An amendment numbered 4 printed in House Report 110-759 to bar the use of funds to prohibit or discourage the use of the phrases `jihadist,' `jihad,' `Islamo-fascism,' `caliphate,' `Islamist,' or `Islamic terrorist' within the Intelligence Community or the Federal Government.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1343 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5959.

{time}  1313

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 5959) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Salazar in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Hoekstra) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, intelligence is critical to every decision affecting
America's national security. Whether the challenge is learning the
intentions of our Nation's adversaries or detecting the location of the
next roadside IED in Iraq, America needs a well-resourced and well-
managed intelligence community.

{time}  1315

This committee's primary responsibilities are to authorize funds for
the intelligence agencies, to conduct vigorous oversight over their
operations and to ensure that those operations are effective, legal and
an appropriate use of taxpayer money.
Mr. Chairman, this afternoon I want to thank my colleague, Mr.
Hoekstra, the gentleman from Michigan, for working with me in a
bipartisan fashion to bring this bill to the floor. I also want to
thank the staffs on both sides of the aisle for the great work that
they have done to bring this bill to the floor today.
This year, as in years past, I have gone to the front lines to see
our courageous intelligence professionals perform their jobs. They do
this quietly, often without recognition or praise. Many spend time away
from their families, often in very dangerous situations and under very
dangerous conditions. This bill is the tangible sign of our support for
the women and men of our America's intelligence agencies.
We're providing robust funding for our most important priorities
including HUMINT, language capabilities and technical capabilities.
Our principal concern continues to be that al Qaeda is stronger today
than at any time since September 11, 2001. Osama bin Laden and his key
deputies remain at large. But al Qaeda is not the only terrorist group
that has gained strength. Over the past 7 years, Hezbollah and Hamas
have become more capable and even more determined. Dangerous states,
including Syria, are pursuing nuclear capabilities. There is the
possibility that one of these states, or even a rogue scientist, could
transfer fissile material to a terrorist group. This must remain our
foremost priority and our top concern.
This bill invests in people, our most precious resource. It adds
funding to enhance human intelligence collection, not only for
counterterrorism, but also for enduring and emerging global security
issues, such as challenges that we face in Asia, Africa and Latin
America, to name a few. This bill also contains a number of provisions
that promote greater accountability, including the creation of a new
Inspector General for the intelligence community.
Our bill will improve language capabilities in the intelligence
community by adding funding for speakers of critical languages and
requiring reports to

[[Page H6600]]

Congress to evaluate progress in this perennial problem area. The bill
also mandates implementation of security clearance reform to make it
easier for first and second generation Americans, many of whom have
critical language skills, to serve in the intelligence community with
proper clearances.
I mentioned earlier that one of the responsibilities of this
committee is oversight. Yet this administration has repeatedly failed
to comply with the National Security Act of 1947, which mandates that
our committee be ``fully and currently informed'' of all the
intelligence activities from the administration. This bill enhances
congressional oversight by ensuring that the committee receives the
information that it needs to perform its inherent oversight function.
Working on a bipartisan basis, our committee adopted two provisions
to enhance reporting on intelligence activities to the full membership
of the congressional intelligence committees. One provision would
restrict 75 percent of all covert action funds until the full
membership of the intelligence committees is briefed on all covert
actions in effect as of April 24, 2008. A second provision would
restrict the administration's attempts to brief only the chairman and
ranking member and clarifies which information must be reported to our
full committee.
This legislation also authorizes much of the requests for the
foundational activities of the cybersecurity initiative, but it also
expresses the committee's serious concerns about potential policy,
implementation and governance issues. Our committee is also concerned
that Congress does not have a comprehensive understanding of the
magnitude of human and fiscal intelligence resources that have been
devoted to Iraq, possibly at the expense of fighting the war on terror.
H.R. 5959 requires a detailed report to our committee on this very
topic.
The bill also addresses a number of long-term technical challenges in
the intelligence community. It does so by adding significant resources
to modernize signals intelligence capabilities and integrate them into
the global enterprise.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, despite the size of the budget request, the
administration did not include funds adequate to keep the U.S.
intelligence community competitive in advanced technologies. Research
and development funding is our Nation's investment in maintaining our
edge in state of the art technologies. Our bill adds funds to four
agencies specifically for that purpose. And the committee urges the
executive branch to sustain, if not increase, this level of funding in
future budgets.
In our markup, Mr. Chairman, the committee adopted a number of
amendments offered by both the majority and minority members. One of
those important amendments, crafted with bipartisan cooperation, will
prevent CIA contractors from engaging in interrogations unless the
Director of National Intelligence provides a waiver.
Our goal is to put this committee back in the authorization business
by getting a bill to the President's desk that he can sign. To do that,
we can't tackle every single important issue in this one bill. But if
we fail to pass this bill, we risk eroding Congress' ability to
strengthen and oversee intelligence operations that are vital to
American national security.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield myself as much time
as I shall consume.
Mr. Chairman, the annual Intelligence Authorization Act is one of the
most important bills that the House passes each year. It provides and
allocates resources critical to national security programs that are the
front lines of America's defense and foreign policies and, most
critically, work to detect, prevent and disrupt potential terrorist
attacks against the American people. The bill is also essential to
ensure close and effective congressional oversight of the intelligence
community.
There are issues that remain to be worked out as the legislative
process continues. But I appreciate the work that Chairman Reyes has
done to avoid many of the contentious items that have recently
prevented the enactment of an intelligence authorization bill. And I
appreciate that the bill reflects areas of consensus on critical
national security issues.
I believe that this bill is strong in two areas. First, it was
significantly improved by seven Republican amendments that were adopted
on a bipartisan basis to address what I believe are important issues in
priorities facing the intelligence community. Among these, the
committee adopted my amendment to remove all earmarks from the bill, a
significant step forward. Our intelligence program should be based on
only one primary consideration, what best ensures that the intelligence
community is able to do its job in the interest of the national
security of the United States.
The committee adopted an amendment offered by my colleague from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) to limit the size and unintended bureaucratic
growth of the Office of the DNI, the Director of National Intelligence.
The bill also includes another amendment by Congressman Rogers to
require a high-level strategic evaluation of the FBI's progress in
transforming its FBI's intelligence capabilities. This process may not
be moving forward fast enough to accomplish the needed changes and
needs close attention.
The bill is also strengthened by significant provisions to improve
congressional oversight of the intelligence community and the executive
branch which addressed issues I have repeatedly raised since serving as
chairman of the committee. These include provisions to clarify that
each member of the Intelligence Committee must be fully and currently
briefed on current activities. Again, I'm pleased that we're able to
take and improve this oversight on a bipartisan basis. Republicans and
Democrats on the committee both believe that we need this information
to be able to effectively do our job. Some work remains to be done to
smooth this out. But we have taken the right steps to move this
forward. I appreciate the chairman's work to develop this framework for
this important reform.
I understand and he understands that the executive branch may not
like enhanced oversight and that they have expressed their concern
about the provisions of the bill that strengthen the oversight process,
including congressional notification, increased reporting and auditing.
But there is no single current issue on which there is stronger
bipartisan consensus on the committee than our concern that the
administration is not fulfilling its statutory duty to keep each member
of the committee fully and currently informed with respect to certain
intelligence matters.
In the past year alone, I joined with Chairman Reyes to call on the
President to brief the members of the committee with respect to
intelligence regarding the al Kibar facility in Syria. The full
committee was not briefed until the day the information was
subsequently disclosed to the public. The committee was briefed months
too late, and we received the information after the media did. On
another matter, the administration has refused to brief all members of
the committee even though it has briefed five members of the committee
staff. It is clear that reforms are necessary.
In addition to these legislative provisions, I believe that the
classified annex adequately supports our needs in important areas such
as human intelligence collection and contains additional provisions to
enhance oversight. While I may not agree with each of the specific
authorizations, on balance the classified portion of the bill generally
reflects consensus on the programmatic requirements needed to protect
our national security.
Despite these areas of consensus, I must point out that I have
concerns with parts of the bill and the action of the Rules Committee
not to make certain important amendments in order. I'm disappointed
with certain provisions relating to national intelligence space
systems. Certain levels of funding fall short, and the bill fails to
stimulate a sense of urgency in overhead architecture and shortfalls.
In certain areas, it mandates technical solutions without a complete
analysis.
I also have concern with what I believe is an unnecessarily complex
and unwieldy provision to create a new Inspector General of the
intelligence

[[Page H6601]]

community. While I support the enhancement of oversight for community-
wide issues, this provision would significantly duplicate existing
efforts and further grow the size of the DNI bureaucracy. I hope that
we can continue to improve the bill as it moves through the process. I
also hope that we can work to address concerns that have been raised by
the intelligence community with respect to section 425 of the bill
concerning the use of contractors.
Finally, I need to express my strong concern that the Rules Committee
did not make in order an amendment I submitted that would prevent funds
authorizing the bill from being used to transfer Guantanamo detainees
to the United States. This provision should not be necessary. I believe
that the public consensus that trained terrorists should not be brought
into the American cities should be clear and overwhelming. However,
there is a significant possibility that lawyers may try to argue that
trained terrorist detainees should be released on American streets.
This would be judicial activism at its worst, unsupported by either
clear legal precedent or statutory authority. Congress must send a
clear message immediately on this critical issue. We may have the
opportunity to do that later today.
On balance, this bill is a workable bill. It needs to be improved.
And I look forward to seeing exactly how the amendments process moves
forward through the day.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to
the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer) who serves as chairman of our
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. May I add, Mr. Chairman,
that on a personal note, I'm privileged and proud to have served with
Mr. Cramer on the Intelligence Committee for about 8 years. This is his
last authorization bill. He will be retiring at the end of this
Congress. So I just wanted to thank the gentleman for his service and
for his work. He has never stopped working up to the very end here in
his last term.
Thank you, Mr. Cramer, for your great work.
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for those kind words.
I, too, have enjoyed almost every minute of service on this
Intelligence Committee. I say to Mr. Hoekstra, as well, the years that
we put in together trying to steer through post 9/11, the struggles of
holding the agencies' feet to the fire but at the same time forcing
them to change, to do things differently to protect this country in a
more unified way, it has been extremely rewarding to see both sides
come together.

{time}  1330

I wanted to use my time today to say that I stand in strong support
of H.R. 5959 because I think this edition of the intelligence
authorization bill does the same thing, and that is it forces the
agencies to be more efficient, it forces them to work together, and at
the same time it is providing our men and women around this world the
resources that they need to do an even better job of protecting us.
I am particularly concerned about our access to space. It is in the
national interest of the United States to have domestic capability for
assured access to space. So as this bill proceeds forward, I hope we
will make sure that while we are performing oversight and we are
forcing the agencies to become more efficient, to consolidate what they
do, that we don't throw the baby out with the bath water.
I know my colleague from Alabama, Terry Everett, who is going to
speak in a few minutes as well, has been particularly concerned about
the access to space issue. My colleague, the gentleman from Alabama
(Mr. Everett) is leaving the committee as well, so Alabama loses one on
each side after this Congress.
Mr. Everett, I want to say that the people of Alabama and the people
of this country are proud of your career here in the United States
Congress. We are proud in north Alabama of our partnership with you.
And as I have watched you through the committee process bring the
access to space issues to the forefront, this country is a better place
because of your service here.
I also want to thank my colleagues. We work hard in cramped,
windowless rooms to make sure that the agencies answer the questions
that we want our constituents to have answered. They come sometimes to
the committee kicking and screaming, but I am proud of the work you do.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to extend my congratulations
to Mr. Cramer on his retirement. We are going to miss you in the
committee, Mr. Cramer. Alabama is going to lose two great Members of
Congress, two members who have helped make the Intelligence Committee a
better committee, who have studied the issues. We will miss you and
wish you well, but I am sure we will see you again. Thank you for the
work and effort you have put on the committee.
My colleague, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett) is also going
to be leaving. I am not sure what the folks in Alabama have put in the
water this year, but they are drinking the same thing and have decided
to retire. Again, Mr. Everett has also contributed a tremendous amount
of time, energy and effort in learning the issues of the Intelligence
Committee and making sure that the work we do on the committee is a
bipartisan effort, coordinated with the efforts in the Armed Services
Committee to make sure that the Intelligence Committee and the Armed
Services Committee are moving in the same direction and doing the
things that are necessary to keep America safe.
At this time I would like to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Alabama (Mr. Everett).
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I thank Mr. Hoekstra and Mr. Cramer. I can
assure the American people that knowing the members on both sides of
the aisle who serve on the Intelligence Committee and the staff who
supports them, even though two Alabamians are leaving, the Nation will
still be safe and in good hands.
I do rise in support of the Fiscal Year 2009 Intelligence
Authorization Act. The process for this year's bill was much improved
over last year; so for that, I thank my friend and chairman, Silvestre
Reyes, and our ranking member, Mr. Hoekstra. It has been 3 years since
we have had an intelligence authorization bill, and that has created a
void in many important policy areas and in programmatic guidance for
the intelligence community.
It is critical that we get a bill passed through the House and Senate
that can be signed by the President, and I hope that can be
accomplished before we adjourn this year.
I have a number of concerns about the bill, some of which have been
detailed in the minority views of the committee report, but I would
like to focus on a few of the joint programs that have military
application as well.
With regard to the national security space systems, the bill falls
short of fully addressing problems in our overhead architecture. As the
report notes, ``National security space systems have been and will
continue to be a cornerstone of the Nation's intelligence collection
capability.''
As Mr. Hoekstra pointed out, critical national security space systems
are not properly funded in conjunction with a complete programmatic
analysis that shows a way forward. This can be addressed and hopefully
will be addressed in conference with the Senate.
As I wind down my career in Congress, this will be my last
intelligence authorization work. The work we do here is fascinating and
important to our national security, and I am pleased to have been a
part of this for the past 6 years. As one of the crossover members from
the House Armed Services Committee, I want to reiterate----
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield my colleague an additional minute.
Mr. EVERETT. I want to reiterate the importance of having members
serve simultaneously on both committees. It is especially important to
have a member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee serve on HPSCI in
order to maintain a clear understanding of how the shared military and
intelligence overhead programs operate so that the right hand, Mr.
Chairman, knows what the left hand is doing.
I say again I appreciate having served over the years with the
members of the committee. I urge my colleagues to support this bill. It
is not

