Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, in the debate over whether we should be supporting or withdrawing our support from the President's plan to surge over 20,000 more troops into…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, in the debate over whether we should be supporting or withdrawing our support from the President's plan to surge over 20,000 more troops into Iraq, I am acutely aware of one overriding irony. Those who are seeking to begin the withdrawal from Iraq are committing the same conceptual error that many of the same critics have accused the administration of committing when they made their flawed plans for the invasion of Iraq. They are not thinking about what will happen on the day after we begin our withdrawal.
Let me say that the situation in which we find ourselves today in Iraq is certainly in part due to the administration's failure to anticipate many variables in the Iraqi theater, in the region, and in Iraqi society. Those who prepared only for the military defeat of Saddam's forces committed such a profound error that it will be a lesson learned in the history books long after we are gone.
We did not prepare for the vehemence with which certain elements of the displaced Sunni elite would fight to retain their status quo.
We did not anticipate how fractured and weak the oppressed Shia society of Iraq would be once the dictator was deposed, and we did not appreciate how unprepared the Shia would be to present true leadership.
And we did not anticipate, because we apparently did not plan for this, that a political and leadership vacuum created by the fall of Saddam would invite the influence of Iran, whose interests in Iraq are anything but charitable.
The mistakes that we have read so much about--the failure to secure massive ammunition dumps, the peremptory disbanding of the Iraqi army, the sweeping de-Baathification policies that alienated many Sunnis not directly responsible for the Saddam's tyranny--all of these mistakes derive from our failure to think about what would happen in Iraq the day after Saddam fell. It was a much more profound mistake than not sending enough troops; we simply did not imagine that we would be facing problems that would require more troops.
Thinking of what was the most fundamental criticisms of our failures to anticipate the terror of September 11, I am reminded of the 9/11 Commission's conclusion that we did not have the imagination to prepare for that attack.
In Iraq, where our imagination failed again, a thorough understanding of Iraqi history and society should have helped.
I am not talking about rehashing the history of imperialists, who would argue to justify their creation of the unnatural state of Iraq, or who would argue about the superiority of one sect over the other.
I am not talking about the history as told by anthropologists, who argue about ancient fights and long-simmering disputes.
A thorough study and understanding of Iraq would have required us-- and the top policymakers of this administration--to understand the complexity of Iraqi society as it was in 2003. And if we had done so, we would have had the imagination to prepare for the many contingencies that quite naturally developed when we so boldly sought to change the status quo.
We know that we had next to no intelligence on Iraq--and if you have read the latest NIE on Iraq put out last Friday, you will be dismayed, as I am, to read that we have very little more intelligence today.
But how about open source knowledge on which we could have made more careful assessments of what to expect the day after the tyrant toppled?
It was a tragic mistake to underestimate the role of criminality underpinning Saddam's regime in its last decrepit days, a criminality that was unleashed immediately after we invaded and which has added great complexity to the conflict among the many armed groups in Iraq today.
But we should not have underestimated the reluctance with which the Sunnis would accept their new de-classed position in Iraq.
We should not have overestimated the ability of the Shia, with no political experience, to assume political power. Had we properly assumed the difficulties that we would have faced, we should have been prepared for a period of instability, during which the neighbor to the east, Iran, would not sit idle.
I say this because I cannot support the administration today without honestly assessing what happened in the preparation and implementation of this war over 4 years ago.
And now, 4 years later, the Senate has determined to take up an increasingly partisan debate over what to do to prevent losing the Iraq war.
And we are now debating a variety of what I hope will be non-binding resolutions in response to the President's announcement to surge 21,500 troops into the Iraq conflict.
This is an extremely somber moment in the history of this nation. We find ourselves in the midst of a war that it appears some still do not fully understand. It is a war whose dynamics and politics are completely in flux, and with the consequences of both our actions in the field--as well as in our politics right here--being profound for the Iraqi people, the Middle East region and our national security.
Make no mistake: What we do communicate is America's political will, and our political will is directly related to the morale of our troops. Those who seek to, for rhetorical purposes only, assert their support of the troops while communicating their opposition to their mission cannot sever this natural connection between political will and morale.
