Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Alabama for his courtesy. Mr. President, I oppose cloture on the motion to proceed to S. 2248, as reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee. This bill is deeply flawed, and I am very disappointed…
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Alabama for his courtesy.
Mr. President, I oppose cloture on the motion to proceed to S. 2248, as reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee. This bill is deeply flawed, and I am very disappointed by the decision to take it up on the Senate floor rather than the better bill reported by the Judiciary Committee.
Before leaving town for the August recess, Congress bowed to pressure from the administration, and vastly expanded the Government's ability to eavesdrop without a court-approved warrant. That legislation, the so-called Protect America Act, was rushed through this Chamber in a climate of fear--fear of terrorist attacks, and fear of not appearing sufficiently strong on national security. There was very little understanding of what the legislation actually did.
But there was one silver lining: The bill had a 6-month sunset to force Congress to do its homework and reconsider the approach it took.
The Senate should be taking this opportunity to fix its mistakes and pass a new bill that gives the Government all the tools it needs to spy on suspected terrorists but also protects Americans' basic freedoms. This time around, the Senate should stand up to an Administration that time and again has employed fear-mongering and misleading statements to intimidate Congress.
The fact is, the Intelligence Committee bill doesn't fix those mistakes, and it is not the bill we should be considering on the Senate floor.
I do agree with the administration on one point--Congress should make clear that when foreign terrorists are communicating with each other overseas, the U.S. Government doesn't need a warrant to listen in, even if the collection activity ends up taking place in this country because of the way modern communications are routed. Unfortunately, both the Protect America Act and the bill approved by the Senate Intelligence Committee go far beyond fixing that problem and also authorize widespread surveillance involving Americans--at home and abroad.
The bill we should be considering is the Judiciary Committee bill, which 14 Senators urged the majority leader to take up, in a letter last week.
The Judiciary Committee bill made critical improvements to ensure independent judicial oversight of these sweeping new powers and to better protect innocent Americans. The Judiciary bill does not contain a new form of retroactive immunity for companies that allegedly cooperated with an illegal wiretapping program that lasted for more than 5 years. And, while the Intelligence Committee bill was drafted and debated behind closed doors and in close consultation with the administration, the Judiciary bill was the product of an open process with the input of experts from a variety of perspectives.
The Judiciary Committee bill is not perfect. It needs further improvement. But it would be a vastly better starting point for Senate consideration than the bill that the majority leader has brought to the floor, which simply gives the administration everything it was demanding, no questions asked.
The stakes are high. I want my colleagues to understand the impact that the Protect America Act and the Intelligence Committee bill could have on the privacy of Americans. These bills do not just authorize the 6 unfettered surveillance of people outside the United States communicating with each other. They also permit the Government to acquire those foreigners' communications with Americans inside the United States, regardless of whether anyone involved in the communication is under any suspicion of wrongdoing.
There is no requirement that the foreign targets of this surveillance be terrorists, spies or other types of criminals. The only requirements are that the foreigners are outside the country, and that the purpose is to obtain foreign intelligence information, a term that has an extremely broad definition.
There is no requirement that the foreign targets of this surveillance be terrorists, spies, or any other kind of criminal. The only requirements are that foreigners are outside the country, that the purpose is to obtain foreign intelligence information, a term that has an extremely broad definition.
No court reviews these targets individually. Only the executive branch decides who fits these criteria. The result is that many law- abiding Americans who communicate with completely innocent people overseas will be swept up in this new form of surveillance, with virtually no judicial involvement.
Even the administration's illegal warrantless wiretapping program, as described when it was publicly confirmed in 2005, at least focused on particular terrorists. What we are talking about now is a huge dragnet that will sweep up innocent Americans.
In America, we understand that if we happen to be talking to a criminal or terrorist suspect, our conversations might be heard by the Government. But I do not think many Americans expect the Government to be able to listen into every single one of their international communications with people about whom there are no suspicions whatsoever.