[[Page H6602]]

perfect, but it is a very good bill and it needs passing.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, before recognizing a very senior and valued
member of our committee, I wanted to wish my good friend and former
chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on Armed Forces well on
his retirement. I have had the privilege of working with Mr. Everett
since I have been in Congress on Armed Services and also on
Intelligence. I know how much he cares about the issues that affect our
national security, and so I want to wish him well in his retirement as
well.
Good luck, Terry.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Eshoo), a senior member of our committee, who serves as the
chairwoman of our Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I want to salute the chairman of our
committee for his superb leadership and caring so much about not only
the issues of intelligence but everyone that is a part of the
intelligence community. I want to thank all of the marvelous staff on
the majority and minority side, and I salute the ranking member of the
committee as well.
This is a tough committee to serve on. People don't know what we are
talking about. We do it in secret. We really can't talk to our
colleagues very much about it. And yet we make some of the weightiest
decisions that any Members of Congress would make because we deal with
what is the most important issue, and that is our national security,
the protection of the American people and giving the intelligence
community, making the choices to give the intelligence community all
the tools it needs in order to function and protect the American people
and that we weigh and balance and always know that we are working under
the Constitution of the United States of America. So this is really
where the rubber meets the road.
I support the bill. Just like all of the other bills we deal with,
there are pluses and minuses. I am very pleased that there are no
earmarks in this bill. That is the first time since I came onto the
committee that that is the case. I am very glad that 75 percent of the
dollars for covert action have been fenced. In other words, no
notification from the administration and from the intelligence
community, no money. And that's the way it should be because the
American people expect us to verify. They expect us to know and then we
can take action. We have to do oversight.
For the first time in the history of our country, we have brought
together a National Intelligence Assessment on global climate change
and the effect it will have on national security. I am very proud of
the work we have been able to do on that.
For the first time there will be an inspector general in the
intelligence community; and the administration, believe it or not, is
still fighting that. Imagine having an inspector general, independent
oversight of the intelligence community. I think that's a darn good
idea and I hope it will prevail and that the President changes his mind
on this.
We still have a lot of work to do to have more human intelligence in
countries where we need them. We have a lot of work to do on black
prison sites, the operation of them by the CIA and renditions. But with
that, Mr. Chairman, I want to commend especially Congressman Bud Cramer
for the magnificent, honest work he has done on the Intelligence
Committee and here in the Congress and wish him well, and Mr. Everett,
too.
I ask my colleagues to support the bill. It has good things and it
has some other things that are missing. But overall, I think it is a
bill worth supporting.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), a member of the
committee.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the ranking member for
yielding.
Mr. Chairman, this is not the intelligence authorization bill that I
would have written exactly, but I think it is important to start out by
thanking the chairman and the ranking member for taking some risk to
have a bipartisan bill that can have support from both sides of the
aisle. That is unfortunately fairly rare in this Chamber to be able to
work together on something that is important, especially in national
security, and yet that has happened here.
Intelligence is very important for our country's security. In many
ways it is the first line of defense. Certainly all our other national
security efforts depend upon intelligence. And so working together in a
bipartisan way, even being willing to take some risks to have a bill
with bipartisan support, means we can't have everything we want, but we
will work together in order to move this bill forward.
Secondly, I think it is important to acknowledge the enormous
influence of three retiring Members, three Members retiring from
Congress after this Congress: the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs.
Wilson) whose personal military background, intelligence, and nature of
her district has made her a leader on many issues, especially in the
area of technical collection; the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett)
with whom I serve on the Armed Services Committee, and we have worked
on many issues, but no one is as knowledgeable and passionate about the
issue of space and space policy as the gentleman from Alabama; and then
the other gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), he and I were partners
in the last Congress when for the first time this Congress stood up an
oversight subcommittee just also as we were beginning to implement the
Intelligence Reform Act. The gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer) is one
of those fairly rare Members who always asks what is in the best
interest of the country first, and it will be a significant loss to
this Congress and to the country upon his retirement.
Mr. Chairman, there are a number of commonsense reforms in this bill
that may not make headlines. One of the issues Mr. Cramer and I have
worked on, for example, in the past is how can we measure improvement
in intelligence, for example, in foreign language capability. There are
some specific provisions in this bill which do help us have specific
measurements so we can tell whether we are increasing our capability,
not just as far as numbers of people but in their fluency in specific
languages. That is absolutely critical for the purpose of intelligence.
And yet even for something like that, it is hard for any of us to
measure whether we are making the improvements that need to be made.
Making sure that any administration gives this committee the
information we deserve to do our job is a challenge. This bill deserves
support.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, it is now my privilege to yield 2 minutes to
the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) who serves as the
chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence and
who proudly represents NSA which is in his district.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support H.R. 5959. I
would first like to thank Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra
for their leadership in helping us put together a good bipartisan bill.
I also am going to miss Bud Cramer, Terry Everett, and Heather Wilson.
We have all worked well together on this committee. You will be missed.
I ask my colleagues to vote for this bill because it supports the men
and women who work within the intelligence community. The National
Security Agency, the NSA, is headquartered in my district. I personally
know that NSA's employees work very hard to ensure our Nation's
security.

{time}  1345

We must continue to invest in the people and resources necessary to
make our intelligence community effective. Intelligence is the best
defense against terrorism.
This bill advances the Cybersecurity Initiative to protect our
computer networks, a very important issue that we will be dealing with
in the future, cybersecurity attacks. We know now that certain
countries are attacking the United States of America through the
Internet.
Two, it increases research and development so that we can maintain
our technical advantage; and, three, invests in both satellite and
airborne collection and in the systems needed to

[[Page H6603]]

process, exploit and distribute this data.
The intelligence community faces enduring technical challenges, but
this bill provides our people, who are our most important asset, with
the tools they need to do their jobs well. In order to protect our
country from threats from countries such as China and Russia, we must
continue to invest heavily in science and technology.
This bill lays the foundation for the future and communicates areas
of concern to current intelligence leaders and the next Presidential
administration.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill and the important work of
the intelligence community.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3
minutes to my colleague from the State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers) who was
successful in the committee in passing two important amendments to
improve this bill.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I thank the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much for working in such a
bipartisan way. I often think after some of our most spirited meetings
in the Intelligence Committee, where we have passionate, civil debates,
how proud, really, America would be that all of us on both sides of the
aisle give all of ourselves to the right outcome on these bills. I want
to thank you for allowing that debate to happen in committee.
To Mr. Thompson, I have enjoyed working with you on the committee,
and I think we have done some great things in a bipartisan way.
Mr. Chairman, this is one of those bills that while I think both
sides probably would have had a few things different, but because we
committed ourselves to put the country first and bipartisanship as our
final goal and what works for America, you have a package here that I
think sends a great message to the most important group that this bill
will impact, and that's the men and women who risk their lives every
single day trying to make sure we have the best intelligence to our war
fighters, to our police officers, and to keep this country safe. For
all of that, to the staffs on both sides, thank you very much.
I want to bring your attention to two particular issues. There are a
lot of great things in here to think about.
One is the FBI policy. Thank you again for working with us on what I
think is a growing problem with the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and this, I think, was the first signal we need to get a handle on it.
The FBI implemented an ``up or out'' policy for its supervisors that
was supposed to allow new people in and promote the supervisory special
agents, people who had over years developed a Rolodex where they could
call the local police chiefs, work with the local community, get to
know and understand and gain the trust of these local communities.
We have hustled them out after 5 years. They may be the best
performing supervisory agents the Bureau has ever had, but when the
clock runs out, you're done.
In that policy, we have lost half. Almost 290 supervisory special
agents have left management in the FBI, retired, stepped down, quit,
whatever they have decided to do that wasn't in their interest or their
family's interest, because of this policy.
I can think of no policy that discriminates against half of your
management that we would call successful at a time where we need
experience to guide these new agents, which are about half of them, by
the way, are fairly new, I think under 5 years or 7 years, something
like that. We have tried to work with the Director and say this is the
wrong approach, this is a punishment approach. You have great men and
women committing themselves to these careers, dedicating themselves to
these supervisory positions. We need to reward them, not punish them.
We have tried to set up a housing policy to entice them. Three years,
longer than 3 years, even after the agreement from the Director, we
have been working on this to no avail. It has gone nowhere. Instead,
they continue to say this is a policy that works.
They are separating themselves from the field, and it's dangerous.
Over the last 2 weeks I bet I have talked to a dozen agents, some in
supervisory roles, others who are not, who are impacted by their
supervisors either leaving or new ones being hired, 12 agents, 100
percent unanimity. This is a bad and dangerous plan for the future of
the FBI.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield an additional minute to my colleague.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I think that this is an issue that we have to
even pay more attention to. This is an important step to regain the
confidence of the FBI and its leadership. It has to happen. Thanks for
your leadership on it.
Lastly, I just want to talk about the DNI, the Director of National
Intelligence. I have worked with Mr. Thompson on this. We have spent a
lot of time understanding this. Our concerns are real, and the
intelligence community concerns are real.
We created this new organization. Its job was to coordinate, not be
operational. We have found that it goes well beyond mission creep, and
it is in mission grasp. It is bloated, it's too big, and it became an
agency not that supported the decision and calculations of the field,
but became supported by the field.
It's a dangerous development in intelligence. I appreciate working
with you. I know we have a lot more work to do. Congratulations to all
on a bill that will, I think and believe, keep America safer.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the
Terrorism, Human Intelligence Analysis and Counterintelligence
Subcommittee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson).
Mr. THOMPSON of California. I want to thank both Chairman Reyes and
Ranking Member Hoekstra for their leadership and making sure we had a
good bipartisan bill that benefits the people of this great country,
the staff that worked so hard to make this happen on both sides of the
aisle, and, in particular, the ranking member of my subcommittee, Mr.
Rogers, for working together to make this a good bill.
Human intelligence, or HUMINT, is one of the most difficult but
effective means of understanding our adversaries' plans and intentions.
This bill adds funds improve HUMINT collection on counterterrorism and
other critical national security challenges. It also adds HUMINT
resources for global challenges, such as the political and humanitarian
crisis in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The events unfolding in those
regions demonstrate that we must always have the resources to
understand these threats.
The information we collect, however, is only useful if analysts
translate it into actionable intelligence for policymakers and law
enforcement. For that reason, this bill provides resources to improve
intelligence analysis across the entire intelligence community. It also
authorizes additional personnel to support State and local law
enforcement so they can better address the challenges of border
security, counterterrorism and infrastructure protection.
And the bill also calls for fiscal restraint. As Mr. Rogers
mentioned, since its creation in 2004, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence has grown into a bloated bureaucracy that
hinders, rather than facilitates, intelligence complexes and analysis.
This bill adds an amendment that Mr. Rogers and I introduced in
committee that prevents further growth in the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, this legislation provides critical
intelligence resources for our troops and strengthens oversight of
intelligence support to the military. Many of us have visited our
troops in Iraq, and we have seen firsthand that good intelligence saves
American lives on the battlefield.
This bill will greatly improve our intelligence capabilities and
enhance our national security. I urge all my colleagues to support it.
In closing, I too want to add my name to those who are very
appreciative and thankful for our friends, Mr. Everett and Mr. Cramer,
who did a great job on the committee. They were a pleasure to work for,
they are fine Americans, and we are going to miss them.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3
minutes to another member of the committee, Mr. McHugh from New York.

