Mr. President, I understand our leader, Senator McConnell, is asking we speak for no more than 10 minutes, but I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak for 25 minutes. I thank the Acting President pro tempore. Mr. President, our…
Mr. President, I understand our leader, Senator McConnell, is asking we speak for no more than 10 minutes, but I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak for 25 minutes.
I thank the Acting President pro tempore.
Mr. President, our debate today takes place in the context of deep economic uncertainty at home, coupled with extraordinary dangers overseas. Our country is suffering from high unemployment, with 9.1 percent of Americans out of work--many for years. Our national debt stands well above $14 trillion, and our credit rating is in doubt. Gas prices are still near $4 a gallon in many locations. The number of Americans requiring food stamp assistance has reached 45 million. Some businesses are returning to profitability but long-term economic growth is threatened by numerous forces, including the skyrocketing national debt, declining home values, high energy costs, and increased competition for export markets.
Overseas, almost 100,000 American military personnel are fighting a difficult war in Afghanistan. More than 1,600 of our troops have been killed in Afghanistan, with roughly 12,000 wounded. Meanwhile, we still have 46,000 troops in Iraq, a deployment that has cost almost 4,500 American lives, with more than 32,000 wounded. Our troops have experienced multiple deployments over the last 8 years that have strained our Armed Forces. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are extremely high, with no resolution to the problem of North Korea's nuclear program. We continue to pursue international support for steps that could prevent Iran's nuclear program from producing a nuclear weapon. We remain concerned about stability in Pakistan and the security of that country's nuclear arsenal. We are attempting to counter terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan, East Africa, Yemen, and many other locations.
Into this confluence of economic and national security commitments, the President has involved our Nation in a civil war in Libya. We find ourselves in a situation where Congress is debating vast cuts in domestic programs to make essential progress on the deficit, even as President Obama has initiated an expensive, open-ended military commitment in a country that his Defense Secretary said is not a vital interest.
Any Member who has been here to witness the last 10 years should understand that war is an inherently precarious enterprise that is conducive to accidents, unintended consequences, and miscalculations. The last 10 years have also illuminated clearly that initiating wars and killing the enemy is far easier than achieving political stability and reconstructing a country when the fighting is over.
This is why going to war should be based on U.S. vital interests. It is also why Congress has an essential role to play in scrutinizing executive branch rationalizations of wars and their ongoing management. This holds true no matter who is President or which war is being fought.
The President stated he intervened in Libya in conjunction with the international community to save lives that would have been lost had Qadhafi's forces been left unchecked. But saving lives alone cannot be our standard for using military force. There is no end to the global humanitarian emergencies in which U.S. military and economic power might be devoted. Saying that American military power in Libya is morally justified is not the same as saying it is wise. There are many other questions that must be answered in a disciplined examination of whether to go to war.
The administration placed much weight on expressions of approval by the United Nations and the Arab League. It is better to have international support than not when considering war. But neither of those institutions is determinative to an assessment of U.S. vital interests.
Even after Qadhafi leaves power, we will be at risk of substantial costs. Already NATO has called for a U.N. peacekeeping force to be deployed on the ground in Libya to help secure a transitional government. As the largest contributor to the United Nations, the U.S. probably will bear a significant share of that cost, even if no American troops participate. What follows Qadhafi's regime will be a true nation-building exercise. Despite massive natural resources, Libya was a poor and largely undeveloped country before the first NATO bomb fell. We have been assured that the Libyans will have the financial resources to pay for this reconstruction effort, but we have heard
this assurance before. We have had ample experience during the last decade with the difficulties of reconstructing nations in which we have intervened.
In justifying our intervention in Libya's civil war, the President has claimed that failure to do so would have emboldened other dictators to resort to violence in the face of popular protests. At a minimum, the unfolding tragedy in Syria is evidence that our intervention in Libya has done little, if anything, to deter such repression.
In fact, I think it is more likely that dictators such as Bashar al- Assad have learned the opposite lesson from the Libyan example. That lesson is do not let an opposition force gain control of territory or the West might intervene to protect it from the sky. Is this the thinking behind the Syrian government's brutal military takeover of the cities along its border with Turkey? At the same time, our Libyan involvement has made it more difficult to obtain Security Council action of any sort, even rhetorical, against the Syrian regime.
American intervention in Libya did not come as a result of a disciplined assessment of our vital interests or an authorization debate in Congress. In the broader strategic context that I have described, a civil war in Libya is not a priority that required American military and economic investments. It is an expensive diversion that leaves the United States and our European allies with fewer assets to respond to other contingencies.
President Obama's assertion that he does not need a congressional authorization to wage war in Libya represents a serious setback to the constitutional limits on Presidential war powers. Historians will point out that this is not the first time that a President has gone to war unilaterally. But saying that Presidents have exceeded their constitutional authority before is little comfort. Moreover, the Libya case is the one most likely to be cited the next time President Obama or a future President chooses to take the country to war without congressional approval.
