Madam Speaker, I include in the Record remarks from the American Hellenic Institute on the Administration's proposed FY2022 foreign aid budget and U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. In promoting peace and stability in this…
Madam Speaker, I include in the Record remarks from the American Hellenic Institute on the Administration's proposed FY2022 foreign aid budget and U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. In promoting peace and stability in this critical region, Congress must authorize robust, America-first security assistance to our democratic allies in the Eastern Mediterranean--Greece and Cyprus. Any security assistance which counters U.S. interests, to Turkey and UN ``Peacekeeping'' efforts in Cyprus, namely, will only serve to advance instability and ideological expansionism in this region. Greece and Cyprus are key allies of our Nation, and we must continue to support their security for years to come.
Testimony of Nick Larigakis, President, American Hellenic Institute
(AHI), Fiscal Year 2022 Appropriations Bill, Submitted to the U.S.
House of Representatives
(By Nick Larigakis)
I am pleased to submit testimony to the House on behalf of
the nationwide membership of the American Hellenic Institute
(AHI) on the Administration's proposed FY2022 foreign aid
budget.
The Administration's budget aims to confront 21st century
security challenges. The budget's vision for the United
States is to ensure it ``. . . plays a lead role in defending
democracy, freedom, and the rule of law'' by recommending a
significant increase in resources to: ``strengthen and defend
democracies throughout the world; advance human rights; fight
corruption; and counter authoritarianism.''
In keeping with the best interests of the United States,
AHI opposes: (1) any proposed foreign aid and assistance to
Turkey from the United States; (2) any proposed reduction in
the aid levels for the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.
Further, AHI recommends an FY2022 funding level of $1.5
million for NATO ally Greece's International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program as authorized for
appropriation in The Eastern Mediterranean Security and
Energy Partnership Act. The Act also authorized $500,000 for
the Republic of Cyprus' IMET program for FY2022, which AHI
recommends. In 2020, the U.S. Department of State provided,
for the first time, IMET program funding for the Republic of
Cyprus. AHI welcomed this policy development, and urges that
this policy be continued.
Finally, AHI recommends robust investment for Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) assistance for Greece, in the amount
of at least $10 million, due to its strategic importance to
the United States as the House will see presented in this
testimony. The East Med Act authorized appropriations of $3
million for FMF assistance in FY2020.
U.S. Interests in Southeast Europe and the Eastern
Mediterranean. The U.S. has important interests in southeast
Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. It is in the United
States' best interest for the region to be politically,
economically, and socially stable, and for democratic
principles to flourish, including adherence to the rule of
law. Significant commerce and energy sources pass through the
region. With Greece's centuries of enduring presence, its
close cultural, political, and economic ties to the
Mediterranean countries, including Israel; Western Europe,
the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Greece is
strategically situated in a vital region to be an ideal
strategic partner for the U.S.
America Values Its Alliance with Greece. Greece is an
immensely valuable link as ``a pillar of stability'' in the
region as several high-level U.S. government officials have
noted. The U.S.-Greece relationship has reached new heights
by virtue of an ongoing Strategic Dialogue, where avenues for
cooperation among many sectors, including: regional
cooperation, defense and security, and trade and investment,
among others, are plotted for implementation. Greece is a
pivotal and dependable NATO ally to advance U.S. interests
and is a frontline state against terrorism. The Mutual
Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United Stales and
Greece illustrates the two allies' commitment to address over
a longer term the security challenges in the region. The
Agreement currently is under revision. After it is upgraded,
it will offer more flexibility to deepen cooperation in the
defense sector, according to Greece's Minister of Defense
Nikos Panagiotopoulos. For its part, Greece further
demonstrates its commitment to the Alliance as a top
contributor to the defense efforts of NATO. Greece is
estimated to spend 2.68% of its GDP on defense expenditures
in 2020 in accordance with NATO standards despite battling
economic challenges. By percentage of GDP, Greece is second
to the U.S.
Greece is also important for the projection of U.S.
strategic interests by being home to the most important U.S.
military facility in the Mediterranean Sea, Souda Bay, Crete.
It is a base from where joint USN/USAF reconnaissance
missions and air refueling support for U.S. and NATO
operations were implemented successfully, and it continues to
be immensely important. In 2020, the United States homeported
the Expeditionary Sea Base ship, the USS Hershel ``Woody''
Williams, at Souda Bay, assisting the U.S. armed forces in
maritime missions and special operations in both Europe and
North Africa. Military installations located at Souda Bay
include the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training
Centre (NMIOTC) and the NATO Missile Firing Installation
(NAMFI). To illustrate Souda Bay's importance, these figures
show the volume of operations conducted there:
In 2020, at least 90 U.S. and 40 NATO (total 130) ships
made a port visit at Souda Bay.