[[Page H6604]]

Mr. McHUGH. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
We have heard, I would say to my colleagues repeatedly today, this is
not a perfect bill. We also should hear that shouldn't be a surprise.
Rarely on the House floor here have perfect bills been delivered.
Rather, as I think the Founding Fathers would have intended, we see a
work in progress.
This is a bill that started off at a certain place, that came through
the committee process, and although I may be somewhat prejudiced, I
firmly believe has been far improved from that starting point through
that committee process. There have been some seven amendments that I
think have upgraded it and have put us on the right path.
I want to say Mr. Chairman, I have enormous respect, enormous
affection for both the distinguished chairman from the great State of
Texas, my good friend, Silvestre Reyes, as well as the gentleman from
Michigan, the distinguished ranking member, who have gone so far in
working together to make such a difference. There are far, far fewer
bills that reach this House floor that are more important in this day
and age for the safety and for the security of the American people.
I have to tell you I share the distinguished ranking member's
concerns about the failures of this administration to adequately
inform, to adequately brief all the Members on both sides of the aisle,
not just so-called leadership, but all the Members, as to the ongoing
activities with respect to our intelligence systems throughout this
world.
I think that the American people need to be assured that as we go
forward in these very dangerous and uncertain times that there are
certain individuals in this House that have, as the law intends, the
opportunity to be fully informed and make sound judgments about what is
appropriate and what is not.
Frankly, as a member of this committee, I am somewhat frustrated by
the lack of total input, the lack of total briefing that has occurred
from the administration side, and I look forward to a better day.
I think tomorrow can help us to further improve this bill. We have
the opportunity now, through the conference process, to continue to
improve upon it, to continue to make sure that the end product that we
send to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, to the President, is a
good bill, a bill that in these very challenging moments of our lives
ensures the American people have the best possible, the most well-
resourced, and the most responsible intelligence activities we can
possibly have.
This is a very appropriate start. It deserves our support, and I urge
all my colleagues to support this bill.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New Jersey, my colleague, Mr. Rush Holt, who also serves as the
chairman of the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel.
Mr. HOLT. I thank the Chair, and I rise in support of the bill.
The work in the Intelligence Committee is some of the most difficult
work that goes on here in the House, behind closed doors, necessarily
with little public input, but we are blessed with a good staff and a
good chairman. We never forget that our work is about people, about the
safety of the American people and about the hardworking, brave people
of the intelligence community.
H.R. 5959 contains some useful provisions that are designed to
strengthen congressional oversight. Among these is a fence of 75
percent of covert action funds, fenced until each member of the House
and Senate intelligence committees has been fully briefed.
I think it would be sufficient to say that this administration has
taken a cavalier attitude toward its legal obligations to keep the
committees fully and currently informed.
This bill would require the CIA Inspector General to conduct audits
of all covert action programs regularly. It would increase critical
research and development activities and improve foreign language
capabilities. It would prohibit the use of contractors for CIA detainee
interrogations.
It would clarify what ``fully and currently informed'' in the law
means for briefing Congress so that all information necessary for
Congress would be provided, and it explicitly requires that all
committee members be notified in general, not just selected members.
It requires guidelines for the implementation of a multilevel
security clearance to increase linguistic and cultural expertise. It
would require reports on the use of contractors, on workforce
diversity, on foreign language proficiency, on the protection of
intelligence officers' identities.
There are a number of good features. This is a good bill that
strengthens our oversight of the intelligence community. We do have a
long way to go to provide the kind of oversight needed after many years
when the intelligence community got almost every wish, billions of
dollars with insufficient justification.
I do support the bill and urge that my colleagues do as well.

{time}  1400

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this point in time, I have no other
speakers so I shall reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, as you know, bringing accountability
and transparency to contracting has been a priority of mine, and I have
worked to ensure that companies that we award contracts to are held
responsible for any abuses. I believe we must make certain that the
intelligence community is not using U.S. taxpayer dollars to enter into
or renew contracts with companies that may be engaging in serious
abuses of law and violence toward civilians and whose actions go
unpunished.
Around the world our country is contracting with private companies
that employ individuals who do not wear the badge of the United States
but whose behavior has, on numerous occasions, severely damaged the
credibility and security of our military and harmed our relationship
with other governments. Perhaps the most egregious example came on
September 16, 2007, when private security contractors employed by
Blackwater Worldwide killed 17 civilians and wounded many more in
downtown Baghdad. No one has been held accountable for this.
At a minimum, we need a more transparent process to hold private
contractors accountable and more information in order to understand
their impact on our Intelligence Community, our armed forces and our
larger objectives.
I thank the chairman for including language prohibiting the use of
contractors for interrogation, as well as a provision requiring a
comprehensive report on the use of contractors in the intelligence
community.
If I may ask the chairman in a brief colloquy if the chairman will
work with me to include additional language in the conference report
calling for a report that examines the extent of criminal activity
among intelligence community contractors and assesses the effects of
hiring contracting companies that are responsible for serious legal
violations.
Mr. REYES. Will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Yes.
Mr. REYES. The answer is yes. I will be happy to work with you in
conference.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am happy to
support this legislation.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time I would like to continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, can I inquire as to the time on both sides.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas has 7\1/2\ minutes, and the
gentleman from Michigan has 10 minutes.
Mr. REYES. And can I inquire of my colleague if he has any additional
speakers.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I am probably the only speaker left. I will close at
the appropriate time.
Mr. REYES. Then I will be pleased to recognize a hardworking member
of our committee, the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), for 2
minutes.
(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)

[[Page H6605]]

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the chairman for yielding, and I want to
commend the chairman and the ranking member on their hard work on this
bill, particularly staff, who also has worked hard on this legislation.
I rise today in strong support of H.R. 5959, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
While the bill contains a number of important provisions to
strengthen our intelligence community and enhance national security
that many of my colleagues have already been speaking about, I am
particularly pleased that it represents a reasonable and measured
response to the administration's cybersecurity initiative.
Now, this bill, the cybersecurity initiative, is the administration's
response to the cybersecurity threats facing the Nation. And although
the administration has been slow in recognizing this threat, I believe
the cyber initiative is a move in the right direction, but requires
careful scrutiny.
Now, this bill reduces funding in selected areas where it is not
adequately justified. However, recognizing that cybersecurity is a real
and growing threat that the Federal Government has been slow in
addressing, the Intelligence Committee has authorized more than 90
percent of the administration's requests.
At the same time, the bill clearly demonstrates that the committee
does not intend to write the administration a blank check for the
cybersecurity initiative, which is a multi-year, multi-billion dollar
project.
Now, we need a thorough assessment of the technical feasibility and
scalability of the initiative and a careful balance between
cybersecurity and privacy protections. Thus, the bill envisions an
advisory panel of senior representatives of Congress, the Executive
Branch and industry who can tackle these issues.
I was co-chair of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th
Presidency, basically a commission that will present a blueprint on
cybersecurity for the next President. I have been deeply involved in
developing recommendations for a national cybersecurity plan that
protects, among other things, our critical infrastructure assets and
infrastructure itself, as well as Federal networks and also the private
sector.
Furthermore, as a member of the House Intelligence Committee, and as
chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
Cybersecurity and Science Technology, I will continue to ensure and
exercise rigorous congressional oversight over this issue as it
evolves.
The measure before us is an important first step in addressing our
cybersecurity threats and closing that vulnerability and it is,
obviously, a critical national security issue. And I urge my colleagues
to support passage of this bill.
Again, I commend Chairman Reyes for his leadership, and also thank
staff for the great work they have done on this bill today.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I continue to reserve.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, it is now my privilege to yield 3 minutes to
the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the chairman for yielding, and rise in support of
H.R. 5959.
I want to congratulate our chairman, Mr. Reyes and his staff for
putting the bill together. In particular, I am proud that this bill
authorizes the funding that our intelligence community needs to help
prevent terrorists from attacking the United States with a nuclear
device.
A nuclear terrorist attack on the United States or on our troops in
the field is the greatest national security threat facing our country.
While part of this fight occurs at our borders, the intelligence
community is the tip of the spear, at the forefront of our efforts to
prevent a nuclear terror attack. The many analysts and officers of the
intelligence community ensure that we know as much as possible, not
only about the terrorists who would attack us with a nuclear device or
a radiological disease, but also about those who may sell fissile
material that they seek. This bill supports our men and women in the
intelligence community as they attempt to ensure that nuclear material
stays out of the wrong hands.
It is much easier to prevent terrorists from getting a hold of
nuclear material than prevent them from getting nuclear material or a
nuclear device into the country. Our country is large, our borders are
porous, and we have to stop the access of people who mean us ill from
gaining nuclear material.
The bill protects Americans against nuclear terrorism by funding the
Nuclear Materials Information Program as well, a Department of Energy-
led effort to understand how much nuclear material is stored worldwide,
what the security is at these sites, the signatures of this material,
also a key ingredient of our nuclear forensics efforts.
But there is more that we still must do. H.R. 1, signed into law by
the President almost a year ago created the position of the United
States Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Proliferation and Terrorism. We must have an individual, a single
person who can marshal all the resources and expertise to prevent the
most horrific attack imaginable. However, no one has been appointed to
this post. It remains vacant. I urge the President to fill this
position as soon as possible.
Nuclear terrorism is the preeminent threat of our time, and all
efforts have to be made to mitigate that threat. What we need to do is
imagine what a post-nuclear 9/11 Commission report would look like,
what would its recommendations be? And we have to implement those
recommendations now; not wait until there is a calamity.
I am proud that this legislation addresses the threat by authorizing
the resources our intelligence community needs to meet that threat.
And again, I want to thank you, Chairman Reyes, for your leadership,
and urge all of the Members to support the bill.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just inquire of the
chairman of the committee, you are prepared to close as well?
Mr. REYES. That was our last speaker. I am prepared to close.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you. I will yield myself the balance of our time.
I am looking forward to, and I am glad that we have had such a
collegial discussion about the bill, the process that we have gone
through in the committee, to get to the point that we are.
Obviously, we are going to go through a process of trying to improve
this bill while we are here on the floor today. I can look forward to
going through that process. I look forward to hopefully passing an
improved bill out of the floor, and then look forward to going to
conference and hope that we can continue this same kind of partnership
in trying to get, not only a bill through the House, but getting it
through a conference process and getting a bill to the President that
the President will sign.
It is important that the Intelligence Committees, that the House and
the Senate, put their imprint on the intelligence community. We haven't
been able to do that for 3 years. It is important that we do it and
that we do it at this time. The intelligence community needs the kind
of direction and the parameters that we have established in this bill,
to ensure that Congress can do its work, but also that the intelligence
community can do its work within a framework that has been established
by the Congress.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I now yield myself the remainder of our
time.
Mr. Chairman, again, I want to say how much I appreciate the
cooperation and the work that the ranking member has done to bring this
bill to the floor. I want to thank staffs on both sides in particular.
I want to thank my Staff Director, Mike Delaney, my Deputy Staff
Director and General Counsel, Wyndee Parker, and Chief Counsel, Jeremy
Bash, for the great work that they have done.
And I also want to thank our Vice Chair of the committee, Congressman
Leonard Boswell, who, unfortunately, was unable to accompany us here
today because he is recuperating in the hospital. All of us wish him
well and we want to see him back as soon as possible. He is a hard
worker and contributes a lot to our committee.
And I also want to say that this is a good, solid bill. This is the
kind of effort that our men and women in the intelligence community
serving us proudly throughout the world deserve.

[[Page H6606]]

Each and every one of them gives their best effort, and they deserve
the respect and the support of every Member of this body and everyone
in this country. We thank them for the effort that they put forward,
and we appreciate the commitment, the dedication and their
professionalism, as well as the sacrifices that their families provide
for our great country.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I want to say that it has been a privilege
to lead this committee. We have great Members on both sides that care
very much about our national security and work very hard on all the
issues that are important to our country and our national security.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank all of those who serve
our country through the gathering of intelligence for the protection of
the American people. I appreciate their dedication and their attention
to the gathering facts for deliberations related to our national
security.
Regrettably, the current administration has destroyed the credibility
of the Intelligence Community through the fabrication of intelligence.
The Bush administration continues a relentless pursuit of a self-
serving agenda rather than an agenda that serves the best interests of
the American people.
No single example can more clearly illustrate this point than the
administration's falsification and cherry-picking of intelligence to
build a phony case for the war in Iraq. Through the manipulation of
intelligence, the administration sold a war to the American public
based on false statements that included a connection between Iraq and
al Qaeda, Iraq and 9/11, as well as false claims that Iraq had weapons
of mass destruction and intentions to attack the U.S.
As long as President Bush remains in office the intelligence budget
will continue to be at risk for being used to support subversive
intelligence and provide license to the administration to engage in
criminal activity by shaping intelligence to fit corrupt policies.
Under the Bush administration there have emerged several high-profile
classified leaks to the media that have reemphasized the need for
reform within our intelligence agencies. From these media leaks, we not
only became aware of the efforts to manipulate intelligence and to
falsify a cause for war against Iraq but we also became aware of the
illegal NSA domestic wiretapping program without a court order. We
became aware of the rumored CIA detention centers in Eastern Europe,
and the CIA's extraordinary rendition program, used to transport
suspects to other nations with less restrictive torture policies. It is
regrettable that intelligence is often reshaped to fit doctrine instead
of doctrine being reshaped in the face of the facts of intelligence.
Furthermore, this bill will not stop unilateral covert U.S.
intelligence operations aimed at bringing about regime change in Iran.
As reported in a recent article in The New Yorker, the Bush
administration is already engaged in collecting covert intelligence on
Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program instead of engaging Iran in
high-level diplomatic negotiations without preconditions. The
administration has made clear their thirst for a war with Iran. The
opportunity for unscrupulous tactics by this administration with
respect to Iran clearly exists as long as this body stands idly by.
I strongly oppose this bill.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R.
5959, the Fiscal Year 2009 Intelligence Authorization Act, and the
important measures to strengthen oversight and accountability of
contractors that the bill includes.
I want to first thank Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes
for his leadership in crafting this bill. Chairman Reyes very
graciously worked with me to include in this bill major portions of
legislation I recently introduced along with Representative Jan
Schakowsky, H.R. 5973, the Transparency and Accountability in
Intelligence Contracting Act.

