Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I rise, Mr. Chairman, in opposition to H.R. 1257. But first of all, I want to compliment the chairman and the ranking member who ran a very good process, had fruitful hearings, but…
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise, Mr. Chairman, in opposition to H.R. 1257. But first of all, I want to compliment the chairman and the ranking member who ran a very good process, had fruitful hearings, but nevertheless I think came up with a faulty product.
We all tend to sometimes argue in the alternative, picking and choosing those things that we want to focus on, and I find it ironic that the chairman has, in one way, this very, very high view of the marketplace and, in another way, demonstrates a fairly low view of the marketplace.
This is all about the level, Mr. Chairman, at which we choose to intervene. We saw the marketplace respond positively just a couple of weeks ago. Morgan Stanley, at their annual meeting, those shareholders decided not to take up this question of executive compensation. The same thing happened, Mr. Chairman, at the Bank of New York recently.
So what is the question before the House today? The question before the House is, when there is a difficult situation that comes forward, admittedly a difficult situation that the chairman recently called a fact of nature, and that is overly compensated executive employees, what does the House do? Does the House rush in?
I would suggest that the bill as presented currently is an overreaction. It is reaching in, and if we are going to be dabbling in this notion of executive compensation, Mr. Chairman, then I would suggest that we need to go all the way and try and take on other highly compensated employees.
What we will hear, I think, from the various speakers on our side of the aisle is trying to lay out a rationale, trying to lay out how we ought best to do this because I will tell you this. I think the great challenge before us as Members of the House is, how do we create the environment where people want to invest in our country, how do we create the environment where the best and the brightest among us want to go into public companies because I will suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the reaction of the past Congress or two on some of these things has unfortunately created an environment that is regulatorily very, very difficult, and it now creates among us the problem of people who say, look, it is simply not worth my time to go into a public company. I am one of the sharp ones; I am going to go into the private equities and so forth.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle).
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle).
Mr. Chairman, just a couple of observations before I yield to my distinguished colleague.
You know, the gentleman from Georgia said that one of the goals of this legislation is that there be transparency and accountability. I would submit, I think there is a transparency and accountability in the current state of the law. The transparency comes in the disclosure of executive compensation, and the accountability comes in the ability to sell shares if you don't like it. That is a very, very, very powerful tool.
My friend from Missouri, the distinguished gentleman who spoke recently kind of criticized a number of individual CEOs. I'm not going to rise to their defense, and I don't think they really deserve defense. But it is an old adage of the law that if what we are doing is creating a statute toward an exception, we tend to make bad statutes.
What I would say is, look at the totality of what executive leadership has brought us. From 2002 to 2006, the market capitalization of American companies has risen to $8 trillion. That is something to celebrate and not something to criticize.
I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul).
(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell).
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
Just kind of a point of interest, and that is, in response to Chairman Frank
calling, observing Mr. Castle's quotation. And I would just point out that the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey has been sort of selective, I think, in the attributes of England that he finds attractive. One of those that he didn't find attractive apparently is a loser-pay litigation system which would also maybe drive part of that debate.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones).
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Bachus), the ranking member.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I will insert into the Record three letters opposing this legislation by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, HR Policy Association and American Bankers Association.
The Association of Senior
Human Resource Executives,
Washington, DC, April 18, 2007.
RE HR Policy Opposes H.R. 1257, Shareholder Vote on Executive
Compensation Act.
Hon. Spencer Bachus,
House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Representative Bachus: On behalf of the HR Policy
Association, I am writing to urge you to vote no on H.R.
1257, the Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act,
when the House considers it this week. We believe that the
bill will have significant negative effects on corporate
governance and will not appreciably increase shareholder
input into the executive compensation process.
HR Policy Association is a public policy advocacy
organization representing the chief human resource officers
of over 250 leading employers doing business in the United
States. Representing nearly every major industry sector, HR
Policy members have a combined U.S. market capitalization of
more than $7.5 trillion and employ more than 18 million
employees world wide. Our members are especially concerned
that a shareholder vote would undermine the authority of the
Board of Directors with respect to compensation and is
unnecessary as a tool to increase communications with
shareholders.
At the outset, it is important to note that last year, the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission completed an overhaul
of its executive compensation disclosure regulations. The
full effect of these changes on executive compensation
practices will not be known until after the 2009 proxy
season, the first year in which companies will have to
present three years of data. At a minimum, the House should
defer any action on the legislation until after the effect of
the new rules can be fully evaluated.
