Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator from Connecticut--in particular, his comments at the conclusion of his remarks about the appropriateness of an expedited appeal. We are both very certain of our constitutional…
Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator from Connecticut--in particular, his comments at the conclusion of his remarks about the appropriateness of an expedited appeal. We are both very certain of our constitutional judgment on this. We are both lawyers. We each come to a totally different conclusion about what is constitutional or not. Fortunately, we have the courts to resolve the issues. As with previous legislation, we had the good sense to include an expedited appeal to the courts so that the issue can be resolved one way or the other. I would note there is one thing that is needed to effectuate this--to be sure that, as it was in the McCain-Feingold legislation, an appeal can be facilitated by ensuring pro bono counsel can represent plaintiff in the case.
Let me also reference a fact that my colleague from Arizona is usually quick to point out. He likes to say he is unburdened by a law degree. That certainly can be a burden for those of us who have the degree, but what he has argued illustrates not only the sensibility of our Constitution but also his extensive knowledge of it. I always appreciate his point of view on these issues because of his wide- reaching experience which helps us understand the reasons for the constitutional provision. I support the constitutional point of order he has raised because I do deeply believe the action the Senate is being asked to take here is unconstitutional.
The creation of a House seat for the District by legislation rather than constitutional amendment is what is before us here, and we believe that only by constitutional amendment can the additional representation be appropriately granted.
I would like to respond briefly to the comments of my colleague from Connecticut. They are all well stated. They are the arguments in opposition to the proposition. I referred to a couple of them yesterday, but let me refresh those and then discuss one other matter.
The primary argument of the proponents of the bill is to rely on the so-
called District clause, which is article I, section 8, clause 17. The District of Columbia Circuit Court actually interpreted this clause in a case called Neild v. District of Columbia in 1940. What the court noted in that case was that the District clause does indeed allow Congress to legislate within the District for ``every proper purpose of government'' and gives Congress ``full and unlimited jurisdiction to provide for the general welfare of citizens within the District of Columbia by any and every act of legislation which it may deem conducive to that end,'' subject, of course, to the negative prohibitions of the Constitution.
But proponents argue that because the District clause allows Congress to do things in the District of Columbia that States themselves cannot do, then it must also follow that Congress, with regard--that it must also allow Congress to do things with regard to the District that only States can do. For example, article I, section 10, of the Constitution bars States from doing things such as coining money, entering into treaties, and keeping troops. But none of these restrictions apply to Congress in the exercise of its power to govern the District.
Proponents of this bill argue that it follows from this sweeping power that Congress may also grant District residents the rights of citizenship in a State, including the right to congressional representation. But this argument does not follow. Congress has some powers in the District that are broader than the powers of a State, but this does not mean that every power of a State must also extend to the District. States and the District of Columbia are different under the Constitution, and each has some rights and powers that the other lacks.
I note in this regard that the Senator from Connecticut quoted from an opinion of Justice Marshall in a very early case in which Justice Marshall saw a problem with the commerce clause and, because of his view that the District of Columbia was not equivalent to a State, invited Congress to solve the problem, which, many years later, as the Senator noted, Congress did do. But, of course, what this case stands for is the proposition that Justice Marshall, who was there at the time and well understood the intent of the Framers, appreciated that he could not do it from the bench. He could not say that the District was the same as a State and therefore he had the ability to fix the problem. That had to be done in another way.
There is a big difference between those kinds of problems dealing with adversity jurisdiction or the commerce clause, and so on, and the fundamental status as a political entity, which would change the representation of the House of Representatives. Moreover, it would make no sense, in the same document where the Framers specifically composed the House of Members of the several States and then specifically designated the District of Columbia as something other than a State, that the Framers then forgot to give the District representation in the House. The Framers had the opportunity to provide the District with a Representative in the House but, of course, declined to do so.
The text of the Constitution on this matter is clear. It says Congress shall be composed of Representatives from States and States alone. Here is the exact wording:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of members
chosen every second year by the people of the several states,
and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
state legislature.
