Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I would like my colleagues to take a trip down memory lane. Go back a decade or two to 2006, 2007, 2008, and look at the decade before…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I would like my colleagues to take a trip down memory lane. Go back a decade or two to 2006, 2007, 2008, and look at the decade before that. My State of Ohio, for 14 years in a row-- from the late 1990s through the year 2010--experienced almost a decade and a half of foreclosure increases leading up to the crisis. That meant that in Ohio, literally every year for 14 years, there were more foreclosures than the year before in my State.
Predatory and irresponsible lenders made dangerous, subprime loans. They often ignored whether borrowers had the ability to repay that loan. The incentives were these: We will keep writing these; we will keep underwriting; we will keep collecting fees. We don't care if the borrower can pay.
We can see that is a setup for disaster. Because of the lack of standards for underwriting, we learned a painful lesson that not all mortgage lending is created equal.
Look at some headlines from that period. On September 18, 2008, the front page of the Wall Street Journal featured three headlines. This was September 18, 2008, so just slightly less than 10 years ago: ``Mounting Fears Shape World Markets As Banking Giants Rush to Raise Capital.'' ``Bad Bets and Cash Crunch Push Ailing AIG to Brink.'' ``Worst Crisis Since `30s, With No End.''
On the same day the Washington Post reported: ``Markets in Disarray as Lending Locks Up.''
How did we get to that crisis? Banks forgot the essential rule of lending. A borrower needs to be able to pay back the loan. It is pretty simple, but a forgotten dictum. Instead, lenders offered loans that required no documentation. They offered loans with teaser interest rates that shot through the roof after 2 or 3 years. They offered loans where borrowers never paid down their principal or they stripped their home's value through cash-out refinances.
So borrowers had these mortgages where they simply paid the interest with the belief the home would go up in value more and more and more, never paying the principal. The homes didn't go up in value, and look what happened.
All of these practices had devastating results for families and communities and the economy. My wife Connie and I live in ZIP Code 44105 in Cleveland, OH, just south of Slavic Village in the great city of Cleveland. Eleven years ago, in the first half of 2007, 44105 had more foreclosures than any ZIP Code in the United States of America. I can still see the blight brought on by those foreclosures--what it did to individual families, what it did to the neighborhood, what it did to the city of Cleveland.
Think about--and we don't do that very much here. We don't really think all that much when we talk about things like this. We look at numbers. We look at statistics. We read analyses and data, but we don't really think about individual families.
Think about what happens when somebody suffers a foreclosure. First of all, these families understand that things are getting tighter. It is harder
and harder to pay their mortgage. Their spouse may have been scaled back to half time, depending on the economic circumstances.
The first thing they do is often get rid of the family pet. It costs too much to take the dog to the vet. The second thing they do is cut back on everything. They just start cutting back on everything. Eventually they have that sit-down with their 12-year-old daughter and their 14-year-old son and their 15-year old son, and tell them: We are going to have to move. We don't know where we are going or what school district we will be in. We don't know how much we are going to get; we have to sell the car. We don't know how much you are going to be able to see your friends. They think about the personal side, but we don't do that much here.
Pope Francis used to admonish his parish priests to go out and smell like the flock. We don't do that very much here. We look at data and ideas, and we don't think about our policies and our votes and the impact they have on individual human beings.
So thinking back to ZIP Code 44105, if those faulty mortgage products weren't bad enough on their own, they were targeted to communities of color. The neighborhood my wife and I live in, ZIP Code 44105, is mostly African American, but pretty diverse. A lot of people look more like me, but there are a lot of people with moderate to low incomes.
These mortgage products were targeted to communities of color. In those communities in particular, even those who qualified for no- frills, no-surprises prime mortgages were often instead steered into subprime loans. Why? Because the lender could make more money on a subprime loan than a straightforward loan that most Members of the Senate generally sign up for. So even African-American and Hispanic borrowers with higher incomes than other borrowers found themselves-- because the banks put them there--with subprime mortgages.
