To limit the waiver authority of the President.

UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION ACT

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I ask that the bill S. 3709, the United
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, be called up and
be the pending business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
proceed to the consideration of S. 3709, which the clerk will report.
The clerk will report the bill by title.
The legislation clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 3709) to exempt from certain requirements of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 United States exports of nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology to India, and to
implement the United States Additional Protocol.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, today the Senate begins consideration of
legislation on the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. This
agreement is the most important strategic diplomatic initiative
undertaken by President Bush. By concluding this pact and the far-
reaching set of cooperative agreements that accompany it, the President
has embraced a long-term outlook that seeks to enhance the core
strength of our foreign policy in a way that will give us new
diplomatic options and improve global stability.
The Committee on Foreign Relations undertook an extensive review of
this agreement. We held four public hearings with testimony from 17
witnesses, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. We received a
classified briefing from Undersecretaries of State Nick Burns and Bob
Joseph. Numerous briefings were held for staff with experts from the
Congressional Research Service, the State Department, and the National
Security Council. I submitted 174 written questions for the record to
the Department of State on details of the agreement and posted the
answers on the committee web site.
The agreement allows India to receive nuclear fuel, technology, and
reactors from the United States--benefits that were previously denied
to India because of its status outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty--NPT. This pact is a lasting incentive for India to abstain from
further nuclear weapons tests and to cooperate closely with the United
States in stopping proliferation.
The bill before us is an important step toward implementing the
nuclear agreement with India, but we should understand that it is not
the final step in the process. This legislation sets the rules for
subsequent congressional consideration of a so-called 123 Agreement
between the U.S. and India. A 123 Agreement is the term for a peaceful
nuclear cooperation pact with a foreign country under the conditions
outlined in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Our legislation does not restrict nor does it predetermine
congressional action on the forthcoming 123 Agreement. Unlike
the adminisiration's original legislative proposal, this bill preserves
congressional prerogatives with regard to consideration of a future 123
Agreement. Under the administration's original proposal, the 123
Agreement would have entered into force 90 days after submission unless
both houses of congress voted against it, and with majorities that
could overcome a likely Presidential veto. I am pleased the
administration changed course on this matter and agreed to submit the
123 Agreement with India to Congress under normal procedures. This
means that both the House and the Senate must cast a positive vote of
support before the 123 Agreement can enter into force.

In our view, this better protects Congress's role in the process and
ensures congressional views will be taken into consideration.
I thank Senator Biden for his close cooperation on developing this
important bill. It reflects our shared views and concerns. He and his
staff were valuable partners in the drafting of this legislation, and
the final product is much improved because of their efforts. Together,
we have constructed a bill that allows the U.S. to seize an important
strategic opportunity, while ensuring a strong congressional oversight
role, reinforcing U.S. nonproliferation efforts, and maintaining our
responsibilities under the NPT. I also want to thank all members of the
Foreign Relations Committee for their support, and the work of their
staffs, in crafting a bill that received the overwhelming support of
the committee last June.
For the benefit of Senators, I offer the following section by section
analysis.
Section 101 identifies the bill as the U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic
Energy and U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act. Sections 102
and 103 of the Lugar-Biden bill include sense of the Congress
provisions on U.S.-India relations and policy declarations. These
provisions give voice to a set of important policy issues involving
bilateral relations, democratic values, nuclear non-proliferation
regimes, fissile material production in South Asia, and support for
IAEA safeguards and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. All of these concerns
are reinforced by the bill's comprehensive reporting requirements.
Section 104 provides waiver authority from provisions in the Atomic
Energy Act and removes the prohibition on cooperating with India due to
its 1998 weapons tests and its existing weapons program. At the same
time, section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, which is preserved under
the Lugar-Biden bill, terminates nuclear cooperation if India conducts
a nuclear test, proliferates nuclear weapons or materials, or breaks
its agreements with the IAEA or the United States.
Section 105 of our proposal adopts all of the administration's
requirements

[[Page S10983]]

to ensure that India is meeting its nonproliferation commitments. In
addition, we require that decisions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
enabling nuclear trade with India are made by consensus and consistent
with its rules. Our aim is to ensure that this multilateral
organization will continue to play a vital role in global
nonproliferation efforts.
Section 106 prohibits exports of equipment, materials or technology
related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear
fuel, or the production of heavy water. The provision allows narrow
exceptions for the export of these items from the United States to
India if they are for proliferation-resistant activities that involve
the United States or have the sponsorship of a recognized international
body such as the IAEA. This provision is consistent with the
administration's policy regarding such transfers. It would allow
cooperation in sensitive nuclear areas only if such cooperation could
be implemented with no risk of proliferation.
Section 107 requires the creation of a system to ensure that no items
exported to India are diverted to any uses that are not peaceful. This
section seeks to ensure U.S. compliance with our NPT obligations.
Section 108 requires annual Presidential certifications that India is
meeting its commitments under the July 2005 Joint Statement, its
Separation Plan, New Delhi's Safeguards Agreement and additional
protocol with the IAEA, the 123 Agreement, and applicable U.S. laws
regarding U.S. exports to India. The President must also certify on an
annual basis that U.S. trade with India in these areas remains in the
national security interests of the United States.

Section 109 requires that no action be undertaken under this act that
could violate any U.S. obligation under the NPT. Section 110 explicitly
stipulates that if India conducts a nuclear test, U.S.-India civilian
nuclear cooperation is terminated. Finally, sections 111 and 112
clarify India's Missile Technology Control Regime status under U.S. law
and various terms used in the bill.
The U.S.-Indian agreement resulted from a delicately balanced
negotiation. Neither side got everything it wanted. Nevertheless, the
Bush administration and the Indian government came to the conclusion
that the agreement was in the national security interest of both
countries. I urge Senators to vote in favor of this legislation without
conditions that would kill the agreement.
I would also note that Senator Biden and I included an important
piece of nonproliferation legislation in the bill as title II. In 2004,
the Senate ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol, but Congress did not
pass implementing legislation that is required for the treaty to go
into effect. President Bush has called on the Senate to act on this
important matter, and the committee voted unanimously in favor of this
bill in March.
The Committee approved this legislation with a bipartisan vote of 16
to 2. Furthermore 15 members of the committee asked to be named as
original cosponsors. Since that time, additional Senators have
requested to be added as cosponsors.
Due to the fact that the legislation was an original bill, the
Parliamentarian ruled that cosponsors were not permitted. This is
unfortunate because the amount of support our legislation has received
is impressive. I appreciate the strong support of Senators Biden,
Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski,
Martinez, Dodd, Kerry, Nelson, Obama, Cornyn, Bayh, Hutchison, DeWine,
and Lott.
During our markup, the committee rejected an amendment offered by
Senator Feingold. Under the amendment, the President would have had to
determine with absolute certainty that no U.S. nuclear fuel exports to
India could increase its production of fissile materials for weapons.
New Delhi would rightly see this as moving the goalposts--an
unacceptable unilateral alteration of the pact. If the Feingold
amendment or others like it are included in the final legislation, they
would effectively kill the U.S.-India Agreement.

I would have preferred that the U.S.-India Agreement had included a
commitment by New Delhi to stop making nuclear bomb materials, but
negotiations did not yield that result. Instead, the Bush
administration won an important commitment to negotiate a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty. Such a multilateral approach is the best way to
reduce nuclear tensions and threats associated with an arms race in
South Asia.
The Lugar-Biden bill declares it the policy of the United States to
achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the production of fissile
materials for nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. Our bill also
includes an annual reporting requirement detailing:

United States efforts to promote national or regional
progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing,
capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles,
pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off
regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-
off Treaty.

I will oppose amendments that delay or impose additional conditions
on the agreement before it can enter into force. The Senate will not
advance U.S. national security in this case by making the perfect the
enemy of the good. We should not hold up the significant
nonproliferation gains afforded by this initiative in order to seek a
fissile material cap that India has indicated it will not consider
absent similar commitments by Pakistan and China.
The United States and India have engaged in initial discussions on a
multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, FMCT, to be negotiated in
the conference on disarmament. We should press for rapid progress in
that context.
The Indian government has expressed concern about section 106 of our
bill. This section prohibits the export of any equipment, materials or
technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of
spent fuel, or the production of heavy water. These technologies are
not purely civilian in nature. They are considered critical elements to
a modern nuclear weapons program.
This provision in our bill is entirely consistent with President
Bush's policy announcement on this matter at the National Defense
University on February 11, 2004. In his speech, the President said:

The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse
to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and
technologies to any state that does not already possess full-
scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. This
step will prevent new states from developing the means to
produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators
must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to
acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for
manufacturing illegal weapons.

President Bush also said that ``enrichment and reprocessing are not
necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes.''
In response to questions for the record that I submitted, Under
Secretaries of State Bob Joseph and Nick Burns amplified this
administration policy as it applies to the nuclear agreement with
India. They said:

For the United States, ``full civil nuclear cooperation''
with India means trade in most civil nuclear technologies,
including fuel and reactors. But we do not intend to provide
enrichment or reprocessing technology to India. As the
President said in February 2004, ``enrichment and
reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to
harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'' We do not
currently provide enrichment or reprocessing equipment to
any country. We will also need to ensure that any
cooperation is fully consistent with U.S. obligations
under the NPT not to in any way assist India's nuclear
weapons program, and with provisions of U.S. law.

Under Secretaries Burns and Joseph also answered that:

We do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to
any state. Therefore, full civil nuclear cooperation with
India will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology.

This answer is especially significant, since the phrase ``full civil
nuclear energy cooperation'' is the phrase taken directly from the July
2005 joint statement.
In response to a question for the record that I submitted to
Secretary Rice, she responded:

The U.S. does not foresee transferring heavy water
production equipment or technology to India, and the draft
bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement accordingly
makes no provisions for such transfers.

Our committee bill, S. 3709, does not break any new ground in this
area. This is not a new subject. The answers to these questions have
been on the committee's Web site for months.

[[Page S10984]]

Nothing in this bill deviates from the President's policy, and we even
go one step further by allowing the flexibility to export those items
from the United States for proliferation-resistant activities with the
U.S. or under international cooperation. I support section 106, and I
think it is important that we take the strong and definitive statements
made by President Bush, Secretary Rice, Under Secretary of State Nick
Burns, and Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph and put them into
law.

The Indian government has also expressed concern about section 107,
which requires an end-use monitoring program to be carried out with
respect to U.S. exports and re-exports of nuclear materials, equipment,
and technology sold or leased to India. Some have argued that this
provision is not needed because IAEA safeguards would verify the use of
any U.S. exports to India. IAEA safeguards only apply, however, to
nuclear materials, not to nuclear technology. Sensitive technology of
the kind the United States might export to India that can be used in
India's civilian nuclear program could also advance India's nuclear
weapons program.
This type of end-use system is not without precedent, as Congress
required similar recordkeeping for nuclear cooperation with China.
An end-use monitoring program can provide increased confidence in
India's separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs. It
also would further ensure United States compliance with article I of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The provision is not intended to cast doubt on the sincerity of
India's July 18 Joint Statement commitments or its March and May 2006
separation documents. Rather, the committee believes that by building
and establishing a special program with India, the resulting
coordination between India and U.S. regulatory agencies can provide a
basis for even greater cooperation and commerce between the two
nations.
Section 107 would confirm that only authorized recipients are
receiving nuclear technology; that the nuclear technology identified
for transfer will be used only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear
activities; that the nuclear technology identified for transfer will
not be retransferred without the prior consent of the United States;
and that facilities, equipment, or materials derived through the use of
transferred technology will not be transferred without the prior
consent of the United States.
This section also requires that, in the absence of IAEA safeguards,
the U.S. and India must arrange a bilateral system to ensure that
safeguards in India remain on U.S. exports and re-exports in
perpetuity.
Section 107 requirements could be met by applying to India those
measures already governing atomic energy cooperation under the 123
Agreement with China. Under Secretary Joseph testified before the
committee that, while the 123 Agreement with India will not provide for
full-scope safeguards, it ``will allow for appropriate controls to help
ensure that material or goods provided for civilian purposes remain
within the civilian sector.'' So nothing in section 107 would be
inconsistent with what may be concluded in the 123 Agreement with India
itself.

Title II of the bill includes the committee's IAEA Additional
Protocol Implementing Legislation. This title permits the Additional
Protocol the U.S. has concluded with the IAEA to go into effect.
In President Bush's 2004 speech at the National Defense University,
he called on the Senate to ratify the U.S. Additional Protocol with the
IAEA. He said:

We must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to
fulfill its essential mandate. America and other nations
support what is called the Additional Protocol, which
requires states to declare a broad range of nuclear
activities and facilities, and allow the IAEA to inspect
those facilities . . . Nations that are serious about
fighting proliferation will approve and implement the
Additional Protocol. I've submitted the Additional Protocol
to the Senate. I urge the Senate to consent immediately to
its ratification.

The Committee on Foreign Relations voted unanimously to approve a
resolution of ratification on the U.S. Additional Protocol on March 4,
2004, and the full Senate approved it on March 31 by unanimous consent
in 2004.
Unfortunately the Additional Protocol is not self-executing. Congress
must adopt implementing legislation for the United States to submit its
instruments of ratification. In other words, implementing legislation
must be passed before the Additional Protocol can go into effect. The
Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously approved the implementing
legislation on March 4, 2006, but efforts to pass the legislation in
the full Senate have been unsuccessful due to holds placed by several
Senators.
At a time when the administration and the Congress are demanding that
India conclude such an Additional Protocol as part of its overall
nuclear arrangements, Congress must muster the political will to act on
the implementing legislation. Our credibility as the leader of global
nonproliferation efforts is at stake. Along with many other nations, we
are asking the IAEA to perform critical functions aimed at preventing
nuclear proliferation. An effective IAEA is very much in the national
security interest of the United States.
Some Senators expressed concern that the Additional Protocol and the
implementing legislation will make it possible, even likely, that
international inspectors will learn secrets about our nuclear weapons
program. Let me state clearly, nothing could be further from the truth.
The Additional Protocol does not contain any new arms control or
disarmament obligations for the United States. Although there are
increased rights granted to the IAEA for the conduct of inspections in
the United States, although there are increased rights granted to the
IAEA for the conduct of inspections in the United States, the
administration has assured the Foreign Relations Committee that the
likelihood of an inspection occurring in our country is very low.
Moreover, even if an inspection under the Additional Protocol is
requested, the United States has the full right, through the National
Security Exclusion, to prevent the inspection if we determine that it
could be potentially harmful to U.S. national security interests.
On July 26, 2006, the National Security Adviser, Steve Hadley,
expressed the administration's support for the language in title II. He
wrote:

The Administration urges both Houses of Congress to act to
complete expeditious action on implementing legislation to
enable the United States to meet its obligations under the
Additional Protocol.

More recently, President Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for
International Security and Nonproliferation, John Rood, testified at
his confirmation hearing that the administration strongly supports the
Additional Protocol and that it is important that the United States
pass implementing legislation.

I am pleased to report that a compromise was reached between the
administration, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and those Senators
who expressed concerns about the IAEA Additional Protocol implementing
legislation. This is an important step for U.S. nonproliferation
policy, and I thank all of the parties involved in the discussions for
their support of those efforts.
In conclusion, Madam President, I urge my colleagues to approve the
U.S.-India agreement. This legislation will allow the United States to
engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation while safeguarding U.S. national
security and nonproliferation efforts, as well as congressional
prerogatives. It is an opportunity to build a vital strategic
partnership with a nation that shares our democratic values and will
exert increasing influence on the world stage. We should move forward
now.
I thank the Chair, yield the floor, and suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

amendment no. 5168

(Purpose: In the nature of a substitute)

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I send a managers' amendment to the desk
that has been cleared on both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

[[Page S10985]]

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar] proposes an amendment
numbered 5168.

(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I urge the amendment's adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is agreed to as original text.
The amendment (No. 5168) was agreed to.

amendment no. 5169

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk that has
been cleared on both sides of the aisle.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for Mr. Obama,
proposes an amendment numbered 5169.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To clarify United States policy in order to deter nuclear
testing by foreign governments)

At the appropriate place in title I, insert the following
new section:

SEC. __. UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE PROVISION OF
NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR FUEL RESERVE TO INDIA.

It is the policy of the United States that any nuclear
power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of
India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities
should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating
requirements.

Mr. LUGAR. I urge the amendment's adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 5169) was agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, today the Senate is engaged in a truly
historic process. When we pass this bill--and I expect we will do
that--America will take a giant step closer to approving a major shift
in United States-India relations. If we are right, this shift will
increase the prospects for stability and progress in South Asia and, I
would argue, the world at large. The Committee on Foreign Relations has
worked to move this project forward, while safeguarding the role of
Congress and minimizing any harm to nuclear nonproliferation policies
and institutions. There is no one who has been stronger in dealing with
the issue of nonproliferation than my colleague, the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee. I have supported him in those efforts for
years.
I urge my colleagues to take a real close look at the argument that
is being made by some that this is going to promote the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. The fact is, I believe it will not.
I am going to urge my colleagues at the appropriate time to support
this bill. It has been a cliche to speak of the United States-India
relationship as a bond between the world's two oldest democracies and
the world's two largest democracies, but this cliche is also a fact.
Shared political values are the foundation of our relationship and, I
would argue, the raison d'etre for taking a chance for those who are
doubtful on this treaty. Both the United States and India believe in
the dignity of man and the consent of the governed. Both countries are
multiethnic and multireligious. Both countries seek economic and social
betterment for their people and believe that it is best achieved
through peaceful change, both domestically and externally. If that were
the whole story, however, it would not have taken us six decades to get
to the moment we are now.
For much of the last 60 years, the political structures were trumped
by geopolitical ones. Democracy in democratic India was often closer to
the Soviet Union, while the United States often favored India's rival
Pakistan, particularly during the most undemocratic phase of Pakistan's
national history. That alignment was an anomaly of the cold war. Today
the United States and Pakistan are important allies in the war on
terror and, at the same time, today the national interests of the
United States and India are in concert, perhaps more than any time in
the past. India and the United States are both status quo powers, at
least regarding territory. Neither of us has any claim on any
neighboring piece of real estate. We face similar challenges from
extremists and terrorists; in some cases, from the same terrorist
groups and same individuals. We share a common desire for stability and
the spread of liberal democracy throughout Asia and, indeed, throughout
the world. And we share a concern about the world's need for energy,
especially energy that does not increase the speed and risk of global
warming.
The need for new energy supplies is an important underpinning of the
issues before us today, legislation opening the way for civil nuclear
cooperation between the United States and India. In time, I hope
India's burgeoning energy needs will prove a spur to a wide variety of
alternatives to fossil fuels, including solar, wind, and biofuel. On
many of these, India has already begun to move, but at present, nuclear
power is a vital part of India's energy equation. It is likely to grow
in significance in the years to come. Experts note correctly that
nuclear power will still provide only a small portion of India's energy
consumption even when this passes. But at the margin, the contribution
of nuclear power will be greater, and India's leaders across the
political spectrum see nuclear power as an important and necessary
contributor to their country's economic progress.
The Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation negotiated by President Bush and
Prime Minister Singh in July of 2005 cannot be implemented unless
Congress approves changes in U.S. law. So we in the Senate must now
address both the opportunities and the nonproliferation issues raised
by that agreement. The administration proposed that we treat the United
States-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as if it met all the
requirements of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. In fact, it does
not. There is no way, of course, that India, with a nuclear weapons
program that is outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, could
meet these requirements. I compliment my chairman for making it clear
to the administration that was a nonstarter.
Were Congress to accept the administration's proposal, it would lose
any real ability to influence a nuclear agreement with India. The
agreement would be sent to Congress, but we would have to enact a
motion to disapprove over a likely Presidential veto within 90 days in
order to stop any agreement from entering into effect. That would be a
gigantic usurpation of our responsibility. The Foreign Relations
Committee, under the leadership of the chairman, rejected this
approach, as did the House of Representatives.
The bill before us today would require, instead, an affirmative vote
of Congress before a United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
can enter into effect. Section 3709 provides expedited procedures for
the resolution to approve such a United States-India agreement. That
resolution would not contain any conditions, and it could not be
amended. But if Congress found the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
wanting in some respect, it could either reject the expedited
resolution or approval or pass a different resolution that did contain
conditions. That is what Congress did with the United States-China
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 1985. So this bill protects
congressional powers not for the sake of protecting congressional
powers, as if we were interested in turf; it protects the balance of
power, the separation of power, which is essential in the formulation
of a policy, including foreign policy. At the same time, it offers
procedures that will expedite approval of a good agreement.
Section 3907 also allows the President to waive section 128 of the
Atomic Energy Act, which provides for annual submission of one export
license to Congress. That provision has never been used and would be of
little benefit to Congress, as a sale could be blocked only if a
resolution of disapproval were enacted, again, over the likelihood of a
Presidential veto.
The administration argued that section 128, while giving Congress
little real power, would harm U.S. industry

