Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary for his distinguished service and my good friend from Texas for his managing of this bill on which we have a vigorous and active disagreement, but realize that the…
Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary for his distinguished service and my good friend from Texas for his managing of this bill on which we have a vigorous and active disagreement, but realize that the role of the Committee on the Judiciary is to enhance justice for all Americans, no matter what size business, what ethnicity, racial background, what issue they bring, whether they bring a commercial issue or whether they are for criminal justice.
That is why I rise to oppose this legislation, for it is important that we monitor, promote, coddle, and respect justice. I oppose the legislation that aims to restore a long-discredited version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in effect from 1983 to 1993. I use as a premise of my argument a letter from the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, in particular written by two distinguished Federal judges from Arizona, the chair of the Committee on Rules and the chair of the Advisory Committee on Rules, both Federal district court judges. But more importantly, my luck was to meet with a series of judges in the past week, Federal judges, Republican appointees and some Democratic appointees, and there was a vocal outcry of the outrage of this legislation, asking and begging that this legislation not be put in place.
Let me give you a description from the Federal courts, recognizing: ``We of course share the desire of the sponsors of LARA to improve the civil justice system''--and that is the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act-- ``in our Federal courts, including the desire to reduce frivolous filings. But LARA creates a cure worse than the problem it is meant to solve.''
``Moreover, as we are both Federal trial judges, our perspective is informed by our ongoing daily experience with the practical operation of the rules.''
I, too, am concerned about small businesses. That is why we need to proceed as we are proceeding. It gives thoughtful judges the ability to protect those entities. The facts do not, according to the letter, support any assumption that mandatory sanctions deter frivolous filings.
``A decade of experience with the 1983 mandatory sanctions provision,'' they go on to say, ``demonstrated that it failed to provide meaningful relief from
the litigation behavior it was meant to address, and instead generated wasteful satellite litigation that had little to do with the merits of cases.''
What good is that for the small litigant? What good will they have when they might be subject to satellite litigation? And so, Mr. Chairman, why would we want to return to the failed, discredited sanction regime rightly abandoned in 1993? H.R. 720 would require courts to impose monetary sanctions for any rule 11 violation, eliminating the safe harbor provision that currently allows attorneys to correct or withdraw a filing before rule 11 proceedings commence. That is justice: I made a mistake, I want to withdraw it. I am suing a small business, I have a different perspective. I know the facts, let me withdraw it.
The cost-shifting provision was eliminated by the courts because it encouraged satellite litigation, and many cases required parallel proceedings. Here is the worst of it: Suppose we were back in 1954. Would Brown v. Board of Education be a frivolous lawsuit subject to sanctions, a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that declared State laws establishing separate public schools for Black and White students unconstitutional? What about Griswold in 1965? It would also be judged as a frivolous lawsuit.
Mr. Chairman, Griswold was a landmark case in which the Supreme Court ruled that we had a right to privacy. Or what about the famous case that was made into a movie, Loving v. Virginia? I think for almost 25 years this mixed-marriage couple could not live in their own State. A lawsuit would have been considered frivolous. Loving was a landmark case which decided Virginia's antimiscegenation statute was unconstitutional.
New York Times Co. v. United States in 1971, the question was on the constitutional freedom of the press. It reinforced the First Amendment.
Mr. Chairman, it is impossible to go back to the old days. I ask my colleagues to support the Jackson Lee amendment, to come up and to oppose the underlying bill in the name of justice for all.
Mr. Chairman, I include in the Record a list of seven notable cases the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act may have barred from a courtroom.
seven notable cases the ``lawsuit abuse reduction act'' may have barred
from a courtroom
Contrary to proponents' claims, LARA does not deter
frivolous lawsuits. Rather it deters meritorious cases by
imposing a one-size-fits-all mandate for federal judges.
