Floor Statements

Mr. President, I rise this morning to take note of the real progress this Congress has made and is on the verge of making in strengthening our homeland security.

This progress--reform of FEMA, protection of our chemical facilities and improved security for our seaports--should not be overlooked as we conclude a hectic month.

In the midst of all the charges that Congress has failed to accomplish all that we should, I want to call attention to the many times when, in fact, Members have cooperated among committees, between Chambers, and across party lines to make real progress to benefit the American people.

The 109th Congress has had many such accomplishments that belie the stereotype of a rancorous debating society that is unable to enact and improve the security of our country.

Let me focus on three major accomplishments by Congress in the area of homeland security. I note that these accomplishments should become law shortly as we complete work on the Homeland Security appropriations bill.

The first accomplishment was reaching agreement on a broad array of reforms to improve the Department of Homeland Security, including urgently needed reform and reinforcement of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The recommendations for improvements the result of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security's 7-month investigation into the failed preparations and response to Hurricane Katrina. This investigation, which was completely bipartisan, included 23 hearings, testimony and interviews of some 400 people, and a review of more than 838,000 pages of documents.

The committee's recommendations will make FEMA a distinct entity within DHS. Why does that matter? It matters because it gives FEMA the same kinds of protections enjoyed by the Coast Guard and the Secret Service. It protects FEMA from arbitrary budget cuts or departmental reorganizations that are implemented without congressional review.

FEMA's Administrator, under the reforms included in the appropriations bill, will become the President's principal adviser for all-hazards emergency management.

Another important reform is that the legislation reunites preparedness and response and makes FEMA responsible and empowered for all phases of emergency management--preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery.

A very important reform will be the creation of response strike teams to ensure a more effective response to disasters.

What we will do is create in the 10 regions of the United States multi-agency task forces comprising representatives from every Federal agency that is involved in responding to or preparing for disaster. They will train and exercise with their State and local counterparts, with NGOs, such as the Red Cross, and with the key for-profit businesses, such as utility companies. That will ensure that they won't need to be exchanging business cards in the midst of the next disaster.

I was struck during our investigation of Hurricane Katrina that so many people from FEMA Region I--the region the Presiding Officer and I are from, New England--were sent down to Louisiana to help with the response to Hurricane Katrina. The problem, of course, is they didn't know the people, they didn't know the geography, they didn't know the culture, they didn't have knowledge of what assets could be mobilized in the response. These regional teams will ensure that does not happen again.

We also addressed issues such as chronic staffing shortages at FEMA, the need for better pre-positioning of emergency supplies and tracking of shipments, better grant-making authority to improve coordination regionally and with local responders, and the need to provide survivable and interoperable communications.

We also revised the Stafford Act to bring it up to date and make it more flexible and responsive.

The second major homeland security accomplishment of this Congress is still a work in progress, but I am very optimistic that it will, in fact, become law, and that is the port-security bill which this Chamber recently passed unanimously. Senator Murray and I have led a bipartisan effort to enact this legislation. There have been many other Members on both sides of the aisle involved, including on my committee Senator Coleman and Senator Lieberman.

With 361 ports in this country and some 11 million shipping containers arriving each year, we desperately need better assurances that our seaports and these containers are not going to be used to bring weapons, explosives, bio-terror compounds, or even a squad of terrorists into our country.

The vulnerability of our seaports is perhaps best underscored by an incident that occurred in Seattle in April, when 22 Chinese nationals were successful in coming all the way from China to Seattle in a shipping container. If 22 illegal Chinese nationals can come to our country via a shipping container, it shows we still have a lot of work to do to ensure better security at our seaports.

The legislation this Chamber passed is balanced legislation that strengthens our security while recognizing the importance of trade and not bringing the shipment of containers to a halt. The port-security package fills a dangerous gap in our defenses. I hope we will enact it before leaving here this week.

The third area of accomplishment involves the security of chemical plants, plants that either use, store, or manufacture large quantities of hazardous chemicals.

Last January, I held a hearing in which I asked several experts: What are your greatest concerns? What gaps do we have in our homeland security? The lack of regulation of our chemical plants came up time and again. Our existing protections are a patchwork of different authorities--State, Coast Guard, and voluntary industry standards. They are inadequate, given the threats we face.

Now, this has been a very difficult debate, but I think it is so important to remember that right now, the Department of Homeland Security lacks the authority to set risk- and performance-based standards for security at our chemical facilities despite the fact that terrorism experts tell us al-Qaida is focused on chemical plants and chemical explosions.

We have some 15,000 chemical facilities around the country, including more than 3,000 sites where a terrorist

attack could cause considerable casualties among nearby populations. Language in the DHS appropriations bill would, for the first time, empower DHS to set performance-based security standards for high-risk chemical facilities. That is approximately 3,400 facilities across this country.

Very importantly, this legislation will allow the Secretary of Homeland Security to shut down a noncompliant plant. I fought very hard for this authority to be included in the appropriations bill. It does no good to empower the Secretary to set these risk-based, performance- based standards but then provide the tools to enforce them.

I recognize there are many chemical plants and chemical companies across this country which have voluntarily taken strong steps to improve their security in the wake of the attacks on our country on 9/ 11. Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security has told us there are many plants which have not improved their security at all or which have taken insufficient measures. We can no longer rely on just voluntary compliance with industry standards.

So this legislation is landmark legislation. It closes a dangerous gap in our homeland security, and it has been included in the Homeland Security appropriations bill.

I would note that the language includes a three-year sunset. The reason for that is we will want to evaluate the effectiveness of this approach, the effectiveness of the regulations, and also consider other measures that were not included in this bill. The committee I am privileged to chair unanimously reported chemical-security legislation that was more comprehensive than the measures included in the appropriations bill. This will give us a chance to evaluate the efforts that have been taken, that will be taken, and then to go back and look at some of the issues that were not included.

I want to be very clear. This is a major step forward. It will help close a dangerous gap in our homeland security, and it is significant progress in eliminating or at least lessening a significant risk to our country.

These are three significant steps forward: the reform of FEMA, the port security bill, and the new authority for DHS to set security measures for chemical facilities. Each of them was made possible because of bipartisan cooperation. At times in this Chamber, we berate ourselves for failing to achieve consensus on legislation that is so important to the American people, but we did it in these three cases-- or we are on the verge of doing it--and it is because we did have good cooperation and strong leadership. It was not easy. But the legislation we are passing will advance our ability to protect the American people.

I compliment all of the Members of the Senate, our partners on the House side, as well as members of the administration who have stepped forward and worked so hard to make these reforms a reality. Our success in advancing these achievements in strengthening our homeland security should be a source of justifiable pride to the Members of this body.

I would assure the Senator from Illinois that that is indeed my expectation.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation that would correct a unique health insurance problem for some American citizens whose work is devoted to maintaining the memory of President Franklin D. Roosevelt at his Campobello Island retreat near the Maine border.

About 10 U.S. citizens from the State of Maine work in Canada under terms of a treaty that governs operation of the Roosevelt Campobello International Park. As you know, that beautiful island in the Province of New Brunswick was President Roosevelt's treasured retreat, and still draws thousands of visitors from around the world.

The American employees of the Park are, unfortunately, faced with a difficult problem in obtaining affordable health-insurance coverage. The legislation I introduce today would solve their difficulty by making them eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Insurance Benefits Program.

In the spirit of bipartisan recognition that FDR was one of our greatest and most inspiring Presidents, I am delighted to be joined in this effort by Senator Harkin. His endorsement of this bill is especially notable because he serves on the Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission, and is thus very familiar with the difficulty of my Maine constituents employed at the Park.

The Roosevelt Campobello International Park was dedicated in 1964 as a unique memorial to former President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Park is governed by a treaty between the United States and Canada, and is funded by both governments.

The Park employs approximately 10 full-time employees who are American citizens residing in Maine. Unfortunately, the treaty that governs the Park does not address the health insurance needs of individuals employed directly by Roosevelt Campobello International Park. As a result, the State Department issued an opinion in 1965 stating that those employed by the Park Commission, ``shall be subject to the relevant Canadian labor laws.'' Based on the State Department opinion, the Civil Service Commission, the predecessor of the Office of Personnel Management, has determined that the employees are not considered Federal employees eligible for FEHBP coverage.

The employees currently receive health insurance coverage through a small group plan negotiated by the Roosevelt Park Commission. The premiums have risen so dramatically that they can no longer afford coverage.

The full-time employees are unique in their situation and should be included under the FEHBP for health insurance purposes. This would be a matter of equal treatment as well as compassion for those workers and their families. Full-time employees of other parks that share a border with Canada, like Glacier National Park, while technically the shared responsibility of both the United States and Canada, are eligible for coverage under the FEHBP.

In addition, the location of the Park makes it impractical for these employees to seek medical treatment in Canada even if the government allowed them to join the Canadian health system. The closest doctors and hospitals are in Maine, and the Park is only accessible from the United States.

If the treaty were negotiated today, health insurance would certainly be a part of the negotiations. The situation facing this small group of Roosevelt Campobello Park employees is a consequence of negotiations conducted when health insurance was not a standard employee benefit as it is today.

I hope that my colleagues will join me in supporting this legislation so that U.S. citizens maintaining the Park honoring a great American President will be treated fairly.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation that would correct a unique health insurance problem for some American citizens whose work is devoted to maintaining the memory of President Franklin D. Roosevelt at his Campobello Island retreat near the Maine border.

About 10 U.S. citizens from the State of Maine work in Canada under terms of a treaty that governs operation of the Roosevelt Campobello International Park. As you know, that beautiful island in the Province of New Brunswick was President Roosevelt's treasured retreat, and still draws thousands of visitors from around the world.

The American employees of the Park are, unfortunately, faced with a difficult problem in obtaining affordable health-insurance coverage. The legislation I introduce today would solve their difficulty by making them eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Insurance Benefits Program.

In the spirit of bipartisan recognition that FDR was one of our greatest and most inspiring Presidents, I am delighted to be joined in this effort by Senator Harkin. His endorsement of this bill is especially notable because he serves on the Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission, and is thus very familiar with the difficulty of my Maine constituents employed at the Park.

The Roosevelt Campobello International Park was dedicated in 1964 as a unique memorial to former President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Park is governed by a treaty between the United States and Canada, and is funded by both governments.

The Park employs approximately 10 full-time employees who are American citizens residing in Maine. Unfortunately, the treaty that governs the Park does not address the health insurance needs of individuals employed directly by Roosevelt Campobello International Park. As a result, the State Department issued an opinion in 1965 stating that those employed by the Park Commission, ``shall be subject to the relevant Canadian labor laws.'' Based on the State Department opinion, the Civil Service Commission, the predecessor of the Office of Personnel Management, has determined that the employees are not considered Federal employees eligible for FEHBP coverage.

The employees currently receive health insurance coverage through a small group plan negotiated by the Roosevelt Park Commission. The premiums have risen so dramatically that they can no longer afford coverage.

