Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act
Mr. President, on Tuesday, October 6, I introduced S. 1756, the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act. To appreciate the need for this bill, consider the case of a hard- working Iowan named Jack Gross. Mr. Gross gave the…
Mr. President, on Tuesday, October 6, I introduced S. 1756, the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act.
To appreciate the need for this bill, consider the case of a hard- working Iowan named Jack Gross. Mr. Gross gave the prime of his life, a quarter century of loyal service, to one company. How did that company reward him for his dedication and hard work? It brazenly demoted him and other employees over the age of 50, and gave their jobs to a younger employee.
Expressly to prevent this kind of discrimination, over 40 years ago Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, ADEA. The ADEA, which made it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of age, was modeled on and used the same language as title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the law that prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin and religion.
When Mr. Gross sought to enforce his rights, a jury of Iowans heard the facts and found that his employer discriminated against him because of age. That jury awarded him almost $47,000 in lost compensation.
The case was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court. This past June, in Gross v. FBL Financial, Inc., five Justices rewrote the rules-- indeed, effectively rewrote the law--and ruled against Mr. Gross and other older workers. In doing so, the Court made it harder for those with legitimate age discrimination claims to prevail under the ADEA.
For decades, the law was clear. In 1989, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court ruled that if a plaintiff seeking relief under title VII of the Civil Rights Act demonstrated that discrimination was a ``motivating'' or ``substantial'' factor behind the employer's action, the burden shifted to the employer to show it would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiff's membership in a protecting class. As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress formally codified the ``motivating factor'' standard with respect to title VII.
Because the Age Discrimination in Employment Act uses the same language as title VII, was modeled off it, and had been interpreted consistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, courts correctly and consistently held that a victim bringing suit under the ADEA need only show that membership in a protected class was a ``motivating factor'' in an employer's action--the same standard for plaintiffs claiming discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. If an employee showed that age was one factor in an employment decision, the burden was on the employer to show it had acted for a legitimate reason other than age.
In Gross, the Court--addressing a question on which it did not grant certiorari--tore up this settled decades old standard. In its place, the Court applied an entirely new standard that makes it prohibitively difficult for a victim to prove age discrimination. According to the Court, a victim of age discrimination bears the full burden of proving that age was not only a motivating factor but the decisive factor.
This extremely high burden radically undermines older workers' ability to hold employers accountable. Bear in mind that unlawful discrimination is often difficult to detect. Obviously, those who discriminate do not often admit they are acting for discriminatory reasons. To the contrary, they go out of their way to conceal their true intent. Discrimination cases rarely involve a smoking gun.
The reality, however, is that while employers rarely post signs saying ``older workers need not apply,'' ageism in the workforce does indeed exist, as Mr. Gross and his colleagues learned the hard way. Indeed, according to an AARP study, 60 percent of older workers have reported that they or someone they know has faced age discrimination in the workplace.
Countless thousands of American workers who are not yet ready to voluntarily retire find themselves jobless or passed over for promotions because of age discrimination. Older workers often face ugly, baseless stereotypes: That they are not as productive as younger workers; that they cannot learn new skills; that they somehow have a lesser need for income to provide for their families.
These stereotypes--and the discrimination they feed--are wrong and immoral. This is also harmful to our economy, inasmuch as it deprives us of the skills and talents of millions of older workers.
The timing of the Court's decision is particularly troubling. As our economy continues to struggle, older workers are being hit particularly hard. According to the Department of Labor, there are 2 million unemployed workers over the age of 55. This is an all-time high since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began matching age and unemployment in 1948. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in 2008 nearly 25,000 age discrimination claims were filed, a 30-percent increase over 2007. Given the stereotypes that older workers face, it is no surprise that, on average they remain unemployed twice as long as all unemployed workers.
The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act reverses
the Court's decision and restores the law to what it was for decades. The bill makes clear that when an employee shows that discrimination was a ``motivating factor'' behind a decision, the burden is properly on the employer to show it complied with the law.
The act is modeled on part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which passed the Senate 93-5. As under title VII of the Civil Rights Act, once a plaintiff establishes that age was a motivating factor, the burden shifts to the employer. If the employer establishes that the same decision would have been made regardless of discrimination, the employer remains liable, but remedies are limited.
Only the employer is in a position to know his or her own mind and offer an explanation as to why a decision that involves discrimination was actually motivated by legitimate reasons. By putting the entire burden on the worker to demonstrate the absence or insignificance of other factors, the Court in effect gave employers license to discriminate, so long as they do not actually say they are singling out an employee solely because of age.
Finally, the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act makes clear that the ``motivating factor'' framework applies to all antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws.
In Gross, Justice Thomas defended the Court's radical departure from well-established law by noting that the Court ``cannot ignore Congress' decision to amend title VII's relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.'' In other words, the Court found that because Congress, in the Civil Rights Act, codified the ``motivating factor'' framework for title VII of the Civil Rights Act, but not for the ADEA, Congress somehow must have intended Price Waterhouse not to apply to any statute but title VII. This is a serious misreading of the intent of Congress.
Unfortunately, this reasoning in Gross has already had reverberations in other civil rights cases since many antidiscrimination and antiretaliation statutes utilize similar language as title VII and the ADEA. As the Seventh Circuit recently held, ``[Gross] holds that, unless a statute (such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991) provides otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is part of the plaintiff's burden in all suits under federal law.''
The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, therefore makes clear that Congress is in no way questioning the ``motivating factor'' framework in other antidiscrimination and antiretaliation statutes.
The aim of this bill is very simple. It reiterates what Congress said 40 years ago when it passed the ADEA: When an employer makes an employment decision it is illegal for age to be a factor. A person should not be judged arbitrarily because he or she was born on or before a certain year, despite the fact that he or she still has the ability to contribute as much, or more, as the next person. This bill will help ensure that all our citizens have an opportunity commensurate with their abilities, for productive employment.