S.-Russian equivalence in NSNF numbers is unnecessary. But the current imbalance is stark and worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe. If and as reductions continue in the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, this imbalance will become more apparent and allies less assured.''

It is therefore inexplicable to me that we will not be negotiating with the Russians about reductions in those nuclear forces.

Moreover, I am concerned by suggestions that discussions of these forces will have to wait for the ``next treaty'' which may not ever arrive. In the meantime, this follow-on agreement may lock in a significant disadvantage for the United States and our allies.

In recent months, it has become clear that the state of our nuclear deterrent is in need of serious attention.

As high an authority as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned: ``At a certain point, it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our testing moratorium. It also makes it harder to reduce existing stockpiles, because eventually we won't have as much confidence in the efficacy of the weapons we do have.''

Secretary Gates continued this argument when he said: ``To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.''

This is a statement of significant import. Secretary Gates has warned that without a modernization program, such as the Reliable Replacement Warhead RRW, which Congress rejected during the last administration, we will be unable to reduce the number of weapons we maintain.

In fact, we are not even certain we can modernize without testing, but we would be a lot closer to knowing the answer to that question if Congress had approved the RRW studies.

As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission noted, our nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms are long overdue for a needed modernization program and will continue to experience safety, reliability and credibility problems until that modernization is in place.

In fact, even in its Interim Report, the commission stated: ``High confidence in stockpile reliability not only is important for maintaining deterrence, it is also vital for making substantial reductions in the size of our stockpile.''

Thus, it should not be surprising that the commission made the following findings and recommendations that are of such importance that I want to read them into the Record in their entirety:

i. For the indefinite future, the United States must

maintain a viable nuclear deterrent. The other NPT-

recognized nuclear-weapon states have put in place

comprehensive programs to modernize their forces to meet new

international circumstances.

ii. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has had some

remarkable achievements. But in recent years, the level of

funding provided to support these safeguards has been

inadequate.

iii. The Life Extension Program has to date been effective

in dealing with the problem of modernizing the arsenal. But

it is becoming increasingly difficult to continue within the

constraints of a rigid adherence to original materials and

design as the stockpile continues to age.

iv. As the reductions have proceeded over the period since

the end of the Cold War, the potential to deal with technical

surprise has been reduced, as the diversity of types of

weapons in the stockpile has shrunk.

v. The infrastructure that supports two thirds of the

strategic deterrent triad--the SLBMs and ICBMs is not being

sustained.

Mr. President, it is clear that not only is a modernization program for our nuclear weapons, the complex that supports it, and the delivery systems associated with it long overdue, it is also inextricably linked to safely reducing our nuclear arsenal further and must be considered by the Senate simultaneously to, if not before, the START follow-on is submitted.

Such a modernization program should take into account issues raised by the Nuclear Weapons Council in its December 24, 2008, letter to the NNSA administrator.

I ask unanimous consent to print the letter in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

It should also take into account the commission's recommendations, which noted that as long as modernization takes place within current policies regarding testing and military characteristics, there should be no political controversy.

The administration should request a modernization program that in its first year includes: increases to stockpile surveillance; LEP studies for W76 and B61 that add safety, reliability and credibility; increases to directed stockpile work; certification and safety at the Nevada Test Site; accelerated funding of the Los Alamos CMRR facility and the Y-12 UPF; and, increases to advanced computing platform and code work.

Mr. President, lastly, I wish to discuss an important but so far overlooked component of the pending arms control discussions, namely Russia's history of violating its obligations.

The unclassified version of the 2005 State Department Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments makes clear, and not for the first time, that Russia has not lived up to all of its agreements under the 1991 START agreement.

Dr. Payne noted this in his recent testimony, and I quote, ``in my opinion, the most important of these violations has been discussed openly in Russian publications. It is the Russian testing of the SS-27 ICBM with MIRVs in direct violation of START. The SS-27 is listed as a single-warhead ICBM and can only be tested and deployed with a single warhead under START. Russian Sources place the number of MIRVs on this forthcoming missile at 4 or more.''

These are not the only such issues regarding the Russians compliance with START. I ask unanimous consent that the START section of the unclassified Compliance Report be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Additionally, the Commission on the Strategic Posture noted that the Russians are in violation of their commitments concerning tactical nuclear weapons under the 1990-91 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.

I remind my colleagues these are the same tactical nuclear

weapons that Russia refuses to discuss in the follow-on

treaty, a demand the administration seems to have accepted.

Clearly, if the United States is going to negotiate a successor to the 1991 START agreement with the Russians, we must have a way to reconcile past compliance failures and ensure that future violations, if any, are resolved in a timely manner.

As I have articulated, there are significant issues that the Senate will have to follow closely and scrutinize as a part of the process of advice and consent.

This is a two-way process of consultation between the administration and the Senate.

I remind my colleagues and the administration, it is more important that this be done right than quickly.

Arrangements can be made to ensure that the provisions of START that enjoy almost universal support in this body do not expire, as administration officials have freely admitted.

I urge the administration to continue consulting regularly with the Senate, including the National Security Working Group that I cochair with my colleague from West Virginia, Senator Byrd.

I yield the floor.

Exhibit 1

U.S.-Russian START Renewal Negotiations--Guidelines To Protect U.S.

Interests

Recognize that the U.S. nuclear deterrent force is a key

element in the defense of the United States and of our allies

and friends.

U.S. nuclear umbrella is crucial non-proliferation tool.

The U.S. nuclear umbrella is perhaps the most important

nonproliferation tool we possess, as many of our allies and

friends rely on our deterrent force. Absent a U.S. nuclear

deterrent seen to be credible, effective and safe, those

nations would have to consider developing their own nuclear

weapons.

Analyze first, then negotiate. The U.S. Defense Department

should complete a proper Nuclear Posture Review, as mandated

by Congress, before the U.S. concludes a new treaty with

Russia on further nuclear weapons reductions.

Limit Russian advantage in ``tactical'' nuclear weapons--A

new U.S.-Russian agreement should aim to reduce the current

Russian superiority over the U.S. in numbers of ``tactical''

nuclear weapons. Russia has approximately ten times the

number of such weapons in the U.S. arsenal.

Address before U.S. leverage shrinks--The U.S. will have

less leverage to address this issue once a START renewal

agreement has been concluded.

Recognize the significance of Russia's large advantage in

``tactical'' nuclear weapons. The distinction between

strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is an artifact of the

Cold War that facilitated arms control agreements on very

high levels of nuclear forces.

Today, the size of nuclear arsenals is much smaller and the

importance of large numbers of smaller-yield weapons is much

greater.

To U.S. allies and friends, all nuclear weapons are

strategic.