=========================== NOTE ===========================

July 16, 2008 on Page H6606 the following appeared: Chairman
Silvestro Reyes for his leadership

The online version should be corrected to read: Chairman
Silvestre Reyes for his leadership

========================= END NOTE =========================

For the last several years, I have been working to correct a serious
lack of attention to the management and oversight of contractors in the
Intelligence Community. Press reports indicate that roughly half of the
Intelligence Community's budget is now contracted out, yet there is
little understanding of where the money goes, what kinds of activities
contractors are performing, whether this contracting saves taxpayer
money, and whether the contracted activities are appropriate for
private corporations to perform. Additionally, accountability for
misconduct by contractors has been seriously deficient.
This rush to outsource sensitive government functions has placed
private contractors at the center of some of the most significant
national controversies in recent years. Contractors have been accused
of torturing or abusing foreign detainees, including the practice of
waterboarding high-level suspects. Contractors have participated in
warrantless electronic surveillance and data-mining programs targeting
U.S. citizens. Contractors have been deeply involved in the analysis of
critical intelligence on Iraq and al Qaeda, including, reportedly, the
preparation of the President's Daily Brief on intelligence matters.
Contractors may very well have a place in the Intelligence Community,
but their role must be carefully considered, thoroughly managed, and
strenuously overseen. A national conversation about the appropriate use
of contractors in our national security apparatus is long overdue. This
is a conversation the Administration skipped over as it was
implementing this major shift in the way we conduct intelligence
operations, but for the sake of the integrity of our national defense,
we must collectively scrutinize this practice and set clear boundaries.
H.R. 5959 begins to put Intelligence Community contracting back on a
rational and stable footing. It incorporates a number of provisions for
which I have advocated. Let me highlight just a few examples.
First, the legislation would explicitly prohibit the use of
contractors for the performance of interrogations. Interrogations
should be carried out by individuals who are well-trained, fall within
a clear chain of command, and have a sworn loyalty to the United
States--not by corporate, for-profit contractors. Given how delicate
such interrogations are, and how critical the intelligence they obtain
might be, I believe that drawing this red line is a commonsense step
with which all members should agree.
The House passed a similar restriction on Defense Department
contractors as part of the Defense Authorization bill in May. This bill
would appropriately extend that limit to intelligence contractors
outside the DoD.
Second, the bill would require an assessment of the number and cost
of contractors employed by the intelligence community, the types of
activities being performed by contractors, an analysis of cost savings,
and a description of mechanisms available for ensuring oversight and
accountability. This assessment will give Congress the data we need to
ascertain whether the use of contractors for certain activities is
beneficial and what reforms may be needed.
Third, the bill would require the Director of National Intelligence
to assess the appropriateness of using contractors for especially
sensitive activities, including intelligence collection, intelligence
analysis, interrogation, detention, and rendition. It will also require
information on how many contractors are currently employed in the
performance of these activities. Giving the head of the intelligence
community the chance to explain the reasoning behind this widespread
contracting will allow the Congress to carefully weigh the appropriate
limits for intelligence outsourcing.
These provisions are not overly prescriptive or restrictive. We fully
recognize that the Intelligence Community needs flexibility and agility
to be able to obtain and deliver to decision-makers accurate and timely
intelligence about matters involving extremely high stakes. Rather,
this bill gives us the tools we need to initiate a conversation about
how we can better organize, manage, and oversee contractors. It is a
first step toward ending the abuses of the past.

=========================== NOTE ===========================

July 16, 2008 on Page H6606 the following appeared: intelligence
community needs flexibility and agility

The online version should be corrected to read: Intelligence
Community needs flexibility and agility

========================= END NOTE =========================

Again, I thank Chairman Reyes and his colleagues on the Intelligence
Committee for recognizing the importance of addressing contractor
issues in the intelligence community. I look forward to continuing to
work with him on this issue.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the Democratic
majority has taken a thoughtful and bipartisan approach to this year's
Intelligence Authorization bill. I have expressed my concerns about the
health of our intelligence community and appreciate the work that has
been done to strengthen the Inspector General, increase contractor
oversight, and invest in the training of our operatives.
However, I am deeply troubled that this bill does not contain a
prohibition on torture, which I believe is absolutely critical. Torture
violates not only the laws and values of our country, but all standards
of decent human conduct. I have consistently spoken out against the
stonewalling and equivocation surrounding this administration's
``interrogation'' of detainees. I find it appalling that it has fallen
solely to the legislative and judicial branches to set interrogation
and detention standards worthy of our Nation.
Yet I remain hopeful that the abuses of this administration will be
checked by wise and thoughtful policy. I applauded the recent
``Boumediene v. Bush'' Supreme Court ruling that guarantees Guantanamo
Bay detainees the right of habeas corpus. Further, I believe that
extending the rules of the Army Field Manual to U.S. intelligence
personnel sends a clear signal that we have broken with and are rolling
back the abuses of this administration.
I support a great deal of what this bill includes, yet my greatest
concern is with what this bill omits. It is my hope that Congress will

[[Page H6607]]

come together in conference to send a message to this administration
and the world at large that Americans do not approve of, and will not
stand for, torture.
Mr. REYES. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIRMAN (Mr. Ross). All time for general debate has
expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the
purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered
read.
The text of the committee amendment is as follows:

H.R. 5959

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Limitation on the use of covert action funds.
Sec. 106. Prohibition on use of funds to implement ``5 and out''
program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.

TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements
of the intelligence community.
Sec. 303. Multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence
community.
Sec. 306. Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community
personnel management system.
Sec. 308. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence
community.
Sec. 309. Report on security clearance determinations.

Subtitle B--Other Matters

Sec. 311. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 312. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under
the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 313. Modification of availability of funds for different
intelligence activities.
Sec. 314. Protection of certain national security information.
Sec. 315. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt
and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
Sec. 316. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of
2006.
Sec. 317. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
Sec. 318. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 319. Enhancement of critical skills training program.
Sec. 320. Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory
panel.

TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy
efficiency reports.
Sec. 406. Semiannual reports on nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and
North Korea.
Sec. 407. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
Sec. 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 409. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the
intelligence community.
Sec. 410. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 411. National intelligence estimate on weapons of mass destruction
in Syria.
Sec. 412. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Sec. 413. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
Sec. 414. Security clearance reciprocity.
Sec. 415. Report on international traffic in arms regulations.
Sec. 416. Report on nuclear trafficking.
Sec. 417. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.

Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 421. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 422. Inapplicability to Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in
auditable financial statements.
Sec. 423. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain Central
Intelligence Agency positions.
Sec. 424. Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 425. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for
interrogations involving persons in the custody or
control of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

Sec. 431. Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into
the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Subtitle D--Other Elements

Sec. 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration as elements of the
intelligence community.
Sec. 442. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the
Research and Development Programs of the United States
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 502. Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 503. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
Sec. 504. Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China.
Sec. 505. Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources.

Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

Sec. 511. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949.
Sec. 512. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 513. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint
Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence
and Related Activities.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2009 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The
amounts authorized to be

[[Page H6608]]

appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103,
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2009,
for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the
elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section
101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on
the bill H.R. 5959 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable
distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of
the Schedule, within the executive branch.
(c) Earmarks.--
(1) In general.--Nothing in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations, the joint explanatory statement to accompany
the conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One
Hundred Tenth Congress, or the classified annex to this Act,
shall be construed to authorize or require the expenditure of
funds for an earmarked purpose.
(2) Earmarked purpose defined.--In this subsection, the
term ``earmarked purpose'' means a provision or report
language included primarily at the request of a Member,
Delegate, Resident Commissioner of the House of
Representatives or a Senator providing, authorizing, or
recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget
authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for
a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or
other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a
specific State, locality, or Congressional district, other
than through a statutory or administrative formula-driven or
competitive award process.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2009 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to
in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence
determines that such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except that the number
of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such
element.
(b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to each exercise of an authority described in
subsection (a).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2009 the sum of $648,842,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2010.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 772 full-time or full-
time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2009. Personnel
serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available
to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103
are also available to the Director for the adjustment of
personnel levels within the Intelligence Community Management
Account.
(d) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2009 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for
advanced research and development shall remain available
until September 30, 2010.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2009, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a).

SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON THE USE OF COVERT ACTION FUNDS.

(a) In General.--Not more than 25 percent of the funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the National
Intelligence Program for covert actions may be obligated or
expended until the date on which each member of the
congressional intelligence committees has been fully and
currently briefed on all authorizations for covert actions in
effect on April 24, 2008.
(b) Covert Action Defined.--In this section, the term
``covert action'' has the meaning given the term in section
503(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
413b(e)).

SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT ``5 AND
OUT'' PROGRAM OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated in this Act
may be used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation requiring the mandatory reassignment of a
supervisor of the Bureau after such supervisor serves in a
management position for 5 years (commonly known as the ``5
and out'' program).

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2009 the sum of $279,200,000.

SEC. 202. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT
PROVISION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RETIREMENT ACT.

Subparagraph (A) of section 235(b)(1) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)) is
amended by striking ``receiving compensation under the Senior
Intelligence Service pay schedule at the rate'' and inserting
``who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank''.

TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.

SEC. 302. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO
ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h) and section 904(g)(2) of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of
Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c(g)(2)) and notwithstanding
any other provision of law, in any fiscal year after fiscal
year 2008 an officer or employee of the United States or
member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to the staff of an
element of the intelligence community funded through the
Community Management Account from another element of the
United States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable
basis, as jointly agreed to by the Director of National
Intelligence and the head of the detailing element (or the
designees of such officials), for a period not to exceed 2
years.

SEC. 303. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.

(a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that
the elements of the intelligence community adopt a multi-
level security clearance approach in order to enable the
intelligence community to make more effective and efficient
use of persons proficient in foreign languages or with
cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that
is critical to national security.''.
(b) Implementation.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall issue guidelines to the intelligence community on the
implementation of subsection (s) of section 102A of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a),
not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.

SEC. 304. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON
CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

(a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
(2) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of
this subsection, by striking ``may only delegate'' and all
that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in
subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the
intelligence community.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community
to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant
to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such
senior officials of such element as are specified in
guidelines prescribed by the Director of National
Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
(b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than 6
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit
to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines
referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).

SEC. 305. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 506A the following new section:

``annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community

``Sec. 506B.  (a) Requirement To Provide.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of
the element of the intelligence community concerned, prepare
an annual personnel level assessment for such element of the
intelligence community that assesses the personnel levels for
each such element for the fiscal year following the fiscal
year in which the assessment is submitted.
``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence
committees each year along

[[Page H6609]]

with the budget submitted by the President under section 1105
of title 31, United States Code.
``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a)
submitted during a fiscal year shall contain, at a minimum,
the following information for the element of the intelligence
community concerned:
``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the
upcoming fiscal year.
``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current
fiscal year.
``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs as compared to the personnel costs during the
prior 5 fiscal years.
``(4) The number of personnel positions requested for the
upcoming fiscal year.
``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such number as compared to the number of personnel positions
of the current fiscal year.
``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such number as compared to the number of personnel positions
during the prior 5 fiscal years.
``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of
contractors to be funded by the element for the upcoming
fiscal year.
``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate of
the costs of contractors of the current fiscal year.
``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of
contractors, and the number of contractors, during the prior
5 fiscal years.
``(10) A written justification for the requested personnel
and contractor levels.
``(11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts
employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence
community.
``(12) A list of all contractors that have been the subject
of an investigation completed by the Inspector General of any
element of the intelligence community during the preceding
fiscal year, or are or have been the subject of an
investigation by such an Inspector General during the current
fiscal year.
``(13) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence
that, based on current and projected funding, the element
concerned will have sufficient--
``(A) internal infrastructure to support the requested
personnel and contractor levels;
``(B) training resources to support the requested personnel
levels; and
``(C) funding to support the administrative and operational
activities of the requested personnel levels.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 506A the following new item:

``Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence
community.''.

SEC. 306. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CONTRACTORS.

(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1,
2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report describing
the use of personal services contracts across the
intelligence community, the impact of such contractors on the
intelligence community workforce, plans for conversion of
contractor employment into government employment, and the
accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such
contractors.
(b) Content.--
(1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include--
(A) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance
issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head
of an element of the intelligence community relating to
minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training,
security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and
how those standards may differ from those for government
employees performing substantially similar functions;
(B) an identification of contracts where the contractor is
performing a substantially similar functions to a government
employee;
(C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved by
awarding contracts for the performance of such functions
referred to in subparagraph (B) instead of using full-time
employees of the elements of the intelligence community to
perform such functions;
(D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using
contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph
(2);
(E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the number
of personnel working under such contracts, related to the
performance of activities described in paragraph (2);
(F) a comparison of the compensation of contract employees
and government employees performing substantially similar
functions;
(G) an analysis of the attrition of government personnel
for contractor positions that provide substantially similar
functions;
(H) a description of positions that will be converted from
contractor employment to government employment;
(I) an analysis of the oversight and accountability
mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts awarded
for intelligence activities by each element of the
intelligence community during fiscal years 2006 and 2007;
(J) an analysis of procedures in use in the intelligence
community for conducting oversight of contractors to ensure
identification and prosecution of criminal violations,
financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by
contractors or contract personnel; and
(K) an identification of best practices for oversight and
accountability mechanisms applicable to personal services
contracts.
(2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are
the following:
(A) Intelligence collection.
(B) Intelligence analysis.
(C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention, and
interrogation activities.

SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

(a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The
Director of National Intelligence and the head of an element
of the intelligence community may not implement a plan that
provides compensation to personnel of that element of the
intelligence community based on performance until the date
that is 45 days after the date on which the Director of
National Intelligence submits a report for that element under
subsection (b).
(b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to Congress a report on performance-based compensation
for each element of the intelligence community, including,
with respect to each such element--
(1) a description of a proposed employee advisory group to
advise management on the implementation and management of a
pay for performance system in that element, including the
scope of responsibility of the group and the plan for the
element for ensuring diversity in the selection of members of
the advisory group;
(2) a certification that all managers who will participate
in setting performance standards and pay pool administration
have been trained on the implementing guidance of the system
and the criteria upon which the certification is granted; and
(3) a description of an external appeals mechanism for
employees who wish to appeal pay decisions to someone outside
the management chain of the element employing such employee.

