Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1036) to prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or importers of firearms or ammunition for damages resulting from the misuse of their products by others.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to control the time of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) in opposition to the bill.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

First of all, I think I want to clarify this debate because, starting at 7:30 this morning, eight o'clock this morning, I was on a television show debating about the bill I thought, and I heard all of the arguments related to how trial lawyers are irresponsible, how judges are irresponsible. I heard arguments about whether people ought to have guns or not have guns.

I submit to my colleagues that this debate is not about any of that. It is about a bill which I believe is an extreme bill, and I want to call my colleagues' attention to five points.

This is reform. I believe it is extreme reform. We are not talking about capping recoveries or putting a limit on recoveries from gun manufacturers, sellers, dealers, importers. We are talking about immunizing them from their liability for negligence. So this is extreme reform. It is not the kind of reform that we have been talking about in other contexts.

The second point I want to make is, this is unprecedented reform. The reform that this bill would provide is not available to any other manufacturer in America. It is not available to the automobile industry. It is not available to the pharmaceutical industry. It is not, despite what my chairman has said, about the tobacco industry. It is not available to the tobacco or the cigarette industry. There is no industry in America that has this kind of immunity. So it is unprecedented reform that is being sought here.

The third point I want to make is, this is not well-thought-out reform. There are major problems with this bill, and the committee made no effort to try to debate those problems, consider those problems, try to correct those problems.

There was no markup. If my colleagues heard the debate on the rule, there really was no markup. The total markup of this bill in committee took a total of 44 minutes, 44 minutes, and most of that was spent debating and arguing about whether the previous question ought to have been called. So these issues have not been considered. So we have got a bill that has not been well thought out because nobody has taken the time to worry about the specific provisions in the bill.

The fourth point I would make to my colleagues is that this is unconstitutional reform. We have a bill that says,

not only will it apply henceforth, now and forever, forward, but it will apply henceforth, now and forever, backwards. So if a person had a lawsuit and they are already in court, they already had their trial, their case is on appeal, this lawsuit would tell the appeals court to dismiss that lawsuit. If a person is in the middle of selecting a jury, if they have had motions and arguments about whether the conduct of the manufacturer or seller or dealer has been outrageous, this legislation would require that that lawsuit be dismissed. I think that retroactivity is unconstitutional, and if it is not unconstitutional, it is certainly unfair, unwise and unwarranted.

The fifth point I want to make about this legislation is that it is politically motivated reform. The reason this bill had not gotten any attention in the Committee on the Judiciary and that nobody wants to take the time to really debate about it on the floor is that we are rushing this bill through to the other side so that 2 weeks from now, when the National Rifle Association convenes its national convention in Florida, they will be energized, they will be motivated to do whatever they need to do to support many of the supporters of this bill. There is no reason that this bill has to be dealt with in the form that it is being dealt with.

So it is extreme. It is unprecedented. It is not well thought out, has not been debated. It is unconstitutional and if not unconstitutional, certainly unfair and unwise, and it is politically motivated.

Those five things should give us pause today, even aside from how this bill got here. We should be concerned that this institution is moving an irresponsible piece of legislation that is solely for the benefit of some right-wing agenda.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds, just long enough to respond to the gentleman that I am glad he demonstrated the court process is working. Most of the cases he talked about have been dismissed if they did not have merit, and that is exactly what should happen to them. And to distinguish for him between all of those cases, I know he would like to put this bill in the category of volunteer protections and Good Samaritans, but I do not think he is going to succeed on that front.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4\1/4\ minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. McCarthy).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).

(Mr. SCOTT of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell).

Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Emanuel).

(Mr. EMANUEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I thank all Members who have participated in the debate. I would just reemphasize the five points that I made at the outset of this debate.

This legislation is extreme. It is unprecedented because it will give gun manufacturers, sellers and dealers immunity that no other industry has in America. It is not well thought out, because it has not gone through the process in a proper way and had amendments put on it. It is unconstitutional. Finally, it is politically motivated.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote against this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I offer Amendment No. 1.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the bill, because it has not been properly considered through the committee process, leaves a lot to be desired in terms of drafting. This amendment is an effort to correct a real problem with the bill, because the bill purports to give an exception for suits where there are physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product when the product is used as intended.

