Mr. Speaker, I submit the following remarks given by Willy Mutunga, Chief Justice and President Supreme Court of Kenya on April 13, 2012. Fellow Africans and our Friends: I thank the Albany Law School and Professor James Gathii for…
Mr. Speaker, I submit the following remarks given by Willy Mutunga, Chief Justice and President Supreme Court of Kenya on April 13, 2012.
Fellow Africans and our Friends: I thank the Albany Law
School and Professor James Gathii for inviting me to this
conference. I am delighted to be among so many practitioners
and scholars of international law who share a commitment to
Africa. There is a very special reason for me to be
delivering this address today. April 13th was the late
President--Mwalimu-Julius Nyerere's birthday. He would have
been 88 today. Nyerere was a special and inspirational
leader--he believed in the solidarity of the African people
as well as in human dignity.
Nyerere was interested in both constitutional law and
international law. There is a picture of him as a student at
Edinburgh holding a copy of Dicey's Law of the Constitution.
His interest was both scholarly and practical. It fell to him
to develop a constitution suitable for his country--where his
commitment to a one party state, although intended to
increase democracy, must have come sorely in conflict with
the Diceyan preference for the rule of law. As far as
international law goes, he was greatly concerned to promote
African unity, redefine the relationship between Africa
(indeed the whole of
the South) and the West--as well as deal with Tanzania's
colonial legacy, including that relating to treaty
succession. He ruled out automatic succession, so the newly
independent country was not burdened with unfair and unequal
obligations.
I also felt honored as I read the biographies of the other
participants in this conference: they read like a ``Who's
Who?'' of international law and Africa. One only has to look
at the conference program to see the broad depth of
international law work relating to Africa. The papers
submitted are impressive. I am looking forward to the
deliberations here and the opportunity to get to know you and
to talk about our common commitments and concern about
Africa. My challenge to you always is to continue making
transformative contributions in your work on Africa and
international law. This will at times require those of you
who are based outside Africa to return home and help
contribute to the growing use and practice of international
law in Africa.
My focus this morning is the new Constitution of Kenya and
the role of the judiciary within it. First I want to tell you
about that constitution and the vision that it espouses. We
are now engaged in the challenging but difficult task of
implementation in which a key role has been assigned to the
judiciary. The judiciary has already made a good start on a
progressive, indeed in some respects, radical jurisprudence--
and now enjoys great public support.
The Constitution is one of the most progressive in the
world. It was overwhelmingly approved in a referendum as a
result of the most consultative and participatory processes
of Constitution making anywhere in the world. The long period
before the Constitution was upheld in the referendum was
characterized not only by delays and deadlock, but by a
series of governance challenges familiar in many countries of
Africa:
An absence of a political culture of obedience to and
respect for rules, and a cavalier treatment, even of
constitutional texts;
Failed systems including the electoral system;
Failed institutions including a corrupt judiciary and
police force;
A population tortured and inhibited from fulfilling its
full potential;
Exclusion of women and many groups from full participation
in society;
Gross manipulation of ethnic, racial, regional, religious,
generational, clan, class, and occupational divisions by
politicians for their personal ends;
Extreme inequality, great poverty and failure of even
development;
An institutional culture of timidity, even where no threats
existed;
A society and politics characterized by violence, fragility
and instability; and
An international community that excelled in perfidy and
double standards and that could not be relied upon to
consistently support progressive constitutional reforms.
The result of the above has been a massive culture and
practice of impunity and the marginalization of the
constitution. The Constitution, which was, as my old teacher,
and one of the leading constitutional scholars in Africa and
the world, Yash Ghai is fond of saying, ``forced upon the
rulers by the ruled.'' Here Yash's reference to rulers means
both internal and external rulers--for Ghai, the Constitution
has to be written to address these ills.
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya seeks to incorporate such
rules in a number of ways. For example, it constantly
emphasizes the sovereignty of the people, and is full of
people oriented values. So Article 10 enumerates the national
values and principles of governance that bind all state
organs as well as everyone who applies or interprets the
Constitution or any law or performs any public duty:
Patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of
power, the rule of law, democracy and participation of the
people;
Human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness,
equality, human rights, nondiscrimination and protection of
the marginalized;
Good governance, integrity, transparency and
accountability; and
Sustainable development.