[[Page S10986]]

by creating an annual event that would frighten both the customer and
the investor from proceeding. We agreed, and this bill includes a
section 128 waiver provision that the administration requested.
Chairman Lugar and I yield to nobody in our commitment to
nonproliferation, and no one has a stronger record on this than Senator
Lugar. We believe we have presented to this body a bill that allows
civil nuclear cooperation with India to proceed and ends India's
nuclear isolation, but it does so without seriously jeopardizing the
hard-won nonproliferation gains of nearly the last four decades.
Specifically, our aims have been as follows:
To preserve the right of Congress to conduct a meaningful review of
the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement that India and the United
States are negotiating; secondly, to ensure that such nuclear
cooperation is used exclusively in India's civil nuclear program and
that India continues to be a ``good citizen'' when it comes to
nonproliferation, as it has been; to preserve the role and procedures
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and of the International Atomic Energy
Agency; and to do all this without requiring any renegotiation of the
United States-India treaty deal.
Look, every time we have a treaty presented to us in the Senate,
there are those of us, including my friend from North Dakota who is on
the Senate floor, who believe we can probably do it better. We believe
we could have gotten a better deal. We believe we could have gotten a
treaty that was even better than the one that exists. But the old
expression is that we cannot let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
It wasn't really very easy to do what we set out to do, but I truly
believe we have succeeded in the points I have just made. There is a
reason this bill was reported out of committee with a 16-to-2 margin;
we did really try to address the major nonproliferation concerns
legitimately raised by colleagues in the committee.
The Foreign Relations Committee did not endorse, for example, the
administration's request for broad waiver authority regarding section
129 of the Atomic Energy Act. That section terminates nuclear exports
to a country under certain circumstances. The administration did not
want that in place.
The committee agreed that the President needs the right to waive
those portions of section 129 which would end exports because India has
a nuclear weapons program or because it has tested nuclear devices in
the past. But section 3709 doesn't grant a waiver authority regarding
those portions of section 129 which would end nuclear exports if India
were to, 1, test a nuclear device in the future; 2, terminate or
materially violate the IAEA safeguard; 3, materially violate its
agreement with the United States, or engage in nuclear proliferation.
Look, if India does any of those things, then the premise upon which
we have dealt with a good friend and neighbor was falsely relied upon.
I believe India understands the consequence of this bilateral
relationship as profoundly as we do. If I am wrong about that and India
were to do any or all of the four things I just named, it would clearly
violate the spirit of this agreement, part of which, as all agreements
ultimately are, is based on some sense of comity and trust.
This bill requires that India sign a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA and negotiate an additional protocol as well. It requires the
President to certify, moreover, that the safeguards agreement is ``in
accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices.'' The
President must certify to that effect.
We understand that India, having nuclear weapons, will not accept
full-scope safeguards. But the language in this bill makes clear our
expectation that the safeguards agreement India works out with the IAEA
will guard effectively against diversion of foreign nuclear material
and technology to India's military program.
Section 3709 also requires the President to certify that the Nuclear
Suppliers Group has decided to permit civil nuclear commerce with India
and that the NSG, Nuclear Suppliers Group, decision was made by
consensus. We do not want to damage the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which
has been a vital institution in our fight against nuclear
proliferation. So this bill protects the Nuclear Suppliers Group's role
in governing peaceful nuclear commerce.
The administration has said repeatedly that this is an India nuclear
deal, not intended to permit nuclear commerce with Pakistan or Israel--
the only other states that never signed the NPT. The committee's bill
incorporates that distinction by requiring the President to certify
that the NSG--Nuclear Suppliers Group--decision does not permit nuclear
commerce with any other state that does not accept full-scope
safeguards.
The NSG is not likely to single out India as an exception to its
guidelines. Rather, it will create tests that a non-NPT state must meet
before nuclear commerce with the country may take place. The committee
believes that such a test should be substantial, so that the countries
outside the NPT are not all given the same benefits as the nonnuclear
weapon states inside the treaty. Thus, the bill before us today is
designed to maintain important nonproliferation policies that have
served our country well.
With regard to sections 106 and 107, two sections of this bill, they
have been cited by some Indian officials as causing concern. I will
address these sections, as I do not believe such concern is merited.
Section 106 in the agreement bars the executive branch from exporting
to India ``any equipment, materials, or technology related to the
enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the
production of heavy water.'' That is because these technologies are all
used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In fact, the
administration already has a worldwide policy of not exporting these
technologies. Section 106 merely makes that a legal requirement in this
case.

Because section 106 makes this a legal requirement, we also added two
exemptions. One would be for a program such as the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership, which is to develop a new generation of
proliferation-resistant nuclear facilities. In other words, the second
exemption would be for a facility in an IAEA-approved program to
provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capability. For example,
there might some day be a South Asian regional uranium enrichment
facility under IAEA auspices.
Some Indian officials are reportedly upset because section 106
singles out India. But they have long known that it is U.S. policy not
to sell them these technologies, so this is a matter more of pride than
of substance, which I hope they deal with. I would not object to making
section 106 apply worldwide, but we believed this was too large a step
to take in this bill. I would think it should apply worldwide.
Section 107 requires a program to maintain accountability with
respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology that we sell,
lease, export, or reexport to India. This program would include end-use
monitoring conditions, as appropriate. A similar program exists for
U.S. nuclear exports to China. Such a monitoring program would enhance
confidence in India's separation of its civilian and military nuclear
programs. It would also further ensure U.S. compliance with article I
of the nonproliferation treaty.
Indian officials are reportedly upset that American personnel might
need to visit India's nuclear sites. It should come as no surprise,
however, that we need to ensure that U.S. nuclear materials, equipment,
and technology are not diverted to military uses.
The purpose of section 107 is not to impose new conditions upon India
but, rather, to make sure the executive branch doesn't forget its
obligation to guard against diversion. That obligation is already U.S.
policy. It also flows from article I of the nonproliferation treaty,
which requires nuclear weapon states not to assist nonnuclear weapon
states ``in any way'' to manufacture nuclear weapons. And India remains
a nonnuclear weapons state under both the NPT and U.S. law, despite the
fact that now it does have nuclear weapons.
I hope that in conference we can adjust the wording of section 107 to
correct any potential misunderstanding of its effect, which is not
intended to be onerous. I also hope that Indian officials will
understand the U.S. need to embark upon nuclear commerce with India in
a manner that maintains our

[[Page S10987]]

nonproliferation policies and fulfills our international obligation. I
believe the bill reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee does
that in a most reasonable manner and that it will provide a strong
foundation for a new beginning in United States-Indian relations.
The United States-Indian agreement is much more than just a nuclear
deal, though, Mr. President. I believe historians will see this as a
historic step, part of the dramatic and positive departure in United
States-Indian relationship that was begun by President Clinton.
President Bush is to be commended for continuing and accelerating the
journey President Clinton started in our relations with India.
If I were asked to name the pillars for security in the 21st century,
India and the United States would be two of them. India and the United
States, working in cooperation toward the same goal, can provide the
beginning of a strong foundation for a stable world. And for the United
States, no relationship, in my view, is more important than the United
States-India relationship maturing along the lines that have begun.
The ultimate success of this agreement will rest on India's
willingness and ability to reduce tensions with its nuclear neighbors
and achieve nuclear stability. We all hope to see the day when India
and Pakistan voluntarily reduce or end their fissile material
production, as the recognized NPT nuclear weapons states already have
done.
I hope especially that India will not use its peaceful nuclear
commerce to free up domestic uranium for increased production of
nuclear weapons. The United States-India deal doesn't bar India from
doing that. But such a nuclear buildup--unless carried out in response
to a direct threat from its nuclear-armed neighbors--would be a gross
abuse of the world's trust, in my view. It would sour relations between
India and the United States, just at a time when both countries hope to
build upon a new foundation that has been laid in the past decade and
which I respectfully suggest is in the overwhelming self-interest of
both countries.
India and the world will also benefit if India embraces these
critical nonproliferation standards. These include the Proliferation
Security Initiative; the guidelines and policies of the Australia
Group, which, I add, controls exports that could help countries build
chemical or biological weapons; and the guidelines and policies of the
Wassenaar Arrangement, which combats the spread of advanced
conventional weapons.
India is a major world power. India needs to--and will, I believe--
step up to this awesome responsibility. As an important world power, it
is important that support for the complete nonproliferation regime
would make a gigantic difference in the world. Currently, however,
India doesn't stop its companies from exporting dual-use chemicals and
equipment to countries such as Iran because those exports are not
banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Other leading countries have concluded that unrestrained exports of
items that could be used to produce chemical or biological weapons and
advanced conventional weapons are a real danger to world stability. It
is my fervent hope and prayer that India reaches that conclusion as
well. It is time for them to adopt, in my opinion, the same approach to
the dangers posed by such proliferation.
India will not attain the respect and status it seeks and deserves in
the world unless it takes a willing and active role in preventing
proliferation of all kinds. The nuclear deal we are considering today
is a sign, however, of the world's desire to bring India into the fold.
I hope India will use this deal as a departure point from which it will
branch out to embrace all international nonproliferation activities. It
will surely be welcomed if it does.
In my view, the bill before us is a victory for United States-India
relationships. It is a victory for the quest to move beyond fossil
fuels. And it is a victory we have achieved while doing our best to
maintain the global effort to end proliferation.
I believe, not guaranteed by this agreement, it will be also a point
of departure for India to rethink its role in the world with regard to
proliferation of all kinds. I sincerely hope it does.
I end where I began. I think United States-India relations is two of
the pillars upon which we have a chance--we have a chance, a real
chance--to build a 21st century that is much more stable than the 20th
century and to avoid the carnage of the 20th century. It cannot be done
without India's cooperation, and it can be done with India's
leadership.
I thank my colleagues for listening. I understand my friend from
North Dakota may have an amendment or may wish to seek the floor.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I wish I were on the Senate floor today
able to be supportive of the chairman and ranking member of the
committee. They have both given persuasive and eloquent statements
about the matter.
I come to the floor of the Senate with a different view. I come here
very disappointed because I think we are beginning down a very
troublesome road for this country. I want to talk a little about what
all this means.
I know the issue is not an issue that rates at the top of the
attention of the American people at the moment, this Government, or the
press corps. This is an issue about whether there will be more nuclear
weapons built in a world in which there are already too many nuclear
weapons. This is an issue in which we are going to discuss the issue of
nonproliferation, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons at a time when
we have terrorism in this world that we worry could result in a
terrorist organization acquiring a nuclear weapon and detonating a
nuclear weapon in a major American city.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to show a couple of items on
the floor of the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, my colleague, Senator Lugar, is someone
who has been a real leader with Senator Nunn on the Nunn-Lugar program,
which I have been proud to support. It has been a program that has
actually reduced the number of nuclear weapons and reduced the delivery
systems for nuclear weapons. It is what we aspire to do. It is what our
country should lead the world in doing, and that is to step away from
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the building of new nuclear
weapons.
This is a piece of a wing strut from a Backfire bomber. This used to
be flying in the air, part of a wing strut from a Soviet Backfire
bomber that likely carryied nuclear weapons that threatened our
country. We didn't shoot this plane down. This wing strut was sawed
off. The wing was destroyed. The plane was destroyed. It was
dismantled.
How did that happen? We actually paid for it. My colleagues, Senator
Nunn and Senator Lugar, proposed legislation that allowed us to, with
the Russians, actually begin to destroy and reduce delivery systems and
nuclear weapons. So this bomber that carried a nuclear weapon,
presumably to threaten this country, doesn't exist anymore. A piece of
its wing is in my desk drawer in the United States Senate.
This is a vile of ground-up copper. This used to be part of a Soviet
submarine, that prowled under the water with missiles and warheads
presumably aimed at U.S. cities. Yes, this used to be a Soviet
submarine carrying weapons of mass destruction threatening our country.
This was a hinge on a missile silo in the Ukraine, and that missile
silo contained a missile. That missile contained nuclear warheads,
presumably aimed at a U.S. military target or a U.S. city. This hinge,
of course, is in my desk today, not in a field in the Ukraine. Where
that missile used to sit, there is no missile. There is no missile
silo. There are now sunflowers planted in that field in the Ukraine.
The Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus--all three countries--had several
thousand nuclear weapons and are now free of all nuclear weapons.
How did all that happen? Was it by accident? No, no, it wasn't. This
country embarked on a set of policies and proposals that resulted in
the reduction of delivery systems and nuclear weapons.
Have we been enormously successful? I have described some successes,
but we

[[Page S10988]]

have, oh, probably 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons remaining on this
Earth. Far too many--25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons. We have much to
do to step away from the abyss of having a terrorist organization or
rogue nation acquire nuclear weapons and threaten our country or
threaten the world.
We have all experienced 9/11/2001 where several thousand innocent
Americans were murdered. That was an unbelievable terrorist attack on
our country. It could happen again with a nuclear weapon. We are going
to spend $9 billion or $10 billion this year building an antiballistic
missile defense system to create some sort of an electronic catcher's
mitt to catch an intercontinental ballistic missile someone might aim
at our country armed with a nuclear warhead.

That is one of the least likely threats our country faces. We are
going to spend close to $10 billion for a threat that is one of the
least likely threats we face.
The most likely threat, perhaps, instead of an intercontinental
ballistic missile coming in at 18,000 miles an hour aimed at an
American city, is a container ship pulling up to a dock in a major
American city at 3 miles an hour with a container that contains a
weapon of mass destruction onboard, to be detonated in the middle of an
American city.
Let me read for the Record, as I start--and I want to then talk about
this specific agreement--I want to read an excerpt from Graham
Allison's book. He is at Harvard. He wrote a book called ``Nuclear
Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe.''
I talk about 9/11/2001, several thousand Americans murdered by
terrorists. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city by a
terrorist group will not mean several thousand Americans being
murdered; it could likely mean several hundred thousand Americans being
murdered, or more.
Let me read to you from Graham Allison's book. I am quoting:

On October 11, 2001, a month to the day after the terrorist
assault on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President
George W. Bush faced an even more terrifying prospect. At
that morning's Presidential Daily Intelligence Briefing,
George Tenet, the director of central intelligence, informed
the president that a CIA agent code-named Dragonfire had
reported that Al Qaeda terrorists possessed a ten-kiloton
nuclear bomb, evidently stolen from the Russian arsenal.
According to Dragonfire, this nuclear weapon was now on
American soil, in New York City.
The CIA had no independent confirmation of this report, but
neither did it have any basis on which to dismiss it. Did
Russia's arsenal include a large number of ten-kiloton
weapons? Yes. Could the Russian government account for all
the nuclear weapons the Soviet Union had built during the
Cold War? No. Could Al Qaeda have acquired one or more of
these weapons? Yes. Could it have smuggled a nuclear weapon
through American border controls in New York City without
anyone's knowledge? Yes. . . .
In the hours that followed, national security adviser
Condoleezza Rice analyzed what strategists call the ``problem
from hell.'' Unlike the Cold War, when the United States and
the Soviet Union knew that an attack against the other would
illicit a retaliatory strike of greater measure, Al Qaeda--
with no return address--had no such fear of reprisal. Even if
the president were prepared to negotiate, Al Qaeda had no
phone number to call.
Clearly, no decision could be taken without much more
information about the threat and those behind it. But how
could Rice engage a wider circle of experts and analysts
without the White House's suspicions leaking to the press? A
CNN flash that the White House had information about an Al
Qaeda nuclear weapon in Manhattan would create chaos. New
Yorkers would flee the city in terror, and residents of other
metropolitan areas would panic.

I continue to quote:

Concerned that Al Qaeda could have smuggled a nuclear
weapon into Washington as well, the president ordered Vice
President Dick Cheney to leave the capital for an
``undisclosed location,'' where he would remain for many
weeks to follow. That was standard procedure to ensure
``continuity of government''. . . . Several hundred federal
employees from more than a dozen government agencies joined
the vice president at this secret site. . . . The president
also immediately dispatched NEST specialists (Nuclear
Emergency Support Teams of scientists and engineers) to New
York City to search for the weapon. But no one in the city
was informed of the threat, not even Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.
As the CIA's analysts examined Dragonfire's report and
compared it with other bits of information, they noted that
the attack on the World Trade Center in September had set the
bar higher for future terrorist spectaculars.

I won't read to the end. I ask unanimous consent that this document
be printed in the Record at the end of my statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. DORGAN. At the end of this process, they finally determined after
about a month that this was not a credible threat. Dragonfire's report
turned out not to be credible.
But at the time they took the report very seriously. They analyzed it
this way: Was it possible that a Russian 10-kiloton nuclear weapon
could have been stolen? Yes, it was possible. Is it possible a
terrorist group could have acquired it? Yes. Is it possible it could
have been smuggled into New York City? The answer was yes. And, if so,
was it possible a terrorist group could detonate a nuclear weapon in a
major American city? The answer was yes.
This is not fiction. I am reading an excerpt of a book of something
that happened in October of 2001.
My greatest fear is that we do not yet understand the difference
between what was and what is. What was, was a standoff called the cold
war in which two major nuclear superpowers aimed massive numbers of
nuclear warheads at each other, but understanding, under the concept of
mutually assured destruction, called MAD, that if either attacked the
other, the other would be literally vaporized by an avalanche of
nuclear weapons. The result was that there was a standoff, a mutually
assured destruction standoff, and although both sides in that Cold
War--the United States and the Soviet Union--possessed the most
unbelievably powerful killing machines known to humankind, they were
not used. Neither side ever used them.
Fast-forward to today. The Cold War is over. President Bush, in fact,
visited with the President Putin yesterday, in Russia. Times have
changed, but this world still has somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000
nuclear weapons, the loss of one of which could be cataclysmic for this
world. The detonation of one nuclear weapon in a major city will change
everything--everything--and be a catastrophe unlike any we have
previously known.
If we have 25,000 or 30,000 nuclear weapons on this Earth, what is
the responsibility of this great country? What is our responsibility?
What burden falls on our shoulders? I submit it is the burden to
provide world leadership to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to
reduce the threat of nuclear weapons and to reduce the stockpile of
nuclear weapons. That is our responsibility. That responsibility falls
on us.
How do we do that? Listen, our country has provided leadership in a
nonproliferation treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the test
ban treaty. Our country has been moving always, telling the rest of the
world we aspire to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Now we live in
this age of terrorism where we see people who are perfectly content to
kill themselves. They don't care. As long as they can take a weapon
with them and kill themselves and many others with them, it doesn't
matter to them. They are reaching for some higher glory, apparently.
In this age of terrorism, everything about nuclear weapons has
changed. The loss of one nuclear weapon, the loss of one anywhere on
this globe to a terrorist organization is going to be devastating.
So if that is the case, what does it have to do with what we are
talking about today? We are now talking today about a country called
India. India is quite a remarkable place--a wonderful country with
wonderful people. It is a big country. It is trying to build an
economy. You can read some books about what is going on in India and
the discussions about progress--it is quite a remarkable place. Our
country aspires to have a better relationship with India. I support
that. I believe we ought to reach out to India and improve our
relationship, cement our relationship.
I know there are some who see all of the geopolitical relationships
on this Earth as aligning one way or the other. We align with this
country to be a counterweight against this set of interests, and it is
kind of akin to teams. So I confess to you, I come here today not
perhaps understanding all of the sophisticated elements of
counterweights

[[Page S10989]]

and the nuances of why someone believes it is essential, at this point,
to allow India to produce additional nuclear weapons in order to create
some sort of counterweight to China, but I want to talk about this
issue. I was unbelievably surprised to read in the newspaper of the
travels of Ambassador Burns, someone for whom I have high regard, and
of the interest of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in going to
India and reaching a deal without consulting Congress that I think
begins to unravel, and undermine several decades of efforts in our
country to tell the world: It is our responsibility and our major goal
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and try to reduce the number of
nuclear weapons and reduce the nuclear threat.
We would not be in this position today with this bill with India if
India had followed the example, for example, of South Africa. They
secretly had nuclear weapons by the 1980s. But South Africa dismantled
them prior to the transfer of power to the postapartheid government.
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus had more than 4,000 nuclear weapons in
those three countries when the Soviet Union was dissolved which they
gave up in the years following. And I must say that my colleague
Senator Lugar and others had significant successes in working with
those three countries to accomplish that. So Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus are all now free of nuclear weapons.
Any nuclear deal--any relationship we have with another country that
deals with nuclear power and nuclear issues should be judged, in my
opinion, on whether it reduces the number of nuclear weapons. Does it
reduce the nuclear weapons that exist or increase them? It is quite
clear that what we are debating will result in an increase in nuclear
weapons in India. I don't think there is much doubt about that. This
bill fails that test, in my judgment.
Experts have warned that there is enough weapons-usable fissile
material in the world to make about 130,000 nuclear weapons. A working
nuclear bomb, we are told, can be made with as little as 35 pounds of
uranium-235 or 9 pounds of plutonium-239. And the acquisition of a
nuclear weapon by a terrorist is, in my judgment, the greatest threat
that exists in our country.
Retired GEN Eugene Habiger, who commanded America's nuclear forces,
said that nuclear terrorism ``is not a matter of if, it is a matter of
when.''
Henry Kissinger wrote in the Washington Post recently:

The world is faced with the nightmarish prospect that
nuclear weapons will become a standard part of national
armament and wind up in terrorists' hands.

