Pension Security And Transparency Act Of 2005
Mr. Chairman, the proposed Treasury regulation ``safe harbor'' in the Pension Security and Transparency Act of 2005 states: The accrued benefit determined under this subparagraph shall be determined under regulations prescribed by the…
Mr. Chairman, the proposed Treasury regulation ``safe harbor'' in the Pension Security and Transparency Act of 2005 states:
The accrued benefit determined under this subparagraph
shall be determined under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary which are consistent with the purposes of this
paragraph and which may require a plan to provide a credit of
additional amounts or increases in additional account
balances in amounts substantially equivalent to the benefits
that would be required to be provided to meet the
requirements of subparagraphs (B) or (C).
Mr. Chairman, am I correct in my understanding that the intention of this provision authorizing Treasury regulations is that the Secretary be given the widest latitude possible to approve cash balance conversions falling within the spirit of the conversion requirements?
Mr. Chairman, do you agree that the provision is intended to allow Treasury to consider for purposes of the regulatory safe harbor cash balance plan conversions that are announced 5 or more years in advance, allow employees to continue to accrue benefits under the old formula until the conversion date and thereafter provide full protection for previously accrued benefits as well as the opportunity to ``grow into'' early retirement subsidies under the old formula; and that provide full cash balance plan accruals after conversion without wear away?
I thank the distinguished chairman for this important clarification and for his hard work in developing this important legislation.
Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the pension reform legislation we have been working on for months. Many have said that the policy goal of any major reform to the current pension system is to ensure that the defined benefit system remains a viable option for companies and that employers keep the retirement promises they have made to their employees. In these discussions, one often hears about the proposed new rules and mandates concerning funding rules or asset and liability valuations. Given that the pension statute has not received a major overhaul since the 1970s, new rules are certainly necessary to ensure that past and present employees and the American taxpayer are protected from financial loss.
Nevertheless, what is often left unsaid in our discussions is the fact that the defined benefit system is a voluntary, not a mandatory, system. While rules and mandates exist for companies that choose to participate in the defined benefit system, no such rules or mandates exist requiring companies to participate. Thus, if strengthening the defined benefit system is the basic premise behind this proposed legislation, it is critical that we ask ourselves if the proposed rules and mandates might have the unintended consequence of driving companies out of the voluntary defined benefit system once and for all.
Alternatives to the voluntary defined benefit system do exist. For many companies and employees, they are good alternatives, such as the defined contribution system and its 401(k)s. However, the personal savings rate of
Americans remains one of the lowest among the industrialized nations, and the average balances in 401(k) accounts are quite modest. There is no question that without defined benefit plans, fewer Americans would be able to retire comfortably. Further, the disappearance of defined benefit plans, including hybrid defined benefit plans, could very well result in increased pressure on Federal entitlement and income maintenance programs, not to mention an increase in old-age poverty.
Given these troubling facts, the value of defined benefit plans to many American families is clear. Sadly, we have seen a decline in defined benefit plan sponsorship, and these are perilous times for the defined benefit system. Employers are leaving the system for many reasons. Among these are uncertainty about how future pension liabilities will be measured, new pension funding rules that are complicated and unpredictable, the worry over new and more onerous pension funding and premium requirements, upcoming changes to the pension accounting rules, and, of course, legal questions regarding hybrid pension plans.
I appreciate the efforts of my Senate colleagues to craft meaningful defined benefit pension reform legislation. The proposed legislation, however, will have the unintended consequence of driving away company after company from the defined benefit system and further exacerbate the looming deficit of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, PBGC, thereby passing an unnecessary financial risk on to the American taxpayer. Rather than strengthening the defined benefit system, this proposed legislation contains elements that could negatively affect the retirement security of the current 44 million participants in defined benefit plans. Further, workers coming behind them are at risk if the legislation is not done in a way that encourages plan sponsors to stay in the voluntary defined benefit plan system. I wish to highlight a few of the provisions contained in the proposed legislation I believe will lead employers to opt out of the voluntary defined benefit system.
To plan business investment and operations, employers must be able to anticipate required pension contributions several years into the future. Required contributions cannot be too volatile; otherwise, they will be too difficult to accommodate in cash flow operations of the business. To determine the amount of money an employer must contribute to its pension plan, assets in the plan are compared to the liabilities of the plan. Under the bill, plans would determine the amount of their funding liability using an interest rate averaged over only a 12-month period and asset values also averaged over just a 12-month period. This will make it very difficult for businesses to plan and will force them to set aside assets in the event they are needed for liabilities due to spikes in interest rates. The alternative is to force companies to shift assets out of the equity markets and into fixed income markets which could hike costs and discourage plan sponsorship. This is bad policy.
