Intelligence Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2010
Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume. The fourth time for this bill on the floor is not the charm. This continues the process of bringing badly thought through, badly formed legislation on intel to the floor of the…
Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.
The fourth time for this bill on the floor is not the charm. This continues the process of bringing badly thought through, badly formed legislation on intel to the floor of the House of Representatives.
This is the fourth rule that we've considered this year as we've gone through this process. It is interesting that this bill is titled the fiscal year 2010 authorization. It's September 29. Tomorrow is September 30. Maybe the President will sign this bill if we pass it tonight, meaning that much of the bill will be meaningless, or only in effect for 6 to 8 hours, maybe 10.
This bill, I don't believe, Mr. Chairman, even has a classified annex. It was the one thing that we agreed on, on a bipartisan basis, as to how funding for the bill, or for the intelligence community and different agencies within the intelligence community, at what level they would be funded. Again, it's one part where we had bipartisan agreement. It's gone. We're now just authorizing the expenditures as done through the appropriations committee. Members have no time to review the classified annex. There was no classified annex outlining these specific appropriations levels by different organizations within the intelligence community. Nothing for the Members to review.
The notifications, it's a fig leaf. It says the administration still shall determine who shall be informed of what and when.
We had stronger language before, accepted on a bipartisan basis. Now all the administration has to do is notify other people that the Gang of Four or the Gang of Eight has been notified of certain information, but they don't have to disclose. They have to outline why, but there is no requirement for more complete exposure.
It is a fig leaf that may serve as a justification for dealing with a complaint that was made by the Speaker of the House in May of 2009. The Speaker of this House said the CIA ``misleads us all the time.'' You know, we've asked for more of an explanation on that. The chairman of the committee and the chairwoman of the subcommittee in October 2009 said that they were going to do a notification and a covert action investigation--as far as I can tell, it has never happened, and it is not complete after almost a year now--to find out if there were problems with notification and if it were true that, as the Speaker claimed, the CIA misleads us all the time. So, in one way, we are providing something that may serve in dealing with this allegation by the Speaker.
At the same time, we have CIA employees around the world who did what the administration asked them to do and what previous administrations notified Congress they were doing about what they were going to do to keep America safe. They notified, and took Congress through that in great detail. The people went through that notification process in great detail, understanding that, when they left, if the administration had had a problem with it, they ought to have stood up and said, ``We've got issues with these, and we need to work through them.'' Instead, there was either silence or affirmation that what the CIA and what these individuals within the CIA were doing was appropriate, was necessary and was supported by the political leadership of this Nation as being their best intent to keep us safe.
So, while this bill may serve to provide some people with political cover, it does nothing to protect the CIA employees who now, for the third time, are under review by the Justice Department as to whether they should be prosecuted for doing what the political leadership of this country asked them to do.
Where is the equality? Where is the fairness? How does this serve our national interest by allowing these people to continue to be hung out, facing possible prosecution? It is wrong. It is inappropriate. It should have been dealt with in this bill.
I will detail a number of other issues that also need to be dealt with, but at this point in time, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, at this time, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly).
(Mr. GALLEGLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
At this time, I yield 5 minutes to my colleague from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
I yield myself 1 minute.
Madam Speaker, I find it interesting that people talk about, we are bringing fiscal responsibility back to the Intelligence Committee. There's not even a classified annex which outlines the spending that this committee believes each of the agencies should have for running their operations for fiscal year 2010. As I said earlier, that's one area where we had bipartisan agreement. That's been taken out. That's gone. We are not providing any type of fiscal direction to the intelligence community by telling them what we believe our priorities are.
The other interesting thing, as we go through this process, is that in the bill 2 years ago, we had a bipartisan vote on the floor. We adopted an amendment that I offered to prohibit the use of authorized funds for earmark purposes. As you take a look here, we've authorized everything that the Appropriations Committee has done. What has the Appropriations Committee done? Lots of earmarks in the intelligence bill.
I yield 4 minutes to my colleague from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
I yield the gentleman 30 additional seconds.
Madam Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Madam Speaker, let's talk about what should have been in this bill and what this bill does do and what it doesn't do.