I had argued before its promulgation that our constitution
should establish a human rights state and society whose
vision is radical social democracy. It is my view that this
has now happened. It is, therefore, not surprising that there
is considerable internal and external resistance to the
constitution from people who have a vested interest in bad
old habits--tribalism, nepotism and corruption. This
increases the responsibility of the judiciary to ensure the
enforcement of the constitution, as indeed is envisaged in
Art. 20(3), which requires that a court develops the law
where the Bill of Rights fails to give effect to a right or
fundamental freedom.
The extent of my personal pride, sense of responsibility,
and hope, as head of the judiciary, can perhaps be judged
from the fact that I once wrote a book about efforts for a
new Constitution, in the 1990s, in which I said ``The process
of making the new constitution, the credibility of the final
document and whether the people would be convinced that they
own the new constitution are all issues at the root of the
problem of constitution making. It is a fact that the
judiciary has not fully implemented the Bill of Rights to
protect the rights of the people against encroachment by the
executive and state apparatuses. The overhauling of the
judiciary and judicial system is also at the root of these
issues.''
I still believe in the key importance of the judiciary. And
the Constitution does give it a central role. Article 259
requires that the Constitution be interpreted in a way that
promotes its purposes, values and principles, an obligation
placed specifically upon courts and tribunals by Article
159(2)(e). And it provides a practical basis for this central
role of the courts by its provisions designed to make them
truly accessible, including through the institutionalization
of public interest litigation. It destroys old concepts of
standing by providing that anyone may bring an action to
protect rights or enforce the constitution, even if they have
no interest other than that of concerned citizen. It
prohibits the charging of court fees for actions to enforce
the Bill of Rights. It endorses the practice that the Indian
Courts call ``epistolary jurisdiction''--the possibility of
actions being commenced by informal documentation. And while
requiring the rules of natural justice to be observed, it
denies the possibility of ``unnatural justice'' in the form
of procedural technicalities standing in the way of justice.
Much of this comes ultimately from the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of India, some by way of the South African
Constitution.
The judiciary was one of the most criticized of the
institutions of the old order. The legacy of the one party
state was still discernible in judicial pandering to
executive wishes. And I do not mean merely the sort of
deference to the legislature that lawyers may legitimately
argue about, but judges who would adjourn matters before them
to take instructions from State House. The judiciary was one
aspect of the machinery of impunity. Simple financial
corruption was also rife. And, if you are auctioning your
judgment to the highest bidder, it is probably counter-
productive to exhibit much legal skill! For many years law
reports were not up to date, and legal literature was all but
non-existent.
Radical measures were needed. And they are found firstly in
a process of subjecting all serving judges and magistrates to
an examination of their suitability to remain in office. This
process is under way, in the hands of an independent body, a
process with which I have nothing to do, and on which it is
of course improper for me to comment. Secondly, the
appointment system was revamped. Now judges are interviewed
and nominated by a Judicial Service Commission truly
independent of government. The President is to have no
discretion but must act on the Commission's recommendation.
The Chief Justice and Deputy must be approved by Parliament.
I was myself interviewed by the parliamentary committee, on
live television, and questioned about, among other things, my
finances, my attitudes to certain sensitive issues, my
sexuality and my earring!
The judiciary has embarked upon many organizational changes
intended to realize the Constitution's vision. These include
the recruitment of judges and magistrates and professional
administrative staff. Recently we appointed 26 judges to the
High Court (that is the court of first instance of unlimited
jurisdiction)--half of them women. The Court of Appeal now
has 7 more judges, 5 of them women. We will recruit 160
Magistrates before the end of May, 2012. We have delinked
judicial functions from administrative functions, boldly set
out to stamp out corruption in the judiciary while speeding
up reforms in computerization and other electronic justice
measures. We have achieved some significant progress in
reducing the backlog of cases and changing backward judicial
culture. The 12 clusters that reflect these reforms,
including the creation of progressive, indigenous and
patriotic jurisprudence that I touch on later are contained
in a write-up named the Judicial Transformation Framework
that I will launch in May, 2012.
The constitution also provides for the decentralization and
democratization of the judiciary. Unlike previous years when
the old constitution made the Chief Justice a judicial
autocrat and monarch, under the new constitution I do not
control everything from the top. I have already set up a
management and leadership committee that is representative
and participatory.