The full-time employees are unique in their situation and should be included under the FEHBP for health insurance purposes. This would be a matter of equal treatment as well as compassion for those workers and their families. Full-time employees of other parks that share a border with Canada, like Glacier National Park, while technically the shared responsibility of both the United States and Canada, are eligible for coverage under the FEHBP.

In addition, the location of the Park makes it impractical for these employees to seek medical treatment in Canada even if the government allowed them to join the Canadian health system. The closest doctors and hospitals are in Maine, and the Park is only accessible from the United States.

If the treaty were negotiated today, health insurance would certainly be a part of the negotiations. The situation facing this small group of Roosevelt Campobello Park employees is a consequence of negotiations conducted when health insurance was not a standard employee benefit as it is today.

I hope that my colleagues will join me in supporting this legislation so that U.S. citizens maintaining the Park honoring a great American President will be treated fairly.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be dispensed with.

Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Arkansas for his involvement on this issue. He is a terrific member of the Homeland Security Committee. I appreciate his many contributions.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I would like to have the Chair recognize the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. President, there are two amendments that have been cleared on both sides, the Isakson amendment No. 4923, as modified, and the Baucus amendment No. 4986, as modified. I ask unanimous consent that they be agreed to en bloc.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, very shortly we will be voting on cloture on the Port Security Act. I urge my colleagues to support the cloture motion. We hope to be able to complete action on this bill by 5 o'clock this afternoon. We are working toward that goal.

Senator Murray and I are happy to talk to our colleagues, but we will be moving through the amendments at a very rapid pace after cloture is invoked, as I hope it will be. We have made great progress on this bill. It is

an important bill for our homeland security, and I urge all of our colleagues to support the cloture motion.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Specter, be allowed to speak for 10 minutes as in morning business immediately after the cloture vote.

I would be happy to withhold.

Mr. President, I so modify my request.

Mr. President, I am compelled to object because we have another Senator coming over shortly for an amendment. I have promised the Senator from Nebraska and the Senator from Montana that they would have a few minutes to talk about their amendment.

It will come out of the time of the Senator from Nebraska because we have the Senator from New York coming at 12:45 for his amendment. I have no objection with that understanding--that it will come out of the time of the Senator from Nebraska.

I do not object.

To the objectionable part.

Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I object. The leader objected yesterday. This is the same issue. He has asked I make this objection known.

Mr. President, at this point I suggest time be yielded to the Senator from Nebraska and the Senator from Montana to briefly discuss a pending amendment of the Senator from Nebraska.

Amendment No. 4945

Mr. President, a point of order does lie against this amendment because it is not germane postcloture.

Prior to objecting to the Senator's unanimous consent request, I am happy to withhold so that the Senator from Montana may address this issue.

Mr. President, I do object to the request of the Senator from Nebraska.

I am very sympathetic to the concerns of both Senators but, unfortunately, this does not belong on the port security bill.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent it be in order to make the following point of order, en bloc. I make a point of order that the following amendments are not germane postcloture: amendment No. 4967, offered by Senator Stabenow; amendment No. 4957, offered by Senator Clinton; amendment No. 4943, offered by Senator Clinton; and amendment No. 4958, offered by Senator Clinton.

Mr. President, I further make a point of order that amendment No. 4945, offered by the Senator from Nebraska, as modified, is also not germane postcloture.

Mr. President, thank you.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Minnesota for his leadership on this issue and for his excellent comments. This issue was debated at length yesterday, so I am going to make my comments very brief.

I do oppose Senator Schumer's amendment. I do not think it is practical at this point to require 100 percent scanning of 11 million containers coming into this country. And it ignores the very real improvements that are included in the underlying bill.

I am disappointed to hear the Senator from New York describe our bill as yet another study or yet another pilot project. It is way more than that. It has a layered security system that greatly strengthens the Container Security Initiative, the C-TPAT Program, the automated targeting system. And it includes the provisions we added yesterday at the behest of the Senator from Minnesota that will help us move toward 100 percent scanning when it is

feasible and practical, when the technology is there and able to be in an integrated system.

It also ignores the fact that our bill includes a mandate--a mandate, I would say to the Senator from New York--that the Department of Homeland Security has to install radiological monitors in the 22 busiest ports by the end of next year, which will result in 98 percent of all cargo being screened for radiation, and addresses the issue the Senator has raised about a nuclear bomb or the makings of a dirty bomb.

So this bill does a great deal. I must say, it disappoints me to hear the Senator imply that it does not, even though we disagree on this one particular issue. This has been a bipartisan bill. Senator Murray has worked very hard on it, as well as many of the rest of us.

But let me sum up the problems by reading from a recent letter from the World Shipping Council because I think it really says it best. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the Record.

The letter reads, in part, as follows:

One-hundred percent container inspection proposals purport

to be a cheap and effective way to ensure security. They are

neither. It also fails to address fundamentally important

security questions, it would disrupt American commerce, and

it would cause foreign retaliation against American exports.

. . .

The proposal would effectively end Customs' Trade

Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), without so much as a

hearing on the issue. This amendment rejects the strategic

concept that there is low risk cargo that does not require

inspection, and in doing so, it rejects many U.S. and

international governmental efforts to create programs that

reward supply chain participants for enhancing the security

of their supply chains by inspecting their cargo less

frequently.

It also undermines the Container Security Initiative. That is the international cooperative program where we station our inspectors in foreign ports and work with the governments that host those ports.

There are so many arguments against this amendment, Mr. President. The Washington Post said it very well in an editorial earlier this week as well. Most of all, let us remember what the implications are.

I have visited the port in Seattle and have seen the VACIS machines that do the x rays. It took approximately 4 minutes to do that x ray of the container and then another 15 minutes to analyze the image. If you do that with even the completely low-risk cargo, and you think of the fact that we have 11 million containers coming into this country, you are diverting resources away from inspections of high-risk cargo. It would create a massive backlog of cargo at our ports.

Now, as I have indicated, the technology is improving. I am glad the Senator from Minnesota set the record straight on what is and what isn't being done in Hong Kong at this time, where only two lanes are being scanned and the images are not being read and integrated into a security system. But we are going to keep improving the technology. We have a requirement that the Secretary report on this issue to us every 6 months after the pilot project in three foreign ports--after we have the results.

So we are moving in that direction, but let's do so in a practical, effective, efficient way. That is what the underlying bill does, particularly as strengthened by the Coleman-Collins-Stevens amendment.

Mr. President, we have tried very hard in this bill to make sure that we strike the right balance and put into place a security regime that is going to make our ports and our people safer. But we have done it without hampering the vital trade that manufacturers, retailers, and farmers in this Nation depend upon. I think we struck the right balance, and I am going to move to table the Schumer amendment, with the time of the vote to be determined at a mutually agreed upon time.

Mr. President, I will move to table the Schumer amendment, with the understanding that the time for a vote will be at a mutually agreed-upon time.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the motion to table the Schumer amendment No. 4930 occur at 4 p.m., with no second degrees in order prior to that vote. I further ask consent that following that vote, the bill be read a third time, and the Senate proceed to a vote on passage of the bill, with no intervening action or debate.

No objection, and I so modify my request.

Mr. President, I will yield myself 1 minute, and then I will reserve a minute for after Senator Schumer speaks.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join me in voting to table the amendment offered by the Senator from New York, which would require 100-percent scanning of all 11 million cargo containers entering the United States, regardless of whether they are incredibly low-risk containers or high-risk containers.

Now, the amendment that was adopted yesterday, the Coleman amendment, provides for 100-percent scanning of high-risk containers. The bill before us has a pilot program in three foreign ports to find out: Is it feasible and practical? Is the technology available? Can we, in fact, do 100-percent scanning without significantly slowing the flow of commerce? Right now it appears that we cannot do that. The technology is not there. But eventually we will be able to get to that goal. The approach in the Schumer amendment ignores the technological limitations we now have.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, once again, I will explain the provisions of the bill. It has a layered system of security for our cargo and, by the end of next year, it requires that the 22 busiest ports in the United States, which handle 98 percent of all cargo containers, will have installed the equipment to screen for radiation, for radiological devices, including a nuclear device. So it is not just studies and plans, as the Senator from New York repeatedly says; it has specific mandates.

The Coleman amendment, adopted yesterday, requires 100 percent screening and scanning of all high-risk containers. But the fact is that we do not yet have feasible, efficient, practical technology in place to allow us to do 100 percent scanning of all containers without significantly slowing container movement, producing a backlog, and harming our economy.

I move to table the Schumer amendment, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

You are correct, Senator Levin. The bill contains provisions which would strengthen security measures for containers transiting either land or sea ports of entry.

Yes, it is the intent of the bill that those provisions apply to all containers, whether transiting U.S. seaports or land ports of entry.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the attached letter from the Supply Chain Security Coalition be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, we are on the verge of passing major port security legislation that will provide the structures and resources needed to better protect the American people from attack through seaports that are both vulnerable points of entry and vital centers of economic activity.

I wish to thank all those who have been involved in this effort: the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee, Senator Lieberman; the Commerce Committee chairman and ranking member; Senator Grassley and Senator Baucus on the Finance Committee. Most of all, I thank Senator Patty Murray, who has been my partner in the port security legislation from conception to this day. It has been a great honor and pleasure to work with her.

I have a list of the hard-working staff, my staff on the Homeland Security Committee, who have worked on this issue. I ask unanimous consent that a list of their names be printed in the Record.

I see our colleagues are eager to vote, so I yield the floor.

I ask for the yeas and nays.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Steve Midas, who is a Coast Guard detailee assigned to the Homeland Security Committee, be accorded privileges of the floor for the remainder of the consideration of the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006.

Mr. President, earlier today in morning business, the Democratic leader spoke in favor of the amendment that he has brought to the Senate floor which we will vote on shortly this afternoon. I rise in opposition to Senator Reid's amendment.

Mr. President, this is Senator Reid's amendment, and this is the port security bill. I can barely hold up the 507 pages of the Democratic leader's amendment. It is an interesting hodgepodge of provisions that are irrelevant to the underlying bill--to port security. It includes provisions that have already been rejected by the Senate. It includes provisions that have already been enacted by the Congress and signed into law. It includes provisions that have just recently been passed by the Senate and added to the port security bill.

What it does not include are provisions that have to do with port security. This proposal, 507 pages, includes 37 pages of findings, 16 senses of Congress, and no fewer than 95 reports, certifications, and determinations.

Let me tell my colleagues a bit about what is actually in Senator Reid's amendment. Let's go first to the category of provisions which have already been rejected by the Senate. Let me give two examples. The legislation includes, word for word, the exact same language regarding the involvement of the United States in Iraq that was soundly rejected by the Senate by a vote of 39 to 60 in June of this year. This is the language that calls for a phased redeployment of U.S. forces in Iraq. It has nothing to do with port security, and it is legislation that this body has already thoroughly considered and voted against.

