Mr. President, I am pleased to join today the chairman of our committee, Senator Lieberman, and the sponsor of this bill, Senator Scott Brown, in urging our colleagues to begin consideration of what is known as the STOCK Act. This…
Mr. President, I am pleased to join today the chairman of our committee, Senator Lieberman, and the sponsor of this bill, Senator Scott Brown, in urging our colleagues to begin consideration of what is known as the STOCK Act.
This legislation is based on a bill that was first introduced in the Senate by Senator Scott Brown and a similar one introduced by Senator Gillibrand. Put simply, the STOCK Act is intended to ensure that Members of Congress do not profit from trading on insider information.
As a cosponsor of Senator Brown's bill, I wish to commend him for his leadership in this area. I also wish to recognize Chairman Lieberman for moving this important bill forward in such an expeditious manner.
Press reports on ``60 Minutes'' and elsewhere have raised questions about whether lawmakers have been exempt, either legally or practically, from the reach of our laws prohibiting insider trading. At a time when polls show record low public confidence in Congress, there is a strong desire on our part to address the concerns that underpin the public's skepticism and assure the American people that we are putting their interests ahead of our own.
The STOCK Act is intended to affirm that Members of Congress are not exempt from our laws prohibiting insider trading. While several of the witnesses who appeared before our committee's hearing on this bill testified that there is no legal exemption for Members of Congress, confusion and uncertainty nevertheless persists. For example, on the eve of our markup, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed by a Yale law professor who wrote that ``the Securities and Exchange Commission has determined that insider trading laws do not apply to Members of Congress or their staff.''
This, however, is directly contradicted by the statement for the record submitted to the committee by the SEC's Enforcement Director who said: ``There is no reason why trading by Members of Congress or their staff members should be considered exempt from the Federal securities laws, including trading prohibitions.''
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the SEC statement at the conclusion of my comments.
Mr. President, to me, this illustrates the confusion over this issue. So I am pleased the committee not only reported Senator Brown's bill but unanimously adopted an amendment I offered with Chairman Lieberman that states clearly that Members and their staff are not exempt from insider trading laws.
The need for this unambiguous statement can likely be traced back to the nature of the insider trading laws. As our committee has learned, our Nation's insider trading laws are not, generally speaking, based on statutes passed by Congress but rather on court precedents. As one of our witnesses, law professor Donna Nagy from Indiana University, pointed out during our hearing:
Congress has never enacted a Federal securities statute
that explicitly prohibits anyone from insider trading. . . .
The explicit statutory ban on insider trading . . . is
entirely absent in U.S. securities law.
Rather, the SEC pursues insider trading cases under the general antifraud provisions of the Federal securities laws, most commonly section 10B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b5, a broad antifraud rule promulgated by the Commission. Therefore, what constitutes insider trading has largely been determined by the courts, including the Supreme Court, on a case-by-case basis.
Under the case law, two different types or theories of insider trading violations have developed; one where the defendant is a classic corporate insider using nonpublic information to trade on the company's stock and a second where the defendant has misappropriated inside information in violation of a duty owed to the source of the information, such as a lawyer who trades on advanced notice of a business transaction. Both types of cases, however, share common elements:
There must be a breach of a duty, such as a traditional fiduciary duty or a duty of trust and confidence; the breach must involve material information, which is the type of information a reasonable investor would consider important in making a decision to buy or
sell stock; the information must be nonpublic; and the defendant must receive a personal benefit, which the Supreme Court has said may include not only financial gain but also reputational benefits.
As the Supreme Court has held, under section 10B, the chargeable conduct must involve a deceptive device or contrivance used in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. In criminal prosecutions for insider trading, under rule 10b5, the government must prove that a person willfully violated the provision with culpable intent.
Although the witnesses who came before the committee generally agreed that Congress enjoys no exemption from insider trading laws, they also stressed the need to clarify the relevant duty that applies to Members.
The bill reported by the committee, in language refined by Senator Levin, addressed this issue by affirming a duty arising from the relationship of trust and confidence already owed by Members and their staff to the Congress, the U.S. Government, and the citizens we serve. At our markup, we clarified that this does not create a new fiduciary duty, in the traditional sense, but rather recognizes or affirms our existing duty.