Mandatory sanctions inevitably chill meritorious claims
particularly in cases of first impression or involving new
legal theories, including cases to protect civil rights, the
right to privacy, the environment, collective bargaining and
the First Amendment. Our system of justice is a moving body
of law, and novel legal theories have the ability to shift
public policy and law.
Below are seven notable cases that LARA may have prevented
because the cases presented what--at the time they were
presented to the court--would have been considered novel
legal theories:
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954):
Brown was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme
Court that declared state laws establishing separate public
schools for black and white students unconstitutional. The
decision overturned the Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896
which allowed state-sponsored segregation. The Court's
unanimous decision stated that ``separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.'' As a result, de jure
racial segregation was ruled a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. This ruling paved the way for
integration and the civil rights movement.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): Griswold was
a landmark case in which the Supreme Court ruled that the
Constitution protected a right to privacy. The case involved
a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court invalidated the law on
the grounds that it violated the ``right to marital
privacy.''
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): In Lawrence, the
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether adult
consensual sexual activity is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection under the law. The
Court found that the petitioners were free as adults to
engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their
liberty under the Due Process Clause. The decision
decriminalized the Texas law that made it illegal for two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct.
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S.
497 (2007): In this case, twelve states and several cities of
the United States brought suit against the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to force the federal
agency to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
as pollutants. The Supreme Court found that Massachusetts,
due to its ``stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign
interests'' as a state, had standing to sue the EPA over
potential damage caused to its territory by global warming.
The Court rejected the EPA's argument that the Clean Air Act
was not meant to refer to carbon emissions in the section
giving the EPA authority to regulate ``air pollution
agent[s].''
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967): Loving was a
landmark civil rights case in which the United States Supreme
Court, by a 9-0 vote, declared Virginia's anti-miscegenation
statute, the ``Racial Integrity Act of 1924,''
unconstitutional, thereby ending all race-based legal
restrictions on marriage in the United States.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971):
This case considered whether the New York Times and
Washington Post newspapers could publish the then-classified
Pentagon Papers without risk of government censure. The
question before the Court was whether the constitutional
freedom of the press, guaranteed by the First Amendment, was
subordinate to a claimed need of the executive branch of
government to maintain the secrecy of information. The
Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment protected the
right of the New York Times to print the materials.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
(The Snail Darter Case): In TVA, the Supreme Court affirmed a
court of appeals' judgment, which agreed with the Secretary
of Interior that operation of the federal Tellico Dam would
eradicate an endangered species. The Court held that a prima
facie violation of Sec. 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. Sec. 1536, occurred, and ruled that an injunction
requested by respondents should have been issued.
Mr. Chair, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 720, the ``Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2017,'' because it is both unnecessary and counterproductive.
I oppose this legislation that aims to restore a long-discredited version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in effect from 1983 to 1993.
The current Rule 11 allows federal courts, in their discretion, to impose sanctions for frivolous filings and it encourages litigants to resolve such issues without court intervention.
As written, H.R. 720 would change the sanctions for a violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 to a cost-shifting sanction payable to the opposing party, an antiquated version of the Rule in effect from 1983 until 1993.
Why, Mr. Chair would we return to the failed and discredited sanction regime rightly abandoned in 1993?
H.R. 720 would require courts to impose monetary sanctions for any Rule 11 violation, eliminating the safe harbor provision that currently allows attorneys to correct or withdraw a filing before Rule 11 proceedings commence.
That cost-shifting provision was eliminated by the courts because it encouraged satellite litigation; many cases required parallel proceedings--one on the merits of the lawsuit and one on the Rule 11 motion.
The 1983 rule had a particularly negative disproportionate impact on plaintiffs, especially plaintiffs in civil rights cases, because plaintiffs in such cases often raise novel legal arguments, leaving them vulnerable to a Rule 11 motion by a defendant.
Reinstating this mandatory fee shifting rule, as H.R. 720 does, will again have a chilling effect on plaintiffs' claims, especially individual plaintiffs taking on large corporate interests.