Former Senator Sam Nunn wrote in the Wall Street Journal:

We know that terrorists are seeking nuclear materials--
enriched uranium or plutonium--to build nuclear weapons. We
know that if they get that nuclear material, they can build a
nuclear weapon. We believe that if they build such a weapon,
they will use it. We know terrorists are not likely to be
deterred, and that the more this nuclear material is
available, the higher the risks.

Osama bin Laden has been seeking nuclear components since the 1990s.
In 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a statement entitled ``The Nuclear Bomb
of Islam,'' declaring:

It is the duty of Muslims to prepare as much force as
possible to terrorize the enemies of God.

And Osama bin Laden's spokesman announced that the group aspires ``to
kill 4 million Americans, including 1 million children,'' in response
to casualties supposedly inflicted on Muslims by the United States and
Israel.
The more countries there are with nuclear weapons and weapons-grade
nuclear material and the more weapons each of them has, the greater the
threat that one will be used by a rogue nation or will fall into the
hands of terrorist groups.
Now, frankly, we have not been very aggressive as a country in recent
years in stopping proliferation. Instead of talking about how we would
reduce the number of nuclear weapons, we were on the floor of the
Senate, during previous debates, talking about the fact that we need
new nuclear weapons. Our country has said we need designer nuclear
weapons; we need bunker-buster nuclear weapons. We have people openly
speaking about the desire in this country to build additional nuclear
weapons.
We attacked Iraq because we believed it possessed and was seeking
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. We are spending $10
billion a year, as I said, on missile defense for fear that North Korea
already has nuclear weapons. And we are talking about serious issues
with Iran in order to try to stop its nuclear program. And the No. 1
nightmare is that a terrorist group may acquire a nuclear weapon. No
one in my judgment can credibly say that a world that has more nuclear
weapons is a safer world. It is just not.
Nowhere in the world is the threat of nuclear terrorism more imminent
than in South Asia. It is the home to al-Qaida which seeks nuclear
weapons. It is an area where relations among regional nuclear powers
are always tense: China, India, and Pakistan. India and China fought a
border war in 1962. India and Pakistan fought three major wars, had
numerous smaller scale conflicts since the partition of British India
in 1947. Both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear weapons in 1998 and
declared themselves as nuclear powers. And after that, all of us in the
world held our breath as they began fighting a limited war in Kashmir.

Now, it has traditionally been the case that the United States has
led the international community in efforts to deny India, Pakistan, and
other nonnuclear States access to nuclear technology. That has been our
traditional role. We have always been the one who said: No, no, no. We
can't do that. We need to limit the capability of nations that will not
sign up to nonproliferation.
We pushed for the nonproliferation treaty, which prohibits nuclear
assistance to these so-called nonnuclear States, unless they agree to
put all of their nuclear facilities under international safeguards and
to give up the option of developing a nuclear weapon. That has been our
position. It has always been our position.
Article I of the nonproliferation treaty obligates the recognized
nuclear weapons States, including the United States, to:

Not in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear
weapons State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

That is Article I of the nonproliferation treaty. We signed it. We
helped write it. We supported it. It is what we believe in.
The United States helped form the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975 to
help prevent the misuse of peaceful nuclear technology. In 1978, we
passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which restricts nuclear
commerce with States that don't agree to the full scope of the
safeguards. We pushed for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172 which
condemned India's and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests and called upon
them to cease their nuclear weapons programs and join the
nonproliferation treaty as nonnuclear weapons states. We did that.
In 1998, President Clinton imposed sanctions on both India and
Pakistan, under section 102 of the Arms Control Act, which requires
sanctions on any non-nuclear weapons state that has detonated nuclear
devices.
Now, these policies did not stop India's and Pakistan's nuclear
weapons programs, but they did restrain them and they hindered them. In
fact, that is precisely why we are here with respect to India.
The Bush administration has taken a different tact now. Their
proposal is to provide ``full'' assistance to India's civilian nuclear
program, while India keeps its nuclear weapons, which represents a
complete abandonment of our traditional approach to nonproliferation.
I don't think you can come to the floor and argue that this is part
of an approach we have always taken. This is a U-turn. This is a 180-
degree change from the approach we have always had. The Bush
administration formed an agreement that allows New Delhi to
dramatically expand its stockpile of nuclear weapons and could ignite a
regional arms race. That is what we have here. They can have reactors
behind the curtain that will not be subject to inspection by anybody.
That is part of the deal. It will undermine 30 years of
nonproliferation efforts at the very time when we are engaged in these
issues with North Korea and Iran.
It is a major, it seems to me, exception to the prohibition of
nuclear assistance to any country that doesn't

[[Page S10990]]

accept international monitoring of all of its nuclear facilities. This
is a major exception to that. And it also is one that gives legitimacy
to a nuclear arsenal that India secretly developed, and it is not going
to help us in any way. It will hinder us in convincing others to give
up their nuclear weapons.
Now, India never signed the nonproliferation treaty. Because of that,
Pakistan never signed the treaty. In the 1960s, India used both
American technology and also Canadian technology and the nuclear fuel
provided under what was called the Atoms For Peace Program to secretly
build nuclear weapons. By doing so, New Delhi broke an explicit pledge
to both the United States and to Canada about the use of technology and
nuclear fuel only for peaceful purposes. In 1974, India conducted its
first nuclear weapons test. It denied that it had done so. It said it
was a peaceful nuclear test.
In May, 1998, they conducted a series of nuclear tests and declared
themselves as a nuclear weapons state. In response, Pakistan did
exactly the same thing and declared themselves as a nuclear state.
Because India has a shortage of domestic uranium, the application of
the U.S. and international laws that prevent the sale of nuclear fuel
and other nuclear assistance to them has seriously constrained its
nuclear power industry and nuclear weapons program. All of us
understand that India has energy issues. It has an expanding population
and it wishes to build additional powerplants, nuclear powerplants, but
it also wishes to build additional nuclear weapons. India's power
reactors, we are now told, are operating at less than capacity due to
fuel shortages and their utilization rates are expected to decrease
even further. Very little uranium is leftover from its domestic
supplies for India to turn to nuclear weapons. So in the past year--
couple of years--New Delhi has stepped up efforts to get our assistance
in obtaining nuclear fuel and reactor components so it can increase its
nuclear power. But the fact is, it will also increase its nuclear
weapons programs.
Here is what the deal that is now brought to the floor of the Senate
does: My understanding is that it obligates the United States to
persuade the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to change their
rules which bar sales to India. It allows India to buy sensitive
nuclear technologies, now forbidden under the nonproliferation treaty.
It includes nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, and advanced technology.
This agreement would open the door to India's cooperation with France,
Japan, and others who want to do business with India and who now have
not been doing business with India because of the NPT. In return, in
this agreement, India has agreed to allow the IAEA inspections and
safeguards at 14 of their 22 planned nuclear power reactors. But eight
of their nuclear power reactors will be placed behind a curtain. No one
will be able to inspect them. That is where they will be able to
continue increasing the production of nuclear weapons, and it is not--
you wonder, do they want to produce additional nuclear weapons? Let me
quote directly from a senior adviser to India's nuclear program,
December 2005, an article in The Times of India. Dr. Subrahmanyam says:

Given India's uranium ore crunch and the need to build up
our minimum credible nuclear arsenal as fast as possible, it
is to India's advantage to categorize as many power reactors
as possible as civilian ones to be refueled by imported
uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons-
grade plutonium production.

This is clear:

Given India's . . . crunch and the need to build up our
minimum credible nuclear deterrent arsenal. . . .

That is what this is about in India.
We have those who support this, who say it is not perfect, but it is
not bad. I don't know whether the contention on the Senate floor is
going to be that this will not result in additional warheads. But I am
clear, and I think everybody should be clear, it will. India will
produce additional nuclear weapons. We believe, if that makes the world
safer, I guess that is what one can argue. I do not believe that at
all. I think the addition of nuclear weapons to the stockpile that
exists in this world is a serious danger to the world.
Pakistan has already said: If you are going to give this deal to
India, how about giving this deal to us? We might want to look at what
we are doing. The administration just proposed, by the way, a big arms
package for Pakistan: 36 Lockheed F-16C/D fighter planes, 500 JDAM
satellite-guided bomb kits, 700 bunker buster bombs, 1,600 laser-guided
bombs, 800 conventional bombs, 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, 200
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, 130 Harpoon antiship missiles, 115
self-propelled howitzers.
That is an arms package to Pakistan. But Pakistan would say: We have
nuclear weapons. We exploded them. We showed you we have nuclear
weapons. You are going to give this deal to build more nuclear weapons
to India. We want that deal for Pakistan. We want to build more nuclear
weapons.
What will China say? What will China say when they see this agreement
and decide that India is increasing its stockpile? China will say: We
want to increase the stockpile of nuclear weapons.
India is in the process of becoming a full-fledged nuclear power with
a triad, an emerging triad. Aircraft? They have a number of types of
aircraft used to deliver a nuclear weapon, or that could be so used,
and land-based missiles and naval weapons.
I do not allege that India is a country that is an aggressor. That is
not my point. I think our relationship with India is important. I
believe we ought to connect with India. We ought to reach out to India.
We ought to have an improved relationship with India. I don't know,
maybe it is advantageous to have India as a counterweight in the region
to China.
But, look, do any of us really believe that an agreement that pulls
the rug out from under decades of positions we have held in this
country on nonproliferation that results in the building of additional
nuclear weapons advances our interests? Advances the world's interests?
Of course not.
It falls on our shoulders as the nuclear power in the world. It is
our responsibility to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Will our
children or our grandchildren someday see a nuclear weapon detonated in
a major American city? Will we see that? We didn't see it during the
Cold War because we had mutually agreed destruction; that is, both
countries, us and the Soviet Union, understood if one launched a
missile or airplane containing a nuclear weapon to be detonated in our
country, we would launch sufficient nuclear weapons to completely
destroy their country and their society. Both sides understood that.
Both sides understood we have arsenals that would destroy each other
and neither side did. Neither side was an aggressor.
In an age of terrorism, all of that has changed. In an age of
terrorism, if we do not embrace policies that stop the production of
additional nuclear weapons, we have missed an enormous opportunity to
prevent the detonation of a nuclear weapon in one of our cities. This
agreement simply does not stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It
doesn't prevent the production of additional nuclear weapons. This
undermines that which we have described as our goal in the United
Nations. It undermines that which we have for decades described as
being our goal as a leader in nonproliferation. It provides the green
light for India to produce additional nuclear weapons.
With all the sophisticated arguments in favor of this agreement, I
fail to see how undermining decades of effort at nonproliferation and
now providing a green light to India to produce new nuclear weapons,
additional nuclear weapons, makes this a safer world. Quite the
contrary. I think it is dangerous. I think this agreement is a horrible
mistake. I think all of the sophisticated calculations mean very little
when we have decided to send signals to the world that we do not oppose
producing additional nuclear weapons; that we support that.
We are willing to decide to undermine the nonproliferation treaty. We
are willing to ignore United Nations resolutions all because Ambassador
Burns and Secretary Rice and the Bush administration said: You know
what, we have all these calculations about weights and counterweights
and geopolitical strategies and here is our new one. It is a new
strategy that undermines decades of what ought to be the best virtue of
this country, and that is providing world leadership, real world

[[Page S10991]]

leadership, aggressive world leadership to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons and prevent the building of more nuclear weapons and begin
reducing the number of nuclear weapons that exist in this world.
As I said when I started, I regret very much I am on the other side
of this issue from Senator Lugar. Senator Lugar has great credibility
on these issues because he has done a very substantial amount of good
work. I am not quite sure how I should describe this. I was
extraordinarily surprised when I read the first account in the
newspaper that it was likely that this agreement was going to be
supported by my colleague and friend. I would say the same with respect
to Senator Biden. I have great respect for them. So I am someone who
comes to the floor of the Senate in disagreement. That doesn't mean I
in any way disparage their abilities or their intellectual honesty in
pursuing strategies they believe are best for this country.
I have very strong opposition to those who believe, however, that
this in any way represents our best interests. I wish I could come to
the Senate floor with a better message, but I do not. I believe one day
we will look back on this with great regret. We have seen that in this
decade already with some other decisions, information provided us with
respect to Iraq and other decisions we have made. We have already, in
my judgment, had opportunities to understand regret about policies
undertaken that turned out to be not in this country's best interests.
I believe if we open the floodgates with this agreement, we will
seriously undermine this country's best interests.

Exhibit 1

[From Blueprint Magazine, October 7, 2004]

Nuclear Terrorism--Book Excerpt

(By Graham Allison)

On October 11, 2001, a month to the day after the terrorist
assault on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President
George W. Bush faced an even more terrifying prospect. At
that morning's Presidential Daily Intelligence Briefing,
George Tenet, the director of central intelligence, informed
the president that a CIA agent code-named Dragonfire had
reported that Al Qaeda terrorists possessed a ten-kiloton
nuclear bomb, evidently stolen from the Russian arsenal.
According to Dragonfire, this nuclear weapon was now on
American soil, in New York City.
The CIA had no independent confirmation of this report, but
neither did it have any basis on which to dismiss it. Did
Russia's arsenal include a large number of ten-kiloton
weapons? Yes. Could the Russian government account for all
the nuclear weapon the Soviet Union had built during the Cold
War? No. Could Al Qaeda have acquired one or more of these
weapons? Yes. Could it have smuggled a nuclear weapon through
American border controls into New York City without anyone's
knowledge? Yes. In a moment of gallows humor, someone quipped
that the terrorists could have wrapped the bomb in one of the
bales of marijuana that are routinely smuggled into cities
like New York.
In the hours that followed, national security adviser
Condoleezza Rice analyzed what strategists call the ``problem
from hell'' Unlike the Cold War, when the United States and
the Soviet Union knew that an attack against the other would
elicit a retaliatory strike for greater measure, Al Qaeda--
with no return address--had no such fear of reprisal. Ever if
the president were prepared to negotiate, Al Qaeda had no
phone number to call.
Clearly no decision could be taken without much more
information about the threat and those behind it. But how
could Rice engage a wider circle of experts and analysts
without the White House's suspicions leaking to the press? A
CNN flash that the White House had information about an Al
Qaeda nuclear weapon in Manhattan would create chaos. New
Yorkers would flee the city in terror, and residents of other
metropolitan areas would panic. The stock market, which was
just then stabilizing from the shock of 9/11, could collapse.
American Hiroshima. Concerned that Al Qaeda could have
smuggled a nuclear weapon into Washington as well, the
president ordered Vice President Dick Cheney to leave the
capital for an ``undisclosed location,'' where he would
remain for many weeks to follow. This was standard procedure
to ensure ``continuity of government'' in case of a
decapitation strike against the U.S. political leadership.
Several hundred federal employees from more tan a dozen
government agencies joined the vice president at this secret
site, the core of an alternative government that would seek
to cope in the aftermath of a nuclear explosion that
destroyed Washington. The president also immediately
dispatched NEST specialists (Nuclear Emergency Support Teams
of scientists and engineers) to New York to search for the
weapon. But no one in the city was informed of the threat,
not even Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.
Six months earlier the CIA's Counterterrorism Center had
picked up chatter in Al Qaeda channels about an ``American
Hiroshima,'' The CIA knew that Osama bin Laden's
fascination with nuclear weapons went back at least to
1992, when he attempted to buy highly enriched uranium
from South Africa. Al Qaeda operatives were alleged to
have negotiated with Chechen separatists in Russia to buy
a nuclear warhead, which the Chechen warlord Shamil
Basayev claimed to have acquired from Russian arsenals.
The CIA's special task force on Al Qaeda had noted the
terrorist group's emphasis on thorough planning, intensive
training, and repetition of successful tactics. The task
force also highlighted Al Qaeda's strong preference for
symbolic targets and spectacular attacks.
Staggering the imagination. As the CIA's analysts examined
Dragonfire's report and compared it with other bits of
information, they noted that the attack on the World Trade
Center in September had set the bar higher for future
terrorist spectaculars. Psychologically, a nuclear attack
would stagger the world's imagination as dramatically as
9/11 did. Considering where Al Qaeda might detonate such a
bomb, they noted that New York was, in the jargon of national
security experts, ``target rich.'' Among hundreds of
potential targets, what could be more compelling than Times
Square, the most famous address in the self-proclaimed
capital of the world?
Amid this sea of unknowns, analysts could definitively
answer at least one question. They knew what kind of
devastation a nuclear explosion would cause. If Al Qaeda was
to rent a van to carry the ten-kiloton Russian weapon into
the heart of Times Square and detonate it adjacent to the
Morgan Stanley headquarters at 1585 Broadway, Times Square
would vanish in the twinkling of an eye. The blast would
generate temperatures reaching into the tens of millions of
degrees Fahrenheit. The resulting fireball and blast wave
would destroy instantaneously the theater district, the New
York Times building, Grand Central Terminal, and every other
structure within a third of a mile of the point of
detonation. The ensuing firestorm would engulf Rockefeller
Center, Carnegie Hall, the Empire State Building, and Madison
Square Garden, leaving a landscape resembling the World Trade
Center site. From the United Nations headquarters on the East
River and the Lincoln Tunnel under the Hudson River, to the
Metropolitan Museum in the eighties and the Flatiron Building
in the twenties, structures would remind one of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Office Building following the Oklahoma City
bombing.
On a normal workday, more than half a million people crowd
the area within a half-mile radius of Times Square. A noon
detonation in midtown Manhattan could kill them all. Hundreds
of thousands of others would die from collapsing buildings,
fire, and fallout in the ensuing hours. The electromagnetic
pulse generated by the blast would fry cell phones, radios,
and other electronic communications. Hospitals, doctors, and
emergency services would be overwhelmed by the wounded.
Firefighters would be battling an uncontrolled ring of fires
for many days thereafter.
The threat of nuclear terrorism, moreover, is not limited
to New York City. While New York is widely seen as the most
likely target, it is clear that Al Qaeda is not only capable
of, but also interested in, mounting attacks on other
American cities, where people may be less prepared. Imagine
the consequences of a ten-kiloton weapon exploding in San
Francisco, Houston, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, or any
other city Americans call home. From the epicenter of the
blast to a distance of approximately a third of a mile, every
structure and individual would vanish in a vaporous haze. A
second circle of destruction, extending three-quarters of a
mile from ground zero, would leave buildings looking like the
Murrah building in Oklahoma City. A third circle, reaching
out one and one-half miles, would be ravaged by fires and
radiation.
Uncontrollable blaze. In Washington, a bomb going off at
the Smithsonian Institution would destroy everything from the
White House to the lawn of the Capitol building; everything
from the Supreme Court to the FDR Memorial would be left in
rubble; uncontrollable fires would reach all the way out to
the Pentagon.
In a cover story in the New York Times Magazine in May
2002, Bill Keller interviewed Eugene Habiger, the retired
four-star general who had overseen strategic nuclear weapons
until 1998 and had run nuclear antiterror programs for the
Department of Energy until 2001. Summarizing his decade of
daily experience dealing with threats, Habiger offered a
categorical conclusion about nuclear terrorism: ``it is not a
matter of if; it's a matter of when.'' ``That,'' Keller noted
drily, may explain why he now lives in San Antonio.''
In the end, the Dragonfire report turned out to be a false
alarm.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. I want to say just one additional thing. I have two
amendments that I intend to offer today. I do not intend to take a
great amount of time with either of them. Both of them are very
important. I wish to say to the chairman, I know he is working through
this bill today. I want to be

