Mr. President, last night I reluctantly voted in favor of the Economic Stabilization Act. I want to emphasize the word ``reluctantly.'' I did so because the Nation's financial system faces serious challenges, and it was important for us to…
Mr. President, last night I reluctantly voted in favor of the Economic Stabilization Act. I want to emphasize the word ``reluctantly.'' I did so because the Nation's financial system faces serious challenges, and it was important for us to act. However, I am under no illusion. While this rescue plan will likely calm and stabilize the financial system, at least in the short term, it is not as strong as it should be in terms of protecting taxpayers' money, and it does not get at the underlying problem of what got us here in the first place.
Over the last week, I worked with a number of other Senators to improve this measure that was in the House, that the House turned down. For example, I joined with a group of Senators in developing and creating a special inspector general to oversee the emergency efforts of the Treasury Department and to investigate the inevitable waste, fraud, and abuse as the bailout goes forward. I say ``inevitable'' because when you have $700 billion sloshing around out there and you have one person sort of deciding where it goes, that just invites a lot of mischief. So we have this special inspector general to oversee that. That was a good addition. I am pleased that recommendation was included in the final bill.
I am disappointed that the limits on executive compensation in the bill are not as strong as I would have liked and others would have liked. The final decisions on executive compensation are left to the Secretary, who, by his background, training, and everything, is certainly no champion of limits on executive compensation. Look at his own background, for example. I felt and still feel we should have definitive, hard limits on executive compensation. If they are going to come in here and ask the taxpayers to bail them out, they are, in fact, becoming, effectively, like Government employees, and they should not make anything more, I have often said, than the highest paid Government employee, who is the President of the United States. If they do not like it, they do not have to come to us for the taxpayers to bail them out. So that is something we are going to have to fix.
Likewise, the final decision on acquiring stock in participating banks--that is, getting equity positions--is crucial to protecting taxpayers' money. The decision on what we do on equity is left up to the Secretary
again--either this Secretary or whoever follows this Secretary--and this Secretary has indicated he does not favor the Government taking an equity stake. Well, I beg to differ. Again, if our taxpayers are being asked to put up their money and to put this debt on their children and their grandchildren, well, they and their children and grandchildren ought to have an equity stake, and nothing less will suffice. Again, that is something else that has to be fixed.
In addition, I am disappointed that banks are still not required by law to open their books so we can determine how they valued the assets the Government will be purchasing. We need full disclosure and transparency from participating institutions. If we are going to invest taxpayers' money in these banks and acquire their debt portfolios, then we need to know the details of their methods and their proprietary models for placing values on those portfolios. It is not enough for them to give us the balance sheet. That is not enough. What we need to know is how they got there in the first place, what models they used internally to decide how they would place the value on a certain asset, how they decided how much to pay for a certain asset and how much to sell that asset to someone else.
Therein lies perhaps some of the answers to the questions of how we got here in the first place. Again, there is nothing in this bill that would require them to do it, but they have to be forced to do that. You will hear: There is transparency; we put transparency in the bill. The transparency is in terms of the Secretary buying the assets and how that is done and it is all open and aboveboard. There is nothing in this bill that requires transparency to look at their books to see how they got there in the first place.
Ask yourself this question: You have a company. For a number of reasons, you are going underwater, you are going bankrupt. You go to a bank to get a loan to get back on your feet, hopefully to get up and operating again. Is the bank going to be satisfied with looking at your balance sheet, your assets and debits? No. The bank is going to want to know what got you in trouble. Why are you here seeking our help? What were you doing there that got you into this trouble? Let's look at all your books. No bank is going to loan you money based upon your balance sheet, if you are underwater, declaring bankruptcy or about to.
We are the bank now, the taxpayers. The Federal Government is now the bank. When they come to us and they have assets and they put in this reverse auction, we ought to say: OK, let's take a look at your books; not just your balance sheet, but how did you get to the valuation of those assets? How did you come by those assets? What did you pay for those assets? Why didn't you pay that much for those assets? What was the model you used when you went to the computers and all these ``brainiac'' people decided how much they would pay for these assets? That is a very important point to know. And, if we are to protect the taxpayers, we need to fully understand all of the details about these financial paper we may be buying which may prevent our overpaying.
