Approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.

Mr. President, I speak about Burma and U.S. sanctions policy. Last year, thugs working for the illegitimate Burmese government attacked opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters with clubs and sharpened sticks, killing as many as 70 pro- democracy activists.

The government then held Suu Kyi in what it cynically called ``protective custody.'' Those events prompted international outrage and led the United States to pass the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.

That Act banned all imports to the United States from Burma. Chairman Grassley and I worked hard to ensure that these sanctions would be effective--and that Congress would continue to play a key role in their implementation.

I did not want Congress to impose trade sanctions on Burma without any opportunity to review the policy and revise it if it wasn't working. So the act requires that Congress debate and vote on whether to renew the import ban every year. That is why we are here today.

What has the import ban accomplished? In 2002, the last full year without a ban, Burma exported $356 million to the United States, mainly in garments and apparel products.

Since the U.S. blocked all imports from Burma, more than 100 garment and apparel factories have closed, throwing 50,000 to 60,000 people, mainly young women, out of work.

And according to the State Department, many of these young women, lacking jobs and opportunities are, in desperation, quote, ``turning to work in the sex industry or being forced or duped into prostitution by traffickers.''

On the other hand, Burma's military rulers are doing just fine. The State Department notes that ``the military leaders personal power and wealth have little connection to the well-being of the country. The country's economic and military elite derives its greatest earning power from the trade of natural resources with neighboring states and countries in the region.''

I have long been critical of unilateral sanctions. They almost never work. They may be an effective expression of our rage, but as a rule, they do not destabilize oppressive regimes, and they often hurt the unfortunate people they are intended to help.

The ban on imports from Burma is no exception to this rule. Multilateral sanctions can be effective. That's why I insisted that the act require the administration to work toward making the sanctions multilateral. But to date, no country in the world has joined the United States in banning imports from Burma--not one.

Now, let me emphasize that Burma's government is despicable by any measure. Security forces commit murder, use rape as a weapon of war against ethnic minorities, and utilize forced labor. Democracy activists are arrested and dissent punished. Conscription of child soldiers is widespread.

There is no dispute that Burma's actions require a response. The question is whether unilateral trade sanctions are the proper response.

This is not an easy question. I hope that my colleagues have thought hard about the consequences. I hope they have made an honest assessment of the merits of maintaining the import ban.

We cannot forget that the votes we cast have real consequences. Those thousands of young women being forced into prostitution should serve as a harsh reminder.

After struggling with the issue for some time, I decided to support renewing the import ban for another year.

On balance, I believe we should allow the administration more time to try to convince other countries to join in sanctioning the outlaw regime in Burma. But I would urge the administration to make this more of a priority. Their efforts so far have produced little result.

If I am to find any consolation in this state of affairs, it comes from the fact that Congress has a say in whether the trade sanctions on Burma continue. We have retained our Constitutional authority over international commerce.

This is consolation to me because it is hard to evaluate any unilateral sanctions program without looking back on our failed sanctions against Cuba.

Since 1960, when the Cuban embargo was first put in place, the United States has pursued a unilateral policy of driving the Castro regime out of power. Even as the rest of the Soviet bloc collapsed, the Castro regime has retained its control on the Cuban island.

The U.S. embargo has failed. In fact, it is obvious to me that the embargo actually shelters Castro, and has directly contributed to the strength of his regime.

But the unilateral embargo has remained in place for more than forty years. Had Congress originally required an annual vote on the Cuban embargo, as we have now done with the Burma sanctions, the embargo would have been eliminated long ago.

Instead, the Cuban sanctions were created without any end in sight, without any exit strategy, without any plan for its removal. So, here we are, thirteen years beyond the fall of the Soviet Union, with the last vestige of the Cold War alive and well 90 miles from our shores.

That's why Senators Roberts, Enzi and I have introduced legislation to give Congress a voice on Cuba sanctions. This legislation mirrors the legislation on Burma that we are discussing today.