No person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the age of twenty five years . . . and who shall
not . . . be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be
chosen.
And finally:
[E]ach state shall have at least one Representative. When
vacancies happen in the Representation from any state, the
executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to
fill such vacancies.
So any act by Congress purporting to grant a seat in the House of Representatives would contradict this plain text and would be unconstitutional.
My colleague from Connecticut also noted that we have, for Americans residing abroad, enabled them to vote. But, of course, it is tied to their last domestic residence to a State. It is the State to which these votes go. So, even in those situations where there has been a need to accommodate the fact that Americans are not all residing at that moment in a State, we have tied their vote to the State from which they have come.
I mentioned one case, but I would also like to briefly discuss some other cases because judicial precedent has accumulated over the years and strongly supports the point my colleague from Arizona makes with regard to the constitutionality of this legislation.
In Bolling v. Sharpe, the companion case to Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly recognized that when it came to the application of the fundamental constitutional principles, the District could not be considered to be the same thing as a State. The Bolling petitioners had challenged the constitutionality of racial segregation in the DC public schools. The Court held that such segregation was unconstitutional in the District, but the Bolling Court was very careful to make clear that the District was not equivalent to the States and not subject to the same legal strictures.
Brown v. Board of Education was based on the 14th amendment, which by its own terms applied only to the States. Because the District is not a State, the Bolling Court reasoned different rules had to apply to this case.
Here is how the Court explained it:
We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools. The legal
problem in the District of Columbia is somewhat different,
however. The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the
District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection
clause, as does the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies only
to the states.
So the Court obviously had a dilemma. It went on to reach the same result as in Brown v. Board of Education and strike down racial segregation, but on different grounds. It was careful to emphasize that the law that applies to the District is different because the District is not a State.
Other courts have also emphasized that the District is not a State.
My colleague mentioned Adams v. Clinton. DC residents there argued that they had a constitutional right to elect a Representative to Congress but the three-judge district court, examining the text and the history, determined that the District is not a State under article I, section 1, and therefore the plaintiffs did not have a judicially cognizable right to congressional representation.
In another case from the DC Circuit Court, Michel v. Anderson, the court affirmed the constitutional principle that Congress cannot grant voting rights to citizens of the District. The court considered congressional rule changes that will allow Delegates from the District and U.S. territories the right to vote in committees and even the committee of the whole in the House. Some Members of Congress sued, claiming these rules went too far. Although the District of Columbia Circuit Court upheld the new rules, it noted that the rules passed constitutional muster only because they did not give the essential qualities of representation to the Delegates; namely, according to the court, it was acceptable to allow the Delegates to participate in deliberations and secondary votes--for example, in committees and the committee of the whole--as long as their votes would not be decisive in the final vote on final passage of the bill. There was a reason for that. The bottom line: The District has a voting Representative in the House to the full extent that it can be granted by the Congress short of a constitutional amendment. At that point, for full representation there would need to be a constitutional amendment.
In a similar vein, in United States v. Cohen, then-Judge Scalia explained, again in a DC Circuit Court decision, that the District clause ``enables Congress to do many things in the District of Columbia which it has no authority to do in the 50 States.'' But Judge Scalia went on to emphasize ``[t]hat there has never been any rule law that Congress must treat people in the District of Columbia exactly as people are treated in the various States.''
Finally, in Banner v. United States, the DC Circuit, in a panel that included now-Chief Justice Roberts, rejected a constitutional challenge to congressional legislation that prevents the DC
government from imposing a ``commuter tax'' on people who work in the District but reside in Virginia or Maryland. The Court stated that Congress had broad authority to legislate under the District clause but also noted:
None of this is to say that Congress can legislate for the
District without regard to other constitutional constraints.
And of particular relevance to the present debate, the DC Circuit panel stated:
[T]he Constitution denies District residents voting
representation in Congress.
These cases are all clear, and they all reach either the same result or are all based upon the same reasoning. The final constitutional argument was also addressed by the Senator from Connecticut. This has to do with the 23rd amendment. Let me discuss that.