As reported, the bill would also have amended the Congressional Accountability Act to prohibit Members and staff from using nonpublic information gained through the performance of their official duties for personal benefit. This proposed prohibition, however, was not limited to the trading context or otherwise tethered to financial transactions. Because it was not anchored in financial transactions, I expressed some concerns about the potential breadth of this term and the potential for unintended consequences.
These concerns were echoed by several members of the committee during our consideration of the bill. Therefore, following the markup, we continued to refine the bill while adhering to the fundamental principle that Members of Congress should be subject to the same insider trading laws as other Americans. I believe we have come up with a solution that addresses the potential problem that troubles all of us; that is, public officials using public office for private gain. We need, however, to make sure that in doing so, we do not inhibit our ability to gather information so we can serve our constituents to the best of our ability.
The proposed substitute offered by Senator Reid, Senator Brown, and Senator Lieberman reflects the work of our committee members as well as other bill sponsors. It would require the Senate Ethics Committee and the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct to issue guidance on the relevant rules of each Chamber, clarifying that Members and staff may not use nonpublic information derived from their positions in Congress to make a personal profit. This would cover insider trading matters, as well as land deals and other financial transactions where nonpublic information could be wrongly converted into a private gain.
Similar to the reported bill, the substitute includes a straightforward statement making clear that Members and their staff are not exempt from insider trading prohibitions arising from the securities laws.
In keeping with an amendment that Senator Paul successfully offered at our markup, the substitute applies the same framework--clarification of the prohibition against using nonpublic information for private profit and the affirmation of existing duty that we have--to the employees of the executive and judicial branches, as well as the legislative branch. Similar to the reported bill, the substitute includes earlier deadlines for financial reporting requirements and greater transparency for financial disclosure statements, as the chairman mentioned, by requiring that they be available online and in a searchable format.
I believe we need to reassure a skeptical public that we understand that elective office is a place for public service, not private gain; that it is an honor and a trust we have been given by the people we represent. Underscoring that important message is clearly the intent of this bill, and that is why I support it.
I urge my colleagues to vote yes to vote to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed.
Exhibit 1
[From U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Dec. 1, 2011]
Statement on the Application of Insider Trading Law to Trading by Members of Congress and Their Staffs, Before the United States Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(By Robert Khuzami)
Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of
the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to provide a statement for
the record on behalf of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on the subject of insider trading.
Insider trading threatens the integrity of our markets,
depriving investors of the fundamental fairness of a level
playing field. To deter this conduct and to hold accountable
those who fail to play by the rules, the detection and
prosecution of those who engage in insider trading remains
one of the Division of Enforcement's highest priorities.
My statement provides a summary of the Division of
Enforcement's recent work in the area of insider trading, an
overview of the law of insider trading as developed through
our enforcement program and judicial precedent, and a
description of how the current law of insider trading applies
to securities trading by Members of Congress and their
staffs.
Enforcement's Insider Trading Program
Insider trading has long been a high priority for the
Commission. Approximately eight percent of the 650 average
annual number of enforcement cases filed by the Commission in
the past decade have been for insider trading violations. In
the past two years, the Commission has been particularly
active in this area. In fiscal year 2010, the SEC brought 53
insider trading cases against 138 individuals and entities, a
43 percent increase in the number of filed cases from the
prior fiscal year. This past fiscal year, the Commission
filed 57 actions against 124 individuals and entities, a
nearly 8 percent increase over the number of filed cases in
fiscal year 2010.
The increased number of insider trading cases has been
matched by an increase in the quality and significance of our
recent cases. In fiscal year 2011 and the early part of
fiscal year 2012, the SEC obtained judgments in 18 actions
arising out of its investigation of Galleon hedge fund
founder Raj Rajaratnam, including a record $92.8 million
civil penalty against Rajaratnam personally. The SEC also
discovered and developed information that ultimately led to
criminal convictions of Rajaratnam and others, including
corporate executives and hedge fund managers, for rampant
insider trading. In addition, we recently filed an insider
trading action against Rajat Gupta, a former director of both
Goldman Sachs and Procter & Gamble, whom we allege provided
confidential Board information about both companies'
quarterly earnings and about an impending $5 billion
Berkshire Hathaway investment in Goldman Sachs to Rajaratnam,
who traded on that information.