It would allow sanctions against Cuba to continue--but would require both Houses of Congress to vote annually to renew the sanctions. Absent such a vote, the sanctions would end.

This is a reasonable approach to Cuba, and to sanctions more generally. Of course, that's also why this legislation won't pass this year. The Administration and Congressional leadership are well aware that Cuba sanctions would not survive a Senate vote.

In fact, last year, overwhelming majorities in the Senate and House voted to suspend enforcement of the travel ban. Everyone here remembers that those votes were ignored by the leadership in both chambers, and the travel ban remained in place.

I hope that Congress can learn from the mistakes we have made--and are still making--in Cuba. I hope that Congress will work toward a more responsible sanctions regime. I stand ready to work with my colleagues to make that happen.

Let me close by thanking Senators McConnell, Feinstein, and Grassley for their work on the Burma legislation. Senators McConnell and Feinstein have been tireless advocates for democracy in Burma. They deserve to be commended.

I would also like to acknowledge some of the staff who have worked hard on this issue--Paul Grove, Michael Schiffer, Everett Eissenstat, and Stephen Schaeffer.

Mr. President, I rise today with my colleague from Kentucky, Senator McConnell, in support of the joint resolution renewing the sanctions against Burma. The House has overwhelmingly and in a bipartisan manner passed this resolution, and I urge the Senate to do likewise.

Last year, following the brazen attack against the motorcade of Nobel Peace Prize winner and National League of Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the United States took a firm stand on the side of human rights and democracy for the Burmese people by passing the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act and imposing a complete ban on Burmese imports.

One year later, Suu Ky remains under house arrest and the military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), has failed to make ``substantial and measurable progress'' towards a true dialogue on national reconciliation and recognition of the results of the 1990 parliamentary elections, decisively won by the NLD.

As a result, the Senate has no choice but to support renewing the sanctions for another year.

Let me be clear. I do not believe sanctions are a panacea for every foreign policy dispute we have with another country.

I have long supported the reform of our sanctions policy, and, in my view, Congress should have the opportunity to revisit sanctions imposed on other countries on a case-by-case basis and in a timely fashion.

I am cosponsor of Senator Baucus's legislation to allow Congress to vote up or down on the sanctions imposed on Cuba for that very reason.

It seems clear to me that 40 years later, those sanctions have not achieved our foreign policy goals. Yet, under different circumstances and conditions, sanctions can be effective.

Burma, in my view, is such a case. One year is not a sufficient period of time to judge the effectiveness of the sanctions, and there is reason to believe that the international community is coming together to put additional pressure on the military regime.

I was disappointed that the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) did not follow the United States' lead last year and impose tough sanctions on the military junta.

Nevertheless, the EU, for one, is beginning to realize that engagement with Rangoon has failed to achieve the desired results.

Last week, the EU refused to include Burma in two lower-level meetings with ASEAN representatives and, in response to ASEAN's demand that all of its members be allowed to attend, the EU canceled the meetings.

Supporters of freedom and democracy in Burma should welcome this move and continue to urge our allies to put additional pressure on the military regime.

There is also some positive movement within ASEAN itself, including Malaysia, the country that sponsored Burma's entry into the Association and has supported ``non-interference'' in domestic affairs of other members.

Earlier this month, a group of Malaysian parliamentarians--from the government and the opposition--formed a committee to press for democracy in Burma. The group called on the SPDC to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and restore democratic government.

The parliamentary group stated: ``The caucus also calls upon the (Burma) government to respect ASEAN and international opinion and return to the mainstream of responsible international norms and behavior.''

Of course, we would all like to see ASEAN, the EU, and others to take additional steps to put pressure on Rangoon to respect human rights and restore democracy. But we must continue to take the lead.

I believe that by passing this resolution and renewing the sanctions on imports from Burma for another year, we will enhance our leadership in this area and rally the international community to our cause. Now is not the time to weaken our resolve.