Sanctions were more often imposed against plaintiffs than defendants and more often imposed against plaintiffs in certain kinds of cases, primarily in civil rights and certain kinds of discrimination cases.
A leading study on this issue showed that although civil rights cases made up 11.4% of federal cases filed, 22.7% of the cases in which sanctions had been imposed were civil rights cases.
The imposition of mandatory fees and costs ultimately shifts the purpose of the Rule from deterrence to compensation, encouraging parties to always file Rule 11 motions in the hopes of gaining additional compensation.
Both the Judicial Conference of the United States and the U.S. Supreme Court support preservation of the current version of Rule 11(c) and restoring the true balance between punishing unwarranted conduct and deterring unnecessary litigation.
Given the highly problematic experience under the 1983 rule, which sparked extensive and costly litigation, the rule burdened already strained federal court system, adversely affecting cases of all types, including civil litigation among businesses.
Congress should be looking for ways to decrease, not increase wasteful burdens on
courts, and should avoid rule changes that have a discriminatory impact on civil rights, employment, environmental, and consumer cases.
For these reasons and more, I oppose this bill.
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, let me again emphasize our mutual commitment to justice and why I think the underlying bill skews justice and tips the scale of justice on Lady Justice.
I again refer you to the sitting experts, and that is the Judicial Conference of the United States, comprised of Federal judges all across America. I can't help but recite this sentence that strikes me as one as strong as possible to have been cited in a letter.
Their referral to LARA, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, in this one sentence, recognizing the concern about frivolous lawsuits or filings, they say:
But LARA creates a curse worse than the problem it is meant
to solve.
I think that that one sentence says it all. We are not here solving a problem. We are here creating a problem.
I am particularly struck by the comments regarding small businesses. My amendment improves H.R. 720 by preserving the current law and practice of courts awarding attorneys' fees when justice requires.
As written, H.R. 720 would change the sanctions for violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 to a cost-shifting sanction, payable to the opposing party, an antiquated version of the rule in effect from 1983 until 1993. That cost-shifting provision was eliminated by the courts because it encouraged satellite litigation.
The Jackson Lee amendment would preserve the sanctions currently available under rule 11, which provide the correct balance in punishing unwarranted conduct--this is under the present status of rule 11-- without encouraging unnecessary litigation.
Specifically, my amendment will strike a provision of the legislation that mandates the award of reasonable attorney fees and costs. Instead, it restores judicial discretion to award such fees and costs when warranted.
Take small business A, who is mad at big bank XYZ. They mishandled my account, and they filed a lawsuit. Unfortunately, the bookkeeper--not accountant--bookkeeper that the small business used really made the mistake, but the judge, recognizing the small business had good intentions, would not have to mandatorily force them to be sanctioned and to pay attorneys' fees but might then have discretion. That is how you help small business A.
I ask my colleagues to support the reasonable Jackson Lee amendment.
Mr. Chair, thank you for this opportunity to explain the Jackson Lee Amendment to H.R. 720.
My amendment improves H.R. 720 by preserving the current law and practice of courts awarding attorney fees when justice so requires.
As written, H.R. 720 would change the sanctions for a violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 11 to a cost-shifting sanction payable to the opposing party, an antiquated version of the Rule in effect from 1983 until 1993.
That cost-shifting provision was eliminated by the courts because it encouraged satellite litigation.
The Jackson Lee Amendment would preserve the sanctions currently available under Rule 11, which provide the correct balance in punishing unwarranted conduct, without encouraging unnecessary litigation.
Specifically, my amendment will strike a provision of the legislation that mandates the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and instead restores judicial discretion to award such fees and costs when warranted.
The Jackson Lee Amendment preserves the balance found in the current version of Rule 11, which gives the court discretion to determine an appropriate sanction.
H.R. 720 seeks a return to the failed and discredited sanction regime rightly abandoned in 1993.
