Floor Statements

Madam President, I ask that the bill S. 3709, the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, be called up and be the pending business.

Madam President, today the Senate begins consideration of legislation on the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. This agreement is the most important strategic diplomatic initiative undertaken by President Bush. By concluding this pact and the far- reaching set of cooperative agreements that accompany it, the President has embraced a long-term outlook that seeks to enhance the core strength of our foreign policy in a way that will give us new diplomatic options and improve global stability.

The Committee on Foreign Relations undertook an extensive review of this agreement. We held four public hearings with testimony from 17 witnesses, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. We received a classified briefing from Undersecretaries of State Nick Burns and Bob Joseph. Numerous briefings were held for staff with experts from the Congressional Research Service, the State Department, and the National Security Council. I submitted 174 written questions for the record to the Department of State on details of the agreement and posted the answers on the committee web site.

The agreement allows India to receive nuclear fuel, technology, and reactors from the United States--benefits that were previously denied to India because of its status outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty--NPT. This pact is a lasting incentive for India to abstain from further nuclear weapons tests and to cooperate closely with the United States in stopping proliferation.

The bill before us is an important step toward implementing the nuclear agreement with India, but we should understand that it is not the final step in the process. This legislation sets the rules for subsequent congressional consideration of a so-called 123 Agreement between the U.S. and India. A 123 Agreement is the term for a peaceful nuclear cooperation pact with a foreign country under the conditions outlined in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Our legislation does not restrict nor does it predetermine congressional action on the forthcoming 123 Agreement. Unlike the adminisiration's original legislative proposal, this bill preserves congressional prerogatives with regard to consideration of a future 123 Agreement. Under the administration's original proposal, the 123 Agreement would have entered into force 90 days after submission unless both houses of congress voted against it, and with majorities that could overcome a likely Presidential veto. I am pleased the administration changed course on this matter and agreed to submit the 123 Agreement with India to Congress under normal procedures. This means that both the House and the Senate must cast a positive vote of support before the 123 Agreement can enter into force.

In our view, this better protects Congress's role in the process and ensures congressional views will be taken into consideration.

I thank Senator Biden for his close cooperation on developing this important bill. It reflects our shared views and concerns. He and his staff were valuable partners in the drafting of this legislation, and the final product is much improved because of their efforts. Together, we have constructed a bill that allows the U.S. to seize an important strategic opportunity, while ensuring a strong congressional oversight role, reinforcing U.S. nonproliferation efforts, and maintaining our responsibilities under the NPT. I also want to thank all members of the Foreign Relations Committee for their support, and the work of their staffs, in crafting a bill that received the overwhelming support of the committee last June.

For the benefit of Senators, I offer the following section by section analysis.

Section 101 identifies the bill as the U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy and U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act. Sections 102 and 103 of the Lugar-Biden bill include sense of the Congress provisions on U.S.-India relations and policy declarations. These provisions give voice to a set of important policy issues involving bilateral relations, democratic values, nuclear non-proliferation regimes, fissile material production in South Asia, and support for IAEA safeguards and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. All of these concerns are reinforced by the bill's comprehensive reporting requirements.

Section 104 provides waiver authority from provisions in the Atomic Energy Act and removes the prohibition on cooperating with India due to its 1998 weapons tests and its existing weapons program. At the same time, section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, which is preserved under the Lugar-Biden bill, terminates nuclear cooperation if India conducts a nuclear test, proliferates nuclear weapons or materials, or breaks its agreements with the IAEA or the United States.

Section 105 of our proposal adopts all of the administration's requirements

to ensure that India is meeting its nonproliferation commitments. In addition, we require that decisions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group enabling nuclear trade with India are made by consensus and consistent with its rules. Our aim is to ensure that this multilateral organization will continue to play a vital role in global nonproliferation efforts.

Section 106 prohibits exports of equipment, materials or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water. The provision allows narrow exceptions for the export of these items from the United States to India if they are for proliferation-resistant activities that involve the United States or have the sponsorship of a recognized international body such as the IAEA. This provision is consistent with the administration's policy regarding such transfers. It would allow cooperation in sensitive nuclear areas only if such cooperation could be implemented with no risk of proliferation.

Section 107 requires the creation of a system to ensure that no items exported to India are diverted to any uses that are not peaceful. This section seeks to ensure U.S. compliance with our NPT obligations.

Section 108 requires annual Presidential certifications that India is meeting its commitments under the July 2005 Joint Statement, its Separation Plan, New Delhi's Safeguards Agreement and additional protocol with the IAEA, the 123 Agreement, and applicable U.S. laws regarding U.S. exports to India. The President must also certify on an annual basis that U.S. trade with India in these areas remains in the national security interests of the United States.

Section 109 requires that no action be undertaken under this act that could violate any U.S. obligation under the NPT. Section 110 explicitly stipulates that if India conducts a nuclear test, U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation is terminated. Finally, sections 111 and 112 clarify India's Missile Technology Control Regime status under U.S. law and various terms used in the bill.

The U.S.-Indian agreement resulted from a delicately balanced negotiation. Neither side got everything it wanted. Nevertheless, the Bush administration and the Indian government came to the conclusion that the agreement was in the national security interest of both countries. I urge Senators to vote in favor of this legislation without conditions that would kill the agreement.

I would also note that Senator Biden and I included an important piece of nonproliferation legislation in the bill as title II. In 2004, the Senate ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol, but Congress did not pass implementing legislation that is required for the treaty to go into effect. President Bush has called on the Senate to act on this important matter, and the committee voted unanimously in favor of this bill in March.

The Committee approved this legislation with a bipartisan vote of 16 to 2. Furthermore 15 members of the committee asked to be named as original cosponsors. Since that time, additional Senators have requested to be added as cosponsors.

Due to the fact that the legislation was an original bill, the Parliamentarian ruled that cosponsors were not permitted. This is unfortunate because the amount of support our legislation has received is impressive. I appreciate the strong support of Senators Biden, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Dodd, Kerry, Nelson, Obama, Cornyn, Bayh, Hutchison, DeWine, and Lott.

During our markup, the committee rejected an amendment offered by Senator Feingold. Under the amendment, the President would have had to determine with absolute certainty that no U.S. nuclear fuel exports to India could increase its production of fissile materials for weapons. New Delhi would rightly see this as moving the goalposts--an unacceptable unilateral alteration of the pact. If the Feingold amendment or others like it are included in the final legislation, they would effectively kill the U.S.-India Agreement.

I would have preferred that the U.S.-India Agreement had included a commitment by New Delhi to stop making nuclear bomb materials, but negotiations did not yield that result. Instead, the Bush administration won an important commitment to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Such a multilateral approach is the best way to reduce nuclear tensions and threats associated with an arms race in South Asia.

The Lugar-Biden bill declares it the policy of the United States to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. Our bill also includes an annual reporting requirement detailing:

United States efforts to promote national or regional

progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing,

capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles,

pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off

regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-

off Treaty.

I will oppose amendments that delay or impose additional conditions on the agreement before it can enter into force. The Senate will not advance U.S. national security in this case by making the perfect the enemy of the good. We should not hold up the significant nonproliferation gains afforded by this initiative in order to seek a fissile material cap that India has indicated it will not consider absent similar commitments by Pakistan and China.

The United States and India have engaged in initial discussions on a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, FMCT, to be negotiated in the conference on disarmament. We should press for rapid progress in that context.

The Indian government has expressed concern about section 106 of our bill. This section prohibits the export of any equipment, materials or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent fuel, or the production of heavy water. These technologies are not purely civilian in nature. They are considered critical elements to a modern nuclear weapons program.

This provision in our bill is entirely consistent with President Bush's policy announcement on this matter at the National Defense University on February 11, 2004. In his speech, the President said:

The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse

to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and

technologies to any state that does not already possess full-

scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. This

step will prevent new states from developing the means to

produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators

must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to

acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for

manufacturing illegal weapons.

President Bush also said that ``enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.''

In response to questions for the record that I submitted, Under Secretaries of State Bob Joseph and Nick Burns amplified this administration policy as it applies to the nuclear agreement with India. They said:

For the United States, ``full civil nuclear cooperation''

with India means trade in most civil nuclear technologies,

including fuel and reactors. But we do not intend to provide

enrichment or reprocessing technology to India. As the

President said in February 2004, ``enrichment and

reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to

harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'' We do not

currently provide enrichment or reprocessing equipment to

any country. We will also need to ensure that any

cooperation is fully consistent with U.S. obligations

under the NPT not to in any way assist India's nuclear

weapons program, and with provisions of U.S. law.

Under Secretaries Burns and Joseph also answered that:

We do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to

any state. Therefore, full civil nuclear cooperation with

India will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology.

This answer is especially significant, since the phrase ``full civil nuclear energy cooperation'' is the phrase taken directly from the July 2005 joint statement.