Organization is of course important, even essential, to
make the courts accessible, to end the interminable delays,
the strain on the pockets and the patience, and to end
impunity and, as far as the courts can, injustice. But I want
briefly to emphasize something else.
I preside over the Supreme Court. As I understand the
reasoning of the Constitution makers when creating this new
court, apart from the desire to reintroduce the possibility
of a second appeal, was similar to that that motivated the
drafters of the South African Constitution when they created
the Constitutional Court: to have at the apex of the system a
court that would be respected, was committed to the
Constitution and could set a new standard, and a new tone. In
my view, one of the most important tasks that court will
perform will be as a source of a new, highly competent and
indigenous jurisprudence.
I link this last adjective to the Constitution's value of
patriotism. Patriotism (when not being abused as the ``last
refuge of the scoundrel'' in Samuel Johnson's words) requires
putting love of country above love of self. For a judge it
does not mean putting country above justice. I conceive that
it requires the judge to develop the law, for, as
we all know, in the common law system that is what judges do,
in a way that responds to the needs of the people, and to the
national interest. I call this patriotic and indigenous
jurisprudence. Above all, it requires a commitment to the
Constitution and to the achievement of its values and vision.
But don't get me wrong: by ``patriotic and indigenous'' I
do not mean insular and inward looking. The values of the
Kenyan Constitution are anything but that. We need to learn
from other countries. And we need to learn from scholars like
this assembled company. We intend to build up a network of
interested and highly qualified academics who share our
vision. I hope that some of you here will form part of that
network. My concern, when I emphasize ``indigenous'' is
simply that we should grow our jurisprudence out of our own
needs, without unthinking deference to that of other
jurisdictions and courts, however, distinguished. The Kenyan
judiciary has, therefore, a great opportunity to develop a
robust, indigenous, patriotic and progressive jurisprudence
that will give the country direction in its democratic
development. This transformative mission is a duty to all
judicial officers. They have all undertaken a constitutional
obligation to undertake it and I have challenged them to make
a personal obligation to help accomplish it.
Former Justice Krishna Iyer of the Indian Supreme Court
expressed the same ambition, in his inimitable style:
Jurisprudence must match jurisdiction and jurisdiction must
broaden to meet the challenges of the masses hungry for
justice after a long night of feudal-colonial injustice. . .
. The rule of law must run close to the rule of life and the
court, to be authentic, must use native jural genius, people-
oriented legal theory and radical remedial methodology
regardless of Oxbridge orthodoxy, elitist petulance and
feudal hubris.
Far from being inward looking, it would be my hope that we
could learn from, and even emulate, distinguished courts in
other countries, including, for example, the Supreme Court of
India and the South African Constitutional Court. The Kenyan
courts do not need to be as bold as the Indian apex court:
many of its procedural innovations in public interest
litigation are already enshrined in our constitution. And I
would argue that the types of jurisprudence that that court
has been so creative in developing are already part of our
constitution. Protection of the environment, recognition of
rights of communities especially in land, affirmative action,
rights of persons with disability, rights to education,
health and food--and the redress of past injustices--are
engraved in our constitutional text.
What the first Chief Justice of the South African
Constitutional Court, Arthur Chaskalson, said of their
constitution could just as well be said of ours:
We live in a society in which there are great disparities
in wealth. Millions of people are living in deplorable
conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of
unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not
have access to clean water or to adequate health services.
These conditions already existed when the Constitution was
adopted and a commitment to address them, and to transform
our society into one in which there will be human dignity,
freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new
constitutional order.
For these reasons, including that our Constitution is
couched often in language similar to that of South Africa, I
anticipate that we shall learn a great deal from them, though
always, as I say, suiting the decisions to our own realities.
Upendra Baxi wrote, of Public Interest Litigation (PIL),
The Supreme Court of India is at long last becoming . . .
the Supreme Court for Indians. For too long the apex court
had become ``an arena of legal quibbling for men with long
purses''. Now increasingly, the court is being identified by
the Justices as well as people as ``the last resort of the
oppressed and bewildered.''
I would hope that the Supreme Court of my country will be
the Supreme Court for Kenyans where the oppressed and
bewildered will find justice.
