Mr. Chair, I would like to thank Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Smith for their leadership in bringing this years's NDAA. I would also like to thank my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Jim Cooper, the ranking member on our…
Mr. Chair, I would like to thank Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Smith for their leadership in bringing this years's NDAA. I would also like to thank my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Jim Cooper, the ranking member on our subcommittee, for being such a great partner as we worked on this important bill.
Now, I would like to focus on some key provisions in the bill. First, space reform. This bill takes two monumental steps to reform national security space. First, the bill provides for the creation of a space core within the Air Force to fix the fragmented space acquisition process.
Second, it provides for the establishment of a subordinate, unified command for space under U.S. Strategic Command to ensure integration of the joint command of all space operations.
I can't stress enough the urgent necessity of these reforms. Our society and our military are enormously dependent on space. Meanwhile, our adversaries continue to grow their counterspace capabilities. These adversaries have already reorganized their space forces toward the goal of neutralizing our advantage in space.
Multiple studies going back almost two decades have recommended a space force to fix our space acquisition and management problems. Regardless, the DOD and the Air Force have yet to fix the problem. Decisionmaking authorities for space acquisitions remain fragmented across over 60 organizations. This bill would consolidate acquisition authority and improve our ability to jointly operate in space.
Earlier this week, I returned from Asia where I got to meet with our troops on the Korean Peninsula. I was in theater when North Korea conducted their intercontinental ballistic missile. We must be vigilant when it comes to our missile defenses, and this year's NDAA does that.
Noteworthy initiatives in the bill include the authorization of approximately $2 billion in additional funds for the Missile Defense Agency. It also accelerates our efforts to develop a space-based sensor and interceptor capabilities. Lastly, the bill supports our nuclear deterrence and includes provisions to improve the oversight of our nuclear command, control, and communications.
Mr. Chair, I urge support of this important legislation.
Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition.
Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman, Mr. Blumenauer, for his amendment, although I urge its defeat.
I start off with pointing out that both the Obama administration and the Trump administration have decided the fact that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty, and neither of those administrations have indicated any belief that Russia will come back into compliance.
But having said that, I want to say I am troubled that the gentleman would want to provide a veto on the development of a system that hasn't been developed, much less deployed. The gentleman is worried about deployment of a system that we still don't have developed yet. And hopefully it won't be deployed when it is completed.
That is really the function of whether Russia comes back into compliance. General Selva, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the HASC in March: ``They do not intend to return to compliance absent some pressure from the international community and the United States as a cosigner of that same agreement. There is no trajectory in what they are doing that would indicate otherwise.''
The development of this system that we are talking about here today is that very pressure that General Selva was referencing. This kind of development got the Russians to the table on the INF Treaty anyway, but they are violating the treaty. And that doesn't just matter to Europe. It matters to Asia, which is completely ignored by the gentleman's amendment. And Asia matters on INF. Why? Because 95 percent of China's missiles are in INF range.
The commander of PACOM has testified that he has requirements for intermediate-range missile capability in Asia, ``the aspects of the INF Treaty that limit our ability to counter Chinese and other countries' land-based missiles, I think is problematic. ``
We didn't conjure the idea of a ground-launched cruise missile out of thin air. The U.S. Army reported that introducing intermediate-range ground-launched missiles into the land domain provides military value across the range of the joint military operations and provides a land-based counter to our adversaries' anti-access area denial capabilities.
This report was required by the HASC last year as a part of our multiyear oversight on how to respond to Russia's violations of the INF Treaty, which the prior administration did nothing to challenge.
I appreciate the gentleman's interest. I will gladly work with him on ways to counter Russia's violations of the treaty, but I must urge defeat of this well-intentioned but poorly conceived amendment.
Mr. Chair, I urge support of the bipartisan approach taken by the House Armed Services Committee in sections 1244 and 1245, and I urge a vote ``no'' on the Blumenauer amendment.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, again, I want to remind the gentleman that nobody has indicated that Russia has any intention--they see no signs that Russia has any intention of coming back into compliance.
I think this is poorly thought out. We need to go forward and not be giving vetoes to other people about what weapon systems we can start developing.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for offering this important amendment.
This is a simple and straightforward amendment that would help us set priorities in spending taxpayer dollars in a small but meaningful way. The U.S. signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, back in 1996, but the Senate voted against that ratification in 1999.
We are talking about two decades ago. In the meantime, the U.S. has abided by a unilateral pledge to refrain from nuclear explosive tests of any size or kind, but other nations, including Russia and China, have not. They continue to conduct very low-yield nuclear tests that the U.S. does not. Why? Two reasons: one, the CTBT has not entered into force, and the CTBT doesn't even define what it bans.
So while we keep a very stringent policy against testing, other nuclear powers do not. Twenty years later, it is time to ask ourselves why we continue to fund the organization for a treaty that is not going anywhere. This amendment wisely funds the International Monitoring System which provides us some benefits but prohibits the approximately $2 million in payments to the CTBT organization itself that is included in the FY18 budget request for the State Department.
Let's set this small commonsense priority and let's reinforce the Obama administration's own position that the U.N. resolution from last year is not legally binding on the United States.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this amendment.
Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition.
Mr. Chair, my friend from California is correct about one thing: I will say a 30-year cost estimate is not worth the paper it is written on.