While it is always good for the Senate to debate great matters of war and peace--and, indeed, there are no more important matters--the imbalance between partisan rhetoric and substantive direction on this question has been, to my mind, unsettling. A perilous state of war in Iraq is not improved by the partisan level of debate here.
I have watched the course of this conflict with increasing concern and dismay.
As I said, I have been profoundly disappointed in realizing the errors we have made in implementing this war.
I have been greatly dismayed in the failure of the Iraqi people to resist the descent into sectarian violence, and their failure to demand leadership from their elected leaders.
I have been horrified by the level of barbarism. I have not been surprised, I must say, by the Sunni jihadists, whose barbarism should be well known by now, but by Shia militias, who, operating under a government dominated by the Iraqi Shia for the first time in modern Iraq's history, seem to operate without restraint or morality by their authorities in their nihilistic persecution of their real and perceived enemies. I can understand the sense of revenge one must feel when one has been
released from decades of oppression; I can understand the anger and despair one feels when one's family is targeted for murder; I can appreciate the rage when one's shrines and mosques are bombed. I will never understand a revenge that takes as its victims other innocents and noncombatants.
The American people have been shocked by this level of brutality as well--but we shouldn't call it mindless, because in the diabolic minds of the Sunni al-Qaida and ex-Baathist perpetrators, it has a reason: to push Iraq into chaos. In the minds of the bloody Shia militia leaders like Moqtada al-Sadr, there is also a rationale: Their militias complete the cyclical logic of barbarism.
In this cycle is perpetuated a nihilistic violence that will so destabilize Iraq that the Sunni jihadists will be able to create a safehaven where they will expand their reach and refocus on their long- term goals. They are succeeding, and if they succeed they will focus on us.
In this cycle is perpetuated a nihilistic violence that will so destabilize Iraq that the Shia will be left so victimized and subject to militia rule that Iran will further assert its influence to undermine this fledgling nation. If post-Saddam Iraq succeeds, its success would provide the Shia world with an alternate model to the corrupt and failing regime in Tehran. If it fails, Tehran will have a field in which to meddle for years.
The Iraqi Shia, so traumatized by years of oppression under Saddam, and traumatized--let us be perfectly honest about this--by America misleading them and neglecting them in their hour of need immediately after the first gulf war--have failed to stand up and present political figures who can assert leadership instead of political impotence.
Iran is not a passive player here, no.
It is not in Iran's interest for the Iraqi Shia to build a strong, independent, Shia Arab state.
It is not in Iran's interest to have the seminaries of Najaf and Karbala returned to their central position in the world of Shia scholarship, possibly eclipsing Qum. To have this occur would lessen the legitimacy Iran desperately needs as ideological cover for Persian supremacy. The Iraqi Shia, Arabs who were the rank-and-file cannon fodder in the 8-year war against Iran, are now left open to Iran's meddling by their own weak government.
The Sunnis, Iraqi and others throughout the region, are quick to tell us we have fallen into a preexisting and ancient conflict between the Arabs and the Persians, and the Iraqi Shia and their seemingly hapless leaders are caught in between. And that is where we find ourselves today.
Now the Senate is to respond to the policy advanced by the President before the Nation on January 10.
We are to express approval or disapproval to the President's initiative in the middle of a war like this Nation has never faced. At a moment when the situation in Iraq is critical and the outcome is uncertain, some believe our excercise here will provide valuable clarity.
As I have said, it is fitting that the Senate debate this war.
From the day we passed a resolution authorizing the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein the fall of 2002, it has been fitting to debate this war, and we have, through many floor speeches and amendments to authorizing or appropriating legislation. Whether it is fitting that we respond to the President's latest change in military strategy with these resolutions is another matter.
I have paid a great deal of attention to the hearings held before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. I thank and commend the chairmen and ranking minority members of both committees for the many opportunities for substantive review they have sought to present to us and to the American public.
Dozens of substantive testimonies have been submitted, and the questioning has been, in many cases, direct and detailed.
As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have also had the opportunity to listen to the opinions of the leaders of the intelligence community, and I have read the reports coming from Iraq including, most recently, the National Intelligence Estimate released last Friday.
The public needs to be reminded: There are no silver bullets, no glowing assessments, no confident predictions.
Surrounding this debate, there is a level of political taunting amongst ourselves that I find troubling.
