I wish to make a few comments in regard to the Kennedy- Feinstein amendment currently before us. Madam President, I think it behooves all of us to take the time and review where we are in this debate. The current law prohibits research and…
I wish to make a few comments in regard to the Kennedy- Feinstein amendment currently before us.
Madam President, I think it behooves all of us to take the time and review where we are in this debate.
The current law prohibits research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons. It prevents scientists from even thinking about low- yield nuclear weapons. There is a provision in the bill before us that says we will be able to think about low-yield nuclear weapons, but it specifically prevents testing, acquisition, or deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons unless you come to the Congress and ask permission to move forward with that type of effort.
The Kennedy-Feinstein amendment we are currently considering takes it back to the current prohibition of even thinking about what it is we need to do about low-yield nuclear weapons.
During the Easter break, which was a 2-week break, I spent the first week on townhall meetings in Colorado. The second week I spent visiting our National Laboratories.
Our National Laboratories are pretty much known for their responsibility of managing the nuclear stockpile to make sure that it is safe and reliable. As I visited these laboratories, I found out they do much more than that. They give a lot of thought to what type of deterrence should we have as far as being a superpower. They do a lot of thinking about our vulnerabilities. They think about our potential threats and what might be the proper response to those threats.
So the nuclear laboratory scientists tell me that they wish at least they could study the low-nuclear weapon alternative. I agree. I think at least we ought to look at the pros and cons. We ought to try to gather the scientific data and understand which situations may be needed. Maybe we do not need low-yield nuclear weapons, but they at least need to think about it and they need to have a study.
Ambassador Linton Brooks testified before the Armed Services Committee, and he was the acting administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. He also testified before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on April 8, 2003. This is what he said: Repeal of the low- yield restriction simply removes the chilling effect on scientific inquiry that could hamper our ability to maintain and exercise our intellectual capabilities and to respond to the needs that one day might be articulated by the President.
He also noted that such warhead concepts could not proceed to full- scale development, much less production and deployment, unless Congress authorizes and appropriates the funds required to do this.
As a point of reference in the ban on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons--low yield is defined as below 5 kilotons as a comparison. So in nuclear technology, we are talking about a relatively small type of warhead.
I respect the view of the scientists I visited at our various laboratories. One thing I came away thinking is they are dedicated Americans. They are dedicated scientists. They have a lot of ingenuity, and they are supported by a tremendous workforce that is dedicated to making sure we have a safer world and that we can actually preserve freedom. They are concerned that we remain a world leader. My view is we are a world leader, but we are a world leader in reducing nuclear weapons.
Earlier the Senator from North Dakota commented about the fact that where he had silos for missiles with nuclear warheads, he now has sunflowers growing in the field. Well, right now, under the Presidential directive of President Bush, we are removing peacekeepers from the ground. We are taking out a sizable proportion of some of the cold war relics that are supposed to act as deterrents as far as a nuclear war is concerned.
While these sunflowers are growing and the President is removing more of our nuclear warheads, what is the rest of the world doing? What I have observed is that there are countries such as Iran and Iraq--no longer Iraq but at one point in time at least--Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea are building more nuclear weapons. They are trying to develop that technology.
We have been a leader. The problem is nobody is following. I think these countries are more concerned not so much about what the United States is doing but about what their neighbors are doing, what it is that they are going to have to require to defend their borders. So this is beyond what we do in this country.
Even though this country remains committed and has shown leadership in reducing our nuclear weapons, we have to remember that other countries are moving ahead, regardless of what we are doing. We need to give some thought to that. We need to study that issue.
I am looking at some figures on nuclear testing which we postponed on September 23, 1992. That was the last date of underground nuclear tests by the United States. Since that date, we have had a number of nuclear tests by China, France, India, and Pakistan. I have a whole list of them.
I ask unanimous consent that this list be printed in the Record.
I do not see that other countries are responding to our efforts. So I think we need to think about our own vulnerabilities and our own potential threats. That is what we are trying to do in the armed services bill. We are trying to at least give our scientists an opportunity to study our nuclear weapon vulnerabilities.
Earlier on in the debate, some comment was made--I think we had a dialogue between a couple of Members who were supporting the Kennedy- Feinstein amendment. The point was made during that dialogue that this provision we have in the bill would lead to the building of new weapons. That is not true. We have a specific provision in the bill that says nothing in the provision shall be construed as authorizing the testing, acquisition, or deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons.
What it does provide for is study and thinking about our vulnerabilities, our deterrence efforts, and our potential threats.
I mentioned that Ambassador Linton Brooks testified in front of our subcommittee. I have a letter from General Jumper explaining how important it is that we at least study the low-yield nuclear weapons. I have a letter from Admiral Ellis talking about that need. We also have a letter from Secretary of State Colin Powell talking about the need of having low-yield nuclear weapons. I ask unanimous consent these three letters be printed in the Record.
Many rogue nations have built and are continuing to build hard and deeply buried facilities to protect their most valuable assets such as their leadership, communications equipment, and facilities for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. We know that conventional weapons cannot hold all of these targets at risk. A recent report by the Congressional Research Service cited a DIA estimate of some 1,400 known or suspected strategic underground facilities world wide. It further states that the only way to destroy them is with a strong shock wave that travels through the ground.