The proposed legislation also sets a new target liability--100 percent of liabilities promised under the plan. This is a significant increase from the current law target--90 percent. If companies must meet this new target too quickly, sharp upticks in contributions may be required for many companies that are currently considered well-funded. Because the new interest rates will adjust liabilities for some companies, companies that are currently at their maximum funding level could be facing very large contributions. Since obligations are due over a very long period in many instances, these contributions will be unnecessary. Pensions could be frozen, other benefits could be frozen, costs of goods and services could increase, and jobs could be lost as a result. The 3-year phase-in of the new target is insufficient to avoid harmful consequences to American workers and the economy.
Another very troubling provision of the proposed legislation relates to credit ratings. A company's credit rating, determined by private ratings agencies and not the Federal Government, should not determine a pension plan's liability. The credit rating of a company does not determine the funded status of a plan. A company can have a below investment grade credit rating and pose absolutely no risk to the PBGC. It serves no policy goal to impose new liabilities on a company because it is financially weak. That will simply make it more difficult for a company to recover, leading to potentially lower credit ratings, and could result in death-spirals and plan terminations that the legislation seeks to avoid. Furthermore, the credit rating provision would introduce a whole new concept--credit rating of private companies by the Government. If an at-risk liability is to be imposed, it should be based solely on the funded status of the plan.
A final concern I wish to raise relates to one of the most urgent crises in retirement security--clarifying the outstanding issues regarding hybrid pension plans. Hybrid defined benefit pension plans such as cash balance and pension equity plans were developed to meet the needs of our highly mobile workforce by combining the features of both traditional defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) and other individual account plans. Traditional defined benefit plans are most effective for employees with long careers with only one employer. Yet, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, very few employees are spending a full career with just one company. Today's workers need a pension benefit that is portable and that will produce meaningful benefits, even if they don't stay with one employer for their entire career. In light of these facts, nearly 30 percent of the Nation's largest companies with defined benefit plans have moved to a cash balance or other hybrid plan design. As of 2003, the PBGC reported that there are estimated to be between 1,200 and 1,500 of these plans providing benefits to around 8 million Americans and their families.
Employees know that cash balance and other hybrid plans contain many of the positive features of traditional defined benefit plans such as the safety of an employer-funded, PBGC-insured benefit where the company bears the risk of the investment, while at the same time providing defined contribution plan features such as individual account balances, portability, and a more even benefit accrual pattern. Many people who criticize hybrid plans do not realize that they are defined benefit plans, and as such, they provide a tremendous benefit to Americans, helping them achieve better retirement security.
Hybrid plans also provide greater benefits than traditional pensions for the majority of employees. This is because hybrid plans accrue benefits ratably, rather than toward the end of a long career, which is typical in a traditional pension plan design. For the minority of workers for whom a conversion from a traditional defined benefit plan to a hybrid plan design may result in future benefits that could be less generous than under the old plan, employers have employed a variety of transition assistance techniques to boost their benefit formulas. And of course, benefits earned by employees for service they have already put in are fully protected under the law.
Despite the value that hybrid plans provide to workers, current legal risks threaten their continued existence. One court case has placed all hybrid pension plans, both cash balance and pension equity plans, into doubt. Three other courts have found to the contrary, that hybrid pension plans do not violate the age act and are permissible under law. Yet it is this one single decision on which opponents of the hybrid pension plan hang their arguments. To preserve the retirement security of millions of Americans, it is essential that Congress comprehensively clarify for existing and future plans that the design of hybrid plans is not age discriminatory.
In Cooper v. IBM--274 F. Supp. 2d 1010, S.D. Ill. 2003--a District Court judge held, in the face of legal authority to the contrary, that cash balance and pension equity plans are age discriminatory. This decision was based on the fact that younger workers have more time to earn compound interest on their pension benefit than older workers. Compound interest is a feature of all defined contribution plans and of all savings plans. The logic behind declaring compound interest age discriminatory in defined benefit plans is seriously faulty and would nullify many longstanding defined benefit pension plan designs, including contributory defined benefit plans common in
the Federal, State, and local government sectors.
As a result of the Cooper decision, every hybrid pension plan sponsor today finds itself in potential financial and legal jeopardy. It is a pity that we have come to this state. I say this because policymakers should be working to create an environment that promotes hybrid plans-- not subjects them to greater risk. I had hoped that Congress would have responded to the Cooper case by providing legislative certainty and clarity for hybrid pension plans, both retrospectively and prospectively, to prevent widespread abandonment of these programs by employers.