In response to a question for the record that I submitted to Secretary Rice, she responded:

The U.S. does not foresee transferring heavy water

production equipment or technology to India, and the draft

bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement accordingly

makes no provisions for such transfers.

Our committee bill, S. 3709, does not break any new ground in this area. This is not a new subject. The answers to these questions have been on the committee's Web site for months.

Nothing in this bill deviates from the President's policy, and we even go one step further by allowing the flexibility to export those items from the United States for proliferation-resistant activities with the U.S. or under international cooperation. I support section 106, and I think it is important that we take the strong and definitive statements made by President Bush, Secretary Rice, Under Secretary of State Nick Burns, and Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph and put them into law.

The Indian government has also expressed concern about section 107, which requires an end-use monitoring program to be carried out with respect to U.S. exports and re-exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology sold or leased to India. Some have argued that this provision is not needed because IAEA safeguards would verify the use of any U.S. exports to India. IAEA safeguards only apply, however, to nuclear materials, not to nuclear technology. Sensitive technology of the kind the United States might export to India that can be used in India's civilian nuclear program could also advance India's nuclear weapons program.

This type of end-use system is not without precedent, as Congress required similar recordkeeping for nuclear cooperation with China.

An end-use monitoring program can provide increased confidence in India's separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs. It also would further ensure United States compliance with article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The provision is not intended to cast doubt on the sincerity of India's July 18 Joint Statement commitments or its March and May 2006 separation documents. Rather, the committee believes that by building and establishing a special program with India, the resulting coordination between India and U.S. regulatory agencies can provide a basis for even greater cooperation and commerce between the two nations.

Section 107 would confirm that only authorized recipients are receiving nuclear technology; that the nuclear technology identified for transfer will be used only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear activities; that the nuclear technology identified for transfer will not be retransferred without the prior consent of the United States; and that facilities, equipment, or materials derived through the use of transferred technology will not be transferred without the prior consent of the United States.

This section also requires that, in the absence of IAEA safeguards, the U.S. and India must arrange a bilateral system to ensure that safeguards in India remain on U.S. exports and re-exports in perpetuity.

Section 107 requirements could be met by applying to India those measures already governing atomic energy cooperation under the 123 Agreement with China. Under Secretary Joseph testified before the committee that, while the 123 Agreement with India will not provide for full-scope safeguards, it ``will allow for appropriate controls to help ensure that material or goods provided for civilian purposes remain within the civilian sector.'' So nothing in section 107 would be inconsistent with what may be concluded in the 123 Agreement with India itself.

Title II of the bill includes the committee's IAEA Additional Protocol Implementing Legislation. This title permits the Additional Protocol the U.S. has concluded with the IAEA to go into effect.

In President Bush's 2004 speech at the National Defense University, he called on the Senate to ratify the U.S. Additional Protocol with the IAEA. He said:

We must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to

fulfill its essential mandate. America and other nations

support what is called the Additional Protocol, which

requires states to declare a broad range of nuclear

activities and facilities, and allow the IAEA to inspect

those facilities . . . Nations that are serious about

fighting proliferation will approve and implement the

Additional Protocol. I've submitted the Additional Protocol

to the Senate. I urge the Senate to consent immediately to

its ratification.

The Committee on Foreign Relations voted unanimously to approve a resolution of ratification on the U.S. Additional Protocol on March 4, 2004, and the full Senate approved it on March 31 by unanimous consent in 2004.

Unfortunately the Additional Protocol is not self-executing. Congress must adopt implementing legislation for the United States to submit its instruments of ratification. In other words, implementing legislation must be passed before the Additional Protocol can go into effect. The Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously approved the implementing legislation on March 4, 2006, but efforts to pass the legislation in the full Senate have been unsuccessful due to holds placed by several Senators.

At a time when the administration and the Congress are demanding that India conclude such an Additional Protocol as part of its overall nuclear arrangements, Congress must muster the political will to act on the implementing legislation. Our credibility as the leader of global nonproliferation efforts is at stake. Along with many other nations, we are asking the IAEA to perform critical functions aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. An effective IAEA is very much in the national security interest of the United States.

Some Senators expressed concern that the Additional Protocol and the implementing legislation will make it possible, even likely, that international inspectors will learn secrets about our nuclear weapons program. Let me state clearly, nothing could be further from the truth. The Additional Protocol does not contain any new arms control or disarmament obligations for the United States. Although there are increased rights granted to the IAEA for the conduct of inspections in the United States, although there are increased rights granted to the IAEA for the conduct of inspections in the United States, the administration has assured the Foreign Relations Committee that the likelihood of an inspection occurring in our country is very low. Moreover, even if an inspection under the Additional Protocol is requested, the United States has the full right, through the National Security Exclusion, to prevent the inspection if we determine that it could be potentially harmful to U.S. national security interests.

On July 26, 2006, the National Security Adviser, Steve Hadley, expressed the administration's support for the language in title II. He wrote:

The Administration urges both Houses of Congress to act to

complete expeditious action on implementing legislation to

enable the United States to meet its obligations under the

Additional Protocol.

More recently, President Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, John Rood, testified at his confirmation hearing that the administration strongly supports the Additional Protocol and that it is important that the United States pass implementing legislation.

I am pleased to report that a compromise was reached between the administration, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and those Senators who expressed concerns about the IAEA Additional Protocol implementing legislation. This is an important step for U.S. nonproliferation policy, and I thank all of the parties involved in the discussions for their support of those efforts.

In conclusion, Madam President, I urge my colleagues to approve the U.S.-India agreement. This legislation will allow the United States to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation while safeguarding U.S. national security and nonproliferation efforts, as well as congressional prerogatives. It is an opportunity to build a vital strategic partnership with a nation that shares our democratic values and will exert increasing influence on the world stage. We should move forward now.

I thank the Chair, yield the floor, and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, I send a managers' amendment to the desk that has been cleared on both sides.

Madam President, I urge the amendment's adoption.

Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk that has been cleared on both sides of the aisle.

I urge the amendment's adoption.

I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

I thank the Chair and suggest the absence of a quorum.

I would like to respond to my distinguished colleague. I appreciate the appointment that he has with our colleague from Arizona. My hope would be that the Senator would proceed with his amendments. It would be timely to do so at his earliest convenience. I encourage him to do so.

I just indicated as soon as you could proceed with your amendments, this would be timely, in terms of moving the progress of our bill today.

That is correct. Staffs have been working on one of the amendments of the Senator with the hope it might be possible to accept that amendment. The other amendment would have to be offered and debated.

I appreciate that and thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia for his very generous comments about my leadership and the work of the committee. But I want to say that I appreciated very much the Senator's diligent and thoughtful work on the committee. He will be missed. He has been a great leader in our efforts and has participated materially in the formation of the legislation he talked about today. I deeply appreciate the strength of his statement and his very thoughtful comments.

I understand the distinguished Senator from Kansas wishes to make a statement.

I yield the floor.

I thank the Senator from Kansas for a very strong endorsement of this legislation.

I note in the Senate the distinguished Senator from Georgia who would like to participate. I look forward to hearing from him.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Georgia for visiting India, for his personal testimony on this issue, for strong support of the treaty, and for his very thoughtful personal comments.

I note the presence of the very distinguished leader in the Senate in fostering and strengthening India-United States relationships, the distinguished Senator from Texas.

I thank the distinguished Senator for his leadership. His action with the distinguished Senator from New York, Mrs. Clinton, is certainly timely for these important visits to occur and these negotiations. I think they have restored significance in our relationship. I thank the Senator for coming to the Senate and offering strong support for the treaty.

Mr. President, I note the presence of another distinguished member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the distinguished Senator from Ohio.

Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk that has been cleared on both sides of the aisle.

I urge adoption of the amendment.

I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

I note the distinguished Senator from New Mexico is present.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from New Mexico. This is a killer condition because it requires the President to make two determinations prior to the U.S.-India agreement being implemented that are at odds with the purpose of the pact.

First, under the Bingaman amendment a determination must be made that both India and the United States have taken specific steps to conclude a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, or FMCT, before the U.S. can export nuclear equipment and technology.

The amendment requires that a second determination be made that India has stopped the production of fissile material for weapons before the U.S. can export nuclear materials.

While I agree that an Indian commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons program would have been optimal, even in its absence this agreement serves U.S. national security interests. Members must consider whether this amendment and others like it advance U.S. national security. I believe that U.S. interests are served by greater IAEA oversight of India's nuclear program and I reject amendments that make the perfect the enemy of the good. I support this agreement and oppose amendments, like this one, that would derail its implementation.