The problem is that there is no definition of ``when the product is used as intended,'' so you are left with this situation.

I am sure my colleagues are going to tell you all kinds of things where lawsuits could go forward under this rubric, but I think a number of lawsuits are going to be foreclosed by this language, and I would like to just give one or two examples.

First of all, I am holding in my hand 13 recall notices from manufacturers of weapons. These recall notices recall a product, a gun, a kind of gun, in a lot of cases because when it is accidentally dropped, the gun will discharge.

Well, the question then becomes, if a gun is accidentally dropped, is it being used as intended? Is that gun being used as intended if a person accidentally drops the gun and it discharges?

Mr. Chairman, you have heard the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin) say that was the exact situation which left him paralyzed here, and we should leave no doubt that in those circumstances that there should be liability.

Under this bill, this would apply even if the manufacturer had sent out a recall notice and the person had not acted on that recall notice. In fact, some of those recall notices say, do not do anything immediately on this, we are going to get to you 6 months down the road, and you can bring the gun

back to the dealer, and we will correct whatever problem there is with the gun.

So even if it is during that time period, there could be no potential liability here under this bill.

I think this language is irresponsible; and I am sure my colleagues are going to say, well, we did not intend that. But that is what the bill says, I am reading from the language, and if we had considered this bill in the regular process in the committee, perhaps we could have done a better job. But they were so intent on getting this bill out of committee to the floor and at the National Rifle Association's convention 2 weeks down the road that they did not care about the language.

Mr. Chairman, we should correct this, and this amendment allows us to do that.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee).

(Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I think, regarding the people who have made statements in support of and against this amendment, I think the problem is that we have left a substantial ambiguity in the law because we have not taken the time to deal with this in the committee, where it should have been dealt with.

With all respect to the chairman of my subcommittee, the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Cannon), whom I respect and admire greatly, the fact that somebody shows up at a hearing and says that this language, ``used as intended,'' means one thing or another really is not going to be what controls that. The same judges that they have said are irresponsible are going to be making that determination.

Mr. Chairman, when we write a piece of legislation, it is our responsibility to write it in a way that leaves them no discretion about what we mean. I would submit that a child who picks up a gun and drops it, and it discharges, most of us would stand here and say that that gun was not being used as intended. Therefore, the parents of that child would have no recourse; nobody would have any recourse against the manufacturer.

I would submit that anybody who drops a gun and it accidentally discharges, as it did in the case of the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), could reasonably argue that that was not, or that that falls within the exception.

It is our responsibility to close these loopholes, not open additional ones. I ask my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to join in support of this amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott). Again, this is a case where, had we taken the time in committee to evaluate the language and allow the amendment of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), which was at the desk when the question was called on the bill in committee, if we had had this debate, we could probably have corrected this language to say what the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Feeney) would like for it to say.

Unfortunately, the bill says what it says. As much as he would like for it to say something different than what it says, it does not. It says that in order to pursue a cause of action, we have to have had a conviction.

That is ridiculous. The bill should not say that. Now, maybe the drafters did not intend for it to say that, which is exactly the point that I have been making throughout this process: If we had taken the time to evaluate the provisions of this bill, then we could have at least gotten the bill to say what they intend for it to say.

However, no judge is going to have the luxury of saying, well, they intended to say this, and therefore I am going to interpret this statute in that way. The judge has to look at the law as we have written it. Right now, this bill does not say what my colleagues would like for it to say because we have not taken the time to make it say that.

Mr. Chairman, we are being irresponsible and we are passing legislation through this House that we know has a serious flaw, and they are looking at us saying, well, you cannot read. I learned to read a long time ago. I can read what the language of this bill says, and it says exactly what the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott) says it says. Nothing that my colleagues on the other side can say can change that.

We need to amend the bill so that it says what they want it to say.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to ask my colleague from Virginia a question.

Suppose there is a conviction in a case and then a civil lawsuit is filed which would be allowed, and then the conviction is reversed on appeal. What would happen under this bill under those circumstances?

I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. Chairman, I demand that the words of the gentlewoman from Wyoming (Mrs. Cubin) be taken down.