When Congress in the past has addressed the District's special status, it has acknowledged that status is dictated by the Constitution, and it recognized that a constitutional amendment was necessary to change the status, as we have just seen. So when Congress sought to give the District a vote in Presidential elections, it passed the 23rd amendment to the Constitution. When Congress dealt with this issue before, it dealt with it correctly. Congress does have the power to grant the District representation in the House if it deems that it is necessary and desirable. But the proper way to do this is through the mechanism that the Framers provided in the Constitution: the amendment process in article V.
Prior to the ratification of the 23rd amendment in 1961, District residents could not choose electors for purposes of choosing the President and Vice President; but because of this amendment, District residents are now able to select electors ``equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State.''
Congress thus recognized in the 1960s that it did have the authority under the District clause and without amending the Constitution to allow District residents to choose Presidential electors.
The 23rd amendment to the Constitution itself recognizes that the District is not a State and cannot be treated as one. First, it ensures that the District, even if otherwise entitled by population, may not appoint a number of electors greater than that of the least populous State. As a consequence, even if the District grew enough in population that as a State it would be entitled to three Representatives and two Senators, let's say if a smaller State than was not entitled to three Representatives existed, the District's electors would be limited to a number equal to those of the smaller State.
Even under the 23rd amendment, for the purpose of selecting Presidential electors, the Constitution recognizes that the District is not the same as a State and is not entitled to be represented in the National Government in the same way.
So where does that leave us? What is next were we to pass this constitutional amendment? There has been an argument made, I think, that the proponents of this legislation would perhaps try, for example, to extend this to representation in the Senate as well. My colleague from Connecticut has said: No, there are totally different historical reasons that would not be so. I accept that there are, in fact, historical reasons that would preclude us from doing that. But I would also suggest the very reasons which caused Congress, the political reasons which caused some in Congress to change from the previous position--which has also been a constitutional amendment is required-- to a legislative proposal here, would be very likely to occur in the future on this particular issue as well. I think the same thing could occur with respect to representation in territories, such as the Territory of Puerto Rico, for example.
So if, in fact, today we say, no, that could not possibly be because of tradition and the historical understanding, that is not necessarily the case given the fact that we have now at least some in this body who have thrown over the historical tradition and case law and understanding that only by constitutional amendment could the Constitution--could there be an amendment to allow the District representation.
So I am going to urge my colleagues to vote against the resolution. I am going to urge them to vote to sustain the point of order that my colleague from Arizona has made. There is a constitutional issue, and we need to be on record as to what we believe to be the correct decision. If we believe it is constitutional, then there will be an opportunity to express that in this amendment. If we believe it is unconstitutional, we will have the opportunity to express that. Many of us want to express that proposition.
At the end of the day, however, as my friend from Connecticut has pointed out, the ultimate resolution is not going to be what we believe but, rather, what the courts say with respect to the issue. Again, for that reason, it is important to have a workable, expedited procedure for resolution of this issue in the courts. And I am hopeful we can achieve that in the legislation, even should the legislation pass over the objections of those of us who disagree with it.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Casey.) The Senator from Vermont is recognized.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to consider an amendment at the desk and that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. President, I understand this amendment has been cleared on both sides.
I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, in a few moments I am going to propose an amendment. I thought to conserve time that I would simply describe the amendment now, and then as soon as it is copied, I will distribute it and ask unanimous consent that the pending business be laid aside so that I can offer that amendment.
This is the retrocession amendment. It is an amendment that has been frequently offered in the House of Representatives over the years, and it is the alternative to the constitutional mechanism for providing the District of Columbia with representation in the House and Senate.
Rather than going the constitutional amendment route, there is one thing we know we can constitutionally do legislatively. Congress has the ability to retrocede to the State of Maryland all of the non- Federal areas within the District of Columbia that adjoin Maryland. The effect of that, obviously, is to give the residents of the District of Columbia today the same rights as other citizens of Maryland, if this procedure were to be followed.