These practices of discrimination, which went on for years, stripped a generation's worth of equity from communities that had fought hard for equal access to home ownership. Think about this: The household wealth of communities of color simply hasn't recovered from the last decade. Middle-class Black and Hispanic families lost half of their wealth from 2007 to 2013. In 2016, it was $38,000. The numbers are similar for Hispanic households: $85,000 in 2007, $46,000 in 2016. They all sound like numbers, but what that does to a family who has lost half its wealth, particularly because their wealth is generally in the home that they own--think of what that does.
My colleagues talk about how hard the banks have it, how hard it is to be a banker now, and how hard it is for Wall Street. I would like to revisit what happens when banks stop following the rules. Borrowers with these higher cost loans were foreclosed on at almost triple the rate of borrowers with standard 30-year, fixed-rate mortgages. Between 2006 and 2014, more than 9 million homeowners lost their homes to foreclosure in distressed sales or surrendered their home to the lender--9.3 million homeowners. What does that mean to us? Do we know any of them? Do we ever talk to any of them? Do we listen to their stories about what happens when you get thrown out of your house? Do we sit there and patiently listen and ask them questions and ask them to tell us about what has happened during the last 10 years of their lives? Because when you get thrown out of your home, whether you are evicted or whether you get put out because of foreclosure, you don't just give away the family pet. You don't just cut back on everything. You lose a lot of your possessions because you can't take things with you. You start again in your life, and you start again in debt. Does anybody here care about that?
They talk about how hard it is for the banks and how Wall Street is suffering, but they don't think about the individual homeowners who struggle. Some of them get foreclosed on. Some of them are just struggling. Some of them have lost half of their wealth.
It is not just families of color who lost half their wealth; a whole lot of working class White families have lost a lot of their wealth. Does this place seem to care? Not a whole lot.
It wasn't just subprime mortgages. The crisis revealed a host of other harmful practices, like steering borrowers to affiliated companies, kickbacks for business referrals, inflated appraisals, and loan officer compensation based on the loan product. If you have a certain loan product that might be more profitable, even though it is a little sleazy and a little underhanded, you make a little more money because you steer people into those loan products. It might lead to the ruining of their lives or it might lead to their foreclosure, but they are making more money.
So what does that mean? It means the worse the loan was for the borrower, the more money the lender made. In 2008, the worse the loan was for the borrower, the more money the lender made. That is what our laws were. We fixed that, and we are going to undo some of that in this bill.
After the dust settled, this country realized how twisted our mortgage lending market had become. Congress finally stepped in to do what the market and regulators refused to do for too long.
I believe in free enterprise. I believe in the dynamism of capitalism. But when the market and the regulators did nothing except encourage this kind of behavior--that is why government is involved. That is why government steps in. That is why we did Wall Street reform. It established a commonsense rule that lenders should evaluate whether a borrower has the ability to repay a home loan. The ability to repay rule means that lenders can no longer make a loan based on the home's value or ignore the fact that an adjustable rate mortgage will become unaffordable in a year or two.
A mortgage is the largest financial transaction most families will make in their lifetime. It is a big deal, central to the economic life and the life overall of a great majority of people in this country. Requiring that the mortgage process, services, and fees be transparent and understandable to borrowers is essential. We don't all have great sophistication when we get a homeowner's loan. That is why it is so important that it be transparent and understandable to borrowers. But the bill before us today chips away at that principle. It includes several provisions that, when taken together, weaken transparency and inclusiveness and undermine fairness in mortgage lending.
The bill says lenders need not consider whether a borrower can afford an adjustable rate mortgage after the interest rate adjusts. Banks and mortgage companies make more money when they write more loans. I get that. They should. But when the incentive is only that and there is no requirement that the borrower be able to afford an adjustable rate mortgage after the interest rate adjusts--we know what will happen.