Let me give a second example of provisions of the Reid amendment on which the Senate has already spoken. The Reid amendment contains a first responder funding formula amendment that is almost identical to the one the Senate rejected earlier this year by a vote of 32 to 65. Indeed, the sponsor of this amendment voted against the formula change he has included in this bill, as did a total of 25 Democratic Senators, the majority of the Democratic caucus. It is not surprising that they did, for if the Reid amendment were to pass, 34 States would lose money for homeland security activities. It is also ironic that the funding formula included in Senator Reid's amendment is an implicit endorsement of the funding allocation decisions that were so widely and correctly criticized earlier this summer.

This bill would give the Department of Homeland Security additional discretion in allocating homeland security funds. We know what happened when we gave the Department additional discretion. The outcome was not a good one.

I mentioned that the amendment also includes provisions that have already been signed into law. Let me give an example. Mr. President, 105 pages of this 507-page amendment have to do with implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations on foreign policy and public diplomacy. The proposals outlined in that section of Senator Reid's amendment were signed into law as part of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. They are almost exactly the same as title VII of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. Why do we need to repeat this? It is already law. How does enacting it a second time somehow improve our national security? It makes no sense.

Let's move to the third category; that is, provisions in this amendment which have already passed the Senate. There are many good examples of that, but let me just cite two. They have to do with the rail security and mass transit security amendments which we have already adopted.

Senator McCain's rail security amendment was adopted very early in the debate on this bill. The proposal offered by Senators Shelby and Sarbanes last night is identical to the mass transit security provisions in the Reid amendment. Since those two amendments have already been included in the bill, why would we want to do it all over again?

I think what most disturbs me about Senator Reid's proposal is that it is clearly a partisan amendment that has been offered to a bill, the port security bill, that has been bipartisan every step of the way, from conception to introduction to committee consideration to the floor deliberations. Port security is so important. I know the Presiding Officer understands that well, coming from Louisiana. We have gone to great lengths to make sure that the port security bill was bipartisan.

Patty Murray has been the leader on this bill on the Democratic side. Senator Lieberman worked hard on it in the Homeland Security Committee. Norm Coleman, Senator Coleman, on our side of the aisle, worked with Senator Levin to investigate port security programs.

Even in the House, this has been a completely bipartisan--indeed, a nonpartisan--effort, with the legislation being authored by Representatives Dan Lungren and Jane Harman.

At every step of the consideration, this has been a bipartisan bill. When it went through the Homeland Security Committee, it was bipartisan. In the negotiations with the Commerce Committee and the Finance Committee, it was bipartisan. It is very unfortunate that we are now having a blatantly partisan amendment offered to a bill that I had hoped would be the exception to the rule, a bill we could enact in a bipartisan manner, because it is so important that we act without delay.

As I indicated, from the very beginning of the discussions on this bill, from the hearings, through the committee markups, through visits to ports around the country, it has always been bipartisan. Let's not weigh this bill down with partisan amendments. Instead, let's get the job done and send this bill, a bipartisan bill, to the President for his signature without delay.

I reserve the remainder of the time on this side.

Mr. DeMINT addressed the Chair.

Mr. President, I will be happy to yield time to the Senator from South Carolina, depending on how much time he needs.

That will be fine. I yield the Senator 5 minutes.

Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, let me just add to the comments made by the distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee about the amendment offered by the Democratic leader. I mentioned earlier that this amendment is 507 pages. This, in my hand, is the port security bill. Now, this, in my hand, is the Reid amendment. I can barely lift it. It requires no fewer than 95 reports, certifications, and determinations. It has 37 pages of findings. It has 16 sense-of-the- Congress resolutions. It requires 36 GAO reports and audits.

But what is not in there? There is virtually nothing in there that relates to port or maritime security. In fact, we have now done a search of the entire amendment. We found one--one--reference to port security and one reference to maritime and cargo security in the entire Reid amendment.

I think that makes the point. I think that says it all. This amendment is irrelevant to the underlying bill.

As I mentioned earlier, it includes provisions that the Senate has already decisively rejected on what our policy should be in Iraq and what the funding formula should be for the homeland security grant program. It is not as if those provisions were rejected years ago; they were rejected just a few months ago. So it makes no sense for this amendment to include formula changes and a change in our policy in Iraq that this body, by more than 60 votes in each case, decisively rejected.

In fact, when it comes to the funding formula for homeland security grants, the majority of the Democratic Caucus rejects the formula change that is included in the Reid amendment. As I mentioned, over 100 pages of the Reid amendment deal with foreign policy recommendations, public diplomacy recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that are already law. They are virtually identical to a title of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which is already law. Other provisions in the Reid amendment we have passed during the debate on the port security bill--the proposals of Senator McCain and Senators Shelby and Sarbanes on rail and mass transit security. We already adopted those. Those are redundant at best.

What it comes down to is, unfortunately, this is simply a partisan amendment. That is so unfortunate because the work on this port security bill has never been partisan--never. There have been leaders such as Senator Murray and Senator Lieberman on the Democratic side. There have been leaders on the Republican side. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Homeland Security Committee did investigations of the port security programs that were completely bipartisan, headed by Senators Norman Coleman and Carl Levin. The committee consideration both in the Homeland Security Committee and the Commerce Committee was completely bipartisan. This has been a bipartisan effort in the House of Representatives, as well, where the bill was sponsored by Representatives Dan Lungren and Jane Harmon. It has been bipartisan since the conception to where we are today.

It is so unfortunate to have a blatantly partisan amendment, 507 pages, that swamps the bill and has nothing to do with the bill offered by the Democratic leader. So I hope our colleagues will take a look at what is really in the Reid amendment. I fear we may well have a partisan vote. I hope we do not. I think if my friends and colleagues on the other side of the aisle actually look at what is in the Reid amendment, I would be surprised if they vote for it because they voted against large chunks of it in the past.

So I hope once we have disposed of the Democratic leader's amendment, we can return to the constructive, bipartisan approach that we have taken on this bill. This is an important bill. It is a bill that matters to the security of our country. It is a bill that is too important to be bogged down in partisan politics. It has never been bogged down in partisan politics. It has been bipartisan every step of the way. Let's conclude consideration of this bill in a bipartisan way, in a way that reflects well on this Senate, and send this important bill to the President for his signature.

I yield the floor, and I reserve the remainder of the time.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time be charged equally to both sides.

Madam President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Kansas, the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee.

Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, it is interesting to hear my friends on the other side of the aisle talk about the 9/11 Commission and then imply that the Reid amendment would finish the job of the 9/11 Commission. In fact, as I pointed out earlier, over 100 pages of the 507-page Reid amendment already are law. They are the foreign policy and public diplomacy recommendations that were recommended by the 9/11 Commission and included in the Intelligence Reform Act which became law 2 years ago--2 years ago. Many of the other recommendations of the 9/11 Commission were enacted as part of that legislation.

Now, there is one area where the 9/11 Commission did recommend changes that have not been completely made, and that is in the area of congressional oversight and the reorganization of committees. Instead, the Senate and the House adopted some, but not all, of those recommendations. But, ironically, the amendment proposed by the Democratic leader does not deal with that unfinished recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. So I don't want to leave the impression that the 9/11 Commission's recommendations are what are largely found in this amendment; they are not, other than the more than 100 pages on the foreign policy and public diplomacy recommendations, which are already law and have been for almost 2 years.

The fact is, our country has made tremendous progress in strengthening our security since 9/11. We have taken many actions, and if we talk to the experts, they will all tell us that those actions have made a difference. Are we completely safe? Of course not. We can never say that we are completely safe, but we are clearly safer than we were 5 years ago due to actions taken by this Congress, this administration, and State and local law enforcement. We have a ways to go, and the underlying bill on port security will help advance the security of this country.

So for the reasons I have already spoken on extensively today, I hope that our colleagues will vote to sustain the point of order which I will shortly be raising against Senator Reid's amendment. It does violate the Budget Act, and I will be raising a point of order against it.

But aside from the budget issues, the procedural objections, I hope my colleagues will actually look at the Reid amendment and look at what it does contain. If they do, they will find only one reference in it to port security--only one reference in it to maritime and cargo security. They will instead find page after page of policy that this Senate has already rejected with regard to our engagement in Iraq and the policy on the formula for homeland security grants. They will also find legislation that is already law, and they will find amendments that we have already adopted having to do with rail and mass transit security.

So, unfortunately--and I mean this--sadly, this amendment is simply a partisan hodgepodge of provisions that have been cobbled together. I hope we can dispense with it quickly and then move back to the port security bill, an enormously important bill, a bill that many of us have worked on for years, a bill that has been bipartisan from the very start in both the House and the Senate. That is unusual, as the Presiding Officer knows. This bill is an exception to the rule. But, apparently, we couldn't quite get through the floor debate without having a partisan bomb lobbed at this bill, and I think that is unfortunate. But I hope once we get through this, we can go back to bipartisan consideration of relevant and germane amendments and we can get this work done.

This is a gap in our homeland security. When we talk to the experts, they all tell us they are worried about the security of our seaports and the 11 million shipping containers that come into this country each year. We have a carefully crafted, balanced bill that strikes the right balance between the need to strengthen security and the need to facilitate trade.

Again, I recognize the work that Senator Murray has done on this bill. She originated a lot of the concepts in this bill. It has been that kind of bipartisan partnership that has brought us to where we are today. So let's get this partisanship out of the way, and let's return to a bipartisan debate. This bill is so important to the security of people living near our seaports, to those working on our seaports, to the retailers in this country that rely on the cargo brought into our seaports, to our farmers who rely on shipping their crops out of our seaports. Let's remember the impact of this bill on communities not just on our coasts where the seaports are located but communities all across this country that rely on the products brought to our shores by cargo ships, or rely on the cargo ships to export these products.

So I hope we can return to the underlying bill. It is a good bill, and it deserves continued bipartisan support.

Could the Presiding Officer inform me how many minutes are remaining on our side?

Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, has all time expired under the time agreement?

Madam President, I raise a point of order against the Reid amendment because it violates section 302(f) of the Budget Act.

And without checking with the managers of the bill. We have a great number of Senators who are seeking to bring up their amendments or speak on the bill, and it would be helpful if the Senator from New York would work through the managers of the bill.

Mr. President, the reports recently released by the Mount Sinai Center did reveal disturbing news about the long-term health effects suffered by those working in recovery efforts after September 11. It is very disturbing because, clearly, we should make every effort to respond to and monitor the health problems of those who were at or near Ground Zero on that day--the heroes who risked their own lives and, apparently, their long-term health by rushing in to rescue others.

This amendment would direct the Secretary of HHS, acting through the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to award grants to entities to provide medical and mental health monitoring, tracking, and treatment to individuals whose health has been directly affected as a result of the attacks on New York City on September 11.

I do have some questions about the amendment, however. For one--and I see the sponsors otherwise engaged, but I am going to pose the question anyway. Again, I am very sympathetic. I think we have an obligation to those rescue workers, firefighters, emergency medical personnel, police officers, and others who risked their own lives and health to respond to the needs of others.