These incredibly broad authorities are particularly troubling because we live in a world in which international communications are increasingly commonplace. Thirty years ago, it was very expensive, and not common, for many Americans to make an overseas call. But now, particularly with e-mail, such communications are commonplace. Millions of ordinary, and innocent, Americans communicate with people overseas for entirely legitimate personal and business reasons.
Parents of children call family members overseas. Students e-mail friends they have met while studying abroad. Businesspeople communicate with colleagues or clients overseas. Technological advancements combined with the ever interconnected world economy have led to an explosion of international contacts.
We often hear from those who want to give the Government new powers that we just have to bring FISA up to date with new technology. But changes in technology should also cause us to take a look at the greater need for the privacy of our citizens.
We are going to give the Government broad new powers that will lead to the collection of much more information on innocent Americans. We have a duty to protect their privacy as much as we possibly can, and we can do that. We can do that, as the Senator from Connecticut said, without sacrificing our ability to collect information that will protect our national security.
To take one example, a critical difference between the Intelligence and Judiciary bills is the role of the court. The Judiciary bill gives the secret FISA Court new authority to operate as an independent check on the executive branch.
It gives the court authority to assess the Government's compliance to wiretapping procedures, to place limits on the use of information that was acquired through unlawful procedures, and then gives the court, as most courts should have, the ability to enforce its own orders.
The Judiciary bill also does a better job of protecting Americans from widespread warrantless wiretapping. It prohibits so-called bulk collection. What is that? Vacuuming up basically all the communications between the United States and overseas, which the DNI admitted is legal under the PAA. And it ensures that if the Government is wiretapping a foreigner overseas in order to really collect the communications of the American with whom that foreign target is communicating, what is called reverse targeting, well, in that case it has to get a court order on that American. Well, none of these changes hinders the Government's ability to protect national security.
The process by which the Judiciary Committee considered, drafted, amended, and reported out its bill was an open one, allowing outside experts and the public at large the opportunity to review and comment. With regard to legislation so directly connected to the constitutional rights of Americans, I think the result of this open process
should be accorded great weight, especially in light of the Judiciary Committee's unique role and expertise in protecting those rights.
Now, I am certain that over the course of this week we will hear a number of arguments about why the Judiciary bill will hamper the fight against terrorism. Well, let me say now to my colleagues: Do not believe everything you hear. Last week I sat with many of you in the secure room in the Capitol and listened to arguments made by the Director of National Intelligence and by our Attorney General.
I can tell you with absolute certainty that several of the examples they gave were simply wrong, simply false. I am happy to have a classified meeting with anyone in this body who wishes to discuss that. This is not about whether we will be effective in combating terrorism. Both bills allow that. This is about whether the court should have an independent oversight role and whether Americans deserve more privacy protections than foreigners overseas. All of this should sound familiar to those who followed previous debates about fighting terrorism while protecting American's civil liberties in the post-9/11 world.
The administration says--and again, following on what the Senator from Connecticut said--the administration basically says: Trust us. We do not need judicial oversight. The court will just get in our way. You never know when they might tell us what we are doing is unconstitutional. We would prefer to make that decision on our own.
Time and again, that has proved to be a foolish and counterproductive attitude, and sadly, despite the objections of many of us in this Chamber, too many times, Congress has just gone along. We do not have to make that same mistake again. In this case we have a factual record to help us evaluate whether we should simply trust the administration or whether we should write protections into the law.
The Protect America Act has only been in effect for 4\1/2\ months, and we are still missing key information about it. The Intelligence Committee has recently been provided some basic information about its implementation. Based on what I have learned, I have very serious questions about the way the administration is interpreting and implementing the Protect America Act, including its effect on the privacy of Americans.
I will shortly be sending the Director of National Intelligence a classified letter detailing my concerns which are directly relevant to the legislation we are considering. I regret this information is classified, so I cannot discuss it here. I regret that more of my colleagues have not been privy to this information prior to this floor debate, but I would be happy to share a copy of my letter in an appropriate classified setting with any Senator who wishes to review it.