By linking American exports of nuclear equipment and technology to U.S. and Indian progress on a multilateral FMCT holds New Delhi to a different and higher standard than any other country we have nuclear trade with, higher standards for example than we require of Beijing. A successful FMCT will only be concluded and implemented when every nation with fissile material production capabilities agrees and abides by its commitment. I worry that this amendment may provide countries who oppose this bilateral agreement with a backdoor veto. In other words, if another nation stymies progress on a FMCT, will India and the U.S. be penalized?

I share the strong support of the Senator from New Mexico for an FMCT. But a successful FMCT negotiation will require the assent of all nations, in particular China. Unlike the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, China is assumed to have ceased fissile material production but has not made a public statement confirming this as the others have.

The report that accompanies the Lugar-Biden legislation, S. 3709, highlights the potential trouble with these kind of linkages. The Conference on Disarmament, the host of talks on a FMCT, has been unable to agree on a work program, in part because some countries--notably China--have refused to approve the beginning of FMCT negotiations unless the Conference on Disarmament also approves discussions of other issues, such as nuclear disarmament and banning weapons in outer space. For its part India has long supported conclusion of an effectively verifiable FMCT. This position reflects India's concern regarding fissile material production by its nuclear-armed neighbors, and it would be unrealistic to expect a precipitous change in India's position. It would be difficult to determine that the U.S. and India have taken specific steps to conclude an FMCT if Chinese interference didn't permit the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament to start.

In testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, former Secretary of Defense William Perry addressed the danger of conditioning passage of the U.S.-India agreement on FMCT-related issues. In fact, Bill Perry stated that there were many things by which we could condition nuclear trade with India on, including ``India tak[ing] a leadership position in promoting an international cutoff in the production of fissile material.'' But Dr. Perry concluded:

I do not recommend that the Senate try to modify the

agreement to include them. Instead, I recommend that the

Senate task the Administration to vigorously pursue

continuing diplomacy to facilitate these actions, and that

should be as a follow-on to the agreement.

Secretary Perry's advice was good counsel and we adopted it in the Lugar-Biden bill. In our opinion, S. 3709 strikes the right balance in conditioning nuclear trade with India in areas consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement. India reiterated its support for an FMCT in that statement and our bill applies pressure and requires continue monitoring of future Indian and U.S. administrations to ensure full implementation of the decision by India to support such a treaty.

Section 105(5) of the Lugar-Biden bill requires an annual determination that India continues its support for an FMCT and is not preventing adoption of a negotiating mandate that leaves the issue of verification to be decided in the negotiations. If India is working with the United States to conclude an FMCT or a similar treaty, that would justify a presidential determination under this provision.

We reinforce these requirements with report language that reads that:

the United States must now use the influence it has gained

through efforts in both India and Pakistan, and with India

in particular through its nuclear trade with that nation,

to help them transition from nuclear build-ups to

stability and arms reductions. This is nowhere more

relevant than in the area of fissile material production.

In addition, this amendment requires the President to determine that India has ceased the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons before the agreement can be implemented. India has long rejected calls for the cessation of fissile material production, pointing to rival nuclear weapons programs as justification.

India maintains that it cannot agree to a unilateral cap on fissile material production at this time. Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons-related purposes, and China has not yet committed to a moratorium on such production. It is not in U.S. national security interests to threaten the significant nonproliferation gains afforded by this Initiative with India in order to seek a fissile material cap that India indicates it cannot agree to, absent a similar commitment by Pakistan and China.

As Secretary Rice testified on April 6, 2006, before the Committee on Foreign Relations:

India would never accept a unilateral freeze or cap on its

nuclear arsenal. We raised this with the Indians, but the

Indians said that its plans and policies must take into

account regional realities. No one can credibly assert that

India would accept what would amount to an arms control

agreement that did not include other key countries, like

China and Pakistan.

In addition, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Policy, Bob Joseph, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, stated on March 29, 2006:

The curtailment of the production of fissile material for

weapons was discussed as part of the Civil Nuclear

Cooperation Initiative, but India maintained that it could

not agree to a unilateral cap at this time. The U.S. has

achieved an important objective by obtaining India's

commitment to work toward the

conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

(FMCT). Moreover, we remain willing to explore other

intermediate options that might also serve such an objective.

We also continue to call on all states that produce fissile

material for weapons purposes to observe a voluntary

production moratorium, as the United States has done for

many years.

Senator Biden and I took a number of steps to address concerns about continued Indian fissile material production but we sought to do so in a manner that did not threaten the efficacy of the U.S.-India Agreement. In section 103(1) of our bill we make it the policy of the United States ``to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the production by India and Pakistan of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.''

Section 108(a)(1)(A) requires an annual reporting requirement on Indian implementation and compliance with ``the nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India.''

Other subsections within section 108 of our legislation require: (1) annual reports on ``significant changes in the production by India of nuclear weapons or in the types of amounts of fissile materials produced''; (2) whether India ``is in full compliance with the commitments and obligations contained in the [U.S.-India] agreements and other documents''; and (3) a requirement to identify and assess all compliance issues arising on India's commitments and obligations. These reporting requirements will ensure that Congress remains fully informed on developments related to the implementation of this agreement. As we all know, it is the prerogative of Congress to review these treaties and take action should we ever determine that Indian activities put the benefits of the agreement on U.S. national security interests in doubt.

In addition, the committee adopted an amendment offered by Senator Chafee during markup of S. 3709 making it the policy of the United States that peaceful atomic cooperation and ``exports of nuclear fuel to India should not contribute to, or in any way encourage, increases in the production by India of fissile material for non-civilian purposes.''

The administration is in the midst of negotiations with India on a 123 Agreement, and New Delhi is also negotiating a new safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has yet to make a decision to embrace the U.S.-India Agreement and approve its 45 member states to engage in nuclear trade with India. If we accede to conditions such as the one contained in the Bingaman amendment, conditions that India has already rejected, we will severely limit our ability to influence India's nuclear program.

Moreover, the IAEA's ability to monitor India's activities will be further circumscribed and we will return to a time when India was a hindrance rather than a partner in international, multilateral nonproliferation and arms control efforts.

Senator Biden and I believe we have addressed this matter in a manner that does not threaten the viability of the agreement. The determinations I described above were carefully drafted to balance, and not upset, the ongoing negotiations in Vienna or those in the U.S. and India. We must not forget that Congress will have a chance to vote on the 123 Agreement. S. 3709 provides Congress with an up or down vote on this important agreement and fully protects Congress' role in the process and ensures congressional views will be taken into consideration.

In conclusion, the Bingaman amendment imposes an unacceptable precondition on civil nuclear cooperation with India. India will regard this as ``moving the goalposts,'' an unacceptable renegotiation of the deal, and a bad-faith effort on our part.

As a consequence, this is a deal-killer that wrecks the balance that we sought between executive and legislative power, nonproliferation responsibilities, and the U.S.-India relationship. Killer conditions such as these forfeit the U.S. ability to influence Indian behavior. While I understand that this was not the intent of the Senator from New Mexico, in my view it is the practical effect.

In sum, the Lugar-Biden bill addresses the issues raised by this amendment without undercutting the agreement. Unfortunately, the Bingaman amendment is a killer amendment and I urge Senators to oppose it.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Let me respond to the Senator. I appreciate his willingness to offer the amendments in a timely fashion. We are in the process of debating one amendment, but I will ask unanimous consent it be temporarily laid aside so the Senator can offer his amendments to expedite this consideration.

Mr. President, I send two amendments to the desk that have been cleared on both sides.

I urge adoption of the amendments.

I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

I would mention, Mr. President, the author of the amendments is Senator Bingaman, and one of the amendments is also in conjunction with Senator Domenici.

Amendment No. 5178

Mr. President, I want to respond to the distinguished Senator from North Dakota briefly. I oppose his amendment. While the amendment would merely state that it is U.S. policy to continue to support implementation of the Security Council resolution that was passed in June 1998 in response to the nuclear weapons tests in South Asia--a resolution we voted for--I believe the amendment casts us back to a very different time, well before the miraculous changes in India's relations with the United States and with the world that occurred as a result of the July 2005 Joint Statement and India's decision to turn the corner on nonproliferation policy generally.

I do not believe this bill is the right place to address ourselves to the past. This bill is about the future. We have taken adequate account in the bill of the concerns the Senator's amendment would address. Section 1033 of the Lugar-Biden bill makes it the policy of the United States that:

India remains in full compliance with its non-

proliferation, arms control, and disarmament agreements,

obligations, and commitments.

Section 108(b) of our legislation requires annual reporting, including a detailed description of ``United States efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty; the reactions of India and Pakistan to such efforts; and assistance that the United States is providing, or would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan'' to promote such objectives.

In the context of this bill, I do not believe it is appropriate to return to the past in a way the Senator's amendment would, and I urge defeat of the amendment.

Mr. President, may I respond briefly to my colleague?