Among others charged in SEC insider trading cases in the
past fiscal year were various hedge fund managers and traders
involved in a $30 million expert networking trading scheme, a
former Nasdaq Managing Director, a former Major League
Baseball player, a Food and Drug Administration chemist, and
a former corporate attorney and a Wall Street trader who
traded in advance of mergers involving clients of the
attorney's law firm. The SEC also brought insider trading
cases charging a Goldman Sachs employee and his father with
trading on confidential information learned by the employee
on the firm's ETF desk, and charging a corporate board member
of a major energy company and his son for trading on
confidential information about the impending takeover of the
company.
The Division also has targeted non-traditional cases
involving the misuse or mishandling of material, non-public
information. This past fiscal year, the Commission charged
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith with fraud for
improperly accessing and misusing customer order information
for the firm's own benefit. The Commission also censured
broker-dealer Janney Montgomery Scott LLC for failing to
enforce its own policies and procedures designed to prevent
the misuse of material, nonpublic information. Charles Schwab
Investment Management was charged for failing to have
appropriate information barriers for nonpublic and
potentially material information concerning an ultra-short
bond fund that suffered significant declines during the
financial crises. This deficiency gave other Schwab-related
funds an unfair advantage over other investors by allowing
the funds to redeem their own investments in the ultra short-
bond fund during its decline. The Commission also charged
Office Depot, Inc. and two of its executives for violating
Regulation FD by selectively disclosing to certain analysts
and institutional investors that the company would not meet
its earnings.
To respond to emerging risks, the Enforcement Division has
developed several new initiatives targeted at ferreting out
insider trading, which have enhanced our effectiveness in
this area. During our recent reorganization, the Division
established a Market Abuse Unit, with an emphasis on various
abusive market strategies and practices, including complex
insider trading schemes.
The Market Abuse Unit has spearheaded the Division's
Automated Bluesheet Analysis Project, an innovative
investigative tool that utilizes the ``bluesheet'' database
of more than one billion electronic equities and options
trading records obtained by the Commission in the course of
insider trading investigations over the past 20 years. Using
newly developed templates, Enforcement staff are able to
search across this database to recognize suspicious trading
patterns and identify relationships and connections among
multiple traders and across multiple securities, generating
significant enforcement leads and investigative entry points.
While still in its early stages of development, this new data
analytic approach already has led to significant insider
trading enforcement actions that were not the subject of an
SRO referral, informant tip, investor complaint, media
report, or other external source.
As part of the reorganization, the Division also
established a cooperation program to encourage key fact
witnesses to provide valuable information. Insider trading
investigations are extremely fact-intensive. Enforcement
staff undertake the often painstaking work of collecting and
analyzing trading data across equity and options markets,
analyzing communications (email, telephone calls and instant
messages, among others) and analyzing market-moving events
(e.g., announcements of corporate earnings, product
development, and acquisitions and mergers) to identify
persons who may have engaged in insider trading or who may
have information about such activity. Our new cooperation
program is a valuable tool that can help us break open an
insider trading investigation earlier in the process, thereby
preserving resources. We are already seeing the effectiveness
of the cooperation program in our insider trading cases and
expect this trend to continue as more cooperators come
forward in our investigations.
With an aggressive investigative approach that includes
early coordination with the FBI, Department of Justice, and
other law enforcement agencies, we have been able to identify
potential cooperators who may assist criminal authorities
with their covert investigative techniques, helping amass
critical evidence in numerous insider trading investigations.
Our work with certain SROs has provided valuable early tips,
helping us mitigate the harm from insider trading schemes by
freezing the illicit proceeds before funds are moved to
offshore jurisdictions.
Law of Insider Trading
There is no express statutory definition of the offense of
insider trading in securities. The SEC prosecutes insider
trading under the general antifraud provisions of the Federal
securities laws, most commonly Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act'') and Rule
10b-5, a broad anti-fraud rule promulgated by the SEC under
Section 10(b). Section 10(b) declares it unlawful ``[t]o use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.''