[[Page S10992]]

cooperative but not so cooperative that I do not have an opportunity to
fully explain amendments that I think are very important relative to
what I just described.
The amendments I will offer, one has to do with requiring India to
comply with what the U.S. is already required to comply with, the
second relates to a United Nations resolution, that our country pushed,
that represents American policy that appears to be completely
contradictory to the underlying bill on the floor of the Senate.
I say to the chairman, I will have two amendments. I am prepared in a
reasonable period to offer the amendments. I do have, with Senator
McCain, an obligation at 12 o'clock for a few minutes off the Senate
floor. We are going to be speaking to a group. But following that, I
would be happy to come over and offer my two amendments if the Senator
is willing to have me do that.
Mr. LUGAR. I would like to respond to my distinguished colleague. I
appreciate the appointment that he has with our colleague from Arizona.
My hope would be that the Senator would proceed with his amendments. It
would be timely to do so at his earliest convenience. I encourage him
to do so.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I missed the last point.
Mr. LUGAR. I just indicated as soon as you could proceed with your
amendments, this would be timely, in terms of moving the progress of
our bill today.
Mr. DORGAN. I will be off of the Senate floor for the other
requirement that I have, but I will come back. My understanding is
there is a proposal to perhaps try to modify one of my amendments?
Mr. LUGAR. That is correct. Staffs have been working on one of the
amendments of the Senator with the hope it might be possible to accept
that amendment. The other amendment would have to be offered and
debated.
Mr. DORGAN. Yes. I intend to offer the other amendment, debate it,
and ask for a recorded vote on it. I will take a look at the proposed
modification to see what that modification is, but I will try to be
back on the Senate floor as quickly as possible to accommodate the
Senator's interests in getting it done.
Mr. LUGAR. I appreciate that and thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of S. 3709,
the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. This
legislation has been thoughtfully crafted and will help cement an
important partnership with a vitally important Nation in a part of the
world that will become increasingly important for the future.
I first want to thank the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Lugar, for his commitment to this agreement from the
very beginning. Thoughtful, as he always is, I thank him for his
knowledge, his expertise, his wisdom, trying to make sure this is
appropriate for our country, as well as India, and making sure there
are provisions in there that are beneficial to our country while also
not harming the ability of our friends in India to pass it in their
country as well.
There is no person in the Senate more knowledgeable on anti-
proliferation issues than Senator Lugar. His leadership was
instrumental in developing a bill with protocols that met the
commitments made by our President while also respecting the safeguard
agreements that have protected this country for decades. I thank our
chairman.
The hearings by Chairman Lugar back in the spring, along with
informative testimony of Secretary Nicholas Burns, were a necessary
lesson for our colleagues on the committee, and I think the entire
United States, that explained the benefits and also helped remove
outstanding concerns about this historic pact. Chairman Lugar, earlier
speaking on this measure, along with the ranking member on the Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator Biden, addressed the specific sections of
the bill, so I will not recite all of those provisions again for my
colleagues. I wish to provide the principles behind it, the strategic
goals that are achieved in this United States-India civil nuclear pact.
I want to focus on the big picture and the long-term impact of this
cooperation agreement.
First and foremost, the United States-India civil nuclear cooperation
agreement is a significant foreign policy achievement for the
advancement of our security. It is a significant achievement for the
advancement of jobs, and also a significant achievement in improving
the environment--the air quality particularly, in India. This strategic
partnership between the world's oldest democracy, the United States,
and the world's largest democracy, India, is desirable, and it is
possible because we share the same values. We both believe in
representative democracy. We believe in and are girded by the rule of
law. We respect human rights and religious tolerance. We share the same
goals for Asia and for the world, which are freedom and peace.
This pact, this partnership, this agreement, in my view, can be the
beginning of a blossoming marriage between the people of the United
States and the people of India. India is a vital ally and a key global
partner in the war on terrorism. They understand it. They have been
threatened in India. In fact, India has been hit by terrorism in the
name of religious fanaticism and religious extremism. This agreement is
a step forward also regarding concerns with nuclear proliferation. Some
critics will argue this agreement undermines the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, but when you look at the facts, India has no
record of proliferating nuclear material, nuclear equipment, or
technology to any other countries. In addition, India's nuclear weapons
are there for self-defense and India has been a consistent practitioner
of the ``no first use'' doctrine when it comes to nuclear weapons.
India has been an exception in this regard and, in my view, should be
viewed differently than other countries that do not have such a record.
The fact is as a result of this agreement India will place a majority
of its thermal power reactors under the International Atomic Energy
safeguards for the very first time, and there also will be permanent
inspections.
By contrast, Iran doesn't have the same sort of policy as India. Iran
has kicked out the IAEA inspectors. This agreement helps bring India
into the global nuclear mainstream where it is not right now.
It is very clear, whether it was Chairman Lugar or Senator Biden and
others, if you examine this agreement it is going to significantly
increase transparency and oversight of its civilian nuclear program.
We also ought to look at the economic and energy benefits of this
cooperation. India has tremendous energy needs that will only increase
as their economy and country grows and increasingly prospers.
The United States-India nuclear agreement strengthens energy security
for the United States and India by promoting the development and stable
use of clean nuclear power, rather than relying on the Middle East for
oil and gas, particularly from Iran. Obviously, India benefits through
a reliable, affordable energy supply. United States companies will
benefit from increased jobs and economic opportunity in the India
energy market. Cooperation from this will also ensue, I believe, in
clean coal technology and also biofuels.
Having been in India last November-December, the air quality there is
awful. The coal they have in India is dirty coal. They have to import
coal.
There are millions of people in India prospering as a country, and
increasing. There are millions of people who do not have electricity.
For India to have its energy needs met, they are going to have to be
able to import more or they are going to have to come up with creative
approaches.
The U.S.A. is far more dependent on foreign sources of energy. We
need to have more exploration of oil and natural gas in our country. We
ought to be using more clean coal technology since we are the Saudi
Arabia of the world in coal for electricity and gasification and
liquification of coal. We also need advanced nuclear, biofuels, solar--
a diversity of fuels for our energy independence rather than being so
dependent on foreign sources of energy from the Middle East and hostile
dictators around the world.

[[Page S10993]]

India is in a similar situation. In fact, they are even more
dependent than the United States. There are concerns they will have to
have a pipeline from Iran for natural gas or for oil. We are trying to
get Iran not to develop nuclear weapons. One of the reasons
geopolitically why it is difficult to impose sanctions or any sort of
efforts to get them to comply is there are other parts of the world
that are so dependent on Iran for natural gas or for oil.
In a sense, the energy independence and energy security concerns that
we have in our country are also brought about for the people in India
which are even more dependent on foreign sources of energy than we are.
If India can have clean nuclear for electricity generation, that is
going to obviously help the people of India. It will improve their air
quality, clearly. As you all know, a barrel of oil, wherever it is
produced, has the same price.
With the increasing economies of China and India and elsewhere around
the world, for every bit of oil that is produced, the whole global
market is competing for that barrel of oil. To the extent that India's
demands can be somewhat ameliorated as well as ours in coal
liquification or biofuels or other renewable approaches, it is going to
help our energy independence in this insofar as India is concerned.
Beyond energy and jobs, we have grave threats facing the United
States and also our friends and allies insofar as security. We need to
build new alliances, and we need to strengthen existing alliances as
well.
With that in mind, I think we ought to be looking further into the
21st century to determine what U.S. policy will be in Asia. What should
it be? Where can we reasonably expect support to come from, whether in
Asia or the Western Pacific?
Presently, some of the key allies that share our values are South
Korea, Japan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia. They are key
leaders with us. Further positive concerted efforts need to be made
with Pakistan and Indonesia. India has a key role in all of this. I
think India is absolutely essential for our freedom and shared values
but also our freedom advancement in innovation and our security.
As I mentioned, I was in India last fall. This was a key issue on the
minds of Prime Minister Singh and other government leaders. India is a
country with tremendous potential, amazing values, but also a lot of
hardship, hard breaks, and poverty in that country. They need reliable
energy. They are working in education. In fact, we can learn a lot from
India insofar as education is concerned as young people in middle
school are focused on high school exams to get into the India
institutes of technology. We need to get more Americans from all
backgrounds interested in engineering and science as India has done.
India is also so important to security--a country which will soon
have well over 1.2 billion people, not only the world's largest
democracy but the world's largest country in the next few years.
The challenges that face India's future development are making
progress, but they are tremendous challenges. So while India is now a
global economic power, it is going to be increasingly an economic power
in the future. It is going to be a much more important voice in Asia as
well.
So it is in the interest of the United States to engage India, to
help it develop safe, clean, and reliable energy, and also further our
existing ties with its leaders in government, especially the people of
India who appreciate the United States. Of course, there is a great
deal of trade between the United States and India. Many of the H-1B
visa applicants are from India which are very important for Virginia's
economy and for the economy of the United States.
I also believe that we need to--I urge my colleagues to--examine this
in its totality. It is imperative that we pass this legislation and
begin finalizing this agreement that was reached by the elected leaders
of the United States and India. It is in our security interests. It is
in our economic interests. It strengthens the alliance which will be
vital for years ahead.

I believe very strongly that this United States-India pact will be a
marriage which will benefit all of us, not just now but for generations
to come.
I thank my colleagues. I urge most respectfully the passage of the
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act with no
killer amendments and let's allow this marriage between the United
States and India blossom for our security, for our jobs, and our best
interests through the years to come.
I thank Chairman Lugar again for his outstanding and remarkable
wisdom and insight shepherding this measure through. I hope by the end
of the day this will pass, and that this marriage will continue to bear
fruit for generations to come.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Virginia for his very generous comments about my leadership and the
work of the committee. But I want to say that I appreciated very much
the Senator's diligent and thoughtful work on the committee. He will be
missed. He has been a great leader in our efforts and has participated
materially in the formation of the legislation he talked about today. I
deeply appreciate the strength of his statement and his very thoughtful
comments.
I understand the distinguished Senator from Kansas wishes to make a
statement.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Isakson). The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Indiana,
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. He has done an outstanding
job. He has been a leader and a foreign policy voice on Capitol Hill.
His leadership is measured, and he is very knowledgeable and quite
good. I appreciate his wisdom, counsel, and leadership--and his
leadership on this bill as well.
I recognize my colleague from Virginia who has done an outstanding
job for many years in many capacities on foreign relations. I know that
he knows the issues on the United States-India relationship. Many
people I have worked with on India have worked with the Senator from
Virginia. I deeply appreciated his work, knowledge, interest, and
passion on pushing these issues. It takes people such as that to build
relationships. You have to always be pushing people together. I
appreciate his willingness to do that.
I rise in support of this bill. I rise, as my colleague from Virginia
has done, in support of the bill but without debilitating killer
amendments associated with it.
I rise as someone who has chaired the South Asia subcommittee for a
period of time and worked in building relationships with India.
I rise as the Senator who carried the initial bill to allow the
administration to lift sanctions against India when it tested nuclear
weapons during the Clinton administration. It was a big brawl of
discussion we had at that point in time.
Let me take my colleagues back a little bit. That was the point in
time when India was starting to shift away from its former focus on the
Soviet Union, then Russia, and whether it was going to join the West
and work with us. There was a big debate going on within Indian society
as to whether they were going to pull along alongside the United
States. It was a very heated debate, a very important discussion. It
became the signature moment as to whether the United States would be a
partner with India.
You will recall that for many years the United States and India had
what was best described as a prickly relationship. There was not an
easy, favorable one even though the fundamentals underneath seemed like
they were something that would be very good. India is equal. It has the
largest democracy and we the oldest. We are the two largest democracies
in the world. It would seem to be that this would be a very easy and
logical relationship. Yet they had gone into the Soviet sphere. We had
built more of a relationship with China than with India even though the
fundamentals under India were much better for us than they were with
China. There has been this separation and division for some period of
time.
India decided they needed to have a nuclear basis. They tested.
Pakistan tested in response to that. We had a series of sanctions that
immediately kicked in with that testing. Then our

[[Page S10994]]

entire relationship with India was viewed through the nuclear
nonproliferation issue. We had all these other issues that we needed to
discuss--economics, spread of terrorism, a series of issues, human
rights items. Everything went through the nonproliferation portal. If
you couldn't clear it through, we wouldn't be able to develop the rest.
Finally, we were able to provide the relationship, the
administration, and the capacity to waive this series of sanctions. It
was a difficult discussion and decision within the Congress. We were
able to pass it through. Then let us get into a broader range--and the
relationship flourished. It expanded enormously.
Now I think we are at another step. This is another one of those key
junctures in the relationship as to whether this was going be a true
and budding and future-oriented relationship. That is whether we can
enter into this agreement that we are discussing here today. This is
being watched very carefully in India as being a key view as to what
the United States is going to do in its ongoing relationship with
India.
I urge passage and strong support in building the fundamentals and
strengthening a United States-India relationship. This agreement is not
about sacrificing the nonproliferation regime on the altar of strategic
cooperation. I want to emphasize that point. I think as people look at
it, the initial question they would come up with is, I am fine with the
strategic relationship; I will not sacrifice the nonproliferation
issue. It is not about sacrificing that. It is about recognizing the
reality of India's 30-year nuclear program. Engaged in peaceful
civilian--as the chairman has said many times--nuclear cooperation with
the world's largest democracy, securing commitments from India to
implement the IAEA standard and safeguard and affirming India's
longstanding commitment to democracy and its constructive role in
shaping the world in decades ahead.
There is an environmental angle on this as we look at India as being
a key economy in growth. That growth is consuming much more energy.
That energy is generally in the form of fossil fuels which release a
lot more CO<inf>2</inf>. If we are concerned about the release and the
impact and the accumulation of CO<inf>2</inf> in the atmosphere, one of
the key things we should do from an environmental perspective is to
engage in this agreement on civilian nuclear power. That is where we
will reduce the CO<inf>2</inf> loading into the atmosphere.

From another nonstrategic, nonproliferation angle, from an
environmental angle, this is a very positive agreement, a key agreement
we can have with one of the fastest growing economies in the world that
will be releasing a lot more CO<inf>2</inf> in the atmosphere unless
they use a great deal of nuclear capacity in building that energy
system.
Bringing India to the nonproliferation regime and forging a strategic
partnership with the world's largest democracy makes America safer, as
well. We have a common enemy in the war on terrorism around the world.
India has been a key and strategic partner in their assistance in
curbing the nuclear pursuits of Iran, a weaponized nuclear pursuit by
Iran. We are getting help from India on that. We continue to work with
Pakistan.
As a number have pointed out, either implicitly or explicitly, it is
a balancing issue, a balance-of-power issue with China. I know everyone
in this Senate thinks about that, even if it is not expressed often,
but it is key that we build this balance of power in our balance with
India in this region of the world as a democracy, as a country that is
with us in the fight on terrorism.
India shares strategic interests; it also shares values. They have a
commitment to democracy, with rules of law, transparency, a
multireligious country. America and India, as I mentioned, are the
world's two largest democracies, and India has had a functioning
democracy for some period of time. Civilian nuclear cooperation is an
important step in developing new and alternative energy sources.
Comparison with Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs are
misleading. There are strict measures taken to ensure our cooperation
will only be with India's civilian nuclear program. They have proven to
be trustworthy. There is still reason to believe North Korea and Iran
are clearly pursuing these for nuclear weapons and for purposes against
us, very threatening to us and our interests. We need to look at the
nature of the regimes. India is a peaceful, stable democracy versus
authoritarian in Iran and North Korea.
Finally, this is just one of the key relationships at one of the key
times. It is important we take the right steps during those points in
time. I hope we have a very positive, robust debate and pass this bill
by a very large margin, saying to the people of India and around the
world: We are interested in partnering with you, we want to partner
with you, we want to expand that partnership, and we see this as a key
partnership for our future, for your future, and for global stability.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham). The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator from Kansas for a very strong
endorsement of this legislation.
I note in the Senate the distinguished Senator from Georgia who would
like to participate. I look forward to hearing from him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, I rise in full support of the United
States-Indian nuclear agreement. I wish to share the two distinct
reasons for my support.
First and foremost is the distinguished chairman from Indiana,
Senator Lugar. There is not an individual in this Senate and I say
probably not an individual in this country who has committed more of
their life to preventing nuclear disaster and its proliferation. There
is perhaps no one who has worked harder to see to it that the U.S.
agreements, as they relate to the security of nuclear power and the
interest of our country, have always been nothing but in the best
interest of the United States of America.
As a Senator from Georgia, I am well aware that Senator Lugar
partnered for many years and still partners today with our Senator, Sam
Nunn, in seeking to ensure nuclear proliferation does not take place
anywhere in the world and that nuclear materials from existing nuclear
nations never fall in the hands of those who would use them in an act
of terrorism. I place my confidence first and foremost in the
distinguished chairman from Indiana.
There is a second, equally compelling reason; that is, my visit to
India in April of this year, just shortly after the President announced
the civilian nuclear deal with India. Quite frankly, my initial
reaction before I went to India was one of significant concern. I think
any time any of us look into nuclear agreements and the sharing of
nuclear technology, we should have significant concern. However, I went
to India and learned a number of things firsthand that I did not know.
I share them with this Senate today because I believe they are
important in whether we grant this agreement.
First, I learned quickly that in the 30-year history of involvement
in the development of nuclear energy, India has never had a single
deviation from its stated original purpose, which was civilian use, and
in terms of military, only for minimal deterrence. They have clearly
said from the beginning they would never be a first-strike nation, and
they have always said that our motivation from a defensive mechanism is
minimal deterrence. A 30-year consistent policy like that in any nation
is good enough evidence for me in terms of the heart and the intent of
that country.
Second, India is a democracy of 1.3 billion people in round numbers
in a part of the world of significant importance to the United States
of America. They have demonstrated in their cooperation with us in the
global war on terror their interest only in peaceful operations of all
nations and never in nuclear energy or technology falling into the
hands of those who would use it in a devious way.
As the distinguished Senator from Virginia has said, India is a
blossoming nation economically, but it suffers dramatically from the
coal it has to burn and from the lack of efficient energy sources it
now has. This civilian nuclear agreement allows them the opportunity to
expand nuclear energy for the generation of electricity and to reduce
the pollution in the atmosphere, which is not just India's atmosphere
but is the world's atmosphere.

[[Page S10995]]

The distinguished chairman from Indiana has worked long and hard on
this agreement. I am in full support of this agreement in its draft
form and its presented form today. I hope the Members of the Senate
will endorse and ratify without debilitating amendments. I have
confidence in the chairman and his work. I have confidence in my visit
to the people of India and Prime Minister Singh that they will continue
to be what they have been: a burgeoning democracy and a great partner
with the United States of America.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Georgia for visiting India, for his personal testimony on this issue,
for strong support of the treaty, and for his very thoughtful personal
comments.
I note the presence of the very distinguished leader in the Senate in
fostering and strengthening India-United States relationships, the
distinguished Senator from Texas.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the United
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. I particularly
express my gratitude to the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Chairman Lugar, for his outstanding work on this bipartisan
piece of legislation that advances our strategic relationship with
India while also bringing India into the mainstream of international
nonproliferation efforts.
I am delighted to be the cochair, along with Senator Hillary Clinton,
of the United States-India caucus in the Senate, actually something we
resurrected just a couple short years ago that had fallen by the
wayside.
After my own visit to India and in consultation with a number of
Indian-American constituents who live in Texas--about 200,000 live in
my State alone--I became absolutely convinced that a closer
relationship with the great nation of India and its people was
essential to our security interests and essential to our economic
interests.
As our colleagues know and as has been mentioned by a number of our
Members, Prime Minister Singh visited Washington last summer and
President Bush paid a visit to India this spring. These events mark a
critical milestone in our improving relationship. Passage of this
legislation will mark another significant step and I daresay cement
what is a very important relationship to both nations.
President Bush made a fundamental foreign policy objective to move
the United States-India relationship to a new level. As Secretary Rice
has said, our relationship with India is one of the most important
partnerships the United States can have in the 21st century.
As has been often noted, India is the world's largest democracy,
while we are the world's oldest democracy, and our two great nations
share so many common values and common beliefs. It is only appropriate
that the United States and India become true strategic partners as we
move into the 21st century. Fortunately, the days of the Cold War, when
India was more aligned with the Soviet Union than with the United
States, are in the long past. The United States and India share a
common vision for our future. It is a peaceful vision where we battle
terrorism together, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
HIV/AIDS, and a host of other challenges that face our world today.
While it is true that the agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation is a
significant departure from previous U.S. policy, I strongly believe
this legislation represents a positive step as we grow our strategic
relationship.
For more than 30 years, the United States and India have disagreed
over India's decision not to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As such, the United States has not cooperated with the Nation of India
on any civilian nuclear technology to speak of. In short, we have been
at a stalemate which has neither served our nonproliferation goals, nor
helped India's vast needs for energy resources. Fortunately, this
carefully crafted legislation will allow us to move forward in a
responsible manner. The agreement, in fact, enhances our
nonproliferation efforts.
It is correct to say that India is not a signatory to the
nonproliferation treaty. They have decided for their own national
security reasons that they will not become a party to the treaty, and
no amount of international pressure is likely to change that
conclusion. This is the reality we face, and the status quo for another
30 years is simply not acceptable. Recognizing this reality, we must
ask ourselves, What can we do to promote nonproliferation efforts with
India and bring them into the international nonproliferation regime?
This legislation provides that answer.
Despite not signing the nonproliferation treaty, India, for the
record, has an excellent nonproliferation record. They understand,
perhaps as well as anyone, the danger of the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. This is why India has agreed to adhere to key
international nonproliferation efforts on top of their own stringent
export control regime. This is a significant step forward which has
been welcomed by the International Atomic Energy Agency Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei, who understands India will not come into the
nonproliferation treaty by traditional means but can be accommodated
through this route.
I conclude by noting that the United States is fortunate, indeed, to
have many Indian Americans who have helped bring our two nations closer
together. As I have noted, many of them live in my State, as they do
around this great country, contributing to our brainpower, to our
economy. Frankly, this community is one of the hardest working, most
accomplished communities in our Nation today. There are about 200,000
of them living in Texas, and nearly 80,000 Indian students are studying
at our Nation's colleges and universities. Their contributions to our
Nation and the United States-India relationship have been remarkably
positive.
I encourage my colleagues to support this legislation, to advance our
strategic relationship with India while also bringing India into the
mainstream of international nonproliferation efforts.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the distinguished Senator for his leadership. His
action with the distinguished Senator from New York, Mrs. Clinton, is
certainly timely for these important visits to occur and these
negotiations. I think they have restored significance in our
relationship. I thank the Senator for coming to the Senate and offering
strong support for the treaty.
Mr. President, I note the presence of another distinguished member of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the distinguished Senator from
Ohio.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my support for S.
3709, the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act,
of which I am a cosponsor. First, I congratulate Senators Lugar and
Biden for their excellent bipartisan effort to produce a quality piece
of legislation. We can all be very proud of this product.
I have long believed the United States and India should expand its
excellent friendship and embark upon a deeper, more strategic
relationship. We now have that opportunity, and I urge my fellow
Members of the Senate to pass S. 3709, a bill that will enable us to
transform our relationship with India and initiate a solid partnership
with great security, economic, and environmental returns for U.S.
national interests.
As President Bush said when he met with Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh in New Delhi last spring:

India in the 21st century is a natural partner of the
United States because we are brothers in the cause of human
liberty.