It would be my hope--and let me discuss this quickly--that the debate on the first amendment of Senator Dorgan is completed. Secondly, I want a short time for Senator Domenici of New Mexico to make a statement. And then thirdly, we will proceed to the introduction of Senator Dorgan's second amendment. My hope would be that a unanimous consent will be formulated--I know staff from both sides are working on that--that will provide for rollcall votes on both Dorgan amendments and then, at the conclusion of the debate of the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, on the Bingaman amendment, perhaps a stack of three votes for the convenience of Senators. I am broaching that, not asking for everybody to agree, but I am hopeful that would be a general agreement of those who are around at this point.

It is my hope that the distinguished Senator from New Mexico might be recognized.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Domenici, for his very strong statement, and I simply want to mention again how much I appreciate working with him over the years. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation was extremely important throughout a good part of the last decade, and on the nonproliferation efforts he has been a champion in the Senate. We appreciate his contribution to this debate today.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I note the presence of the distinguished Senator from North Dakota. We indicated that he would continue by offering his second amendment, and I would advise him to do so, if he is prepared.

Amendment No. 5182

Mr. President, I intend to offer a short statement opposing the amendment. I would ask Members to be alert to the possibility that following my statement, Senator Biden has indicated he would put his statement in the Record if this plan can then be accepted, and we would then proceed to three rollcall votes: an amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Bingaman, and two amendments offered by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan. For the convenience of our colleagues, those three votes would come without pause, thus minimizing the dislocation of Members' schedules and accelerating our consideration of this debate.

I am certain the Chair has heard that Senator Biden and I, for many of our colleagues who were hopeful that we could proceed in a responsible way but conclude the debate today, on Thursday, are attempting to do that, and we appreciate the cooperation of our colleagues.

Having said that, Mr. President, let me state my opposition to the second amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota. His amendment would, in fact, undo the entire effort we have achieved with India over the past year. Not only would he revise India's civilian military separation plan with his amendment, but he would require India to assume the obligations of a nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT. This is, in effect, a perfect killer amendment. It should be strongly opposed by every Member of this body who supports an improved relationship with India.

The Senator's amendment adds two new determination requirements to our bill: first, that India's separation plan result in a situation wherein all reactors that supply civilian power are declared to the IAEA and under safeguards; and second, that India assume certain NPT obligations. This is unnecessary and would do us great harm. It adds a new element in the separation plan that the President did not negotiate and would undo the deal we have reached.

India's separation plan is credible and sound, according to criteria developed by the administration in its negotiations with India. As Secretary Rice stated last April:

For the plan to be transparent, it had to be articulated

publicly.

It has been.

For it to be credible and defensible from a

nonproliferation standpoint, it had to capture more than just

a token number of Indian nuclear facilities--

Which it did----

by encompassing nearly two-thirds of India's current and

planned thermal power reactors, as well as all future civil,

thermal, and breeder reactors. Importantly, for the

safeguards to be meaningful, India had to commit to apply

IAEA safeguards in perpetuity.

It did so.

Once a reactor is under IAEA safeguards, those safeguards

will remain there permanently and on an unconditional basis.

Further, in our view, the plan also needed to include

upstream and downstream facilities associated with the

safeguarded reactors to provide a true separation of civil

and military programs. India committed to these steps, and we

have concluded that its separation plan meets the criteria

established: it is credible, transparent, and defensible from

a nonproliferation standpoint.

The amendment changes the metrics for a credible and defensible separation plan by including that such a plan must mean that any reactor supplying power must be declared. As Secretary Rice stated before the committee:

Regardless of whether they might be used to generate

electric power or not, reactors that are not declared civil,

and thus are not under IAEA safeguards, cannot legitimately

receive nuclear fuel or other nuclear cooperation from any

State party to the NPT.

The second element in the Senator's amendment would require India to assume the obligations of a nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

The administration was careful not to term India a ``nuclear weapon state'' with similar rights and obligations as those five nations in the NPT with status as lawful weapon states--France, Russia, China, the U.K., and the U.S.--and instead termed India in the July 2005 joint statement a ``responsible state with advanced nuclear technology.'' This was necessary to do no harm to U.S. and other weapons states' status under the treaty.

The Senator's amendment would create obligations similar to those of weapon states for India through creating a determination requirement that the President must make wherein India has assumed the obligations of a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. I would argue that this is not necessary, since it could well provoke India to walk away from the obligations they would assume under our 123 Agreement with them and leave the restraint we might get through that deal on their weapons program on the negotiating table.

India has stated they have no intention to sign or become a party to the NPT, as a weapon state or otherwise. India's July 2005 joint statement commitments are significant, but they do not include NPT membership.

I urge defeat of the amendment; it is a killer.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a series of stacked votes in relation to the following amendments: the Bingaman amendment No. 5174, the Dorgan amendment No. 5178, as modified and the Dorgan amendment No. 5182; further, that there be no second degrees in order to any of the amendments prior to the votes, that there be 2 minutes of debate equally divided before the second and third votes.

Mr. President, I amend the request to include 2 minutes of debate on the Bingaman amendment No. 5174 prior to the vote.

I have no objection to that. I amend the request to include 2 minutes of debate by Senator Dorgan.

Mr. President, I will oppose this amendment as it goes significantly beyond the commitments India made in the joint statement. India will regard this particular requirement that India stop producing fissile materials for weapons as moving the goalposts and an unacceptable renegotiation of the deal--a bad-faith effort on our part.

India maintains that they cannot agree to a unilateral cap at this time. We should not hold up the significant nonproliferation gains afforded by the initiative in order to seek a fissile material cap that India indicates it cannot agree to absent a similar commitment by Pakistan and China. Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons-related purposes and China has not committed to a moratorium on such production. Unfortunately, in my judgment, this is truly a killer amendment. I strongly encourage that amendment be defeated.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the next two amendments.

Mr. President, my impression was that the call was for the vote and then a 2-minute debate.

I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, I ask that Members oppose the Dorgan amendment on the basis that the resolution he talks about is an important one, but it talks about a time in which our relationship with India was very different. It talks about the past. We have been very fortunate in this country to move into a better relationship with India, to a point where we are now going to be in India. The IAEA is going to be in India. We are going to be able to observe a bulk of the nuclear reactors and programs there and to work with India in peaceful development.

There was a time when we did not have that relationship. By ``we,'' I mean the United States and the international community. The situation in India is constructive. This is a time to celebrate and to move on that momentum.

I ask that the Dorgan amendment be defeated.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, I would like to indicate that the distinguished Senator from Nevada will offer an amendment. We will then proceed to the Old Senate Chamber for a debate on that amendment. I think we have an agreement that the extent of the debate will be no more than 60 minutes. We would return to this Chamber for the actual vote on the Ensign amendment, following the debate in the Old Senate Chamber. Therefore, the Senator from Nevada should be recognized so that he can start that process.

Amendment No. 5181

Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from Delaware, as the ranking member, will offer the official motion sending us over to the Chamber.

Madam President, we are now prepared to vote in relation to the Ensign amendment. I ask unanimous consent that following that vote, Senator Feingold be recognized to offer his amendment and that there be 90 minutes equally divided on that amendment. I further ask unanimous consent that following the use or yielding back of time on that amendment, it be set aside, and Senator Boxer be recognized in order to offer her amendment; provided further that there be 45 minutes equally divided in relation to that amendment. Further, that following that time the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Feingold amendment, to be followed by a vote in relation to the Boxer amendment, with no second-degrees in order, and following these votes, the bill be read for a third time and the Senate proceed to a vote on passage of the House bill as provided in the previous order. I would also ask that there be 2 minutes equally divided for debate prior to each vote.

I thank the Chair. We are now prepared to vote in relation to the Ensign amendment.

Yes.

Vote on Amendment No. 5181

I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, just for clarification, I ask unanimous consent that the Feingold and Boxer amendments be in order, notwithstanding adoption of the Harkin amendment.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin for his very important contributions to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the specific contributions he has made to the discussion of this legislation. Reluctantly, I rise in opposition to his amendment.

In my judgment--and I don't use the term unadvisedly--this is truly a killer amendment. If accepted, it would require the United States and India to renegotiate the civilian nuclear agreement on which we are having our debate this evening. I state categorically: India has nuclear weapons. Let me repeat that: India has nuclear weapons and has stated its intent to keep them. The critical issue we must consider in examining each of the amendments that have come before us is whether the U.S. national security is advanced by engaging India and by increasing the IAEA oversight of the India nuclear program. I believe the answer is yes, and as a result I support this agreement and I oppose amendments such as the one now before us that would require renegotiation or make implementation of the agreement impossible.

