Madam President, I come again to the floor to speak about one of our greatest national security challenges, which is a nuclear-armed Iran and the latest conflicting remarks coming from Iran's leaders. I will say at the outset, as I have…
Madam President, I come again to the floor to speak about one of our greatest national security challenges, which is a nuclear-armed Iran and the latest conflicting remarks coming from Iran's leaders.
I will say at the outset, as I have said in the past, I support the administration's diplomatic efforts. I have always supported a bipartisan, two-track policy of diplomacy and sanctions. At the same time, I am convinced that we should only relieve pressure on Iran in exchange for very verifiable concessions that will fundamentally dismantle Iran's illicit nuclear program and that any deal be structured in such a way that alarm bells will sound from Vienna to Washington to Moscow and Beijing should Iran restart its program anytime in the next 20 or 30 years.
I am gravely concerned by the recent remarks of Iran's Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah, whose views about what Iran is willing to give up in a deal seem to deliberately undermine the positions of Iran's negotiators in Vienna and clearly curtail their flexibility as we enter into a critical stage of the talks.
Yesterday, Foreign Minister Zarif gave an interview that went public with Iran's negotiating position. Let's break down exactly what it is he offered. He said Iran will freeze its nuclear fuel program for several years in exchange for being treated like other peaceful nuclear nations and for sanctions relief. Let's be clear. This will leave 19,000 centrifuges spinning in Iran. It would not, from what I can tell, require Iran to dismantle anything. In my view, that is not a starting place for an end game. It is the same obfuscation and the same Iranian tactics we have seen for years and decades. Iran puts offers on the table that appear to be concessions but in reality are designed to preserve Iranian illicit nuclear infrastructure and enrichment so that the capacity to break out and rush toward a nuclear weapon is still very much within reach. That is not an end game; it is a nonstarter.
Essentially what Zarif is offering is the same concessions as what Iran made for the interim agreement over 6 months ago. In exchange, Iran gets sanction relief--except we know Iran is not like any other nation, and its history of cheating, lying, and evading inspections proves it.
One commentator said this morning: ``So it seems that Iran is trying to protect its nuclear breakout capacity while trying to appear moderate.''
Zarif's proposal last night is nothing more than smoke and mirrors. It is more moderate than the Ayatollah's outlandish demand for 190,000 centrifuges last week, but at its core it is an offer to not give anything in terms of enrichment capacity and in exchange receive sanctions relief, and that is unacceptable.
The Zarif proposal will extend the joint plan of action, allowing Iran's nuclear program to run in place subject to inspections but will not make a single concession--none--that would demonstrably set back Iran's nuclear ambitions in the long term, including no concessions on the number of centrifuges in the secret Fordow enrichment facility. Iran would get the relief it wants while retaining the infrastructure to quickly rebuild its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. That is straight out of the North Korea handbook--freeze and preserve your ability for a future date.
I remind my colleagues in the Senate that in October of 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an agreed framework which the international community hoped would end the ongoing crisis over North Korea's nuclear program. The agreement froze the operation and construction of North Korea's nuclear reactors which were part of its covert nuclear weapons program. In exchange, the United States agreed to provide two proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors. There were high hopes for the agreement. Many called it a first step in the full normalization of political and economic relations with North Korea.
While North Korea carried out some of the measures in the agreement, it simultaneously continued its ballistic missile program by improving the range and accuracy of its missiles, and it secretly began to pursue a clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons separate from the plutonium program which the agreement had frozen.
Once again, international tensions came to a head in January of 2003 when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and following its withdrawal from the NPT, North Korea kicked out IAEA inspectors, restarted the nuclear reactor that had been frozen under the 1994 agreed framework, and began moving spent fuel rods to a reprocessing center that could produce plutonium.
At the time of its withdrawal, North Korea, like Iran, said it ``had no intention of making nuclear weapons'' and that its nuclear activities ``would be confined only to power production and other peaceful purposes.'' Of course, as
we know now, North Korea would conduct a nuclear test establishing its potential to build nuclear weapons.
This history should serve as a warning about what could happen if we allow Iran to maintain a robust nuclear infrastructure.
The fact is that Iran is simply agreeing to freeze and to temporarily lock the door on its nuclear weapons program as is and walk away. Should they later walk away from the deal, as they have in the past, they can simply unlock the door and continue their nuclear weapons program from where they are today. That is exactly what the talks--in my mind--were intended to avoid.