An agreement that preserves the large imbalance in total

numbers of deployed nuclear weapons in Russia's favor will,

over time, affect the views of U.S. allies and friends on the

reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

U.S. policy for decades--in administrations of both

parties--has been to maintain a nuclear capability second to

none. That policy would be undermined by an agreement that

further reduces strategic weapons while leaving so-called

non-strategic weapons unlimited.

Recognize existence of risks in strategic reductions below

current levels--There is no compelling reason for the U.S.

and Russia to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads

below the current range of 1700-2200, as set in the Strategic

Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). This level of offensive

strategic nuclear arms, the lowest in decades, was based on

analysis that took into account the dangers and uncertainties

of the security environment. Quickly reducing to an arbitrary

number like 1500, does not take into account these risks.

Don't pay for what's free--According to credible Russian

sources, Russia's strategic nuclear weapons will be reduced

by approximately 60% over the next decade in any event--with

or without a START renewal treaty--due to the aging or

planned modernization of systems. The United States should

not make concessions for the purpose of inducing Russia to

make reductions that will occur anyway.

Certain reductions may be harmful--Whether a reduction

below the 1700-2200 range is prudent depends on a number of

considerations, especially preserving deterrence and taking

account of all potential adversaries.

Preserve deterrence and extended deterrence--Any reductions

should allow the U.S. to preserve not only deterrence of

threats directly against the U.S. but also extended

deterrence--for allies and partners who depend on the U.S. to

deter potential nuclear aggressors.

Effect on triad--In particular, any reductions should allow

the U.S. to maintain a robust nuclear triad of land-based,

sea-based and bomber-delivered weapons.

Importance of triad--It is important to maintain the triad,

lest the survivability and flexibility of the U.S. strategic

posture be undermined.

Consider all potential adversaries--In assessing the

sufficiency of the U.S. deterrent, the potential nuclear

capabilities of all possible adversaries of the U.S. and of

allies and partners who depend on that deterrent should be

considered, not just the capabilities of Russia.

Don't incentivize proliferation--The U.S. nuclear posture

should not be constrained to the point that other current or

potential nuclear powers come to believe they can create a

nuclear arsenal that would give them significant strategic

leverage against the U.S.

In any case, exercise caution in limiting delivery

systems--In the interest of stability and flexibility, the

U.S. should not agree to reduce the number of delivery

systems in a way that would increase the vulnerability of

our deterrent (including our extended deterrent that

protects U.S. allies and partners).

Don't incentivize MIRVs--For the same reasons, a new

agreement should not restrain or penalize ``de-MIRVing''--

that is, converting multiple-warhead missiles into single-

warhead missiles.

Severe limits on the number of delivery systems create

pressure for the parties to arm missiles with multiple

warheads.

Preserve U.S. ability to modernize for safety and

reliability--Any agreement should preserve the right of the

U.S. to develop new warheads to be able to react to

unforeseen circumstances.

A crucial requirement: A comprehensive modernization plan--

The Senate should not consent to any treaty until the

Administration has proposed to Congress a satisfactory,

comprehensive modernization plan that fulfills the

modernization recommendations of the bipartisan Congressional

Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,

especially the maintenance of a safe, reliable and credible

U.S. nuclear deterrent, including an extended deterrent for

the protection of U.S. allies and partners.

Don't constrain missile defense--A new U.S.-Russian arms

control agreement should not constrain the U.S. ability to

develop and deploy missile defenses.

Don't constrain advanced conventional weapons--A new U.S.-

Russian agreement should not constrain or penalize (1) U.S.

development of advanced conventional--that is, non-nuclear

weapons, including those capable of strategic strike, or (2)

U.S. deployment of such weapons to replace nuclear weapons.

Take account of unpredictability of technology

developments--We cannot now predict what conventional weapons

developments may be possible.

Consider effects on programs of the future--Thus, the

effect of a given treaty limitation cannot be measured only

by how it would impact programs already on the books.

Address Russian compliance problems--Devise a mechanism

that ensures treaty violations are investigated and parties

to an agreement adhere to their obligations.

From the outset, the Russians have failed to comply fully

with their obligations.

For example, according to an August 2005 U.S. State

Department report, Russia has prevented U.S. inspectors from

verifying warhead limits on certain ICBMs.

Update START verification--A key U.S. objective in an

agreement with Russia should be to update START verification

provisions to take account of new circumstances and fix

problems.

Verification regime extendable--Obama administration

officials have a sense of urgency because the START Treaty

expires in December 2009 and they want to ensure that the

treaty's verification regime does not lapse. But the US and

Russia can agree to extend the verification regime without

having to rush to reach agreement on further weapons

reductions.

Endorsed by:

John Bolton, Ambassador to United Nations, Under Secretary

of State for Arms Control and International Security (G.W.

Bush);

Seth Cropsey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (G.H.W. Bush);

Jack David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations Policy

(G.W. Bush);

Paula DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for

Verification, Compliance and Implementation (G.W. Bush);

Michael M. Dunn, Lieutenant General, U.S.A.F. (ret.);

President, National Defense University;

Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (G.W.

Bush)

Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

(G.W. Bush);

Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

(Reagan); Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

(Ford);

Robert Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control

and International Security (G.W. Bush);

Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for

International Security and Nonproliferation (G.W. Bush);

Abram N. Shulsky, Director, Strategic Arms Control Policy,

Office of Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Defense

Representative to Defense and Space Talks (Reagan);

James Woolsey, Director, Central Intelligence Agency

(Clinton).

Exhibit 2

Joint Understanding

The President of the United States of America and the

President of the Russian Federation have decided on further

reductions and limitations of their nations' strategic

offensive arms and on concluding at an early date a new

legally binding agreement to replace the current START

Treaty, and directed that the new treaty contain, inter alia,

the following elements:

1. A provision to the effect that each Party will reduce

and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years

after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the

limits will be in the range of 500-1100 for strategic

delivery vehicles, and in the range of 1500-1675 for their

associated warheads.

The specific numbers to be recorded in the treaty for these

limits will be agreed through further negotiations.

2. Provisions for calculating these limits.

3. Provisions on definitions, data exchanges,

notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification

procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency

measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as

appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty.

4. A provision to the effect that each Party will determine

for itself the composition and structure of its strategic

offensive arms.

5. A provision on the interrelationship of strategic

offensive and strategic defensive arms.

6. A provision on the impact of intercontinental ballistic

missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-

nuclear configuration on strategic stability.

7. A provision on basing strategic offensive arms

exclusively on the national territory of each Party.

8. Establishment of an implementation body to resolve

questions related to treaty implementation.

9. A provision to the effect that the treaty will not apply

to existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic

offensive arms between a Party and a third state.

10. A duration of the treaty of ten years, unless it is

superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the

reduction of strategic offensive arms.

The Presidents direct their negotiators to finish their

work on the treaty at an early date so that they may sign and

submit it for ratification in their respective countries.