I have been speaking for some time now about my strong opposition to the Intelligence Committee bill, and I have not even addressed one of the more outrageous elements of the bill: the granting of retroactive immunity to companies that allegedly participated in an illegal wiretapping program that lasted for more than 5 years.
This grant of automatic immunity is simply unjustified. There is already an immunity provision in current law that has been there since FISA was negotiated in the late 1970s, with the participation of the telecommunications industry.
The law is clear. Companies already have immunity from civil liability when they cooperate with a Government request for assistance, as long as they receive a court order or the Attorney General certifies that a court order is not required and all statutory requirements have been met.
So this is not about whether the companies had good intentions or acted in good faith; it is about whether they complied with this statutory immunity provision, which has applied for 30 years. If the companies follow that law, they should get immunity. If they did not follow that law, they should not get immunity. A court should make that decision, not Congress. It is that simple.
Congress passed a law laying out when telecom companies get immunity and when they do not for a reason. Those companies have access to our most private communications, so Congress has correctly subjected them to very precise rules about when they can provide that information to the Government. If the companies did not follow the law Congress passed, they should not be granted a ``get out of jail free'' card after the fact.
We have heard a lot of arguments about needing technical cooperation of carriers in the future. We do need that cooperation, but we also need to make sure carriers do not cooperate with illegitimate requests. We already have a law that tells companies when they should and when they should not cooperate, so they are not placed in the position of having to somehow independently evaluate whether the Government's request for help is legitimate.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 3 additional minutes.
I would not object to that.
Instead of allowing the courts to apply that law to the facts, instead of allowing judges to decide whether the companies deserve immunity for acting appropriately, the Intelligence Committee bill sends the message that companies need not worry, they do not have to worry about complying with questionable Government requests in the future, because they will be bailed out. This is outrageous. Even more outrageous is the fact that if these lawsuits are dismissed, the courts may never rule on the NSA wiretapping program.
So what this is is an ideal outcome for an administration that believes it should be able to interpret laws on its own without worrying about how Congress wrote them or what a judge thinks. For those of us who believe in three independent and coequal branches of Government, this is a disaster.
For all of these reasons, I oppose closure on the motion to proceed to the Intelligence Committee bill. I fear we are about to make the same mistake we made with the PATRIOT Act. We passed that law without taking the time to consider its implications, and we did not do enough during the reauthorization process to fix it. As a result, three Federal courts have struck down provisions of the PATRIOT Act as unconstitutional, and that is right back where we are going to end up if we do not do our jobs now and fix the Protect America Act.
I urge my colleagues to vote no on cloture.
I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of our time.
Madam President, this morning I laid out the reasons why I opposed cloture on the motion to proceed. Now I would like to describe in more detail the reasons that the Senate should be considering the Judiciary bill rather than the Intelligence Committee bill. And I will lay out again why I strongly oppose the immunity provision in the Intelligence Committee bill.
There are a number of similarities between the bills reported by the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. Their basic structure is the same. Both bills authorize the Government to conduct surveillance of individuals reasonably believed to be overseas without court approval for individual warrants. Both bills authorize the Government to develop and implement procedures to govern this new type of surveillance, and provide the procedures to the FISA Court for review after they have gone into effect.
But in critical ways, the bills take different approaches. The Judiciary bill contains a number of important changes to improve court oversight of these broad new executive branch authorities, and to protect the privacy of law-abiding Americans.
Let me be clear: The differences between these two bills have nothing to do with our ability to combat terrorism. They have everything to do with ensuring that the executive branch adheres to the rule of law and doesn't unnecessarily listen in on the private communications of Americans.
This debate is about whether the court should have an independent oversight role, and what protections should apply to the communications of Americans that get swept up in these broad new surveillance powers.
If you believe that courts should have a meaningful oversight role with respect to Government surveillance, then you should support the Judiciary bill. And if you believe that Congress should try to limit the number of communications of Americans here at home that will be swept up in a broad new surveillance program that is supposed to be focused on foreigners overseas, then you should support the Judiciary bill.