It also has been noted by U.S. government officials how
Souda Bay allows United States Navy vessels--especially
aircraft carriers--the ability to dock, make needed repairs
and maintenance, and resupply, all within a couple of weeks
and without having to return to Naval Station Norfolk.
According to U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Geoffrey Pyatt, in a
March, 20, 2021 statement: ``Souda Bay is the jewel in the
crown of US-Greece defense cooperation . . . the unique
capacities the
Souda provides to support US presence in the strategically
dynamic East Med.'' To further demonstrate that Greece's
value extends well beyond Souda Bay:
NATO Joint-Command HQ: Thessaloniki hosts a NATO Rapid
Deployment Corps combined with its Third Army Corps for two
years.
Operation Atlantic Resolve: Greece enables a substantial
portion of the U.S. Army's 10th Combat Aviation Brigade to
enter the European theater through the port of Thessaloniki
and to depart through Alexandropoulis. Alexandroupolis is
being recognized as a city with increased geostrategic
importance, which can also contribute to economic development
and energy security.
The 101st Combat Aviation Brigade of the U.S. Army, from
October-November 20, 2020, and from February-Mar 21, 2021,
stationed and trained at Volos and Stefanovikeio.
The U.S. and Greece held a joint military exercise in May
2021 as part of a larger ``DEFENDEREurope'' program, which,
according to the U.S. Army, is ``an annual large-scale U.S.
Army-led, multinational, joint exercise designed to build
readiness and interoperability between U.S., NATO and partner
militaries.'' Greece was one of only four participating
countries whose port was used to deploy equipment into Europe
and to host a ``DEFENDER-Europe 21'' logistical center.
USAF temporarily operated MQ-9 Reaper Drones from Greece's
Larisa Air Force Base.
Increased aircraft and soldier involvement at Stefanovikio
Hellenic Army airbase improves NATO transit capability.
The trilateral naval exercise ``Noble Dina'' between the
U.S., Greece, and Israel is held annually off of the coast of
Souda Bay.
Greece is also an active participant in peacekeeping and
peace-building operations conducted by international
organizations, including the UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE. In sum,
it is evident Greece contributes significantly to U.S.
interests. AHI strongly contends these actions justify a
robust investment by the U.S. in Foreign Military Financing
assistance to Greece.
Regional Instability. The successful projection of U.S.
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean depends heavily on the
region's stability. A key to peace and stability in the
region is for good neighborly relations among NATO members
and respect for the rule of law. Therefore, the U.S. has a
stake in focusing on the problems that are detrimental to
U.S. interests and to call out those who cause instability in
the region. Turkey is the fundamental cause of instability in
the eastern Mediterranean and broader region:
Turkey's unilateral claims against sovereign Greek
territory in the Aegean which are in violation of
international law, and Turkey's refusal to refer its
unilateral claims to binding international arbitration.
Turkey's aggression against Cyprus which includes its
continuing illegal occupation of 37.3 percent of Cyprus.
Turkey's numerous incursions into Cyprus' Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), illegal drilling in Cyprus' EEZ that
were supported by Turkish warships and drones, and
demonstrated ``gunboat diplomacy.''
Turkey's continuing violations of Greece's territorial
waters and airspace, numbering over 7,000 violations in 2020,
which are in violation of international and U.S. law,
including the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). There were
4,605 airspace and 3,215 maritime incidents.
Illegal immigration via Turkey that threatens Greece's
economic development and the peace and stability of Europe.
The Turkey-Libya Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on
maritime borders, which has been resoundingly dismissed by
the international community as illegal.
Turkey's open support for Hamas, and active role in terror
financing.
Turkey's exacerbation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by
encouraging Azerbaijan's aggression against Armenia,
including transiting Syrian mercenaries with ties to jihadist
groups to fight on behalf of Azerbaijan. The threat by Turkey
of casus belli still stands, and Greece continues to register
a considerable number of formal complaints over continued
violations of the Greek airspace and territorial waters by
Turkey. In fact, Greece's Chief of the Hellenic National
Defense General Staff, General Konstantinos Floros, called
out Turkey's provocative behavior, stating to an AHI audience
on April 1, 2021, that Turkey threatens ``Greece's sovereign
rights.'' In addition, Ambassador Pyatt has called the
maritime border MoU between Turkey and Libya MoU
``unhelpful'' and ``escalatory'' in nature in previous public
statements. He also affirmed the internationally recognized
legal concept that ``inhabited islands as a matter of
customary international law are entitled to the same
treatment as continental territory.'' These reoccurring acts
by Turkey are egregious, must cease, and unnecessarily cost
the Greek government millions of dollars a year deal with the
provocative actions of a NATO member country.