Signed at Moscow, this sixth day of July, 2009, in

duplicate, in the English and Russian languages.

Madam President, I join my Republican colleagues in thanking Senator Norm Coleman for his service in the Senate.

As a valued member of my whip team, Senator Coleman was devoted to solving problems in a practical and nonpartisan way. I could always expect from him a serious and interesting view of an issue and could count on him for good advice. His thoughtful and unique perspective, as well as his talent and high energy, will be missed.

Senator Coleman ran a fine campaign and was a consummate gentleman throughout the long process of determining the winner of his seat.

I join my colleagues in wishing him all the best in his future endeavors, and know that he will remain an important voice in our party.

Madam President, I believe there is now 5 minutes per side to debate the amendment I have offered, which is cosponsored by Senator McCain. I would appreciate it if the Chair will advise me when I have consumed 2 minutes. Senator McCain will talk for about 2 minutes, and I wish to reserve the last minute following Senator Tester.

The amendment is very simple. It strikes $900,000 for an earmark for the city of Whitefish Emergency Operations Center in Montana. The administration terminated funding for these types of projects in its 2010 budget submission. This operations center has not been subject to a congressional hearing nor has it been authorized by Congress. It is a pure earmark. Not only did the administration not request funding for the project, it specifically zeroed out funding.

Senator Feingold had an amendment that would have subsumed this project along with several others. That amendment failed. But he noted in regard to his amendment that while we may not all agree on the appropriateness of earmarks in general, I certainly hope we can agree certain things ought not be earmarked, including FEMA grant programs such as those protecting Americans from terrorist attacks. I quote Senator Feingold, because this is precisely the view of the 9/11 Commission. From page 396 of that report it included this recommendation:

Homeland security assistance should be based strictly on an

assessment of risks and vulnerabilities . . . Congress should

not use this money as a pork barrel.

The report goes on to state:

In a free-for-all over money, it is understandable that

representatives will work to protect the interests of their

home states or districts, but this issue is too important for

politics as usual to prevail. Resources must be allocated

according to vulnerabilities.

That is why in its budget submission the administration said this:

The administration is proposing to eliminate the Emergency

Operations Center Grant Program in the 2010 budget because

the program's award allocations are not based on a risk

assessment. Also, other Department of Homeland Security grant

programs can provide funding for the same purposes more

effectively.

So you have the 9/11 Commission saying these programs should be eliminated; you have the administration saying, in its budget submission, they should be eliminated from the budget submission, that they should not be subject to earmarks. That is why our amendment is being offered.

Madam President, it is appropriate for the sponsor of the amendment to have the final word. I wish to reserve my final minute to have the last response.

Madam President, I certainly accept the argument of my friend from Montana that this could be put to good purpose in Whitefish, MT. It could be put to good use in Yuma or Nogales or anywhere else in the country. That is why the 9/11 Commission said, and I quote again:

Homeland Security assistance should be based strictly on an

assessment of risks and vulnerabilities . . . The Congress

should not use this money as a pork barrel.

All we ask is, as the administration did, that the money be allocated based on the risk assessment from the Department of Homeland Security, not on the ability of a particular Congressman or Senator to get the money earmarked in a bill.

I ask unanimous consent that page 396 of the 9/11 Commission report be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks, and again urge my colleagues to support this amendment, as at least one small step we can take to demonstrate that we agree with the 9/11 Commission and we agree with the administration that these grants should be based on risk, rather than earmarks.

I believe we need to ask for the yeas and nays, and I do at this time.

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Martinez), and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe), and the Senator from Florida (Mr. Martinez).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe), and the Senator from Florida (Mr. Martinez).

The following Seantors are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe), and the Senator from Florida (Mr. Martinez).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe), and the Senator from Florida (Mr. Martinez).

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I believe there is an amendment pending. If I am correct in that, I ask unanimous consent to lay that aside for the purpose of getting an amendment pending.

Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment with an original cosponsor, Senator McCain.

Mr. President, since this amendment deals with an earmark in the State of Montana, I will make my comments with respect to it at a time when Senator Tester can be here. I know he wants to oppose the amendment. We can debate that at a time that is mutually convenient for the two of us.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, taking the chairman up on her offer, let me speak on an amendment I got pending earlier today. It is amendment No. 1432. This is an amendment to strike an earmark in the bill. It is a $900,000 earmark for the city of Whitefish emergency operations center in Montana. That is all the amendment does. The amendment does the same thing the administration did in that it terminates a program that the Obama administration terminated in its budget. It is one of several projects that was terminated in the budget submission.

I do not strike the program because I agree or disagree with it. I think you could make an argument that it is a reasonable thing to do. I suspect my colleague from Montana will make that argument. That is not the point. As the administration pointed out, the point is there is a way to do these

projects and then there is a way not to do them. The way not to do them is through earmarks.

The Whitefish emergency operations center has not been subject to a congressional hearing, nor has it been authorized by Congress. Moreover, not only did the administration not request funding for the project, they specifically zeroed out the funding.

On the floor the day before yesterday--or maybe it was yesterday; I have forgotten now--my colleague Senator McCain described several projects, including this project, and noted why it and other earmarks in the bill should not proceed.

He said: The earmarks are in the bill for one reason and one reason only, because of the selective prerogatives of a few Members of the Senate. Sadly, these Members chose to serve their own interests over those of the American taxpayers.

His point also was not that the project is either good or bad, but as the administration noted, there is a way to do it and a way not to do it that is fair to all of the States and to all of the Members, and that way is to have those subject to authorization and then appropriated.

Senator Feingold also on the floor yesterday noted:

While we all may not agree on the appropriateness of

earmarking in general, I certainly hope we can agree that

certain things should not be earmarked, including FEMA grant

programs such as those that protect Americans from terrorist

attack.

I think he is absolutely right, which is why I voted for his amendment earlier this afternoon. These are important projects. These are FEMA projects to protect the American people. Why should they be subject to the earmarking process rather than regular order? Again, that is exactly what the administration had earlier concluded.

I think it is wrong when we are funding projects with very scarce Federal dollars in the name of homeland security and the decision on what to fund is based on the influence of a Senator or a House Member rather than the security risk to Americans.

Especially at a time when unemployment has reached nearly 10 percent and many Americans are obviously hurting a great deal, is it appropriate for Congress to make funding decisions in this manner? Is this the message we want to be sending to our constituents: If you have political power, you can get money earmarked. If you do not, then your community is going to suffer. We are already spending $44.3 billion on this bill. That is $96 million above the President's request and 7 percent above last year's level. Those amounts are significant. And that increase does not include nearly $2.8 billion in stimulus funding.

Current budget projections indicate that we will add, on average, nearly $1 trillion a year to the public debt level from the $7 trillion to date, to $17 trillion in 2019. We have all heard the statistic before that the President's budget doubles the debt in 5 years, triples it in 10 years.