I brought that up with Secretary Paulson in a meeting. I couldn't believe his response. His response was: We can't do that because a lot of times they don't even know how they got there.
That is true. You can ask a lot of Senators who were in that meeting when I asked the question. That was his response. They don't even know how they got there.
I am sorry. They do know how they got there. If they flipped a coin, they ought to tell us that is what they did. But I don't think that happened. It happened because they had internal accounting structures and computer models that they used to decide how much to pay for an asset, to buy it or not, how much to put it on their books as, maybe sometimes how much to sell it at. That is what we need to know. Don't tell me they don't have that information. They do. I know it is proprietary but, nonetheless, if they are coming to us asking us to buy these assets, we have to know how they got there. If we know that, then that helps us next year when we come back to change the fundamentals, to put in more regulation, more oversight of financial markets, which we have to do. But if we don't know how they got there, how are we going to know, as makers of public policy and protecting the taxpayers in the future, what we need to do in the regulatory scheme? I am disappointed that we don't have that.
There is one other aspect of this bill that troubles me. That is the fact that we put all the $700 billion basically out there on the table. Again, Secretary Paulson was asked by Senator Schumer of New York, was he going to spend all that $700 billion in the first couple weeks. He said, no, it will take about $50 billion a month. This raised a lot of questions in my mind and the minds of others. If it is $50 billion per month, why do we to have give you 700? Why don't we give you $50 billion for the next 4 or 5 months, and then we will sunset it and take a look at it, see how it works. If it works, come back. Congress, I am sure, would be more than happy then to debate it and extend this. I thought that was a good proposal. In other words, put out 5 months' worth, put out $250 or $300 billion, sunset it, come back in February. Let's see how it is working. Is this working? Is it not working? Then make the decision whether we want to put another $350 billion of taxpayer money out there.
What happened, finally, in the bill is a scheme that they put out, I think, $250 billion right now. The Secretary can get another $100 billion by the President snapping his fingers, saying: I want it. He gets $100 billion. Then, to get access to the other $350 billion, there has to be a request from the President. Then Congress has 15 days in which to deny it. They get it, but we have 15 days in which to deny it.
You might say: Well, that is some protection. It is. Except if we deny it, the President can override it. He can veto that. Then we have to have a two-thirds vote to override the veto in both Houses. So this is heavily skewed toward letting the executive branch decide on the full $700 billion. This is something we ought to come back and fix when we return in January. Again, there were some questions raised about that $700 billion.
I was interested to read in Forbes, September 23, it says:
In fact, some of the most basic details, including the $700
billion figure Treasury would use to buy up bad debt, are
fuzzy. ``It's not based on any particular data point,'' a
Treasury spokeswoman told Forbes.com Tuesday. ``We just
wanted to choose a really large number.''
So the $700 billion, where did it come from? They wanted a large number. Tell that to the taxpayers.
I ask unanimous consent that this article from forbes.com entitled ``Bad News for the Bailout,'' be printed in the Record.
With all my concerns, why did I vote for the bill? For the following reasons: We did get a change in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance on banks. It was raised from $100,000 to $250,000. That is even too low. That is an inflationary increase. That is where FDIC would be today in their insurance on deposits in banks if, in fact, it had kept pace with inflation. Quite frankly, it would be more than that. I think it ought to be at least $1 million. Some people are advocating that it ought to be removed completely. Ireland did that. They raised their deposit insurance completely off all the banks. I don't know if I would go that far, but it ought to be at least a million or so because I think depositors would be more comfortable choosing smaller retail banks and community banks. Smaller independent banks have more conservative investment standards. They are better regulated. They are more likely to lend to small businesses and manufacturers which are the backbone of our American economy. Again, many of the independent banks in Iowa and around the United States do a darn good job of investing depositors' money. They invest it in local businesses, manufacturers, startup companies or expansions, the backbone of the American economy, sort of where the rubber meets the road, where people get jobs. Yet they are limited to $100,000 right now. At least this raises it to $250,000, and it should be a lot more. Depositors would feel more comfortable putting money in those banks.