By eliminating the mandatory fee-shifting provision, the 1993 Rule discouraged satellite litigation and encouraged parties to move forward with the merits of the case.
Under the prior Rule 11, during the 1983-1993 time, mandatory fee- shifting was used to discourage plaintiffs from bringing meritorious claims using novel legal theories in civil rights and employment rights cases.
Reinstating this mandatory fee shifting rule, as H.R. 720 does, will again have a chilling effect on plaintiffs claims, especially individual plaintiffs taking on large corporate interests.
The Jackson Lee Amendment would preserve the current version of Rule 11(c) and restore the true balance between punishing unwarranted conduct and deterring unnecessary litigation.
The old rule disproportionately affected plaintiffs, especially plaintiffs in civil rights cases.
Sanctions were more often imposed against plaintiffs than defendants and more often imposed against plaintiffs in certain kinds of cases, primarily in civil rights and certain kinds of discrimination cases.
A leading study on this issue showed that although civil rights cases made up 11.4% of federal cases filed, 22.7% of the cases in which sanctions had been imposed were civil rights cases.
The imposition of mandatory fees and costs shifts the purpose of the Rule from deterrence to compensation, encouraging parties to always file Rule 11 motions in the hopes of gaining additional compensation.
For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the Jackson Lee Amendment.
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States,
Washington, DC, April 13, 2015.
Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: We write to present the views of the
Judicial Conference Rules Committees on H.R. 758, the Lawsuit
Abuse Reduction Act of 2015.
As the current chairs of the Judicial Conference's
Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure (the
``Standing Committee'') and the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the ``Advisory
Committee''), we oppose H.R. 758, which seeks to reduce
lawsuit abuse by amending Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The bill would reinstate a mandatory
sanctions provision of Rule 11 adopted in 1983 and removed as
counterproductive in 1993. The bill would also eliminate a
provision adopted in 1993 that allows a party to withdraw
challenged pleadings. Our concerns mirror the views expressed
by the Judicial Conference in 2004 and 2005, and by the
Standing Committee and Advisory Committee in 2011 and 2013,
in response to similar legislation, and reflect our ongoing
daily experience with the practical operation of the rules.
We share the desire of the sponsors of H.R. 758 to improve
the civil justice system in our federal courts, including the
desire to reduce frivolous filings. But legislation that
would restore the 1983 version of Rule 11 would create a cure
worse than the problem it is meant to solve. Such legislation
also contravenes the longstanding Judicial Conference policy
opposing direct amendment of the federal rules by legislation
rather than through the deliberative process Congress
established in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 2071-2077.
A decade of experience with the 1983 mandatory sanctions
provision demonstrated that it failed to provide meaningful
relief from the litigation behavior it was meant to address,
and instead generated wasteful satellite litigation that had
little to do with the merits of cases. The 1983 version of
Rule 11 required sanctions for every violation of the rule,
and quickly became a tool of abuse. Aggressive filings of
Rule 11 sanctions motions required expenditure of tremendous
resources on Rule 11 battles having nothing to do with the
merits of the case and everything to do with strategic
gamesmanship. Many Rule 11 motions in turn triggered counter-
motions seeking Rule 11 sanctions as a penalty for filing of
the original Rule 11 motion.
The 1993 changes to Rule 11 followed years of examination
and were made on the Judicial Conference's strong
recommendation, with the Supreme Court's approval, and
effective only following a period of congressional review.
The 1993 amendments were designed to remedy the major
problems with the rule, strike a fair balance between
competing interests, and allow parties and courts to focus on
the merits of the underlying cases. Since 1993, the rule has
included a safe harbor, providing a party 21 days within
which to withdraw a particular claim or defense before
sanctions can be imposed. If the party fails to withdraw an
allegedly frivolous claim or defense within that time, a
court may impose sanctions, including assessing reasonable
attorney fees. Under the 1993 amendments, sanctioning of
discovery-related abuse remains available under Rules 26 and
37, which provide for sanctions that include awards of
reasonable attorney fees.