I do not want my colleagues to think that I have not heard the critics of hybrid plans. I have. However, I believe that the majority of the criticisms of the plans are unfair. Let me review some of these criticisms and rebut them.
Some critics of hybrid plans have claimed that the plans are discriminatory on the basis of age. It is true that there has been one single court case that found that compound interest is age discriminatory in the hybrid plan context. As I said, three other courts have found to the contrary, yet critics give credence to this odd case. Hybrid plans provide the same or greater wage and interest credits for older participants than for young participants. Because older workers under these plans are treated the same as or better than similarly situated younger workers, the plans cannot possibly be in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, ADEA.
Others have criticized the ``wear away'' or benefit plateau that occurs in some hybrid plans. This has generated numerous questions and concerns through the congressional review of the hybrid plan issue. It is important to understand that parallel rules in ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code protect all benefits that an employee has already earned for service, to date. Thus, despite assertions to the contrary, existing benefits are not reduced in a hybrid conversion. ``Wear away'' is the term used for the benefit plateau effect that some employees can experience in conjunction with a cash balance conversion.
Still others criticize hybrid plan conversions because they frequently eliminate an early retirement subsidy, although they do so only prospectively. Some have complained about allowing employers to eliminate any benefits in their retirement plans. My own feeling is that employers must be able to maintain their flexibility to eliminate early retirement subsidies, but only on a prospective basis, as is the case under current law.
Early retirement subsidies are a better alternative to layoffs in many workplaces and they can help a company to manage its workforce. On the other hand, if an employer's right to eliminate early retirement subsidies on a prospective basis is not protected, no employer would ever adopt such an early retirement program in the first place. It makes no sense for employers to encourage highly productive workers to take retirement in their fifties by paying a premium for them to leave the workforce. While current law protects any subsidy that employees have already earned for their service to date, it allows employers to remove those incentives from their plans going forward.
The conclusion that all hybrid plan designs are inherently age discriminatory also raises the question why the Internal Revenue Service, IRS, issued determination letters for many years specifically permitting the hybrid designs and why it issued proposed regulations providing that the cash balance plan design is not inherently age discriminatory. The Cooper decision completely ignored this regulatory history. Of even more interest is that the Cooper decision disregarded the legislative history of the pension age discrimination laws adopted in 1986. That conference report made it clear that intent of Congress was limited to prohibiting the practice of ceasing pension accruals once participants reached normal retirement age, i.e. the so-called post-65 pension accrual.
The Cooper decision emboldened cash balance critics to demand an appropriations rider that prohibited the Treasury Department from finalizing its age regulations addressing hybrid plan designs and conversions. At that time, Congress directed the Treasury Department to publish a legislative proposal regarding conversions from traditional to cash balance plans. In the legislative history, the conference report did state that ``[t]he purpose of this prohibition is not to call into question the validity of hybrid plan designs (cash balance and pension equity). The purpose of the prohibition is to preserve the status quo with respect to conversions through the entirety of fiscal year 2004 while the applicable committees of jurisdiction review the Treasury Department's legislative proposals.''
While the Cooper case is a rogue decision, there is significant authority to the contrary concluding that hybrid plans are age- appropriate. Unfortunately, the Cooper case has led to what are called copycat lawsuits both in the Southern District of Illinois and elsewhere in the Nation. The Cooper case has also had a chilling effect on the plan sponsor community. Concerns over potential damages from these cases are causing CEOs and CFOs to have very sober discussions regarding the future of their plans. There seems to be a slow, but steady, domino effect of freezing hybrid pension plans as a result of concerns over potential liability from fallout of the Cooper case. This is occurring despite a general belief that the Cooper case could be overturned on appeal. I fear that if Congress fails to bless the hybrid pension plan design in short order, these voluntary plans could all become frozen.
If we can conclude that the design of these plans is consistent with the ADEA, but the conversions to hybrid plans raise questions, why can't we legislate in this area to simply bless the hybrid plan design? Clarifying only the legality of prospective plans does not address any of these problems; it does nothing to eliminate the potential for devastating suits directed at the prior operation of hybrid plans. Retroactive legislation is needed because the consequences of inaction or prospective-only legislation could be disastrous. If retroactive legislation is not adopted and the Cooper case is decided adversely on appeal, the liabilities of hybrid plans would triple if companies are forced to pay the enormous windfalls created under Cooper. This would impose such enormous costs on employers that large numbers of them would have no choice but to eliminate future benefits in their defined benefit plans. Many companies will not be able to absorb those additional liabilities, causing business declines and bankruptcies, as well as widespread damage to the economy.
