Let me thank the ranking member for yielding and, as well, the chairperson, and let me collectively add my appreciation for the two leaders of this committee. They have committed themselves, without question, to the security of this…
Let me thank the ranking member for yielding and, as well, the chairperson, and let me collectively add my appreciation for the two leaders of this committee. They have committed themselves, without question, to the security of this Nation. I thank them for their collaboration.
Mr. Rogers, I thank you for the work that you have done for the Nation and, certainly, for the commitment that you have made to the very important business of this committee.
Mr. Ruppersberger, let me thank you for your friendship as well and for the continued collaboration on an issue of great concern to me, but I will speak generally about this legislation and will, again, acknowledge some of the issues that you have looked at and considered and have even included in this legislation as it comes forward.
Mr. Chairman, I agree that detecting and disrupting and preventing a national security crisis is of paramount responsibility for this committee and many others, including the committee that I serve on, the Committee on Homeland Security. For that reason, I have interfaced with this committee on a number of issues.
I am very glad to note, in particular, that the issue of dealing with the expansive use that has been used, which I will talk about in the en bloc amendment, is clearly something that we should have considered, and in this bill, it did.
It got its hand around the enormous use of outside contractors in the intelligence business, and it emphasized recruitment and training. That is positive. There are young, bright persons who I know are willing to serve their country, and this legislation has committed itself to doing that.
Now, particularly with this legislation, I also want to appreciate the collaboration between the Judiciary Committee and this committee on the USA FREEDOM Act, and I want to say to America that we have corralled the megadata collection. We have done it in a bipartisan manner, and we will do more and do better.
So it is with appreciation for this legislation and in thanking the committee for working with my staff on
my amendment that I ask my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. Chair, I rise to speak on H.R. 4681, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2014.
I want to thank the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for including my amendment in an en bloc.
My amendment to H.R. 4681 is simple and will be an important addition to the legislation, which I believe can be supported by every member of this Committee.
My amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on the people who the Nation relies upon to perform certain types of work required of the Intelligence Community.
The Jackson Lee amendment requires the Director of the Office of National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of intelligence activities on contractors to support Government objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.
The amendment would seek information on the skills necessary to perform intelligence related work and whether Federal employees had these skills. The amendment would also seek statistics on contractors preforming intelligence related work for agencies under the purview of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Something is very wrong when the process for screening and vetting government contractors does not identify someone who would have access to--as well as the ability to collect and remove sensitive information from government computers and publicly disclose that information.
If each person working in an intelligence role within the government decided to act on their own thoughts for their own purposes on whether they would or would not keep their oath to defend and protect our Nation's secrets then there would be chaos.
Our Nation suffers harm in ways we can see, as well as ways that we cannot see when unauthorized disclosures regarding intelligence resources occur.
It harms our ability to work with other nations who rely on our ability to keep secret the information they share with our Nation's intelligence agencies.
If our global assets and allies cease to trust our ability to keep their work with our intelligence, national defense or diplomatic agencies secret then they will not cooperate with us in our efforts to defend our Nation and our interest around the world.
Reckless disclosures make us vulnerable to our Nation's enemies who could make changes to how they hide information because the disclosure of national secrets reveals means and methods.
The world is a dangerous place--we have seen within the last 18 months--a bombing during the Boston Marathon, the rise in sectarian violence in Syria that included incidents involving the use of nerve gas; and Boko Haram which kidnapped nearly 300 girls from their school in northern Nigeria.
According to the United States Department of State Country Report on Terrorism 2013, published in April of this year indicates that there are 53 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).
Designation of FTOs is important to our Nation's fight against terrorism and is effective in cutting off support for those groups so designated.
In 2013, Ansar al-Dine, Boko Haram, and Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Bi Biladis-Sudan were added to the list of FTOs.
FTOs are legally defined under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states the group must be: a foreign organization; engage in terrorist activity or retain the capacity and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; and participating in terrorist activity or terrorism that threatens the security of the United States or its citizens.
United States' National security encompasses national defense, foreign relations, or economic interest.
The unauthorized intelligence disclosures last year impacted U.S. national security.
The intelligence breach came as a result of a government contractor making public sensitive information is still resonating both internationally and within the United States, where an important debate on privacy and civil liberties is still ongoing.
But also around the world the consequences of the unauthorized release of international activity by intelligence agencies is still playing out.
The timing of the release of information on the non-U.S. activity of our intelligence agencies caused tremendous tension in our relations with allies at a time when the United States was working to form a global response to the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria.
In addition to frustrating our efforts to form a strong global response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria it also caused economic harm to U.S. companies internationally.
Congress is not able to fully investigate the circumstances that resulted in last year's intelligence breach because the person with many of the answers to questions many of us have is now living in Russia.
However, we can look prospectively on how the work of the Intelligence Community under the direction of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence should fill positions that require security clearances.
The intelligence work by contractors and Federal employees is critical to the protection of the United States and our interest both domestically and around the world. We should approach the work of the intelligence community as we do when considering the work of the Department of Defense.
The work that our Intelligence professionals perform is critical, and a defense in depth approach is necessary to assure that no matter the challenge or the circumstances there will be well trained professionals in place to do what must be done to defend and protect the nation.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2013 Report on Security Clearance Determinations provides information on the number of persons with security clearance levels of Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret and had access to classified information as well as those who were favorably adjudicated but did not have access to classified information.
I would like to acknowledge the work of the Special Security Directorate (SSD) of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive for compiling and processing the data for this report.
The 2013 Report on Security Clearance Determinations states that by October 1, 2013 the Nation had 3,738,026 Federal agency employees working for the: Office of the Director of National Intelligence Scattered Castles; Department of Defense; Joint Personnel Adjudication System; Office of Personnel Management; and Central Verification System (CVS).