While the Feingold amendment appears harmless, it requires the President to certify that no form of the U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation with India will in any way assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire more nuclear weapons in the future. This certification demanded by the amendment is impossible to make, and even if it could be made, it would be ineffective. How do we expect the President of the United States to predict the future? Clearly we do not expect, plan, or intend for this agreement to aid India's nuclear program. We have taken numerous steps to prevent this from happening. We are confident that we have already put the necessary provisions in place in this agreement.

A Presidential certification as required by the amendment is a legal pledge to Congress. Senate bill 3709 requires a number of certifications, but it does so based upon information in the President's possession. We do not ask the President to predict the future or make a judgment when the necessary information is unavailable.

This is not the first time the Senator from Wisconsin has offered this amendment. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 13 to 5 to defeat the same amendment during our markup of S. 3709. During the markup, the administration strongly opposed the amendment and expressed its view that it was a killer amendment.

Senator Biden and I do not believe this amendment is necessary. We share the concerns Senator Feingold has expressed, but we believe we have addressed them in the committee-passed bill in a manner consistent with our agreement with India and in a way that avoids renegotiation.

First, the United States is obligated by article I of the nonproliferation treaty not to engage in any nuclear cooperation that would assist India's nuclear weapons program. Nothing in the United States-India agreement violates this obligation. In reality, this agreement encourages India to produce fewer nuclear weapons by requiring more Indian facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards. We must remember that the United States will not cooperate with any Indian facility, site, or location that is not under IAEA safeguards. In other words, the IAEA will have inspection rights at those places where U.S. exports are utilized.

Second, S. 3709 requires that the IAEA safeguards be supplemented by bilateral end-use monitoring requirements under section 107. In other

words, if the IAEA were forced to suspend their oversight of India's commitments, the administration is required to have a backup plan in place to ensure that American technologies and materials are not misused or misdirected to India's nuclear program.

Third, the bill requires the President of the United States to inform Congress of any Indian violation of their commitments under the agreement. This preserves Congress's oversight role and permits us to act should Indian behavior require a reexamination of the cooperative agreement.

Fourth, section 109 states that no authority under S. 3709 can be used to violate U.S. commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. U.S. contributions to the Indian nuclear program would be a blatant violation of this treaty commitment. Senator Biden and I thought it was critically important to reinforce the Senate's strong support for the NPT by insisting that our country continue to comply with its requirements.

Lastly, sensitive transfers most likely to aid India's nuclear programs are prohibited by this bill. Section 106 forbids trade in enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water technologies unless those transfers are under international supervision and then only to create proliferation-resistant versions. By prohibiting the transfer of these technologies, we ensure that U.S. assistance does not inadvertently assist India's weapons program.

India is not required to declare to the IAEA any information on the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Its nuclear enrichment and processing plants will also be outside IAEA safeguards. Without access to this information, it will be impossible for the United States to evaluate Indian production of fissile material. Consequently, it is impossible to determine whether an increase in Indian military fissile material production occurred because of foreign nuclear reactor fuel supply. In fact, India's own uranium mining and milling will probably play a much larger role in any analysis on this subject.

In sum, it is simply not possible to verify the relationship between the delivery of foreign fuel exports to India and the possibility of increases in Indian production of highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium, nor is it possible to analyze the relationship between future exports and domestic production. India is not required to share this information. The IAEA does not have access to these facilities. Requiring the President of the United States to certify something he has insufficient information to determine is unwise and potentially harmful, and the amendment clearly demands that the President make that certification. Congress will be kept completely informed on developments in this area through the existing reporting requirements of S. 3709.

Mr. President, for all of these reasons, I oppose this amendment. I ask Senators to vote no when the roll is called.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

Mr. President, we have had a good debate. I note the presence of the distinguished Senator from California on the floor, which prompts me to inquire of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin whether he requires additional time? If the Senator is prepared to yield back his time, I will yield back time on our side, and then we could proceed to debate on the amendment of the Senator from California and maybe to a closer time for final passage, for Members who are requesting this of all of us.

I will yield the time on our side.

Mr. President, I have listened carefully, as all Members do, to the distinguished Senator from California, who is such a valuable member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And she has expressed some of the views which are contained in her statement this evening during the very important hearings the committee conducted.

I will just say very clearly that Members on both sides of the aisle in committee felt that there were improvements that could occur with regard to the agreement, even if the agreement was negotiated in a fairly short period of time. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has taken ample time to work through this with the administration as well as with each other. I regret that we did not have unanimity in the committee on final passage. A vote of 16 to 2, however, indicated a very strong coming together, which clearly

has been expressed on the floor of the Senate today in the votes on various amendments.

But I must say that the amendment offered by the Senator from California is, in my judgment, a killer amendment. It goes far beyond the scope of the July 18 Joint Statement issued by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh.

The amendment as written would not permit the U.S.-India agreement to go into effect until India abandoned its military-to-military contacts with Iran. This is a killer condition that, if adopted by Congress, would require renegotiation of the agreement.

Few, if any, Members of Congress disagree with the sentiment expressed in this amendment; namely, that Iran is a destabilizing force in the Middle East. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently wrote in the Washington Post:

Everything returns to the challenge of Iran. It trains,

finances and equips Hezbollah, the state within a state in

Lebanon. It finances and supports Moqtada al-Sadr's militia,

the state within a state in Iraq. It works on a nuclear

weapons program which would drive nuclear proliferation out

of control and provides a safety net for the systemic

destruction of at least the regional order.

Iran is a critical challenge to U.S. diplomacy and global security. In this difficult environment the U.S. must cultivate a strong multilateral response to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and support for terrorism. An effective solution to the Iranian threat must include India. Holding New Delhi to a different standard than our closest allies or other nations we engage in nuclear commerce does not appear to be the best way to secure their support.

On April 5, 2006, Secretary Rice testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations that India has ``low level military-to-military contacts.'' She noted ``that there are a number of countries that have relations with Iran, and it's, of course, the sovereign right of a country to have relations with whomever they would like to have relations.'' She argues that the U.S. ``is not going to do better in pulling India toward us by insisting that they cut off relations with other states.'' She concluded that she didn't ``think that's going to work very effectively.''

The Secretary of State argues that the international community is changing its approach to Iran. She cites the exodus of banking and financial institutions. Perhaps most importantly she points out that India was the only member of the non-a1igned movement to vote for referral of the Iran to the U.N. Security Council for its illegal nuclear program. This was an important development because India was a founder and a longtime leader of the movement.

Let me be clear, this amendment will reverse the important trend of countries distancing themselves from Tehran and future Indian multilateral nonproliferation cooperation. Some experts have indicated that this amendment could very well have the opposite effect, forcing New Delhi away from the U.S.-Indian Agreement.

The administration has frequently made U.S. policy on Iran clear to the Indian Government. The U.S. has consistently expressed our desire for India's support of our efforts and policies. One of the unheralded diplomatic accomplishments of the 2005 Joint Statement is India's commitment to support international efforts to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, including to states such as Iran.

I emphasize that point. If, in fact, we are deeply concerned--and I am, and the Senator from California certainly is--about the developments in Iran of a nuclear program and the commitment of India to work with us, to limit that spread of enrichment and reprocessing is very important. To deliberately take action which scuttles this agreement and indicates to the Indians that they can look elsewhere for partnership is to court disaster.

l am pleased that India is committed to being a responsible member of the international community and it has made the decision that it is in its own national security interest to oppose Iran's weapons of mass destruction program.

On a number of occasions the Indian-Iranian military relationship has been greatly exaggerated. This year an article alleged that India was providing military training for Iranian sailors. Secretary Rice responded that while Iranian ships have made port calls at India ports, she reported that New Dehli had denied that Iranian sailors had been trained in India.

It is unfortunate that the Senator from California constructed the amendment in this manner. It would be more appropriate to address this issue in the sense of Congress section or as a statement of U.S. policy. If the amendment was modified in this manner, I am prepared to recommend that it be adopted by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, in its current form it makes it impossible for the President to meet the requirement and thus implementation is impossible.

If this amendment is adopted, in my judgment, the United States-India agreement will be scuttled. That, I believe, would be a tragedy.

I urge Senators to vote against the Boxer amendment.

I will yield whatever time the Senator will consume.

Do we have any time remaining on the opposition side?

I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Missouri.

Mr. President, I would inquire of the Chair if the existing order now calls for a 2-minute debate on the Feingold amendment prior to a rollcall vote on that amendment?

Further, I would ask the Chair for clarification: Does the 2-minute debate then occur on the Boxer amendment, after the rollcall vote on Feingold?

Then, finally, an additional 2-minute debate before final passage of the bill, after the Boxer amendment is voted on?

I thank the Chair for that clarification.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that--the first rollcall vote, we understand, is 15 minutes--the subsequent rollcall votes be 10 minutes each.

I thank the Chair.

Senator Feingold is now recognized.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 5187

Mr. President, Iran is a critical challenge to the United States, our diplomacy, our global security, but in this very difficult environment the United States must cultivate a strong multilateral response to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons in support of terrorism.