SEC. 308. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1,
2008, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community,
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the plans of each element to increase diversity
within the intelligence community.
(b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include specific implementation plans to increase diversity
within each element of the intelligence community,
including--
(1) specific implementation plans for each such element
designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic
plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal
employment opportunity and diversity;
(2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to
increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
(3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to
improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior,
midgrade, senior, and management levels;
(4) a description of specific diversity awareness training
and education programs for senior officials and managers of
each such element; and
(5) a description of performance metrics to measure the
success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs
described in paragraphs (1) through (4).

SEC. 309. REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS.

(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:

``report on security clearance determinations

``Sec. 508.  Not later than February 1 of each year, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit
to Congress a report on security clearance determinations
completed or ongoing during the preceding fiscal year that
have taken longer than one year to complete. Such report
shall include--
``(1) the number of security clearance determinations for
positions as employees of the Federal Government that
required more than one year to complete;
``(2) the number of security clearance determinations for
contractors that required more than one year to complete;
``(3) the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such
determinations; and
``(4) the cause of significant delays in such
determinations.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401 et seq.) is further amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 507 the following new item:

``Sec. 508. Report on security clearance determinations.''.

Subtitle B--Other Matters

SEC. 311. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 312. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF
1947.

Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking
``other'' the second place it appears.

[[Page H6610]]

SEC. 313. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read
as follows:
``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an
emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases
efficiency; and''.

SEC. 314. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION.

(a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover
Intelligence Officers and Agents.--
(1) Disclosure of agent after access to information
identifying agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by
striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''.
(2) Disclosure of agent after access to classified
information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by
striking ``five years'' and inserting ``10 years''.
(b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of
Intelligence Identities.--The first sentence of section
603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
423(a)) is amended by inserting ``including an assessment of
the need for any modification of this title for the purpose
of improving legal protections for covert agents,'' after
``measures to protect the identities of covert agents,''.

SEC. 315. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT
RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND
DECORATIONS.

Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of
the intelligence community, the head of such element may
delete the information described in subparagraph (A) or (C)
of paragraph (2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph
(3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the
Secretary of State that the publication of such information
could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or
methods.
``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of
State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be
transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who
shall keep a record of such information.
``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community'
has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.

SEC. 316. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE DETAINEE TREATMENT
ACT OF 2005 AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE
MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006.

(a) Report Required.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report
on all measures taken by the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence and by each element, if any, of the
intelligence community with relevant responsibilities to
comply with the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 (title X of division A of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat.
2739) and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 (Public Law 109-366; 120 Stat. 2600).
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) A description of the detention or interrogation
methods, if any, that have been determined to comply with
section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat.
2739; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd) and section 6 of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (120 Stat. 2632; 18 U.S.C. 2441 note)
(including the amendments made by such section 6), and, with
respect to each such method--
(A) an identification of the official making such
determination; and
(B) a statement of the basis for such determination.
(2) A description of the detention or interrogation
methods, if any, the use of which has been discontinued
pursuant to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or the
Military Commission Act of 2006, and, with respect to each
such method--
(A) an identification of the official making the
determination to discontinue such method; and
(B) a statement of the basis for such determination.
(3) A description of any actions that have been taken to
implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
(119 Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd-1), and, with respect to
each such action--
(A) an identification of the official taking such action;
and
(B) a statement of the basis for such action.
(4) Any other matters that the Director considers necessary
to fully and currently inform the congressional intelligence
committees about the implementation of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006.
(5) An appendix containing--
(A) all guidelines for the application of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 to the detention or interrogation
activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence
community; and
(B) all legal justifications of the Department of Justice,
including any office thereof, about the meaning or
application of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or related
provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 with
respect to the detention or interrogation activities, if any,
of any element of the intelligence community.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in classified form.
(d) Submission to the Congressional Armed Services
Committees.--To the extent that the report required by
subsection (a) addresses an element of the intelligence
community within the Department of Defense, that portion of
the report, and any associated material that is necessary to
make that portion understandable, shall also be submitted by
the Director of National Intelligence to the congressional
armed services committees.
(e) Congressional Armed Services Committee Defined.--In
this section, the term ``congressional armed services
committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.

SEC. 317. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees that is included in the classified
annex to this Act is hereby incorporated into this Act and is
hereby made a requirement in law.

SEC. 318. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence
Initiatives.--Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(1)''; and
(2) by striking paragraph (2).
(b) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification
Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is
amended--
(1) by striking subsection (d); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as
subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
(c) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.--
Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873
note) is repealed.
(d) Conforming Amendments.--Section 507(a)(2) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)(2)) is
amended by striking subparagraph (D).

SEC. 319. ENHANCEMENT OF CRITICAL SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAM.

(a) National Security Agency.--Subsection (e) of section 16
of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402
note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all
that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting
``Agency efforts''.
(b) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.--
(1) In general.--The National Security Act of 1947 is
amended by inserting after section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 441m) the
following new section:

``intelligence community acquisition of critical skills

``Sec. 1022.  (a) In General.--The head of an appropriate
department may assign civilian employees of an element of the
intelligence community that is a component of such
appropriate department as students at accredited
professional, technical, and other institutions of higher
learning for training at the undergraduate level in skills
critical to effective performance of the mission of such
element of the intelligence community.
``(b) Payment of Expenses.--The head of an appropriate
department may pay, directly or by reimbursement to
employees, expenses incident to assignments under subsection
(a), in any fiscal year only to the extent that appropriated
funds are available for such purpose.
``(c) Eligibility.--
``(1) In general.--To be eligible for assignment under
subsection (a), an employee of an element of the intelligence
community must agree in writing--
``(A) to continue in the service of such element for the
period of the assignment and to complete the educational
course of training for which the employee is assigned;
``(B) to continue in the service of such element following
completion of the assignment for a period of one-and-a-half
years for each year of the assignment or part thereof;
``(C) to reimburse the United States for the total cost of
education (excluding the employee's pay and allowances)
provided under this section to the employee if, prior to the
employee's completing the educational course of training for
which the employee is assigned, the assignment or the
employee's employment with such element is terminated either
by such element due to misconduct by the employee or by the
employee voluntarily; and
``(D) to reimburse the United States if, after completing
the educational course of training for which the employee is
assigned, the employee's employment with such element is
terminated either by such element due to misconduct by the
employee or by the employee voluntarily, prior to the
employee's completion of the service obligation period
described in subparagraph (B), in an amount that bears the
same ratio to the total cost of the education (excluding the
employee's pay and allowances) provided to the employee as
the unserved portion of the service obligation period
described in subparagraph (B) bears to the total period of
the service obligation described in subparagraph (B).
``(2) Debt owing the united states.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the obligation to reimburse the United States under an
agreement described in paragraph (1), including interest due
on such obligation, is for all purposes a debt owing the
United States.
``(3) Reimbursement.--
``(A) Bankruptcy.--A discharge in bankruptcy under title
11, United States Code, shall not release a person from an
obligation to reimburse the United States required under an
agreement described in paragraph (1) if the final

[[Page H6611]]

decree of the discharge in bankruptcy is issued within five
years after the last day of the combined period of service
obligation described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
paragraph (1).
``(B) Release.--The head of an appropriate department may
release a person, in whole or in part, from the obligation to
reimburse the United States under an agreement described in
paragraph (1) when, in the discretion of such head of an
appropriate department, such head of an appropriate
department determines that equity or the interests of the
United States so require.
``(C) Monthly payments.--The head of an appropriate
department shall permit an employee assigned under this
section who, prior to commencing a second academic year of
such assignment, voluntarily terminates the assignment or the
employee's employment with the element of the intelligence
community that is a component of such appropriate department,
to satisfy the employee's obligation under an agreement
described in paragraph (1) to reimburse the United States by
reimbursement according to a schedule of monthly payments
which results in completion of reimbursement by a date five
years after the date of termination of the assignment or
employment or earlier at the option of the employee.
``(d) Recruitment.--Efforts by an element of the
intelligence community to recruit individuals at educational
institutions for participation in the undergraduate training
program established by this section shall be made openly and
according to the common practices of universities and
employers recruiting at such institutions.
``(e) Inapplication of Provisions on Training.--Chapter 41
of title 5 and subsections (a) and (b) of section 3324 of
title 31, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to
this section.
``(f) Regulations.--A head of the appropriate department
assigning employees in accordance with this section may issue
such regulations as such head of the appropriate department
considers necessary to carry out this section.
``(g) Rules of Construction.--
``(1) Component.--For purposes of this section--
``(A) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
shall be considered a component of such Office; and
``(B) the Central Intelligence Agency shall be considered a
component of such Agency.
``(2) Required education programs.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to modify, affect, or supercede any
provision of law requiring or otherwise authorizing or
providing for a training program described in this section.
``(h) Appropriate Department Defined.--In this section, the
term `appropriate department' means--
``(1) with respect to the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence;
``(2) with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency,
Central Intelligence Agency; and
``(3) with respect to an element of the intelligence
community other than the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, the
department of the Federal Government of which such element of
the intelligence community is a component.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating
to section 1021 the following new item:

``Sec. 1022. Intelligence community acquisition of critical skills.''.

SEC. 320. COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE
ADVISORY PANEL.

Not later than February 1, 2009, the President shall submit
to Congress a report on options for creating an advisory
panel comprised of representatives of Congress, the Executive
Branch, and the private sector to make policy and procedural
recommendations for--
(1) information security for the Federal Government;
(2) critical infrastructure;
(3) the authorities, roles, responsibilities of the
intelligence community, Department of Homeland Security, and
Department of Defense for purposes of supporting the
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative as described
in National Security Policy Directive 54/Homeland Security
Policy Directive 23 entitled ``Cybersecurity Policy'' signed
by the President on January 8, 2008; and
(4) other matters related to paragraphs (1) through (3) as
the President considers appropriate.

TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.

Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of Headquarters
With Headquarters of'';
(2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the
Office''; and
(3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the
headquarters of any other element''.

SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.

Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(F) The Director of National Intelligence.''.

SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY.

Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7);
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for basic,
applied, and advanced research to meet the technology needs
of the intelligence community;
``(6) submit to the congressional intelligence committees
an annual report on the science and technology strategy of
the Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the
intelligence community; and''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(3)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)--
(i) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate'';
and
(ii) by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``;'';
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C);
and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new
subparagraph:
``(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research
programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence
community; and''.

SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND
OFFICIALS.

(a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18
months after the date of the enactment of the National
Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting
the following:
``(a) In General.--
``(1) Establishment.--The''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter
Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National
Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center
shall be located within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.''.
(b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(c)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new
paragraphs:
``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation
Center.''.

SEC. 405. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA
CENTER ENERGY EFFICIENCY REPORTS.

(a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report
submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled
``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient
computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431;
120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later then November 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the
plan developed under subsection (a).
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.

SEC. 406. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN,
SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA.

(a) Reports.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by title III, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
section:

``semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of iran, syria, and north
korea

``Sec. 509.  (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less
frequently than every 180 days, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the intentions and capabilities of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the
nuclear programs of each such country.
``(b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea--
``(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each
such country;
``(2) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting
standards and practices, of the sources upon which the
intelligence used to prepare the assessment described in
paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such sources
and an assessment of the reliability of each such source;
``(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any such
program gathered or developed since the previous report was
submitted under subsection (a), including intelligence
collected from both open and clandestine sources for each
such country; and
``(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence
in the assessment described in paragraph (1).

[[Page H6612]]

``(c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of
National Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence
Estimate on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, or the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea in lieu of a report required by
subsection (a) for that country.
``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may
be submitted in classified form.''.
(2) Applicability date.--The first report required to be
submitted under section 509 of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by paragraph (1), shall be submitted not later
than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating
to section 508 the following new item:

``Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria,
and North Korea.''.

SEC. 407. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and
(4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.