The question that the Congress and the administration must now grapple with is how to ensure the continued credibility of the Nation's nuclear deterrent into the 21st century. We must recognize that today's stockpile was designed and manufactured to deter the threat by the former Soviet Union. As we all know, that threat no longer exists. Today, we are faced with a multi-dimensional challenge that requires a different set of tools.
By repealing the ban on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons, this does not mean the United States is about to resume nuclear weapons production. In fact, the United States has not manufactured a new nuclear weapon for more than a decade. The advanced concepts initiative merely allows the labs to explore the technical boundaries of providing solutions to new and emerging national security challenges. Advanced concepts work will allow the labs to train the next generation of scientists and engineers that the Nation will need to ensure a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent.
The fear of the erosion of the firewall between the use of nuclear and conventional weapons use is another unfounded issue. During the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, when U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were deployed throughout the world and warfighting plans were in place, no U.S. nuclear weapons were ever used. We still maintain the policy that only the President can authorize the use of nuclear weapons and there are no plans to change that very important policy, nor is there any desire on the part of the Department of Defense to develop battlefield nuclear weapons to accomplish what our conventional weapons can already do.
Now I will review the bill that is before us.
It states specifically in the legislation that nothing in the repeal made by section A shall be construed as authorizing the testing, acquisition, or deployment of a low-yield nuclear weapon.
We are just talking about studying, thinking about low-yield nuclear weapons.
The key is if the U.S. President is faced with a situation so grave that the use of nuclear weapons is considered, we must have a full sweep of options. Options in our current stockpile are very limited and would result in a significant level of collateral damage if the nuclear weapon is required to resolve a crisis in terms of the best interests of the United States.
These are challenging times, but they are crucial times, important times, and it is important we make the right decision because the world is changing. We need to know that. We need to know what the parameters are as we move forward in determining what is best to protect America. To have a provision in law that says you cannot study or think about all the options when you are looking at your vulnerabilities and where you need to go to protect America is foolhardy.
I hope the Senate today will defeat the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment and at least allow for study and our scientists to think about various alternatives, including a low-yield nuclear weapon. I am here to ask my colleagues in the Senate to join me in voting no on the Kennedy- Feinstein amendment.
I think we are getting to the point where we are ready to wrap up debate. I will make a few comments and we will move to table and have a vote in a relatively short period of time. I am warning everyone we are getting close to a vote.
I thought I would take a few moments to review some of the comments made by individuals in the administration about the need to allow for research, at least, and study as far as the low-yield nuclear weapons were concerned.
I rise in opposition to the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment. Let me read from a letter from Secretary of State Powell, dated May 5, 2003.
I am writing to express support for the President's FY2004
budget request to fund the feasibility and cost study for the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), and to repeal the
FY1994 legislation that prohibits the United States from
conducting research and development on low yield nuclear
weapons. I do not believe that these legislative steps will
complicate our ongoing efforts with North Korea.
This is a statement from our Secretary of State.
ADM Ellis, U.S. Navy, had this to say in a letter to the chairman:
The nation needs to understand the technical capabilities
of threats under development by potential adversaries and to
thoroughly explore the range of options available to the
United States to deter or defeat them. Once we complete the
precise engineering analyses necessary to validate facts
related to nascent advanced concepts, the results of the
research will enable dispassionate, fact-based decisions on
very important defense and policy issues.
If you repeal the law on low-yield nuclear weapons, you end up producing nuclear weapons which will cause less collateral damage if used and, therefore, the United States is more likely to use that. That is the assertion.
First, in response to that, NNSA cannot produce or deploy a new nuclear weapon without an authorization and appropriation from Congress. Second, there have been thousands of deployed
low-yield nuclear weapons during the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and today, and that has not lowered the nuclear weapon threshold. Nuclear weapons are still a very high threshold that only the President can initiate.
On April 8, 2003, Admiral James Ellis said:
. . . it's not clear to me there is a direct linkage
between the size of the weapons and the awesome
responsibilities embodied in that decision.
Ambassador Linton Brooks quoted, as then acting director of NNSA, in an April 8, 2003 hearing:
Is there a logic to saying that we have older low-yield
weapons, but that we now know we are not going to ever want
to produce new low-yield weapons. Now to some extent I admit
we are talking about--since I'm not going to develop or
produce anything without the permission of the Congress and
if the Congress decided to give me permission, it could
modify the ban . . .
Now, we are looking at both administrations that have basically taken the position that we need to have a nuclear response to either chemical or biological weapons or weapons of mass destruction.
On December 7, 1997, President Clinton issued some guidelines which would permit nuclear strikes after enemy attacks involving chemical or biological weapons, which was reported widely at that time.
Finally, I point out some language and remind my colleagues we have specific language in the bill, and I will again repeat that language:
Nothing in the repeal made by subsection (a) shall be
construed as authorizing testing, acquisition, or deployment
of a low-yield nuclear weapon.
The issue is clear. I am now willing to move forward with the vote.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
For Members' information, we are going to proceed to a vote. I want Members to understand we are going to hold this vote open an extra length of time to accommodate those who are expecting the vote to occur at 7:45. This will allow Members who are anxious to get home early tonight to leave early, and then we will keep the vote going later on.
Having made that announcement, I will move to table.
I understand we have some time to be yielded back on both sides.
I have contacted the leader on the Republican side. He is expecting us to leave this open to somewhere around 8:10.
Now we both have time to yield back.
I yield the remainder of the time on the Republican side.
Now I move to table the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment. I ask for the yeas and nays.
I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.