Rule 10b-5 broadly prohibits fraud and deception in
connection with the purchase and sale of securities. As the
Supreme Court has stated, ``Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices
employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a
unique form of deception,'' because ``[n]ovel or atypical
methods should not provide immunity from the securities
laws.''
There are two principal theories under which the SEC
prosecutes insider trading cases under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. The ``classical theory'' applies to corporate
insiders--officers, directors, and employees of a
corporation, as well as ``temporary'' insiders, such as
attorneys, accountants, and consultants to the corporation.
Under the ``classical theory'' of insider trading liability,
a corporate insider violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
when he or she trades in the securities of the corporation on
the basis of material, nonpublic information. Trading on such
information qualifies as a ``deceptive device'' under Section
10(b), because ``a relationship of trust and confidence
[exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those
insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason
of their position with that corporation.'' That relationship
``gives rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain from
trading] because of the `necessity of preventing a corporate
insider from . . . tak[ing] unfair advantage of . . .
uninformed . . . stockholders.' ''
The Supreme Court has recognized that corporate
``outsiders'' can also be liable for insider trading under
the ``misappropriation theory.'' Under this theory, a person
commits fraud ``in connection with'' a securities
transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5, when he or she misappropriates confidential and material
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a
duty owed to the source of the information. This is because
``a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a
principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in
breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the
principal of the exclusive use of that information.'' The
misappropriation theory thus ``premises liability on a
fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted
him with access to confidential information.'' Under either
the classical or misappropriation theory, a person can also
be held liable for ``tipping'' material, nonpublic
information to others who trade, and a ``tippee'' can be held
liable for trading on such information.
A common law principle is that employees owe a fiduciary
duty of loyalty and confidence to their employers. In
addition, employees often take on contractual duties of trust
or confidence as a condition of their employment or by
agreeing to comply with a corporate policy. Accordingly,
employees have frequently been held liable under the
misappropriation theory for trading or tipping on the basis
of material non-public information obtained during the course
of their employment. This includes prosecution of federal
employees who, in breach of a duty to their employer, the
federal government, trade or tip on the basis of information
they obtained in the course of their employment. For example,
the SEC recently brought insider trading charges against a
Food and Drug Administration employee alleging that he
violated a duty of trust and confidence owed to the federal
government under certain governmental rules of conduct when
he traded in advance of confidential FDA drug approval
announcements.
In light of existing precedent regarding the liability of
employees--including federal employees--for insider trading,
any statutory changes in this area should be carefully
calibrated to ensure that they do not narrow current law and
thereby make it more difficult to bring future insider
trading actions against any such persons.
Application of Insider Trading Law to Trading by Members of Congress
and Their Staff
The general legal principles described above apply to all
trading within the scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
There is no reason why trading by Members of Congress or
their staff members would be considered ``exempt'' from the
federal securities laws, including the insider trading
prohibitions, though the application of these principles to
such trading, particularly in the case of Members of
Congress, is without direct precedent and may present some
unique issues.
Just as in any other insider trading inquiry, there are
several fact-intensive questions--including the existence and
nature of the duty being breached and both the materiality
and nonpublic nature of the information--that would drive the
analysis of whether securities trading (or tipping) by a
Member of Congress or staff member based on information
learned in an official capacity violates Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.
The first question is whether the trading, or communicating
the information to someone else, breached a duty owed by the
Member or staff. Although there is no direct precedent for
Congressional staff, there is case law from other employment
contexts regarding misappropriation of information gained
through an employment relationship. This precedent is
consistent with a claim that Congressional staff, as
employees, owe a duty of trust and confidence to their
employer and that a Congressional staff member who trades on
the basis of material non-public information obtained through
his or her employment is potentially liable for insider
trading under the misappropriation theory, like any other
non-governmental employee.
The question of duty is more novel for Members of Congress.
There does not appear to be any case law that addresses the
duty of a Member with respect to trading on the basis of
information the Member learns in an official capacity.