I am concerned that the amendment only applies to those first responders in New York City. There may well be health impacts that were suffered by the rescue workers, firefighters, police officers, and others who responded to the Pentagon. I am concerned that the Senator limits the nearly $2 billion in funding to only New York, and that doesn't seem fair to me. It seems to me that it should apply to both jurisdictions. I don't know whether there were similar problems in Pennsylvania, as well, but it seems to me it should be broader.

I am happy to yield to the Senator from New York to respond to the question.

Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator from New York. The conditions in New York, as far as respiratory equipment, may have been different. But I have worked closely with Senator Voinovich on his broader bill. We reported it from the Homeland Security Committee. He offered it today as an amendment. I hope, perhaps, we can have a meeting of the minds on what is a real problem. We do not want those who were so brave that horrible day to not receive assistance, care, and monitoring for health problems associated with their bravery, regardless of which environment they were in.

The second issue I have to raise is the extent of the resources that will be needed to deal with this issue. I don't know the basis for the nearly $2 billion authorization that the Senator has come up with, so I cannot comment on it.

That leads me to my third point, which is the way the Senator has drafted this amendment, directing the Secretary of HHS, through the Director of the CDC, to allocate the funds. That means it is not in the jurisdiction of the Homeland Security Committee, or

even the Commerce Committee or Finance Committee. It is in the jurisdiction of the HELP Committee. So I have asked staff to notify the HELP Committee of this amendment so that they have an opportunity to review it.

With that, let me again repeat that I think the Senator from New York has identified a real problem. It is not germane to the underlying port security bill, but it is an urgent and real problem. It is in another committee's jurisdiction. We have a different approach that the Homeland Security Committee has taken in working with Senator Voinovich because this even goes beyond 9/11.

I know the Senator from New York has also worked with Senator Voinovich on his amendment, which is under the Homeland Security Committee's jurisdiction. So I suggest that we get some input from Senator Enzi and Senator Kennedy, since they are the committee of jurisdiction.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Will the Senator yield?

There is not necessarily an objection. I don't know because it is not under the jurisdiction of the committee that I am privileged to chair. So I don't want to prejudge whether there is an objection from the HELP Committee or not because I don't know. I have saluted the Senator from New York for bringing a very real problem to our attention, although I wish it were on a different bill. I wish we would move the Voinovich bill separately, which has been on the calendar for a long time. I don't know that there is an objection on this side.

Mr. President, the port security legislation we are considering requires that radiation detection equipment be installed in the busiest 22 ports of entry by the end of next year. That would result in 98 percent of all cargo coming into this country being screened for radiation or radiological devices.

The Senator's amendment raises the question of, What about those smaller ports? Doesn't this invite, for example, terrorists, knowing they will be screened at the 22 largest ports, to instead divert dangerous cargo to a small port?

The Department of Homeland Security wants to make sure it has flexibility to do, perhaps, handheld devices for screening rather than the expensive, large radiation portal monitors that are at big ports, such as Seattle.

I would pose a question, through the Chair, to the Senator from Florida, whether there is anything in his amendment that speaks to the type of equipment that must be installed, because obviously, if you have a very small port that only gets a couple of cargo ships per year, it may not make sense to invest in radiation portal monitors, but it may make sense to, instead, assume that the Customs and Border Patrol agents are equipped with handheld screening devices, which still screen.

So I would ask, through the Chair, my colleague from Florida whether his amendment, as I read it, gives flexibility to the Department as to the types of equipment, in keeping with the fact there are different needs and different volumes?

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Florida for his clarification.

With that understanding, I am pleased to recommend that the Senate adopt his amendment.

I yield to the Democratic manager of the bill to see if we could clear this amendment.

Mr. President, we have had a lot of amendments offered on the Democratic side, and there are Republican Senators who are eager to come to the floor--Senator Coburn, Senator DeMint, Senator Voinovich--to complete the action on their amendments. I thought we had an understanding that we were going back and forth, but instead we seem to be doing Democratic amendment after Democratic amendment after Democratic amendment. So until I get some clarification on how we are going to proceed, I do object.

Mr. President, it would be helpful if the Democratic manager of the bill or the sponsor of the amendment gave us some idea as to the subject of the amendment and whether the Senator from New Jersey is seeking a full debate on it or just wants to call it up briefly--or what his intentions are.

The Senator from New Jersey has an amendment that we are trying to put in a block of amendments to deal with the issue of scanning cargo. There are three such amendments that are pending: the amendment of the Senator from New York, Mr. Schumer; the amendment of the Senator from New Jersey; and the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota. I need more information about the Senator's intentions, given he has filed more than one amendment.

Mr. President, then I am going to have to object to the Senator proceeding at this time because we have proposed that all three amendments that deal with the scanning or screening of cargo be considered together, including the amendment of the Senator from New Jersey. If we can get an agreement where we could consider and debate all three amendments and then have three consecutive votes on those amendments, then I would not object. But if we cannot get that agreement, then I do object.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 4 p.m. today, the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Coleman amendment No. 4982, to be followed by a vote in relation to the Menendez amendment No. 4999, with no amendment in order to either amendment prior to the vote; finally, that the time until the vote be equally divided between the two managers or their designees, and that there will be 2 minutes equally divided of debate prior to each vote.

Mr. President, I listened carefully to the comments of the Senator from New Jersey in which he advocates for 100 percent scanning. He says, for example, that is the only way we can be safe, that we would never scan just 5 percent of the people coming to the White House. I think there is a lot of misunderstanding about how the current system works, so let me start with an explanation of the layered system of security we have at our ports right now.

First, all cargo manifests are submitted to authorities 24 hours before ships pull into ports. The automated targeting system is a sophisticated analysis that looks at where did the cargo come from, what is its destination, what is the cargo, who are the shippers involved, who is the retailer or other recipient of the cargo. Through a classified system, those and other factors are considered, and the cargo is assigned scores depending on this analysis.

Let me first be very clear. Every single container goes through that step, and that is called screening. There is a lot of confusion among the terms ``screening,'' ``scanning,'' ``integrated scanning,'' and ``inspection.'' So what I have described is the screening process that uses this automatic targeting system to identify at-risk containers.

After the at-risk containers are identified, they are supposed to be scanned or even physically searched by Customs and Border Protection. However, an investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Homeland Security Committee, which Senator Coleman led, indicated that this system didn't always result in an inspection of the high-risk container, despite it being identified. Senator Coleman is going to be offering an amendment shortly that will ensure 100 percent scanning of those high-risk or at-risk containers. So that is one aspect of the system we have now.

Another layer is the Container Security Initiative. Under this program, our American Customs and Border Patrol officers are stationed at foreign ports. The CSI program is currently operational in 44 ports which cover approximately 75 percent of containerized cargo heading for the United States by sea. What we do is we work with the host government, and again, the process is to push hazards away from our shores, identify the high-risk cargo, and make sure it is never loaded onto our ships in the first place.

In addition, there is another system, which is that many containers are also scanned for radiological material at U.S. ports. When I visited, with the Senator from Washington State, the Seattle Port, we saw the radiation portal monitors that do this kind of scanning. Our bill requires that by the end of 2007, the largest U.S. ports must have radiation scanners which will ensure that 98 percent of inbound containers are scanned.

There is also a Department of Energy program called the Megaports Initiative that is currently scanning containers in foreign ports for radiological material.

Yet another layer of security is the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program, the so-called C-TPAT Program. This is a program whereby manufacturers, retailers, and shippers secure the supply chain so that security is assured from the factory door to when the container arrives at our shores. Every step of the supply chain is secured. Senator Murray has improved upon that concept with her GreenLane concept which will give additional benefits to shippers who undertake even stronger security measures. This involves making sure, for example, that containers are sealed with electronic seals that can reveal whether they have been tampered with or opened en route. In other words, this is a risk-based approach to enhancing the security of our containers.

At the same time--and this is the approach our bill builds upon--the layered approach to security allows the maritime cargo industry in the United States, which moves more than 11 million containers per year, to function efficiently. That is important. I have seen the giant VACIS machines that do these x-ray screenings. It is not that quick a process. It takes a while. It takes probably 4 minutes or so for them to go around the container, and then the analysis of those images can take up to 15 minutes.

With 11 million containers entering the U.S. seaports every year, the delay caused by screening all containers would cause a massive backlog of cargo at the ports. That doesn't mean that someday--someday soon, I believe--we are not going to have the technology that will allow us to do an integrated scan, both in x ray and a scan for radiological material, in a far more efficient way and have a method of triggering an additional review if something is found.

The Washington Post said it very well in an editorial yesterday when they said:

The ``inspect all containers'' mantra is a red herring that

exploits America's fears about what might slip through in

order to score political points, ignoring the fact that there

are much more cost and time effective ways of keeping

dangerous cargo out of the country.

Our bill we have brought before the Senate would do just that by strengthening and improving upon the existing

programs. I believe with Senator Coleman's amendment, which I am proud to cosponsor along with the Senator from Alaska, we can even improve it further and set the stage when someday--soon, I hope--we do have the technology that allows us to do 100 percent integrated scanning.

The Senator from New Jersey just calls for scanning, so I don't know whether he doesn't want an integrated system which includes the radiological scan. But in any event, it has an integrated scanning system that will work and allow us to move cargo quickly. That is where we should be headed. We can't ignore the reality that we don't have the technology yet to do that effectively and efficiently now but that we can put in place a layered system that gives us greater protections than we have today.

We have to realize also that we have limited resources. I remember an expert in port security once telling me that if you inspect everything, you inspect nothing. You have to focus on risk and you have to come up with systems that build a layered approach, starting with securing the supply chain, working with the governments of foreign ports, having radiological scanning, making sure we put into place a layered security system.

I would note two other issues that I see in the amendment offered by the Senator from New Jersey.

First, much to my surprise, the language on page 2 of his bill suggests that all outbound cargo from the United States would have to be scanned. I can't imagine what the impact on trade would be. They would be using the same equipment as the inbound containers, so it would cause a tremendous backlog in scanning containers.

Second, he has some troubling language where he calls for a description of the consequences to be imposed on foreign ports or U.S. ports that don't meet the benchmarks described in his language, which may include the loss of access to U.S. ports and fines. What are we saying--that we are going to threaten ports with fines rather than working with them? That kind of language just invites retaliation by foreign governments, and I think it is misguided in the extreme.

So I think the bill is a very good bill that we have brought before our colleagues and a balanced bill to deal with this issue, but I think we can strengthen it further, improve it further by adopting the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota, which I am proud to support and cosponsor.

Mr. President, how much time is remaining on the majority side?

I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the Senator from Minnesota, and I retain a minute for myself.