Some may argue that the sanctions do no harm to the members of the military junta and instead place additional hardships on the Burmese people.

The military junta itself cynically suggested that the reason why human trafficking is a rampant problem in Burma--as cited in the latest State Department report--is due to the desperate economic conditions caused by the sanctions imposed by the United States.

Let us not forget that for over 15 years the military junta has brutalized its won citizens, engaged in numerous human rights abuses including rape, forced labor, and human trafficking of young boys and girls, and run the Burmese economy into the ground.

And the consequences of the regime's repressive rule extend far beyond its borders. As Senator McConnell and I pointed out in an op-ed that appeared in the Wall Street Journal, the spread of narcotics, HIV/ AIDS, and refugees across the region can be traced back to Rangoon.

As South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu stated earlier this year: ``To dismantle apartheid [in South Africa] took not only commitment, faith, and hard work, but also intense international pressure and sanctions. In Burma, the regime has ravaged the country, and the people, to fund its illegal rule. Governments and international institutions must move past symbolic gestures and cut the lifelines to Burma's military regime through well-implemented sanctions.''

We cannot say for certain these sanctions will work. But we can be certain that if we do nothing and allow these sanctions to expire, the military junta will strengthen its grip on power and the day of Suu Kyi's release from house arrest and the re-birth of democracy in Burma will be put off further into the future.

We simply cannot afford to make that mistake and turn our backs on those who are looking to us for hope and inspiration.

I urge my colleagues to renew their support for freedom and democracy, Suu Kyi and the Burmese people and support this resolution.

Mr. President, I am pleased to support S.J. Res. 39, approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. I am a cosponsor of this resolution, and I believe that these sanctions must be renewed.

The resolution states that the State Peace and Development Council, SPDC, the military junta of Burma, has failed to make substantial progress toward implementing a democratic government and that import sanctions and other restrictions against the SPDC must remain in force until ``Burma embarks on an irreversible path of reconciliation that includes the full and unfettered participation of the National League for Democracy and ethnic minorities in the country.''

The situation in Burma remains disturbing. The military junta in Burma continues to commit egregious human

rights abuses against its population. Human rights organizations have documented the systematic rape of Shan women on a massive scale by Burmese military forces and the recruitment of children, as young as 11, into the Burmese national army. Torture, extra judicial executions, forced labor and widespread political repression all characterize the Burmese political landscape. Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy, NLD, and other senior NLD members remain under house arrest. Approximately 1,300 political activists, including elected members of parliament, languish in Burmese prisons, as punishment for their nonviolent pursuit of democracy.

Despite the SPDC's announcement of a new political initiative, a ``roadmap'' to democracy, they continue to break their promises of political reform. On May 17, 2003, the junta opened a constitutional convention that the junta promoted as being a first step toward democracy and democratic elections. The NLD boycotted this convention, after the junta refused to free Aung San Suu Kyi. The SPDC's continuation of the convention without the key political parties of the NLD and the United Nationalities Alliance, a group of ethnic parties that participated in the 1990 elections, demonstrates the emptiness of the SPDC's commitments to reform.

The military junta not only creates hardship for the Burmese people, but threatens stability in the region and beyond. Reports have emerged that Burma and North Korea have reestablished military and trade links after a termination of diplomatic relations in 1983. The U.S. State Department accused North Korea of seeking to sell surface to surface missiles to Burma's government and reported that Washington was aware that the Burmese regime is interested in acquiring a nuclear research reactor.

In addition, Burma continues to be a primary source of narcotics in Asia, as one of the world's largest trafficker of methamphetamine and second largest producer of opium. In their International Narcotics Strategy report for 2003, the U.S. State Department reported that major Wa traffickers, of the ethnic Wa group in northeastern Shan State, continue to operate with apparent impunity. In addition, in the Annual Presidential Determinations of Major Illicit Drug-Producing and Drug- Transit Countries for 2003, the President designated Burma as having ``failed demonstrably'' to make substantial counter-narcotics efforts. According to U.S. State Department, the government of Burma continued to be deficient in dismantling drug organizations, attacking drug- related corruption and addressing money-laundering issues. Officials in China, Thailand and India have expressed serious concerns about illicit drugs flooding into their countries from Burma and the increase of drug addiction among their youth.