I simply point out that India was the only member of the nonaligned movement to vote for referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council for its illegal nuclear program. Holding India to a different standard than all of our other closest allies or nations with whom we engage in nuclear commerce does not appear to be a good way to secure their support.

Let me be very clear: If this amendment is adopted, the India nuclear agreement is kaput. This is it. This is a killer amendment, and I ask for Senators to vote no.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

nonproliferation consequences

Mr. President, the Senator is correct. Under our bill, the full force of section 129 would apply to any Indian detonation of a nuclear explosive device, any termination or abrogation of IAEA safeguards by India, and material violation of IAEA safeguards by India, all would result under section 129 in the termination of nuclear exports to India.

Yes, under our bill, the only requirement which is waived is that in section 123.a(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, for full- scope safeguards. India's 123 agreement would still have to meet the requirement of section 123.a(4), which requires that in the event of a test by India of a nuclear explosive device the United States shall have the right to request the return of supplies as you have stipulated.

Yes, that is our understanding.

Yes, I hope that would be the case.

My understanding is that the administration, the IAEA, and participating governments in the NSG have all stated that they would prefer that any new Indian safeguards agreement be modeled on INFCIRC/ 66 Rev. 2.

Mr. President, the unanimous consent order provides for 1 minute on each side. I will forego my minute, but I would like to yield to the distinguished leader, who is here. He wants to make a comment.

Mr. President, we relinquish all time.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, the Senate has taken a historic step in approving the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. This is critically important. Passage of the bill takes one more important step toward a vibrant and exciting relationship between our two great democracies. I thank all Senators for their cooperation in completing the Senate's consideration in such a short period of time. I thank especially Senator Biden for his strong support and cooperation. This has been truly a bipartisan effort from the beginning until final passage. We are committed to continuing this effort through the conference process.

Before yielding the floor, let me publicly thank Tom Moore of the majority staff and Ed Levine of the minority staff. They have become experts on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy and Cooperation Act. They have assisted the committee professionally and skillfully in helping craft the bill.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to hold a Full Committee hearing on the Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Program on Thursday, November 16, 2006 at 10 a.m. in room 253 of the Russell Senate Office Building.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, November 16, 2006 at 10 a.m. The purpose of this hearing is to consider the

nomination of Kevin M. Kolevar, of Michigan, to be an Assistant Secretary of Energy (Electricity Delivery and Energy).

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Thursday, November 16, 2006 following the first vote Committee on Environment and Public Works be authorized to hold a Business Meeting to consider the following agenda:

Alex Beehler to be Inspector General of the Environmental Protection Agency.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Finance be authorized to meet during the session on Thursday, November 16, 2006, at 2 p.m., in 215 Dirksen Senate Office Building, to hear testimony on ``The CHIP Program From the States' Perspective.''

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions be authorized to hold a hearing during the session of the Senate on Thursday, November 16, 2006 at 10 a.m. in SD-430.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs be authorized to hold an off-the-floor markup during the session on Thursday, November 16, 2006, to consider pending committee business (agenda attached).

Agenda

Legislation: S. 4046, Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act of 2006.

Nominations: The Honorable James H. Bilbray to be Governor, U.S. Postal Service; Thurgood Marshall Jr. to be Governor, U.S. Postal Service; The Honorable Dan G. Blair to be Chairman, Postal Rate Commission, Stephen T. Conboy to be U.S. Marshal, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet to conduct a hearing on ``Oversight of the Civil Rights Division'' on Thursday, November 16, 2006 at 9:30 a.m. in Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 226. The witness list is attached.

Panel I: The Hon. Wan Kim, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Panel II: Mr. Michael A. Carvin, Partner, Jones Day, Washington, DC; Mr. Ted Shaw, Director-Counsel and President, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF), New York, NY; Mr. Robert N. Driscoll, Partner, Alston & Bird, LLP Washington, DC; Mr. Joseph Rich, Director of Fair Housing and Community Development, Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Washington, DC.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs be authorized to meet on Thursday, November 16, 2006, at 10 a.m., for a hearing entitled ``The Defense Travel System: Boon or Boondoggle (Part 2).''

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on November 16, 2006 at 10:30 a.m., to hold a closed briefing.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, November 16 at 2:30 p.m.

The purpose of the hearing is to receive testimony relating to S. 2626, a bill to establish wilderness areas, promote conservation, improve public land, and provide for high quality economic development in Washington County, Utah, and for other purposes; and S. 3772, a bill to establish wilderness areas, promote conservation, improve public land, and provide for high quality development in White Pine Nevada, and for other purposes.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management support of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on November 16, 2006, at 9:30 a.m., in open session to receive testimony on Department of Defense business systems modernization efforts.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Sharon Squassoni, a specialist with the Congressional Research Service, be granted privileges of the floor during the duration of the Senate's consideration of S. 3709.

I ask unanimous consent that Henry Abeyta, a fellow with the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, be granted the privileges of the floor for the duration of the debate on S. 3709, the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy bill.

Mr. President, today I congratulate a remarkable young Hoosier and fellow Eagle Scout, Stephen Crayner.

Since becoming an Eagle Scout on April 22, 2004, an extraordinary achievement in itself, Stephen has continued to work diligently to improve himself and his community, eventually earning all 121 merit badges offered by the Boy Scouts. This dedication has earned him the distinguished rank of Eagle Scout with Three Silver Palms.

During my time in the Scouting program, I learned many important lessons about leadership, organization, and community spirit. For the troop to be a successful unit, each member must learn to take initiative and offer ideas and energy. He must also develop the ability to work in a team environment, and therefore accept the challenge of compromise and negotiation. Finally, the activities and the efforts of the Scouting program reflect a commitment to community involvement. Stephen's mastery of these lessons will serve him well in the years ahead.

I also appreciate this opportunity to congratulate the members of Stephen's family who have played such a large role in his many accomplishments. Stephen's father David served as Scoutmaster, and his mother Libby has volunteered extensively to support the troop. It is telling that Stephen's two older brothers, William and Benjamin, have also earned their Eagle.

I am hopeful that each of you will join me in congratulating Stephen for all of his remarkable accomplishments and in wishing him continuing success as he pursues new and exciting challenges.

Mr. President, on July 24 the Majority Leader placed in the Record a list of the Senators that had sought to be cosponsors of S. 3709, the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.

Mr. President, I ask that an updated list of those who wish to be listed as cosponsors be printed in the Record

The names follow.

Lugar, Biden, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Dodd, Kerry, Nelson, Obama, Cornyn, Bayh, Hutchison, DeWine, and Lott.

Mr. President, I appreciate this opportunity to join my friends from across the United States, Mexico, Canada, Guatemala, and El Salvador in celebrating the 6th Annual Bi-National Health Week.

Bi-National Health Week affords us an opportunity to reflect upon the many successful efforts made here in the United States in cooperation with Mexican, Canadian, Guatemalan, and Salvadorian consulates in order to promote healthy lifestyles and well-being amongst those who might otherwise lack access to important health care services.

Bi-National Health Week originated as an effort by Mexico's Secretary of Health to direct health care services to the underserved migrant populations currently living and working in the United States. Since its inception in October 2001, the network of Mexican consulates throughout the country has partnered with U.S. Federal, State and local agencies, the Institute for Mexicans Abroad, the United States-Mexico Border Health Commission, the California-Mexico Health Initiative, and various Mexican and United States colleges and universities. These partnerships have resulted in celebrations throughout the world in an effort to empower local health clinics and community organizations to provide services to the Hispanic/Latino population.

The agencies involved with the Bi-National Health week are working diligently to educate and encourage people to pursue healthy lifestyles. HIV, cholesterol, blood sugar, blood pressure, and oral screenings will be offered as examples of first-rate preventative care in order to avoid costly hospitalization and reduce future costs to the taxpayer. We must continue to work together at the Federal, State and local levels with our friends throughout the world in order to ensure that we seek every opportunity to pursue healthy lifestyles.

Mr. President, the organization known as Religions for Peace constitutes a global network of interreligious councils and affiliated groups, harnessed to encourage cooperation among the world's religious communities to transform conflict, build peace and advance sustainable development.

Founded in 1970 as an international, nonsectarian organization, Religions for Peace is now the largest coalition of the world's religious communities.

President of Religions for Peace is His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan.

Secretary General of WCRP, as the organization is known, is Dr. William F. Vendley, of the United States.

Our former colleague and my fellow Hoosier, John Brademas, who served in the House of Representatives from Indiana for 22 years and then became president of New York University, which he now serves as President Emeritus, is an International Trustee of Religions for Peace.

Last month, in Kyoto, Japan, more than 800 religious leaders, from all major traditions and over 100 countries, met at the Eighth World Assembly of the World Conference of Religions for Peace.