As I stand here, there is a rush for our negotiators in Vienna and Secretary Kerry to go and try to save the essence of what seems to be a significant distance between the parties. I know our side is working in good faith to reach an agreement. Our terms have been on the table for months, and now, at the critical hour, the Supreme Leader throws a monkey wrench into the negotiations and even surprises his own negotiating team by demanding that 190,000 centrifuges remain for any final deal.
At this point it is our obligation to ask some very pointed questions. Are Zarif and President Ruhani truly empowered to make this deal? Even though Zarif and Ruhani's intentions seem sincere, can we say the same about the ultimate decisionmaker in Tehran, Supreme Leader Khamenei? Does the Supreme Leader truly want a deal or are his redlines an attempt to undermine the negotiations?
Secretary Kerry said this morning that ``the U.S. believes Iran has the right to a peaceful nuclear program under the NPT.''
Let's remind ourselves of first principles. No country has a right to enrichment. They may have the ability to enrichment or a desire to enrich, but they do not have the right to enrich, and certainly not Iran given its past behavior.
Let's remember how we reached this point. Over a period of decades, Iran has deceived the international community about its nuclear program, breaching its international commitment in what everyone agrees was an attempt to make Iran a nuclear weapons state or at least a threshold state. Experts such as those at the Institute for Science and International Security believe that Iran began building a secret uranium enrichment centrifuge facility underground at Fordow in 2006--3 years--3 years--before it was declared to the International Atomic Energy Administration. Now Iran is seeking to turn the tables on the negotiation to again convince the international community--through words rather than deeds--that it seeks a peaceful nuclear energy program. The Supreme Leader called the idea of closing Fordow ``laughable.'' For my colleagues, this is a facility built under a mountain, declared only after Iran was caught cheating, and designed to withstand a military strike. It does not take a nuclear expert to draw the obvious conclusion about Iran's intentions.
If Iran can't even agree to close the facility that is at the heart of its covert enrichment program, what concessions can it possibly make that would address international concerns? Are we supposed to take Iran at its word when its actions have demonstrated over years that it is not a good-faith actor? Are we supposed to believe that Iran wants 190,000 centrifuges--about 171,000 more than it has right now--for peaceful purposes? That is truly laughable.
Even for a country that doesn't have the world's third largest oil reserves--which Iran does--that would be an absurd position. Iran can-- and in fact already does--get cheaper and better nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor from Russia than it could make at home. Let me repeat that. It gets cheaper and better fuel from Russia for its nuclear reactor at the Bushehr facility than what it can make at home.
Experts agree that centrifuges must be a part of the deal. David Albright, a respected former International Atomic Energy Administration inspector, has said for Iran's move from an interim to a final agreement, it would have to close the Fordow facility and remove between 15,000 and 16,000 of its existing 20,000 centrifuges. Even then, we are looking at a breakout time of about 6 to 8 months, depending on whether Iran has access to uranium enriched to just 3.5 percent or access to 20-percent enriched uranium.
Dennis Ross, one of America's preeminent diplomats and foreign policy analysts, who has served under both Democratic and Republican Presidents, has said Iran should retain no more than 10 percent of its centrifuges. That is no more than 2,000.
So maybe the comments we have heard from the Supreme Leader were, as some analysts have suggested, an effort by the Supreme Leader to superimpose limitations on the negotiating team so at some point they would be free to say these issues are out of their hands, in the hope of somehow forcing a better deal this week in Vienna. So I suggest that we are either seeing a not so clever game of good cop-bad cop or Iran's negotiators in Vienna have done a poor job of communicating what their boss believes is the bottom line at the negotiating table or maybe we just haven't been listening to what we don't want to hear. From the onset of the talks, Iran's Foreign Minister Zarif and President Rouhani have said they would not dismantle any centrifuges. President Rouhani was adamant in an interview on CNN that Iran would not be dismantling its centrifuges.
Let me quote from that interview with Mr. Zakaria.
President Rouhani:
We are determined to provide for the nuclear fuel of such
plants inside the country, at the hands of local Iranian
scientists. We are going to follow on this path.
Zakaria said:
So there will be no destruction of centrifuges, of existing
centrifuges?
President Rouhani said:
No, no, not at all.
Let's remember that the onus in these talks is on Iran, not the P5+1. Iran is the party at fault. Iran is the party that came to these talks with unclean hands. Iran is the party that has been consistently and overwhelmingly rebuffed by the United Nations and the international community for its nuclear ambitions and support for terrorism, the subject of six U.N. Security Council resolutions and a multitude of sanctions regimes.
Just last week the U.S. courts agreed to a landmark payment of $1.7 billion to the families of Iranian terror victims, including families of the 241 servicemembers who died in the bombing of the Marine Corps barracks bombing in Lebanon in 1983--31 years ago--and 19 who died in the Khobar Towers bombing in eastern Saudi Arabia in 1996--both bombings perpetrated by Iran. Iran's duplicity has been going on for decades.