Declarations of war are not anachronistic exercises. They force the President to submit his case for war to Congress and the American public. They allow for a robust debate to examine that case, and they help gauge if there is sufficient political support to commit American blood and treasure. And they define the role and strategy of the United States. Neither U.N. Security Council resolutions nor administration briefings are a substitute for a declaration of war or other deliberate authorizations of military operations.
Actions leading up to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at least acknowledged that congressional authorization was vital to initiating and conducting war. Despite deep flaws in the process of authorizing those wars, there was recogition that both required a deliberate affirmative vote by Congress.
During this debate there will be appeals to set aside discussion of war powers issues in favor of expressing support for the military mission underway. We will be asked to send a message to Colonel Qadhafi, notwithstanding our displeasure with President Obama's unilateralism.
I understand that one can be for the Libya mission while simultaneously being critical of the President's failure to involve Congress in his decisionaking. But I also believe that it would be difficult to render a judgment on the Libya operation without reference to the process failures that have preceded this debate, for two reasons. First, in the long run, the significance of the war powers precedent created by President Obama's unilateral intervention in Libya and his subsequent rationalization for not needing congressional authority may be far more significant than the short term geopolitical consequences of what happens in Libya. Second, we are debating an authorization that the President has taken no affirmative action to seek, that he asserts is not necessary under the Constitution or the War Powers Act, and that presumably will have little impact on his actions.
Even if one believes that the President somehow had the legal authority to initiate and continue U.S. military operations in Libya, it does not mean that going to war without Congress was either wise or helpful to the operation. There was no good reason why President Obama should have failed to seek congressional authorization to go to war in Libya. A few excuses have been offered ranging from an impending congressional recess to the authority provided by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. But these excuses do not justify the President's lack of constitutional discipline. Twelve days before the United States launched hostilities I called for the President to seek a declaration of war before taking military action. The Arab League resolution, which is cited as a key event in calculations on the war, was passed a full week before we started launching cruise missiles. There was time to seek congressional approval, and Congress would have debated a war resolution if the President had presented one.
That debate would not have been easy. But Presidents should not be able to avoid constitutional responsibilities merely because engaging the people's representatives is inconvenient or uncertain. If the outcome of a congressional vote on war is in doubt, it is all the more reason why a President should seek a debate. If he does not, he is taking the extraordinary position that his plans for war are too important to be upset by a disapproving vote in Congress.
The Founders believed that Presidents alone should not be trusted with war making authority, and they constructed checks against executive unilateralism. James Madison, in a 1797 letter to Thomas Jefferson, stated, ``The Constitution supposes, what the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the legislature.''
Clearly, there are circumstances under which a President might be justified in employing military force without congressional authorization. But as Senator Jim Webb has pointed out systematically, none of the reasons apply to the Libyan case.
Our country was not attacked or threatened with an attack. We weren't obligated under a treaty to defend the Libyan people. We were not rescuing Americans or launching a one-time punitive retaliation. Nor did the operation require surprise that would have made a public debate impractical.
In this case, President Obama made a deliberate decision not to seek a congressional authorization of his action, either before it commenced or during the last 3 months. This was a fundamental failure of leadership that placed expedience above constitutional responsibility.
Moreover, the highly dubious arguments offered by the Obama administration for not needing congressional approval break new ground in justifying a unilateral Presidential decision to use force. The accrual of even more war making authority in the hands of the Executive is not in our country's best interest, especially at a time when our Nation is deeply in debt and our military is heavily committed overseas.
At the outset of the conflict, the President asserted that U.S. military operations in Libya would be ``limited in their nature, duration, and scope.'' Three months later, these assurances ring hollow. American and coalition military activities have expanded to an all but declared campaign to drive Qadhafi from power. The administration is unable to specify any applicable limits to the duration of the operations. And the scope has grown from efforts to protect Libyan civilians under imminent threat to obliterating Libya's military arsenal, command and control structure, and leadership apparatus.
Most recently, the administration has sought to avoid its obligations under the War Powers resolution by making the incredible assertion that U.S. military operations in Libya do not constitute hostilities, a view that has been rejected by many supporters of the war.
Let us be clear that we are deliberately trying to overthrow the government of Libya with military force. We were instrumental in putting the alliance together, we were the major force behind the U.N. resolution authorizing the war, we set the table for the NATO operation through an intensive bombing campaign to open the war, our planes and drones continue to bomb Libya, and most missions flown by allied pilots are dependent on the
intelligence and refueling capabilities that we are providing. The means that we are using to overthrow the Libyan government are limited in the sense that we could be applying more military force to the task, but the goal of the operation is not limited. We are using military force to achieve regime change. Defining these actions as something less than hostilities requires extraordinary legal contortions.