Minimizing frivolous filings is vital. The current rules
give judges tools to deal with frivolous pleadings, including
the imposition of sanctions where warranted. Rule 12(b)(6)
authorizes courts to dismiss pleadings that fail to state a
claim. Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code
authorizes sanctions against lawyers for ``unreasonably and
vexatiously'' multiplying the proceedings in any case. Other
tools to address frivolous filings include 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1915(e), which requires courts to dismiss cases brought
in forma pauperis that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to
state a claim, and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915A, which requires
courts to dismiss prisoner complaints against governmental
entities, officers, or employees that are frivolous,
malicious, or fail to state a claim.
Some may ask, why not give courts another tool to deter
frivolous filings by reinstating the 1983 version of Rule 11?
The answer is that the very process Congress established to
consider rule proposals exposed the 1983 version of Rule 11
as superficially appealing, but replete with unintended
consequences, chiefly an explosion of satellite litigation.
Congress designed the Rules Enabling Act process in 1934, and
reformed it in 1988, to produce the best rules possible
through broad public participation and review by the bench,
the bar, and the academy. The Enabling Act charges the
judiciary with the task of neutral, independent, and thorough
analysis of the rules and their operation. The Rules
Committees undertake extensive study of the rules, including
empirical research, so that they can propose rules that will
best serve the American justice system while avoiding
unintended consequences. Experience has shown that this
process works well. Direct amendment of Rule 11 will not only
circumvent the effective Rules Enabling Act process Congress
implemented, but as the careful study of Rule 11 undertaken
by the Rules Committees over many years demonstrates, direct
amendment of Rule 11 as envisioned by H.R. 758 would work
against the laudable purpose of improving the administration
of justice.
Before proposing the 1993 amendments, the Advisory
Committee reviewed several empirical studies of the 1983
version of Rule 11, including studies conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center in 1985 and 1988, a Third Circuit
Task Force report on Rule 11 in 1989, and a New York State
Bar Committee report in 1987. In 1990, the Advisory Committee
issued a call for general comments on the rule. The response
was substantial and clearly called for a change. The Advisory
Committee concluded that Rule 11's cost-shifting provision
created an incentive for too many unnecessary Rule 11
motions. Amendments to Rule 11 were drafted by the Advisory
Committee and approved by the Standing Committee and Judicial
Conference. The Supreme Court approved the amendments and
transmitted them to Congress in May 1993 after extensive
scrutiny and debate by the bench, bar, and public in
accordance with the Rules Enabling Act process.
The amended rule has produced a marked decline in Rule 11
satellite litigation without any noticeable increase in
frivolous filings. In June 1995, the Federal Judicial Center
conducted a survey of 1,130 lawyers and 148 judges on the
effects of the 1993 amendments. The Center found general
satisfaction with the amended rule, and that a majority of
the responding judges and lawyers did not favor a return to
mandatory sanctions when the rule is violated.
In 2005, the Federal Judicial Center surveyed federal trial
judges to get a clearer picture of how the revised Rule 11
was operating. A copy of the study is enclosed. The study
showed that judges on the front lines--those who must contend
with frivolous litigation and apply Rule II--strongly believe
that the current rule works well. The study's findings
include the following highlights:
More than 80 percent of the 278 district judges surveyed
indicated that ``Rule 11 is needed and it is just right as it
now stands'';
87 percent prefer the existing Rule 11 to the 1983 version
or the version proposed by legislation (e.g., H.R. 4571 (the
Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004) or H.R. 420 (the Lawsuit
Abuse Reduction Act of 2005));
85 percent strongly or moderately support Rule 11's safe
harbor provisions;
91 percent oppose the proposed requirement that sanctions
be imposed for every Rule 11 violation;
84 percent disagree with the proposition that an award of
attorney fees should be mandatory for every Rule 11
violation;
85 percent believe that the amount of groundless civil
litigation has not grown since the promulgation of the 1993
rule (for judges commissioned before 1992) or since their
first year as a federal district judge (for judges
commissioned after January 1, 1992); and
72 percent believe that addressing sanctions for discovery
abuse in Rules 26(g) and 37 is better than in Rule 11.