SEC. 408. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 103G the following new section:

``inspector general of the intelligence community

``Sec. 103H.  (a) Office of Inspector General of
Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community.
``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community is to--
``(1) create an objective and effective office,
appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and
conduct independently investigations, inspections, and audits
on matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence;
``(2) recommend policies designed--
``(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in
the administration and implementation of matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
``(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such
matters;
``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National
Intelligence fully and currently informed about--
``(A) problems and deficiencies relating to matters within
the responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective
actions; and
``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that
the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly
informed of--
``(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to
matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence; and
``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective
actions.
``(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1)
There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
``(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as
Inspector General shall be made--
``(A) without regard to political affiliation;
``(B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the
security standards of the intelligence community, and prior
experience in the field of intelligence or national security;
and
``(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting,
financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or auditing.
``(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be
under the general supervision of the Director of National
Intelligence.
``(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only
by the President. The President shall immediately communicate
in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the
reasons for the removal of any individual from the position
of Inspector General.
``(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections
(g) and (h), it shall be the duty and responsibility of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community--
``(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan,
conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the
investigations, inspections, and audits relating to matters
within the responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence to ensure they are conducted
efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and
regulations;
``(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence fully
and currently informed concerning violations of law and
regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, fraud
and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may
occur in matters within the responsibility and authority of
the Director, and to report the progress made in implementing
corrective action;
``(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued
by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with
the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures
as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of
intelligence sources and methods described in such reports;
and
``(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities
under this section, to comply with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
``(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the
Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to
protect vital national security interests of the United
States.
``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under
paragraph (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately
classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such
authority within 7 days to the congressional intelligence
committees.
``(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at
the time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to
the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a
copy of such report.
``(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the
Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the
Inspector General considers appropriate.
``(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General.
``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any
employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of
the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
``(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other material which relate to the
programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector
General has responsibilities under this section.
``(C) The level of classification or compartmentation of
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient
rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any
materials under subparagraph (B).
``(D) Failure on the part of any employee, or any employee
of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community
to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for
appropriate administrative actions by the Director or, on the
recommendation of the Director, other appropriate officials
of the intelligence community, including loss of employment
or the termination of an existing contractual relationship.
``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once
such complaint or information has been received from an
employee of the Federal Government--
``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity
of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless
the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is
unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the
disclosure is made to an official of the Department of
Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution
should be undertaken; and
``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee in a position to take such actions, unless the
complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the
knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its
truth or falsity.
``(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to
administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation,
or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the
duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or
affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee
of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community designated by the Inspector General shall have the
same force and effect as if administered or taken by, or
before, an officer having a seal.
``(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the
production of all information, documents, reports, answers,
records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary
evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General.
``(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other
elements of the United States Government, the Inspector
General shall obtain information, documents, reports,
answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and
evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using
procedures other than by subpoenas.
``(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for,
or on behalf of, any other element of the intelligence
community, including the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
``(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a
subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be
enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the
United States.
``(g) Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence
Community.--(1)(A) In the event of a matter within the
jurisdiction of

[[Page H6613]]

the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that may
be subject to an investigation, inspection, or audit by both
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an
Inspector General, whether statutory or administrative, with
oversight responsibility for an element or elements of the
intelligence community, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community and such other Inspector or Inspectors
General shall expeditiously resolve the question of which
Inspector General shall conduct such investigation,
inspection, or audit.
``(B) In attempting to resolve a question under
subparagraph (A), the Inspectors General concerned may
request the assistance of the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum established under subparagraph (C).
In the event of a dispute between an Inspector General within
an agency or department of the United States Government and
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that has
not been resolved with the assistance of the Forum, the
Inspectors General shall submit the question to the Director
of National Intelligence and the head of the agency or
department for resolution.
``(C) There is established the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory
or administrative Inspectors General with oversight
responsibility for an element or elements of the intelligence
community. The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum
shall have no administrative authority over any Inspector
General, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing its
members of the work of individual members of the Forum that
may be of common interest and discussing questions about
jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of a
contractor, records, audits, reviews, documents,
recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of
assistance to more than 1 of its members.
``(2) The Inspector General conducting an investigation,
inspection, or audit covered by paragraph (1) shall submit
the results of such investigation, inspection, or audit to
any other Inspector General, including the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to conduct
such investigation, inspection, or audit who did not conduct
such investigation, inspection, or audit.
``(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community shall be provided with
appropriate and adequate office space at central and field
office locations, together with such equipment, office
supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities
and services as may be necessary for the operation of such
offices.
``(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General
shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees
as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the
Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that
any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed
has security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties
of such officer or employee.
``(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and
employees have the requisite training and experience to
enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the
Inspector General effectively.
``(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career
cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity
and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the
duties of the Inspector General.
``(3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the
Inspector General may request such information or assistance
as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General from any
department, agency, or other element of the United States
Government.
``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information
or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the
department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is
practicable and not in contravention of any existing
statutory restriction or regulation of the department,
agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, or to
an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
``(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the
intelligence community, conduct, as authorized by this
section, an investigation, inspection, or audit of such
element and may enter into any place occupied by such element
for purposes of the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General.
``(i) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall, not later than January 31 and
July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of
National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate,
unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of
the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period
ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30,
respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall provide any portion of the report involving a
component of a department of the United States Government to
the head of that department simultaneously with submission of
the report to the Director of National Intelligence.
``(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a
minimum, the following:
``(i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation,
inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by
such report, including a summary of the progress of each
particular investigation, inspection, or audit since the
preceding report of the Inspector General under this
paragraph.
``(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and
deficiencies relating to the administration and
implementation of programs and operations of the intelligence
community, and in the relationships between elements of the
intelligence community, identified by the Inspector General
during the period covered by such report.
``(iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective
or disciplinary action made by the Inspector General during
the period covered by such report with respect to significant
problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
``(iv) A statement whether or not corrective or
disciplinary action has been completed on each significant
recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and,
in a case where corrective action has been completed, a
description of such corrective action.
``(v) A certification whether or not the Inspector General
has had full and direct access to all information relevant to
the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
``(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General
during the period covered by such report.
``(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and
implementation of matters within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to
detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such matters.
``(C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt
of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall
transmit the report to the congressional intelligence
committees together with any comments the Director considers
appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the committees of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives with
jurisdiction over a department of the United States
Government any portion of the report involving a component of
such department simultaneously with submission of the report
to the congressional intelligence committees.
``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to
the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility
and authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
``(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A)
within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together
with such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of
each report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem,
abuse, or deficiency related to a component of such
department simultaneously with transmission of the report to
the congressional intelligence committees.
``(3) In the event that--
``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution of the
duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General;
``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by
the Inspector General focuses on any current or former
intelligence community official who--
``(i) holds or held a position in an element of the
intelligence community that is subject to appointment by the
President, whether or not by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting
basis;
``(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the
intelligence community, including a position held on an
acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence; or
``(iii) holds or held a position as head of an element of
the intelligence community or a position covered by
subsection (b) or (c) of section 106;
``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General
to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by
a current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of
possible criminal conduct of any current or former official
described in subparagraph (B); or
``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible
alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or
audit,

the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a
report on such matter to the congressional intelligence
committees.
``(4) Pursuant to title V, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees any report or findings
and recommendations of an investigation, inspection, or audit
conducted by the office which has been requested by the
Chairman or Vice Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of
either committee.
``(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress
a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern
may report such complaint or information to the Inspector
General.
``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall determine whether the complaint or
information appears credible. Upon making such a
determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the
Director a notice of that determination, together with the
complaint or information.

[[Page H6614]]

``(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector
General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7
calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to
the congressional intelligence committees, together with any
comments the Director considers appropriate.
``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible
under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted
under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or
information to the Director in accurate form under
subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may
submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting
either or both of the congressional intelligence committees
directly.
``(ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees
directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the
employee's complaint or information and notice of the
employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly; and
``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the
Inspector General, direction on how to contact the
intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate
security practices.
``(iii) A member or employee of 1 of the congressional
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or
information under clause (i) does so in that member or
employee's official capacity as a member or employee of such
committee.
``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General
under this paragraph of each action taken under this
paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such
notice shall be provided not later than 3 days after any such
action is taken.
``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector
General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial
review.
``(G) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means
any of the following:
``(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of
law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the
funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence
activity involving classified information, but does not
include differences of opinions concerning public policy
matters.
``(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact
relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity.
``(iii) An action, including a personnel action described
in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code,
constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under
subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section in response to an
employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with
this paragraph.
``(H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the
findings set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section
701(b) of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection
Act of 1998 (title VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App.
8H note).
``(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United
States Code, the Inspector General shall report to the
Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint
received by the Inspector General relating to violations of
Federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of
an element of the intelligence community, or in the
relationships between the elements of the intelligence
community, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued
by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such
section. A copy of each such report shall be furnished to the
Director.
``(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be
issued by the Director in consultation with the congressional
intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence
Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community.
``(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of
Intelligence Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to
subsection (g), the performance by the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community of any duty, responsibility, or
function regarding an element of the intelligence community
shall not be construed to modify or effect the duties and
responsibilities of any other Inspector General, whether
statutory or administrative, having duties and
responsibilities relating to such element.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 103G the
following new item:

``Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.

(b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position.--
Section 8K of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.) is repealed.
(c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new item:
``Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.

SEC. 409. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 406 of
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new section:

``report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community

``Sec. 510.  Not later than February 1 of each year, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
proficiency in foreign languages and, if appropriate, in
foreign dialects of each element of the intelligence
community, including--
``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency and the level of
proficiency required;
``(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each
element will require during the 5-year period beginning on
the date of the submission of the report;
``(3) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency that are filled
by--
``(A) military personnel; and
``(B) civilian personnel;
``(4) the number of applicants for positions in such
element in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign
language proficiency, including the foreign language
indicated and the proficiency level;
``(5) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language
and proficiency level;
``(6) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the provider
of such training;
``(7) a description of such element's efforts to recruit,
hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a
foreign language;
``(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic,
advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
``(9) for each foreign language and, where appropriate,
dialect of a foreign language--
``(A) the number of positions of such element that require
proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
``(B) the number of personnel of such element that are
serving in a position that requires proficiency in the
foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of
the position;
``(C) the number of personnel of such element that are
serving in a position that does not require proficiency in
the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty
of the position;
``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each
level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level of
proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the
requirements of such element;
``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as
linguists for such element that are not qualified as
linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language
Roundtable;
``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists
for such element during the preceding calendar year;
``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that
discontinued serving such element during the preceding
calendar year;
``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills
that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and
``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills
that is fulfilled by contractors;
``(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and
capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and
``(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of
National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer
relevant.''.
(2) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
415b(a)(1)) is amended--
(A) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph (J);
and
(B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(K) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in
the intelligence community required by section 510.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act is further amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 509 the following new
item:

``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence
community.''.

SEC. 410. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE.

(a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of
Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l),
and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i),
respectively; and
(3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2)
of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it
appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection
(e)''; and
(2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and
inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and
inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.

SEC. 411. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION IN SYRIA.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a National Intelligence
Estimate on the history, status, and projected development of
any weapons of mass destruction development program
undertaken by the Government of Syria, or by any person on
behalf of the Government of Syria.
(b) Form.--The National Intelligence Estimate required
under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

[[Page H6615]]

SEC. 412. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DEDICATED TO IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on
intelligence collection resources dedicated to Iraq and
Afghanistan during fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Such report
shall include detailed information on fiscal, human,
technical, and other intelligence collection resources.

SEC. 413. OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY
CLEARANCES.

(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 103H, as added by section 409 of this Act, the
following new section:

``ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances

``Sec. 103I.  (a) Appointment.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence
community security clearances.
``(b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of
the intelligence community shall provide a person applying
for a security clearance through or in coordination with such
element with contact information for the ombudsman appointed
under subsection (a).
``(c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the
ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing--
``(1) the number of persons applying for a security
clearance who have contacted the ombudsman during the
preceding 12 months; and
``(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and questions
received by the ombudsman from persons applying for security
clearances.''.
(b) Appointment Date.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence
community security clearances under section 103I(a) of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a),
not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is further
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103H
the following new item:

``Sec. 103I. Ombudsman for intelligence community security
clearances.''.

SEC. 414. SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.

(a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall conduct an audit of the reciprocity of
security clearances in the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing the results of
the audit conducted under subsection (a). Such report shall
include an assessment of the time required to obtain a
reciprocal security clearance for--
(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community
detailed to another element of the intelligence community;
(2) an employee of an element of the intelligence community
seeking permanent employment with another element of the
intelligence community; and
(3) a contractor seeking permanent employment with an
element of the intelligence community.

SEC. 415. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS
REGULATIONS.

(a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2009, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report assessing--
(1) the threat to national security presented by the
efforts of foreign countries to acquire, through espionage,
diversion, or other means, sensitive equipment and
technology, and the degree to which United States export
controls (including the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations) are adequate to defeat such efforts; and
(2) the extent to which United States export controls are
well matched to the scope of the foreign threat such controls
are designed to defeat and whether other means could more
successfully defeat such threats.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) International Traffic in Arms Regulations Defined.--The
term ``International Traffic in Arms Regulations'' means
those regulations contained in parts 120 through 130 of title
22, Code of Federal Regulations (or successor regulations).

SEC. 416. REPORT ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING.

(a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2009, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the
illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and
equipment.
(b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include, for a period of time including at least the
preceding three years--
(1) details of all known or suspected cases of the illicit
sale, transfer, brokering, or transport of nuclear or
radiological material or equipment useful for the production
of nuclear or radiological material or nuclear explosive
devices;
(2) an assessment of the countries that represent the
greatest risk of nuclear trafficking activities; and
(3) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence
in the assessment referred to in paragraph (2).
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted
in classified form, but shall include an unclassified
summary.

SEC. 417. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.

(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct a study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions
of personnel in the intelligence community who commit
unauthorized disclosures of classified information, including
whether revoking such pensions is feasible under existing law
or under the administrative authority of the Director of
National Intelligence or any other head of an element of the
intelligence community.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report containing the results of the study conducted under
subsection (a).

Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 421. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended by--
(1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and
transferring such subsection to the end; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an
audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such
audits shall be conducted subject to the provisions of
paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to
conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that
has been terminated or suspended if such covert action was
terminated or suspended prior to the last audit of such
covert action conducted by the Inspector General and has not
been restarted after the date on which such audit was
completed.
``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion
of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
containing the results of such audit.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)'';
(2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by
striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and
(3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''.

SEC. 422. INAPPLICABILITY TO DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL
REPORT ON PROGRESS IN AUDITABLE FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.

Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency,''.

SEC. 423. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CERTAIN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS.

Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended--
(1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director''
and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director'';
(2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National
Clandestine Service'';
(3) in subclause (III), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence'';
(4) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Administration'' and inserting ``Director of Support''; and
(5) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Science and Technology'' and inserting ``Director of Science
and Technology''.

SEC. 424. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF
THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2004.

Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31
U.S.C. 311 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after
``subsection (a)),''.

SEC. 425. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR
INTERROGATIONS INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY
OR CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
not expend or obligate funds for payment to any contractor to
conduct the interrogation of a detainee or prisoner in
custody or under the effective control of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(b) Exception.--
(1) In general.--The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency may request, and the Director of National Intelligence
may grant, a written waiver of the requirement under
subsection (a) if the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency determines that--
(A) no employee of the Federal Government is--

[[Page H6616]]

(i) capable of performing such interrogation; and
(ii) available to perform such interrogation; and
(B) such interrogation is in the national interest of the
United States and requires the use of a contractor.
(2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--Any
contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to a waiver
under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all laws on the
conduct of interrogations that would apply if an employee of
the Federal Government were conducting the interrogation.

Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

SEC. 431. INTEGRATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD
ACTIVITY INTO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) Report.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence and armed services committees a
report outlining the process by which the Counterintelligence
Field Activity is to be integrated into the Defense
Intelligence Agency. Such report shall include--
(1) a description of the nature of any law enforcement
authorities to be delegated to the Defense Intelligence
Agency;
(2) the authority under which the delegation of authority
referred to in paragraph (1) would occur; and
(3) the guidelines for the implementation of such law
enforcement authorities.
(b) Congressional Intelligence and Armed Services
Committees.--In this section, the term ``congressional
intelligence and armed services committees'' means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(3) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.

Subtitle D--Other Elements

SEC. 441. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AS ELEMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (H)--
(A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine
Corps,''; and
(B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,''
after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and
(2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the
Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.

SEC. 442. REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE
CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report describing the Director's long term vision for
transforming the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and
the progress of the internal reforms of the Bureau intended
to achieve that vision. Such report shall include--
(1) the direction, strategy, and goals for transforming the
intelligence capabilities of the Bureau;
(2) a description of what the fully functional intelligence
and national security functions of the Bureau should entail;
(3) a candid assessment of the effect of internal reforms
at the Bureau and whether such reforms have moved the Bureau
towards achieving the goals of the Director for the
intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau;
and
(4) an assessment of how well the Bureau performs tasks
that are critical to the effective functioning of the Bureau
as an intelligence agency, including--
(A) identifying new intelligence targets within the scope
of the national security functions of the Bureau, outside the
parameters of an existing case file or ongoing investigation;
(B) collecting intelligence domestically, including
collection through human and technical sources;
(C) recruiting human sources;
(D) training Special Agents to spot, assess, recruit, and
handle human sources;
(E) working collaboratively with other Federal departments
and agencies to jointly collect intelligence on domestic
counterterrorism and counterintelligence targets;
(F) producing a common intelligence picture of domestic
threats to the national security of the United States;
(G) producing high quality and timely intelligence
analysis;
(H) integrating intelligence analysts into its intelligence
collection operations; and
(I) sharing intelligence information with intelligence
community partners.

TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF
THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) Extension.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public
Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking
``September 1, 2004'' and inserting ``December 31, 2009''.
(2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the
amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if
included in the enactment of such section 1007.
(3) Commission membership.--
(A) In general.--The membership of the National Commission
for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of
the United States Intelligence Community established under
subsection (a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-
306; 116 Stat. 2438) (referred to in this section as the
``Commission'') shall be considered vacant and new members
shall be appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as
amended by subparagraph (B).
(B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of section 1002(b)
of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for Community Management.'' and
inserting ``The Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.''.
(4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act
is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking
``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research
and development programs and activities. Such review shall
include--''.
(b) Funding.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community
Management Account, the Director of National Intelligence
shall make $2,000,000 available to the Commission to carry
out title X of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2437).
(2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until
expended.

SEC. 502. AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

(a) General Congressional Oversight.--Section 501(a) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall
provide to the congressional intelligence committees all
information necessary to assess the lawfulness,
effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary
authority, and risk of an intelligence activity, including--
``(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence
activity is being or was conducted;
``(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought in
carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including
dissenting legal views;
``(C) any specific operational concerns arising from the
intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods;
``(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will
exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or
other resources; and
``(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will
fail.''.
(b) Reporting on Activities Other Than Covert Actions.--
Section 502 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended by adding
at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Distribution of Information.--
``(1) Request.--Information or material provided in
accordance with subsection (a) shall be made available to
each member of the congressional intelligence committees,
unless the President requests that access to the information
or material be limited after determining that limiting such
access is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances
affecting vital interests of the United States. A request
under this paragraph and the extraordinary circumstances
referred to in this paragraph shall be detailed in writing to
the Chair and ranking minority member of the congressional
intelligence committees.
``(2) Distribution.--If the President submits a request
under paragraph (1), the Chair and ranking minority member of
each congressional intelligence committee may jointly
determine whether and how to limit access to the information
or material within such committee. If the Chair and ranking
minority member of such committee are unable to agree on
whether or how to limit such access, access to the
information or material will be limited. Any information or
material to which access is limited shall subsequently be
made available to each member of the congressional
intelligence communities at the earliest possible time and
shall include a detailed statement of the reasons for not
providing prior access.''.
(c) Approval of Covert Actions.--Section 503(d) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(d)) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting
``(d)(1) The President''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall
constitute a `significant undertaking' if the activity--
``(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities,
including authorities relating to research, development, or
operations;
``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or
other resources;
``(D) requires notification under section 504;
``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods; or
``(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic
relations of the United States if such activity were
disclosed without authorization.''.

SEC. 503. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST
ASSETS.

(a) Annual Reports.--Section 118 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404m) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and
inserting ``annual''; and
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and
inserting ``Annual'';
(B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and inserting ``annual
basis''; and
(ii) by striking ``preceding six-month period'' and
inserting ``preceding year'';
(C) by striking paragraph (2); and

[[Page H6617]]

(D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs
(2) and (3), respectively.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 507 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1), by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
``(L) The annual report on financial intelligence on
terrorist assets required by section 118.''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6).

SEC. 504. NOTICE OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING NORTH KOREA AND
CHINA.

Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
413) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new
subsection:
``(f) A notification to the congressional intelligence
committees regarding intelligence information relating to
North Korea or China after all or part of the information has
been communicated to the governments of North Korea or China,
respectively, shall not be construed to fulfill the duty
under this title to keep the congressional intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of the intelligence
activities of the United States.''.

SEC. 505. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING USE OF INTELLIGENCE
RESOURCES.

It is the sense of Congress that the resources authorized
under this Act should not be diverted from human intelligence
collection and other intelligence programs designed to combat
al Qaeda in order to study global climate change.

Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY ACT OF 1949.

Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking
``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a),
subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a)
and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7),
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized
under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-4a)''.

SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50
U.S.C. 404b) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
(2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
(b) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence.--
That section is further amended--
(1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of
Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National
Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is
amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.

SEC. 513. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO
JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.

Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-1) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets
for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program or programs''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military
Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence
Program or any successor program or programs''.

SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
OF 1947.

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.)
is amended as follows:
(1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
(A) in subsection (d)--
(i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in
the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting
``paragraph (1)(A)'';
(ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in
the matter preceding clause (i); and
(iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking ``or agency
involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case
of the Central Intelligence Agency)'';
(B) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and
inserting ``paragraph''; and
(C) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after
``Acquisition''.
(2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by
striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
(3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C.
432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting
``responsive''.

SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND
TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.

(a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act
of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of
2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643) is
amended as follows:
(1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by
striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and
inserting ``Department of Justice''.
(2) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
(3) In section 1072(b), in the subsection heading by
inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''.
(b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118
Stat. 3638) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
(A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an
institutional culture'';
(B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National
Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section
112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National
Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law'';
and
(C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter
preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
(2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and
inserting ``Federal''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and
inserting ``specific''.

SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

(a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the
following new item:

``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

(b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting
the following new item:

``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

(c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the General Counsel of the Office of the National
Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item:

``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.''.

SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL
GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) Title 5.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place
it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency''.
(b) Title 44.--Title 44, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in section 1336--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``National Imagery and
Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''; and
(B) by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency''
each place it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''; and
(2) in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter
13, by striking the item relating to section 1336 and
inserting the following new item:

``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications.''.

(c) Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.--
Section 201(f)(2)(E) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 121) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and
Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''.

The Acting CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the committee amendment is in
order except those printed in House Report 110-759. Each amendment may
be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member
designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable
for the time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by
the proponent and an opponent of the amendment, shall not be subject to
amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the
question.

Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Reyes

The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1
printed in House Report 110-759.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Reyes:
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following
new section:

SEC. 321. EXCEPTION TO ALTERNATIVE FUEL PROCUREMENT
REQUIREMENT.

Section 526(a) of the Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17142(a)) does not prohibit an element of
the intelligence community from entering into a contract to
purchase a generally available fuel that is not an
alternative or synthetic fuel or predominantly produced from
a nonconventional petroleum source, if--
(1) the contract does not specifically require the
contractor to provide an alternative or synthetic fuel or
fuel from a nonconventional petroleum source;
(2) the purpose of the contract is not to obtain an
alternative or synthetic fuel or fuel from a nonconventional
petroleum source; and
(3) the contract does not provide incentives for a refinery
upgrade or expansion to allow a refinery to use or increase
its use of fuel from a nonconventional petroleum source.

[[Page H6618]]

Page 70, line 3, strike ``and''.
Page 70, strike line 7 and insert the following: ``dated or
no longer relevant; and''.
Page 70, after line 7 insert the following:
``(12) an assessment of the feasibility of employing
foreign nationals lawfully present in the United States who
have previously worked as translators or interpreters for the
Armed Forces or another department or agency of the Federal
Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical
language needs of such element.''.
Page 72, line 18, insert ``and analysis'' after
``collection''.
Page 72, line 21, insert ``and analysis'' after
``collection''.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 1343, the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, the revised Reyes/Murphy manager's amendment
does several things. First, it makes clear that the intelligence
community may enter into a contract to purchase a generally available
fuel that is not an alternative or synthetic fuel or produced from a
non conventional petroleum source provided that certain criteria are
met. Some members of our committee were interested in addressing this
issue, and we, Mr. Chairman, have done our best to handle it within the
jurisdiction of our committee.
Second, we included an amendment offered by Mr. Welch to require an
assessment of the feasibility of employing individuals who have worked
for the Federal Government in Iraq or Afghanistan as translators or
interpreters. It fits very well with the committee's other reporting
requirements on foreign languages. I believe it will be helpful to know
whether the intelligence community can benefit from those individuals
who have already served our government in Iraq or Afghanistan.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, the manager's amendment makes a technical
correction to a report on intelligence resources devoted to Iraq and
Afghanistan. This correction is designed to ensure that the report
captures both collection and analysis resources.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the
manager's amendment, and reserve the balance of my time.

{time}  1415

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to claim the time in
opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. While I will not oppose this amendment, I do want to
note my concern that it includes substantive provisions that were not
included in the amendment when it was originally submitted to the
Committee on Rules.
On this side, we did not have an opportunity to review those
provisions before the amendment was made in order. I'm disappointed
that in this case, the process that has been so successful in terms of
working together was not continued. In the future, I hope that the
process will be more transparent and enable a fair opportunity to
review and understand the provisions that are being included in the
manager's amendment before they are submitted to the Rules Committee
and before we are required to go to the Rules Committee to testify.
We support the manager's amendment. We don't support the process. But
we continue to work on the process and those things as we go through
that.
With that, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, while we have no additional speakers, I just
wanted to assure the ranking member that, as has been stated, like the
bill, this is not a perfect bill. We're still working through the
process, and I assure him we will continue to work together.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra

The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2
printed in House Report 110-759.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to, as the designee of Mr.
Blunt, call forward the second amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Hoekstra:
At the end of subtitle A of title V, add the following new
section:

SEC. 506. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING COLOMBIAN PARAMILITARY
ORGANIZATIONS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the permanent defeat of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Columbia (FARC), United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC), National Liberation Army (ELN), and other Colombian
paramilitary organizations is in the national interest of the
United States;
(2) the Colombian operation that liberated Americans Keith
Stansell, Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes and Ingrid
Betancourt and 11 other Colombian hostages from the FARC on
July 2, 2008, demonstrated the professionalism of Colombian
security forces and intelligence operatives;
(3) intelligence and other cooperation by the United States
has played a key role in developing and reinforcing the
capabilities of the Government of Colombia to address
terrorist and narcoterrorist threats;
(4) intelligence and other cooperation by the United States
has significantly contributed to the continued success of the
Government of Colombia in impacting the capabilities of
terrorist and narcoterrorist groups that have threatened the
national security of Colombia and the United States; and
(5) it is critical that such assistance continue in order
to support the Government of Colombia in its efforts to
continue to capitalize on those successes.