So who is the bad guy here? Now commentators may choose to see the U.S. Congress as the antagonist here, but I suggest they look across the table and decide whether they want to take a deal with Iran on a nod and a handshake. In my view, through its history, through its actions, through its false words and deeds for decades, Iran has forgone the ability for us to shake on a deal that freezes their program. The only option on the table can be a long-term deal that dismantles Iran's illicit nuclear weapons program--a deal that clearly provides for a long-term verification, inspection, and enforcement regime, and incentives for compliance in the form of sanctions relief-- based on Iranian actions that are verifiable, not on what Iran claims to be the truth.
The fact is, from my perspective, there is no sanctions relief signing bonus. If Iran wants relief from sanctions, then it needs to tangibly demonstrate to the world it is giving up its quest for nuclear weapons--period.
Let's remember that, although none of us in this Chamber are at the negotiating table, we have a tremendous stake in the outcome. Without Congress's bipartisan action on a clear sanctions regime, there would have been no talks and we would not even have had the hope of ending Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. As a separate and coequal branch of government representing the American people, Congress has an obligation to provide oversight and a duty to express our views of what a comprehensive deal should look like. I will continue to come to this floor to express my views and my concerns given what we have heard and seen in the past from Iran.
Iran has a history of duplicity with respect to its nuclear program, using past negotiations to cover advances in its nuclear program. And let's not forget that President Rouhani, as the
former negotiator for Iran, said, in no uncertain terms:
The day that we invited the three European ministers to the
talks, only 10 centrifuges were spinning at Natanz. We could
not produce one gram of U4 or U6. We did not have the heavy
water production. We could not produce yellowcake. Our total
production of centrifuges inside the country was 150. We
wanted to complete all of these. We needed time. We did not
stop. We completed the program.
That is his quote.
The simple truth is he admitted to deceiving the West.
Everyone knows my history on this issue. Everyone knows where I stand. It is the same place I have always stood. For 20 years I have worked on Iran's nuclear issues, starting when I was a junior Member of the House, pressing for sanctions to prevent Iran from building the Bushehr nuclear powerplant and to halt IAEA support for Iranian mining and enrichment programs. For a decade I was told that my concern had no basis, that Iran would never be able to bring the Bushehr plant on line, and that Iran's activities were not a concern.
Well, history has shown those assessments about Iran's abilities and intentions were simply wrong. The fact is Iran's nuclear aspirations have been a long and deliberate process. They did not materialize overnight, and they will not end simply with a good word and a handshake. We need verification.
If Iran's nuclear weapons capability is frozen rather than largely dismantled, they will remain at the threshold of becoming a declared nuclear State should they choose to start again, because nothing will have changed if nothing is dismantled.
Make no mistake. Iran views developing a nuclear capability as fundamental to its existence. It has seen the development of nuclear weapons as part of a regional hegemonic strategy to make Tehran the center of power throughout the region. That is why our allies and partners in the region--not just Israelis, but the Emiratis and the Saudis--are so skeptical and so concerned about having a leak-proof deal. Quite simply, our allies and partners do not trust Iranian leaders, nor do they believe that Iran has any intention of verifiably ending its nuclear weapons program.
So while I welcome diplomatic efforts as what we have worked toward and I share the hope that the administration can achieve a final comprehensive agreement that eliminates this threat to global peace and security, for the U.S. Congress to support the relief that Iran is looking for, we will need a deal that doesn't just freeze Iran's nuclear weapons program, but a deal--demonstrated through verifiable action by Iran over years--that in fact turns back the clock and makes the world a safer place.
Let me say the fact is there are those who have created a false narrative over the last 6 months that now seems to be self- perpetuating, that anyone who expresses an opinion different than the desire to have a deal--almost a deal at any cost--is a warmonger. For those who now say, Well, if we don't have a deal, then what? I would remind them of what the administration has said time and time again: No deal is better than a bad deal. I agree with that sentiment. But I am concerned that there are forces that would accept a deal even if it is a bad deal. This doesn't serve the interests of the negotiators at the table in Vienna, and it doesn't serve the interests of the American people who want to ensure that Iran doesn't get a nuclear weapon, and that any deal permanently eliminates the possibility that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon that threatens the international order. One mistake is all it takes.
At the end of the day, keeping the pressure on Iran to completely satisfy the United Nations and the international community's demands to halt and reverse its illicit nuclear activities is the best way to avoid war in the first place.
With that, I yield the floor.