Mr. President, if you think about it, those who are advocating that we go to 100 percent scanning prior to having the technology in place to do it efficiently without slowing down trade are, in fact, rejecting the whole notion of the C-TPAT Program. Why should a shipper, retailer or manufacturer, secure its supply chain from end to end if they are going to be subjected to the same kinds of inspection as a shipper who has high-risk cargo in an unsecured supply chain? That doesn't make any sense at all. It completely undermines the C-TPAT Program, the container security initiative, because it embraces the concept that all cargo is alike. It is not all alike. There are low-risk containers.

I think we should think very carefully about the implications of this amendment. I think Senator Coleman has come up with an excellent amendment. He has done a great deal of work, and I urge my colleagues to support the Coleman-Collins-Stevens amendment and to vote against the amendment of the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Coleman amendment.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 4999

Mr. President, we just agreed to an amendment that will require 100 percent scanning of high-risk containers and put us on the path to having 100 percent scanning of containers, once it is feasible, once the technology is there.

I am concerned about the amendment of the Senator from New Jersey. I don't think it has the kind of thought in it that was in the Coleman amendment. There are two provisions, in particular, that concern me.

One, it requires a plan for scanning containers that are going out of U.S. ports. That is going to slow down trade incredibly and will be a real problem for our farmers who are exporting their crops.

Second, it has a provision requiring consequences to be imposed on foreign ports or U.S. ports that do not meet the benchmarks described in the plan, which may include a loss of access to U.S. ports and fines. This will lead to retaliation by foreign ports.

I urge our colleagues to oppose the amendment.

Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues, I want to explain how we are going to proceed. Obviously, Senator Baucus made his unanimous consent request. I didn't anticipate that when we were ordering the speakers earlier. We are going to go to Senator Santorum for the purpose of an amendment, but he will only take 3 minutes, and then we are going to go to Senator Obama for his amendment, and then I am going to propose on behalf of Senator Voinovich an amendment he has worked out with the Presiding Officer.

Mr. President, first I would inquire through the Chair of the Senator from Illinois whether he has modified his amendment. I didn't hear a request that it be modified.

I appreciate the clarification.

Mr. President, this proposal of the Senator from Illinois is very similar to a provision of the post-Katrina Stafford Act reforms that were reported by the Homeland Security Committee. The Senator from Illinois is absolutely right that we need to do a far better job in this country of developing comprehensive plans for the evacuation of individuals with special needs before, during, and after a disaster.

When we look at the experience with Hurricane Katrina, what we find is those who were left behind were predominantly elderly and disabled. Those were the characteristics that caused people to not be able to evacuate. Another factor was they tended to be lower income individuals, too. But the disabled individuals of the area, in Louisiana in particular, also actually had the experience of going to Red Cross shelters and being turned away, which is something I have discussed with the Red Cross.

So I think it is a good idea to require State and local governments to develop these kinds of plans, and I am happy to accept the amendment. I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to reconsider the vote on the Menendez amendment No. 4999 at this time.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I send to the desk a modified amendment of the Senator from Ohio, Mr. Voinovich.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, as the Presiding Officer is well aware, this reflects an agreement between the Senator from Oklahoma and the Senator from Ohio. It is my understanding that it has been cleared on both sides, and I ask for its adoption.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on September 13, 2006, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing on ``The Housing Bubble and its Implications for the Economy.''

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, September 13 at 11:30 a.m.

The purpose of this meeting is to consider the nominations of John Ray Correll to be director of the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Mark Myers to be director of the United States Geological Survey, and David Longly Bernhardt to be solicitor of the Department of the Interior.

President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Environment and Public Works be authorized to hold a Business Meeting on Wednesday, September 13, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. to consider the following agenda:

Legislation: H.R. 5689, To amend the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users to make technical corrections, and for other purposes; S.1848, Cleanup of Inactive and Abandoned Mines Act; S. 3630, To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to reauthorize a program relating to the Lake Pontchartrain Basin, and for other purposes; H.R. 3929, Dana Point Desalination Project Authorization Act; S. 3617, North American Wetlands Conservation Reauthoriiation Act of 2006; H.R. 5061, Paint Bank and Wytheville National Fish Hatcheries Conveyance Act; S. 3551, Tylersville Fish Hatchery Conveyance Act; S. 3867, To Designate the Federal Courthouse at 555 Independence Street, Cape Girardeau, Missouri, as the ``Rush H. Limbaugh Sr., Federal Courthouse''; H.R. 5187, To Amend the John F. Kennedy Center Act to authorize additional appropriations for the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts for fiscal year 2007; S. 3879 ``Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage Contingent Cost Allocation Act''; S. 2348, Nuclear Release Notice Act of 2006; and S. 3591, High-Performance Green Buildings Act of 2006.

Nominees: William B. Wark to be a Member of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; William E.

Wright to be a Member of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; Stephen M. Prescott to be a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National Environmental Policy Foundation; Anne Jeannette Udall to be a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National Environmental Policy Foundation; Brigadier General Bruce Arlan Berwick to be a Member of the Mississippi River Commission; Colonel Gregg F. Martin to be a Member of the Mississippi River Commission; Brigadier General Robert Crear to be a Member of the Mississippi River Commission; and Rear Admiral Samuel P. DeBow, Jr. to be a Member of the Mississippi River Commission.

Resolutions: Committee Resolution for the Republican River Basin-- Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas; Committee Resolution for Beverly Hills, New Haven, Connecticut; Committee Resolution for Hanover Pond; Holly Pond; and Eisenhower Park--Connecticut; Committee Resolution for Mystic Harbor Water Resources Development--Mystic, Connecticut; Committee Resolution for the Burns Waterway Harbor--Indiana; Committee Resolution for Jefferson Parish Flood Control, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana; Committee Resolution for the Blackstone River Watershed--Massachusetts, Rhode Island; Committee Resolution for the St. Clair River, Lake Level Study--Michigan; Committee Resolution for the Crow Creek Watershed-- Cheyenne, Wyoming; Committee Resolution to direct GSA to prepare a Report of Building Project Survey; 12 resolutions to authorize the majority of the remainder of the General Services Administration's FY 2007 Capital Investment and Leasing Program; and 8 resolutions authorizing courthouse projects.

Mr. President: I ask unanimous consent that on Wednesday, September 13, immediately following the 9:30 a.m. Business Meeting the Committee on Environment and Public Works be authorized to hold a hearing to consider the following pending nominations:

Roger Romulus Martella, Jr., to be Assistant Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency;

Alex A. Beehler to be Assistant Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and

William H. Graves to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Finance be authorized to meet during the session on Wednesday, September 13, 2006, at 10 a.m., in 215 Dirksen Senate Office Building, to hear testimony on ``Taking the Pulse of Charitable Care and Community Benefits at Nonprofit Hospitals.''

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

committee on foreign relations

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, September 13, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. to hold a hearing on Lebanon.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs be authorized to meet on Wednesday, September 13, 2006, at 2:30 p.m. to consider the nominations of Wayne C. Beyer to be Member, Federal Labor Relations Authority, and Stephen T. Conboy to be U.S. Marshal, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet to conduct a markup on Wednesday, September 13, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. in the Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 226.

Agenda

I. Bills: S. 2453, National Security Surveillance Act of 2006, Specter; S. 2455, Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, DeWine, Graham; S. 2468, A bill to provide standing for civil actions for declaratory and injunctive relief to persons who refrain from electronic communications through fear of being subject to warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, and for other purposes, Schumer; S. 3001, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2006, Specter, Feinstein.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on September 13, 2006 at 2:30 p.m. to hold a closed briefing.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Special Committee on Aging be authorized to meet Wednesday, September 13, 2006 from 10 a.m.-11:30 a.m. in Dirksen 562 for the purpose of conducting meeting.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs be authorized to meet to conduct a hearing on ``Challenges Facing Today's Federal Prosecutors,'' on Wednesday, September 13, 2006, at 2:30 p.m. in SD226.

Witness list

Panel I: Mike Battle, Director, Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC; Susan Brooks, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Indiana, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Panel II: William Shockley, Former President, National Association of Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Lake Ridge, VA.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of S. Con. Res. 114, which was submitted earlier today, that the resolution be agreed to, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

Mr. President, I understand that this is directly related to the fiscal transparency, Google For Good Government, bill of the Senator from Oklahoma. I hope this will clear the way for its passage.

Mr. President, while we are awaiting representation on the other side of the aisle in order to get the yeas and the nays, let me respond to the Senator from Texas about her amendment.

First, let me acknowledge the work of the Senator from Texas on port security issues over the past few years. Her amendment would increase the minimum hiring of Customs and Border Protection officers in the resource allocation model of the legislation before us from 725 to 1,000. As the Presiding Officer is aware, our bill requires the Department to do a resource allocation model, really take a hard look at how many CBP officers are needed at which port.

One reason we believed that was necessary was the experience of Houston's ports and airports. The Senator from Texas has told me of the problems that Houston has experienced, where CBP agents actually are being transferred from the port to the airport to deal with incoming flights and then are sent back to the port. Clearly that is a situation that cries out for more agents so they do not have to be constantly shifting back and forth from a busy port to a busy airport.

I think the Senator is correct that she has a real problem with understaffing in the Houston seaport and airport and that we do need to have more agents allocated. But I also want to point out to my colleagues that we do specifically require the Department to do this resource allocation plan. There may be some seaports or airports that actually have more staff than they need. Those could be allocated to busier seaports and airports. But clearly the situation in Houston cries out for more agents so we do not have this constant choice of where they should be.

I do support the amendment of the Senator. I will assist her in gaining the yeas and nays when we have representation from the Democratic side. I hope that will be shortly.

I also suggest that we stack the vote on the amendment of the Senator at 5 o'clock, after the vote on the Lautenberg amendment, in order to make it more convenient for our colleagues.

Once we get the yeas and nays, I will be making a unanimous consent request that the vote occur immediately after the vote on the amendment offered by the Senator from New Jersey, with 4 minutes of debate equally divided prior to the vote. But I am withholding that unanimous consent request until we have representation from the minority on the floor.

Mr. President, I think we are now ready to order the yeas and nays.

We are still not ready for the timing on that, but we have ordered the yeas and nays, and I hope we will be able to stack the vote to occur immediately after the conclusion of the vote on the amendment of the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a vote in relation to the Hutchison amendment No. 4931 occur following the vote on the Lautenberg amendment, No. 4940, with no second degrees in order to either amendment prior to the votes, and 2 minutes of debate equally divided between the managers or their designees before each vote, and that this occur at 5 o'clock.

Thank you, Mr. President. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator Murray's amendment. I commend her for offering it. Each year, U.S. Customs and Border Protection collects more than $24 billion in Customs duties and fees.

The amendment would extend the merchandise processing fee and passenger conveyance fee for an additional year, and our hope is that that money will then be targeted to pay for this bill. This makes sense. In many ways, it is a user fee. It makes a great deal of sense. It will help ensure that there is a dedicated funding source for the security measures.