The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 1343, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support this amendment. It was
originally going to be offered by my colleague, the distinguished
Republican whip. He was called to the White House, and I consider it an
honor to move this amendment forward on his behalf.
The amendment highlights not only the absolute success of the
Colombian Government in its rescue of American and Colombian hostages
that had been held for years by a narcoterrorist organization, but also
the clear successes of the Colombian Government's efforts after years
of close cooperation with the United States.
I want to take this opportunity to commend President Uribe and the
Armed Forces and the National Police of Colombia on their efforts on
this rescue and their many successes in implementing Plan Colombia. The
amendment emphasizes the strong need to continue our close cooperation
to work towards finishing the job in Colombia. We will continue to
follow these issues closely and carefully in the committee, and I
appreciate the Whip's efforts to focus attention on this important
issue.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to
the amendment, but I support this amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Texas is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. REYES. This amendment expresses congressional support of Colombia
in its most recent success against the FARC. I thank the minority
leader for offering it.
The United States should support democratic nations in their efforts
against violent terrorist groups such as FARC. We are all proud of the
recent rescue of U.S. and Colombian hostages held by the FARC. This
operation shows the strength, resourcefulness, and valor of the
Colombian military. These qualities were developed through cooperation
between the U.S. and Colombia.
In the past years, Colombia has made great strides against the FARC
and greatly has reduced their strength. Republicans and Democrats alike
have supported assistance to Colombia for the past decade. We must
continue to do so.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan has 4 minutes
remaining. The gentleman from Texas has yielded back his remaining
minutes.

[[Page H6619]]

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield myself
1 minute.
Again, this is an amendment that talks about the success of the
programs that we have been working on in a bipartisan basis with the
Colombian Government, highlighted, of course, by the recent rescue of
the American and Colombian and other hostages that had been held for
years; but more importantly, we have worked in a participative way, in
a collaborative way, in a number of different areas, on the diplomatic
front, political front, and also on an intelligence and military front
and continue to do that, not only to free the hostages but also to make
a firm statement against narcotraffickers that the Colombian
Government, the U.S. Government, and others are committed to stopping
the narcotraffic which is kind of performing and acting as a cancer in
both the United States and Colombia.
This amendment by Mr. Blunt that I have the privilege of offering
recognizes the participation and the work of the various governments,
the various agencies, and the various individuals that have enabled
this program to be successful.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield 2 minutes to my
colleague from Illinois (Mr. Weller).
Mr. WELLER of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this
amendment.
If you travel in Latin America and you ask someone in Latin America
who is America's best friend, who is America's most reliable partner
and ally, they would say President Uribe of the Republic of Colombia.
Ladies and gentlemen, I'm here today to stand in support of this
amendment that thanks America's best friend, America's most reliable
and partnered ally, particularly on the war on narcotics and
counterterrorism, and to thank them for the successful rescue of three
Americans. And it was done without a shot being fired, without loss of
life.
It was an incredible operation, an operation based on good
intelligence, on good work by the Colombian military and the resources
that had been made available thanks to the work of many in this
Congress. That's good news, and we want to say thank you to our friend
and ally.
You know, there's a reason that President Uribe today enjoys an
approval rating of almost 90 percent. He's the most popular elected
official in the entire Western Hemisphere. And that's because he's made
tremendous progress in dealing with the FARC and the ELN and the
paramilitaries, those who have threatened the peace and security of
that great nation for the last four decades. He has made tremendous
progress.
And his record is successful. You look at it. Poverty has decreased
by 10 percent. Today, 40 percent of the national budget is spent on
social needs, as they made progress in bringing down violence. The
murder rate has been reduced by 40 percent. In fact, for labor
unionists, trade activists, trade union activists, it's down about 85
percent. Tremendous.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. WELLER of Illinois. I urge bipartisan support for this amendment.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I believe I have 1 minute remaining; is
that correct?
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has 1 minute remaining.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to yield my last minute to my colleague
from Florida (Mr. Mario Diaz-Balart).
Mr. MARIO DIAZ-BALART of Florida. I want to thank the sponsor of this
sense of Congress.
We saw just a few weeks ago what happened in Colombia where the
Colombian military and that democratically elected government freed a
number of hostages, including Americans, that had been held hostage for
over 5 years. If there's ever been a time when U.S. aid has been used
effectively, we saw it just a few days ago.
It is time that this Congress stop criticizing the democratically
elected government of Colombia. Stop criticizing the Colombian people
and start putting the blame where the blame needs to be, and that is on
those murderous FARC. The Colombian Government is doing an incredible
job, a wonderful job fighting those narcoterrorist thug murderers, and
they're doing it with our help. It's great that we're finally going to
commend them.
I hope that this is just the first step. I hope we pass a free trade
deal with Colombia because they deserve it. The democracy in Colombia
deserves it, and we cannot turn our back. I hope we also stop that cut
to our friend Colombia that reduces the funding to the Government of
Colombia.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the
ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Holt

The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3
printed in House Report 110-759.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Holt:
At the end of subtitle A of title IV, add the following new
section:

SEC. 418. MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE ON IRAN.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall issue a
memorandum to holders of the National Intelligence Estimate
entitled ``Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities''
regarding any intelligence on the nuclear program of Iran
that has been gathered or emerged since the publication of
such National Intelligence Estimate in October, 2007.

The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 1343, the gentleman
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I need not be long.
This is a straightforward, simple amendment that I hope will be
without controversy. My amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act
would require the Director of National Intelligence to inform all
recipients of the October 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's
nuclear program of any new intelligence on this subject that has
emerged since the publication last fall.
The October 2007 NIE was prepared with new and, I would say, improved
procedures and provided us with insights into the status of the Iranian
nuclear program. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the intelligence process is
not static. This amendment is designed to ensure that Congress and
others in the executive branch get the very latest information on
Iran's nuclear program in a timely fashion and developed with good
intelligence procedures.
I believe I have no other speakers, but I will reserve my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to take the time
in opposition, although I will not oppose the amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan
is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I support this amendment. In the committee, I offered a similar
amendment that would have required a revised National Intelligence
Estimate on Iran. The discovery of the al Kibar facility in Syria
shortly after the original National Intelligence Estimate on Iran came
out clearly suggested that prior assessments with respect to
proliferation should be reviewed and reevaluated and the confidence
level reassessed.
The previous NIE on Iran was so poorly drafted and so seriously
undermined by subsequent developments in intelligence that I thought it
was necessary for the DNI to go back to the drawing board and start
over. While my amendment was not successful, I believe that this
amendment helps to address the issues I was attempting to raise.

[[Page H6620]]

Therefore, I will support this amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
The amendment was agreed to.

{time}  1430

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra

The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4
printed in House Report 110-759.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hoekstra:
At the end of subtitle A of title V, add the following new
section:

SEC. 506. JIHADISTS.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act
may be used to prohibit or discourage the use of the words or
phrases ``jihadist'', ``jihad'', ``Islamo-fascism'',
``caliphate'', ``Islamist'', or ``Islamic terrorist'' by or
within the intelligence community or the Federal Government.

The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 1343, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time, I yield myself whatever time I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of my amendment to prohibit the
use of funds in this bill to discourage analysts from using the words
``jihadist,'' ``jihad,'' ``caliphate,'' ``Islamist'' or ``Islamic
terrorist'' by or within the intelligence community or the United
States Government.
We are dealing with an enemy that speaks in no uncertain terms about
its desire to attack our homeland and kill innocent Americans. In a
statement released in March, Osama bin Laden said the following:
``God, make the mujahedin in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, the
Islamic Maghreb, the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia, Chechnya, and
everywhere victorious. God, defeat our enemies of the Jews, the
Christians, and their supporters.''
More recently, in May bin Laden said the following:
``O youths of the generation: Jihad is the only way to liberate
Palestine and al-Aqsa Mosque and to regain the orthodox caliphate, God
willing.''
Al Qaeda itself uses these terms to describe its fight against
America, our allies, and moderate Muslims around the world. Why then
would we prohibit our intelligence professionals from using the same
words to accurately describe al Qaeda's stated goals?
Yet that is exactly what some in Washington are attempting to do. I
was dismayed to learn that over the past few months, intelligence
bureaucrats at the State Department, the National Counterterrorism
Center, and the Department of Homeland Security have issued memos
imposing speech codes on how their employees can describe al Qaeda and
other radical jihadist groups. They won't even be able to use the words
these groups use themselves to describe themselves. These agencies
within the intelligence community won't be able to use those words.
Mr. Chairman, free speech should not be controversial, nor should
candid, accurate, and fair discussion of the self-professed goals of
the terrorists that attack our homeland and have sworn to kill more
Americans.
I find it more than ironic that some who have complained the loudest
about politicization in the intelligence community would oppose this
simple amendment to prevent the politically correct politicization of
our Nation's intelligence community. We all know that political
correctness can be the enemy of clarity.
We also know that radical jihadists have made repeated efforts to
stifle free speech in the West, including the murder of Dutch film
maker, Theo van Gogh, and frequent death threats against authors,
cartoonists, and journalists.
Let's not give the radical jihadists a victory here by imposing a
speech code on America's intelligence community.
With that, I will reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to
this amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment, which incidentally
was offered in our committee but which was not agreed to.
For years, Members have come to this floor to talk about the need to
win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims. This was one of the
central recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
The Department of Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism
Center, and the State Department have issued careful guidance to their
employees saying in effect, when you see the term ``jihad'' to describe
a violent form of terrorism, you might be alienating those moderate
Muslims who want to join us in the fight against terrorism.
The government must consider how its words will be interpreted by its
audience. If Muslims around the world hear something other than what we
want to say, we will simply not achieve our goals.
This is sensible guidance, not political correctness. Language is a
strategic weapon in the war of ideas. We should, therefore, use it
wisely. The administration has obviously realized this and has provided
appropriate guidance.
Congress should not try to undermine this effort by sending
contradictory messages about the use of these terms.
I oppose this amendment, Mr. Chairman.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan has 2\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time, I'd like to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my
colleague from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. This is the one thing that just has me
scratching my head. Every day, analysts in the IC community will hear
those words, ``caliphate,'' ``jihadist,'' ``Muslim extremism,'' because
those are the words of our enemy. And what we're telling this whole
community, whose job it is to keep us informed and keep people who are
going to do these intelligence investigations informed, is who they
are, what they are, and how they use words, including coming up and
briefing members of the State Department, ambassadors, and other
things.
So what you're saying is no more free speech; we're going to hurt
somebody's feelings. We don't want to say that terrorists are using
words like ``caliphate,'' they're using words like ``jihad.''
This is the craziest thing I have ever heard. It is political
correctness that is dangerous.
If you ask the average American, should we shut down these people's
use of the words in describing it to public officials, they will
scratch their head and laugh. But that's exactly what you do when you
create these artificial systems of the speech police.
Do you want them to walk around the halls and police those who may
slip and use the word ``jihadist'' after quoting Osama bin Laden in
trying to get somebody to understand the dangers that they pose to the
United States of America?
I would just ask my colleagues, please, use a little common sense.
This surpasses any, any commonsense test you can put together when it
comes to free speech, number one, and accurately communicating between
the powers that be, the intelligence community and policy-makers that
need to have the same language that our enemy does to understand who
they are and how dangerous they are.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas has 3\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, with that, I will yield the gentlelady from
California (Ms. Harman), former ranking member of this committee, 2\1/
2\ minutes.
Ms. HARMAN. I thank the chairman for yielding to me, and I commend
him and the ranking member for crafting a very good bill. Many parts of
this bill that reflect work we did together in

[[Page H6621]]

this committee in years past, and it's wonderful that we will act on it
later this afternoon.
With respect to this amendment, I rise in reluctant opposition which
I want to explain. I do understand the point that we should not be
engaged in political correctness or censorship. I don't think my
opposition is based on either of those things.
Former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld once wrote a snowflake which asked,
Are we capturing and killing them faster than they are rising up
against us? The answer was no, and it's still no.
It does matter that we try to win the argument, and not just with the
next generation who could become suicide bombers or build the next
lethal generation of IEDs, but we win the argument with moderate
Muslims, many of whom live in the United States and want to help us.
And their guidance has gone into this guidance, published by the
Homeland Security Department, which is that we not use language that
inflames.
To the gentleman from Michigan, there is no prohibition in this to
quoting the statements of Osama bin Laden and others who use these
hateful words. Why would we want to sensor that? The prohibition is
directed at ourselves, words that will inflame the very communities
we're trying to convince.
I would just close with the observation that if we had thought a
little longer about using the phrase ``axis of evil'' we might have, it
seems to me, engendered more cooperation on the part of some countries
that have, sadly, moved far away from us, and engendered more
cooperation on the part of populations which now look at America with
disapproval.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I believe I have the right to close, so I
will reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I will just yield myself the remainder of my
time to say that this is not about political correctness. This is about
recognizing that words matter and the way we use words matter,
particularly to those that we're trying to influence and those that
we're trying to bring over in this war of ideas.
I think it's important to recognize that, again, it's not about
political correctness. It's about using common sense.
And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
This is absolutely about political correctness. If we can't use the
words that our enemies use to describe themselves and their activities,
when they say jihad is the only way to liberate Palestine, and we go to
local law enforcement, when we go to others in America and we describe
the motivations and the intentions of those who wish to do us harm, I
ask my colleagues, how do you expect the intelligence community to
explain the behavior or the motivation of our enemies? Do we expect the
intelligence community to say these are kind of bad people that may
want to do us harm? We can't really use the words that they use to
describe themselves because we've restricted the access of those words.
How will America understand the nature and the character of our enemy
if we can't use the words that they use to describe themselves and we
need to come up with a whole new language that is totally out of
context with the enemy and the nature of the threat that we face today?
I urge my colleagues to support this commonsense amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the
noes appeared to have it.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
will be postponed.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Committee will rise informally.
The Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Hinchey) assumed the chair.

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