The President's administration said there are some things we should not fund in the way they are funded in this bill. All I am doing is agreeing with the administration not to add more debt on top of what has already been accumulated.

The path forward is not sustainable. I think the head of the OMB has made that point. So I think we need to start making tough decisions around here and we need to respect the congressional budget process. It seems to me the easiest way to make a tough budget decision is when, on a matter of process, we can all agree it is not the right way to proceed.

That is why I think this particular project, though the amount of money is relatively small, is still a good candidate to show we can make those tough decisions as a way of demonstrating to the American public that at least we are willing to start somewhere.

Finally, I will reiterate, I am not here to argue the merits of this project. I am sure my colleague from Montana will describe its merits in glowing terms. To me, that is not the point. The point is that the administration has said this emergency operations grant program should be terminated, it should not exist, we should not spend money on it because this is the wrong way to spend money.

In the document entitled ``Terminations, Reductions and Savings,'' in that volume of the President's fiscal year 2010 budget, the administration states:

The Administration is proposing to eliminate the Emergency

Operations Center (EOC) Grant Program in the 2010 Budget

because the program's award allocations are not based on a

risk assessment. Also, other Department of Homeland Security

grant programs can provide funding for the same purpose more

effectively.

I think that rationale demonstrates why we need to support my amendment to eliminate this part. This is only one part of that grant program. But it is a part that I think would at least illustrate to the American people that we want to begin the process and spend this money in the right way.

I ask unanimous consent that the part of the budget designated ``Termination: Emergency Operations Center Grant Program,'' which describes what the administration has said, be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

I understand that a little bit later we will be able to reach an agreement on voting on several of the amendments. This amendment presumably will be voted on sometime tomorrow. I would hope the proponents and opponents would have a minute each prior to the vote to reiterate their arguments and would hope my colleagues would support amendment No. 1432.

Exhibit 1

Termination: Emergency Operations Center Grant Program

Department of Homeland Security

The Administration is proposing to eliminate the Emergency

Operations Center (EOC) Grant Program in the 2010 Budget

because the program's award allocations are not based on risk

assessment. Also, other Department of Homeland Security grant

programs can provide funding for the same purpose more

effectively.

Mr. President, a July 7, 2009, Wall Street Journal editorial ``Of NICE and Men'' describes the denial and delay of health care in Britain as a result of decisions by the British government's health care cost-containment board, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, NICE.

The article quotes the Guardian, which in 1998 reported, ``Health ministers are setting up [NICE], designed to ensure that every treatment, operation, or medicine used is the proven best. It will root out under-performing doctors and useless treatments, spreading best practices everywhere.''

Yet NICE routinely denies patients the very treatments and medications they need.

For example, according to the editorial, ``NICE ruled against the use of two drugs, Lapatinib and Sutent, that prolong the life of those with certain forms of breast and stomach cancer.''

Explaining the ruling against the use of a drug that would help terminally ill kidney-cancer patients, Peter Littlejohns, NICE's clinical public health director, said there is ``a limited pot of money.''

The editorial provides numerous other examples of drugs and treatments that are either denied or restricted in order to reduce costs.

And it explains how NICE has even assigned a mathematical formula for determining the maximum amount the government will spend to extend a life for 6 months.

President Obama has praised countries that spend less than the U.S. on health care, while saying we can spend less here too, even while adding tens of millions to a government-run health care program and improving the quality of care.

This editorial clearly and concisely outlines why this cannot be achieved and why, if President Obama's health care plan passes, the administration's new Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research could eventually gain the same authority to deny or delay treatments and care as Britain's NICE.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Record, and urge my colleagues to consider the facts and arguments contained in this editorial.

Mr. President, I wish to compliment my colleague from Florida for a very thorough explanation of what has been, to many Americans, a very confusing situation and also his support for the most recent call for a mediation and discussion among the various parties so that this whole matter can be brought to a successful conclusion without armed force or other inappropriate action. I, too, hope that can produce the right kind of result. But I think the point--if I could, while the Senator is still here, make this point strongly, as he did--you have to stand up for what is right. And we all know an election does not a democracy make. You can elect a government which then begins to govern undemocratically.

Unfortunately, some of the governments in the southern part of our hemisphere have started all right with the elections and then ended in a very bad way. We certainly did not want that to happen to our friends in Honduras. And, in fact, the people of Honduras did not want that either. They are people who stood by us when we were trying to support the forces of freedom who were fighting in Nicaragua, and there were some sacrifices on the part of the Hondurans to do that. It is a country that has had very friendly relations with the United States over the years, and it is important for us to stand up for our friends.

For that, I compliment my colleague from Florida, and I again add my voice to his saying we hope these discussions the Secretary of State has now called for can produce an appropriate resolution to this issue without any kind of bloodshed.

Mr. President, that is precisely the way I see it as well. I hope that helps to clarify for the American people what is really going on there and that we can support our friends in Honduras and that relationship which has existed all these years can continue to be the productive one it has been.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, we have heard some debate recently centered on whether it is appropriate for judges to consider foreign law and public attitudes when interpreting our U.S. Constitution and laws.

In our constitutional system, the American people, through their elected representatives, make the laws by which we are governed. As James Madison said in Federalist 49:

The people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and

it is from them that the Constitutional charter, under which

the several branches of government hold their power, is

derived.

Judges have the responsibility to faithfully interpret the Constitution and the laws that have been adopted through our democratic processes. Again, judges do not make the law, they interpret it.

Within our constitutional structure, the growing idea of using foreign law to interpret our own laws and Constitution is troubling and problematic for two main reasons:

First, as Chief Justice John Roberts pointed out during his confirmation hearings, the consideration of foreign law by American judges is contrary to the principles of democracy. Foreign judges and legislators are not accountable to the American electorate. Using foreign law, even as a thumb on the scale, to help decide key constitutional issues devalues Americans' expressions through the democratic process. An analogy would be to allow noncitizens to vote in our elections, thus devaluing the votes of every American.

Second, even if the use of foreign law were not inconsistent with our constitutional system, its use would free judges to enact their personal preferences under the cloak of legitimacy. If an American judge wants to find a foreign judicial decision or legislative enactment consistent with his or her preferred outcome in a case, he or she could find it in the laws of at least 1 of the 192 United Nations member states. That would be judicial activism compounded by the error of using inappropriate precedent.

As we soon begin the consideration of Judge Sonya Sotomayor's nomination to the Nation's highest Court, both the American people and the Senate deserve to know where she stands on the issue of the use of foreign law to interpret the U.S. Constitution. Although we do have some materials that suggest her views, we are still waiting on a number of important documents that will help us better understand her views. For example, in response to the Senate Judiciary Committee's questionnaire, Judge Sotomayor identified 200 public speeches or remarks she has given. Of those, we have not received a draft, video, or a sufficient topic description for more than 100 of them. These include four occasions in which she publicly spoke on the issue of foreign law. On one of these occasions, Judge Sotomayor apparently participated in a panel discussion with foreign judges at St. John's Law School in November of 2006. According to her Judiciary Committee questionnaire, she said she ``spoke on the permissible uses of international law by American courts.'' And in October 2008, Judge Sotomayor participated in a roundtable discussion at New York University's law school on the ``Dynamic Relations Between International and National Tribunals.''