Further, Turkey's continuing occupation of Cyprus, its
intransigence in solving the Cyprus problem, and its refusal
to recognize the Republic of Cyprus (a prerequisite to
Turkey's E.U. accession process), which is a member of the
European Union; are detrimental to U.S. interests and
contributes to regional instability. To illustrate, Turkey
insists on maintaining troop levels illegally on Cyprus, and
President Erdogan's promotion of a two-state solution for
Cyprus and support for illegally re-opening the beach in
Varosha inflame tensions and are in violation of
international law and United Nations Resolutions.
In addition, Turkey's actions regarding occupied Cyprus are
deeply troubling. Turkey is transforming the former Lefkoniko
Airport, located in occupied Cyprus, into a drone base,
moving Bayraktar-TB2 drones onto the complex. From occupied
Cyprus, these advanced drones are in range of Europe, North
Africa, and the Middle East, posing a threat to regional
security.
Secretary Antony Blinken, during a January 19, 2021 hearing
in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated:
``Turkey is an ally, that in many ways . . . is not acting as
an ally should and this is a very, very significant challenge
for us and we're very clear-eyed about it.''
Turkey. Turkey continues to demonstrate it is not a true
and dependable U.S. and NATO ally. The U.S. government, both
executive and legislative branches, rightly sanctioned Turkey
for its procurement of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense
system under Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in December 2020. Those penalties
should be expanded. AHI calls for the continued inclusion of
appropriations language that direct the suspension of
delivery or transfer of F-35 aircraft to Turkey until reports
detailing the impact of Turkey's purchase of the S-400
missile system from Russia on U.S. weapon systems such as the
F-35s are provided to Congress. Further, Turkey's invasion of
northeast Syria and attack upon U.S.-allied Kurds was not in
the United States' best interests and rightfully resulted in
the passage by an overwhelming vote in the U.S. House of
Protect Against Conflict by Turkey (PACT) Act to sanction
Turkey for its actions. In addition, Turkey's support for
Hamas has been evident.
President Erdogan has hosted Hamas' top leadership,
including individuals designated as global terrorists. In
doing so, Turkey is in contravention of the Arms Export
Control Act, which requires that the United States cannot
supply arms to nations that support international terrorism.
Hamas' recent attack against U.S. ally Israel only further
highlights Turkey's role as a malign regional influence.
We oppose any foreign aid for Turkey and any other
assistance programs from the United State. This includes most
favored nation trade benefits including textile quotas and
the transfer of any nuclear related assistance which we
oppose as not in the best interests of the U.S. AHI applauded
the United States' decision to terminate Turkey's designation
as a beneficiary developing country under the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) program, which became effective
May 17. 2019. AHI has long argued for this type of action by
the U.S. government, especially in testimony presented to
this House, until the following actions are taken: (1) the
immediate withdrawal of all Turkish troops from Cyprus; (2)
the prompt return to Turkey of the over 180,000 illegal
Turkish settlers in Cyprus; (3) the Turkish government's
safeguarding the Ecumenical Patriarchate, its status,
personnel and property, reopening the Halki Patriarchal
School of Theology, returning church properties illegally
seized, and the reversal of Hagia Sophia's status, returning
it to a UNESCO-designated museum; (4) the cessation of
violations against Greece's territorial integrity in the
Aegean and of its airspace; (5) the cessation of illegal
interference in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the
Republic of Cyprus; (6) Turkey must cease its support and
promotion of a ``two-state'' solution regarding Cyprus, in
violation of United Nations resolutions and the position of
the U.S. government; (7) Turkey must cease its egregious
violations of important United States laws, in particular the
Arms Export Control Act & the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Of course,
Turkey's ongoing human rights, freedom of speech, and
religious freedom violations are problematic.
Cyprus. The illegal military occupation of the Republic of
Cyprus by 40,000 Turkish troops continues. As long as the
Republic of Cyprus remains under Turkish military occupation,
a strong UN peacekeeping force must be maintained on the
island. Congress can assist the Republic of Cyprus by
reaffirming the United States' position that assistance
appropriated for Cyprus should support measures aimed at
solidifying the reunification of Cyprus and the unified
government in Cyprus. It would provide a settlement, should
it be achieved, with a chance to succeed. Therefore, AHI
recommends the following language from Title III of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 be included in the
FY2022 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations bill:
Assistance provided to Cyprus under this Act should
foremost ensure that the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in
Cyprus (UNFICYP) can fully implement its mandate, while
remaining available to also contribute to the creation of a
conducive environment for the settlement talks under the
auspices of the UN Secretary General's Good Offices.
