Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the U.S. Supreme Court. Judge Sotomayor has a compelling biography. As the first daughter of a young Puerto Rican couple, she grew up in a public housing…
Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Judge Sotomayor has a compelling biography.
As the first daughter of a young Puerto Rican couple, she grew up in a public housing project in the South Bronx.
Her father, a factory worker, died when she was 9 years old.
Her mother, a nurse, then raised her and her younger brother, and instilled in them a belief in the power of education.
Judge Sotomayor excelled in school.
She graduated as valedictorian of her class at Blessed Sacrament and at Cardinal Spellman High School in New York.
She won a scholarship to Princeton University, where she continued to excel, graduating summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa.
She was a co-recipient of the M. Taylor Pyne Prize, the highest honor Princeton awards to an undergraduate.
At Yale Law School, Judge Sotomayor served as an editor of the Yale Law Journal and as managing editor of the Yale Studies in World Public Order.
Over a distinguished career that spans three decades, Judge Sotomayor has worked at almost every level of our judicial system.
Today, she serves on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
An appointee of President Clinton on the Second Circuit Court, she has participated in over 3,000 panel decisions, and authored roughly 400 published opinions.
When I met with Judge Sotomayor last month, I found her to be a very likeable woman.
She also displayed these traits during her Senate confirmation hearings.
If she is confirmed, she will be the first Hispanic Supreme Court Justice--an ascendency that will mark a historical moment for our country.
I have, throughout my career, been a strong supporter of Hispanic nominees for judicial appointments and confirmation.
I am proud of the fact that, of the 40 judges I have had a role in nominating for the district courts in Texas, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 30 percent have been Hispanic.
Likewise, I was a strong supporter of Miguel Estrada, who, like Judge Sotomayor, had an incredibly compelling life story, but whose nomination for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District Circuit was filibustered.
I believe the decision of whether to support a nominee for the Federal courts--and especially the highest court--must be grounded in qualification and judicial philosophy.
She certainly meets the academic and experience criteria for service on our country's highest court.
The criteria for judicial philosophy for my concurrence is to apply the law, not make the law.
A judge must interpret the Constitution, not amend it by judicial decree.
One of the most important and recently confirmed constitutional rights is the right to keep and bear arms.
The Founding Fathers knew what they were doing when they put the second amendment in the Bill of Rights. This wasn't an accident.
They knew from their experience in the Revolutionary War that a free people must have the right to possess and bear arms.
The second amendment clearly says: ``A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.''
Although some people are confused by the word ``militia,'' it is clear that the Founders did not use the word ``militia'' to mean that gun rights could only be used in an organized army.
The Framers did not intend for this right to be a ``collective'' right.
If that had been their purpose, they would have been satisfied with article 1 section 8 of the Constitution that gives Congress the power ``to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.''
The Framers went further than that.
They wanted to ensure that gun ownership was recognized by posterity as an ``individual right.'' So they included it as part of the Bill of Rights, which is a compilation of protected individual liberties such as free speech, freedom of religion, and a fair trial.
The second amendment ensures that every American can secure his freedom, and defend his life and property, if necessary.
In that sense, the right to keep and bear arms could very well be one of our most important rights--because it is the right from which all of our other rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, et cetera are secured.
That's why, last year, I led a congressional effort to support the affirmation of the second amendment as an important individual right in the Supreme Court case of D.C. v. Heller, which overturned Washington, DC's unconstitutional ban on handguns.
In that case, Senator Tester and I, joined by 53 of our colleagues and 250 members of the U.S. House, filed a ``friend of the court'' brief in favor of Dick Heller, who simply wished to exercise his constitutional right to protect himself and his family.
That brief was proof that a majority in Congress believe that the second amendment is a constitutionally secured individual right.
It was the first time in history that a majority of the House and Senate sent this type of brief to the Supreme Court.
In the case of D.C. v. Heller, the Supreme Court affirmed the right to keep and bear arms as an individual right for the first time in almost seven decades.
Unfortunately, however, just a few months ago, even after the Supreme Court's verdict in D.C. v. Heller, Judge Sotomayor issued an opinion in another case, Maloney v. Cuomo refusing to acknowledge that the second amendment is a fundamental right, and therefore may not be binding on the States.
As a strong advocate of the second amendment, I cannot ignore this decision.