The bill also allows the largest banks to acquire small banks and retains these legal protections for the larger banks.
I spoke to a member of a bank board in Mansfield, OH, yesterday, a longtime friend of our family's. That is where I grew up. I know the locally owned banks in Mansfield, OH. I know that Mechanics Bank works hard for their enrichment. I know they work hard for their customers. They know their customers. Small banks work with their customers. If they lose a job or face a sudden illness, the bank can try to work with them to figure out how to avoid foreclosure. Would a megabank in Cleveland, Columbus, or Dayton do the same thing? Based on the record of Secretary Mnuchin's bank, OneWest, and others during the crisis, we can be pretty sure we know the answer to that, and the answer is no, they won't.
The bill before us also gives lenders a pass on the requirement to escrow for taxes and insurance when making subprime loans. It doesn't cost real money to the lender to put money aside for taxes and insurance; it is part of the calculation when you buy a house. Most of us want our taxes and insurance included so we have a more predictable stream of outflow, so we know how much we are paying next month, and it doesn't change. It may change once a year, but it doesn't change often. By definition, someone taking out a subprime loan is at a higher risk of default. Also, escrow helps a borrower plan for the expenses of taxes and insurance, and it protects
the lender from unexpected losses. That is in the bill, and we are stripping that out of the law.
Former FDIC Chair Sheila Bair, appointed by President Bush, is a terrific public servant. She was a high-ranking employee--I believe chief of staff--for Senator Dole when he was a Member of the Senate. She steered the FDIC through the worst of the financial crisis. She raised her opposition to this provision in a letter to me.
This bill exempts 85 percent of banks from reporting the HMDA data they are collecting and reporting today. I credit Senator Cortez Masto, who, as the attorney general of Nevada before she joined us in the Senate 14 months ago, saw up close what happened with foreclosures. She is a strong, outspoken opponent of this bill. She has had those discussions with people who have lost their homes. She understands how it happened. She doesn't have the amnesia that apparently a majority of my colleagues have, forgetting what happened 10 years ago and learning almost nothing from what happened 10 years ago. Her amendment would fix HMDA data collection. Without this data, we can't monitor trends in mortgage lending, particularly in rural areas. Without this data, it will be even harder to see who has access to affordable mortgage credit and who does not.
We know that redlining is still happening. The latest report from the Center for Investigative Reporting analyzed tens of millions of mortgage records and found that across the country, people of color are far more likely to be turned down for a loan even when you take into account factors like their income and the size of the loan. Without this data, we won't know when redlining happens. It will make it more difficult to show that community lenders go the extra mile for their customers. That is why the NAACP, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, Unidos, National Urban League, Rural Community Assistance Corporation, and more than 170 State and national organizations have objected to this devastating new hole in lending data. Why in the world would Congress want to keep us from getting that information, keep us from getting that data, so we, in fact, understand better what goes on?
Part of our problem in 2007 and 2008 was that we had a whole bunch of regulators who were asleep at the switch, we had a Congress that was oblivious, and we had a national media that was not paying enough attention to this. Part of that was that the regulators didn't have the information they needed. That is why the head of supervision at the Federal Reserve, Randal Quarles, who was in the Bush administration then, could see nothing but roses and candy in the years ahead. He said that in 2006 and I believe in 2007. He had no idea what was going on, partly because he maybe didn't want to know but partly because we didn't have the data collected that we are starting to collect now. So we are going to say we don't care about that.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from former FDIC Chair Sheila Bair and the letters from civil rights groups in opposition to this provision be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
Any one of these provisions is bad enough, but taken together, they add up to riskier loans for American families and more foreclosures on American families.
Think about this: If this bill passes, a bank could make a subprime loan without considering whether a borrower could afford the higher interest rate when the teaser rate expires. The first 2 or 3 years, you are paying rate X, and then in the third or fourth year, you are paying X plus two or X plus three, and then the next year, maybe X plus that number plus one, to the point you can't afford your mortgage anymore. What happens? You get foreclosed on, and your life turns upside down.
