Floor Statements

Mr. Speaker, I rise before you today to bring to the attention of my colleagues an article that appeared in the National Review Online on January 14, 2003. This article, written by Nikolas K. Gvosdev, artfully details the greater significance of a solution to the division of Cyprus. I ask that my colleagues please review this article, and keep it in mind as we continue our efforts in the 108th Congress.

[From the National Review Online, Jan. 14, 2003]

Cyprus, Iraq, and the War on Terrorism

(By Nikolas K. Gvosdev)

At first glance, Cyprus would appear to have little

connection to either the forthcoming clash with Iraq or the

ongoing war against international terrorism. Yet, the fate of

this divided Mediterranean isle is closely linked with both.

British Defense Minister Geoff Hoon, visiting Turkey in an

effort to enlist Ankara's full participation in any potential

military action against Iraq, said on January 8th that it was

critical to demonstrate to Baghdad that the international

community was ``not simply going to pass resolutions and not

see them enforced'' and that ``we restore Iraq to the

international community as a peaceful neighbor of Turkey,

that we work together to ensure a peaceful outcome to the

present difficulties.'' Both outcomes are far more likely if

a U.N.-drafted peace plan for Cyprus is accepted as the basis

for a final agreement that would end a longstanding source of

instability and tension in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Much attention has been rightfully focused on the February

28th deadline for a settlement. If an agreement cannot be

reached, only the portion of the island controlled by the

internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus will be

admitted, leaving the unrecognized ``Turkish Republic of

North Cyprus'' outside of the common European home, and

further impeding the eventual accession of the Turkish

mainland into the EU.

But there are more immediate consequences. Carl Bildt,

former U.N. Special Envoy for the Balkans, observed that a

settlement for Cyprus ``concerns not only a divided island in

the eastern Mediterranean, or the relationship between two

important countries straddling the divide between Europe and

the Middle East. It is of key importance in the quest for

peace and stability in the entire post-Ottoman area that

stretches from Bihac in Bosnia in the north-west to Basra at

the Persian Gulf in the south-east.''

The peace plan put forward by Kofi Annan envisions a bi-

zonal, bi-communal federation for the island. Admittedly, it

is not a perfect solution, for it tries to balance between

the competing and clashing claims to self-determination of

Cyprus's Greek majority and Turkish minority. What it

attempts to do is to provide a workable mechanism for two

communities to live and co-exist in shared geographic space

within the framework of the internationally recognized

Cypriot state and under the rubric of a common Cypriot

nationality that does not require ethnic homogenization. At

the same time, it hopes to prevent the opening of a Pandora's

box that could plague the entire Eastern Mediterranean:

revising state boundaries; a plague that many fervently hoped

the 1975 Helsinki Final Act had banished from Europe once and

for all.

Iraq faces many of the same issues that bedevil Cyprus. Its

current solution has been to subordinate all regional and

ethnic groups to the personal, dictatorial tyranny of Saddam

Hussein. When his regime falls, however, something must take

its place. Simply dividing Iraq into three ``cantons'' (a

Shiite province in the south, a Sunni center, and a Kurdish

statelet in the north) is a recipe for disaster. Not only

does such a ``solution'' fail to consider that populations

are not neatly segmented (Baghdad, after all, has a largely

Shiite population) and ignore other ethnic minorities

dispersed throughout the country, it would preclude any

central ``Iraqi'' identity from developing. This, in turn,

would increase the risk of regional strife that would draw in

neighboring states. (I commend readers to Dan Byman's

excellent essay on this subject.)

On the other hand, a functioning Cypriot bi-zonal, bi-

communal federation could serve as a model for reconstructing

postwar Iraq in a fashion that respects local autonomy yet

permits freedom of movement and investment across Iraq,

allows for the creation of a durable Iraqi ``identity'' and

maintains a viable Iraqi state within its current boundaries.