The findings of the Federal Judicial Center underscore the
judiciary's united opposition to legislation amending Rule
11. Lawyers share this view. The American Bar Association has
opposed H.R. 758. Indeed, of the 200 lawyers, litigants,
judges, and academics who participated in the 2010 conference
at Duke University Law School convened by the Advisory
Committee to search for ways to address the problems of costs
and delay in civil litigation, nobody proposed a return to
the 1983 version of Rule 11.
Thank you for considering the views of the Standing
Committee and Advisory Committee. We look forward to
continuing to work with you to ensure that our civil justice
system fulfills its vital role. If you or your staff have any
questions, please contact Rebecca Womeldorf, Secretary to the
Standing Committee.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey S. Sutton,
United States Circuit Judge Sixth Circuit,Chair, Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
David G. Campbell,
United States District Judge District of Arizona, Chair,
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, reading again from the Judicial Conference letter, it says: The facts do not support any assumption that mandatory sanctions under H.R. 720--that is what the bill is about--deter frivolous filings. All it does, after a decade of experience, is that it demonstrates that it failed to provide meaningful relief from the litigation behavior it was supposed to address.
What it will do is it will punish the small business. By eliminating the mandatory fee-shifting provision, the 1993 rule discouraged satellite litigation. Reinstating this mandatory fee-shifting rule, as H.R. 720 does, will again have a chilling effect.
The Jackson Lee amendment would give the courts discretion to protect against the mom-and-pop business from having to pay because they mistakenly thought big bank XYZ did them in, and it really was a mistake on their part.
Sanctions are more often imposed against plaintiffs than defendants, more often imposed against plaintiffs in certain kind of cases, primarily civil rights and certain kinds of discrimination cases.
The Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka might have been perceived to be outrageous--how dare you try to strike down the separate but equal--and yet it has had an amazing impact and a case of moment in history.
Or the Loving v. Virginia, when two individuals who loved each other still were kept out of Virginia because they were of different races, it was absurd to file that lawsuit at that time. Yet, if they had not, or if these kinds of penalties were in place, they might be suffering mandatory sanctions and kept out of the courthouse.
A leading study on this issue showed that, although civil rights cases make up 11.4 percent, 22.7 percent of the cases in which sanctions have been imposed are civil rights cases.
Mr. Chair, I ask my colleagues to support the Jackson Lee amendment. In order to foster justice, support the Jackson Lee amendment, which restores to the courts judicial discretion on penalties and sanctions, if you will, and listen to the Judicial Conference: this is a curse worse than the problem.
Mr. Chair, I urge support of the Jackson Lee amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
Mr. Chairman, I support Representative Conyers' amendment.
I include in the Record in support of our amendment a Judicial Conference letter dated April 13, 2015, and letters from a number of organizations, including the Alliance for Justice and the American Association for Justice.
I also include in the Record a letter from the American Bar Association, who begins their message:
``On behalf of the American Bar Association, ABA, and its over 400,000 members, I am writing to urge you to vote against H.R. 720, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act . . . which is scheduled for a floor vote this week.''
Re Groups Strongly Oppose Attacks on Civil Justice.
Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. John Conyers, Jr.,
Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers: On
February 2, the House Committee on the Judiciary is scheduled
to mark up several bills that collectively would make it more
difficult for Americans to enforce their legal rights, and
would place unreasonable burdens on the federal judiciary and
federal enforcement officials. The undersigned organizations
strongly oppose these bills as harmful and unnecessary.