The Association believes that H.R. 1257 would seriously
erode the authority of the Board of Directors to determine
appropriate executive compensation levels. Under our system
of corporate governance, the Board manages the company on
behalf of the shareholders. In turn, the shareholders have
the right to vote on strategic matters, such as mergers, and
remove directors if they believe the corporation is not being
managed in the shareholders' best interests. This delegation
of authority is necessary because of the considerable amount
of detailed and confidential information that Board members
must consider when making decisions regarding corporate
strategy and executive compensation. Providing a shareholder
vote on compensation would be unprecedented because it would
provide a referendum on the results of the Board's decision,
rather than on a framework for making decisions, as occurs in
the case of shareholder authorization for equity compensation
or mergers.
More importantly, a shareholder vote would potentially open
up other Board decisions to a shareholder vote, such as the
decision to pursue merger talks or settle certain lawsuits,
thus substantially slowing the ability of the Board to make
quick decisions and undermining competitiveness.
Fundamentally, an advisory shareholder vote would not
provide meaningful information to companies about the
practices shareholders find objectionable. It is simply an up
or down vote, with no explanation attached, leaving
substantial questions about its meaning. Under current law,
shareholders already may file advisory resolutions with any
publicly held company seeking changes in specific executive
compensation practices. There is no need for legislation
adopting a mandatory framework that will have a negligible
impact on most of the 15,000-plus publicly held companies.
Counter to arguments made in support of the bill, new
mechanisms of communications between companies and
shareholders are not necessary. Most large companies already
hold periodic meetings throughout the year with their largest
shareholders on a variety of subjects, including
compensation.
In addition, the shareholder vote concept has been imported
from the United Kingdom, but the U.K. regulatory and legal
systems are substantially different from those in the U.S.,
and the results of a shareholder vote are likely to be
fundamentally different. In the U.K. the two largest
investors control roughly 30 percent of the market while in
the U.S. ownership is more diffuse, making shareholder
consensus much more difficult. The U.K. has voluntary
corporate governance standards with less rigid standards for
Board member independence, and Board members may avoid all
liability with an advisory shareholder vote. In the U.S.,
Board members have fiduciary liability, and are subject to
shareholder derivative actions, regardless of a shareholder
advisory vote. The threat of litigation acts as a check on
Board actions.
The U.K. shareholder vote requirement also has had
significant negative effects that would negatively impact the
management of U.S. companies. These effects include
encouraging executives to seek positions with private equity
firms; making pay arrangements more standardized, rather than
customized to the company; increasing diligence among
compensation committees similar to that already occurring in
the U.S.; and, increasing the power of the proxy advisory
services and hedge funds as institutional investors outsource
their compensation research, engagement with boards and vote
administration duties. These negative effects outweigh the
benefits of a shareholder vote.
For all of these reasons, we oppose H.R. 1257 and encourage
the House to reject it. If you have any questions, please do
not hesitate to contact Tim Bartl of our staff at 202-789-
8670. Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey C. McGuiness,
President.
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, I have offered this amendment to clarify some possibly misleading language in H.R. 1257, and it simply strikes ``or other meeting of the shareholders'' and inserts ``meeting of the shareholders or a special meeting in lieu of the annual meeting,'' at page 4, line 14 and page 5, line 7. The bill would allow, as we have discussed, a separate, nonbinding shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives for any proxy, consent or authorization for an annual meeting. As currently drafted, the language in the bill asserts that this would be an annual meeting or other meeting of the shareholders. This language could potentially lead to allowing multiple nonbinding shareholder votes throughout the year instead of just at the annual or special meeting in lieu of the annual meeting, and, therefore, clarification of this language is needed. Hence, the reason for the amendment.
My concern is that if the current language were to be placed into law, that multiple votes would be forced to be taken throughout the year which would distract the board and the executives from their primary responsibility, that is, ensuring that they put in place good business practices that benefit the shareholders' investment instead of being distracted multiple times by a whole host of votes.
The greater concern would be that these potential multiple votes would ensure fiscal and business priorities are not in the forefront of the board members' minds, ultimately having the ill effect on global competitiveness of American business. I spoke to the chairman earlier, and I believe that it's a noncontroversial request to clarify language.
I urge all of my colleagues to support the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Garrett).
Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
I rise to point out that there is some dizzying logic going on. Basically, we are being told, here is a piece of legislation, and if you are clever enough to come up with a germane amendment, we will sort of humor you and listen to you. But if there is a larger suggestion, then it is very difficult to move forward.
I would just suggest to the chairman of the committee that the perfect is the enemy of the good. It strikes me that the gentleman from Massachusetts is an incrementalist. Those who survive most in this arena are incrementalists, and he has survived for a long, long time, Mr. Chairman, and flourished and been very successful as a legislator.
But it just seems that this is a good faith effort on the part of the gentleman from North Carolina to put forward something substantively. Is it the totality of making every problem go away? No. There is no way to do that.
And it is a little bit of a procedural Catch-22 that he is in.