That said, the Judiciary bill is not perfect. More still needs to be done to protect the privacy of Americans. But that is why it should be such an easy decision to support the Judiciary bill as a starting point.
Let me also remind my colleagues that the process by which the Judiciary Committee considered, drafted, amended and reported out its bill was an open one, allowing outside experts and the public at large the opportunity to review and comment. With regard to legislation so directly connected to the constitutional rights of Americans, the results of this open process should be accorded great weight, especially in light of the Judiciary Commiittee's unique role and expertise in protecting those rights.
So what are the differences between the two bills?
First, the Judiciary bill gives the secret FISA court more authority to operate as an independent check on the executive branch.
One provision in the Judiciary bill fixes an enormous problem with the Intelligence Committee bill--the complete lack of incentives for the Government to do what the bill tells it to do, which is target people overseas rather than people here in America. The Judiciary bill solves this problem by limiting the use of information concerning Americans when that information is obtained through procedures the FISA Court ultimately finds are not reasonably designed to target persons overseas.
The Judiciary bill states that if the court determines that the Government has been using unlawful procedures, then its use of that information is limited--in exactly the same way that it is limited under FISA today if the Government starts surveillance in an emergency and is later turned down for a court order. But the new provision in the Judiciary bill is more flexible: It gives the court the option to allow the use of the information the Government collected the first time around, depending on the circumstances.
Another provision of the Judiciary bill ensures that the FISA Court has the authority to oversee compliance with minimization procedures.
Minimization procedures have been held up as the primary protection for the privacy of Americans whose communications get swept up in this new surveillance authority.
I don't think current minimization procedures are strong enough to do the job. But to the extent that minimization can help protect Americans' privacy, its implementation needs to be overseen by the court. That means giving the court the authority to review whether the Government is complying with minimization rules and to ask for the information it needs to make that assessment. Without this provision from the Judiciary bill, the Government's dissemination and use of information on innocent, law-abiding Americans will occur without any checks and balances whatsoever. Once again, ``trust us'' will have to do. I believe in this case, as in so many others, ``trust us'' is not enough.
The Judiciary bill furthers other types of oversight, as well. It requires relevant inspectors general to conduct an audit of the President's illegal wiretapping program, which is long overdue.
And it improves congressional access to FISA Court orders. The Intelligence Committee bill requires that Congress be provided with orders, decisions and opinions of the FISA Court that include significant interpretations of law within 45 days after they are issued. That is good as far as it goes, but the Judiciary bill adds that Congress should be provided with pleadings associated with opinions that contain significant interpretations of law. These pleadings may be critical to understanding the reasoning behind any particular interpretation as well as how the Government interprets and seeks to implement the law. It also requires that significant interpretations of law not previously provided to Congress over the past 5 years be provided.
The Judiciary bill also does a better job of protecting Americans from widespread warrantless wiretapping.
First, it protects against reverse targeting. It ensures that if the Government is wiretapping a foreigner overseas in order to collect the communications of the American with whom that foreign target is communicating, it has to get a court order on the American. This is very reasonable. Specifically, the Judiciary bill says that the Government needs an individualized court order when a significant purpose of its surveillance is listening to an American at home. The DNI himself said that reverse targeting violates the Fourth Amendment; this provision simply codifies that principle. The administration continues to oppose this provision, and I have a simple question for it: ``Why?'' Why is it opposed to a provision that prohibits a practice that its own Director of National Intelligence says is unconstitutional?
The Judiciary bill also prohibits bulk collection--that is, the sweeping up of all communications between the United States and overseas. The DNI said in public testimony that this type of massive bulk collection would be permitted by the Protect America Act. But he has also said that what the Government is seeking to do with these authorities is something very different. It is ``surgical. A telephone number is surgical. So, if you know that number, you can select it out.'' If the DNI has said it doesn't even need broader authorities, we should certainly should not be providing them.