By expanding civil nuclear cooperation with India, the United States
has an opportunity to bring India into an arms control regime that will
guarantee greater oversight and inspection rights and which will allow
us to make India's preexisting nuclear program safer and more
transparent. At a time when we are facing many other nuclear power
challenges, we should welcome this as a positive step in the world of
nonproliferation.
It is not just the United States that supports civil nuclear
cooperation with India. I was in Vienna in May, where I met with the
International Atomic Energy Agency. During our meetings--we

[[Page S10996]]

were talking primarily about Iran and what they were doing in terms of
Iran's violation of the nuclear nonproliferation agreement. We also
talked about India and how they felt about the proposal that was being
entered into between the United States and India. And I was told, at
that time, that India has been a more active and responsible partner,
in terms of their cooperation with the IAEA, than many of the
signatories to the nuclear nonproliferation agreement.
As was just pointed out by the Senator from Texas, later on Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei called the idea that is contained in this
agreement ``a milestone'' and ``timely for ongoing efforts to
consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and
strengthen nuclear safety.''
Furthermore, this agreement will allow us to form a critical
strategic relationship with India. And from a point of view, it is long
overdue. The geostrategic facts are that China and India are two rising
powers in the industrialized world. As China expands its economic power
and military strength, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India can help to
even the international keel.
I am also referring to the fact that China, could pose a threat to
U.S. national security in the future. We are working very carefully to
make sure that does not happen, but it is something we should think
about. But I am also thinking about the fact that India and China also
have a good relationship. So the fact that we are entering into a new
relationship with India, I think, also would be well received by the
Chinese and other Asian countries and helpful to alleviating any
tensions that exist.
For the past 30 years, we let differences in our domestic policies
and our international intentions keep us from working together. But
India is a unique democracy, a new shining city upon a hill, and we
need this more than ever before. We need models such as this, where
people of different faiths and ethnicities live together and where the
Government is open and accountable for its actions. It is the largest
democracy that we have in the world today.
Following the end of the Cold War, new economic opportunities have
created room for cooperation between the United States and India in
agriculture, health care, commerce, defense, technology, and education.
It is amazing to me the number of businesses I have in Ohio that have
joint ventures in India and Indian investment in the State of Ohio.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, India has been a leader
in fighting terrorism and rooting out extremists from its society. It
has a long record of responsible behavior on nonproliferation matters,
and it is time we embrace India as part of that nonproliferation
community.
I strongly encourage the Senate to pass S. 3907 and take the next
step in bolstering our relationship with India. A democratic,
economically sound, internationally integrated India will serve as a
ballast in a region experiencing rapid, sweeping change.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. May I have recognition?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I see the floor manager and the matter we
have before us is of great importance and consequence. I know we have a
variety of different amendments that are being considered and are being
talked about, even as we are here now. I do not mean to interfere with
the flow of this debate and reaching a timely conclusion of it, but I
want to address the Senate for a few moments on what I consider to be
sort of the important agenda for our committee, our HELP Committee, in
this next session. I will cooperate, obviously, with the floor manager
and ask that my remarks be printed in an appropriate place in the
Record. And I will speak for just a few moments.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. So others who want to continue the debate will have the
opportunity to do so. And as one who has been a floor manager, I
understand his desire to have focus and attention on the underlying
matters. But I appreciate the courtesy and the understanding of the
manager letting me talk briefly this afternoon.
(The remarks of Mr. Kennedy are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')

Amendment No. 5173

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk that has
been cleared on both sides of the aisle.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for Mr. Harkin,
proposes an amendment numbered 5173.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To make the waiver authority of the President contingent upon
a determination that India is fully and actively participating in
United States and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and
contain Iran for its nuclear program consistent with United Nations
Security Council resolutions)

On page 8, beginning on line 8, strike ``Group; and'' and
all that follows through ``Nuclear'' on line 9 and insert the
following:

Group;
(8) India is fully and actively participating in United
States and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and
contain Iran for its nuclear program consistent with United
Nations Security Council resolutions; and
(9) the Nuclear

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I thank the managers of this bill,
Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden, for accepting my amendment. I thank
my colleagues.
My amendment is very simple and straightforward. It requires the
President to determine that India was fully and actively participating
in U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and contain
Iran's nuclear program consistent with United Nations Security Council
Resolutions.
As my colleagues know, Iran is one of, if not the most, urgent
nuclear nonproliferation challenges the world faces today.
For two decades Iran secretly built up its nuclear capabilities in
violation of the safeguards commitments it made with the International
Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. To date, Iran has completed most of the
construction of a massive uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz, opened
a heavy-water production plant at Arak and began construction of a 40-
megawatt reactor there. It also began construction on a fuel
manufacturing plant at Isfahan; tested centrifuges with uranium,
hexafluoride, produced their first samples of low-enriched uranium; and
nearly completed construction of their first nuclear power reactor at
Bushehr, set to open in 2007.
Iran says these programs are for peaceful purposes, but experts agree
and the Bush administration believes, that Iran is on its way to
acquiring the capability to produce large quantities of bomb grade
nuclear material. Additionally, Iran has not fully answered numerous
questions from the IAEA about activities that may be related to a
weapons program. These activities are very concerning.
Earlier this year, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in
violation of its safeguards commitments and reported Iran's file to the
U.N. Security Council. The Security Council has demanded that Iran
suspend its uranium enrichment program and construction of a heavy-
water production reactor. These technologies can be used to make bomb-
grade nuclear material.
However, Iran continues to stiff-arm the IAEA's investigation of its
program. This week Iran again thumbed its nose at the international
community boasting that the world would have to ``live with a nuclear
Iran.'' A new report this week from the IAEA says the agency found new
traces of plutonium and enriched uranium at a nuclear research facility
in Tehran.
As we are here debating this bill, U.S. diplomats are engaged with
our partners in the U.N. Security Council on this very important issue.
They are working to build support for a new resolution that would
mandate targeted sanctions on Iran to help persuade its leadership to
change course and halt its uranium enrichment work.
This diplomatic course of action is appropriate at this stage, and I
fully support it. To succeed, any targeted sanctions policy must not
only have the active support of Security Council member states, but
also the cooperation of other member states of the

[[Page S10997]]

international community. Targeted sanctions against Iran will not work
unless they are fully and actively supported by states close to Iran
and with ties to Iran, such as India. They will not work, I would add,
without effective diplomatic engagement with Iran.
This is a time when we need to have the support of every country as
the United States works with our allies to contain and constrain Iran's
troubling nuclear program.
Now my colleagues may be wondering what this has to do with India.
India has a robust relationship with Iran. India actively engages in
military-to-military cooperation with Iran and the two countries have a
significant trade relationship. India plans to build a gas pipeline
from Iran through Pakistan. India's leaders see Iran as a diplomatic
partner on many issues. In fact, Iran's Foreign Minister will be
visiting New Delhi today.
Given India's proximity to Iran, none of this is surprising, but it
means that India has a particular responsibility to help contain Iran's
nuclear and missile capabilities and support possible U.N. Security
Council sanctions against Iran.
Obviously, India, like most other states, does not support a nuclear
weapons option for Iran.
However, Indian views of the threat posed by the Iran nuclear program
and its perspective on Iran's so-called ``right'' to peaceful nuclear
technology differ significantly from U.S. views. Unfortunately, some of
India's policies appear to embolden Iran's leaders to press forward
with their ambitious nuclear plans.
As we move forward in our effort with the international community to
deal, contain, and if necessary sanction Iran for its defiance of
international demands to halt its sensitive nuclear activities, we will
need greater support from all states, including India, in this effort.
Over a year ago, on September 24, 2005, India voted with the United
States and 20 other states on the IAEA resolution which found Iran in
compliance with its safeguards agreement. But the resolution did not
refer the matter immediately to the Security Council and according to a
recent report produced by the Congressional Research Service, India was
one of a handful of countries seeking to avoid such a referral.
Disturbingly, India's official explanation of its vote highlights
India's differences with the United States on how to deal with Iran's
nuclear transgressions. It stated that:
In our Explanation of Vote (this is the Indian government), we have
clearly expressed our opposition to Iran being declared as noncompliant
with its safeguards agreements. Nor do we agree that the current
situation could constitute a threat to international peace and
security. Nevertheless, the resolution does not refer the matter to the
Security Council and has agreed that outstanding issues be dealt with
under the aegis of the IAEA itself. This is in line with our position
and therefore, we have extended our support.
India again voted with the United States on February 4, 2006, when
the IAEA Board of Governors voted to refer Iran's noncompliance to the
U.N. Security Council. This was welcomed at the time. Yet the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs responded to questions about its vote by
noting that:
``While there will be a report to the Security Council, the Iran
nuclear issue remains within the purview of the IAEA. It has been our
consistent position that confrontation should be avoided and any
outstanding issue ought to be resolved through dialogue. . . . Our vote
in favour of the Resolution should not be interpreted as in any way
detracting from the traditionally close and friendly relations we enjoy
with Iran.''
By keeping the issue under the purview of the IAEA Iran would not be
subject to sanctions. The IAEA does not have that capability, the
Security Council does.
In April 2006, the U.N. Security Council issued a statement calling
for an immediate suspension of all Iranian enrichment activities. Iran
responded by announcing that it had produced a small quantity of low-
enriched uranium using a test assembly of centrifuges and noted it
planned to expand the facility's production capacity.
What was India's response? On May 30, India signed onto a statement
by the Non-Aligned Movement, which said that concerns surrounding
Iran's nuclear program should be resolved at the International Atomic
Energy Agency Board of Governors and not the U.N. Security Council,
again seeking to avoid sanctions, contrary to what U.S. diplomats and
others were urging at that time.
In July, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1696, which gave
Tehran until August 31 to suspend its uranium enrichment program and
required Tehran to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy
Agency's, IAEA, investigation of its nuclear programs.
Again what was India's response? Apparently, in an attempt to patch
up relations with Tehran over its earlier votes at the IAEA Board of
Governors, India added its name to the September 2006 joint statement
on Iran's nuclear program released by the Non-Aligned Movement at its
meeting in Havana. In this statement, India called nuclear research and
development a ``basic inalienable right'' of Iran's, and said that
nuclear ``choices and decisions'' of different countries ``must be
respected.''
Newspaper headlines in Iran trumpeted the news. The Iran Times
headline on September 18 read: ``118 Countries Back Iran's Nuclear
Program.'' Iran's President met with India's Prime Minister in Havana
to discuss how to deepen Indo-Iranian ties.
Since then, talks between Iran and the EU to halt the Iranian nuclear
program have broken down, and in October, Iran took additional steps to
improve its enrichment capability and is now seeking IAEA nuclear
safety assistance on its Arak heavy-water reactor. U.S. diplomats are
working hard now to lobby fellow members of the IAEA Board of Governors
to reject this request. We need India's active support when that
happens.
In a recent report, the Congressional Research Service detailed some
concerns about India's proliferation record with respect to Iran.
The U.S. Government, as a result of the Iran-Syria Nonproliferation
Act, has sanctioned Indian companies for transferring WMD technologies
and materials to Iran and other countries.
On August 4, the Bush administration publicly announced in the
Federal Register sanctions on two Indian entities for transferring
chemicals that can be used to produce missile propellant to Iran. The
sanctions determination had been made July 25, a day before the House
passed its version of the India bill.
For its part, India contended the sanctions were unwarranted. A
Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson asserted on August 7th the
transfers were ``not in violation of our regulations or our
international obligations.''
This is deeply disturbing. What this means is that India's current
export control laws are inadequate and do not meet the same high
standards of U.S. export laws.
As we move forward in our effort with the international community to
deal, contain, and if necessary, sanction Iran for its defiance of
international demands to halt its sensitive nuclear activities, we will
need greater support from a regional partner. We will need India to be
more effective and diligent in preventing the proliferation of
technologies, goods, and material that might be used by Iran to produce
weapons of mass destruction or the means to deliver them.
I think that my colleagues would agree that the ties between India
and Iran are troubling. That is why I believe we must--through my
amendment--require the President to provide a determination that India
is actively supporting efforts to contain Iran's nuclear program before
he can waive existing restrictions on civil nuclear commerce with
India.
I want to be clear--my amendment is not ``anti-India.'' My amendment
is a positive and vital step in safeguarding our own national security
interests.
There are some in this body who have argued that this legislation,
and the possible agreement for nuclear cooperation, will enhance our
strategic relationship and improve India's nonproliferation record.
Others have warned that this will damage the vital effort to reduce
nuclear weapons dangers in South Asia and elsewhere if we don't make
adjustments to strengthen the nonproliferation requirements in the
package.

[[Page S10998]]

Whatever our differences may be regarding other aspects of this
proposal, one issue that I hope we can agree on is the need to ensure
we have India's full and active cooperation and support in the effort
to prevent Iran or other states from acquiring the capability to
produce bomb material.
As the Senate considers reversing 36 years of nuclear proliferation
restrictions, it is important that we ensure that India is a true
strategic partner in the effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons.
Again, I appreciate the support of my colleagues in accepting my
amendment.
Mr. LUGAR. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
If not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 5173.
The amendment (No. 5173) was agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on
the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. I note the distinguished Senator from New Mexico is
present.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.

Amendment No. 5174

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman] proposes an
amendment numbered 5174.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment
be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To limit the waiver authority of the President)

On page 6, after line 21, add the following:

(c) Operation of Waivers.--Notwithstanding any waiver under
subsection (a)--
(1) no nuclear equipment or sensitive nuclear technology
may be exported to India unless the President has determined,
and has submitted to the appropriate congressional committees
a report stating, that both India and the United States are
taking specific steps to conclude a multilateral treaty on
the cessation of the production of fissile materials for use
in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and
(2) no nuclear materials may be exported to India unless
the President has determined, and has submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees a report stating, that
India has stopped producing fissile materials for weapons
pursuant to a unilateral moratorium or multilateral
agreement.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, this amendment would establish a link
between the export of nuclear fuel and equipment to India under the
United States-India nuclear agreement and India's halting of the
production of nuclear weapons material. More specifically, my amendment
provides two separate tests, one for nuclear equipment and technology,
and another for nuclear material.
As to the nuclear equipment and technology, my amendment would
require the President to certify that both India and the United States
are taking specific steps to conclude a verifiable fissile material
cutoff treaty before the United States exports any nuclear equipment or
technology to India. As to nuclear fuel, my amendment would require the
President to certify that India has stopped producing fissile material
for weapons, either unilaterally or as part of a multilateral
agreement, again, before the United States exports nuclear material to
India.
The purpose of the amendment is not to kill the bill or the agreement
with India but, as I see it, to strengthen that agreement. It would
allow nuclear trade with India to proceed but in a way that will be
consistent with our nuclear nonproliferation goals and our security
interests.
It imposes no unreasonable or unrealistic conditions on nuclear trade
with India. It simply requires the President to determine that India
has followed through on its stated agreement to work toward a fissile
material cutoff treaty. Let me explain why I believe this amendment is
necessary.
In 1974, India tested a nuclear weapon it built using technology that
we had provided to it for peaceful purposes. The title of the pending
bill is United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. So
in 1974, India tested a nuclear weapon built using technology that we
had given it for peaceful purposes. We responded then by strengthening
our nuclear export laws in 1978 to ensure that that could not happen
again. In 1980, we cut off nuclear cooperation with India, after India
failed to meet the terms of the new law.
The bill before us would make it possible to resume nuclear
cooperation with India by exempting India from certain requirements
that we added to our nuclear export laws in 1978.
Proponents of the bill offer some strong arguments for going ahead.
They say that we need to resume nuclear cooperation in order to
cultivate closer ties with India. They say it is in our best interest
to help India expand its civilian nuclear power program so that India
might meet its growing energy needs with clean, environmentally
friendly sources of power. They say it will help to bring India within
the ``nonproliferation mainstream.'' I don't quarrel with any of those
arguments or with the goal of the legislation. I agree that our past
policies to pressure India on nuclear nonproliferation have not worked.
Compared to several of its neighbors, India has a relatively good
nonproliferation record, and by improving cooperation with India, we
may be able to make India a useful ally in our efforts to halt the
spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia.
My quarrel is not with the goal of reopening nuclear cooperation with
India but in the details of the bill and in the terms on which we
propose to resume that cooperation.
Under current law, in order for the United States to resume nuclear
trade with India, our two nations must enter into an agreement for
cooperation under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act requires the agreement to meet eight specific
conditions. One of those conditions is that India must sign an
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to safeguard all
nuclear material under its jurisdiction. India has consistently and
steadfastly refused to agree to these so-called full-scope safeguards.
Even if we were able to enter into an agreement for cooperation with
India, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would then have to license the
export of specific nuclear material and facilities to India under the
provisions of section 126 of that same Atomic Energy Act. And in order
to license an export under those provisions, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission would first have to find that the statutory export licensing
criteria of section 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act are met. Among
other things, section 128 requires the Commission to find that the
full-scope IAEA safeguards will be maintained on all of India's nuclear
activities.
Once again, though, of course, India has refused to agree to those
full-scope safeguards. Even if India were to accept full-scope
safeguards, there is the third problem.
Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act prohibits the export of nuclear
materials or equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to any
nonnuclear weapons state that has detonated a nuclear explosive device,
violated or abrogated IAEA safeguards, or engaged in activities
directed toward making a nuclear explosive device. Even section 129--
and since India tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974 and five
times since then in 1998, it has clearly run afoul of this provision.

The Atomic Energy Act provides a way around all of these obstacles.
It says that the President can waive the full-scope safeguard
requirement and can enter into an agreement for cooperation, as he is
here proposing to do, without full-scope safeguards if he determines
that insistence on full-scope safeguards:

Would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the
United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise
jeopardize the common defense and security.

Similarly, the act allows the President to authorize exports without
full-scope safeguards, and in spite of India's detonation of a nuclear
explosive device, if the President:

Determines that cessation of such exports would be
seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States
nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the
common defense and security.

[[Page S10999]]

President Carter used this authority in 1980 to export nuclear fuel
to India. But the current administration has apparently concluded that
President Bush cannot say that withholding nuclear exports from India
would seriously prejudice our nonproliferation objectives or jeopardize
our security.
So instead of relying on the existing waiver authority that is in the
law, the administration has requested and the bill provides--the bill
before us would provide a specific statutory waiver for India. This is
a waiver from the full-scope safeguard requirements of sections 126,
128, and the nuclear weapons prohibition contained in section 129. So
instead of applying full-scope safeguards to all peaceful nuclear
activities in India, the bill only asks that India give the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the United States a:

Credible plan to separate its civil nuclear facilities,
materials, and programs from its military facilities,
materials, and programs, and that it only apply the IAEA
safeguards to those civilian activities.