I am very troubled by Judge Sotomayor's opinion in Maloney v. Cuomo because it appears to disregard an instruction by the Supreme Court in Heller specifically regarding fundamental rights.
In Footnote 23 of the Heller decision, the Supreme Court stated: ``With respect to Cruikshank's continuing validity on incorporation, a question not presented by this case, we note that Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.''
These ``later cases'' to which the court is referring held most Bill of Rights guarantees to be incorporated through the due process clause of the 14th amendment against State violation.
This was a clear instruction to the circuits that in future second amendment cases they will need to confront the incorporation argument and do so following the Supreme Court's line of cases on incorporation.
I must take issue with Judge Sotomayor's per curiam opinion in Maloney because while her opinion references the Heller footnote, it only acknowledges the portion noting the continued validity of Supreme Court precedent indicating the second amendment is not binding on the States.
Her court failed to recognize the instruction to conduct the contemporary 14th amendment incorporation analysis the Heller footnote demands.
As such, the Sotomayor opinion reaches the conclusion that the cases from the 1890s are still applicable--and therefore, basically, the second amendment is not binding on the states.
When questioned by the Judiciary Committee about the Maloney case, Judge Sotomayor said she was following precedent.
However, she did not follow the instruction of the Supreme Court in Heller on this point.
In Maloney, the Second Circuit cites the Supreme Court cases of Heller and Presser v. Illinois, decided in 1886, and the Second Circuit opinion Bach v. Pataki, decided in 2005.
Judge Sotomayor determines that Presser and Bach instruct the court to maintain Presser 's conclusion that the second amendment is not applicable to the States.
But Heller's Footnote 23 asks the Court to ``engage in a Fourteenth Amendment inquiry.''
I specifically asked Judge Sotomayor when we met why she did not follow this instruction, articulated just last year by the Court?
I did not receive a satisfactory explanation to this very pivotal question, nor did I hear one in her testimony before the Judiciary Committee.
Heller is precedent, and in this precedent, the Supreme Court tells the circuits to perform a 14th amendment inquiry.
In April of this year, the Ninth Circuit considered the same second amendment incorporation question.
While also looking to Presser for guidance, the Ninth Circuit turned to its own circuit precedent, Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, and--like the Second Circuit--it would have been inclined to conclude that the second amendment did not apply to the States.
However, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that it had not yet engaged ``in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by [the Supreme Court's] later cases,'' and therefore undertook the due process incorporation analysis as envisioned by the Heller footnote.
At the conclusion of the analysis, the Ninth Circuit finds that the second amendment right to keep and bear arms is ``deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'' and ``compels [us] to recognize that it is indeed fundamental'' and is therefore incorporated by the due process clause of the 14th amendment and applied against the states and local governments.
Let me repeat that. The Ninth Circuit's opinion holds that the second amendment protects an individual's liberty, and because that protection is enumerated and so fundamental, the due process clause guarantees it, and the second amendment is therefore binding on the States.
We cannot escape the fact that both courts, each bound by the same Heller precedent, reached opposite conclusions, with Judge Sotomayor's opinion failing to subject the second amendment to the incorporation analysis required by the Supreme Court, and failing to identify the second amendment as a fundamental right, binding against the States.
It is from this fact, this outcome, that I am unable to reconcile with my earnest desire to confirm the first Hispanic Justice to the Supreme Court.
With the circuit courts split on the question of whether the second amendment is an individual right protected against State infringement, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly have this issue before it in the upcoming term.
With the constitutional right to keep and bear arms hanging in the balance, I cannot in good conscience vote to confirm a nominee whose judicial record indicates an unwillingness to protect and defend such a fundamental, individual right.
For that reason, I must oppose the nomination of Judge Sotomayor to the Supreme Court of the United States.
I similarly opposed the confirmation of Attorney General Eric Holder earlier this year due to his stance on the second amendment embodying a collective right rather than an individual right.
One added point. I am troubled by a line in her February 25, 2005, speech at the Duke Law School, ``Court of Appeals is where policy is made.''
This is a troubling statement in the area of judicial philosophy.
As I have stated earlier, I believe policy is made by elected officials who must be accountable through elections, not by Federal judges with lifetime appointments.
Judge Sotomayor is without a doubt an intelligent, experienced, and capable nominee, and she will bring much needed diversity to the Court.
But, after careful examination, I cannot support her confirmation to the highest court in the land.