All this modest provision does is hold the DNI to his word. It ensures that the Government has some foreign intelligence interest in individual targets, and is not just vacuuming up every last communication between Americans and their friends and business colleagues overseas. Targets do not need to be known or named individuals; they can be anonymous phone numbers, which is how the DNI has described how the Government collects. And the Government does not have to identify or explain its interest in the targets to the FISA Court; it merely has to make a general certification that individual targets exist. Again, why does the administration oppose this provision? I have yet to hear a convincing answer.
The Judiciary bill also has a sunset of 4 years rather than 6 years, ensuring that Congress will reevaluate this law before the end of the next Presidential administration. And, critically, it contains a strong statement that Congress intends for FISA to be the exclusive means by which foreign intelligence surveillance is conducted. It closes purported statutory loopholes that the Justice Department relied on to make its tortured arguments that the congressional authorization for use of force against al-Qaida somehow authorized the President's illegal wiretapping program. The Judiciary bill makes clear, once and for all, that the President must follow the law.
Madam President, the Judiciary bill also does not contain the provision in the Intelligence Committee bill granting automatic, retroactive immunity to companies that allegedly cooperated with the President's illegal NSA wiretapping program. I supported an amendment to strike the immunity provision in the Intelligence Committee when it was offered by the Senator from Florida, Mr. Nelson--I offered an amendment to strike the immunity provision in the Judiciary Committee-- and I will cosponsor Senator Dodd's amendment to strike the immunity provision on the Senate floor. The immunity provision does not belong in this bill.
Granting immunity, first of all, is unnecessary. Current law already specifically provides immunity from lawsuits for companies that cooperate with the Government's request for assistance, as long as they receive either a court order or a certification from the Attorney General that no court order is needed and the request meets all statutory requirements. This current FISA immunity provision, contained in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2511, already protects companies that act at the request of the Government, while also protecting the privacy of Americans' communications by assuring that immunity is granted only if the law is followed.
Some supporters of immunity argue that companies should not be penalized for relying in good faith on the legality of a request from the executive branch. This argument ignores the history of FISA. Private companies have a long history of receiving requests for assistance from the Government, and they worked with Congress when FISA was first enacted to devise a law that tells them exactly which Government requests they should honor. They also have experienced, well-trained lawyers to examine the written requests they receive from the Government and determine whether those requests comply with the clear requirements of the law or not.
The idea that telephone companies could not have foreseen that the Government might overstep the law makes no sense. FISA's requirement of a court order or a valid certification was designed precisely to respond to Government abuses that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, and to prevent such abuses from occurring in the future.
The Judiciary Committee heard testimony from Mort Halperin, a former Nixon administration official who had himself been the subject of a warrantless wiretap, and was involved in drafting FISA in the 1970s. He testified that before FISA:
Government communication with the telephone company . . .
could not have been more casual. A designated official of the
FBI called a designated official of [the company] and passed
on a phone number. Within minutes all of the calls from that
number were being routed to the local FBI field office and
monitored.
Not surprisingly, this casual, ad hoc system failed to protect Americans' privacy; the abuses that took place are well documented and quite shocking. FISA was supposed to give everyone involved a level of certainty about what was permitted and what was not. And the provision specifying the circumstances under which a Government request could be honored, in particular, was supposed to play a significant role in ensuring that certainty. AT&T, which was the only telephone company in existence at the time, was at the table when this provision was drafted. As Halperin described it in his testimony, the company:
received the clarity that it sought and deserved. The rule,
spelled out clearly in several places in the legislation and
well understood by all, was this: If [the phone company]
received a copy of a warrant or a certification under the
statute, it was required to cooperate. If it did not receive
authorization by means outlined in the statute, it was to
refuse to cooperate and was to be subjected to State and
Federal civil and criminal penalties for unlawful acquisition
of electronic communications.
This is the history. This is why we have the FISA statute. This is the whole point.
This history should give all of us pause as we consider the immunity provision in this bill. Granting companies that allegedly cooperated with an illegal program this new form of automatic, retroactive immunity undermines the law that has been on the books for decades--a law that was designed to prevent exactly the type of actions that allegedly occurred here. Perhaps more importantly, it will undermine any new laws that we pass to govern Government surveillance.