Let me just put up a chart up here to make the point as to what I
think the bill contains. This is an important distinction for all of us
to understand.
India has been called upon in this agreement to separate what they
are going to open to safeguards from the portion of their nuclear
program they are going to keep separate from any kind of a full-scope
safeguard. So there are 14 power reactors and one fuel reprocessing
plant they have identified as being subject to safeguards under this
agreement. That is the so-called civilian side of what they are doing.
Then there is the nonsafeguarded area, and that, according to the
Indians--and, of course, they are the ones who make this judgment and
have under this agreement we are now considering, they have determined
that there are eight power reactors for which they are not going to
provide safeguards: their Fast Breeder program, which they are not
going to provide safeguards for, and of course their entire military
program, which is made up of two plutonium reprocessing plants, two
uranium enrichment plants, and two heavy water plutonium production
reactors. So it is clear that there is a substantial amount of their
nuclear program that they have determined they will not open to
inspection by the IAEA and will not open to these requirements which
are contained in our own law.
There are major problems with this approach. First is that the
partial safeguards are not full-scope safeguards. India produced its
separation plan in March. It offers to place some of its civilian power
reactors, some of its fuel cycle facilities, some of its research
facilities under safeguards, but it leaves still others of its civilian
power reactors, its fuel cycle facilities, its research reactors, and
its military plants unsafeguarded. Many of the facilities that raise
the greatest proliferation concerns, including the Fast Breeder Reactor
program and its uranium enrichment plants and its spent fuel processing
facilities, are placed beyond the reach of any international
safeguards. India will be free to use these facilities to produce
fissile material for nuclear weapons without any international
inspection or control.
To make matters worse, by allowing India to buy civilian nuclear fuel
on the international market, India will no longer have to choose
between using its own limited uranium resources to supply its civilian
power program or its weapons program. It will be able to buy nuclear
fuel for its civilian power program and devote all its own uranium
resources to its weapons program.
The other major problem with this approach is that it abandons the
fundamental tenet of our nuclear nonproliferation policy; namely, that
nations are required to renounce nuclear weapons in order to get our
assistance. This simple bargain has been the cornerstone of our
nonproliferation policy since President Eisenhower announced the Atoms
For Peace program over a half a century ago. The bill before us
abandons that policy. It offers U.S. assistance to India without any
restraint or limitation on its existing weapons program. Making such an
exception for India will, in my view, permanently weaken our
nonproliferation policy and our credibility on this issue. Already
there are other nations, including Pakistan, that have asked for
similar treatment. We are signaling that there are no general rules
that apply when it comes to nonproliferation; whether we will ship
nuclear technology or nuclear fuel or materials to a country depends
upon the circumstances of each case. That is what this agreement
signals to the rest of the world. It is difficult to see how we can
insist that China and Russia strictly enforce full-scope safeguards in
their dealings with Iran and North Korea if we are not going to enforce
full-scope safeguards in our dealings with other countries--India, in
this case. That is not to say we should bar the door to further nuclear
cooperation with India or vote down the bill. I think we should open up
nuclear trade with India, but we should do it in a way that is in
keeping with our broad nuclear nonproliferation policy.
I believe the bill before us, while seriously flawed as it now
stands, can be fixed, can be salvaged, and that is the purpose of my
amendment. The central issue, as I see it, is how to allow nuclear
trade with India to proceed without aiding and abetting India's nuclear
weapons program. India has dozens of nuclear weapons today. China has
hundreds of nuclear weapons today. We do not want to see a race begin
in Asia to see who can achieve the greatest capability in nuclear
weapons. I believe the answer is to establish a link between our
cooperation with India's civilian nuclear program and India stopping
its production of nuclear materials for its weapons program.

What I am recommending is nothing more than what our former
colleague, Senator Sam Nunn, suggested in the article which is on each
Member's desk entitled ``A Nuclear Pig In A Poke.'' It was an article
in the Wall Street Journal on May 24, and I commend it to all of my
colleagues for their consideration. Specifically, Senator Nunn in that
article recommended that:

Congress require a two-stage process. First, before any
export of nuclear reactors, components, or related technology
are provided to India, the President should have to certify
that both India and the United States are taking specific
steps to lead a serious and expedited international effort to
conclude a verifiable fissile material cutoff treatment.

Continuing with his statement:

Second, before any exports of nuclear reactor fuel or its
components are provided to India, thereby freeing India to
use its limited stocks to expand its nuclear weapons program,
the President would be required to certify that India has
stopped producing fissile materials for weapons, either as
part of a voluntary moratorium or multilateral agreement.

That is precisely what the amendment does.
I have attached a letter to the opinion piece Senator Nunn wrote, a
letter from Senator Nunn to me where he states that clearly the
amendment I am offering today is trying to implement the
recommendations he made in his earlier opinion piece. So this amendment
is based squarely on Senator Nunn's proposal. It simply requires first
that before nuclear equipment and technology can be exported, the
President first should determine that both India and the United States
are taking specific steps to conclude a fissile material cutoff treaty;
second, that before any nuclear materials may be exported to India, the
President must determine that India has stopped producing fissile
materials for weapons.
Both the United States and India have already agreed to work toward a
fissile materials cutoff treaty. The bill before us, in section 1055,
already requires the President to determine that India is working with
us toward such a treaty before he can use the waivers. All my amendment
does is to require the President to determine and to report to Congress
that specific steps are being taken before we export nuclear equipment
and technology, and that India has, in fact, stopped producing weapons
material before we export nuclear material to India. The amendment
would simply implement Senator Nunn's recommendations.
As I indicated, there is a letter pointing out that this amendment
would, in fact, accomplish that objective that is attached to the
opinion piece.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Nunn's May 24 op-
ed in the Wall Street Journal and his letter to me dated September 28
of this year be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Vitter). Without objection, it is so
ordered.

[[Page S11000]]

(See exhibit 1).
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, the amendment I am proposing here is not
a killer amendment. I know the traditional approach in the Senate is
that any time an amendment is offered, it is characterized by its
opponents as a killer amendment, so you could make the argument that
anything we might change in the pending legislation would absolutely
kill our prospects of getting anything done. But this amendment is not
a killer amendment. As Senator Nunn has stated in his op-ed piece, it
is not a killer amendment:

Unless you believe that India will continue its weapons-
usable nuclear material production, and that U.S. and Indian
pledges to work for a fissile material cutoff treaty are
insincere, meaningless gestures.

If those pledges are sincere and meaningful, as I trust they are,
then this amendment simply says they should be fulfilled before exports
begin.
Adoption of my amendment will significantly strengthen the agreement
with India. As Senator Nunn has said:

This two-stage approach would significantly strengthen the
deal in a way that improves the protection of our core
security interests, while ultimately allowing trade to
proceed. By establishing a linkage between exports of nuclear
material and the cessation of Indian production of nuclear
weapons material, this amendment will maintain the integrity
of an important U.S. security objective; that is, preventing
the growth and spread of nuclear weapons-usable material
around the globe.

Without this amendment I am offering, I fear the enactment of the
bill pending before us would result in making the world a more
dangerous place rather than a less dangerous place. This amendment will
give us the advantages of the agreement but without the increased
danger which all of us would like to see avoided.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the Senator from New Mexico. This is a killer condition
because it requires the President to make two determinations prior to
the U.S.-India agreement being implemented that are at odds with the
purpose of the pact.
First, under the Bingaman amendment a determination must be made that
both India and the United States have taken specific steps to conclude
a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, or FMCT, before the U.S. can export
nuclear equipment and technology.
The amendment requires that a second determination be made that India
has stopped the production of fissile material for weapons before the
U.S. can export nuclear materials.
While I agree that an Indian commitment to abandon its nuclear
weapons program would have been optimal, even in its absence this
agreement serves U.S. national security interests. Members must
consider whether this amendment and others like it advance U.S.
national security. I believe that U.S. interests are served by greater
IAEA oversight of India's nuclear program and I reject amendments that
make the perfect the enemy of the good. I support this agreement and
oppose amendments, like this one, that would derail its implementation.
By linking American exports of nuclear equipment and technology to
U.S. and Indian progress on a multilateral FMCT holds New Delhi to a
different and higher standard than any other country we have nuclear
trade with, higher standards for example than we require of Beijing. A
successful FMCT will only be concluded and implemented when every
nation with fissile material production capabilities agrees and abides
by its commitment. I worry that this amendment may provide countries
who oppose this bilateral agreement with a backdoor veto. In other
words, if another nation stymies progress on a FMCT, will India and the
U.S. be penalized?
I share the strong support of the Senator from New Mexico for an
FMCT. But a successful FMCT negotiation will require the assent of all
nations, in particular China. Unlike the U.S., the United Kingdom,
France, and Russia, China is assumed to have ceased fissile material
production but has not made a public statement confirming this as the
others have.
The report that accompanies the Lugar-Biden legislation, S. 3709,
highlights the potential trouble with these kind of linkages. The
Conference on Disarmament, the host of talks on a FMCT, has been unable
to agree on a work program, in part because some countries--notably
China--have refused to approve the beginning of FMCT negotiations
unless the Conference on Disarmament also approves discussions of other
issues, such as nuclear disarmament and banning weapons in outer space.
For its part India has long supported conclusion of an effectively
verifiable FMCT. This position reflects India's concern regarding
fissile material production by its nuclear-armed neighbors, and it
would be unrealistic to expect a precipitous change in India's
position. It would be difficult to determine that the U.S. and India
have taken specific steps to conclude an FMCT if Chinese interference
didn't permit the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament to
start.
In testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, former
Secretary of Defense William Perry addressed the danger of conditioning
passage of the U.S.-India agreement on FMCT-related issues. In fact,
Bill Perry stated that there were many things by which we could
condition nuclear trade with India on, including ``India tak[ing] a
leadership position in promoting an international cutoff in the
production of fissile material.'' But Dr. Perry concluded:

I do not recommend that the Senate try to modify the
agreement to include them. Instead, I recommend that the
Senate task the Administration to vigorously pursue
continuing diplomacy to facilitate these actions, and that
should be as a follow-on to the agreement.

Secretary Perry's advice was good counsel and we adopted it in the
Lugar-Biden bill. In our opinion, S. 3709 strikes the right balance in
conditioning nuclear trade with India in areas consistent with the July
18, 2005, Joint Statement. India reiterated its support for an FMCT in
that statement and our bill applies pressure and requires continue
monitoring of future Indian and U.S. administrations to ensure full
implementation of the decision by India to support such a treaty.
Section 105(5) of the Lugar-Biden bill requires an annual
determination that India continues its support for an FMCT and is not
preventing adoption of a negotiating mandate that leaves the issue of
verification to be decided in the negotiations. If India is working
with the United States to conclude an FMCT or a similar treaty, that
would justify a presidential determination under this provision.
We reinforce these requirements with report language that reads that:

the United States must now use the influence it has gained
through efforts in both India and Pakistan, and with India
in particular through its nuclear trade with that nation,
to help them transition from nuclear build-ups to
stability and arms reductions. This is nowhere more
relevant than in the area of fissile material production.

In addition, this amendment requires the President to determine that
India has ceased the production of fissile materials for nuclear
weapons before the agreement can be implemented. India has long
rejected calls for the cessation of fissile material production,
pointing to rival nuclear weapons programs as justification.
India maintains that it cannot agree to a unilateral cap on fissile
material production at this time. Pakistan continues to produce fissile
material for weapons-related purposes, and China has not yet committed
to a moratorium on such production. It is not in U.S. national security
interests to threaten the significant nonproliferation gains afforded
by this Initiative with India in order to seek a fissile material cap
that India indicates it cannot agree to, absent a similar commitment by
Pakistan and China.
As Secretary Rice testified on April 6, 2006, before the Committee on
Foreign Relations:

India would never accept a unilateral freeze or cap on its
nuclear arsenal. We raised this with the Indians, but the
Indians said that its plans and policies must take into
account regional realities. No one can credibly assert that
India would accept what would amount to an arms control
agreement that did not include other key countries, like
China and Pakistan.

In addition, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Policy, Bob Joseph, and Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, stated on March 29, 2006:

The curtailment of the production of fissile material for
weapons was discussed as part of the Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative, but India maintained that it could
not agree to a unilateral cap at this time. The U.S. has
achieved an important objective by obtaining India's
commitment to work toward the

[[Page S11001]]

conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT). Moreover, we remain willing to explore other
intermediate options that might also serve such an objective.
We also continue to call on all states that produce fissile
material for weapons purposes to observe a voluntary
production moratorium, as the United States has done for
many years.

Senator Biden and I took a number of steps to address concerns about
continued Indian fissile material production but we sought to do so in
a manner that did not threaten the efficacy of the U.S.-India
Agreement. In section 103(1) of our bill we make it the policy of the
United States ``to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the
production by India and Pakistan of fissile materials for nuclear
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.''
Section 108(a)(1)(A) requires an annual reporting requirement on
Indian implementation and compliance with ``the nonproliferation
commitments undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between
the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India.''
Other subsections within section 108 of our legislation require: (1)
annual reports on ``significant changes in the production by India of
nuclear weapons or in the types of amounts of fissile materials
produced''; (2) whether India ``is in full compliance with the
commitments and obligations contained in the [U.S.-India] agreements
and other documents''; and (3) a requirement to identify and assess all
compliance issues arising on India's commitments and obligations. These
reporting requirements will ensure that Congress remains fully informed
on developments related to the implementation of this agreement. As we
all know, it is the prerogative of Congress to review these treaties
and take action should we ever determine that Indian activities put the
benefits of the agreement on U.S. national security interests in doubt.
In addition, the committee adopted an amendment offered by Senator
Chafee during markup of S. 3709 making it the policy of the United
States that peaceful atomic cooperation and ``exports of nuclear fuel
to India should not contribute to, or in any way encourage, increases
in the production by India of fissile material for non-civilian
purposes.''
The administration is in the midst of negotiations with India on a
123 Agreement, and New Delhi is also negotiating a new safeguards
agreement with the IAEA. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has yet to make a
decision to embrace the U.S.-India Agreement and approve its 45 member
states to engage in nuclear trade with India. If we accede to
conditions such as the one contained in the Bingaman amendment,
conditions that India has already rejected, we will severely limit our
ability to influence India's nuclear program.
Moreover, the IAEA's ability to monitor India's activities will be
further circumscribed and we will return to a time when India was a
hindrance rather than a partner in international, multilateral
nonproliferation and arms control efforts.
Senator Biden and I believe we have addressed this matter in a manner
that does not threaten the viability of the agreement. The
determinations I described above were carefully drafted to balance, and
not upset, the ongoing negotiations in Vienna or those in the U.S. and
India. We must not forget that Congress will have a chance to vote on
the 123 Agreement. S. 3709 provides Congress with an up or down vote on
this important agreement and fully protects Congress' role in the
process and ensures congressional views will be taken into
consideration.
In conclusion, the Bingaman amendment imposes an unacceptable
precondition on civil nuclear cooperation with India. India will regard
this as ``moving the goalposts,'' an unacceptable renegotiation of the
deal, and a bad-faith effort on our part.
As a consequence, this is a deal-killer that wrecks the balance that
we sought between executive and legislative power, nonproliferation
responsibilities, and the U.S.-India relationship. Killer conditions
such as these forfeit the U.S. ability to influence Indian behavior.
While I understand that this was not the intent of the Senator from New
Mexico, in my view it is the practical effect.
In sum, the Lugar-Biden bill addresses the issues raised by this
amendment without undercutting the agreement. Unfortunately, the
Bingaman amendment is a killer amendment and I urge Senators to oppose
it.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. I have two amendments to offer. I will be happy to offer
and debate them in order and to work with the chairman on whatever
arrangements he might wish for a vote on these amendments.
Mr. LUGAR. Let me respond to the Senator. I appreciate his
willingness to offer the amendments in a timely fashion. We are in the
process of debating one amendment, but I will ask unanimous consent it
be temporarily laid aside so the Senator can offer his amendments to
expedite this consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is set aside.
The Senator is recognized to present his first amendment.

Amendment No. 5178

Mr. DORGAN. I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] proposes an
amendment numbered 5178.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To declare that it is the policy of the United States to
continue to support implementation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1172 (1998))

On page 5, beginning on line 15, strike ``Treaty; and''
and all that follows through ``that exports'' on line 16 and
insert the following: ``Treaty;
(9) to continue to support implementation of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998); and
(10) that exports

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this amendment is very simple and very
short. Its brevity is contained in line 4 to line 6.
It is an amendment that says we will:

On page 5, beginning on line 15, strike ``Treaty; and'' and
all that follows through ``that exports'' . . . and insert
the following:
(9) to continue to support implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1172.

Let me describe what this means and why I am offering it. In May of
1998, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Security
Council Resolution No. 1172 after India and then Pakistan, detonated
nuclear weapons. The Security Council unanimously passed a resolution.
The resolution I have in my hand, in part, says that the Security
Council is gravely concerned at the challenge that the nuclear tests
conducted by India and then Pakistan constitute to international
efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons and also gravely concerned at the danger to peace and
stability in the region.
Continuing, it says that the resolution condemns the nuclear tests
conducted by India on 11 and 13 May, 1998, and by Pakistan on 28 and 30
May, 1998, demands that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear
tests, calls upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear
weapon development programs, to refrain from weaponization or from the
deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; it says the
Security Council recognizes that the tests conducted by India and
Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts toward nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament, urges India and Pakistan and all
other states that have not yet done so to become parties to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty without delay and without conditions.
That was the reaction of our country and of the United Nations in May
of

[[Page S11002]]

1998, following the detonation of nuclear weapons by both India and
Pakistan, a point in time in which the world was very concerned about
those actions.
Our country then led a multinational effort to pass a resolution in
the United Nations, Resolution 1172. That resolution, which passed
unanimously and which has become a resolution that represents our
policy and our support for these basic tenets, is at odds with the
underlying legislation being considered by the Senate.
I offer a piece of legislation, an amendment, that says it is still
U.S. policy to support the implementations of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1172.
How does this square with what is before the Senate?
Resolution 1172 demonstrated that our country, the United States, and
the rest of the international community, agree there should be no
further nuclear weapons testing in South Asia and there should be an
end to dangerous nuclear arms competition and no additional nuclear
weapons produced. That resolution is as relevant today as it was in
1998.
Both India and Pakistan have violated Resolution 1172. They continue
to build nuclear weapons, they produce fissile material for weapons in
both of those countries, they continue to develop new nuclear-capable
missiles.
No one in this Chamber would like to see, in my judgment, India or
Pakistan resume nuclear testing.
Now, the Bush administration wants to lift international restrictions
on nuclear trade with India. It is as if the United Nations Security
Council resolution doesn't exist, never happened, doesn't apply to our
country, doesn't apply to India. What does that say to North Korea?
What does that tell the country of Iran?
This past July, the United States convinced the Security Council of
the United Nations to call upon Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA
and suspend its uranium enrichment program, stop work on a heavy water
production. Iran has not complied and the U.S. working with other
nation states on the Security Council to pass another resolution.
In October, the Security Council passed Resolution 1718, which
condemns North Korea's nuclear test and demands that North Korea not
conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile. It
also calls on North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons in existing
nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner;
also, to give up its ballistic missile program.
But these resolutions on Iran and North Korea will, in my judgment,
mean far less if the United States does not reaffirm its commitment to
Resolution 1172 with respect to India and Pakistan.
As the world watches our actions--and we have Ambassador Burns and
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice rushing to India to negotiate these
kinds of agreements that begin to untie and unravel decades of
leadership by our country against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
As the world watches our actions, what will they learn from this
discussion, from these actions by the Senate? Will they learn today
that we remain committed to Resolution 1172 of the United Nations?
It would be, it seems to me, a huge step backward for the Senate to
say that Resolution 1172, which was our policy, which passed
unanimously in the United Nations, which called for the cessation of
the production of additional nuclear weapons by both India and
Pakistan, if we were to tell the world that somehow that is no longer
our policy, that is no longer operative--at least it is not operative
with respect to India and Pakistan.
As I said earlier, the burden falls to us to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons. It is our responsibility. We are the major nuclear
superpower in the world. We inherit the requirement to stop the spread
of nuclear weapons, keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of
terrorists, try to prevent a cataclysmic terror attack anywhere in the
world and especially against the cities of our country by a terrorist
group who has a nuclear weapon. It is our responsibility to do that.
What then embraces that responsibility? What kind of things should we
be doing in the Senate? Should we be deciding in the Senate that one
way to do that is to allow the production of additional nuclear weapons
on this Earth? Of course not, that is absurd. Will the underlying bill
that is before the Senate allow the production of additional nuclear
weapons? Of course, it will. Everyone agrees with that. We all
understand that. If that weren't the case, there would not be a
requirement to keep eight of the nuclear reactors behind a curtain that
will never be inspected. We understand what is going on.
I read this morning the statement from one of the top advisers in
India that said they have a responsibility to move quickly and
aggressively to continue to build their nuclear deterrent. That is
exactly what is at work here. Has our country now decided it is not our
responsibility to stop this? Have we decided to be the green light to
allow others to build additional nuclear weapons? Is that the junction
we have reached? Not with my vote.
I understand all the arguments about the geopolitics and about India
and China and counterweights and all of these issues. None of it, in my
judgment, justifies a decision by the United States of America to send
a signal to the world that we believe it is all right for anybody to
begin producing additional nuclear weapons.
Our role, our responsibility, is to find ways today, on Thursday,
November 16, 2006 to shut down the production of additional nuclear
weapons, put pressure on those who want to build more nuclear weapons,
to say to them it is not acceptable to us to have you building
additional nuclear weapons.
Yes, that goes for India. It goes for Pakistan. It goes for China. It
goes for all of those countries.
That ought to be our message. It ought to be unified. It ought not to
be convoluted. It ought to be clear. Yet the underlying message with
what is on the floor of the Senate--again, negotiated by Ambassador
Burns and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, largely in secret; I
read about it, by the way, in the Washington Post--the underlying
message is we have decided to develop a relationship with India that is
a counterweight to China in that region. One way to do that is to allow
India to be able to purchase the things they need with which to produce
additional nuclear power.
They have been prevented from doing that because they refused to sign
the nonproliferation treaty. They refused to sign that treaty;
therefore, they have had sanctions against them and resolutions at the
United Nations enacted that have condemned the actions. And now, in one
fell swoop, they are told: Never mind. It does not matter. We are
friends, and that friendship transcends the sanctions that exist for
those of you who have not signed the nonproliferation treaty.
I think this is a horrible mistake. Again, I do not question the
motives of those who disagree with me. But we have made some very
serious mistakes recently because some big thinkers made some big
mistakes. This is a very big mistake. It is likely that the Senate will
pass the underlying legislation today. I will regret that. But if it
passes that legislation without reaffirming the basic support for
Resolution 1172, this message today will have been a very destructive
message to the rest of the world with respect to our country's
leadership away from nuclear proliferation.
So, Mr. President, I would hope that we could have a vote on this
resolution. I have a second resolution that I shall offer. But with
that discussion of my resolution, I will yield the floor so my
colleagues can respond to it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.

