Mr. President, it has been a month--almost to the day-- that former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated. She was murdered barely a mile from the site where her own father, also a prime minister, had been executed by a…
Mr. President, it has been a month--almost to the day-- that former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated.
She was murdered barely a mile from the site where her own father, also a prime minister, had been executed by a military strongman nearly two decades earlier.
She was killed by a terrorist attack in the very same park where, over half a century ago, Pakistan's very first prime minister was gunned down under circumstances that to this day remain clouded in mystery.
The death of Ms. Bhutto was not the first time a Pakistani leader met a violent end. But never has the loss been greater--for Pakistan, and for friends of democracy the world over.
Never has the danger posed by such a loss been more serious--for Pakistan, and for the U.S. as well.
For many Members of this body, the loss of Ms. Bhutto comes as a personal shock. Some of us knew Benazir during her tenure in office, others had met her during her years of exile.
Anyone who encountered the prime minister can understand the sadness experienced by Pakistanis of all political outlooks.
The murder of Ms. Bhutto was a human tragedy, but one with potentially dire political and national security repercussions. In the wake of this shocking act of terrorism, Pakistani democracy remains seriously threatened.
This is not merely a matter of concern to Pakistan, but to the U.S. as well. Until the political crisis in Pakistan is resolved, no government in Islamabad will have the focus, the will, or the military and intelligence resources necessary to combat the threat of al-Qaeda terrorism and Taliban insurgency effectively.
The resolution I offer expresses condolences on the murder of Ms. Bhutto and condemns the cowardly terrorists who cut short the life of a brave and brilliant woman.
It calls for a genuinely independent inquiry, to clear up the mysteries surrounding this crime--an attack not only on one leader, but on Pakistani democracy itself.
It calls upon the government of Pakistan to return to the democratic path by insuring free and fair elections without further delays; by releasing all political detainees; by revoking restrictions on the press and free speech; and by restoring a genuinely independent judiciary.
It also calls on the President of the review all U.S. aid to Pakistan--as he promised to do immediately after Pakistan's current leader suspended the constitution and declared a State of Emergency in November.
The White House review found--to nobody's surprise--that no significant change in policy was required. The resolution I offer calls for a more targeted and more open-eyed approach.
It calls on the President to ensure that all assistance furthers the common goals shared by the people of Pakistan and the U.S., with specific reference to combating violent radicalism and promoting a free and democratic Pakistan; and
It calls on the President, if he cannot make such a declaration, to suspend the transfer of weapons systems primarily designed and manufactured for combat against a rival state rather than counterterrorism or counterinsurgency.
What does this mean?
In simple language, it calls upon President Bush to match his words with deeds. For the good of the Pakistani people, and for the national security interests of the United States.
The President has often said that a democratic Pakistan will be our best partner in the battle against radical theocrats and bloodthirsty terrorists.
I wholeheartedly agree--and urge the President to demonstrate that his words are something more than empty rhetoric.
Specifically, I urge the President to let the Pakistani military establishment know that the $10 billion we have provided in assistance over the past 6 years--the vast bulk of it security assistance--is not a blank check.
The American people and the Pakistani people, have a right to insist that their money is being well spent.
At a time when Pakistani soldiers and paramilitary troop are sent to fight the Taliban without bulletproof vests, without sufficient ammunition, sometimes marching through the snow in sandals rather than combat boots.
At such a time, does it make sense to spend $500 million on high- tech, highcost, nuclear-capable fighter aircraft?
Does it make sense to spend hundreds of millions on P-3 naval surveillance aircraft specifically designed to hunt submarines?
So far as I know, al-Qaeda has not yet developed a submarine navy.
The White House claims that weapons systems like these are indeed counterterrorism tools, but such a claim is an insult to common sense.
Yes, it is possible to drop a bomb on a terrorist from a supersonic jet--and our pilots sometimes do so.
Yes, it is possible to use P-3s to track fishing boats rather than submarines--and our pilots may do that too. But let us get real here.
The primary use of these weapons has nothing to do with counterterrorism--using them for this purpose is like swatting flies with a sledgehammer.
Moreover, this resolution doesn't even mandate that such weapons transfers be terminated. It merely urges that they be suspended: temporarily put on hold, until the current political crisis has passed.
Why is this necessary? For starters, because the administration has consistently failed to apply a common-sense approach to its Pakistan policy--and shows no sign of starting to do so now. I'll give just one example, but I could select from dozens.
A few days after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, just as Pakistani President Musharraf was deliberating over whether or not to postpone elections in which Bhutto's party was nearly certain to prevail, the Pentagon awarded a contract for fighter jets worth $498 million.
Despite a direct Congressional inquiry several weeks earlier, no member of the Foreign Relations Committee--or any other committee, so far as I know--was alerted to this sale.
The administration claims this was merely a coincidence, that the deal had been in the works for a long time, that no policy-maker had any say in the timing of the announcement.
Perhaps that is true. If so, all the more reason for Congress to lay down a marker.
I first suggested putting noncounterterrorism security aid on the table on November 4--the morning after President Musharraf effectively declared a coup d'etat against his own government.
I did so moments after speaking by phone with Benazir Bhutto, who had just returned to Pakistan from 8 years in exile, and who had narrowly escaped a bomb blast on her convoy that left 140 of her supporters dead.
I urged President Musharraf to step back from the brink of disaster, to revoke an order that could destroy his country's democracy.
I urged President Bush to use U.S. military aid as a carefully calibrated lever, in order to make sure our arms and our money helped make Pakistan more free, and the U.S more safe.
Later that week, I unveiled a comprehensive plan for long-term engagement with pakistan--or moving our strategy from a ``Musharraf policy'' to a ``Pakistan policy.'' In broad strokes, the basic elements of this plan are:
Triple non-security aid, to $1.5 billion annually. For at least a decade. This aid would be unconditional: it is our pledge to the Pakistani people.
Instead of funding military hardware, it would build schools, clinics, and roads.
Condition security aid on performance. We should base our security aid on clear results.
We are now spending well over $1 billion annually, and it is not clear we are getting our money's worth.
We should be willing to spend more if we get better returns--and less if we don't.
Help Pakistan enjoy a ``democracy dividend.'' The first year of genuine democratic rule should bring an additional $1 billion, above the $1.5 billion non-security aid baseline, with future non-security aid calibrated, again, above the guaranteed baseline, to Pakistan's institutionalization of democratic and good-governance norms.
We have got to help moderate, secular political leaders show the Pakistani people that they can deliver the goods.
Engage the Pakistani people, not just their rulers. We need a broad- based engagement, not just government to government.
This will involve everything from improved public diplomacy to reviewing visa procedures and textile quotas to reversing this administration's shameful torture policies and shutting the prison at Gitmo.
Today is not the day to delve into the specifics of long-term strategy; I will come to the floor at a later date and sketch out this comprehensive plan in greater detail.
Today is a time for all of us to come together in support of a resolution which, I would hope, expresses the sentiments of every Member here.
All of us, surely, send our condolences on the death of Benazir Bhutto, and condemn her bloodthirsty assassins.
All of us, surely, want to see her murderers--and those who arranged her murder--brought to justice.
All of us, surely, want to see Pakistan set firmly back on the democratic path.
All of us, surely, want to make certain that the billions of dollars we send to Pakistan in aid genuinely serve the purposes for which it is intended--that it bolsters a stable, moderate, democratic state, and that it supports the battle against the violent terrorist groups who have declared war on the U.S. and Pakistan alike.