If we want companies to follow the law in the future, it sends a terrible message, and sets a terrible precedent, to grant a new form of retroactive, blanket immunity for alleged cooperation with an illegal program. We not only want companies to follow the law, we want the Government to follow the law. If we don't give the companies a solid basis for refusing to respond to a Government request that falls short of statutory requirements, we take away the incentive for the Government to follow the law. It would be irresponsible for Congress to allow this to happen.
It is time for Congress to state clearly and unequivocally: ``When we pass a law, we mean what we say and we expect the law to be followed.'' But if we grant immunity to companies that may have broken the law, the message we send will be quite the opposite. We will be effectively making compliance with the law optional. We will be saying: ``If a high Government official asks you to ignore the law, go ahead. Congress can always change the law retroactively so you won't pay any penalty for your lawbreaking.'' I ask my colleagues to think long and hard about this as they consider this amendment. Is that the message that we really want to send?
This retroactive immunity provision presents another serious problem.
It could very well prevent the courts from ruling on the administration's warrantless wiretapping program. That may explain why the administration is pushing so hard for this part of the bill. This program is one of the worst abuses of executive power in our Nation's history, and the courts should be able to rule on it once and for all. For Congress to step in and likely wipe out the pending court cases, when the administration has stonewalled congressional oversight efforts for so long, would be an unacceptable capitulation to an administration that thinks it is above the law.
Finally, I must emphasize that a vote to strike immunity is not a vote to hold telephone companies liable. Rather, it is a vote to let the courts decide whether the existing immunity provisions apply. If telephone companies received a directive from the Government and complied with well-established law, the courts will find that they are entitled to immunity and these cases will be dismissed. But if they failed to follow the law that applied specifically to them--a law they helped create and a law that their lawyers knew inside and out--we will have done American citizens a grave injustice by saying that sometimes it is just plain OK to break the law.
In other words, Congress should not prejudge the guilt or innocence of the companies, especially without knowing the facts. Unfortunately, most of the Members of this Chamber have not had access to those facts. The members of only two committees have had the opportunity to study what happened. I happen to sit on both committees, and after seeing all the evidence, my firm view is we should leave this to the courts to decide under existing law. But it is wrong for the administration to ask my colleagues who do not serve on these committees to vote for immunity. They are effectively being asked to grant immunity without being told for what they are granting immunity. This is fundamentally unfair.
The Senate can stand up for the rule of law and let the courts handle these cases as they see fit, or it can decide to change the rules in the middle of the game and block accountability for possible past law breaking. Voting to preserve retroactive immunity means they are blessing the behavior of the administration and the companies that allegedly cooperated with it. I urge my colleagues not to take that step.
Before I close, I wish to respond briefly to the comments made by the vice chair of the Intelligence Committee concerning the President's so- called inherent constitutional power to order surveillance. Relying on a nonbinding statement made in passing in a FISA Court of Review decision on another issue and a 1980 circuit court case that addresses surveillance before FISA was passed, the vice chairman asserts that the President has inherent constitutional authority to wiretap without a court order.
I am afraid to say that argument is an invitation to lawlessness. What he basically said is that because in his view the President has wiretapping authority that cannot be limited by statute, a company that complies with his request for assistance cannot be held accountable, no matter how unreasonable the request was. If that is the case, then Congress may as well pack up and go home because the laws we pass don't matter.
Congress has spoken very clearly in FISA and limited Presidential power to conduct surveillance. Congress had the authority to take this action, and the courts have never upheld an assertion of Presidential power over statutory restriction in a case where Congress has acted within its authority. In this case, the President must follow the law that Congress passes, and so should the telecommunications companies.
Madam President, how much time do I have remaining?
I ask unanimous consent to yield my remaining time to Senator Dodd.
Madam President, I thank the Senator from Connecticut for his kind words, and I thank him for his important leadership on this issue. What he is doing today is extremely helpful to the preservation of the rule of law in this country.