In addition to surveying these agencies a special data call was made to the seven intelligence community agencies with delegated authority to conduct investigations or adjudications to fulfill specific reporting requirements directed by the fiscal year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. These agencies were the: Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; National Security Agency; and Department of State.
In 2013, the total number of persons with a Confidential, Secret or Top Secret security clearance totaled 5,150,379 individuals--of this number 3,738,026 were government agency personnel, 1,056,309 were contractors and 356,044 were categorized as other.
Between January and October 1, 2013 there were 777,168 security clearances approved--152,490 were government agency employees and 131,209 were contractors with an additional 12,785 designated as other.
Congress must have the ability to make decisions regarding how intelligence agencies fill positions that require security clearances because it has implications for the appropriations process.
The Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archives 2012 Report to the President focuses on the classification practices of intelligence agencies.
The report addresses the power of ``original classification authorities'' also called ``original classifiers,'' which are individuals designated with Top Secret original classification authority to classify information.
Only original classifiers are authorized to determine what information, if disclosed without authorization, would be expected to cause damage to national security.
The original classification authority process comes before all other aspects of the security classification system. In 2004, the total number of original classifications was 351,150 and in 2012 the number was 74,477.
The cost of government security classification in 2005 was $7.66 billion and in 2011 the total was $11.36 billion.
The amount expended in 2011 included: 5.65 billion for protection maintenance; 1.53 billion for security management oversight and planning; 502.51 million for professional education, training and awareness; 352.4 million for classification management; and 52.76 million for declassification.
These costs cited are not all encompassing, but were generated by 41 executive branch agencies including the Department of Defense.
The funds expended do not include activity by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director for National Intelligence, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency.
The focus on training is critical in the work of the Intelligence Community and it is important that this is a high priority for the agencies represented in the National Archive report.
The work by the Intelligence Community to address classification in an evenhanded way can help create and maintain a firm basis for classification of information that is sustainable can go a long way in addressing questions regarding what secrets are critical to our nation's national security and what the public has a right to know.
I thank my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee for their hard work in bringing this bill before the full House for consideration. I ask that members of the Congress vote in favor of this bipartisan en bloc amendment to H.R. 4681.
Mr. Chair, let me again thank the ranking member and the chairman. Let me also acknowledge the very fine men and women that work in our intelligence community in the United States and around the world.
I would like to thank the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for their efforts to include the Jackson Lee amendment in the en bloc amendments and thank them for working with my staff in a very cooperative manner.
The Jackson Lee amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on the people the Nation relies upon to perform certain types of work for the intelligence community.
The Jackson Lee amendment requires the Director of the Office of National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of intelligence activities on contractors to support government objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.
This complements the underlying bill, because the underlying bill has determined to assess the utilization and reduce the number of private contractors.
In a Time article dated Monday, July 19, 2010, a comment says:
Explosion of contractors in the intelligence community.
And that has been the case.
It is important that we recognize that contractors can be useful. But like the President stated publicly on August 26, 2013:
It is important that we have so many extraordinarily
capable folks in our military and our government who can do
this--and probably do it cheaper.
Well, I agree with the President and this committee.
I also take note of an article that cites NSA contractors using LinkedIn profiles to cash in on national security.
I believe that with the work that we are doing here in this legislation, along with my amendment, we will get our hands around the idea of outsourcing our intelligence work and develop a pathway of excellence, as we have in the past.
We will utilize our veterans, we will utilize military personnel, we will utilize young persons who are interested in this as a career, and we will have the finest intelligence staffing that we have ever had, as we have had in the past.
I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. I again thank the chairman and ranking member for including this in the en bloc amendments. I think we are on a pathway of greater success in securing this Nation.
Mr. Chair, I support H.R. 4681, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014,'' a bill Authorizing appropriations for our nation's intelligence agencies for Fiscal Year 2014 through Fiscal Year 2015. The bill provides funds for the conduct of intelligence and intelligence-related activities.
My thanks to the House Rules Committee for making my amendment in order under the rule for H.R. 4681.
I appreciate the work of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence efforts to include the Jackson Lee Amendment in the En Bloc.
My amendment is simple and makes an important contribution to the bill.
The Jackson Lee Amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on the people the nation relies upon to perform certain types of work for the Intelligence Community.
The Jackson Lee Amendment requires the Director of the Office of National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of intelligence activities on contractors to support Government objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 2013 Report on Security Clearance Determinations said that on October 1, 2013, the total number of persons with a Confidential, Secret or Top Secrete security clearance totaled 5,150,379 individual.
According to the ODNI 3,738,026 were government agency personnel, 1,056,309 were contractors and 356,044 were categorized as other.
Between January and October 1, 2013 there were 777,168 security clearances approved--152,490 were government agency employees and 131,209 were contractors with an additional 12,785 designated as other.
The cost of government security classification in 2oo5 was $7.66 billion and in 2011 the total was $11.36 billion.
The amount expended included: 5.65 billion for protection maintenance; 1.53 billion for security management oversight and planning; 502.51 million for professional education, training and awareness; 352.4 million for classification management; 52.76 million for declassification.
The assessment provided for through the Jackson Lee amendment would shed light on the work that our federal agency Intelligence professionals and the role contractors play in protecting our nation.
President Obama stated publicly on August 6, 2013 that it is important that we have so many 'extraordinarily capable folks in our military and our government who can do this, and probably do it cheaper.'
I agree.
That is why I introduced H.R. 4110, the HERO Transition from Battlespace to Workplace Act of 2014.
This legislation addresses the problem of underemployed veterans in obtaining positions that take maximum advantage of their skills and experience.
For some time I have worked to make sure that transparency, accountability and oversight were firmly established to guide the work of intelligence agencies, including introducing legislation such as