Another reason for making a settlement on Cyprus an urgent

priority is that it can produce momentum toward solving other

lingering conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus that have

produced ``brown zones'' (whether unrecognized statelets like

Abkhazia or ill-defined international protectorates like

Kosovo) where definitive state authority is lacking. Such

``holes'' in the international system help to facilitate the

activities of terrorists, organized crime factions and drug

smugglers. If a workable bicommunal, bi-zonal federation can

be created for Cyprus, it could then serve as a model upon

which solutions for ethno-separatist conflicts such as

Nagorno-Karabakh or TransDniestria could be crafted. It might

also help to redefine and strengthen currently weak states

such as Bosnia, which endures largely because of the ongoing

infusion of outside capital and troops to sustain the Dayton

Accords. Crafting more viable states throughout the arc of

Eurasia serves long-term American interests as well. After

all, the best means for weakening international terrorist

networks are effective governments that can police their

borders and exercise supervision over their territories.

Cyprus is not simply a ``European'' problem. It requires

continued American effort as well. It is not a

``distraction'' from the larger problems that beset the

United States. Rather, Cyprus may provide a way to deal with

larger headaches in the years ahead.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to comment on the legislative intent of the Comprehensive Environment Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and specifically on the cleanup of a Superfund site in my district, the Gloucester Environmental Management Services (GEMS) landfill (EPA Facility ID NJD980529192).

I strongly oppose the transport of pollutants from the GEMS landfill through sewer lines to the Camden County Municipal Utilities Authority (CCMUA). I continue to believe that the only responsible option is for the GEMS Trust to build an on-site treatment facility that can treat the contaminated water to the highest standards possible. Further, I call on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) and CCMUA to step up and protect the public interest by insisting on on-site treatment, and only on-site treatment of the contaminants in the landfill. According to a letter from EPA Region 2 Administrator Jane Kenney dated November 25, 2002, the CCMUA is under no legal obligation to accept contaminants from GEMS. As such, I continue to urge the CCMUA heed the call of the local community and reject any discharge from GEMS.

The intent of Superfund is to hold polluters responsible for cleaning up the damage they have caused to a community. There is no plausible reason that a publicly financed municipal utility authority should be involved in the remediation process. Furthermore, committing the CCMUA to the long term burden of processing unpredictable wastewater is inconsistent with New Jersey's efforts to meet federal Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL) initiatives as prescribed in the Clean Water Act.

Proponents of the CCMUA treatment option cite water quality tests that satisfy permit requirements for discharge to the CCMUA. I believe that this testing is inadequate evidence to send the GEMS pollutants off-site. It is likely that the customary ``grab samples'' will miss radioactive ``spikes'' and that the heavier radio isotopes will flocculate in the sludge, which is destined to be sent back into a community as part of the state's controversial ``beneficial use'' land application sludge policy. It is also predictable that under current testing and notification procedures, there will be a significant lapse of time from when a problem is detected, its source is determined, the flow to the sewer plant halted, and byproduct recipients are notified. I am convinced that this testing and monitoring regime will not fully protect the community.

Insufficient review has been given to the synergistic and cumulative effects of discharges to CCMUA. Needless to say, any costs related to the disruption of the CCMUA system, environmental impairment and legal defenses, will immediately be a pass through cost to the CCMUA rate payers and ultimately, to New Jersey taxpayers in general. This is a risk that I am not will to pass on to my constituents.

The GEMS Landfill has exposed our community to hazardous material for almost 50 years. Today, approximately 38,000 of my constituents live within a three mile radius of the GEMS Landfill, some as close as 300 feet. Unfortunately the community has not been adequately involved in the decision making process. Many of my constituents have contacted me with their concerns about GEMS and to outline their difficulty in obtaining information about the remediation.

Although the landfill has been closed for 22 years, amazingly we are still grappling with how to cleanup the site. The GEMS Trust should not get away with a band aid solution to a major environmental hazard. My constituents have suffered long enough. I sincerely hope that the EPA, NJDEP and constituents meet the responsibility they have to the public and to public health by supporting the construction of a treatment facility that will contain the pollution and treat it on-site rather than spread it around the community by sending it to the constituents. If, however, they do not do so, I am prepared to pursue any avenue necessary--including legislation or litigation or both--to block this unwelcome and risky plan.