From the majority leader, I hear public pronouncements of 21 Republican seats to be defended in 2008--and I find it disturbing that anyone would question that a Senator of any party would hinge his or her voice on such momentous policy problems for the purpose of personal political survival.
Does anyone doubt that the November election in 2008 is a world away from the carnage of Iraq today?
Can anyone predict with certainty what the situation will be in Iraq almost 2 years from now?
I do not like the rhetoric of ``cut and run'' any more than I like the rhetoric accusing members of my party for ``heading for the tall grass.''
Lives are in balance and we should not be throwing around glib rhetoric.
In that sense, the exclamation of a member of my party 2 weeks ago that we should all be accountable on these resolutions or go be shoe salesmen has a certain urgency, although I do not condescend to the working man, a good many of whom are fighting in this war as we speak.
Nor do I believe that if I go and buy a pair of shoes from a good shoe salesman today that those shoes will not last longer and give better value than some of the resolutions being bandied about today, to be forgotten months from now when the war will bring to us either the reality of some progress toward stability, more stalemate in strife or even greater chaos.
One should predict the future with caution and humility. But, I can make one prediction here, particularly to those on the other side of the aisle: Iraq will be a central issue before this Congress, and before the next administration, in 2009.
We cannot make it go away before then. There is no way that a withdrawal begun now will leave a new administration free from the policy problems presented by Iraq.
So we should liberate ourselves right now from seeking partisan advantage, because as much as some may wish to walk away from Iraq, its relevance to our security and standing is not going to diminish. Not for a long time.
I will support the President's plan for this surge, and I will support any resolution that articulates such support, provided I can agree with all of its language. In doing so, I am acutely aware that the situation we are addressing is at least in some part a function of policy failures committed by this administration.
Admitting this, I have to say that I am unaware, through my reading of American military and diplomatic history, of any conflict in the midst of which our leaders saw clearly the end. Rarely have outcomes been perceivable through the shifting tactics and circumstances that war presented in the moment of greatest chaos.
Many times, in hot wars and cold wars, we have reassessed and changed policy.
Retroactive analysis and accountability are important--sometimes it is critical to understand minor and major mistakes in order to correct flawed policy--but the challenge is to seek the policy amongst the realistic options that will best deliver us to our goals for the future, not to sink in self-satisfying denunciations of the past.
I have read each of these resolutions carefully. I oppose the original Biden amendment, because I fundamentally disagree with it.
Its first resolution clause states:
It is not in the national interest of the U.S. to deepen
its military involvement in Iraq, particularly by escalating
the United States military force presence in Iraq.
I deeply disagree.
Not only does this set up a potential constitutional conflict between the executive and legislature as to who runs foreign policy in a war, its intent is to inhibit the President from trying to improve the situation in Iraq at a perilous time. Further, to maintain the status quo in Iraq, as this clause implies, is to guarantee greater chaos in Iraq.
If the opponents of the President want to force a withdrawal, shouldn't they say so directly?
The second clause of the original Biden resolution stated:
The primary objective of U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to
have the Iraqi political leaders make the political
compromises necessary to end the violence in Iraq.
When I read this, I have to ask, where have the authors of this language been? That was our strategy, which we tried mightily, from 2004 until last year: to let politics lead the way to security. But the forces of insurgency and chaos overwhelmed the fledgling political process and now we clearly realize we have to implement and achieve security before we can regain political process.
Am I the only one here who finds it ironic that critics of the administration who support this resolution appear to be advocating a policy that has failed?
The next clause reads:
Greater concerted regional and international support would
assist the Iraqis in achieving a political and national
reconciliation.
This is not a policy option, but a dreamer's delusion. It is true, in the abstract, that international support would be greatly beneficial to the Iraqis. But if you look at the region, this dream of international cooperation is not based on reality. Aspirations should not substitute for harsh reality.
Then the resolution states:
Main elements of the mission of the U.S. forces in Iraq
should transition to helping ensure the territorial integrity
of Iraq, conduct counterterrorism activities, reduce regional
interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, and accelerate
training of Iraqi troops.