Human trafficking in Burma is also of enormous concern. In the State Department's Trafficking in Persons report for 2004, Burma was placed in Tier 3, a category for those countries which are not in compliance with the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 and are not making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance. According to the State Department, not only is Burma a source country for persons trafficked for forced labor and sexual exploitation, but government officials and the military are complicit in trafficking. Human Rights Watch states, ``recruiters for Burma's army frequently apprehend boys at train and bus stations, markets and other public places, threatening them with jail if they refuse to join the army. . . . After brutal training, child soldiers are deployed into units, where some are forced to fight against ethnic armed opposition groups.''

Adding to regional instability, over 1.6 million person have fled Burma due to persecution and violence. In addition, it is estimated that there are between 600,000 and 1 million internally displaced persons within the country.

The United States and its international partners, including the United Nations, ASEAN and the European Union must persist in their demands for political reform in Burma. The renewal of these sanctions sends a powerful message to Burma that the United States is not satisfied with their facade of democratization. I also strongly urge the European Union to strengthen their existing sanctions on Burma. The SPDC must take immediate steps to release Aung Sang Suu Kyi and other political prisoners and to create a broad-based democratic government that respects human rights and the rule of law.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of House Joint Resolution 97, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would first like to express my appreciation to my friend and fellow Californian, (Chairman Bill Thomas), for his assistance in moving this legislation to the floor so expeditiously, and to my colleagues, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin), for their leadership on Burma and for granting me the privilege of managing this bill today for the Democratic side.

Mr. Speaker, a year ago, the Burmese regime launched a brutal crackdown on Burmese democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of the National League for Democracy. Burma's authoritarian ruler simply could not accept the fact that Aung San Suu Kyi remained enormously popular a dozen years after the government nullified the fair and free elections that she won.

Just 10 months ago, Mr. Speaker, President Bush signed into law my bill imposing comprehensive sanctions on Burma. My legislation was approved by this House overwhelmingly, 418 ayes to 2 noes.

Sadly, the case for a tough approach toward Burma, including import sanctions, is even stronger today than a year ago. Countless National League for Democracy leaders remain behind bars. Aung San Suu Kyi, a woman of extraordinary courage, is locked inside her house and there is little prospect that the Burmese junta will engage in meaningful dialogue with the National League for Democracy and other democratic leaders.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, the Burmese regime is currently holding a ``national convention'' to write a new constitution for Burma. The meeting itself is a complete and utter sham. The Burmese leadership refused to let Aung San Suu Kyi participate, apparently afraid that her eloquent words would convince the delegates to move towards democracy and away from dictatorship.

For that reason, Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that the House is moving forward with this bipartisan initiative to renew Burma import sanctions. Burma's ruling elite, who have a questionable direct financial tie to most enterprises in Burma, must understand that they will be unable to enrich themselves off the American consumer.

To those who argue that the sanctions have not worked, I have two responses. First, when Congress imposed import sanctions on Burma, we fully understood that such measures might take years, if not decades, to bring change to Burma, certainly not 10 months. If 10 months were the standard duration for American import sanctions, South Africans would still be governed by the apartheid regime, and Libya would have developed and deployed nuclear weapons instead of surrendering them to the United States.

Second, the United States must make it a top priority to convince our key allies in Europe and in Asia to adopt import sanctions on the Burmese regime. Unfortunately, the executive branch has made little or no effort to accomplish this important task. If sanctions fail to quickly bring change

to Burma, it is not because they represent the wrong approach; it is because high-level administration officials have not picked up the phone to urge our European Union counterparts to adopt targeted import sanctions on Burma.

