Mortgage Reform And Anti-Predatory Lending Act
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. Mr. Chairman, in 2007 this bill passed the House with no subsequent action in the Senate. Since then, the Federal Reserve has finalized rules establishing a new category of ``high-priced…
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, in 2007 this bill passed the House with no subsequent action in the Senate. Since then, the Federal Reserve has finalized rules establishing a new category of ``high-priced mortgages'' under HOEPA that will virtually eliminate all subprime lending.
When the Fed released these new regulations, Chairman Frank described the Fed's response to tighten the HOEPA restrictions as a ``very strong consumer protection position.'' I have heard the arguments made by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle that the Fed's regulations eliminating all subprime lending don't go far enough, that even more lending in the marketplace needs to be eliminated. Now, I say ``eliminated'' instead of ``prohibited'' because by defining a class of loans under HOEPA, you are essentially killing that class of loans, never mind the fact that they may be a reasonable option for a number of consumers.
Now, I say ``eliminate'' because these loans under HOEPA are simply not originated, financed, or securitized in a normal marketplace, much less the severely restricted marketplace we currently have in lending that is very clear to the American people. The reason why there is not lending under HOEPA is due to the significant risk of loss on the holder of these loans.
In 2006, when we had a normal functioning mortgage marketplace, of the 10 million loans made, less than 1 percent were HOEPA loans. By expanding the loans that would fall under HOEPA even further than the Fed has already done, we would be killing options for millions of people to get future lending and ensuring that in an already restricted marketplace, things will become even more restricted.
Mr. Chairman, Members need to ask themselves, if the marketplace for mortgages is going to become so heavily regulated, further regulated with so many new protections included in the rest of this bill, then why in the world do we need title III of this bill? My amendment strikes title III.
During the committee hearing earlier this month, Massachusetts Bank Supervisor Steven Antonakes expressed his concern that the dramatic expansion of HOEPA will result in much fewer loans being made. Is this really the direction the Congress wants to take right now, further restricting the mortgage marketplace?
Mr. Chairman, I ask support of my colleagues for striking title III of this bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
As a proponent of the legislation, do I have the right to close?
Mr. Chairman, in summation, my colleague from North Carolina has made the argument why you should strike section III. His quote is, ``Yes, we intend to limit choices, Mr. Chairman.'' I think that is the wrong attitude this Congress should take.
The fact is, for those that have less than perfect credit, this section of the legislation will hamper their ability to get mortgages and purchase homes. That is the simple fact. In fact, my colleague from North Carolina says that, yes, they intend to limit choices, they want to eliminate choices in the marketplace for lending and for further restricting lending. I think that is the wrong path, Mr. Chairman. I think that is the wrong attitude this Congress should take. I think it limits choices for our consumers.
Mr. Chairman, when this becomes law, if we do not strike this section, Members will have to go home and answer to their constituents, Why can't I get the lending I need to purchase a home? And we can point to this very vote on whether or not they are in favor of more options in the marketplace or fewer, restricting choices, restricting opportunities, eliminating certain types of mortgages in the marketplace. I think we should eliminate section III.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.