With hearings scheduled to begin in a couple of weeks, getting this information is critical to our understanding of her judicial philosophy. The most notable of the materials we do have is a 22-minute speech Judge Sotomayor gave to the ACLU of Puerto Rico on April 28, 2009, entitled ``How Federal Judges Look to International and Foreign Law Under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.'' From that speech, we begin to see how foreign law could shape Judge Sotomayor's jurisprudence in the future. Her views were not casual observations but directed to this specific topic. In this speech, she says:

[I]nternational law and foreign law will be very important

in the discussion of how we think about the unsettled issues

in our own legal system. It is my hope that judges everywhere

will continue to do so because . . . within the American

legal system we're commanded to interpret our law in the best

way we can, and that means looking to what other, anyone, has

said to see if it has persuasive value.

What on Earth does this have to do with judging, asking what ``anyone has said to see if it has persuasive value''? How about using the traditional rules of judicial construction, precedents, and our judicial tests based on our common law heritage.

Judge Sotomayor also reveals that she believes foreign law is a source for ``good ideas'' that can ``set our creative juices flowing.'' Deciding an antitrust case or a commerce clause dispute or an Indian law issue or an establishment of religion case does not require ``creative juices.'' Indeed, it could interfere with specific rules of construction or application of precedent. But Judge Sotomayor says that not considering foreign law would be ``asking American judges to close their minds to good ideas.'' What is ``closedminded,'' I would ask, about requiring that American judges interpret our laws and our Constitution? That is what they take their oath of office to do.

Let's also remember that Judge Sotomayor has previously stated that appellate courts are ``where policy is made.'' When you combine the notion that judges may usurp the legislative power of policymaking with the view that foreign law is an incubator of creative ideas for a judge to employ as he or she sees fit, you open the door to the worst form of judicial activism, one completely untethered from American legal principles. Judges do not have the responsibility of finding new good ideas that would make good policy. That is the role for our elected representatives. The ideas expressed by Judge Sotomayor threaten to undermine a system that has served us well for over two centuries.

Judge Sotomayor went on in the same ACLU speech to criticize two sitting justices and align her views with those of Justice Ginsburg, who recently endorsed the use of foreign law at a symposium at the Moritz College of Law at Ohio State University.

Specifically, Judge Sotomayor stated that ``[t]he nature of the criticism comes from . . . a misunderstanding of the American use of that concept of using foreign law and that misunderstanding is unfortunately endorsed by some of our own Supreme Court justices. Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have written extensively criticizing the use of foreign and international law in Supreme Court decisions. . . .''

She continues: ``I share more the ideas of Justice Ginsburg in thinking . . . that unless American courts are more open to discussing the ideas raised by foreign cases, and by international cases, that we are going to lose influence in the world. Justice Ginsburg has explained very recently . . . that foreign opinions . . . can add to the story of knowledge relevant to the solution of a question, and she's right.''

Judge Sotomayor's rationale for judges looking to foreign law--so that the United States does not ``lose influence in the world''--is absolutely irrelevant to the role of judges in America. It is the province of the President and the legislative bodies--not activist judges--to make policy and manage foreign affairs.

In defending the Supreme Court's use of foreign law, Judge Sotomayor made an astonishing argument: Courts, she said, ``were just using that law to help us understand what the concepts meant to other countries, and to help us understand whether our understanding of our own constitutional rights fell into the mainstream of human thinking.'' But the words of our Constitution were not intended to reflect the ``mainstream of human thinking.'' Think about mainstream public opinion in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America at the end of the 18th century. Even today, it is doubtful the United States would be satisfied being governed by the thinking of most of the governments in the world, such as China, much of the Muslim world, and the dozens of kleptocracies around the world.

As I noted in my remarks that related my concerns about Harold Koh's views on foreign law, if the Founding Fathers had been given to transnationalism, America would not be the leading light of freedom in the world that it is today. Nor would it be a leader in convincing other nations to protect free speech, assembly and other political freedoms, such as are being asserted in Iran right now.

Do we really want judges to look to the laws of foreign countries when deciding our most treasured, constitutional provisions, such as, for instance, the Second Amendment? I do not, and the American people share my view. Judicial activism is not a popular concept.

While I do not intend to judge her qualifications to decide cases on the U.S. Supreme Court based on this one speech, I believe it is fair to ask what else she has said on the subject. There are apparently other speeches that we do not have. The nominee should either

find these speeches or ask whather there are other records--for example, transcripts, tape or video recordings, press accounts, and so on--that would indicate whether her April 28 speech is indicative of her approach to judging.

As we begin to consider the nomination of Judge Sotomayor, we will need this information to properly evaluate her qualifications, especially as it relates to her view that using foreign or international law is an appropriate way for U.S. Supreme Court Justices to interpret the U.S. Constitution.

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Isakson), and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Wicker).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Isakson).

The following Senators are necessariy absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Isakson).

Madam President, today the Senate confirmed Harold Koh to the position of Legal Adviser to the State Department by a vote of 62 to 35. I voted against his confirmation for reasons I explained on the floor yesterday. Chiefly, I am concerned about his support for a transnational legal process. The National Review recently published an article that explores the inherent conflict between transnational legal structures built on ``global norms'' and the constitutionally defined role of the American judiciary. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Cochran).

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, the nomination of Harold Koh concerns me for a number of reasons. Primarily, his view that international law should guide U.S. law and his criticism of our first amendment right to freedom of speech and his opposition to the Solomon amendment, which conditions Federal funding to educational institutions on allowing military recruiting on campus.

The State Department Legal Adviser helps formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy, advises the Justice Department on cases with international implications, influences U.S. positions on issues considered by international bodies, and represents the United States at treaty negotiations and international conferences.

In short, this position requires the utmost deference to the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Koh is a proponent of transnationalism, the belief that Americans should use foreign law and the views of international organizations to interpret our Constitution and to determine our policies.

Mr. Koh has gone so far as to refer to the United States as part of an ``axis of disobedience'' in reference to America's alleged violations of international law.

During his 2003 speech at the University of California at Berkeley, Mr. Koh said:

When I came to government, the first conclusion I reached

was that the rule of law should be on the U.S. side.

That's a system of law--

He is speaking now of international law--

that we helped to create. So that's why we support various

systems of international adjudication. That's why we support

the UN system. We need these institutions, even if they cut

our own sovereignty a little bit.