While we would all like to see a negotiated solution to Burma's political crisis, we cannot be naive enough to believe that Burma's leaders have changed their stripes. They have no intention of allowing Aung San Suu Kyi, a woman they tried to kill just a few months ago, to participate meaningfully in free and fair elections, let alone to transfer power to her political party.

If I am proven wrong, Mr. Speaker, and Burma's ruling thugs win the Noble Peace Prize in 2005 for working out an agreement with the opposition, we will have plenty of time to express our congratulations and to lift sanctions at that point. Until then, we must ratchet up pressure on the Burmese thugs who are running that country and assure that our allies do so as well.

Mr. Speaker, we all look forward to a day when we will welcome Aung San Suu Kyi to Washington as the leader of a free and democratic Burma. She will follow in the footsteps of Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic and of all of the other leaders who fought for freedom in Central and Eastern Europe. But we will achieve that goal only by maintaining strong pressure on Burma's ruling dictatorial clique and convincing our allies to do so as well.

I strongly support this legislation, and I urge all of my colleagues to do so as well.

Mr. Speaker, I again want to thank the gentleman from California (Chairman Thomas) for his extraordinary leadership on this issue, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker. I rise in support of H.J. Res. 97, a measure to approve the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. At the outset, let me express my appreciation to the leadership of the distinguished Chairmen and Ranking Members of both the International Relations and Ways and Means Committees for moving this resolution on a timely basis.

On March 25, the Subcommittees on Asia held its third hearing in 2 years on developments in Burma. Unfortunately, it was made clear during the course of the hearing that Burma made little progress toward democratic reform in the past year, and in fact the country has yet to return to even the admittedly low, but hopeful status it had achieved prior to the May 30 attack on democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of the National League for Democracy (NLD).

Indeed, as many suspected would be the case, Burmese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt's announcement of a seven-point ``road map'' for political reconciliation in the fall of 2003 has been revealed to be a sham. Burma's military junta, known as the State Peace and Development Council, has proceeded with a so-called National Convention despite the nonparticipation of the National League for Democracy (NLD), and without freeing the NLD's leader Aung San Suu Kyi. In so doing the Burmese military leadership has exposed for all to see its determination to push for a new constitution that would legitimize its dominance and control over the country's politics and governance, even under a future ``civilian'' administration.

As my colleagues understand, Burma presents one of the most complicated and vexing foreign policy challenges in Asia for the United States and the world community. Numerous political prisoners remain in detention, including one of the most remarkable and courageous leaders of our time, Aung San Suu Kyi. The issue is how can the U.S. best secure their release and help start a meaningful political dialogue in Burma, while also endeavoring to advance a panoply of other priorities, including stable democratic governance, human rights, counternarcotics, regional stability, combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, as well as economic and human development more broadly.

In this context, it is self-evident that the U.S. is confronted by multiple dilemmas in pursuing our objectives in Burma. For illustrative purposes, I would note just a few: the strongly nationalistic, self- centered outlook of the ruling regime; the reliance by the military elite on an illicit, underground economy for power and survival; the inability of major industrial countries to agree on comprehensive sanctions as the basis for a common strategy; competition for geopolitical influence in Burma between China and India; and the ongoing humanitarian crisis for the people of Burma--including for the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced ethnic minority groups along the country's borders--that calls out for a more robust and humane international response.

Nevertheless, in response to repeated efforts by the ruling military to thwart the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people as well as to ongoing serious human rights violations, the U.S. has been compelled to utilize sanctions and coercive diplomacy as the centerpiece of our policy. Given the deeply disappointing lack of progress in Burma over the past year, there is no credible option at this time but to renew current sanctions.

Here it is critically important for Congress and the Administration to reaffirm our unflinching support for those who want freedom in Burma. We honor the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues in the pro-democracy movement, including representatives of Burma's numerous ethnic minorities. The American people stand with the people of Burma in a common determination to see decent democratic governance and national reconciliation in Burma.

I urge support for the resolution.