I point out again that the amendment has been cleared with the Finance Committee. Senator Murray has worked hard with Senators Grassley and Baucus to find the source of funding. I commend her for her efforts. I fully support the amendment and I urge its adoption.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, the amendment offered by Senator Dorgan is a restriction on the U.S. Special Trade Representative's authority in negotiations. As such, it is under the jurisdiction of the Senate Finance Committee. However, it is my understanding that the chairman and the ranking member of the Finance Committee have no objection to acceptance of the amendment.

I urge acceptance of the amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, based on the debate that occurred earlier, I believe the distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee has decided to accept this amendment and was willing to do it without a rollcall vote. However, the distinguished Senator from New Jersey wants a rollcall vote, so we are going to have a rollcall vote.

I do not know whether the Senator from New Jersey is on his way. I see that he is in the Chamber, so I yield the floor to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate resumes action on the bill on Wednesday, the time until 12:15 be equally divided in the usual form and that at 12:15 the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Reid amendment No. 4936, with no second degrees in order prior to the vote.

Before the Chair rules, we anticipate a budget point of order against this amendment, and therefore this vote is likely to be on the motion to waive.

Therefore, Mr. President, although we are going to consider two more amendments tonight, there will be no more rollcall votes tonight.

Amendment No. 4935

Mr. President, I am unclear whether the Salazar amendment No. 4935 is actually pending.

I do support the amendment offered by the Senator from Colorado, and the managers on this side are also pleased to recommend its acceptance.

Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the Salazar amendment.

I commend the Senators for their initiative. The horrific terrorist attacks in London and Madrid demonstrate that terrorists are willing and able to attack transit systems. Our systems in the United States remain vulnerable.

Just today, the Homeland Security Committee held a hearing looking at the next 5 years and what challenges face us. The witness, the deputy commissioner for counterterrorism from New York City, specifically pointed out the vulnerabilities of our transit systems and also the inequities in funding. I believe the statistics he gave us were that there was a ratio of 9:1 in the amount of money that had been spent on aviation security versus other forms of transportation security. So I think there is an imbalance. I believe this is a vulnerability and that this amendment would allow for the authorization of significant transportation security improvements. I am pleased to join my colleagues in support of the amendment.

Mr. President, I rise to commend the Senator from Washington State for her dogged pursuit of a funding source for this bill. I agree with her that it is so important we have dedicated funding so the promise of this bill can become the reality.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor to Senator Murray's amendment No. 4929.

Again, I thank the Senator for her efforts. It has been a real pleasure to work with her on this important bill.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, 5 years ago, our Nation experienced one of its darkest days and finest hours. With shocking suddenness, an act of unparalleled cruelty transformed the late-summer morning of uncommon brilliance into one of unfathomable horror. On that awful morning, September 11 was transformed from a mere point on the calendar into an eternal monument to the deepest human emotions of loss, of sacrifice, and of resolve.

We pause today to remember those whose lives were taken that terrible morning--2,996 innocent men, women, and children, workers doing their jobs, travelers embarking on trips. Men and women like Robert and Jacqueline Norton of Lubec, ME boarded Flight 11 to celebrate a son's wedding in California. In the days just before the trip, the Nortons planted new raspberry bushes in their garden and Robert, at age 85, helped repair the concrete steps at their church.

At age 85, Robert Norton was the oldest to perish that day. At age 2, Christine Hanson of Groton, MA, was the youngest. She was traveling with her parents to that place of childhood dreams, Disneyland. The aircraft that was to take the Hanson family on their dream vacation instead was driven into the North Tower. There, on the 92nd floor, were John and Sylvia Resta of Queens, NY. They worked together and on September 11th they died together. Resta was seven months pregnant.

The Pentagon that morning was filled with men and women who had dedicated their lives to serving their country. Among them was Commander Robert Schlegel. After his 1981 graduation from Gray-New Gloucester High School in Maine, he went to college, married his high- school sweetheart, Dawn, and followed a tradition set by his father and two brothers by joining the United States Navy. His 15-year Naval career was one of achievement and courage. Among his many commendations were the Meritorious Service Medal, four Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medals, and the Purple Heart. Shortly before September 11, he had been promoted to the rank of Commander. His new office, on the second floor of the Pentagon, believed to be the point of impact of Flight 77.

Each of these names, and the names of so many more, represent lives of accomplishment, contribution, and promise. Each loss leaves a wound in the hearts of families and friends that can never be fully healed.

But September 11 was not just a day of personal tragedy. It was an attack on the United States, an attack on freedom, an attack on civilization. We must never forget what was lost, and what remains at stake.

We also pause today to remember the heroes whose courage saved countless lives then, and who continue to inspire us. Yamel Merino, of Yonkers, NY, was described by colleagues as the perfect EMT. She gave her life while helping the injured near the World Trade Center when the first tower collapsed.

After an outstanding career with the FBI, John O'Neill became head of security for the World Trade Center. He exited the building safely after the first of the two hijacked planes hit, but re-entered when he saw the extent of the damage and the danger to others. He saved lives, but could not save himself.

After his safe exit from the Pentagon, Staff Sergeant Christopher Braman rushed back into the burning building, returning again and again to find survivors and to carry them to safety. He stayed on the scene for the next 3 days, working past exhaustion, saving lives with the search and rescue skills the U.S. Army had taught him.

In the days and weeks immediately following the attacks, we were moved by the selfless courage of the men and women--passengers and crew--aboard Flight 93. By wresting control of that aircraft from the terrorists, they knowingly gave their lives so that others might live. Todd Beamer's Let's Roll! became our Nation's rallying cry.

Last month, additional recordings of emergency calls made that terrible morning were released. One contains a statement that describes with eloquent simplicity the spirit of September 11. Amid the suffocating smoke, searing flames, and falling debris of the South Tower, the last words Fire Captain Patrick Brown spoke from the 35th floor to the outside world were these: ``We're still heading up.''

We may never know where the courage to keep heading up into such danger comes from. We must always honor it. We must never forget.

As we pledge to never forget what was lost and what was given on September 11, we must in the same breath pledge to do all that we can to prevent future attacks. We can offer no guarantee, but that must be our goal.

The fundamental obligation of Government is to protect its people. Since September 11, we have done much to meet that obligation. Immediately after the attacks, we passed legislation to close the gap between law enforcement and intelligence that the terrorists exploited. The reauthorization signed into law earlier this year makes permanent many provisions from the original law that are important to protect Americans from terrorists. Equally important, it contains significant new safeguards that protect the civil liberties we cherish but that the terrorists despise.

We created the Department of Homeland Security to provide a unifying

core to the vast effort of detecting and preventing terrorist attacks, assessing and protecting our vulnerabilities, and improving our response to disasters of all types. We have made great investments in training and equipping first responders throughout the nation. We have strengthened our borders with additional personnel, better coordination with State and local authorities, and cutting-edge technology so that they remain open to our friends but increasingly closed to our enemies.

We passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which Senator Lieberman and I authored. This legislation, based on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, brought about the most comprehensive reforms of our intelligence community in more than a half century so that the trail of dots terrorists leave behind as they plan, train, and organize will never again be left unconnected. This newly restructured intelligence community has uncovered terrorist plots, cells, and financing operations, and it played an important role in thwarting the scheme to blow up transatlantic airliners that was exposed in Britain last month.

Today we are on the brink of passing the GreenLane Maritime Security Act. America's seaports are vital to our economy, but at the same time they offer a port of entry for those who would do us harm, or for devastating weapons. This bipartisan legislation will help build a coordinated approach to maritime and port security across all levels of government with our overseas trading partners. I urge my colleagues to take this major step toward protecting these valuable and vulnerable facilities.

We have taken many such steps. None was easily taken. All were accompanied by controversy, conflict, and reasonable differences of opinion. Yet, working together, we found a way.

Each, however, remains a work in progress. DHS has yet to develop the cohesion, the common culture, that is needed for its complex mission. First responder grants to the States still lack the accountability and effective measures of progress needed to prevent the waste of taxpayer dollars. Ongoing shortages of detention space and personnel still leave our borders at risk, despite the many improvements that have been made.

Other gaps remain. Ten million Americans live and work in proximity to plants that produce, use, or store large quantities of hazardous chemicals and, indeed, if one talks to the experts, over and over again you will hear them identify the security of our ports and our chemical facilities as major vulnerabilities. We are about to complete action this week on port security legislation. I hope we will turn to chemical security legislation as well. There is no question that attacking these facilities fits squarely within the terrorist strategy of causing maximum harm to our people and to our prosperity.

Yet 5 years after 9/11, America is left vulnerable by an incomplete and inadequate patchwork of laws and voluntary industry standards that too many facilities fail to observe. The Homeland Security Committee approved our bipartisan Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act more than 3 months ago by a unanimous vote. For the first time, our legislation would ensure that high-risk chemical facilities are covered by Federal standards that would not only help to deter terrorist attacks but also to mitigate the consequences of an attack.

Our legislation would give the Department of Homeland Security the strongest possible remedy to ensure compliance: the authority to shut down any chemical facility that does not adequately address the risks of a terrorist attack. Unless this legislation moves forward, these highly attractive terrorist communities, large and small, will remain without the protection they require.

The heroes of 9/11 faced grave danger and made great sacrifices in order to save others. They performed magnificently despite being hampered by obsolete and incompatible communications equipment that placed them in needless peril and resulted in needless loss of life. That should be a major national priority for our country to solve once and for all the issue of first responders being able to communicate with one another in the midst of a disaster, whether it is a terrorist attack or another hurricane, such as Hurricane Katrina.

The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act, which Senator Lieberman and I introduced, contains strong provisions to establish a comprehensive national emergency communications strategy and provide State grants for interoperable communications. It is time to act on this legislation--we must never again send our first responders into harm's way with a deficiency that has been so thoroughly revealed.

Perhaps our greatest challenge, however, is to recognize that terrorism continually evolves. As the devastating attacks in Madrid, Bali, Istanbul, Beslan, London, and Israel prove, terrorists will strike wherever opportunity allows and wherever innocent people are the most vulnerable. The terrorists' resourcefulness, cunning, and patience are exceeded only by their cruelty.

Indeed, one of the most striking findings of the 9/11 Commission was that the September 11 attacks were made possible by a failure of imagination. Commercial airliners had long been a target of terrorists. The conventional wisdom was that they would be targeted in two ways: to hijack for the purpose of taking hostages or to blow up in midair. To envision airliners being hijacked to use as missiles would have taken some imagination, but it was not unimaginable.

We all remember one of the striking findings of the 9/11 Commission that the September 11 attacks represented a failure of imagination. How different things might be today if 5 years prior to September 11, 2001, our imagination had been fully engaged.

Mr. President, 1996 was the year that Ramzi Yousef, while awaiting trial for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was convicted of a conspiracy to plant bombs on a number of U.S. airliners operating in East Asia, and of placing the bomb that exploded on a Philippine airliner the previous year.

Mr. President, 1996 was the year of the truck bomb attack on Khobar Towers that specifically targeted U.S. military personnel.

And 1996 was the year that Osama bin Laden relocated from the Sudan to Afghanistan, established a new base of operations under the protection of the Taliban, and declared war on the United States.