The theme of this assembly was Confronting Violence and Advancing Shared Security.

At the request of our former colleague Representative Brademas, I ask unanimous consent to have the final statement issued by the Kyoto Assembly printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise to introduce the National Fuels Initiative of 2006. This act presents to this Congress a plan to bring meaningful reductions in the amount of oil we consume in the United States and reduce our dependency on oil imports. Dependence on imported oil has put the United States in a position that no great power should tolerate. Our economic health is subject to forces far beyond our control, including the decisions of hostile countries. We maintain a massive military presence overseas, partly to preserve our oil lifeline. We have lost leverage on the international stage and are daily exacerbating the problem by participating in an enormous wealth transfer to authoritarian nations that happen to possess the commodity that our economy can least do without. The hundreds of billions of dollars we spend on oil imports each year weakens our economy, enriches hostile regimes, and is used by some to support terrorism.

In the absence of revolutionary changes in energy policy, we are risking multiple disasters for our country that will constrain living standards, undermine our foreign policy goals, and leave us highly vulnerable to the machinations of rogue states. There are at least six threats posed by oil dependence. First oil is vulnerable to supply disruption as a result of natural disasters, wars, and terrorist attacks. Price shocks resulting from a major supply loss can put the U.S. economy into recession. Second, global oil reserves are becoming more limited as easy supply is depleted, global demand rapidly increases, and governments exert more control over reserves. This makes oil more expensive in the short term, and creates the prospect that supplies may not be accessible in the future. Third, some oil-rich nations are using energy as an overt weapon. Adversarial regimes from Venezuela, to Iran, to Russia are using energy supplies as leverage against their neighbors. Fourth, hundreds of billions of dollars in oil export revenues flowing to authoritarian regimes increase corruption and hurt democratic reform. Some oil-rich nations are using this money to invest in terrorism, instability, or demagogic appeals to populism. Fifth, the threat of global climate change has been made worse by inefficient and unclean use of non-renewable energy like oil. This could bring about drought, famine, disease, and mass migration. And finally, dependence on oil increases instability and undermines development in much of the developing world. Rising energy costs can undermine our foreign assistance and hurt stability, development, disease eradication, and efforts to combat the root causes of terrorism.

The new geo-political reality emerging from the global energy situation and United States dependence on oil imports demand that we dramatically decrease the amount of oil we consume. In March 2006, I delivered an address at the Brookings Institution in which I described ``a shifting balance of realism'' from those who believe in the immutability of oil's domination of our economy and a laissez faire approach to energy policy to those who recognize that our Nation has no choice but to seek a major reorientation in the way we get our energy. Marginally reducing our reliance on imported oil over the course of the next few decades via the slow progress of market forces will be welcome, but by the time a sustained energy crisis fully motivates market forces, we are likely to be well past the point where we can save ourselves from extensive suffering. We must respond to our energy vulnerability as a crisis. This is the very essence of a problem requiring Congressional action.

The heart of America's geostrategic problem is reliance on imported oil in a market that is dominated by volatile and hostile governments. We can start to break petroleum's grip right now. The key is to replace oil used in transportation with renewable fuels and to improve the fuel efficiency of our cars and trucks.

I outlined the 5 central components of this energy plan at the Richard G. Lugar--Purdue University Summit on Energy Security on August 29th, 2006. First, this bill sets a goal for the United States to expand production of renewable fuels to at least 100 billion gallons a year by 2025. Some of this added production will come from current corn-based ethanol and biodiesel, but a great majority will be from emerging cellulosic technology allowing ethanol from diverse sources of renewable biomass. Second, virtually all new cars sold in America should be flex-fuel capable. These vehicles give Americans the choice to use E-85, a blend of 85 percent ethanol and 15 percent gasoline, or regular gasoline. This bill would require that virtually all vehicles would be manufactured as flexible fuel vehicles within ten years. This provision was also part of the Biomass Security Act of 2006 which I joined Senator Harkin in introducing earlier this year. Third, roughly 25 percent of our nation's fueling stations should offer E-85 within the next ten years. This provision was also part of the Biomass Security Act of 2006. This will give consumers choice and help spur investment in renewable fuel production. Fourth, the bill would enact increased mileage standards that set a target of steadily improving fuel economy every year, as well as encourage research into new advanced technology vehicles such as hybrids and coal-based transportation fuels. I joined Senator Obama in introducing this provision earlier this year as the Fuel Economy Reform Act of 2006. Finally, the bill would establish a revolutionary variable alternative fuel tax credit to support growth of alternative fuel production. While this novel portion of the bill should be further debated and improved, its aim is to increase investment in cellulosic ethanol, coals to liquid, and other non-petroleum based fuels by reducing risks posed by oil price manipulation of foreign regimes.

We must move now to address our energy vulnerability because sufficient investment cannot happen overnight, and it will take years to build supporting infrastructure and to change behavior. Americans need to know exactly what the plan is and how we will achieve it. We not only must understand how to bring alternatives to the market, we must establish what degree of change would improve our national security situation, then tailor national policy to achieve that goal. The energy plan presented in this bill is a package of proposals that would dramatically improve America's security posture. The plan would achieve the replacement of 6.5 million barrels of oil per day by volume--the rough equivalent of one third of the oil used in America and one half of our oil imports. It would provide more jobs for Americans instead of sending a deluge of money to hostile countries, support our farmers instead of foreign terrorists, and promote green fuels over fossil fuels.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the ``NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2006. I am pleased that the Majority Leader, Senator Frist, Senator Biden, and Senator Smith have joined me in proposing this important legislation.

The goal of this bill is to reaffirm United States support for continued enlargement of NATO to democracies that are able and willing to meet the responsibilities of membership. In particular, the legislation calls for the timely admission of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, and Macedonia to NATO and authorizes security assistance for these countries in Fiscal Year 2007. Each of these countries has clearly stated its desire to join NATO and is working hard to meet the specified requirements for membership. The bill also affirms that the United States stands ready to consider, and if all applicable criteria are satisfied, to support efforts by Ukraine to join NATO, should Ukraine decide that it wishes to meet the responsibilities of membership in the Alliance.

I believe that eventual NATO membership for these four countries would be a success for Europe, NATO, and the United States by continuing to extend the zone of peace and security. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia have been making progress on reforms through their participation in the NATO Membership Action Plan since 2002. Unfortunately, Georgia has not yet been granted a Membership Action Plan but nevertheless has made remarkable progress. This legislation will provide important incentives and assistance to the countries to continue the implementation of democratic, defense, and economic reforms.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been evolving to meet the new security needs of the 21st century. In this era, the threats to NATO members are transnational and far from its geographic borders. There is strong support among members for NATO's operation in Afghanistan, and for its training mission in Iraq. NATO's viability as an effective defense and security alliance depends on flexible, creative leadership, as well as the willingness of members to improve capabilities and address common threats.

If NATO is to continue to be the preeminent security Alliance and serve the defense interests of its membership, it must continue to evolve and that evolution must include enlargement. Potential NATO membership motivates emerging democracies to make important advances in areas such as the rule of law and civil society. A closer relationship with NATO will promote these values and contribute to our mutual security. Georgia is a young democracy that has made tremendous progress since the ``Rose Revolution.'' It is situated in a critical geostrategic location and his host to a large portion of the Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that carries important energy resources to the West from Azerbaijan and, in the future, Kazakhstan. Georgia is resisting pressure from breakaway republics backed by Moscow. In the past, border disputes have been identified as reasons a country may not be invited to join NATO. But in this case, Russia's action, not Georgia's, is frustrating Tbilisi's NATO aspirations.

Three years ago, the United States Senate unanimously voted to invite seven countries to join NATO. Today, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are making significant contributions to NATO and are among our closest allies in the global war on terrorism. It is time again for the United States to take the lead in urging its allies to bring in new members, and to offer

timely admission of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, and Macedonia to NATO.

Mr. President, I rise to introduce the National Fuels Initiative of 2006. This act presents to this Congress a plan to bring meaningful reductions in the amount of oil we consume in the United States and reduce our dependency on oil imports. Dependence on imported oil has put the United States in a position that no great power should tolerate. Our economic health is subject to forces far beyond our control, including the decisions of hostile countries. We maintain a massive military presence overseas, partly to preserve our oil lifeline. We have lost leverage on the international stage and are daily exacerbating the problem by participating in an enormous wealth transfer to authoritarian nations that happen to possess the commodity that our economy can least do without. The hundreds of billions of dollars we spend on oil imports each year weakens our economy, enriches hostile regimes, and is used by some to support terrorism.