Right now big depositors feel very comfortable putting $20 million in Citibank. Why? Their deposits are not guaranteed, but they know Citibank is too big to fail. We now know some of these banks are now going to be--JPMorgan Chase--too big to fail. Let's put all our money there. The Government is not going to let them fail.
Quite frankly, I believe very strongly that a lot of our smaller, independent banks do a much better job of investing our money than some of the New York banks that used to be investment banks but now want to become depository banks. I was happy to at least raise the FDIC to $250,000. I think it should be higher, but at least that is better than nothing.
The fact is, the choice was either to vote for the bill, despite its flaws, or do nothing, and doing nothing was not an acceptable option. I am hopeful that in the short term this rescue package will work to calm markets and restore confidence in the financial system and loosen up on what is called the liquidity crisis. We are hearing of instances where small businesses in Iowa cannot get the funds that they need. We are hearing about construction projects that are being cancelled. That is costing jobs in my state. I hope it will have an effect worldwide of calming things. But I also hope and insist that we come back early next year to strengthen and improve the rescue framework. I will be working with others to do that. As I said, we need to strengthen the equity position of taxpayers. We have to redo that $700 billion and how that is parceled out. We have to be stronger on executive compensation and equity.
We need to look, at that point in time, at whether we want to also use this money, rather than going in at the top, maybe to go in at the bottom, to help homeowners with their mortgages. I have often said there were two ways of approaching this bailout. You put it in at the top, and it trickles down or you put it in at the bottom and it percolates up. I would prefer putting it in at the bottom and letting it percolate up. We know that trickle-down economics has failed this country time and time again. As one worker told me once, he said: You know, I have heard all about this trickle down. I have been waiting. I haven't felt a drop. I would settle for a heavy dew. I haven't even seen that.
We know what works. We know that when you put money in at the bottom, it does percolate up. Our whole economy is strengthened because of it. When we come back, that is what we have to do in January and February, change this thing around.
I might mention one other thing. When we come back, we have to do something about credit card debt. I keep hearing everyone talking about a credit crunch. When I talk to my constituents about a credit crunch, they think I am talking about credit cards. I was told there is something floating around this country, nine credit cards for every individual. I don't know if that is true, but that is what they say. I read that. We know there are too many credit cards. We know credit cards are too easy to get. One of the reasons they are so easy to get is because the interest rates are out of sight, and people don't know what they are being charged for interest on their credit cards. These young people get credit cards sent to them as soon as they graduate. They get one after another. Credit cards are easy to use. Then you get the bill, but you can roll it over and pay it next month. OK, maybe I can do that. But they don't realize that 12 percent or 15 percent this month can rise up to 28 percent; and not just for the next month, it can impact purchases made before that point. Now you are paying 28 percent on items you buy. So many people have been hooked on this, using their credit cards. So we have to do something about the credit card debt.
There is a bill called the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act, the CARD Act, of which I am a cosponsor. As we come back in January and February, that is something else we are going to have to incorporate into this so-called bailout.
There is one other thing we will have to do. I was sorry to see it lost in the Senate earlier this week. That is the stimulus package. We had a package to put money in at the bottom, let it percolate up, by helping people with extending their unemployment benefits which has the biggest bang for the buck in terms of economic stimulus. People on food stamps, investing in rebuilding our schools, our roads, bridges, our sewer and water systems, that goes directly to people, and it helps stimulate the economy and puts people to work. That bill had a pricetag of about $56 billion. That is not chump change. That is lot of money: $56 billion. But do you know, in what we just voted on last night with $700 billion, $54 billion is, what, not quite 8 percent of what we voted on last night, which we turned down earlier this week to stimulate the economy by putting people to work. Well, I think we have to come back and do that again next year. That is to stimulate our economy.
But there are some other provisions in the rescue bill that are extremely important and valuable. The bill includes a number of tax provisions important to Iowans in particular, including energy production tax credits for producers of wind energy and biomass energy. That will create a lot of new jobs in Iowa and continue the jobs we have.
