Mr. Speaker, please submit the following transcript from the June 25, 2005 meeting of the Iranian Human Rights and Democracy Caucus for the Record. Congressman Tom Tancredo: We are going to be talking about the election in Iran and the…
Mr. Speaker, please submit the following transcript from the June 25, 2005 meeting of the Iranian Human Rights and Democracy Caucus for the Record.
Congressman Tom Tancredo: We are going to be talking about
the election in Iran and the aftermath of the election.
According to reports the mullahs employed a variety of
methods to get Mahmood Ahmadinejad elected and including the
use of 5 million national ID cards of the deceased, voting
with unofficial ID cards, voting with both passports and
birth certificates outside of Iran to allow the mullahs men
to write in their votes twice, paying $15.5 million 300,000
members of the parliamentary Bassij force in support of a
particular candidate, buying votes for $35.00 each in many
provinces, furthermore in recent years we have learned
critical information about the mullahs of nuclear program.
Since then the international community has come to better
appreciate the extent of Iran's involvement in terrorist
activity abroad, nuclear ambitions and interference in Iraq,
Lebanon and Palestine. It would be a monumental error if we
assume that the mullahs are reformable, can tolerate
intellectually progress and regional or international peace.
I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and I
hope they can illuminate for us Iran's recent elections and
their implications for the U.S. and the world.
Dr. Kenneth Katzman (Excerpt): Congressional Research
Service--The twists and turns of the Iranian presidential
election in 2005 might indicate that Iranian politics are
more vibrant and less scripted than some experts, and some
Administration officials appear to believe. On the other
hand, Bush Administration criticism of the Council of
Guardians' heavy hand in candidate selection--and eliminating
of all women candidates from the competition--is accurate. .
. . Although Iranian voters apparently did not vote for him
because of his foreign policy positions, his victory has now
ensured a hardliner lock on virtually all major
institutions--the Supreme Leadership, the Council of
Guardians, 6 clerics appointed by Khamenei plus 6 jurists
appointed by the judiciary, the Majles, the Expediency
Council, and now the presidency and government ministries.
The 86-seat Assembly of Experts is elected. Reformists are
now virtually shut out. . . . Potential alterations to
Tehran's bargaining strategies at the nuclear talks with the
so-called ``EU-3'', Britain, France, and Germany, are perhaps
harder to judge. During his second round campaign,
Ahmadinejad pointedly criticized the Foreign Ministry
negotiators as too willing to make dramatic concessions in
order to reach a deal with the EU-3. Those penalties will
likely be the subject of discussion between the United States
and its European allies.
Professor Raymond Tanter (Excerpt): Iran Policy Committee--
With regard to the turnout in the June 2005 Iranian
elections, a Council on Foreign Relations analyst referenced
Iran's notorious Ministry of Intelligence and Security to
validate the regime's announced turnout numbers. . . . I
think if disinformation means anything it means that you
don't go to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security to find
out what the turnout is! I've heard reports from some of the
smaller cities in Iran that the opposition-led boycott was
very effective. The turnout was between 10 percent and 20
percent not the regime's inflated figure of over 50 percent.
It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that the
lower the turnout rate, the less the legitimacy of that
government. . . . In addition, the so-called election was
actually a ``selection'' because the Supreme Leader Khamenie
handpicked candidates in advance of the vote. He started
nearly two years ago to have the revolutionary guards take
control over all organs of the regime. This power play did
not begin a month before the June elections. There was
some internal dissent, and Khamenie thought it was
important for him to control all organs of power. . . .
President Bush deserves credit for condemning the ``sham
selections'' and hence de-legitimizing them in advance.
Here is a three-point plan of the Iran Policy Committee to
facilitate regime change in Iran. First, remove the
Mujaheddin-e Khalq from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations
list. Secondly, expand U.S. funding for Iranian opposition
groups and nongovernmental organizations committed to
democratic change in Iran, including the Mujaheddin-e Khalq
and related groups. Thirdly, invite Iranian opposition
leaders to the White House and to the Congress; these leaders
would include leaders of the Mujaheddin-e Khalq and members
of the National Council of Resistance of Iran.
Congressman Tom Tancredo: It does seem, listening to you,
there is a ray of sunshine and you both have just let shine
on this because, would we be Pollyannaish to think and that
it is good that he is going to disavow any foreign investment
and therefore any internationalization of the economy, those
oil revenues will be less effective perhaps and the mischief
making, then they otherwise would be if the economy were to
thrive under a more expansive or more open arrangement.
Congressman Tom Tancredo: I would like to recognize a
member who has joined us, congressman Clay.
Congressman William Lacy Clay: I appreciate hearing from
Dr. Tanter and the other witnesses here, defined out their
take on the recent elections in Iran. Let me also say that
it's OK to mention Florida, you can also mention Ohio. This
is a bipartisan committee [laughter] I'm delighted to be
here, it's a pleasure, thank you.
Ilan Berman (Excerpt): American Foreign Policy Council--. .
. A great deal of think has been spilt in recent weeks in an
attempt to game the Iranian elections. The art of predicting
have the next president is going to be has been elevated to
high drama, certainly on the editorial pages that we've all
read. Also I think it's important to note that most of this
analysis has been spectacularly wrong, not just wrong but
spectacularly wrong. . . . The power centers within the
Islamic Republic are fully consolidated under the leadership
of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In the past, the outgoing
President Mohammad Khatami had succeeded on a very notable
but very few and far between occasions on breaking with the
clerical leadership and doing so publicly. With the rise of
Mr. Ahmadinejad such descent is more than likely going to
become a thing of the past. Given his political leanings and
his revolutionary credentials he is likely to steer the
Iranian presidency into the out right rubber stamp of the
clerical leadership. That is the first implication. . . .
Second is that Mr. Ahmadinejad's ascendance to power actually
mirrors a deeper political shift that has taken place within
that the Iranian politics
over the last couple of years. The reformists we now all see
are in retreat and internal political changes have shifted
power and shifted power dramatically to a cadre of clerical
hardliners who are committed to revitalizing and even
expanding the Islamic revolution. . . . Iran in short,
constitutes a mounting strategic challenge to the United
States and also to U.S. objectives and the broader Middle
East and the war on terror. Unfortunately, and I use the same
caviar and the Dr. Katzman did, that these are my views
alone, the White House seems to have failed to articulate a
comprehensive strategy towards addressing, not only the
nuclear program but also the broader strategic threat from
the Iranian regime and I think I'd like to conclude by saying
that this is a high time in a good benchmark for us to urge
to change that policy and to actually adopt a proactive
approach.
Question from VOA: I'm wondering what the future relations
between Iran and the United States and I see it as stage that
there is a divergence between the European in the U.S.
concerns. The EU is welcoming the elections and the Americans
are denouncing the elections. What do you see as the future
of Iran, U.S. EU relations and negotiations on the nuclear
issue?
Congressman Tom Tancredo: I think we will have quite a
tussle over the possibility of sanctions we mentioned earlier
that if they do have an effect and I would imagine that will
be arguing with our friends in Europe about things like that.
Is not surprising to me that we see this divergence of
opinion between Europe and the United States with regard to
Iran but I have to admit myself that I have a hard time
understanding the opinions that are being expressed about the
president. I think to some degree our State Department is a
reflection of Europe. We're going to be very pragmatic about
this, we may not like it but that's the way it is and we'll
make the best of it. That's the pragmatic view and I think
that Europe takes that and I would say the more realistic
view is that we have to change the situation. The status quo
is not acceptable, it's far too dangerous. But I don't know
that my opinion will be the one taken by the administration.