In the absence of revolutionary changes in energy policy, we are risking multiple disasters for our country that will constrain living standards, undermine our foreign policy goals, and leave us highly vulnerable to the machinations of rogue states. There are at least six threats posed by oil dependence. First oil is vulnerable to supply disruption as a result of natural disasters, wars, and terrorist attacks. Price shocks resulting from a major supply loss can put the U.S. economy into recession. Second, global oil reserves are becoming more limited as easy supply is depleted, global demand rapidly increases, and governments exert more control over reserves. This makes oil more expensive in the short term, and creates the prospect that supplies may not be accessible in the future. Third, some oil-rich nations are using energy as an overt weapon. Adversarial regimes from Venezuela, to Iran, to Russia are using energy supplies as leverage against their neighbors. Fourth, hundreds of billions of dollars in oil export revenues flowing to authoritarian regimes increase corruption and hurt democratic reform. Some oil-rich nations are using this money to invest in terrorism, instability, or demagogic appeals to populism. Fifth, the threat of global climate change has been made worse by inefficient and unclean use of non-renewable energy like oil. This could bring about drought, famine, disease, and mass migration. And finally, dependence on oil increases instability and undermines development in much of the developing world. Rising energy costs can undermine our foreign assistance and hurt stability, development, disease eradication, and efforts to combat the root causes of terrorism.

The new geo-political reality emerging from the global energy situation and United States dependence on oil imports demand that we dramatically decrease the amount of oil we consume. In March 2006, I delivered an address at the Brookings Institution in which I described ``a shifting balance of realism'' from those who believe in the immutability of oil's domination of our economy and a laissez faire approach to energy policy to those who recognize that our Nation has no choice but to seek a major reorientation in the way we get our energy. Marginally reducing our reliance on imported oil over the course of the next few decades via the slow progress of market forces will be welcome, but by the time a sustained energy crisis fully motivates market forces, we are likely to be well past the point where we can save ourselves from extensive suffering. We must respond to our energy vulnerability as a crisis. This is the very essence of a problem requiring Congressional action.

The heart of America's geostrategic problem is reliance on imported oil in a market that is dominated by volatile and hostile governments. We can start to break petroleum's grip right now. The key is to replace oil used in transportation with renewable fuels and to improve the fuel efficiency of our cars and trucks.

I outlined the 5 central components of this energy plan at the Richard G. Lugar--Purdue University Summit on Energy Security on August 29th, 2006. First, this bill sets a goal for the United States to expand production of renewable fuels to at least 100 billion gallons a year by 2025. Some of this added production will come from current corn-based ethanol and biodiesel, but a great majority will be from emerging cellulosic technology allowing ethanol from diverse sources of renewable biomass. Second, virtually all new cars sold in America should be flex-fuel capable. These vehicles give Americans the choice to use E-85, a blend of 85 percent ethanol and 15 percent gasoline, or regular gasoline. This bill would require that virtually all vehicles would be manufactured as flexible fuel vehicles within ten years. This provision was also part of the Biomass Security Act of 2006 which I joined Senator Harkin in introducing earlier this year. Third, roughly 25 percent of our nation's fueling stations should offer E-85 within the next ten years. This provision was also part of the Biomass Security Act of 2006. This will give consumers choice and help spur investment in renewable fuel production. Fourth, the bill would enact increased mileage standards that set a target of steadily improving fuel economy every year, as well as encourage research into new advanced technology vehicles such as hybrids and coal-based transportation fuels. I joined Senator Obama in introducing this provision earlier this year as the Fuel Economy Reform Act of 2006. Finally, the bill would establish a revolutionary variable alternative fuel tax credit to support growth of alternative fuel production. While this novel portion of the bill should be further debated and improved, its aim is to increase investment in cellulosic ethanol, coals to liquid, and other non-petroleum based fuels by reducing risks posed by oil price manipulation of foreign regimes.

We must move now to address our energy vulnerability because sufficient investment cannot happen overnight, and it will take years to build supporting infrastructure and to change behavior. Americans need to know exactly what the plan is and how we will achieve it. We not only must understand how to bring alternatives to the market, we must establish what degree of change would improve our national security situation, then tailor national policy to achieve that goal. The energy plan presented in this bill is a package of proposals that would dramatically improve America's security posture. The plan would achieve the replacement of 6.5 million barrels of oil per day by volume--the rough equivalent of one third of the oil used in America and one half of our oil imports. It would provide more jobs for Americans instead of sending a deluge of money to hostile countries, support our farmers instead of foreign terrorists, and promote green fuels over fossil fuels.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the ``NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2006. I am pleased that the Majority Leader, Senator Frist, Senator Biden, and Senator Smith have joined me in proposing this important legislation.

The goal of this bill is to reaffirm United States support for continued enlargement of NATO to democracies that are able and willing to meet the responsibilities of membership. In particular, the legislation calls for the timely admission of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, and Macedonia to NATO and authorizes security assistance for these countries in Fiscal Year 2007. Each of these countries has clearly stated its desire to join NATO and is working hard to meet the specified requirements for membership. The bill also affirms that the United States stands ready to consider, and if all applicable criteria are satisfied, to support efforts by Ukraine to join NATO, should Ukraine decide that it wishes to meet the responsibilities of membership in the Alliance.

I believe that eventual NATO membership for these four countries would be a success for Europe, NATO, and the United States by continuing to extend the zone of peace and security. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia have been making progress on reforms through their participation in the NATO Membership Action Plan since 2002. Unfortunately, Georgia has not yet been granted a Membership Action Plan but nevertheless has made remarkable progress. This legislation will provide important incentives and assistance to the countries to continue the implementation of democratic, defense, and economic reforms.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been evolving to meet the new security needs of the 21st century. In this era, the threats to NATO members are transnational and far from its geographic borders. There is strong support among members for NATO's operation in Afghanistan, and for its training mission in Iraq. NATO's viability as an effective defense and security alliance depends on flexible, creative leadership, as well as the willingness of members to improve capabilities and address common threats.

If NATO is to continue to be the preeminent security Alliance and serve the defense interests of its membership, it must continue to evolve and that evolution must include enlargement. Potential NATO membership motivates emerging democracies to make important advances in areas such as the rule of law and civil society. A closer relationship with NATO will promote these values and contribute to our mutual security. Georgia is a young democracy that has made tremendous progress since the ``Rose Revolution.'' It is situated in a critical geostrategic location and his host to a large portion of the Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that carries important energy resources to the West from Azerbaijan and, in the future, Kazakhstan. Georgia is resisting pressure from breakaway republics backed by Moscow. In the past, border disputes have been identified as reasons a country may not be invited to join NATO. But in this case, Russia's action, not Georgia's, is frustrating Tbilisi's NATO aspirations.

Three years ago, the United States Senate unanimously voted to invite seven countries to join NATO. Today, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are making significant contributions to NATO and are among our closest allies in the global war on terrorism. It is time again for the United States to take the lead in urging its allies to bring in new members, and to offer

timely admission of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, and Macedonia to NATO.

Mr. President, on July 24 the majority leader placed in the Record a list of the Senators who had sought to be cosponsors of S. 3709, the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an updated list of those who wish to be listed as cosponsors be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a joint statement with Senator Biden, and accompanying materials, regarding the Geneva Protocol III--the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem--be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for three cost estimates from the Congressional Budget Office to be printed in the Record.

These estimates are for three important bills which the Committee on Foreign Relations has already reported to the Senate. They are S. 2489, S. 3709, and S. 3722.

The Standing Rules of the Senate require that committee reports on bills or joint resolutions contain cost estimates for such legislation.

When the Committee on Foreign Relations reported these bills earlier this year, the committee had not received the Congressional Budget Office's cost estimates.

Mr. President, today I honor and remember Dorothy C. Stratton, founder of the Women's Reserve for the Coast Guard during World War II and a strong proponent of women's education throughout her lifetime.

Dr. Stratton became the first full-time Dean of Women at Purdue University in 1933. During her tenure at Purdue, Dr. Stratton saw the enrollment of women students increase from 500 to over 1,400. In addition, a liberal science program for women in the School of Science was inaugurated, three modern residence halls for women were constructed, and an employment placement center for Purdue women was instituted.

In 1942, she was commissioned a senior lieutenant in the U.S. Navy. Later in 1942, she transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard where she created and became the first director of the Women's Reserve of the U.S. Coast Guard in World War II. Upon being named director, she was promoted to lieutenant commander in 1942 and advanced to commander in January 1944 and to the grade of captain 1 month later. She was awarded the Legion of Merit medal for her contributions to women in the military upon retirement in 1946.

Dr. Stratton then became the first director of personnel at the International Monetary Fund followed by service as executive director of the Girl Scouts of the U.S.A. She was the United Nations representative of the International Federation of University Women and chairman of the Women's Committee within the President's Commission on Employment of the Handicapped.

Please join me in honor and remembrance of Dorothy C. Stratton. I offer my deep condolences to all her family and friends, and to the many who have been inspired and touched by all that she has given.