The terrorist strategy was evolving 5 years prior to 2001 to direct massive attacks on high-profile American targets, but we failed to see that these seemingly isolated events were, in fact, tied together.

In the aftermath of 9/11, we learned that although the terrorists targeted high-profile targets in major cities, they did much of their planning, training, and transiting in smaller communities--communities such as Stone Mountain, GA, Norman, OK, and Portland, ME. It may be that they believed these locations shielded their activities from the scrutiny they would have been subjected to in their larger, more terrorism-savvy target locations.

Today there is no question that the tactics of terrorists have evolved. As the recent arrests in Canada and Miami, the attacks on the London subway of a year ago, and the thwarted airliner plot in Britain have made clear, terrorist masterminds no longer have to rely on operatives imported from abroad to infiltrate target nations and carry out attacks. The emerging threat is from home-grown terrorists. They are far harder to detect, and increased border security will not protect us from them.

Whether the target we seek to protect is a cargo port, a chemical plant, a public water supply, the electric grid, or the information technology networks critical to our economy, it does not take a stretch of imagination to see that an attack can come from within just as easily, perhaps more easily, than from overseas.

From John Walker Lindh, we already know the most extreme ideology can take root even among those who enjoy the most privileged circumstances our society can offer. As the details of the British airliner plot emerge, it becomes evident that home-grown terrorists, working in conjunction with masterminds overseas, can be every bit as sophisticated as the imported terrorists who attacked us on 9/11.

What is particularly alarming is the evidence that this infection is being spread within our State and Federal

prisons, and this is an area that the Homeland Security Committee will hold a hearing on next week.

Richard Reid--the infamous shoe-bomber--and Jose Padilla both were indoctrinated into Islamic extremism while in prison. Less well known, but equally lethal, is Kevin James, a self-styled Imam who, while a California State prison inmate, founded an organization based upon his radical interpretation of Islam. James recruited among his fellow inmates, allegedly instructing them that it was their duty to kill his perceived enemies of Islam--in particular U.S. military personnel and supporters of Israel. Upon their release, his followers reportedly conducted surveillance on military installations, the Israeli Consulate, and synagogues. It is alleged that they sought firearms with silencers and also explosives and that they financed their operations through a string of armed robberies in the Los Angeles area. These operatives have been arrested and they face trial next month.

The new face of terrorism--born and raised in America, in Great Britain--has been exposed. This new face of terrorism will challenge us, perhaps as much or even more as Osama bin Laden has challenged us. But this is the reality that we must confront. We must not allow our imagination to fail us again.

Five years ago, in what seemed like a moment, September 11 was transformed from a day like any other day into one that for as long as our Nation stands will stand alone. The loss that we relive this day reminds us of the value of all that we must protect. The heroism reminds us of the unconquerable spirit of the American people. Our accomplishments remind us that we can meet any challenge with decisive action and a sense of unity. As long as we keep the meaning of this day of remembrance in our hearts, I am confident that we can meet any challenge that lies ahead.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be dispensed with.

Mr. President, it is my understanding that either shortly this evening or tomorrow the Senator from South Carolina will be coming to the floor to speak on the agreement that has been worked out among all the players, which is based on legislation he introduced, S. 1753, the Warning Alert and Response Network Act, the so-called WARN Act. This amendment would create the national alert system which will contribute to a strengthened emergency management system for our country. The amendment will create a national alert office within the Department of Homeland Security and will ensure that the office will work closely with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA, to bring together the wealth of expertise in both of these agencies to create an alert system that will transmit alerts in response to all threats to public safety, whether they are a terrorist attack, a natural disaster or a manmade accident.

The amendment directs this new office to develop a 21st century alert system that takes advantage of new technologies, including technologies to better alert underserved communities.

Five years ago, all of us remember the frustration of trying to get accurate information. Most of us found that our cell phones were no longer functioning. At that point, we did not have Blackberries, and we had a very difficult time communicating.

The legislation that Senator DeMint has authored helps to respond to that need to disseminate information quickly and accurately to the public using a variety of tools. The new system would use multiple modes of communication, providing alerts not only by television and radio but also cell phones, Blackberries, and other wireless devices such as the Internet, satellite television, and other means of communication.

The DeMint proposal builds on the recommendations of the White House Katrina Report to employ all available 21st century technologies both to update and utilize the National Emergency Alert System in order to provide the general public with advanced notification of, as well as instructions during, a disaster or other emergencies.

We need a warning and alert system in this country that keeps pace with new technologies and an increasingly mobile society. No longer is it adequate to depend on television and radios to disseminate absolutely critical public safety information.

I believe that the approach in this amendment will save lives by creating a system with the capability to alert individuals to dangers, whether they are watching television, driving in their cars or sitting on the beach with a cell phone and a Blackberry. Yes, some of us take the Blackberry and the cell phone even when we are on the beach.

I thank Senator DeMint for his work on this important amendment. I thank the Commerce Committee, which has worked very closely with the Homeland Security Committee to work out some issues, and I am pleased to support its passage as amended by the amendment of Senator Inouye and Senator Stevens.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I spoke earlier in favor of the amendment of the Senator from South Carolina. While he is here, I again commend him for his effort, his leadership in this area, and for working with both the Homeland Security and the Commerce Committees to work out some technical issues. His amendment is going to make a big difference. All of us remember 5 years ago on this day how difficult it was to get information--our cell phones were not working; we did not have Blackberrys then. The Senator's approach will ensure that we use every possible means to inform the public when there is an incident that is a threat to public safety.

I salute the Senator for his leadership. This is an excellent proposal. I am pleased to support it.

public safety promotion

Mr. President, for the information of our colleagues, I thought I would describe how we are going to be proceeding today. Shortly, the President pro tempore, who is the comanager of the bill, will be making his opening statement. It is my understanding he will then move to lay down an amendment offered by Senator DeMint and a substitute amendment offered by Senator Inouye relating to the WARN Act, which is a Commerce Committee bill. We will not be voting on that amendment today, it is my understanding, under the agreement that has been previously reached.

We are open for business on other amendments for Members who may come to the floor or Members who wish to speak on this bill.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 prepared by my staff be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, one of the issues that will undoubtedly come up during the debate on the port security bill has to do with the scanning of containers. Some people have asked: Why don't we scan 100 percent of the 11 million containers coming into this country? And the answer is simply that it is not practical with the current technology. The bill that is before us authorizes three pilot projects in three foreign ports where we would take a look at the feasibility and practicality and the implications of 100 percent scanning.

There is 100 percent screening. There is a difference between screening a container, which means gathering information on each and every container and doing a sophisticated computer analysis to determine which are of higher risk, versus scanning each container with an x-ray-type machine or some other method or a physical inspection.

The problem of trying to scan 100 percent of all containers is best summed up by a letter that we recently received from the Supply Chain Security Coalition. This is a coalition of some of the largest and most knowledgeable stakeholders in the supply chain's system, including the Retail Industry Leaders Association.

The letter says:

One hundred percent scanning proposals and amendments

advocating such a proposal could potentially actually

decrease security by forcing containers to sit for extended

periods of time, putting them at greater risk of tampering,

and would divert resources away from the current risk

assessment approach. In addition--

And this is the key point--

such a mandate has the potential to significantly impede the

flow of commerce and damage the U.S. and global economy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of that letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, what we have tried to do with this bill is very carefully balance the need for effective, improved security with the need to ensure that we are not crippling our international trading system. We now have 11 million shipping containers coming into this country each year. This is a number that has grown substantially in recent years. We know each one has the potential to be the Trojan horse of the 21st century, to include not consumer goods but perhaps terrorists themselves, the makings of a dirty bomb, a chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapon.

That is why the legislation that we have authored proposes a strong, effective, layered system of security. It focuses on the ports of origin. It focuses on each container to make sure that it is effectively evaluated, and it has a system for securing the entire supply chain that is called the C-TPAT system.

The highest system of C-TPAT would be the GreenLane system, of which Senator Murray is the author.

At that level, shippers would take steps to completely certify the security of their supply chain from the factory where the good is manufactured, all the way to the delivery to the retail store. Each step of the supply chain would be certified as secure. In return, those shippers or retailers that reach that highest level, the GreenLane, would be given certain benefits. Their cargo would be expedited. Their cargo would be subjected to fewer inspections. Their cargo would be released more quickly in the event of an attack on our ports.

Our proposal addresses the people who work at our ports. It addresses the shipping containers. It addresses the ports themselves and other facilities. It takes the layered approach to security that is recommended by the 9/11 Commission.

So I hope those of our colleagues who may be tempted to think that the answer to port security is to do an x-ray of each and every shipping container will take a closer look at the systems and the security that would be provided by our legislation and would consider the points that have been raised by the experts who point out the dangers in delaying the transit of shipping containers. It might actually decrease security rather than enhance it. And, also, that we have to strike that right balance so we do not significantly impede the flow of commerce and damage the U.S. and global economy.

Just think how many farmers rely on our ports to ship their crops overseas. Think of how many factories and stores in our country rely on just-in-time inventory. If you are reliant on just-in-time inventory and your containers are delayed just 3 days, it can make a big difference to your operations. So we need to make sure that we strike the right balance.

I think the bill before us, which has been carefully worked out by three committees, which has been in progress for years, does strike the right balance.

Mr. President, I, too, commend the Senator from Arizona for bringing this measure to the Senate floor. As Senator Stevens has pointed out, it is directly relevant to port security because many of the containers that come into our ports by ship are then deployed throughout the country by rail. So I would argue this is directly relevant to the goal of the legislation before us.

This is a Commerce Committee matter that Senator McCain has brought

up, but I did just want to let my colleagues know that it is very relevant to our goal of securing our ports. I strongly support the amendment and commend the Senator for his initiative.

Mr. President, I want to comment on the tremendous efforts of the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee, Senator Lieberman, and the chairmen and ranking members of the Commerce and Finance Committees, Senators Stevens, Inouye, Grassley and Baucus. They along with their committee staffs have worked together for months to develop the bill that is before us today.

Each of the committees has its own jurisdictional interests in this bill. The Homeland Security Committee has jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security with its primary mission of preventing terrorist attacks against the United States and reducing vulnerabilities to such attacks. Many of the programs in this bill, including the Automated Targeting System, the Container Security Initiative, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, serve the purpose of reducing vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks and are operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection within the Department of Homeland Security--squarely within the Homeland Security Committee's jurisdiction. Moreover, it was the committee's jurisdictional authority to study the effectiveness of government agency programs that began the evaluation of the DHS' cargo security initiatives that are improved by this bill.

The Commerce and Finance Committees also have significant jurisdictional interests. The Commerce Committee has jurisdiction over shipping and the Coast Guard. And the Finance Committee has jurisdiction over the assessment of customs duties and compliance with customs laws.

Mr. President, I rise to present the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006. This bill will help to close dangerous gaps in our ability to protect our shipping lanes and seaports from attack.