But, we are conducting counterterrorist activities, and the fight in al-Anbar for which the President has requested a small number of this surge is exactly for that. But this resolution disapproves of that, if you are to re-read the first clause. We are accelerating training, but we have learned that, if you are going to do it right, you can't speed it up beyond a certain point.
To paraphrase my colleague, the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Bond, who has said of rushed intelligence assessments:
If you want it bad, you're going to get it . . . bad.
If we rush the training, as we have seen, we're going to get ineffective results. If our training of the Iraqi security forces is to be effective and successful, we need to take the time to do it right.
I am all for reducing regional interference, but to do so might mean exercising power and influence, and critics of this President have a conniption if you suggest anything other than a diplomatic tea party with Syria or Iran.
And I do not consider it wise to commit to the territorial integrity of Iraq. We should be agnostic about this question, and recent history should keep us humble against knee-jerk commitments to territorial lines drawn by imperial powers. A previous Bush administration fumbled on the wrong side of history in the last days of the Cold War when it argued against ``suicidal nationalism'' at a time when the Soviet Union was dissolving. A failure to recognize that Yugoslavia was a false state led the U.S. to delay for years an involvement that could have saved hundreds of thousands of civilian lives.
If a soft partition could be achieved without bloodshed, I would support that in Iraq, although no one has figured out how to do that, yet, and it remains unclear whether Iraqis themselves, particularly urbanized Iraqis, desire this or could survive a bloody partition.
But I repeat: If I could imagine a nonviolent partition implemented by an international organization that would have the support of the Iraqi people, I would rather find the billions to do that than the billions to fight a war. In the case of finding financial resources for soft partition, I would expect we would have a somewhat better response from the international community than we are having now.
The next resolution clause states:
The U.S. should transfer, under an appropriately expedited
timeline, responsibility for internal security and halting
sectarian violence in Iraq to the Government of Iraq and
Iraqi security forces.
But just because we want to shed ourselves of this war does not mean we can immediately stand up Iraqi security forces. We have been trying to do that, and it is taking time. This clause is, in effect, purely aspirational. It makes us feel good, but it doesn't change the reality on the ground.
The final clause states:
The U.S. should engage nations in the Middle East to
develop a regional, internationally-sponsored peace and
reconciliation process for Iraq.
Mr. President, who are the players in the Middle East who are both: (a) sympathetic to the Iraqi cause, and (b) strong enough to be effective?
No country meets both of these simple conditions.
They aren't there. It is too typical of the critics of this administration to substitute the process of diplomacy for the substance of hard policy choices.
Now, I do not oppose diplomacy. It is a legitimate tool in the tool kit. But diplomacy must always be part of a broader policy. Before I would support this administration's diplomatic initiative toward Iran, I would want to see a comprehensive Iran policy. However late in the day, the administration appears to to be forming such a policy, and it appears to include elements of confrontation and competition, as well as a clearly stated solicitation for more constructive relations, as any sound and sophisticated policy should.
If we are to sit down with Iran while Iran is continuing with a program for nuclear development, continues to be the No. 1 state sponsor of terrorism in the world, continues to undermine the stability in Lebanon, and is working against the coalition's forces in Iraq, I would want those Iranian diplomats that we are sipping tea with to know that we are competing and challenging them on all of those fronts. It would be foolish to talk to Iran simply hoping we could convince the Iranians to see the world our way.
The nations of the region with whom we are close do support the peace and reconciliation in Iraq. And those nations want us to remain in Iraq until the situation is stabilized. Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia--none of those governments want us to leave Iraq the way it is now. But Syria and Iran and al-Qaida, too--they want us to leave, and leave behind chaos they can exploit.
My colleague and good friend, Senator Warner, has made an effort to write a resolution that smoothed away some of the aspects of the original Biden legislation which I find I cannot support.
In particular, the senior Senator from Virginia recognizes, in the first clause, the President's foreign policy prerogative, while somewhat ambiguously also stating that the resolution's intent is not ``to question or contravene'' the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.
I say ``ambiguously,'' because Senator Warner's first resolution clause is remarkably similar to Senator Biden's:
The Senate disagrees with the plan to augment our forces
and urges the President to consider all options and
alternatives for achieving the strategic goals set forth
below.
It seems to me, however, that adding troops to meet the goals the President has set--achieving a zone of security in Baghdad from which the Iraqi political leadership can assert its leadership and implement essential policies--is a major option that the Warner resolution precludes.