Mr. Chairman, I do not need the gentlewoman to apologize for my sensibilities. She needs to be apologizing for using words that are insulting to the entire African American race. And if that is what she is doing, then I gracefully accept her apology. But if she is saying that this is somehow because I am sensitive to those words, then I will not.

That is not what she said, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I do insist, yes.

Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.

Motion to Table Offered by Mr. Sensenbrenner

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 5.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I would say to my colleagues that the effect of this amendment would be to limit the application of this bill to manufacturers only.

As I said during the brief debate that we had in the committee, the Committee on the Judiciary, on this bill, there are, in fact, some manufacturers who are attempting to address concerns that the public has about gun safety. Some of them are trying to develop safety locks. Some are trying to develop computerized techniques for ownership identification.

If there is a rationale for this bill, which I do not believe there is, the rationale would be to reward those manufacturers who are acting responsibly. Unfortunately, the effect of this bill will be to reward them and incentivize them to act irresponsibly. I think that is a very, very unfortunate consequence of this bill.

On the other hand, most of the outrageous stories that we hear about irresponsibility are not necessarily about the manufacturers of guns; they are about dealers and sellers who refuse to acknowledge anything other than their own profit motives. They want, when someone walks into their store, when somebody walks into their pawnshop, when somebody approaches them with some money, they want that money and they do not care what happens after that. We have heard example after example after example of that kind of irresponsibility on the part of dealers.

Now, it is unfortunate that this bill covers not only manufacturers, it covers dealers, sellers, importers, the whole range of providers that put these guns into the stream of commerce. If there is any rationale for the bill, it is for the manufacturers.

I do not think we ought to be excusing irresponsible dealers, such as the dealer who ignored the frequent disappearance of guns from his inventory. One of hundreds of missing guns, which were never reported missing despite having been prominently displayed in the store, ends up being used in the sniper attacks in Washington. This bill would immunize that dealer from liability. That is irresponsible.

Mr. Chairman, let us have a debate about those manufacturers who are being responsible. I applaud their activities. Perhaps we could make a reasonable argument that they should be immunized from liability because they are making a product that is legal. I have heard that argument. I do not subscribe to it, but at least it has some credibility to it. But when we start immunizing everybody in the stream of commerce regardless of how responsible or irresponsible they are, that is where I draw the line.

Mr. Chairman, I would encourage a ``yes'' vote on my amendment, which limits the impact of this bill to manufacturers only.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Rush).

Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary for his help in bringing this bill to the floor. I also want to thank my colleagues, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. John), the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Hart) and the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) for their support.

H.R. 1036, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, as we pointed out earlier, addresses the growing concerns of junk lawsuits filed with the intention of driving the firearms industry out of business by simply attempting to hold manufacturers and dealers liable for the criminal acts of third parties who are totally beyond their control.

These suits are different from other lawsuits that affect other industries. The cities and counties are not representing specific victims nor are they claiming specific damage against city property. No, instead, they are simply suing because they happen to dislike a product, its appearance, its distribution and how it markets its product. Yet, under the Constitution, these companies have the constitutional right to manufacture these products.

Now, the previous speaker mentioned that this has been a very quick process and he thought it was extreme. That is the word he used, extreme, unprecedented. I have on this chart here 31 States which have already passed legislation that prohibits frivolous lawsuits against the firearm industry. So I would say to my colleagues, perhaps your State, when you come on the House floor, you should look at this chart to make sure before you vote whether your State has already passed a bill that has recognized the absurdity of these lawsuits. As such these States have acted to prohibit these types of suits, and H.R. 1036 is designed to simply mirror what the States have done.

The goal is to seize the attempts at regulation through lawsuits that achieve nothing except the blatant interference in a company's constitutional right to sell and market a legal product and the constitutional duty of the Congress to regulate the commerce of such product. As I stated, creative legal theory does not make good public policy.

We have seen through the course of these 30-plus suits that have come to the courts that the courts are not buying the theory either. Many of these suits have been dismissed. If my colleagues will bear with me, I will show my colleagues another chart. I have just taken a sample of the municipal lawsuits that have been dismissed, but I particularly want to highlight the city of Boston's case. Twenty-nine manufacturers and distributors and three associations were defendants. The alleged claim: negligent distribution. Very simply, negligent distribution was the claim against them, and 29 manufacturers were sued, distributors and associations. Defective design, deceptive advertising, nuisance, unjust enrichment. It was dismissed.