They are important tax provisions, added by my colleague, Senator Grassley, on the Finance Committee that I have been a strong supporter of, to help the victims of the floods we had in Iowa, to help them get back on their feet, to help the small businesses get back on their feet. It is vitally important to get our economy going back in the State of Iowa. That was in the bill last night.
There is also a provision in there to improve the prospects for the construction of ethanol pipelines--something vitally important to the fledgling biofuels industry that I have led on. It is important to get ethanol back to the east coast, where a lot of people live, from the Midwest where we produce it. That was also in the bill last night.
In addition, there was another thing in that bill last night that we have been trying to do for many years around here, and that is to get mental health parity. In other words, if you have health insurance, they would treat mental health, an addiction, just the same as they would any other
health problem. We have been trying to get that for years, and we finally got it in the bill last night. That will make sure families struggling with mental illness do not have that challenge compounded by having to pay for it out of their pockets. It will be covered by their insurance. It is named after Senator Paul Wellstone and Senator Pete Domenici, both of whom worked very hard to get it passed.
Well, Mr. President, it was an overwhelming, bipartisan vote last night. There are a lot of reasons we need to come back, as I said, next year and make some changes, and we will do that. Hopefully, as I said, this will calm the markets.
Now, Mr. President, I want to ask consent for a number of articles to be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
One is an article by Jonathan Koppell and William Goetzmann entitled ``The Trickle-Up Bailout.'' I will quote from one part of it. It says:
The financial crisis is a liquidity crisis, yes, but it is
ultimately a product of homeowner failures to pay. Unless
this fundamental problem is fixed, we will continue to see--
and need to treat--the symptoms. The proposed bailout ignores
this. Yet the sum being demanded from taxpayers is almost
certainly more than sufficient to pay off all currently
delinquent mortgages.
They call this the ``trickle down,'' what we passed, rather than the ``trickle up'' bailout.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that article be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
Mr. President, I will also ask consent that an article by Harold Meyerson entitled ``Slow Rise for a New Era'' be included in the Record. Again, I will quote from that article. Mr. Meyerson talked about this bill being passed. He said:
If that happens--
If we pass this bill--
the next move would be for Democrats to craft a solution more
in the spirit of FDR:
Franklin Roosevelt.
Save American capitalism by fundamentally reshaping it.
They could direct the government to raise the amount of
depositors' money it insures--
We did in the bill last night a little bit--
to compel the banks to write down their losses, to
recapitalize the banks by taking a significant equity
interest in them, and to refinance beleaguered homeowners
directly.
Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that article be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
Mr. President, I will also ask consent that a list of economists who signed a letter saying there are better ways to approach the problems we have in our financial institutions rather than what we did last night be printed in the Record. It is a letter that was sent to the Speaker and the President. They said:
As economists, we want to express to Congress our great
concern for the plan proposed by Treasury Secretary Paulson
to deal with the financial crisis. . . .We see three fatal
pitfalls in the currently proposed plan:
(1) Its fairness. . . .
(2) Its ambiguity. . . .
(3) Its long-term effects. . . .
So, Mr. President, I ask consent that this list also be printed in the Record to show that--again, the one thing that bothered me in the hearings we had on this plan is, we only heard from the administration. We only heard from people who were for the plan. Why didn't we hear from other people, 200 other economists, Nobel prize-winning economists, who say there is a better way of doing this, folks?
I think when we come back in January, and perhaps even between now and January, we ought to be hearing from these people to see what changes we ought to make in this proposal when we come back in January.
I ask unanimous consent to have that letter and list printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.
Lastly, Mr. President, I have an article by William Isaac, former head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. It is a Washington Post article dated September 27, entitled ``A Better Way to Aid Banks.'' I also ask unanimous consent that article be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, to sum it up, as I said when I started, I reluctantly supported this bill. I hope it will calm the markets. But I am under no illusions that what we did last night solves the problem of why we got here in the first place. To that end, we have to come back. We have to have hearings. We have to bring in other people. We have to get a better handle on what was going on, and next year, with a new administration and a new Congress, I think one of the first things we have to do is to fix this, make it more equitable, make it more fair to the taxpayers of this country, and to get at the underlying fundamentals of why we are here and not just to be satisfied with stopping the bleeding, which is what we did last night.