Furthermore, in the event of reunification, further
assistance should be used to contribute towards the cost of
reunification, including towards monitoring provisions,
facilitation for settlement of the property issue, supporting
and underpinning the new federal structures of a reunified
island and assisting with the construction of a strong
unified Cypriot economy able to cope with
the new challenges, and strengthening the contacts between
the two communities as conducive to reunification, in a way
agreed to between the United States and Cyprus.
The last UN-led attempt, which took place in Crans-Montana
in 2017, aimed to achieve a just and viable solution to the
near 47-year division of the Republic of Cyprus, ended
without reaching an agreement because of Turkish
intransigence. Instead of helping to provide stability by
promoting a just settlement supported by both Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot communities, Turkey continued to insist
on antiquated and obstructive stances, such as its insistence
to maintain the Treaty of Guarantee with a right of future
unilateral Turkish military intervention.
More recently, during the latest 5+1 informal meeting in
Geneva at the end of April 2021, aiming to assess whether
there was sufficient common ground for the resumption of the
negotiations, Turkey fundamentally changed its official
position on the form of settlement of the Cyprus problem,
insisting on a ``two-state-solution'' to solidify its
occupation of the island, contrary to UN Security Council
resolutions and the stated position of the United States
government.
Furthermore, Turkey hinders the humanitarian work of the
Committee on Missing Persons (a previous recipient of USAID
support) by denying access to areas under its occupation,
including Turkish military zones, in order to excavate for
the remains of 996 Cypriots still missing (including four
U.S. citizens) following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in
1974.
Congress should call on Ankara to constructively support
the reunification efforts, in accordance with the UN Security
Council Resolutions calling for a bizonal, bicommunal
federation, as well as for a solution that embodies the full
respect of the principles and laws of the European Union, of
which Cyprus is a member state. The new state of affairs
ought lo safeguard that a reunified Cyprus would have a
single international legal personality, a single sovereignty
and a single citizenship. Finally, AHI welcomed Secretary of
State Antony Blinken's testimony to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on March 10, 2021, where he stated ``American
diplomacy will be fully engaged'' on the issue of a Cyprus
settlement.
AHI is also concerned with energy security. AHI contends
the U.S. must continue to support the sovereign rights of the
Republic of Cyprus to explore and develop the resources
within its EEZ free of any third-party interference and to
underscore the importance of avoiding any actions that
escalate tension. As mentioned, Turkey's threats in Cyprus'
EEZ endanger U.S. companies. In addition, Turkey's illegal
actions in Cyprus' EEZ raise tensions and security concerns,
hindering any real chance for the resumption of settlement
talks.
International Military Education & Training (IMET)--Greece
and Cyprus. AHI recommends FY2022 funding for Greece's IMET
program at $1.5 million and the Republic of Cyprus's IMET
program at $500,000. The recommended funding levels are in
line with the authorization of appropriations passed in The
Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act.
For Greece, the country experienced 11 fiscal years (FY2006-
FY2017) of a steady decline of its IMET funding levels. It
resulted in the drastic decrease in the number of Greek
military students participating in the program. An investment
of $1.5 million in FY22 will help address that 11-year
decline in funding, but more investment is needed to make up
for ``lost time.'' For the Republic of Cyprus, which received
its first IMET program funding in FY21, it is critical to
continue this investment in FY22. It will be the next step in
a series of positive developments since the Statement of
Intent that the U.S. and Republic of Cyprus signed in
November 2018. Since then, Cyprus has assigned a defense
attache to the Embassy in Washington, the Cyprus Center for
Land, Open-Seas, and Port Security (CYCLOPS), an innovative
security site that has been partially funded by the U.S., is
scheduled to begin operations in January 2022; and the U.S.
implemented a partial lifting of an arms prohibition on
Cyprus. The U.S. must fully and permanently lift its arms
prohibition on Cyprus and remove Cyprus from the list of
countries to which arms sales are prohibited under
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and calls
for appropriations language to direct this of the U.S.
Department of State.
The IMET program advances the professional military
education of the Greek and Cypriot Armed Forces. It enhances
interoperability with U.S. forces, and in Greece's case, NATO
forces. Through the training of Greek and Cypriot military
and noncommissioned officers in a multitude of professional
military education and technical courses in the U.S., IMET
offers strong U.S.-Greece and U.S.-Republic of Cyprus mil-to-
mil relations. It is an effective and wise investment toward
a key component of U.S. security assistance. It also helps
the U.S. because it contributes toward the strengthening of
U.S. security interests in an important part of the world by
training and promoting the professionalization of the Greek
and Cypriot Armed Forces.
Thank you for the opportunity to present them in our
written testimony to the House.