We all know that the face of terrorism is changing. We have seen Fort
Hood, we have seen the attempted attack in Detroit, we have seen the attempted attack at Times Square. We know that terrorism is changing.
This bill is based on the past. There were reports that came out after these attacks and attempted attacks on the United States outlining changes that they thought needed to be made. As terrorism changed, intelligence policies needed to change as well.
The recommendations included improving the systems that deal with information, information sharing, terrorist screening, watch lists, watch list criteria, and those types of things. That's not dealt with in this bill. It is on the sidelines, even though the threat has evolved.
My colleagues have clearly articulated that, by doing nothing, we now open the possibility for Gitmo folks to come to the United States. We open the possibility and the likelihood that once again terror suspects overseas will be Mirandized.
Where is there a provision in this bill that would regulate covert actions that may impact U.S. citizens? Where is the bipartisan part of this bill, the classified annex, the part that we did agree? It was tossed.
Why wasn't there a conference on this bill? Why couldn't we go and have a meaningful discussion and debate involving all the parties about what would make a good intelligence bill?
When did Members meet to discuss the bipartisan agreement that has been claimed in the Senate amendment? They didn't meet. This is a short-circuited process that didn't address and doesn't address the top issues that needed to be addressed to keep America safe.
Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
There aren't a lot of things in this bill. The chairman is absolutely right. Lots of things that should be in this bill. There should be a classified annex. There should be something that outlines our committee's response to what many believe are actions that are being carried out by the government through covert means that affect Americans overseas. This committee should take a stand on that position or on that issue.
This committee should take a stand on Mirandizing. This committee should take a stand on Gitmo. This committee should take a stand on the things that groups who have taken a look at what is happening to terrorism and have recommended changes that be made to keep America safe. And that is a reason why we are opposed to this bill.
We know what is in the bill, and we know what is not. The things that would keep America safe and safer in a changing environment are not in this bill.
I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
I reserve the balance of my time.
I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to work with you on the committee. I am disappointed that we did not get to agreement on this bill and that we are at different places on what is a very important piece of legislation to keep America safe.
I wish you the best in your future in Congress, as I leave this institution and as I leave the House Intelligence Committee. It has been a great honor to serve on this committee and do the work that we have tried to do to keep America safe.
You know, there are things that I wish we would have gotten done as we structured this bill that would have enabled us to move forward in a bipartisan basis.
There have been a number of investigations, beginning in 2007 dealing with the tapes investigation, dealing with detention, dealing with interrogation. I wish those investigations had been completed and reports would have been issued, and that we would have used the findings of those reports and those investigations to improve this bill.
I wish that we would have continued to move forward in a way that, a few years ago, in a bipartisan basis, this House said we are not going to put earmarks into intelligence bills.
I wish that we as a committee would have taken a position in repudiating a position that the President of the United States took soon after he assumed office which said he was going to close Gitmo and move the detainees from Guantanamo, move them into the United States. I wish we had said in this bill that we would have continued that prohibition on moving and expending any funds for moving people from Guantanamo into the United States. That is now an open question as to whether that may or may not happen.
I wish that in this bill we would have taken a position and said that it is inappropriate to Mirandize terrorists captured overseas, in many ways, I believe, giving them more legal rights than what we give to our own employees of the CIA.
CIA employees that do face perhaps the possibility of being prosecuted, I wish we would have said in this bill, these people have been investigated twice, they did what the leadership and the political leadership of this country asked them to do, and we will now protect them and say no, no funds will be used to prosecute them for the things that leadership in the United States of America asked them to do to keep us safe.
I wish we would have clearly said that we repudiate the policy of this administration where they for a period of time said, ``We are not going to use the word `terrorism' anymore. We are going to wipe the slate clean, and we are not going to use that language. We are now going to call terrorism `manmade disasters.' ''
We all know that if you don't correctly identify the threat that you face, you will never be able to contain it, confront it, and defeat it.
I wish that we would have taken a strong position in this bill in response to what happened at Fort Hood. Remember at Fort Hood, for months after the attack at Fort Hood, where 14 Americans were brutally murdered, this administration refused to recognize that this might be related to terrorism or the threats that we face from overseas.