Amendments Nos. 5179 and 5180

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send two amendments to the desk that have
been cleared on both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for Mr. Bingaman,
proposes amendments numbered 5179 and 5180, en bloc.

The amendments are as follows:

[[Page S11003]]

AMENDMENT NO. 5179

(Purpose: To require as part of the implementation and compliance
report an estimate of uranium use and an analysis of the production
rate of nuclear explosive devices)

On page 18, beginning on line 7, strike ``existing'' and
all that follows through ``description'' on line 9 and insert
the following:

existing agreements;
(6) an estimate of--
(A) the amount of uranium mined in India during the
previous year;
(B) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or
allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices;
and
(C) the rate of production in India of--
(i) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and
(ii) nuclear explosive devices;
(7) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected
the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices;
and
(8) a detailed description

AMENDMENT NO. 5180

(Purpose: To establish a United States-India scientific cooperative
threat reduction program)

At the end of title I, add the following:

SEC. 114. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC COOPERATIVE THREAT
REDUCTION PROGRAM.

(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through
the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, shall establish a cooperative threat
reduction program to pursue jointly with scientists from the
United States and India a program to further common
nonproliferation goals, including scientific research and
development efforts related to nuclear nonproliferation, with
an emphasis on nuclear safeguards (in this section referred
to as the ``program'').
(b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense.
(c) National Academies Recommendations.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall enter into
an agreement with the National Academies to develop
recommendations for the implementation of the program.
(2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into under
paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified
individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the
communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year
of--
(A) recommendations for research and related programs
designed to overcome existing technological barriers to
nuclear nonproliferation; and
(B) an assessment of whether activities and programs funded
under this section are achieving the goals of the activities
and programs.
(3) Public availability.--The recommendations and
assessments prepared under this subsection shall be made
publicly available.
(d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All
United States activities related to the program shall be
consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this section for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

Mr. LUGAR. I urge adoption of the amendments.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments are adopted
en bloc.
The amendments (Nos. 5179 and 5180) were agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. I would mention, Mr. President, the author of the
amendments is Senator Bingaman, and one of the amendments is also in
conjunction with Senator Domenici.

Amendment No. 5178

Mr. President, I want to respond to the distinguished Senator from
North Dakota briefly. I oppose his amendment. While the amendment would
merely state that it is U.S. policy to continue to support
implementation of the Security Council resolution that was passed in
June 1998 in response to the nuclear weapons tests in South Asia--a
resolution we voted for--I believe the amendment casts us back to a
very different time, well before the miraculous changes in India's
relations with the United States and with the world that occurred as a
result of the July 2005 Joint Statement and India's decision to turn
the corner on nonproliferation policy generally.
I do not believe this bill is the right place to address ourselves to
the past. This bill is about the future. We have taken adequate account
in the bill of the concerns the Senator's amendment would address.
Section 1033 of the Lugar-Biden bill makes it the policy of the United
States that:

India remains in full compliance with its non-
proliferation, arms control, and disarmament agreements,
obligations, and commitments.

Section 108(b) of our legislation requires annual reporting,
including a detailed description of ``United States efforts to promote
national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing,
securing, capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles,
pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off regime,
including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty; the
reactions of India and Pakistan to such efforts; and assistance that
the United States is providing, or would be able to provide, to India
and Pakistan'' to promote such objectives.
In the context of this bill, I do not believe it is appropriate to
return to the past in a way the Senator's amendment would, and I urge
defeat of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to speak to the Dorgan amendment. I
appreciate, respect, and share the sentiment and concern of the Senator
from North Dakota who has been doggedly supportive of pushing
nonproliferation and a nonproliferation regime. And if this were 1998
or 1999, I would support the Senator's amendment. But this is 2006, and
a great deal has changed since India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear
devices in 1998.
The Security Council resolution passed after those tests called for
several things: one including for India and Pakistan to immediately
stop their nuclear weapons programs and their ballistic missile
programs. We wish they would have ceased their nuclear programs. They
did not. We wish they had ceased their programs with regard to
missiles. Well, they did not.
So the fact is, it is not realistic. We wish they would join the
nuclear test ban treaty. But do we really think that is possible under
this administration that is not supportive of a comprehensive nuclear
test ban treaty?
In this legislation, and in the United States-India nuclear
agreement, we are making clear that continued cooperation under this
nuclear agreement and nuclear exports to India will cease if India,
one, tests a nuclear device, terminates or materially violates its IAEA
safeguards, materially violates its agreement with the United States,
or engages in nuclear proliferation.
Further, the bill requires that India sign a safeguards agreement
with the IAEA and negotiate an additional protocol. It also requires
the President to certify that the safeguards agreement is in accordance
with the IAEA standards, principles, and practices.
In sum, that is U.S. policy toward India and its nuclear program, and
I do not see the purpose of revisiting the old history of 1998. We need
to look forward, and that is what we are doing in this legislation. We
are using this legislation and the agreement to build a new
relationship with India on this issue, and also using it as a means to
strengthen the bilateral relationship across the board. And in doing
so, we have enshrined important nonproliferation principles into this
legislation because we cannot turn back the history of 1998.
So at the appropriate time--and I think we are working now on a
consent agreement--I would urge the defeat of the Dorgan amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, just a couple of----
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, will the Senator yield just for a
moment?
Mr. DORGAN. Yes.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask the Senator, how long do you think
it will take for you to discuss and dispose of your amendment?
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, it is my intention to respond briefly to a
couple of comments that have been made in objection to my amendment,
and then to offer my second amendment, per agreement with the chairman.
That would probably take me about 10 minutes, and to speak in support
of my second amendment.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank the Senator, and I yield the
floor.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I listened intently to my two colleagues

[[Page S11004]]

who apparently cannot find the ability to support this amendment. I do
want to make a couple of observations. One of my colleagues said that
India is in full compliance with its commitments. Well, yes, that is
true. And the reason they are in full compliance with their commitments
is they do not have the commitments we have. They have not signed the
nonproliferation treaty. They do not have the commitments that we would
expect of them. So are they in full compliance with the commitments
that do not exist? I do not know. I mean, I guess. It is not much of an
excuse for India, in my judgment. I don't understand that objection.
The discussion of ``this agreement would cease if the following''
omitted one key issue: ``This agreement will cease if India continues
to produce additional nuclear weapons.'' No, that was not included in
this bill. Why? Because this agreement allows India to continue to
produce additional nuclear weapons. That is at the root of this
agreement; otherwise why would you have nuclear facilities put off
limits behind a curtain, behind which India can produce additional
nuclear bombs?
So this issue of that we have safeguards, and this agreement will
cease if the following exists, does not include that this agreement
will cease if India continues to produce additional nuclear weapons.
Why doesn't it include that provision? Because all of us here know what
is going to happen. What is going to happen is this agreement is going
to pass, and our ally, a wonderful country, India, is going to be told
by this country: It is all right if behind a curtain uninspected
facilities continue to produce additional nuclear bombs. That is all
right with us. It works fine with us. It is not all right with me. It
does not work fine with me.
The past versus the future? I am glad we are not debating the
Constitution. That is the past. Man, that is a couple hundred years
past. What are the virtues of the Constitution? How about the virtues
of the past, the efforts in the past at nonproliferation, the efforts
in the past when we were serious about these issues? Really serious.
And this country took it upon themselves to say: We are going to lead
the way. We, by God, are going to lead the way because it is our
burden. It is our responsibility.
We inherit that requirement. Yes, that is the past, and I am proud of
that past. In fact, this morning I described part of that past,
credited, I might say, to my colleague from Indiana and my former
colleague from Georgia, and my colleague from Delaware. I hold in my
hand a wing strut from a Soviet bomber that likely carried a nuclear
weapon, which could have been dropped on an American city.
That wing strut came from an airplane that was not shot down. That
airplane was sawed up by an agreement. That sawing of that Backfire
bomber, whose wing strut I now hold, was paid for by American
taxpayers. We destroyed nuclear weapons, no, not by battle, not through
firing our nuclear weapons. We destroyed them by saws and other methods
of destruction, paid for by the American taxpayer.
We destroyed nuclear weapons. Four countries that possessed them are
now free of nuclear weapons. We destroyed delivery systems, Backfire
bombers, missiles. Yes, that is the past, a past I am enormously proud
of, a past we need more of, a past we need to learn from.
The future? The future is a process here by which we say: Do you know
what. India, you are a good country--and let me join in that
description of the county of India. But we also say: We don't care so
much anymore you didn't sign the nonproliferation treaty. We don't care
that you violated Resolution 1172 of the United Nations. That is all
OK. And, in fact, we are going to tell the suppliers of the world that
can supply you with things you need to produce nuclear power go ahead
and do that. The sanctions are off. We have decided that our position
has changed. It used to be that we and the rest of the world would not
allow you to purchase that because you would not sign the
nonproliferation treaty. We have changed our minds. In fact, we are
going to tell the suppliers to furnish that to you, and you can use it
behind the curtain with some of your facilities to produce additional
nuclear weapons. You can do it because there will be no inspections.
That, frankly, is the circumstance of this legislation. So we have
disagreement. I regret that. But I feel very strongly. I know my
colleagues feel strongly about their position on this issue. I would
just say, I hope we will not decide today as a Senate to say that
Security Council Resolution 1172 does not matter because it is old. It
is timeless. It is not old. It is timeless in its position of what we
should stand for as a country.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief.
As I said, I really admire, respect, and observe the passion of my
friend from North Dakota on this issue. But I think the comparisons are
not particularly apt. The wing strut the Senator has was able to be
held in his hand because two countries--the United States and the
Soviet Union--concluded that it was in their mutual interest to cease
and desist and/or significantly reduce the threat each posed to the
other. And they were the only threats that existed. The only threat to
the United States from a nuclear capability of an ICBM or a Backfire
bomber resided in the Soviet Union.
Now, we tried. I was the author of--and, as a matter of fact, there
was a South Dakota Senator named Pressler, along with John Glenn, who
early on put in legislation relating to sanctions for India.
India obviously violated those sanctions and did not comply with the
U.N. resolution. But there is a reason for that--not a justification, a
reason. They looked across their borders north and west and saw two
nuclear powers--one emerging nuclear power, one existing nuclear
power--and they concluded, rightly or wrongly, from their perspective
that they had to be a nuclear power.
It is clear nonproliferation does not work in a vacuum.
Nonproliferation entreatments, requests, proddings to a nation that
finds itself in a situation where it believes it is threatened by a
nuclear neighbor have not worked particularly well, offering those two
examples, for example.
It seems to me what we are attempting to do is the only route to get
to the point where both India and Pakistan are part of a
nonproliferation treaty; that is, we are trying to change the regional
situation on the ground. It is not going to happen through a
nonproliferation treaty. It is going to happen through a rapprochement
between India and Pakistan. The idea that we would be able to, through
any legislation, prevent India from moving forward to add additional
nuclear weapons, if they so choose to do that--there is no legislation
we can pass to do that.
What this legislation does is recognize the reality of the
geopolitical situation in the region, set up safeguards to deal with
the ability for India to use anything we are doing with them to be able
to further advance their nuclear capability, give them a new buy-in to
an international regime that will have the effect of putting pressure
on them to move in the direction we and the Soviets moved on back when
that Backfire bomber strut was sawed off a wing, and that is the route
we choose. It is not pretty. It is not clear. It is no guarantee. It is
not certain to succeed. But I do know one thing: Absent this agreement,
there is a likelihood things get worse instead of better, beyond what
may already occur.
I appreciate the Senator's comparisons, but I think they are not as
apt as they might appear to be because, again, India's motivation, in
terms of its viewing its need for a nuclear arsenal, is not unlike the
motivation that existed with regard to the United States and the Soviet
Union. It is going to take a geopolitical settlement of that, not a
nuclear arms control agreement imposing a settlement on India and
Pakistan at this moment, now that the genie is out of the bottle.
I appreciate my friend's point and respect his point of view, but I
disagree that it is the best way to move forward.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Let me respond briefly. There is a very big difference
between this and the agreement we had with the Soviet Union. In the
Soviet Union agreement, both sides, the United States and the Soviet
Union,

[[Page S11005]]

decided they wished to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the
delivery systems of those weapons. As a result of that decision, both
sides wishing to reduce both weapons and delivery systems, we embarked
on a process that was very helpful to both countries and to the world
and to world peace. This is very different. This is mutual interest.
But now, we are told it is in our mutual interest, us and India, to
have India be allowed to produce additional nuclear weapons, not reduce
nuclear weapons. Under this agreement, everyone will agree, India will
be allowed to increase nuclear weapons. If India is allowed to increase
nuclear weapons under this agreement, that is very different from the
agreement we had with the Soviets by which we decided to reduce.
The point is, this agreement says it is in our mutual interest to
allow India to increase its production of nuclear weapons. That is
clearly not in our mutual interest, but that is what the resolution
says.
Second, my colleague is right, none of this operates in a vacuum.
This will not be in a vacuum, either. Pakistan will insist on producing
more nuclear weapons. So will China. Pakistan has already told our
country: If you are going to do this with India, we want you to do it
with us. So this decision will not be made in a vacuum vis-a-vis India;
this decision will have an impact regionally and around the world.
My colleague is very skillful in presenting his position. I admire
both of my colleagues and their skill and determination as well. We
just have a difference of opinion. I think this is a very significant
mistake.
I have a second amendment which I will send to the desk and offer for
its consideration and try to truncate the description of that very
briefly, if that is appropriate to the chairman.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, may I respond briefly to my colleague?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. It would be my hope--and let me discuss this quickly--that
the debate on the first amendment of Senator Dorgan is completed.
Secondly, I want a short time for Senator Domenici of New Mexico to
make a statement. And then thirdly, we will proceed to the introduction
of Senator Dorgan's second amendment. My hope would be that a unanimous
consent will be formulated--I know staff from both sides are working on
that--that will provide for rollcall votes on both Dorgan amendments
and then, at the conclusion of the debate of the distinguished Senator
from New Mexico, on the Bingaman amendment, perhaps a stack of three
votes for the convenience of Senators. I am broaching that, not asking
for everybody to agree, but I am hopeful that would be a general
agreement of those who are around at this point.
It is my hope that the distinguished Senator from New Mexico might be
recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman,
Senator Lugar, for arranging for my few remarks before he proceeds.
After committing to a framework 16 months ago, President Bush and
India's Prime Minister announced an agreement earlier this year on
civil nuclear cooperation between our two countries. I believe they
recognize this historic moment in our history, one that requires vision
and foresight to anticipate the world as it will be rather than stuck
in the past wishing things somehow would be different. Some will argue
that we must pursue a better deal approaching perfection, but the deal
that has been negotiated is a good one that we must pursue now and
begin taking steps to strengthen the nonproliferation regime with India
by our side.
Senators Lugar and Biden and the Foreign Relations Committee have
done an admirable job of striking a balance that anticipates this
future. This strong, bipartisan bill represents a critical step toward
strengthening an eroding nonproliferation framework. We only need look
at North Korea and Iran for evidence that this erosion is taking place
and as a wake-up call that fundamental change is needed. The global
community must work together to assure the peaceful pursuit of civilian
nuclear waste.
This historic agreement is a critical step that moves the United
States and India toward a strategic relationship between our great
democracies. Through this relationship, built on strength, we can
jointly work toward a vision of a proliferation-free world. I
understand that is a vision. It is not real even now. And while things
might even look a little worse, the truth is, the relationship we are
building with what we are agreeing to here on the floor, when that
completes its course and becomes a reality, then that means we are
building toward a proliferation-free world.
India is a worthy partner. That was one of the basic questions:
Should you enter into this agreement with a partner that has not been
part of the ordinary, agreed-upon, acceptable accords and agreements
between countries heretofore? I would remind everyone that India is the
largest democracy--a population currently over 1 billion and expected
to surpass China in the next 50 years. It has a rapidly expanding
economy with a growth rate of over 7 percent a year in 2005, a rapidly
expanding economy that is the envy of almost all countries that have
free and open democracies. This agreement with India brings global
transparency to India's entire civilian nuclear program. We forget that
India's civilian and military program still remains closed to global
scrutiny. Under this agreement, the entire civilian program, 65 percent
of all nuclear activity and eventually 90 percent of all nuclear
activity, will open to monitoring by the IAEA. Obviously, we ought to
start, if that is where we are going to end up, because that is as good
as we are going to do. And certainly we ought to be grateful that
through the leadership of the President and now the leadership of the
Congress, we can get there.
The people are similar to the American people. They desire a better
life for themselves and their children. Rapid economic growth that has
led to improving their standard of living is projected to result in a
doubling of the energy needs of their country in the next 25 years.
India must make choices today that drive their energy mix in the
future.
Like many countries, they have chosen nuclear power to improve their
energy security while reducing reliance on imports. India currently has
nine reactors under construction and plans to grow the nuclear share to
25 percent by 2050. That is 100 times the 2002 capacity. Cooperation
with India will lead to significant opportunities for U.S. industry to
help assure India's energy mix, including nuclear power, is clean,
diversified, and proliferation-resistant.
I strongly support an evolving strategic U.S. relationship with India
that this agreement promotes. We ought to be proud of it and move with
dispatch. It is the world's largest democracy and a worthy partner that
we can work with in our pursuit of global security. I have worked with
Senator Lugar in the past on nonproliferation measures that required
vision and foresight. With India also, we must look to our future. I
urge my colleagues to support this bill and urge dispatch in
consideration of the balance of the subject matter.

I thank Senator Lugar for obtaining time for me on the floor, and I
yield the floor.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from New
Mexico, Mr. Domenici, for his very strong statement, and I simply want
to mention again how much I appreciate working with him over the years.
The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation was extremely important throughout
a good part of the last decade, and on the nonproliferation efforts he
has been a champion in the Senate. We appreciate his contribution to
this debate today.
Mr. DOMENICI. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I note the presence of the distinguished Senator from
North Dakota. We indicated that he would continue by offering his
second amendment, and I would advise him to do so, if he is prepared.