Under this amendment, it would require an affirmative action of the Legislature of the State of Maryland, so that if the Legislature of Maryland did not wish to proceed with this, then it would not occur. It also would require the repeal of the 23rd amendment to the Constitution, as I will describe in just a moment. But the effect of it is, as I said, to allow the residents of the District to enjoy representation in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. It would do so without violating the Constitution's requirements that only States be represented in Congress and it would do so without creating a city state that would have disproportionate leverage in Congress and over the Federal budget.
The amendment provides quite simply that after certain conditions are satisfied:
The territory ceded to Congress by the State of Maryland to
serve as the District constituting the permanent seat of the
Government of the United States is ceded and relinquished to
the State of Maryland.
Retrocession, as I said, includes a minor exception for the so-called national areas--the White House, the Capitol building, the Supreme Court building, and the other Federal buildings and monuments around the National Mall. The length of the amendment is simply due to the fact that there is a full description in section 3 of the amendment of the area that would remain under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Congress.
There is an important transition provision that would allow lawsuits begun in the District of Columbia to be continued in Maryland courts. The amendment also provides that until the next reapportionment, the DC Delegate will serve as a full Member of the House of Representatives from Maryland. As I said, there are two conditions that would have to be satisfied before it takes effect. First, the State of Maryland would have to enact accepting the retrocession of the District to Maryland; and second, amendment XXIII, which currently gives the District three electoral votes in Presidential elections, would need to be repealed.
The reason for this is that in the absence of such a repeal, amendment XXIII might be construed not to be mooted and might be construed to give the very few residents living around the National Mall three electoral votes. The intent here is not to capture anyone who actually has an abode in that area, but there are some people who might be living there nonetheless.
We believe the amendment is the most reasonable means of providing representation in Congress to the residents of the District. It is a solution that is based on precedent. Obviously, as we all know, in 1846 the part of the District south of the Potomac River was retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia and became Arlington County and old Alexandria. We have done this before. We know how it works.
If we adopt the amendment, the residents of Maryland could have a vote in the House and in the Senate within a year or two. If we continue down our current unconstitutional path, the legislation will be tied up in litigation for several years and, at least in the view of many of us, then struck down and we will be back at the drawing board. Unlike proposals to grant statehood to the District of Columbia, retrocession provides representation to the District residents in the national legislature but without creating a city state that would further skew representation in the Senate.
In that regard, I would note that the number of people represented in most of the congressional districts of the United States exceeds the number of people who are residents of the District of Columbia. As State population continues to grow, there is every reason to believe that ratio would continue to exist.
I urge my colleagues to support this sensible constitutional means of providing representation in Congress to the residents of the District of Columbia.
At this point I ask unanimous consent that pending business be laid aside for the purpose of offering an amendment.
Mr. President, I note for the benefit of colleagues that we now have, I think, two pending amendments.
I urge my Republican colleagues, if they wish to speak to either of these two amendments or to lay down further amendments--we have good cooperation here on both sides of the aisle to move forward with this legislation, and if Members who have an interest can be here and express their views or offer their amendments, we can move through the bill more quickly.
I will suggest the absence of a quorum here, but in the event Members on the Republican side wish to speak, certainly this would be a good time for them to come down and speak to the bill and offer amendments.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I would like to ask my colleague from Connecticut a question or two about this. First of all, I think it is correct that all of us would like to see a way, a proper way--and we disagree about what that way is--for the residents of the District of Columbia to have a full franchise in terms of congressional representation. Failing that, I think Senator Coburn was simply saying they should not have to pay taxes.
I was wondering myself about potentially a second-degree amendment that might give that option to other States or congressional districts on the theory that maybe this would be a two-fer for their constituents: they could vote to get rid of their Congressman and the income tax. I wonder if my colleague would have an idea about such an amendment.
I think the Senator from Connecticut is probably right about that. His point is to draw an important distinction, and that is that there are two elements to this, one being the taxation and the other the representation. The Senator from Connecticut rightly points to a very important episode in our history where the Founding Fathers tied those two together. There are other factors as well.
I urge support for the amendment.