Administration analysis focuses on the question of whether U.S. casualties are likely to occur, thereby minimizing other considerations relevant to the use of force. Such an interpretation would deny Congress a say in other questions that are obviously implicated in decisions to go to war, including the war's impact on U.S. strategic interests, on our relations with other countries, and on our ability to meet competing national security priorities.
The administration also implies that because allied nations are flying most of the missions over Libya, the U.S. operations are not significant enough to require congressional authorization. This characterization underplays the centrality of the U.S. contribution to the NATO operations in Libya. We are contributing 70 percent of the coalition's intelligence capabilities and the majority of its refueling assets. The fact that we are leaving most of the shooting to other countries does not mean that the United States is not involved in acts of war. If the United States encountered persons performing similar activities in support of al Qaida or Taliban operations, we certainly would deem them to be participating in hostilities against us.
This state of affairs is at odds with the President's own pronouncements on war powers during his Presidential candidacy. For example, in December 2007, he responded to a Boston Globe question by saying: ``The President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.''
American combat forces are so efficient at certain types of operations and our over-the-horizon technology is so potent that the use of the military instrument to right wrongs exists as a tremendous temptation for Presidents. If we fail to come to grips with this now, I fear that we are setting the stage for Presidents to undertake other humanitarian interventions without congressional approval.
The President does not have the authority to substitute his judgment for constitutional process when there is no emergency that threatens the United States and our vital interests. The world is full of examples of local and regional violence, to which the U.S. military could be applied for some altruistic purpose. Under the Constitution, the Congress is vested with the authority to determine which, if any, of these circumstances justify the consequences of American military intervention.
The Foreign Relations Committee markup of S.J. Res. 20 significantly improved the resolution in several key respects. First, the committee adopted amendments that Senator Webb and I introduced, establishing legally binding prohibitions on the introduction of American ground troops and contractors into Libya. The original resolution addressed this issue only through nonbinding language that the President could have ignored.
Second, the committee adopted an amendment I offered requiring specific reports on the Libya operation from the administration on strict deadlines. These deadlines were strengthened further by an amendment from Senator Bob Corker. The original resolution lacked sufficient provisions for congressional oversight of the operations, their costs, and their potential impact on other U.S. national security objectives.
Third, I offered an amendment specifying that the War Powers resolution applies to current U.S. military operations in Libya, and that continuation of those operations requires congressional authorization. This was adopted by acclamation after Members on both sides delivered statements supporting the amendment. In doing so, the committee repudiated the administration's contention that U.S. operations in Libya do not constitute ``hostilities'' and therefore are not subject to the War Powers resolution.
Fourth, the committee adopted a sense of the Congress amendment stating that postwar reconstruction costs should be borne primarily by the Libyan people and Arab League nations.
Even with the success of these amendments, S.J. Res. 20 remains overly broad, despite its stated purpose of authorizing a limited use of force. Specifically, it contains no meaningful limits on the use of American air assets over Libya.
This resolution clearly would give the President the authority to escalate the American role in the bombing campaign. I understand that some Members of the Senate may favor that course. But Members who have concerns about a re-escalation of the U.S. combat role should understand that passage of the resolution not only gives the President that authority, it makes such a re-escalation more likely.
The defining limitation in S.J. Res. 20 is U.N. Security Council resolution 1973, which calls on nations to protect Libyan civilians. Effectively, any use of airpower consistent with this U.N. resolution is permitted under S.J. Res. 20. Using resolution 1973 as justification, the President already engaged in an intensive bombing campaign against Libyan targets at the beginning of our intervention. By definition, the administration and our allies would regard S.J. Res. 20 as permitting at least the intensity of American bombing that was undertaken in the first week of the war.
Moreover, President Obama publicly has defined the removal of Colonel Qadhafi as in the interest of protecting Libyan civilians. From the administration's point of view, almost any airstrike that degrades Libyan military capabilities or contributes in some way to the potential for the ouster of Qadhafi can be justified as contributing to the protection of civilians. This could include the use of slower fixed wing aircraft flying close air support missions and perhaps helicopters.
Passage of this resolution does not guarantee that there will be a full-scale re-escalation, but if President Obama is armed with this resolution and if the Libyan operation drags on, it is almost inevitable that the American role in Libya will expand. We know that some of our allies are running short of munitions. We also know that public opinion in some allied nations may trend against continuing this mission. Our military is the best and most capable in the world. If the President has this broad authorization from Congress in hand, allies will be far more confident that the United States will pick up the slack if they withdraw or limit their participation. In a recent press conference, the President said, ``There's no risks of additional escalation.'' But the only barrier to escalation would be the decision- making of the President himself.
I do not believe that our intervention in the Libyan civil war was prudent in the context of U.S. vital interests. I continue to be concerned that the U.S. role in Libya will escalate, that Libya reconstruction burdens could fall on our country, and that the Libyan operation siphons attention and resources away from more important national security priorities. I cannot support the broad mandate that this resolution would give to the President to expand U.S. military activities over Libya. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing adoption of S.J. Res. 20.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.