However, in a variety of other contexts, courts have held
that ``[a] public official stands in a fiduciary relationship
with the United States, through those by whom he is appointed
or elected.'' Commenters have differed on whether securities
trading by a Member based on information learned in his or
her capacity as a Member of Congress violates the fiduciary
duty he or she owes to the United States and its citizens, or
to the Federal Government as his or her employer.
Existing Congressional ethics rules also may be relevant to
the analysis of duty for both Members and their staff. For
example, Paragraph 8 of the Code of Ethics for Government
Service provides that ``Any person in Government service
should . . . [n]ever use any information coming to him
confidentially in the performance of governmental duties as a
means for making private profit.''
The second question is whether the information on which the
Member or staff trades (or tips) is ``material''--that is, is
there ``a substantial likelihood'' that a reasonable investor
``would consider it important'' in making an investment
decision? Materiality is a mixed question of fact and law
that depends on all the relevant circumstances. In some
scenarios, it may be relatively clear that an upcoming
Congressional action would be material to a particular issuer
or group of issuers, while in others it may be more
challenging to establish that.
The third critical question is whether the information on
which the Member or staff traded (or tipped) is
``nonpublic.'' The Commission has stated that ``[i]nformation
is nonpublic when it has not been disseminated in a manner
making it available to investors generally.'' Whether
information is ``nonpublic'' would likely depend on the
circumstances under which the Member or staff learned the
information and the extent to which the information had been
disseminated to the public.
As with all issues of liability with regard to insider
trading and other claims under Section 10(b), the conduct at
issue must be intentional or reckless. Since all of these
issues are inherently fact-specific, it is difficult to
generalize about the likely outcome of any particular
scenario. However, trading by Congressional Members or their
staffs is not exempt from the federal securities laws,
including the insider trading prohibitions.
Application of Tipper and Tippee Liability Theories to Members of
Congress and Their Staff
Communication of nonpublic information to others who either
trade on the information themselves or share it with others
for securities trading purposes, could be analyzed under the
case law relating to tipper and tippee liability and also
would turn on the specific facts of the case.
A person can be liable as a tipper where he or she
discloses information in breach of a fiduciary duty or other
similar duty of trust or confidence and the tippee trades on
the basis of that information. The same duty requirement
described above is applicable in the tipper context, as are
the requirements that the tipped information be nonpublic and
material. In addition, a court may require a showing that the
Member of Congress or staff member personally benefited from
providing the tip.
A person who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic
information conveyed by a Member or staff member in breach of
a duty also could be liable for illegal insider trading as a
tippee. An additional element of liability is that the tippee
knew or should have known of the tipper's breach of duty in
disclosing the information.
Investigations into potential trading or tipping by Members
of Congress or their staff could pose some unique issues,
including those that may arise from the Constitutional
privilege provided to Congress under the Speech or Debate
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 6, cl.1. The Supreme Court
has stated that ``[t]he Speech or Debate Clause was designed
to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of
speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or
threats from the Executive Branch.'' The Clause ``protects
Members against prosecutions that directly impinge or
threaten the legislative process.'' While the ``heart'' of
the privilege is speech or debate in Congress, courts have
extended the privilege to matters beyond pure speech and
debate in certain circumstances. There may be circumstances
in which communication of nonpublic information regarding
legislative activity to a third party falls ``within the
`sphere of legitimate legislative activity,' '' and thus may
be protected by the privilege.
Conclusion
The SEC's continued focus on insider trading and innovative
investigative techniques demonstrates our commitment to
pursuing potentially suspicious trading in a variety of
contexts. While recent innovations in the Division of
Enforcement are enhancing our ability to obtain that
evidence, to establish liability we must satisfy each of the
elements of an insider trading violation, including the
materiality of the information, the nonpublic nature of the
information, the presence of scienter, and a fiduciary or
other duty of trust and confidence that was violated by the
trading or tipping. While trading by Members of Congress or
their staff is not exempt from the federal securities laws,
including the insider trading prohibitions, there are
distinct legal and factual issues that may arise in any
investigations or prosecutions of such cases. Any statutory
changes in this area should be carefully calibrated to ensure
that they do not narrow current law and thereby make it more
difficult to bring future insider trading actions against
individuals outside of Congress.
I now yield the floor to the sponsor of the bill, Senator Brown.