Amendment No. 5182

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 5182 and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

[[Page S11006]]

The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] proposes an
amendment numbered 5182.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 5182

(Purpose: To require as a precondition to United States-India peaceful
atomic energy cooperation a determination by the President that India
has committed to certain basic provisions consistent with United States
nonproliferation goals and the obligations and political commitments
undertaken by State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)

On page 8, beginning on line 8, strike ``Group; and'' and
all that follows through ``the Nuclear'' on line 9 and insert
the following:

Group;
(8) India has committed to--
(A) the development of a credible separation plan between
civilian and military facilities by ensuring all reactors
that supply electricity to the civilian sector are declared
and are subject to permanent IAEA standards and practices;
(B) a binding obligation to the same extent as nuclear-
weapon State Parties under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty--
(i) not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices or control over such
devices directly or indirectly; and
(ii) not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any
non-nuclear-weapon State Party to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
acquire control over such weapons or explosive devices; and
(C) consistent with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--
(i) pursuing negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, including ending
fissile material production for nuclear weapons;
(ii) joining a legally-binding nuclear test moratorium;
(iii) verifiably reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile;
and
(iv) eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons; and
(9) the Nuclear

Amendment No. 5178, as Modified

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to offer a
modification to the first amendment I offered today. The amendment had
two line numbers in it that were made to the original copy of the
legislation. That legislation was subsequently changed. So let me ask
unanimous consent that on the initial amendment I offered today, on
line 1, the reference to line 15 be struck, and it is line 8; on line
2, the reference to line 15 be struck, and it is line 9.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 5178), as modified, is as follows:

On page 5, beginning on line 8, strike ``Treaty; and'' and
all that follows through ``that exports'' on line 9 and
insert the following:

Treaty;
(9) to continue to support implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998); and
(10) that exports

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, the second amendment I have sent to the
desk says that before this United States-India agreement can go into
effect, the President must submit to the Congress a written
determination that India has committed to certain basic provisions
consistent with U.S. nonproliferation goals and with the NPT, the
nonproliferation treaty. It requires the President to determine that
India has committed to, for example, putting all of its reactors that
supply electricity to the civilian sector under the IAEA inspection
regime. This would close a loophole that exists in the proposed
agreement, and that loophole allows India to keep electricity-producing
reactors out of the IAEA inspection regime. Eight of them will be out
of the regime, and those eight are going to be behind a curtain, unable
to be inspected, and able to produce the materials to produce
additional nuclear weapons. Fourteen of the existing and planned
nuclear reactors would be inspected, and eight of them would not.
If those other eight reactors produce civilian electricity, my
amendment would require that India allow inspection of them.
The bill as now written would allow India to produce energy with
nuclear reactors that are closed to IAEA safeguards. My amendment says
that is a loophole which should not be allowed. If India can keep
energy-producing reactors outside of these safeguards, why shouldn't
other countries be allowed to do so? How will our country say to
others: Well, we have special deals. We have loopholes here for one,
but we are not consistent. There is no consistency with respect to our
position on these issues.
The amendment also requires India to undertake a binding obligation
not to assist, encourage, or induce nonnuclear weapons states to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. That is what our
country has obligated itself to do under the nonproliferation treaty.
It is what other nuclear weapons states have done as well, including
Russia, China, Britain, and France. They have all agreed to and signed
the nonproliferation treaty and agreed to that basic provision, a
binding obligation not to assist, encourage, or induce nonnuclear
weapons states to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.
Lastly, my amendment requires the President to determine that India
has committed itself to pursuing negotiations on measures directed at
reducing nuclear stockpiles and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons.
These are the same commitments, the very same commitments our country
has made, the same commitments other nation states which have signed
the nonproliferation treaty have made. So I believe it is appropriate
that if we have this agreement with India dealing with the issue of
nuclear weapons, they should be under the same obligations we are
under. Even though they have not signed the nonproliferation treaty, we
have. We have obligations under that treaty. They should accept the
obligations under that treaty, in my judgment, even though they have
not yet signed it.
This debate today has been interesting and, in many ways, very
frustrating as well. I intend to support very aggressively the
amendment offered by my colleague from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman. I
believe that amendment is very important and at the root of much of
what I have talked about today as well.
It seems to me this is a case for our children and our grandchildren
about what kind of a world they are going to live in. It is
interesting. If you just fast forward from 1960 to 1980 to 2000 and
fast forward from 2001 to today, we went through a Cold War with the
Soviet Union where we had heavy nuclear weapons, huge nuclear weapons
with big bombers and powerful missiles aimed at each other, so we had a
Cold War. Massive numbers of nuclear weapons were built. We had a
standoff between our country and the Soviet Union. There was great
concern and worry that somehow, something would happen in which someone
would launch a missile or a submarine or an airplane would launch a
missile with a nuclear weapon and we would start a nuclear war and our
two countries would be obliterated. It didn't happen. Instead, we chose
a much more constructive direction.
We and the Soviet Union began what is called arms control talks, and
we reached arms control agreements. Those agreements began the
destruction of weapons systems, delivery systems, nuclear weapons. I
admit that a very small amount of those delivery systems and nuclear
weapons were actually destroyed, but some of them were. It was actually
moving in the right direction rather than the wrong direction. We
developed a test ban treaty. We led the way. We said: We are going to
no longer test nuclear weapons. We said that to the world. A
nonproliferation treaty. We said this is important to do, and we were
the leaders in saying this is the right course for the world. Now we
are told: You know what, that is old-fashioned; that is the past; this
is the future. I say that what we did then is timeless. These values
don't change, the value of deciding that our future ought to be a
future with fewer nuclear weapons rather than more nuclear weapons.
If anyone has listened closely, they will know there has been no
refutation of the assertion that some of my colleagues and I have made
that this agreement will mean we have more nuclear weapons produced. No
one has disputed that. This agreement means we are signing up to have
more nuclear weapons produced on this Earth. One--just one--nuclear
weapon in the hands of a terrorist group pulling up to a dock in a
major American city on a container ship at 2\1/2\ or 3 miles an hour

[[Page S11007]]

can potentially kill hundreds of thousands of American citizens--just
one--and there are 30,000 out there. Can anyone here tell me that every
one of those 30,000 is safeguarded and that no terrorist organization
will acquire one? Can anybody tell me that is going to be the case?
I started this morning talking about a CIA agent called Dragon Fire
who reported 1 month after 9/11 that a Russian 10-kiloton nuclear
weapon had been stolen by a terrorist group and taken into New York
City and was about to be detonated. That episode has been written about
in a book. Most of us have heard of it. It was a time when for a month
we didn't know if it was true or not. It wasn't disclosed publicly
because there would have been mass hysteria if it was thought that a
10-kiloton nuclear weapon had been stolen from Russia and was now in
New York City about to be detonated. It eventually was discovered that
had not happened. But when they did the postmortem on that situation,
it was understood that it was clearly possible. Russia had those
weapons. They were not safeguarded well. They are not, and they were
not. They could have been stolen. It could have been smuggled into a
major American city by a terrorist group and it could have been
detonated, killing hundreds of thousands of people. That is the
consequence of one nuclear weapon. Just one. We have 30,000 or so on
this Earth. What are we doing today? We are saying it is all right if
they build more--in this case, India. It is OK if they build more.
This is not going to be done in a vacuum. What we do here today will
have consequences for Pakistan, it will have consequences for China.
You think they won't decide if India is going to be allowed to build
more nuclear weapons that they won't build more nuclear weapons? Of
course they will. That is what this is about.
I understand it is argued that this is geopolitics; you don't
understand it; you can't see over the horizon. Maybe not. What I do
understand is that this world will be a safer place with fewer nuclear
weapons, this world will be a safer place if we care about
nonproliferation, if we reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and this
world will not be safer if at the end of today we have decided that we
have given a green light to a world with more nuclear weapons.
I hope my colleagues will agree with me and support my amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I intend to offer a short statement
opposing the amendment. I would ask Members to be alert to the
possibility that following my statement, Senator Biden has indicated he
would put his statement in the Record if this plan can then be
accepted, and we would then proceed to three rollcall votes: an
amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, Mr.
Bingaman, and two amendments offered by the distinguished Senator from
North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan. For the convenience of our colleagues, those
three votes would come without pause, thus minimizing the dislocation
of Members' schedules and accelerating our consideration of this
debate.
I am certain the Chair has heard that Senator Biden and I, for many
of our colleagues who were hopeful that we could proceed in a
responsible way but conclude the debate today, on Thursday, are
attempting to do that, and we appreciate the cooperation of our
colleagues.
Having said that, Mr. President, let me state my opposition to the
second amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from North
Dakota. His amendment would, in fact, undo the entire effort we have
achieved with India over the past year. Not only would he revise
India's civilian military separation plan with his amendment, but he
would require India to assume the obligations of a nuclear weapons
state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT. This is, in
effect, a perfect killer amendment. It should be strongly opposed by
every Member of this body who supports an improved relationship with
India.
The Senator's amendment adds two new determination requirements to
our bill: first, that India's separation plan result in a situation
wherein all reactors that supply civilian power are declared to the
IAEA and under safeguards; and second, that India assume certain NPT
obligations. This is unnecessary and would do us great harm. It adds a
new element in the separation plan that the President did not negotiate
and would undo the deal we have reached.
India's separation plan is credible and sound, according to criteria
developed by the administration in its negotiations with India. As
Secretary Rice stated last April:

For the plan to be transparent, it had to be articulated
publicly.

It has been.

For it to be credible and defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint, it had to capture more than just
a token number of Indian nuclear facilities--

Which it did----

by encompassing nearly two-thirds of India's current and
planned thermal power reactors, as well as all future civil,
thermal, and breeder reactors. Importantly, for the
safeguards to be meaningful, India had to commit to apply
IAEA safeguards in perpetuity.

It did so.
Once a reactor is under IAEA safeguards, those safeguards
will remain there permanently and on an unconditional basis.
Further, in our view, the plan also needed to include
upstream and downstream facilities associated with the
safeguarded reactors to provide a true separation of civil
and military programs. India committed to these steps, and we
have concluded that its separation plan meets the criteria
established: it is credible, transparent, and defensible from
a nonproliferation standpoint.

The amendment changes the metrics for a credible and defensible
separation plan by including that such a plan must mean that any
reactor supplying power must be declared. As Secretary Rice stated
before the committee:

Regardless of whether they might be used to generate
electric power or not, reactors that are not declared civil,
and thus are not under IAEA safeguards, cannot legitimately
receive nuclear fuel or other nuclear cooperation from any
State party to the NPT.

The second element in the Senator's amendment would require India to
assume the obligations of a nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.
The administration was careful not to term India a ``nuclear weapon
state'' with similar rights and obligations as those five nations in
the NPT with status as lawful weapon states--France, Russia, China, the
U.K., and the U.S.--and instead termed India in the July 2005 joint
statement a ``responsible state with advanced nuclear technology.''
This was necessary to do no harm to U.S. and other weapons states'
status under the treaty.
The Senator's amendment would create obligations similar to those of
weapon states for India through creating a determination requirement
that the President must make wherein India has assumed the obligations
of a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. I would argue that this is not
necessary, since it could well provoke India to walk away from the
obligations they would assume under our 123 Agreement with them and
leave the restraint we might get through that deal on their weapons
program on the negotiating table.
India has stated they have no intention to sign or become a party to
the NPT, as a weapon state or otherwise. India's July 2005 joint
statement commitments are significant, but they do not include NPT
membership.
I urge defeat of the amendment; it is a killer.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the remarks
made by the Senator from Indiana.
The amendment requires India to declare as civil reactors all
reactors that supply electricity to the civil sector.
There is no way that India will accept this.
I might wish they would, but they will not.
That's because for decades, they have built reactors that can be
either civil or military.
So India has reserved as military enough reactors to produce more
plutonium for nuclear weapons--in case they decide they need to do
that.
But India will also use those reactors for electric power.
If this amendment is enacted, India will have to choose to either
make all its power reactors civil, and build new ones to produce
plutonium; or waste the electric power capability of its current
military reactors.
India will not do that.
So this is a killer amendment.
It's also a killer amendment because it requires India to commit to

[[Page S11008]]

verifiably reduce its nuclear weapons stockpile.
I wish India would do that--but it will not.
India fears both Pakistan and China, which also have nuclear weapons.
The Dorgan amendment does not require Pakistan and China to reduce
their stockpiles, only India.
This is a non-starter for India.
Finally, the amendment requires India to commit to ``joining a
legally-binding, nuclear test moratorium.'' I wish India would do that.
I hope the administration will push for that.
But for now, there is only one ``legally-binding, nuclear test
moratorium.'' It is called the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.
And I do not think this administration will press India to join that
treaty.
So, I sympathize with all of the concerns raised by this amendment.
But I know that it would kill the nuclear deal.
That is the bottom line: if we support the deal, we have to reject
this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to a series of stacked votes in relation to the following
amendments: the Bingaman amendment No. 5174, the Dorgan amendment No.
5178, as modified and the Dorgan amendment No. 5182; further, that
there be no second degrees in order to any of the amendments prior to
the votes, that there be 2 minutes of debate equally divided before the
second and third votes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I think
there is a need for a mild correction.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my second
amendment be considered, notwithstanding the Harkin amendment that was
previously offered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the primary request?
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, could I ask the floor manager? I would
prefer if we had 2 minutes equally divided prior to the first vote as
well since there has been some time since we debated it. I want the
chance to explain it for 1 minute before we have a vote.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I amend the request to include 2 minutes of
debate on the Bingaman amendment No. 5174 prior to the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent
request, as amended?
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me ask the chairman. I wish to respond
for 2 minutes to the comments which the chairman just made in
opposition to my amendment prior to proceeding to the vote.
Mr. LUGAR. I have no objection to that. I amend the request to
include 2 minutes of debate by Senator Dorgan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection, as amended? Without
objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 5182

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I will try not to take the 2 minutes, but
it is important to point out the chairman, in responding--and I suspect
the ranking member in his response--is saying this is a killer
amendment. It is not offered as a killer amendment, but it is the case
that my amendment would impose upon India exactly the same burdens that
exist upon our country. My colleague, the chairman, said the President
``did not negotiate''--he started the sentence. That is what brings me
to the floor--that the President ``did not negotiate.'' What he did not
negotiate was a requirement and a burden on India which clearly is a
nuclear weapons state. He did not negotiate a requirement and a burden
on them that we ourselves assume under the nonproliferation treaty. My
amendment would simply provide that requirement and that burden to the
country of India.
I come from a town of 300 people. I have to relearn always the
lessons of the Senate--and not just the Senate but the way the
Government works. In my hometown you always call things just the way
they are. You saw it, you spoke it, and described it. In this body,
however, now we know that India has a nuclear weapon--has many of them.
We know they have detonated them, and we know they are a nuclear
weapons state. So we have decided as a country officially to describe
India as a responsible state with nuclear technology as opposed to a
nuclear weapons state. I don't know; maybe it works here. It doesn't
work in my hometown. We have to call things as we see them.
We have responsibilities--all of us do. Our responsibility is, I
think, toward nonproliferation, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons,
to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. I regret that the underlying
piece of legislation is going to result in more nuclear weapons being
built.
The second amendment I have offered is an amendment that simply says
let us impose on those with whom we negotiate the same burdens we
inherit ourselves. In fact, the United States negotiated with India in
the way that exempts them from those burdens. I think that is
fundamentally wrong.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 2 minutes equally divided on the
Bingaman amendment.

Amendment No. 5174

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will briefly describe the Bingaman
amendment. It is an amendment that puts into effect the recommendations
Senator Nunn made in his op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal in May
of this year. It says that as to nuclear equipment and technology,
before we can export or reexport to India nuclear equipment or
technology, the President must first determine that both India and the
United States are taking specific steps to conclude a fissile material
cutoff treaty.
Second, the amendment says that before any nuclear materials fuel can
be exported to India, the President must determine that India has
stopped producing fissile materials for weapons.
This is a reasonable amendment. This does not kill the deal, as I
would see it. This is something which India has stated a willingness to
generally abide by. I think this is the least we can insist upon. I
hope very much my colleagues will support this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I will oppose this amendment as it goes
significantly beyond the commitments India made in the joint statement.
India will regard this particular requirement that India stop producing
fissile materials for weapons as moving the goalposts and an
unacceptable renegotiation of the deal--a bad-faith effort on our part.
India maintains that they cannot agree to a unilateral cap at this
time. We should not hold up the significant nonproliferation gains
afforded by the initiative in order to seek a fissile material cap that
India indicates it cannot agree to absent a similar commitment by
Pakistan and China. Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for
weapons-related purposes and China has not committed to a moratorium on
such production. Unfortunately, in my judgment, this is truly a killer
amendment. I strongly encourage that amendment be defeated.
Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the next two
amendments.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time on the next amendment?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, my impression was that the call was for the
vote and then a 2-minute debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is correct.
The question is on agreeing to the Bingaman amendment. The yeas and
nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Thomas).
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). Are there any other Senators
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 26, nays 73, as follows:

[[Page S11009]]

[Rollcall Vote No. 265 Leg.]

YEAS--26

Akaka
Baucus
Bingaman
Boxer
Byrd
Cantwell
Conrad
Dayton
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Harkin
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Lautenberg
Leahy
Lincoln
Menendez
Mikulski
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Salazar

NAYS--73

Alexander
Allard
Allen
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Ensign
Enzi
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden

NOT VOTING--1

Thomas

The amendment (No. 5174) was rejected.
Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the next
rollcall votes be 10 minutes each.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 5178, as Modified

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are now 2 minutes equally divided prior
to a vote on the Dorgan amendment No. 5178, as modified.
The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, my amendment, in light of the underlying
bill brought to the floor of the Senate, would express that we would
continue to support the implementation of the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1172.
The reason that is important is it had been the policy of this
country to not only author but to support that resolution after India
and Pakistan exploded their nuclear weapons.
It calls on them to immediately stop their nuclear weapons
development programs, refrain from weaponization or deployment of
nuclear weapons, cease the development of ballistic missiles, and so
on.
That has been a very important tenet of this country in supporting
that United Nations Resolution 1172. Despite what we are doing in the
underlying bill, I would hope this country and this Senate would
express our support for that which we drafted and that which we
encouraged the rest of the world to support some while ago.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask that Members oppose the Dorgan
amendment on the basis that the resolution he talks about is an
important one, but it talks about a time in which our relationship with
India was very different. It talks about the past. We have been very
fortunate in this country to move into a better relationship with
India, to a point where we are now going to be in India. The IAEA is
going to be in India. We are going to be able to observe a bulk of the
nuclear reactors and programs there and to work with India in peaceful
development.
There was a time when we did not have that relationship. By ``we,'' I
mean the United States and the international community. The situation
in India is constructive. This is a time to celebrate and to move on
that momentum.
I ask that the Dorgan amendment be defeated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment,
as modified. The yeas and nays were previously ordered. The clerk will
call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the
Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr.
Thomas).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 27, nays 71, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 266 Leg.]

YEAS--27

Akaka
Bingaman
Boxer
Byrd
Clinton
Conrad
Dayton
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Harkin
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Menendez
Mikulski
Nelson (FL)
Obama
Reid
Salazar
Schumer
Stabenow

NAYS--71

Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Ensign
Enzi
Feinstein
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Kohl
Kyl
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McConnell
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Reed
Roberts
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden

NOT VOTING--2

McCain
Thomas

The amendment (No. 5178), as modified, was rejected.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.

Amendment No. 5182

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, the second amendment I had offered says
that before the United States-India agreement can go into effect, the
President must submit to the Congress a written determination that
India has committed to certain basic provisions that are consistent
with the U.S. nonproliferation goals and with the nonproliferation
treaty. In other words, I would suggest that we should impose the same
burdens on India as we have on ourselves. There is great reluctance to
do that by this Chamber, but that was my amendment. I must say there is
very little education in a third vote if I believe it weakens our
efforts in nonproliferation nuclear weapons. So rather than have a
third recorded vote, I will ask that we vitiate the recorded vote and
vote on this amendment by voice.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, the yeas and nays are vitiated.
Is there further debate? If not, the question is on agreeing to the
amendment, as modified.
The amendment, as modified, was not agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to indicate that the
distinguished Senator from Nevada will offer an amendment. We will then
proceed to the Old Senate Chamber for a debate on that amendment. I
think we have an agreement that the extent of the debate will be no
more than 60 minutes. We would return to this Chamber for the actual
vote on the Ensign amendment, following the debate in the Old Senate
Chamber. Therefore, the Senator from Nevada should be recognized so
that he can start that process.

Amendment No. 5181

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 5181 and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Ensign] proposes an amendment
numbered 5181.

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

[[Page S11010]]

AMENDMENT NO. 5181

(Purpose: To ensure that IAEA inspection equipment is not used for
espionage purposes)

Strike section 262 and insert the following:

SEC. 262. IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.

(a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--
No national of a country designated by the Secretary of State
under section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2371) as a government supporting acts of international
terrorism shall be permitted access to the United States to
carry out an inspection activity under the Additional
Protocol or a related safeguards agreement.
(b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA
inspectors shall be accompanied at all times by United States
Government personnel when inspecting sites, locations,
facilities, or activities in the United States under the
Additional Protocol.
(c) Use of United States Equipment, Materials, and
Resources.--Any inspections conducted by personnel of the
IAEA in the United States pursuant to the Additional Protocol
shall by carried out using equipment, materials, and
resources that are purchased, owned, inspected, and
controlled by the United States.
(d) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--The President
shall conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related
assessments not less than every 5 years to ensure that
information of direct national security significance remains
protected at all sites, locations, facilities, and activities
in the United States that are subject to IAEA inspection
under the Additional Protocol.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from
Delaware, as the ranking member, will offer the official motion sending
us over to the Chamber.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I understand the parliamentary situation
properly, and I am not sure I do, I ask unanimous consent that
following the offering of the Ensign amendment, the Senate stand in
recess subject to the call of the Chair so that it may reconvene
pursuant to the previous order.
I further ask that the following Senate staff be permitted to attend
the closed session, and I send the list to the desk.
The list is as follows:

Mike Disilvestro; Joel Breitner; Mary Jane McCarthy; Paul
Nelson; Richard Verma; Stephen Rademaker; Marcel Lettre;
Nancy Erickson; Lynne Halbrooks; Scott O'Malia; Pam Thiessen;
Thomas Moore; Lynn Rusten; Ed Corrigan; Rexon Ryu; Ken Myers
III; Ken Myers, Jr; Brian McKeon; Ed Levine; Madelyn Creedon;
Nancy Stetson; Diane Ohlbaum; Anthony Blinken; Janice
O'Connell.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, before the Chair rules, I will remind
Senators that those who attend the closed session are not permitted to
bring any electronic devices into the Old Senate Chamber. Mr.
President, I send to the desk the list of the names of the staff
members that could be present.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.

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