So, Mr. President, with that, I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
The Trickle-Up Bailout
(By Jonathan G.S. Koppell and William N. Goetzmann)
The theory underlying the bailout plan stalled in Congress
is that rescuing the finance industry will restore market
stability and that the benefits will eventually trickle down
to average Americans. Thus, solving the sub-prime mortgage
crisis has morphed into a much larger challenge: reassembling
the architecture of the financial markets, which seemingly
requires giving the Treasury secretary nearly a trillion
dollars and extraordinary latitude to pick winners and
losers.
There is an easier and more politically palatable fix: Pay
off all the delinquent mortgages.
The financial crisis is a liquidity crisis, yes, but it is
ultimately a product of homeowner failures to pay. Unless
this fundamental problem is fixed, we will continue to see--
and need to treat--the symptoms. The proposed bailout ignores
this. Yet the sum being demanded from taxpayers is almost
certainly more than sufficient to pay off all currently
delinquent mortgages.
If the government did this, all the complex derivatives
based on these mortgages would be as good as U.S. Treasuries.
Their fair value would jump to 100 cents on the dollar,
rescuing teetering financial institutions. The credit markets
would be resuscitated overnight. Foreclosures would stop.
Some will argue that it is grossly unfair to pay off the
mortgages of borrowers who took risks and lost. In other
words, why should my profligate neighbor be rewarded for
over-leveraging himself?
Because such unfairness is a small price to pay to avoid a
rapid transition to a socialist economy, the collapse of our
financial system (and its related global implications) and a
frightening shift of economic power toward the executive
branch. Why shell out $700 billion to Wall Street dealmakers
and the companies they managed into this mess? Wouldn't it be
preferable for individual homeowners to benefit directly?
Implementation could follow the example of the Home Owners'
Loan Corp., which in the 1930s issued new mortgages to a
quarter of American homeowners. The government could offer to
refinance all mortgages issued in the past five years with a
fixed-rate, 30-year mortgage at 6 percent. No credit scores,
no questions asked; just pay off the principal of the
existing mortgage with a government check. If monthly
payments are still too high, homeowners could reduce their
indebtedness in exchange for a share of the future price
appreciation of the house. That is, the government would take
an ownership interest in the house just as it would take an
ownership interest in the financial institutions that would
be bailed out under the Treasury's plan.
All this could be done through the Federal Housing
Administration, with the help of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
which have the infrastructure to implement this plan rapidly.
An equity participation structure would prevent thousands of
foreclosed homes from being dumped on a strained housing
market and would allow prices to reach a new equilibrium that
is based on realistic demand for houses rather than on easy
money or impending foreclosures.
Like the administration's proposal, this plan would result
in the government owning assets. But these assets would be
real estate, not complex derivatives whose true value would
take weeks to discern. Homeowners would become partners with
the government in resolving the crisis.
When Congress returns, lawmakers are likely to modify and
then pass the administration's bailout proposal. They should
consider ways to implement this bottom-up solution. Combining
this approach with the government's proposal could greatly
benefit taxpayers. Yes, the government's swift purchase of
illiquid securities would stabilize compromised financial
institutions and the credit markets. But the notion that
taxpayers would benefit in the long run is pure speculation,
particularly if the government
overpaid for the securities. On the other hand, once a
government-sponsored refinancing wave kicked in, the full
value of the securities in the government's portfolio would
be restored, and they could be sold off in an orderly manner,
with Uncle Sam taking profits that would cover the cost of
the bailout.
The public is rightly concerned that the administration's
bailout would benefit only powerful financial institutions.
No matter how it's done, rescuing the financial system is a
large, complex gamble.
This solution would start by helping ordinary Americans and
would quickly spill over to revive the financial markets.
Directly addressing the underlying cause of the crisis would
help ensure that we would not be facing the same crisis again
down the road. While Wall Street has only recently felt the
bite of foreclosures delinquencies, communities across the
nation will face greater financial and social fallout if the
foreclosure crisis continues.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.