The city dropped its own suit saying it was too expensive for the city to do and acknowledging that, through its vigorous prosecution, the suit would need hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, would go on forever and ever, and would not be realistic and concrete in its steps to reduce illegal acquisition of firearms, and need to reduce the incidence of firearm accidents and increasing public awareness concerning the safe handling and storage of firearms. So the city of Boston voluntarily decided this is wrong. Not the courts' decision, but the city of Boston, after spending all this money.

We can go from New Orleans to Miami-Dade County. Twenty-six manufacturers, distributors, three associations, and two dealers were all sued simply because of their design, their distribution, and what they said was negligent deceptive advertising. It was dismissed at trial court and dismissed at appellate court. The Florida Supreme Court denied this petition. So it went through every one. The trial court, the appellate court, and the Supreme Court; and they all denied. So, my colleagues, this bill we have here is simply mirroring what has been done in the other 31 States.

Now, the question comes up, this bill is just a carve-out for the firearms industry. The previous speaker mentioned that, so I would like to bring to his attention other Federal legislation that protects specific industries and other cases where these industries or groups have found themselves uniquely threatened by bizarre or novel legal situations.

For example, in 1994, we passed legislation, the General Aviation Revitalization Act, which generally protects manufacturers of small planes more than 18 years old against personal injury lawsuits in both Federal and State courts.

Let us take another act, the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1995, which declared certain community, migrant and homeless health care center employees to be employees of the Public Health Service, thus protecting them under the Federal Tort Claims Act from malpractice lawsuits in State courts.

Another example: the Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act of 1996, which protects nonprofit organizations from State or Federal lawsuits arising from the nature, age, packaging or condition of apparently wholesome food received in good-faith donation to benefit the needy.

The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 provides limited immunity from liability for volunteers acting on behalf of a nonprofit organization and preempts inconsistent State law unless such law provides additional protection.

The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998, which supersedes State law to create an exclusion from liability for manufacturers of raw materials or components of medical implants.

And let us not forget the Y2K Act of 1999, which limits punitive damages and establishes special procedures for liability in Y2K cases.

The Public Health Improvement Act of 2000, which provides Good Samaritan liability protection for users of cardiac defibrillators.

So, my colleagues, there are literally dozens and dozens of such pieces of legislation, major pieces of legislation, very similar, very like this bill that have been passed by Congress to protect and to enforce protection against nuisance lawsuits.

Basically, what we have is a bill that has been cosponsored by 250 colleagues here in the House. And the bill did not just happen to appear recently for anything like a convention of the NRA. This bill has gone through Congress. In

the 107th Congress, we had almost 240 sponsors. It went through the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection and then the full committee and passed. It went through the appropriate subcommittee and the full Committee on the Judiciary in the 107th Congress. And we now have even more support for it, so the time is right for passage on the House floor.

My colleagues will hear a lot about victims' rights from opponents to this bill. I want to emphatically state that this bill protects victims' rights. Their right to sue is protected in this bill, relying on product defect, negligent entrustment, and industry compliance with Federal and State law. What is not protected is the use of creative legal theory to sue the deepest pockets.

My colleagues, we have a good bill here, one that 250 Members of Congress agree with. It is bipartisan, both sides. They agree that using the courts to circumvent the constitutional authority of this body to make public policy is an improper use of our judicial system.

I will close in a moment, but want to leave my colleagues with several quotes. Dave Kopel, a professor at New York University Law School, has stated that the cities do not have to win in court with these nuisance suits. All they have to do is keep suing and suing. They will kill the industry with the cost of defending the lawsuits. He has got it right.

And then I would like to give another quote here. This is from a former labor secretary in which he pointed out that if I had my way, we would have laws restricting hand guns, and we are launching here an effort to succeed where legislation has failed. The strategy may work, but at the cost of making our frail democracy even weaker. You might approve the outcome in these cases, but they establish a precedent for other cases that you might find wildly unjust.

My point is that most nuisance lawsuits are taking to the courts an attempt to bankrupt these manufacturers. It is clear the courts agree, it is clear my colleagues agree, it is clear the State legislatures agree; and so I urge my colleagues to support the bill.

Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, the gentleman from Utah, for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, the Watt amendment is attacking the words ``used as intended'', and he has sort of indicated that those words are vague and perhaps they should be deleted because the courts could not quite understand them.

I have Black's Law Dictionary back in my office, Mr. Chairman. I went up and looked up the words. It is defined as ``the intended use doctrine,'' defined as ``The rule imposing a duty on a manufacturer to develop a product so that it is reasonably safe for its intended or foreseeable users.''

In fact, if we look up the words ``used as intended,'' for example, the words ``manufacturing defects'' or ``design defects,'' any of these terms which, at first glance, would connote some nebulous concept. Indeed, it is not a nebulous concept; there is a strict interpretation of these words in tort law.

In Westlaw, which is a commonly used legal database, if we go into that and put in the words ``used as intended,'' we come up with that it has been cited in 1,300 State cases and over 900 Federal cases come up. That is ample guidance for courts to use regarding what ``used as intended'' means in a case alleging defective design or manufacture.

The treatise American Law of Products Liability states that ``Courts have consistently refused to impose liability on manufacturers of firearms that function exactly as intended.''

Mr. Chairman, I think what I am saying is, there is ample evidence in the law, both in the Federal and in the State, where the term ``used as intended'' is clearly understood in tort law, so there is no ambiguity here.

Mr. Chairman, I would urge defeat of the Watt amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Tennessee for yielding to me.

I would say to the gentlewoman from Texas that I understand her feelings when she mentions she finds this bill an insult, and she sort of indicates it is perhaps because of what happened in the Committee on the Judiciary. She has mentioned that perhaps the rule, and she mentioned the NRA convention, but I still do not think that those kinds of statements necessarily apply and convince Members not to vote for this bill because, basically, H.R. 1036 already incorporates what the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Linda T. Sanchez) is providing under her amendment.

I have to be honest. I think what she is saying is praiseworthy, but the amendment is not necessary because we already have in the bill the language that is needed.

We have used the words ``negligent entrustment,'' and this is a legal term, and that term is used in the bill. Because of the way it is used in the bill, it automatically covers what the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Linda T. Sanchez) wants to put in her amendment as part of the bill, and I might read ``negligent entrustment'' just to clarify what the actual legal definition is, as defined.

It is ``supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by another person when the seller knows or should know the person to whom the product is supplied is likely to use the product and, in fact, does use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person and others.''

The bill already allows suits for negligent entrustment or negligence per se or where a manufacturer or seller knowingly and willfully violates a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product and the violation has a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought.

In a nutshell, we have in H.R. 1036 all the necessary language to cover what the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Linda T. Sanchez) is talking about. So I urge my colleagues not to support the Sanchez amendment. It is unnecessary because H.R. 1036 already holds liable anyone who violates any State or Federal statute.

The Sanchez amendment also eliminates a requirement that a violation of a Federal statute must actually cause an injury before liability can attach. So I urge my colleagues to vote no on the Sanchez amendment.

Mr. Chairman, maybe I could just have a colloquy with the gentlewoman on her amendment.

Would my colleague not agree that the language dealing with negligent entrustment is not part of the bill, H.R. 1036?

I yield to the gentlewoman from California.

Would the gentlewoman not agree that that term ``negligent entrustment'' is fully understood under tort law?

But the consensus is, when we read the gentlewoman's amendment, in fact everything she has asked for is already included in our bill. So we think the amendment, as praiseworthy as it might be, in effect it is already being spoken to and clarified in our bill, so we just do not think the gentlewoman's amendment is necessary.

Can the gentlewoman define very clearly why the term ``negligent entrustment'' does not cover all that is necessary in tort law and why the gentlewoman's amendment would be needed with that already in existence?

Well, reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I disagree. Negligent entrustment, as I read the definition earlier, it is all laid out.

Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Sanchez amendment.

Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 181 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for purposes of debate only.

Mr. Speaker, I am exceedingly pleased today that we will consider legislation protecting interstate commerce in firearms and ammunition under the direction of a structured rule that allows for a total of five minority party amendments to be made in order.

