Mr. Speaker, I rise today to provide additional remarks on H.R. 2314, the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act of 2009, a bill the House passed with a clear majority vote of 245-164 on February 23, 2010. At the end of the 18th…
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to provide additional remarks on H.R. 2314, the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act of 2009, a bill the House passed with a clear majority vote of 245-164 on February 23, 2010.
At the end of the 18th century, King Kamehameha I united the separate island chiefdoms under one Hawaiian monarchy, which was recognized by the United States. This unified Native Hawaiian self-rule continued through most of the 19th century, with Native Hawaiians ``constitut[ing] the overwhelming majority of the political community that participated in decisionmaking in the Kingdom,'' (Jon M. Van Dyke, Population, Voting, and Citizenship in the Kingdom of Hawai'i, 28 U. Haw. L. Rev. 81, 81 (2005)), and came to an end only when, in 1893, commercial interests overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy with the support of the U.S. government.
Even after the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, Native Hawaiians have continued to maintain their separate identity as a single distinctly political community through cultural, social, and political institutions, and through efforts to develop programs to provide governmental services to native Hawaiians. For example, the Hawaiian Protective Association--a political organization with by-laws and a constitution that sought to maintain unity among Native Hawaiians, protect Native Hawaiian interests (including by lobbying the legislature), and promote the education, health, and economic development of Native Hawaiians--was ``organized [in 1914] . . . for the sole purpose of protecting the Hawaiian people and of conserving and promoting the best things of their tradition'' (Hearing on H.R. 13500 Before the Committee on Territories, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 44 (Dec. 14, 1920) (Rev. Akaiko Akana)).
To this end, the Association established twelve standing committees, published a newspaper, and also developed the framework that became the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA) in 1921. In 1918, Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole, a U.S. delegate to Congress, founded the Hawaiian Civic Clubs, the goal of which was to perpetuate the language, history, traditions, music, dances and other cultural traditions of Hawaii. The clubs' first project was to secure enactment of HHCA and the clubs remain in existence today.
Efforts to maintain a distinct political community have continued into the present day. Examples include the 1988 Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Conference; the Kau Inoa organization, which registers Native Hawaiians for a movement toward a Native Hawaiian governing entity; the efforts to protect the North Western Hawaiian Islands because of their cultural and traditional significance; the creation in the Hawaii State Constitution of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, which serves as an entity to protect Native Hawaiian interests; and the development of traditional justice programs, including a traditional method of alternative dispute resolution, ``ho`oponopono,'' which has been endorsed by the Native Hawaiian Bar Association.
Moreover, as the findings of H.R. 2314 explain, the Native Hawaiian people have actively maintained native traditions and customary usages throughout the Native Hawaiian community and the Federal and State courts have continuously recognized the right of the Native Hawaiian people to engage in certain customary practices and usages on public lands.
For example, traditional Native Hawaiian fishing and water rights are protected by state law (Haw. Rev. Stat. Sec. 174C-101(c) & (d) (2008) (stating that certain traditional and customary water rights ``shall not be abridged or denied,'' or ``diminished or extinguished,'' by provision of the State Water Code)]; id. Sec. 187A-23 (1985) (providing for recognition of certain ``vested fishing rights'' linked to ``ancient regulations'').
Hawaii courts have also recognized and upheld traditional gathering and access rights, (See, e.g., Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995); State v. Hanapi, 970 P.2d 485 (Haw. 1998); Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982)). Further, Native Hawaiian traditional practices are often permitted on federal parks land (See, e.g., 16
U.S.C. Sec. 396d (KalokoHonokohau National Historical Park). These practices and legal protections further reinforce the Native Hawaiian community's continuing status as a distinctly native community.
Congress has recognized the distinct status of the Native Hawaiians by ``extend[ing] services to [them]'' on the basis of that status, recognizing that they are ``the native people of a prior-sovereign nation with whom the United States has a special political and legal relationship.'' (See, e.g., Brief of United States at 4-5 & nn.2-4, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (noting that Congress has ``established special Native Hawaiian programs in the areas of health care, education, employment, and loans,'' ``has enacted statutes to preserve Native Hawaiian culture, language, and historical sites, and ``by classifying Native Hawaiians as `Native Americans' under numerous federal statutes, . . . has extended to Native Hawaiians many of `the same rights and privileges accorded to American Indian, Alaska Native, Eskimo, and Aleut communities' '' and collecting examples of these congressional acts)).
Other specific examples of Congress' recognition of the distinct status of the Native Hawaiians include the Native American Language Act of 1990, which recognized and clarified the language rights of American Indians, Alaskan Natives, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders and explicitly allowed exceptions to teacher certification requirements for instruction in Native American languages; the Native Hawaiian Education Act of 1988 (Title IV of the Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988) which awarded $30 million annually in competitive education grants to programs benefitting native Hawaiian students; the Native Hawaiian Assessment Project of 1983; and special education programs specifically targeting Native Hawaiian students.