Mr. Koh's views on the first amendment again portray a desire to make

American law subservient to international law. In his Stanford Law Review article--the title of which was ``On American Exceptionalism''-- Koh stated that our first amendment gives ``protections for speech and religion . . . far greater emphasis and judicial protection in America than in Europe or Asia,'' and he opined that America's ``exceptional free speech tradition can cause problems abroad.'' Furthermore, he stated that the way for the ``Supreme Court [to] moderate these conflicts'' is ``by applying more consistently the transnationalist approach to judicial interpretation.''

This is breathtaking. Is it even consistent with an oath to protect and defend the Constitution? Should we now begin to dismantle a founding principle of our democracy in order to appease the so-called international community, as Mr. Koh advocates? If the Founding Fathers had followed this advice, this country would not be the leading example of freedom in the world it is today and a leader in getting others to protect free speech and assembly and other freedoms--such as are being asserted in Iran today. Conforming our views to the norm, which Mr. Koh acknowledges provides less protection than our Constitution would, therefore, would adversely affect the very international community which Mr. Koh seeks to emulate.

Let me put it another way. People in Iran today are taking to the streets to try to exercise some degree of free speech and assembly and petition their government. Mr. Koh acknowledges that in our Constitution we provide much more protection for those rights than anywhere else, or, I think as he put it, than the mainstream of international law provides. That is true.

I think that is something we should not only adhere to for our own benefit but for the benefit that it provides to others around the world as an example of what they should seek to achieve and because of the moral status it gives the United States to be able to say to the leaders of a country such as Iran: You need to provide free speech and assembly and the right to petition their government, and the fact that you are not doing it is wrong because if we believe we are all created equal, by our Creator, that means we have moral equality as individuals. Everybody in Iran, we believe, would have the same right as anyone else to exercise these God-given rights. And if that is true, it makes no sense to diminish those rights as they have been interpreted by our courts in the United States, interpreting our U.S. Constitution, in order for us to conform to an international norm.

Rather, it makes sense for us to continue to adhere to those high standards and to try to bring other countries along with us. In fact, I would postulate that because of our high standard of rights and the example that our Constitution provides, many countries of the world have actually advanced the cause of free speech and assembly and petitioning their government more than they otherwise would have because they have the example of the United States to look at.

If I think of countries, the revolutions, the Orange Revolution, and the changes in governments in places such as Poland, back when it broke from the Soviet Union, and Ukraine and Georgia and all of the other places in the world where people finally broke free from the shackles of a government that would not permit free speech, what were they seeking to do? To exercise free speech in order to petition their government for individual freedom.

So the United States should jealously guard those rights in our Constitution rather than, as Mr. Koh says, have the United States interpret its Constitution more in line with the mainstream of thinking in the rest of the world.

If you sort of try to apply a mathematical formula, and you average what the rest of the world thinks about free speech, the right of religion, the right to assemble, the right to petition the government, the average is far below what we provide. We are pretty much at the top of the pile in terms of what we protect.

But if we were to follow Mr. Koh's advice, in order to be more accepted in the world, we would draw our standards of protection of individual rights down to the leveled area of the mainstream around the world. If you look around the world today, there are so many dictatorships, totalitarian systems, autocracies--even a country such as China--which provide very little in the way of freedom for their people. If you just took the average based on the population of the world, I know what the mainstream would be. It would not be very much in the way of individual rights.

So we should jealously protect what we have in the United States, which is a constitution that at least thus far has been interpreted to protect those rights jealously, not just for our benefit--though that should be, I submit, the sole purpose of a Supreme Court Judge, for example, deciding Supreme Court cases; what does the Constitution say for the people of America?--but if one is going to consider the international implications, I think it would be exactly the opposite of what Mr. Koh is saying; namely, that we should be concerned that any diminishment of the interpretation of our rights would negatively affect other people around the world.

I do not care if the average is a lower standard. I wish those countries would bring their standards up to ours. But I certainly do not want to conform to some idea of international acceptance or international popularity by bringing ourselves down to their level. This is not what ``American Exceptionalism'' is all about--the title of the piece Mr. Koh wrote.

He has argued in other contexts as well that unique American constitutional provisions should conform to the international view of things. I have been speaking of free speech and assembly, the right to petition your government, to practice religion. We think those are absolutely basic. But there are some other rights in our Constitution. One of them is the second amendment. It is controversial.

Other countries do not have a protection such as the second amendment to the U.S. Constitution. If we want to amend the Constitution, we can do that. But as it stands right now, the second amendment has been upheld by the Supreme Court to apply to every individual in the United States, free from Federal undue interference with respect to the ownership of guns.

But if we adopt Mr. Koh's argument about conforming to international norms, including stricter gun control, it may bring us more in line with some other countries, but it certainly would not be in keeping with the interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to that second amendment.

In an April 2002 speech at the Fordham University School of Law, Mr. Koh advocated a U.N.-governed regime to force the United States ``to submit information about their small arms production.'' He believes the United States should ``establish a national firearms control system and a register of manufacturers, traders, importers and exporters'' of guns to comply with international obligations. This would allow U.N. members such as Cuba and Venezuela and North Korea and Iran to have a say in what type of gun regulations are imposed on American citizens.

As the dean of Yale Law School, Mr. Koh was a leader in another effort I think is troublesome. It was an effort to deprive students of the freedom to listen to military recruiters who wanted to explain on campus the benefits of a career in our military services. We all--every one of us in this body--frequently express our gratitude to the people in the U.S. military services who protect us, who put themselves in danger in order to protect the very freedoms we are talking about. Yet as dean of the law school, he would not allow the recruiters for these military institutions to come on campus. Yet he would protect students' freedom to listen to antiwar speakers on campus. But Yale closed its doors to military recruiters primarily because it disagreed with the military's policies on gays, which, by the way, is a policy of the President and the Congress, not just the military.

In court, Mr. Koh and others in Yale's administration challenged the constitutionality of the Solomon amendment. The Solomon amendment is a statute that denies Federal funds to educational institutions that block military recruiters. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled against Mr. Koh's position.

Mr. Koh also led a lawsuit against Department of Justice lawyer John

Yoo for doing what any government lawyer is expected to do: provide his legal opinions to the people he worked for, the policymakers of the U.S. Government.

The Supreme Court has said, in no uncertain terms, that government lawyers need immunity from suit in order to avoid ``the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office'' and the ``danger that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of . . . public officials in the unflinching discharge of their duties.''

In other words, by encouraging this lawsuit, Mr. Koh was effectively deterring his students from doing precisely what Yale otherwise recommends that they do: enter public service.

Elections have consequences. I understand and generally support the prerogative of the President to nominate individuals for his administration he deems appropriate as long as they are within the spectrum of responsible views. However, because of the importance of his position in representing the United States in the international community with respect to treaties and other agreements, his own words and actions demonstrate to me he is far outside the mainstream in such a way that his appointment as State Department Legal Adviser could damage U.S. sovereignty.

