Nomination Of Janice R. Brown To Be United States Circuit Judge
Mr. President, I urge all of my colleagues in the U.S. Senate to reject the nomination of Janice Rogers Brown to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. I strenuously oppose this nomination because I believe that her appointment…
Mr. President, I urge all of my colleagues in the U.S. Senate to reject the nomination of Janice Rogers Brown to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. I strenuously oppose this nomination because I believe that her appointment to a lifetime tenured position on the D.C. Circuit Court will lead to the destruction of so many of the achievements we have struggled to achieve during the past 70 years--the creation of a social safety net, the advancement of civil rights for all Americans, and the protection of workers throughout our country. When I say achievements I am talking about many of the laws passed by the U.S. Congress, for during the past 70 years we have created the heart of what is today our modern American government. Congress has set the standard for our Nation--from social security and minimum-wage laws to homeland security and regulation of the business industry--by establishing laws that provide tremendous benefits and protections for all Americans.
I am deeply troubled by the nomination of Janice Rogers Brown, a jurist who has made no secret of her disdain for government and her desire to overturn many of the most important laws passed by Congress during the past 70 years. She will dismantle the foundation of our democracy, challenging the right of Congress to pass laws to help our citizens. Keep in mind that when I speak about Congress, I am not discussing people from one political party or the other; rather, I speak of the collective will of the American people, which is forged so often through bipartisan agreement and compromise between legislators from both political parties. And so I ask, who is Justice Brown to try to dismantle the very laws that we have forged over time through debate and consensus to protect our rights and keep us safe in America today?
During the past 9 years, Justice Brown has made her legal philosophy clear through both her public speeches and her legal opinions as a Justice on the California Supreme Court. She has, time and time again, demonstrated that she will be a movement judge--someone who will determine the ultimate outcome of a case based on her political beliefs instead of on the facts and law before her. Justice Brown has been inconsistent in her interpretation of the law, following precedent when it helps her to arrive at a desired result and rejecting precedent as non-binding when it will not achieve her desired ends. This is precisely the type of individual who should not receive a seat on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which is considered the second highest court in the country and a stepping-stone to a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court.
We should not approve any individual for a lifetime tenure position as a Federal judge who would use her position to achieve results consistent with an extreme political philosophy regardless of the facts and law. And I believe this to be true regardless of what the extreme political philosophy may be. Our goal must always be to ensure the independence and fairness of our courts. This is the very reason that Federal judges receive lifetime appointments: to guarantee that they will not be susceptible to political pressure or undue influence. Our goal must be to sustain this level of independence so that all citizens can be confident that, when they bring a case in Federal court, they will receive a fair hearing, based on the facts and law and not upon one individual's political beliefs.
We must place the value of an independent judiciary above the partisan politics of the day and refuse to approve purely partisan political nominees such as Janice Rogers Brown. The U.S. Senate has a constitutional obligation to advise the President on judicial nominations. As part of this obligation, the Senate must fight to ensure the continued existence of an independent and fair judiciary. We must never forget that our courts depend, first and foremost, on the judges who hear arguments, preside over trials, and issue rulings each and every day. The only way we can maintain a strong judiciary is if we approve only the most qualified individuals to lifetime appointments as Federal judges. And so we must approve nominees who possess the very traits we value most in our judiciary--fairness, independence, and an allegiance to the rule of law. That is why I urge my colleagues to reject Janice Rogers Brown, an individual who has consistently failed to demonstrate these traits. An individual who would, in my view, insert her extremist legal
philosophy into the courts in an attempt to undo years of Congressional legislation and legal precedent.
There should be no doubt that Justice Brown espouses an extreme legal philosophy far outside the mainstream of American legal thought. The President has selected a number of appellate court nominees, including Justice Brown, who embrace a radical legal theory frequently referred to as the ``Constitution in Exile.'' The ``Constitution in Exile'' theory is based on arguments put forth by Judge Douglas Ginsburg and Professor Richard Epstein. Ginsburg and Epstein believe that individuals have certain rights and liberties, including ``economic liberties'', and that any government that infringes upon these so- called liberties is ``repressive.'' This theory, advocated by Justice Brown, argues that the U.S. government represses its citizens when it takes land to build schools and pays the owner fair market value, establishes worker safety and minimum-wage laws, and institutes zoning and other regulations. Indeed, the ``Constitution in Exile'' theorists call into question the decisions of some of the most important government agencies--the EPA, the FCC, the SEC, and even the Federal Reserve--and argue that these agencies are themselves unconstitutional.
This legal theory is so far outside the mainstream that even the most conservative jurists on the U.S. Supreme Court recently rejected its premise. A unanimous Supreme Court--including conservative justices such as Scalia and Thomas, with whom I don't generally agree--handed down a decision on May 23, 2005, in Lingle v. Chevron, No. 04-163,-- S.Ct.--, 2005 WL 1200710 (May 23, 2005) that squarely rejects the ``economic liberty'' theory of takings asserted by ``Constitution in Exile'' theorists.
Lingle addressed questions of economic liberty in the context of challenges to Hawaii's rent-control regulations. The case tested whether the ``Constitution in Exile'' theory operates within the mainstream of American legal thought because advocates of the theory, including Richard Epstein, argued that the Supreme Court should look more critically on economic regulations and give less deference to legislative judgments. The Supreme Court strongly rejected this approach; writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor dismissed the argument that the Court should adopt a more critical approach to economic regulations and noted the strong need for deference to the judgment of state legislatures. O'Connor further stated that ``'government regulation--by definition--involves the adjustment of rights for the public good.''
Lingle demonstrates that Justice Brown stands far outside the legal mainstream. Beyond the defeat of the general principles espoused by the ``Constitution in Exile'' theorists, the Lingle decision serves as an explicit rejection of the legal theory set forth by Justice Brown in a lone dissent--one of her many--on the California Supreme Court. In San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, a case contesting the legality of a San Francisco development fee used to promote affordable housing, Justice Brown issued a dissent espousing the same legal argument outlined by Epstein in Lingle--that the court should look more critically on economic regulations and give less weight to the wishes of the legislature. In rejecting the principles of the Constitution in Exile theorists, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument set forth by Justice Brown in her San Remo dissent. Although there should be no need for additional evidence that Justice Brown's legal philosophy falls outside of the mainstream, the decision in Lingle provides powerful proof that Justice Brown falls far outside the boundaries of established legal thought.
For all these reasons, let me again urge my fellow colleagues to reject the nomination of Janice Rogers Brown. We must reject extremist judges like this who fall outside of the mainstream and who will use the federal judiciary to dismantle so many of the progressive accomplishments we have fought so hard to achieve during the past 70 years.