Further, Senator Warner's resolution strongly supports our efforts against Sunni jihadists, including al-Qaida, in Anbar Province, as I do.
Senator Warner and the cosponsors of his resolution, however, do not want to see us in between the various sects fighting in Baghdad.
I have to ask: If we are to encourage the anti-al-Qaida Sunni elements in Anbar to join us in a fight to eradicate al-Qaida, what credibility do we have to do so if we are standing by while Sunni jihadists target Shia in Baghdad, and Shia militias slaughter Sunnis in response?
Part of how we got here is by not imagining the way the perpetrators of sectarian strife calculate. We can't continue to fail to understand this dynamic, nor to believe that we can ignore it.
I will support the President's surge strategy because I believe there is a reasonable chance--reasonable, not guaranteed--that a strong military presence that has open rules of engagement to attack insurgents, militias and other criminal elements may create a zone of calm and security for Baghdad. This goal is to create the
space for political leaders to make effective decisions on oil resources, federalism, economic development and other critical issues to entice the majority of the Iraqis into believing there is an alternative to civil war.
Such a period of calm, if achieved, is essential not only for the political system to assert itself, but for us to complete the majority of our training of Iraqi security forces.
If we are to succeed, we won't be able to do it alone. The Iraqi Sunnis are going to have to lead in defeating the foreigners who are terrorizing them in their homes in western Iraq and leading the attacks against Shia in Baghdad.
The Sunnis will have to lead in ejecting al-Qaida, as they have begun to do so.
The Sunnis, not the Shia, are going to have to definitively expose and defeat the former Baathists who have not accepted that the Baath era is over.
The Sunni will have to address this challenge, not the Shia.
And the Shia, not the Sunni, are going to have to lead in ending the terror of the Shia militias.
The Shia are going to have to defeat those who claim to advance the Shia cause by revenge, by torture, by barbarism. If the Maliki government fails to muster the political will to do so, we cannot impose it from the outside.
Perhaps the Iraqi government can finally make progress toward building institutions that will sustain a unified Iraq, toward passing legislation that will divide Iraq's enormous natural resources equitably among the three ethnicities, that will open the civil society to Sunnis, instead of punishing them indiscriminately for their dominance during the Baath era.
Perhaps.
But if not, this Nation and this administration should not be irrationally wedded to the notion of a unitary state of Iraq. We need to imagine all options, rather than cling to ideas which may have departed from the realm of reasonable options.
I will support this surge because the option right now of withdrawing leaves three critical questions unanswered:
No. 1: How do we continue the fight against foreign Sunni extremists, including al-Qaida, in the west of Iraq?
No. 2: Are we to leave a fractured Shia substate unstable enough for Iran to exert expansionist influence, thereby strengthening Tehran?
No. 3: Are we prepared as a nation to see a bloodbath ensue, in Baghdad and elsewhere, that may make other American foreign policy failures--Budapest in 1956, Vietnam in 1975, the Shia slaughter after we ejected Saddam from Kuwait in 1991--pale in comparison?
As I said at the beginning of this speech, the critics' attempts to set the stage for withdrawal commits the same strategic blunder they legitimately accuse the Bush administration of making in its implementation of the Iraq war. They didn't think of the day after Saddam fell. Today the critics are not thinking of the day after we withdraw.
Today, however, we need to recognize that worse than the vanity about easy victory committed in 2003 is the denial of calamitous defeat that would occur if we leave before we make every attempt to stabilize the country.
For this reason, I will support the administration, but I will do so under no casual assumptions or glib assurances.
I will also do so by demanding that the administration be much more forthcoming in its plans for the day after--the day after we complete our surge into Baghdad, the day after we can honestly assess that Baghdad has been pacified, and heaven forbid, the day after we assess that the chaos unleashed and manipulated by the forces of destruction are prohibiting a meaningful and comprehensive success.
I am not conceding defeat, nor preparing for withdrawal.
I am supporting a strategy for success. So far, President Bush--who has a lot to answer for the mistakes that have been made--is offering the only way to try to leave Iraq in better shape than it is now.
He has my support, and I urge my colleagues to join me.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.