But it is not enough for the Supreme Court to shine in
jurisprudential terms. Most cases will never get beyond the
High Court. The corollary of the decision to create a new,
final, court of general, not specifically constitutional
jurisdiction, was the desire that courts at all levels could
confront constitutional issues and deal with them in a way
that fulfills the constitutional dream. We are hoping to
raise standards of judging and standards of advocacy,
including through the work of the Judicial Training
Institute, and by adopting frequent use of written briefs,
rather than just skeleton oral arguments. The development of
a new jurisprudence must be a collaborative effort between
judges at all levels, and practicing and academic lawyers.
The internet is making access to precedents much easier,
and there is an improvement in the law reporting situation.
There is even some sign of a resurgence of interest in
writing about Kenyan law. Do add your bit!
If I may turn now to the focus of concern of most of you:
international law. The Constitution took a bold step and
provides that ``The general rules of international law shall
form part of the law of Kenya'' and ``Any treaty of
convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of
Kenya under this Constitution''. Thus Kenya has become a
monist state rather than a dualist one!
The implications of this will have to be worked out over
time, as cases come before the courts. I would not have you
imagine that Kenyan judges have ignored international law. I
know firsthand from Kenya's supercharged civil society that
constantly makes claims of international law to hold the
government accountable, exemplifies the growing importance of
international law in our courts. The courts have often
applied the familiar common law approach, and indeed quoted
the Bangalore Principles on Domestic Application of
International Human Rights Norms, including:
It is within the proper nature of the judicial process and
well-established judicial functions for national courts to
have regard to international obligations which a country
undertakes--whether or not they have been incorporated into
domestic law--for the purpose of removing ambiguity or
uncertainty form, national constitutions, legislation or
common law.
However, where national law is clear and inconsistent with
the international obligations of the State concerned in
common law countries the national court is obliged to give
effect to national law. In such cases the court should draw
such inconsistency to the attention of the appropriate
authorities since the supremacy of national law in no way
mitigates a breach of an international legal obligation,
which is undertaken by a country.
Now, however, the courts have greater freedom. Many issues
will have to be resolved: what precisely are the ``The
general rules of international law'' ?; what is the effect of
the direct application of a treaty of which the language is
not self-executing, such as ``States Parties shall take all
appropriate measures'' rather than ``everyone has the right''
? And what is the effect of a treaty provision that does not
fill a gap in domestic law but inescapably conflicts with it?
And what if the general rules of international law are
exploitative, oppressive and subvert the radical social
democratic vision of our constitution? All these questions
clearly identify where the scholarship of people like
yourselves, will be much appreciated by both bar and bench.
I should also like to quote another Bangalore Principle,
relevant to my theme of indigenous jurisprudence:
While it is desirable for the norms contained in the
international human rights instruments to be still more
widely recognized and applied by national courts, this
process must take fully into account local laws, traditions,
circumstances and needs.
How can we achieve this marriage consistent with
international law obligations?
Let me also emphasize that Kenya does not intend to be a
``user'' of international law, but a producer, shaper and
developer of it as well. This is the link to the Nyerere
Doctrine where I began. Nyerere refused to accede to existing
international rules on treaty succession and came up with his
own innovation. Kenyan judiciary will not just import all
international legal rules including those which are
disempowering to the South as a political and economic
category. Instead, as I pointed above in our strategy to
create an indigenous, patriotic and progressive
jurisprudence, the Kenyan judiciary will use our new
constitution to begin a dialogue with international legal
communities to nudge the jurisprudence of social justice in a
progressive direction. In particular, we have a chance to
develop jurisprudence on economic and social rights in ways
that are unique to our social and economic development. We
intend, therefore, to be able to export progressive
jurisprudence to the rest of the world.
Finally, let me not give the impression that I am negative
about the work of my judicial colleagues. There are many
competent and committed members of the bench. Even under the
former constitution with its inadequate Bill of Rights (more
limitations than rights!) creative judges were doing their
best. And now many of them, new and longer established, are
responding with enthusiasm to the challenges and
opportunities of the new Constitution. I cannot really
comment on individual cases--none has come before us yet, and
some will undoubtedly do so. But I personally feel encouraged
by signs of willingness to draw on international instruments,
not only treaties, and by reliance on the values including
those of Article 10--as Article 259 requires.
As we say in Kenya in Kiswahili--Asante Sana. We also say
Shukrani, shukran and shukria. Thank you very much.