We now know that in this and other terrorist attacks, as this face of terrorism changes, that in Fort Hood and other instances, Anwar al- Awlaki, associated with al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, played a part. We maybe don't know exactly how big of a part, but whether it was Fort Hood, whether it was the Christmas Day attack or what happened at Times Square, al-Awlaki may have been involved in some if not all of these attacks, and we know that al-Awlaki, bin Laden and all of these individuals continue to plan attacks against the U.S., against our allies in Europe, and against other friends around the planet.
These are all things that needed to be done in this bill. These are all things that needed to be done if we were going to keep America safer.
Right now, we all see and read about the fact that there is heightened awareness of threats, a heightened threat alert in Europe and in the United States, because we sense that there is an urgency by the radical jihadists to attack the West and to attack them again. This bill needed to meet that standard of addressing a changing environment, a changing threat level.
We see that happening. And my fear is that sometime in the future people are going to say Congress came up short. They didn't connect the dots one more time. They didn't connect the dots of threats coming out of Pakistan, coming out of Somalia, coming out of northern Africa, coming out of the Arabian peninsula. They didn't clearly understand the changing face of terrorism. They didn't learn the lessons from Fort Hood. They didn't learn the lessons from Christmas Day. They didn't learn the lessons from Times Square. Because the people who investigated those said, These are the types of things that we need to do to keep
America safe. And as we close out a fiscal year, Congress acted; but it didn't act on the lessons learned. Why didn't they act? Didn't they really have all the knowledge? Didn't they really connect the dots? I think we have the information. We could have connected the dots better. We needed to connect the dots better because each and every day the threats that we face change and adapt.
The challenge that we have as a Nation, that we have as an intelligence community is to design an intelligence community, to design an intelligence capability that is one step ahead of the challenges that we face, not one or two steps behind. The face of terrorism is changing. This bill doesn't put us out in front of dealing with those threats. It leaves us behind. That's why I am disappointed in this bill. That's why I am voting ``no,'' and I encourage my colleagues to vote ``no,'' because we need to do better than what is in this bill.
Having a bill with no classified annex providing no direction is not an authorization bill. Much more needs to be done. I wish and I hope that we can send this bill back, vote it down and improve it, and do what this country needs and what this country demands from us to keep America safe.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I would like to note for the Record my specific objections in several respects with the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act ``agreement'' that was passed by the Senate and agreed to by the Administration based on a Staff draft, and that now may come before the House just two days before the end of that fiscal year after repeated delays. The bill is completely unnecessary and moot for the purposes of authorizing intelligence activity; it instead appears intended to force through several controversial provisions as the House approaches a ``lame duck'' session.
While I have repeatedly raised our broader concerns with respect to this legislation in the House and in our formal Minority Views, I felt it important to memorialize what we believe are significant shortcomings and flaws in the current bill, especially with provisions that were not previously included in the House bill. I do not believe that this bill in its current form addresses a number of critical national security issues, and in many respects would fail to empower our intelligence professionals and create significant and unnecessary new bureaucracy and politicization of the intelligence community.
Most significantly, we are concerned with the absence of provisions to address the following critical issues:
Earmarks: The bill removes language from a previous
Republican amendment to prohibit the use of funds authorized
in the bill for any earmarked purpose, and effectively
authorizes earmarks of the Appropriations Committee.
Covert Action Authorities: The bill does nothing to provide
safeguards for certain covert action activities that could
impact U.S. citizens.
Intelligence Flaws Revealed After Fort Hood Shooting: The
bill contains no substantive provisions to address critical
information sharing flaws brought to light in the aftermath
of the Fort Hood shooting.
Interrogation of High Value Detainees: The bill contains no
substantive provisions to make intelligence collection a
priority in the interrogation of high value detainees, or to
address the complete lack of coordinated decisionmaking with
respect to interrogation of high value detainees.