Many have ignored the taxpayer interest in the outcome of retroactivity legislation. As we contemplate the precarious state of the PBGC, it is important to consider the potential impact of failing to provide retroactive relief on that troubled agency's solvency. Conservative estimates of the national liability attributable to the Cooper theory of age discrimination are well in excess of $100 billion. Many employers would undoubtedly be forced into distress plan terminations by this liability, shifting the liability to the PBGC. Other employers would simply terminate their plans, resulting in a precipitous contraction of the PBGC's premium base. The PBGC reports that for 2004, 24.6 percent of the participants in covered single employer plans are in hybrid plans; this means that such plans generate almost a quarter of the single-employer flat-rate premiums. Both developments would make a taxpayer bailout of PBGC far more likely.
I must also raise an additional issue regarding the hybrid pension plan provisions of the bill before us. As you know, it is the cash balance pension design that has been at the center of the congressional discussion about the need to provide legislative clarity for hybrid plans. Yet, another leading variety of hybrid plan, called the pension equity plan, is in equal need of congressional attention. In a pension equity plan, employers provide credits for each year of employee service and these credits are multiplied by an employee's final pay to produce a lump sum figure. Typically, the benefit credits given to employees increase with age and/or years of service, making this design an attractive one for older and long-service workers. Dozens of large employers around the country offer pension equity plans, including a
number of very large employers in my state.
Pension equity plan sponsors and participants face the same risks and are in need of the same legislative clarification as cash balance plans--that their basic design is not, in fact, illegal and does, in fact, satisfy our age discrimination rules. To achieve this objective, the legislative provision clarifying the age discrimination rules for hybrid plans must specifically reference pension equity plans in the statutory language. The legislation before us does not do this. Rather, it leaves the issue of whether pension equity plans receive the same beneficial clarification as cash balance plans up to the Treasury Department in later administrative guidance. This will simply prolong the legal uncertainty that is driving many employers to consider ending their pension equity plans altogether. I believe this must be remedied--that we must give pension equity plans the same explicit statutory treatment as cash balance plans. I hope that, along with applying the clarification of the hybrid designs to existing plans under current law, we can explicitly address pension equity plans as we move toward conference on this pension bill.
I likewise hope that we can make several other refinements to the bill's hybrid provisions so that these provisions more appropriately address some of the unique issues surrounding pension equity plans. For example, the bill currently has a requirement that hybrid plans pay certain minimum interest rates. Yet, unlike in cash balance plans, the benefits in pension equity plans grow with pay increases, as traditional defined benefit plans do, rather than with interest, so this requirement really does not make sense in the pension equity context. In addition, conversions to pension equity plans are typically handled differently than conversions to cash balance plans, and this needs to be acknowledged in the legislation. Finally, just as there are unique differences between cash-balance and pension equity hybrid plans that we must acknowledge, we must also recognize and support unique differences among cash-balance and pension equity plans respectively. No two plans are identical, nor should they be. Congress should not be so overly prescriptive in the rules for hybrid pension plans that it prohibits sponsors from adding unique features that may better serve their employees in retirement. I hope that during the conference on this bill, for example, we can recognize that there are cash balance plans that have returns based on equity indices. Such plans may provide returns that do not fall within the interest rate corridor established in this bill because their returns may be greater or lesser than required under this bill for the plan to be considered a qualified cash balance plan. While I do believe it is good policy for these plans to have a principal protection feature, to ensure workers are guaranteed upon retirement to receive the investment credits they have earned, I also believe that we should not discourage plans which provide participants the opportunity to receive higher returns that are attainable through the equity markets.
I would like to finish my statement by thanking the chairmen and ranking members for their work on the prospective hybrid language. While the bill does not address existing plans, serious discussions have begun to do so. It is imperative that these discussions continue so that we can clarify the validity of the hybrid pension designs, both cash-balance and pension equity, under current law.
Hybrid defined benefit plans play an invaluable role in delivering retirement security to millions of Americans and their families. To prevent total abandonment of hybrid plans by employers and the resulting harm to employees, I hope Congress will quickly provide legislative certainty and clarity for existing cash balance and other hybrid pension plans such as pension equity plans. Waiting for the Cooper case to be resolved on appeal is not the answer; as time goes by, more companies are reacting to the current uncertainty and potential liability by freezing or terminating their plans. At the same time, more and more companies are being dragged into copycat litigation. The losers in this terrible failure to act are my constituents in North Carolina and workers across America who will lose the opportunity to be covered by an employer-provided pension plan. Failure to resolve the status of hybrid defined benefit plans comprehensively is a betrayal of employers who are trying to do the right thing by their employees and the millions of workers who are counting on a pension for their retirement.