A number of our colleagues have worked very hard on this bill. This bill reflects not only bipartisan consultation and support but coordination among the Senate Homeland Security Committee, the Commerce Committee, and the Finance Committee. I thank our leader, Senator Frist, for encouraging and facilitating those discussions.

I particularly wish to thank my colleague, Senator Murray, who joined me in sponsoring the GreenLane cargo security bill in November of 2005, which

has served as the basis for the legislation we debate tonight. Senator Murray has been steadfast in her commitment to enhancing port security. She has been working on it since the attacks on our country 5 years ago. She has been a terrific partner.

Senator Stevens, Senator Inouye, Senator Grassley, Senator Lieberman, Senator Baucus, Senator Coleman, and Senator Allen have also played critical roles on this important legislation. Their support and involvement have been invaluable in crafting a measure that I believe is going to make a real difference and that will improve our protection against terrorist threats without crippling the operations of our ports. This is very important. We need to strengthen security at our ports, but we need to do so in a way that does not cripple our system of trade, that does not place barriers in the way of moving legitimate goods.

This legislation will provide the structure and the resources needed to better protect the American people from attack through seaports that are both vulnerable points of entry and vital centers of economic activity.

Our legislation, our joint legislation, which is the product of so many weeks, months, and years of study and compromise, is a comprehensive approach that addresses all major aspects of maritime cargo security. It would require the Department of Homeland Security to develop a comprehensive strategic plan for all transportation modes by which cargo moves into, within, and out of American ports. It creates an Office of Cargo Security Policy to coordinate departmental activities and to be a central contact point for interagency, private sector, and international partners in cargo security. It requires the Department of Homeland Security to develop protocols for the resumption of trade at seaports after an incident. That is necessary to minimize economic losses. It authorizes risk-based grants, training, and exercises for port security. It improves and expands several security programs, such as the Container Security Initiative, known as CSI, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, and establishes deadlines for DHS action on these programs. And it provides incentives for shippers and importers who meet the highest levels of cargo security standards.

Before commenting further on these provisions, let me offer a few facts that illustrate the importance of strengthening the security of our seaports.

America's 361 seaports are vital elements of our Nation's transportation network. Our seaports move more than 95 percent of overseas trade. In 2005 alone, U.S. ports logged 53,000 calls by foreign-flagged vessels, including 16,000 container ship calls that brought 11 million shipping containers to our shores.

The largest 22 ports, ranging from Los Angeles to Boston, handle 98 percent of the container traffic. Nearly half of all container ship calls are made in just three States--California, New York, and Virginia--but traffic arrives at many ports, from Maine to Hawaii, including a port in my State, Portland, the largest port by tonnage in new England. Coming from a State with three international cargo ports, I am keenly aware of the importance of seaports to our national economy and to the communities in which they are located.

In addition to our ports' economic significance, the link between maritime security and our national security is obvious and the vulnerabilities of our ports worrisome. Shipping containers are a special source of concern. When we look at shipping containers, we know, in most cases, they contain useful consumer goods. But shipping containers could also be used to convey a squad of terrorists or a dirty bomb. In some sense, containers could be the 21st century ``Trojan horse.''

The vulnerabilities of containers are evident when one considers a recent incident that occurred in Seattle. In May, several Chinese nationalists illegally smuggled themselves within a shipping container that made its way to Seattle. Now, they were discovered, fortunately, but think if that container had, instead of including illegal Chinese immigrants seeking a better way of life, included individuals, terrorists, who were dedicated to destroying our way of life.

The container has also been called ``the poor man's missile'' because a low-budget terrorist could ship one across the Atlantic or the Pacific to a U.S. port for just a few thousands dollars. And the contents of a container do not have to be as complex as a nuclear or chemical or biological weapon. As former Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner told the New York Times last year, a single container packed with readily available ammonium sulfate fertilizer and a detonation system could produce 10 times the blast that destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.

Whatever the type of weapon, an attack on an American port could cause great loss of life, damage our energy supplies and infrastructure, cripple retailers and manufacturers dependent on just- in-time inventory, prevent farmers from exporting their crops, and hamper our ability to move and supply American military forces.

Earlier this year, I visited the ports in L.A. and Long Beach and Seattle. At the invitation of Senator Murray, I examined the Seattle port. When one looks at the busy harbor in Seattle, one sees ferries bringing thousands of passengers--a large urban population--in sight of the port and two stadiums nearby. You realize immediately the depth and destruction that a ship carrying a container with a weapon of mass destruction could inflict at a single port.

Moreover, a successful port attack would likely trigger a security lockdown of all of our ports, just as the attacks 5 years ago grounded all commercial aircraft. So the economic damage would swiftly spread across the entire country. The Pacific Coast has already given us a glimpse of the economic damage that an attack on a port would cause. The west coast dock strike of 2002 was peaceful and anticipated, unlike any terror attack would be, but it cost an estimated $1 billion a day in economic losses for each of the 10 days it lasted.

Of course, a port could also be a conduit for an attack as well as being a target itself. A container with dangerous cargo could be loaded on a truck or a railcar or have its contents unpacked at a port and distributed to support an attack elsewhere--perhaps in the heartland of this country.

For these reasons, and many others, including the risks of container tampering or false documentation, the 9/11 Commission concluded that ``Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface transportation'' as in commercial aviation.

Some actions have been taken to improve security at our seaports. The 9/11 terror attacks prompted some useful moves toward better security for vessel shipping lanes and the ports themselves. But, unfortunately, many of these initiatives have not proceeded under a comprehensive, strategic security plan. Some of them have lagged, and some of them have not been effectively implemented.

The Senate Homeland Security Committee has conducted five hearings on port security and the failures of DHS's cargo security programs. The first hearing we held back in March of 2003 when the committee heard testimony from several experts that cargo containers could well be the next target of terrorists. Three of these hearings have been conducted by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Senator Coleman, and I thank him and Senator Levin for their efforts in this area. Indeed, several provisions in our bill address concerns that were identified through that joint investigative work.

I am happy to.

Mr. President, I thank the junior Senator from Mississippi for his kind comments. He has been so helpful as a member of the Commerce Committee and the Finance Committee in helping us weave our way through a very difficult maze. Without his advice and support, I doubt that we would be here tonight. I express my personal appreciation to Senator Lott for his guidance and his assistance and for keeping us all focused on the goal. We could never let turf battles or jurisdictional disputes block us from accomplishing such a needed and important task. He helped us keep our eye on the ball. I thank the Senator very much for his comments.

Mr. President, I was talking about the hearings we were having. Our most recent hearing was in April on the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act, which I mentioned Senator Murray and I had introduced. We heard also from the House leaders on port security, including Representative Dan Lungren and Representative Jane Harman, as well as other experts on our Nation's ports. The following month, that bill was reported out of the Homeland Security Committee.

The Port Security Improvement Act will clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of Government agencies at all levels and of private sector stakeholders. It will establish clear and measurable goals for better security of commercial operations from the point of origin to the destination. It will also establish mandatory baseline security standards and provide incentives for additional voluntary measures.

Perhaps most importantly, the Secretary of Homeland Security would be required to develop protocols for the resumption of trade in the wake of an attack. Five years after the 9/11 attacks, the Federal Government still has not established adequate protocols for resuming port operations and setting cargo release priorities after an attack. I will tell you, when I talk to port authority directors, every single one of them brings this up as a major issue. If we don't have a plan for restarting our ports and for releasing cargo, then our ports will be closed far longer than they would need to be and economic losses would multiply.

This legislation would also establish priorities for critical DHS programs necessary to improve maritime cargo security and would set clear timelines to ensure steady progress on their development and expansion. Let me give another example of where DHS has languished in some areas. They have made progress in others but languished in some.

For example, the Department has been working on a minimum standard for mechanical seals on containers for more than 2 years but has yet to issue it. Under our bill, the Department would have 6 months to establish minimum standards for securing containers in transit to the United States. All containers bound for U.S. ports of entry would have to meet those standards no later than 2 years after they are established.

The bill also provides guidance and deadlines for essential improvements in the Automated Targeting System, the Radiation Portal Monitor Program, the CSI and C-TPAT.

The Automated Targeting System, ATS, is a screening mechanism that the Federal Government uses to help it determine which of the 11 million containers entering this country should receive further scrutiny. The GAO has criticized ATS for utilizing inadequate information to accurately assess the risk of cargo, and our legislation will ensure that the DHS improves that program.

Another notable provision of the bill is the requirement that radiation scanning be applied to 100 percent of the containers entering the 22 largest U.S. ports by December 31, 2007. Now, the result of that is that 98 percent of all cargo containers coming into U.S. ports will be screened for radiation. That is in addition to the radiation scanning that is done at foreign ports through the CSI and the Megaports Programs.

The legislation also expands and enhances the C-TPAT program to ensue the security of cargo from point of origin to destination. It creates a GreenLane, a third tier of C-TPAT, offering additional benefits to participants that voluntarily meet the highest level of security standards. The cooperation of private industry is vital to securing supply chains, and C-TPAT is a necessary tool for securing their active cooperation in supply chain security efforts.

Another security measure that has languished for years is the vital Transportation Workers Identification Card, or the TWIC Program. Again, we would require DHS to publish a final rule on the implementation of this program by the end of this year.

Finally, this comprehensive legislation would authorize the competitive, risk-based Port Security Grants Program. It would have stable, consistent funding set at $400 million each year for the next 5 years. This is a significant commitment of resources, and it will allow our ports to plan and to undertake multiyear projects that require a sustained investment.

The Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 will help us construct an effective, layered, coordinated system that extends from the point of origin to the point of destination. It will cover the people, the vessels, the cargo, and the facilities involved in our maritime commerce. And it addresses a major vulnerability identified time and again by terrorism experts.

Mr. President, I do hope that we can proceed with all due haste to enact this important legislation.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I again thank the Senator for her excellent statement, for her leadership, and for getting us to where we are today. It has been a long journey, but with her leadership we were able to craft this bill, work out the many compromises, and come to the floor. I hope we can do this bill relatively quickly. It has been the subject of an awful lot of discussion and review, and it would be terrific if we can show the American people that we can act in a bipartisan way on an issue that really matters to their security.

It is appropriate that the Presiding Officer tonight is the Senator from Virginia, Senator Allen. I know that port security has been a major priority of his. Earlier in my statement, I mentioned that California, New York, and Virginia are the three States that receive the greatest number of containers, although actually I would think that Washington State has to be in there, too, given the size of Seattle and Tacoma's ports as well. So I know they should be in there as well. But Virginia is a major player in port security, and I want to commend the Senator from Virginia for his leadership on this issue. I know that this has been of great concern to him. He has talked to me as this bill has been making its way through the process, and I publicly thank him for caring about this issue and making it a priority as well.

Mr. President, I am not aware of further Members who are seeking to speak on my side, and I see no indication of further Members on the other side. I am going to, very briefly, put in a quorum call so that we can check, but

I believe we are very close to concluding our business for tonight.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.