So I oppose his nomination. I urge my colleagues--all of us who take an oath to support and defend the Constitution and who appreciate there are always challenges to America's sovereignty--to closely examine Mr. Koh's record and determine whether he would be a representative not only whom they could be proud of but whom they could rely upon in representing the American public interest.

At the end of the day, our sovereignty depends upon the American people. We govern with the consent of the governed. Our government does not start with rights. We had a group of people in America who gave their government certain limited rights in order for their common good. So the American people are our bosses. They pay our salary. We need to listen to them.

When I talk to my constituents--at least in recent months--I notice a theme that is recurring, and it is troublesome to me first of all because it is the kind of thing that sometimes is influenced by people who have less character than those of us in this body and others who may disagree with each other but seriously approach these issues. It is the idea that little by little the people are losing sovereignty, and that the country of America is giving up its sovereignty to others. Who are the others?

I am not a conspiratorial person. That is why I say some of the people who promote this idea do not do so for the right reasons, and I do not like to see them paid attention to by our constituents. But every time we adhere to a U.N. resolution or sign a treaty with another country or agree to abide by the terms of a trade agreement, or something of that sort, to some extent we are giving up a little bit of our sovereignty. As long as we do all of those things with the consent of the governed and as long as we do it through the representative process where we pass a law or we confirm a treaty, ratify a treaty, it is done in the right way. We may make a mistake, we may go too far sometimes, but that is the decision we make. We have the right to make mistakes too. But when we go outside the legal framework of the country to cede a little bit of our sovereignty, as Mr. Koh says is OK, then we have abused the confidence the American people have placed in us and we have gone beyond our legal ability as representatives of the people to give up this little degree of sovereignty.

What I am concerned about, because of his position, which is the direct link between the United States and all of these international organizations and countries which our country necessarily deals with, is that he cares less about the protection of American sovereignty than the vast majority of the American citizens. In fact, he has a point of view which regards that as less important than conforming to international norms and even being in line with popular opinion internationally. As I said before, it is nice to be liked, but at the end of the day, the United States should not be about popular opinion.

We could probably be more popular with 100 countries in the United Nations if we stopped harping on things such as clean elections and free speech and the right to assembly and so on because my guess is there are probably 50 to 100 countries in the United Nations that don't respect their citizens' rights nearly as much as we do. In fact, the number is probably larger than that. They are uncomfortable with the example of a country such as the United States which sets on such a high pedestal our American citizens' rights, that we not only protect those rights for our citizens, but we hold them out to the rest of the world as something that would be beneficial for their citizens as well. This makes them uncomfortable, and rightly so, because sometimes, as we are seeing in Iran today, people decide that it is a good thing to decide to exercise those rights and they feel the denial of that ability by their governments is wrong. They are even willing to risk their lives, as our forefathers did, to assert those rights. That is how important they are.

How odd it is, therefore, to come across such an intelligent--and he certainly is intelligent--man such as Mr. Koh who has a very different point of view about these important American rights, who believes it is more important for us to be in the mainstream of international thinking even though that mainstream represents a view of rights far less than the United States views our rights; it is far more important for us to be well viewed in the international community than it is to strictly adhere to those rights that are embodied in our Constitution. That is extraordinarily troubling to me. Some of his views are breathtaking as they have been asserted.

I know he has met with some of our colleagues, that he is apparently, in addition to being very intelligent, very charming, and that his essential position is: Well, that is what I said in a speech, but I will recognize my obligations as a member of the administration.

I think we are all informed by our views, and if we care enough about them to speak out in a way that he has, as frequently and as forcefully as Mr. Koh has, it is difficult to believe that all of a sudden, in a moment of his confirmation, he will forget about everything he said and what he believes and conform his representation of the American people to what is a far more mainstream point of view; namely, that we should defend our Constitution to the absolute maximum extent we can, irrespective of the views of other countries around the world. That is why, at the end of the day, as I said, I hope my colleagues will review his record very carefully and will judge and eventually base their vote on his confirmation on what he has said--because he is an intelligent man who knows very well what he has said--and what, therefore, could flow from his words as actions as our representative in the State Department as its Legal Adviser.

Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.

I wish to commend the Senator from Tennessee because he has been a leader in pointing out the problems that these new health care expenditures would impose upon our States. It is important to have the Governors of the States and the State legislators to begin to let Washington know what they think about these new costs that they are somehow going to have to bear.

Let me begin at the outset here, on the same subject, to make it clear that Republicans are very eager for serious health care reform, just as I think the American people are.

That is why we support new ideas that would actually cut health care costs and make all health care more affordable and accessible. Republicans want to reform our medical liability laws to curb frivolous lawsuits. We want to strengthen and expand wellness programs that encourage people to make healthy choices about smoking, diet, and exercising. All those have huge impacts on the cost of health care.

We also wish to address the needs of the unemployed, those who work for or own a small business, those with preexisting conditions, all of these we can address. And this can and must be done without imposing job-killing taxes and regulations. In short, we favor innovation, not just regulation.

Our Democratic friends would like to take a different route. Many of them would like to impose a one-size-fits-all Washington-run bureaucracy that we believe, ultimately, would lead to the kind of delay and denial of care we have heard about in Canada and Great Britain. I have spoken at length about the trouble with health care rationing, so today I would like to talk about the cost of a new Washington-run health care system.

The administration often argues that we need Washington-run health care to help the economy. Well, ``Washington bureaucracy'' and ``economic growth'' are not phrases that tend to have a positive correlation. Is it realistic to think that adding millions of people to a new government-run health insurance system will somehow save money or help the economy?

As the Wall Street Journal recently editorialized about the so-called plan:

In that kind of world, costs will climb even higher as far

more people use ``free'' care and federal spending will reach

epic levels.

One wag quipped: ``If you think health care is expensive now, just wait until it is free.''

In fact, the first estimate from the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office shows that just a portion of the Democratic plan, covering only one-third of the uninsured, will cost over $1 trillion--$1 trillion to cover 16 million more people.

That is just for one part of the proposed plan. That works out to about over $66,000 per person.

The administration said last weak it wants to rework the plan to bring the cost down below $1 trillion. Well, that will help. They have not provided a specific number. But what I would like to know is: Do they consider anything below $1 trillion acceptable--$999 billion, $800 billion? What is acceptable here? Is it trying to get it down below $1 trillion so the sticker shock is not quite so great?

The American people are very worried about our increasing national debt. This only makes the problem worse, not better.

As the Republican leader mentioned in his radio address Saturday, the President used this same economic argument to sell the $1.3 trillion stimulus package: ``We have to move quickly to pass new government spending to help the economy.'' Four months later, unemployment has risen to 9.4 percent, much higher than the 8-percent peak the administration said it would be if we quickly passed the stimulus legislation. Now the administration is asking for billions more for a Washington-run health care plan.