If this bill passes, a bank could make a subprime loan without considering whether the borrower could pay the higher interest rate. A bank wouldn't have to collect taxes and insurance on a monthly basis, making a loan look affordable when it may not be because you have insurance and taxes. Why not put that in the monthly payment so people can predict more and understand their finances better?
The homeowner loses her right to take the bank to court for removing her from her home even though the bank made a loan it knew she could never repay. So the bank makes a loan to a homeowner. The homeowner perhaps doesn't have the sophistication the banker sitting across the table has, doesn't quite understand what the teaser rate will mean to the cost of her house. Then the bank doesn't do the escrow adding insurance and taxes, and the bank convinces this perspective homeowner, the borrower, that she can make these payments, no problem. Then she loses her right to action if she is foreclosed on. She has no recourse even though the bank sold her something that a good banker wouldn't have. It is a recipe for disaster. It is a recipe for more families ending up in homes they were misled into thinking they could afford. Is it too much to ask a lender to consider whether a family can afford the loan they are getting? Are we back here already?
The cherry on top is this bill eliminates data we need to determine whether banks are targeting certain communities for these risky loans. We know this administration and the heads of Departments are not concerned about accountability for financial institutions' equity, lending, and inclusivity. We learned that HUD is considering changing its mission statement to delete references to inclusive communities. Imagine that, Secretary Carson, that you would do such a thing.
I am concerned this bill will put more families at risk of poor housing conditions, particularly in rural communities that are so often ignored in this town. The bill reduces the frequency of required inspections for units overseen by rural public housing agencies that administer 550 or fewer units of HUD public housing and section 8 rental vouchers. For many of these so-called PHAs, HUD will inspect their property once every 3 years rather than every 1 or 2 years. This bill would allow PHAs to inspect more voucher-assisted units just once every 3 years. A lot can happen to an apartment in 3 years that could put residents' health and safety at risk. In my neighborhood, it is in the 90 percent rate, those homes that have toxic levels of lead, and it gets worse as the house gets older and the paint chips. And we are not going to inspect these places.
I understand that PHAs face many challenges in maintaining high- quality housing for families. Due to years of underfunding, public housing alone faces an estimated $26 billion backlog of repairs. My Senate Democratic colleagues and I have proposed an infrastructure package that includes funding for public housing repairs and revitalization to help address these challenges. We have an obligation to make sure these struggling families have safe and decent housing. I have been clear throughout this process that I want to help community lenders and housing providers better serve their customers. We don't do that by reducing accountability. We don't do that by returning to the freewheeling housing market that led to millions of families losing their homes.
When we talk about escrow and lending requirements, it sounds kind of boring, it sounds dry, and it may sound like legalese that don't matter, but it matters when it comes to the biggest, most important purchase most Americans will make.
It just seems that particularly when people buy that first home and they don't really know much about how to do that--maybe they don't have a lot of political sophistication; they are 25 or 30 years old or whatever age they are--we shouldn't make it more complicated, we should make it less complicated. Bankers should not be incentivized only by how much money they make by writing more and more mortgages but instead should walk through what this is going to cost: Here is the escrow. Here is what your insurance costs. Here is what you are going to pay if you have a teaser rate. We are going to make some decisions, and this house may be a little too expensive for you because of that teaser rate, because of what you will be paying 3 years from now in addition to the escrow, the taxes and insurance that you hadn't really planned for.
Weakening a standard here or granting an exemption there will end up causing real pain for real families.
Growth in the housing sector is only sustainable if families can afford their loans and homes are maintained. I know families in my ZIP Code can't afford a repeat of the housing crisis. I know what it has done to my neighborhood. Some of them are still digging out.
Let's stop listening to the big-bank lobbyists and start listening to the people we serve, the families across this country who remember all too well what foreclosures and job losses mean to them.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.