FISA Authorities: The bill does nothing to provide
critically needed clarification of authorities under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Guantanamo Detainees: The bill contains no outright
prohibition on using intelligence funds to bring Guantanamo
Bay detainees into the United States, or to prohibit secret
payments to foreign countries using intelligence funds to
accept Guantanamo Bay detainees. The conference agreement
also omits a Republican amendment--agreed to on a bipartisan
basis--to evaluate potential threats from released Uighur
detainees.
Administration of Miranda Warnings: The bill omits a
Republican amendment--supported on a bipartisan basis in the
Committee and in the House--to prohibit giving Miranda
warnings to foreign terrorist suspects in foreign countries
in order to protect intelligence collection.
In addition, I have concerns with several provisions of the bill that we believe are seriously flawed in several different respects. A number of these provisions are inconsistent with the letter or the spirit of bipartisan agreements reached in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. I believe a number of provisions would unduly and unwisely further grow the intelligence bureaucracy. I believe that other provisions would impinge on the smooth operation of the intelligence community, and that others would interfere with efficient and centralized intelligence oversight as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. Other objectionable provisions do not appear to have been fully or adequately justified, some with potentially significant consequences. The objectionable provisions include, but are not limited to, the following:
Contractor Conversion: While I support appropriate review
of the size and nature of the contractor workforce, Section
103 of the bill would provide unlimited authority to add an
unlimited number of employees, regardless of any other
statutory limitation. This is inconsistent with bipartisan
agreements in the House Intelligence Committee with respect
to limiting the size of the ODNI.
``A not A'' Funds: Section 101 of the bill would deem any
appropriated but unauthorized funding to be authorized. This
provision fundamentally cedes the authorization prerogatives
of the Intelligence Committees to the Appropriations
Committees, and virtually renders moot bipartisan agreements
on the funding authorizations contained in the classified
annex.
No Classified Annex: The bill omits the classified annex
that provides the specific direction to the intelligence
community on the conduct of operations and the permissible
uses of funds, which had been negotiated on a bipartisan
basis.
Unlimited Increases in Employee Compensation: Section 301
of the bill would allow unlimited increases to pay and
benefit authorization for any increases authorized by law.
Such unrestricted authority effectively renders moot specific
authorization levels elsewhere and can be used by the ODNI to
circumvent such restrictions for additional unapproved
growth. Similarly, Section 303 would permit the DNI to
authorize technically unlimited pay for specific positions at
his sole discretion. I am not aware of any demonstrated need
for such extraordinary authority.
Award of SIS Rank: Section 304 of the bill would permit the
Director of National Intelligence to recommend that the
President directly award Senior Intelligence Service rank to
employees across the intelligence community. This would
directly involve the DNI in specific agency personnel matters
contrary to the intent of the IRTPA and may foster cronyism
and non-merit based promotions of intelligence community
personnel.
Temporary Personnel Authorizations for Critical Language
Training: Section 306 of the bill would exempt up to 100 ODNI
personnel from personnel caps for the purposes of language
training. Given the widespread prevalence of persons
receiving foreign language training in the intelligence
community, I believe this is a thinly veiled authorization to
circumvent existing personnel caps, again inconsistent with
the intended size and scope of the ODNI and bipartisan
agreements within the House Committee on personnel levels
within the ODNI.
Education Programs: Sections 311 through 314 of the bill
would create or modify a number of education programs in the
intelligence community. While I do not necessarily oppose any
of these programs, I do not believe that these provisions--
most of them permanent--have been adequately explained or
justified. I note that previous versions of the bill would
have required a study to review and justify such programs,
which suggests that others share our concerns that these
programs have not yet been fully reviewed. For that provision
to be dropped in lieu of outright authorization makes little
sense in light of the implicit acknowledgment that further
study is needed.
Business System Transformation: Section 322 of the bill
would require the DNI to ``develop and implement'' (rather
than coordinate) an enterprise architecture to ``cover all
intelligence community business systems''. I believe this
provision is inconsistent with the role and scope of the ODNI
contemplated in the IRTPA.
IP Funded Acquisitions: Section 326 of the bill authorizes
the DNI to delegate certain acquisition authorities within
the intelligence community. This provision is inconsistent
with the express agreement reached in the IRTPA conference
not to permit such delegation.