As the New York Times noted last Friday, while the Democrats' bill outlines massive amounts of new spending, it does not explain how it intends to pay for it. That is an important detail. Congress would either have to run up more debt on top of the historic debt already produced by the President's budget and the stimulus bill, or it will have to raise taxes. That is one area in which our colleagues on the other side of the aisle have actually offered a lot of new ideas: Taxes on beer, soda, juice, and snack food, along with new limits on charitable contributions have all been proposed. But actually, they are a drop in the bucket relative to the amount of new taxes that would be required to fund their plan.

I would like to know: When will we draw the line and try something other than new taxes and massive new government spending to solve the problem?

Americans want health care reform, but most of them don't want to be saddled with mountains of new debt. As a June 21 New York Times article reported, a new survey shows--and I am quoting--``considerable unease about the impact of heightened government involvement on both the economy and the quality of respondents' own care.''

The American people are very worried that their own care, which they are generally satisfied with, will be negatively impacted as a result of the so-called ``reform'' that is being proposed. That same survey, which was an NBC New York Times survey, also showed that while 85 percent of Americans want serious reform, only 28 percent are confident that a new health care entitlement will improve the economy. So as the President is trying to sell this on the basis that we need it for the economy, only 28 percent of Americans believe that is the case. Frankly, I share their skepticism. It is going to hurt, not help.

We need to reform health care right. I think there is much more virtue in doing it correctly over doing it quickly. President Obama promised change, but there is nothing new about dramatically increasing government spending and adding even more to our national debt. I hope some of my friends on the Democratic side, as well as Republicans, can agree that when it comes to health care reform, we should embrace real changes that support medical innovation and put patients first. That is the answer. That is what the American people want.

Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, next week President Uribe of Colombia will be meeting with President Obama at the White House. I hope this meeting will serve as an opportunity to get the Colombia Free Trade Agreement back on track.

I support the Colombia Free Trade Agreement because of its importance to Colombia but also because I think it is important for U.S. firms to gain access to the markets of fast-growing developing nations abroad. Our economy will revive only if we create jobs. Enacting this Colombia Free Trade Agreement will help to do that.

America's two-way trade with Colombia reached $18 billion in 2007, making Colombia our fourth largest trading partner in Latin America and our largest export market for U.S. agricultural products in South America.

Exports are the only major sector of the private economy actually making positive contributions to U.S. economic growth. In my own State of Arizona, nearly 80 percent of all of our manufactured goods were exported. On average, net exports added more than 1 percentage point overall to our economic growth last year, in part offsetting the negative consequences of the housing downturn. So if U.S. manufacturers and farmers were not able to sell their products abroad, the current economic downturn would be much worse.

Enacting the Colombia Free Trade Agreement would help more than 10,000 U.S. companies that export to Colombia, 8,500 of which are small and medium-sized firms, by opening a significant new export market.

America's market is already open to imports from Colombia. In 2008, for example, over 90 percent of U.S. imports from Colombia entered the United States duty free under our most-favored-nation tariff rates and various preference programs, such as the Andean Trade Preference Act and the Generalized System of Preferences. However, more than 97 percent of U.S. exports to Colombia are subject to duties that range from 14 to 50 percent. Once the agreement is approved, over 80 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports to Colombia will enter duty free. So each day Congress does not approve the Colombia free-trade deal, the U.S. exporters pay $2 million in unnecessary tariffs.

Let me review very briefly the events of the past 2 years to understand the current state of affairs.

On May 10, 2007, Democrats and Republicans agreed to a framework that modifies future trade agreements to include provisions improving labor and environmental standards in order to move the Peru, Colombia, and South Korea free-trade agreements.

After the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement was signed into law in December 2007, Democrats broke the deal with us in order to extract more concessions. This time, they said that in exchange for passing the Colombia Free Trade Agreement, the Bush administration would need to accept an expansion of TAA benefits by increasing the refundability of the health care tax credit from 65 to 80 percent, expanding the TAA eligibility to service workers, and doubling the mandatory funding for worker retraining from $220 to $440 million.

When the Bush administration tried to jump-start the process last year by introducing the Colombia Free Trade Agreement, Speaker Pelosi responded by unilaterally rescinding Colombia's fast-track authority, essentially killing any chance of moving the agreement.

We missed another opportunity to enact the Colombia Free Trade Agreement on the stimulus bill. Although the majority did find room to enact a multibillion-dollar trade adjustment assistance expansion--that is what T-A-A stands for--which was considered a prerequisite to any additional free-trade agreement, now that it is the law, we are not moving forward on the Colombia Free Trade Agreement.

Interestingly, the President's budget would permanently extend trade adjustment assistance at a cost of $4.6 billion over 10 years. But it does not include one dollar to implement any of the pending trade agreements such as those with Colombia, Panama, or South Korea.

I urge my colleagues to use President Uribe's visit as an opportunity to move forward and renew this Nation's commitment to trade not only to assist an important American ally that needs our help but to enact a true stimulus bill that will promote American manufacturing exports and create badly needed jobs. I ask that we get our staffs to begin working together to develop a plan to ensure passage of the Colombia Free Trade Agreement.

Finally, let me respond briefly to Democrats' charges that Colombia has not done enough to protect human rights. The Colombian Government has demobilized and brought to justice over 31,000 members from 35 paramilitary groups, principally from the AUC or the United Self- Defense Forces of Colombia. In addition, more than 10,500 members of the far-left insurgent groups FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and ELN, which is the National Liberation Army, have chosen to demobilize, individually leaving their units and turning themselves in to Colombian authorities. The Colombian Government is also providing protection to over 10,600 individuals. The largest protection program is run by the Ministry of Interior and Justice and provides protection to more than 9,400 individuals, including 1,900 trade union members. Of the program's $39.5 million budget, one-third--over $13 million--goes to protect trade unionists. As a result, President Uribe has improved the security situation in Colombia dramatically. Kidnappings are down by 83 percent, terror attacks are down by 76 percent, homicides have decreased by 40 percent, and homicides against trade unionists have dropped by twice as much--over 80 percent.

This is important progress by the Government of Colombia. It is an important ally of the United States. It deserves our support. And, as importantly, exporters in the United States deserve congressional support, enabling them to export their products without the kinds of barriers that currently exist.

The trade agreement is in our best interest, and I hope my colleagues will insist that very soon we get the Colombia Free Trade Agreement back on track so this important legislation can pass the Congress, be signed into law, and begin to help our economy generate jobs and stimulate economic growth. It is an important agreement that has languished far too long, and we need to get it moving again.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison), the Senator from Alaska (Ms. Murkowski), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Roberts), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Vitter), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Voinovich).