I oppose this amendment, just as I opposed a similar amendment by my friend from California, number 12. I submitted amendment No. 88 that we will consider shortly. My amendment was a hopeful compromise with my colleagues from California, who are offering amendment Nos. 10 and 12 on this same issue. Unfortunately, we have not been able to reach a compromise, so we will put them all before our colleagues here on the floor for consideration.
The bottom line is that my colleagues are asking DOD and CBO to create a 25- and 30-year cost estimate for how much our nuclear forces cost. That would triple the current requirement of 10-year cost estimates. Unfortunately, these type of multidecade cost estimates won't be worth the paper they are written on.
As evidence for that, Assistant Secretary of Defense Tom Hopkins, who would be responsible for creating the DOD report, has called a 25-year report on this ``burdensome.'' He explained it to us this way during a hearing: ``Right now we submit a 10-year report that does have programs and cost on it. . . . As you would expect, looking out that far, 25 years, the credibility of the numbers would be very, very suspect. . . .
``Forecasting DOD costs over a 25-year period with any useful accuracy is extremely difficult given the challenges of predicting developments in the international security environment and ongoing technological advancements.''
The Armed Services Committee and this House have considered these types of 30-year cost estimate amendments for DOD or CBO in the NDAAs for the last 5 years.
Each time, for 5 years in a row, these amendments have been defeated. That is because these types of amendments would not result in good, effective oversight and transparency.
It would result in false and unreliable data entering the public debate. If any of my colleagues are interested in a reasonable, commonsense way to try and shed a little more light on these very long- term plans and costs, I encourage them to vote for my amendment No. 88. My amendment allows the Secretary of Defense to provide for information beyond 10 years if he thinks it is accurate and would be useful in understanding the nuclear modernization programs.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this current amendment and ``yes'' on my amendment No. 88, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I would say that the Navy provides 30-year cost estimates because Congress made them, and the Navy
doesn't want to do it, and they don't think they are reliable.
I urge a ``no'' vote on this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I reluctantly oppose this amendment from my friend and colleague from California. He is a very serious, thoughtful, and clearly articulate Member, but it is for the same reasons that I just outlined with Mr. Aguilar's amendment.
I will keep this brief because we just talked about this. But going down this path for a 25- or 30-year cost estimate for nuclear weapons is a bad idea and would result in bad data. The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration who is still in the Trump administration doesn't think it is a good idea either.
The HASC and the House have considered this 30-year cost estimate for the last 5 years in a row, and each time it has been rejected. This amendment would not result in good, effective oversight and transparency.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to consider voting for my reasonable, commonsense amendment when we get to it, amendment No. 88. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this amendment and ``yes'' on Rogers 88.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I agree with the gentleman. We don't want to be mushrooms, but we also don't want bad data. So I would urge a ``no'' vote on this and urge people to support Rogers amendment No. 88, which will allow the Secretary to go beyond 10 years to 25 or 30 if the Secretary believes it would yield valuable data.
Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose this amendment, but it is not just me. The Armed Services Committee considered nearly the same amendment during markup, and it was soundly defeated.
It is not just the committee that opposed this amendment. It is also our country's senior-most military officers. They repeatedly described the urgent need for the LRSO and the declining reliability of the NACMs.
They have testified before our committee in March on this exact issue. Here is the Nation's second highest ranking military officer, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Selva:
ALCMs were designed and built in the 1970s with a 10-year
lifespan. We know today they remain relevant, but we can't
continue to maintain them. A decade from now, those weapons
will not be able to penetrate Russian air defenses, and
therefore there is an urgency for their replacement.
In the same year, STRATCOM Commander General Hyten said:
The LRSO is the first missile system developed in unison
with a nuclear warhead in mind for many decades. Limiting
resources or funding of either component will disrupt the
entire concept-to-capability timeline.
Here is President Obama's Assistant Secretary of Defense, Bob Scher, testifying before my committee last year:
The Obama administration's decision to field a modern ALCM
replacement is essential to maintain the ALCM's unique
contribution to stable and effective deterrence.
Finally, let me briefly address this nonsense argument that LRSO is destabilizing. Here is President Obama's Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Rose Gottemoeller testifying before the Senate last year:
First, the LRSO is consistent with our arms control
commitments and President Obama's Prague agenda. Second, the
LRSO supports strategic stability and does not undermine it.
Third, it is important in the eyes of our allies. There is no
evidence that the LRSO or our nuclear modernization program
are prompting an action-reaction cycle or catalyzing these
arms races. The LRSO is valuable in maintaining strategic
stability.
Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I was quoting Rose Gottemoeller from the Obama administration, saying that it was not going to perpetuate this cycle.
Mr. Chair, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Wyoming (Ms. Cheney), my friend and an outstanding member of the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, as I said a few minutes ago, I submitted this amendment as a hopeful compromise with my colleague from California who offered amendment Nos. 10 and 12 on this same issue. I will keep this very brief because we have discussed this thoroughly tonight.
But going down a path of a 30-year cost estimate for nuclear weapons is a bad idea and will result in bad data. As we debated this for the past 5 years now, the Obama administration didn't want to do it, the Trump administration doesn't want to do it, and the HASC and the House have voted against it every year.
I urge my colleagues to consider voting for my reasonable commonsense amendment, commonsense way to get this issue resolved with amendment No. 88.
My amendment allows the Secretary of Defense to provide information beyond 10 years if he thinks it would be accurate and useful in the information it yielded. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on my amendment and ``no'' on amendment Nos. 10 and 12.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I urge a ``yes'' vote, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.