S.Amdt. 2518Senate109th Congress (2005-2007)

To clarify and recommend changes to the policy of the United States on Iraq and to require reports on certain matters relating to Iraq.

Submitted November 10, 2005

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Senate amendment agreed to: Amendment SA 2518 agreed to in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 79 - 19. Record Vote Number: 323.

November 15, 2005

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Senate amendment agreed to: Amendment SA 2518 agreed to in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 79 - 19. Record Vote Number: 323.

November 15, 2005

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Roll call votes on amendments in Senate: Amendment SA 2518 agreed to in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 79 - 19. Record Vote Number: 323.

November 15, 2005

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Considered by Senate. (consideration: CR S12777, S12796-12798)

November 15, 2005

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Amendment SA 2518 agreed to in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 79 - 19. Record Vote Number: 323.

November 15, 2005

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Considered by Senate. (consideration: CR S12727)

November 14, 2005

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Senate amendment submitted

November 10, 2005

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Senate amendment proposed (on the floor): Amendment SA 2518 proposed by Senator Warner.

November 10, 2005

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Amendment SA 2518 proposed by Senator Warner. (consideration: CR S12668-12669; text: CR S12669) To clarify and recommend changes to the policy of the United States on Iraq and to require reports on certain matters relating to Iraq.

November 10, 2005

Text

Submitted

SA 2518. Mr. WARNER (for himself and Mr. Frist) proposed an amendment
to the bill S. 1042, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2006
for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes; as follows:

[[Page S12701]]

At the end of title XII, add the following:

SEC. __. UNITED STATES POLICY ON IRAQ.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``United
States Policy on Iraq Act''.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that,
in order to succeed in Iraq--
(1) members of the United States Armed Forces who are
serving or have served in Iraq and their families deserve the
utmost respect and the heartfelt gratitude of the American
people for their unwavering devotion to duty, service to the
Nation, and selfless sacrifice under the most difficult
circumstances;
(2) it is important to recognize that the Iraqi people have
made enormous sacrifices and that the overwhelming majority
of Iraqis want to live in peace and security;
(3) calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant
transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security
forces taking the lead for the security of a free and
sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the
phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq;
(4) United States military forces should not stay in Iraq
any longer than required and the people of Iraq should be so
advised;
(5) the Administration should tell the leaders of all
groups and political parties in Iraq that they need to make
the compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and
sustainable political settlement that is essential for
defeating the insurgency in Iraq, within the schedule they
set for themselves; and
(6) the Administration needs to explain to Congress and the
American people its strategy for the successful completion of
the mission in Iraq.
(c) Reports to Congress on United States Policy and
Military Operations in Iraq.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and every three months
thereafter until all United States combat brigades have
redeployed from Iraq, the President shall submit to Congress
an unclassified report on United States policy and military
operations in Iraq. Each report shall include, to the extent
practicable, the following unclassified information:
(1) The current military mission and the diplomatic,
political, economic, and military measures, if any, that are
being or have been undertaken to successfully complete or
support that mission, including:
(A) Efforts to convince Iraq's main communities to make the
compromises necessary for a broad-based and sustainable
political settlement.
(B) Engaging the international community and the region in
the effort to stabilize Iraq and to forge a broad-based and
sustainable political settlement.
(C) Strengthening the capacity of Iraq's government
ministries.
(D) Accelerating the delivery of basic services.
(E) Securing the delivery of pledged economic assistance
from the international community and additional pledges of
assistance.
(F) Training Iraqi security forces and transferring
security responsibilities to those forces and the government
of Iraq.
(2) Whether the Iraqis have made the compromises necessary
to achieve the broad-based and sustainable political
settlement that is essential for defeating the insurgency in
Iraq.
(3) Any specific conditions included in the April 2005
Multi-National Forces-Iraq campaign action plan (referred to
in United States Government Accountability Office October
2005 report on Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link
Economic, Governance, and Security Indicators to Conditions
for Stabilizing Iraq), and any subsequent updates to that
campaign plan, that must be met in order to provide for the
transition of security responsibility to Iraqi security
forces.
(4) To the extent that these conditions are not covered
under paragraph (3), the following should also be addressed:
(A) The number of battalions of the Iraqi Armed Forces that
must be able to operate independently or to take the lead in
counterinsurgency operations and the defense of Iraq's
territory.
(B) The number of Iraqi special police units that must be
able to operate independently or to take the lead in
maintaining law and order and fighting the insurgency.
(C) The number of regular police that must be trained and
equipped to maintain law and order.
(D) The ability of Iraq's Federal ministries and provincial
and local governments to independently sustain, direct, and
coordinate Iraq's security forces.
(5) The criteria to be used to evaluate progress toward
meeting such conditions.
(6) A schedule for meeting such conditions, an assessment
of the extent to which such conditions have been met,
information regarding variables that could alter that
schedule, and the reasons for any subsequent changes to that
schedule.
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