As the 1993 Apology Resolution and other recent federal statutes extending educational and health benefits to Native Hawaiians make clear, Congress has found that: (1) Native Hawaiians are ``a distinct and unique indigenous people with a historical continuity to the original inhabitants of the Hawaiian archipelago,'' 42 U.S.C. 11701(1); 20 U.S.C. 7902(1); (2) Native Hawaiians exercised sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands, 20 U.S.C. 80q-14(11); (3) the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii was ``illegal'' and deprived Native Hawaiians of their right to ``self-determination,'' 107 Stat. 1513; (4) the government installed after the overthrow ceded 1.8 million acres of land to the United States ``without the consent of or compensation to the Native Hawaiian people of Hawaii or their sovereign government,'' id. at 1512; (5) ``the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States,'' ibid.; and (6) ``the Native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territory, and their cultural identity in accordance with their own spiritual and traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language, and social institutions,'' id. at 1512-1513.
Those findings demonstrate that indigenous Hawaiians, like numerous tribes in the continental United States, share historical and current bonds within their community. Also like tribes in the continental United States, Native Hawaiians, pursuant to Acts of Congress, have substantial lands set aside for their benefit: 200,000 acres of Homestead Act land on which there are thousands of leases to Native Hawaiians that furnish homes to tens of thousands of Hawaiians, and a 20 percent interest in the income generated by 1.2 million acres of public trust lands under the Admission Act.
The fact that the indigenous Hawaiian community does not presently have a central operating tribal government recognized by the U.S. Department of the Interior does not remove that community from the scope of Congress's Indian affairs power. Initially, the Constitution does not limit Congress's Indian affairs power to groups with a particular government structure. ``[S]ome bands of Indians, for example, had little or no tribal organization, while others were highly organized.'' (Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 664). Nor does the Constitution limit Congress's power to groups that continue to exercise all aspects of sovereignty. European ``discovery'' and the establishment of the United States necessarily diminished certain aspects of Indian sovereignty (Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 45). Thus, under the Constitution, ``[f]ederal regulation of Indian tribes . . . is governance of once- sovereign political communities'' (Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646).
Moreover, the United States' authority over Indian affairs does not emanate simply from the Commerce Clause's reference to ``Indian Tribes.'' Rather, the Constitution implicitly gives Congress power to manage Indian affairs more generally (Seber, 318 U.S. at 715; Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 45-46; Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-384). That power does not disintegrate when an indigenous people loses its formal government structure. In the first place, the loss of a particular form of government is not tantamount to termination of all sovereignty or of the prospect that sovereignty might be given expression in the future through governmental or other structures. In the case of Native Hawaiians, a variety of Native Hawaiian organizations are active in a broad range of Native political, cultural, religious, legal, and land- related matters, and furnish vehicles for the expression of self- determination over important aspects of Hawaiian affairs, and thus confirms that Native Hawaiians constitute a present-day ``political'' community (Cf. 25 C.F.R. 83.7(c)).
Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that a central operating tribal government is not a predicate for legislation on behalf of indigenous people. For example, in John, 437 U.S. at 634, the Court upheld the power of Congress to provide for a group of Mississippi Choctaw Indians that did not have a federally recognized tribal government. The United States had entered into a treaty under which the Choctaw Indians would leave Mississippi by 1833. In the 1890s, however, the United States became aware that a group of Choctaws had not left Mississippi. Even though the United States did not regard that remaining group as members of a federally recognized tribe, it began to provide services and land to individual Choctaws in Mississippi.
In 1939, Congress declared that the lands that had been purchased for individual Choctaws would be held in trust for Choctaw Indians of one- half or more Indian blood, resident in Mississippi, and in 1944, Congress made those lands a reservation. Finally, in 1945, Mississippi Choctaws of one-half or more Indian blood adopted a constitution and bylaws, which were then approved by the appropriate federal officials.
Against that background, Mississippi argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to establish federal criminal jurisdiction in the Choctaw Reservation (John, 437 U.S. at 652). The U.S. Supreme Court rejected that argument, explaining: ``[I]n view of the elaborate history of relations between the Mississippi Choctaws and the United States, we do not agree that Congress and the Executive Branch have less power to deal with the affairs of the Mississippi Choctaws than with the affairs of other Indian groups. Neither the fact that the Choctaws in Mississippi are merely a remnant of a larger group of Indians, long ago removed from Mississippi, nor the fact that federal supervision over them has not been continuous, destroys the federal power to deal with them.''
I would like to take this opportunity to provide clarification on the legislative intent of H.R. 2314, particularly for Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9. My remarks for Sections 3 and 9 are supplementary to the remarks previously made by Congressman Abercrombie.