Congressional Notification: Section 331 of the bill
continues to cede sole authority to the President to
determine which members of the congressional intelligence
committees would receive briefings on particularly sensitive
intelligence matters. This provision is inconsistent with
previous bipartisan agreements reached in the House
Committee, and fails entirely to protect the Constitutional
prerogative of the Congress to make its own rules of
proceedings. It would have little meaningful effect and
appears to provide political cover at the expense of real
reform in this critical area.
GAO Review: Section 348 of the bill also contains a
provision that requires the Executive Branch to promulgate
guidelines for dealing with GAO reviews of intelligence
community programs. I believe that this provision is unwise
for a number of reasons. Most notably, it potentially cedes
significant elements of the traditional oversight role of the
intelligence committees to the GAO and potentially to other
Committees of the Congress, and it fails to adequately
protect the security and dissemination of classified work
product under the same terms as the Committee rules. In
addition, this specific provision cedes to the Executive
Branch and the Comptroller General the determination of how
to manage GAO inquiries that should be directed by Members of
Congress.
Report on Intelligence Community Contractors: Section 339
of the bill would improperly require reports on sensitive
intelligence collection matters--including covert action
programs--to be provided to the Armed Services committees,
contrary to the Rules of the House. Several other provisions
of the bill also require reports on intelligence matters to
be submitted to Committees that may not have jurisdiction
over the material to be reported on.
Reprogramming Standard: Section 362 of the bill would
modify the reprogramming standard for intelligence activities
in a manner that would render it virtually meaningless. This
change is contrary to the express
bipartisan agreement reached in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act conference.
Declassification of Intelligence Budget Topline: Section
364 provides for permanent declassification of the
intelligence budget topline. This provision serves no
demonstrable intelligence purpose, and is contrary to the
express bipartisan agreement reached in the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act conference.
Review Authority of the Public Interest Declassification
Board: Section 365 would allow any individual member of
certain committees to request declassification review of
certain records. This provision is contrary to the express
bipartisan agreement reached in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act conference to restrict such
requests.
Accountability Reviews: Section 401 of the bill would
authorize the DNI or the congressional intelligence
committees to directly conduct or request accountability
reviews of individual intelligence community personnel. This
provision would involve the DNI in individual personnel
matters within intelligence agencies in a manner inconsistent
with the authorities contemplated in the IRTPA.
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community: While I do
not necessarily oppose the concept of greater coordination by
the DNI of intelligence community inspectors general, Section
405 of the bill is a massive and unduly prescriptive
provision that is inconsistent with the contemplated size and
scope of the ODNI and in many respects duplicates existing
oversight by Department inspectors general.
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency:
Similarly, I have significant concern that Section 425 of the
bill is unduly prescriptive and burdensome with respect to
the organization and management of the office of the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Defense Inspector General Matters: Section 431 of the bill
would authorize the Secretary of Defense to prohibit certain
inspector general reviews of intelligence matters within the
intelligence community. I see no apparent justification for
this provision, which we believe could potentially interfere
with the independence of the intelligence community and may
be inconsistent with the intention of the IRTPA.
Confirmation of Heads of Certain Components of the
Intelligence Community: Section 432 of the bill would require
Senate confirmation of the heads of certain IC agencies. This
provision threatens to politicize such positions, which are
often held by career military officers, and could impede the
efficient functioning of these agencies in times of vacancy.
FBI Relocation and Retention Bonuses: Section 443 of the
bill would provide certain authorities relating to relocation
and retention bonuses for the entire Federal Bureau of
Investigation--not just employees funded by the National
Intelligence Program. Such a broad provision is outside the
Committee's jurisdiction, has not been justified to the
Committee, and has not been reviewed for consistency across
the Intelligence Community and federal law enforcement. While
I strongly support line personnel of the FBI, we believe that
this provision must be more carefully reviewed and harmonized
with personnel practices in other intelligence and law
enforcement agencies. Similarly, we believe that section 444,
which extends authority to delay certain FBI mandatory
retirements must be better reviewed, especially for its
implications for federal law enforcement retirement, which is
intended to promote a young and vigorous workforce and should
be applied consistently across federal law enforcement
agencies.