Today, Mr. Speaker, I call up H. Res. 181 to do my part to ensure that businesses in the United States that are engaged in interstate and foreign commerce through the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, importation, and sale to the public of firearms or ammunition are not and should not be negligent through lawsuit for the harm caused by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse firearm products or ammunition products that function as they are designed and intended. The people who choose to bring these lawsuits want to hold manufacturers negligent for the criminal abuse of their products, but it is like suing the Louisville Slugger for harm caused by criminals using one of their famous products to unlawfully threaten or harm a third party and not for hitting baseballs, for which that product was intended.

It is my intention today to provide Members with information about this fair and balanced rule and also the underlying legislation that will be on the floor today. This underlying bill must be passed today if we are to beat back the forces who believe that responsible gun ownership is an oxymoron and those who are bent on destroying a citizen's right to firearms for lawful purposes. Lawsuits have been filed nationwide and are pending in our courts today that seek to hold these businesses responsible on a negligence theory for the harm caused by criminals or unlawful use of firearms or ammunition by others, when the product functioned and was designed and was intended to perform and it did, once again, a dangerous and slippery proposition which the underlying bill will prevent.

Guns can be dangerous and deadly when criminals and others who unlawfully use them do so. But then again, so can automobiles, especially when they are used illegally, which I will never condone, and which the underlying bill does not condone or seek to excuse from negligent causes of action. In fact, under the provisions underlined in this bill, H.R. 1036, plaintiffs may still bring negligence causes of action for harm caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of guns or ammunition.

The forces arrayed against this bill today believe that guns have no constructive purpose in American society and believe that all firearms are so inherently dangerous that no level of responsible caution and education could ever render them useful or enjoyable to a law-abiding citizen. It is on this most tenuous, dangerous, and shaky logic that the gun haters have mounted their present flank maneuvering on the second amendment in both our State and Federal courts through these negligence lawsuits. These hostile forces to the second amendment can only be repelled when every single American who believes in the right to keep and bear arms shall be firmly entrenched by passage of this underlying legislation.

I believe today that the House of Representatives is rightly and correctly again invoking its right to regulate interstate commerce in the name of protecting our citizens' constitutional rights, in this case, the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. Without it, the myriad lawsuits nationwide advancing a negligence theory for the harm caused by the criminal or unlawful use of firearms or ammunition by others, when the product is functioning as it was designed and intended to do, will form a very real threat, completely halting the movement of these lawful products in interstate commerce. In fact, this is the very intent, what this bill is all about. It is to stop the chilling effect that would stop the design, production, trade and ownership of legal firearms and ammunition in the United States by lawsuits.

Mr. Speaker, I want to wrap up what I have said today by stating that the interstate commerce clause thankfully gives us the power and the right to be here in the House today to protect the Second Amendment from these dangerous attempts by others who would

twist the common law to meet their goal of eroding its protections by flanking maneuvers in State and Federal courts.

I am proud of this legislation that we are on the floor to pass today.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, we are continuing the debate today on the floor after we had an opportunity yesterday in the Committee on Rules to talk about this, and the bill is pretty straightforward. It says that a manufacturer of a gun, ammunition or other product that might be used, with the gun working as it was intended, we would hold them harmless; but if a person was illegally or unlawfully using these guns or obtaining these guns under some measure, that they would be held responsible.

The interesting part about this, and there are so many analogies that could be used, but it would be like an automobile, which kills millions of Americans every year. It would be like an automobile that was properly designed,

properly structured, properly placed upon the roadway, and there is not one parent or one person that I know of that has years of experience in using an automobile that would not say to an occupant or to someone who was going to use their car that this could be a dangerous product.

But if we use it properly, then we have no worry about it. But if the manufacturer of that product, the car, manufactured it, designed it or did something that they know they should not have done, and it has happened in the automobile industry, it has happened with side fuel tanks, it has happened with any other number of defective parts of that product, then they would be held liable.

Such is true today also if gun manufacturers do something that is inherently wrong with their product.

But what this bill says is, once that gun or ammunition, just like a car is designed properly, is sold legally and properly under the laws of this country, and if it is utilized properly, that they could not be held liable. Such is true with guns.

The bottom line is that what is true is that the Democrat Party chooses to take this up as an issue because they are antigun. That is what this is about. We see these forces every day. We see them on the street. We see them with the things that they do. This is another way to get in the way of the second amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

So the reasonable legislation that we propose today is one that says that if someone has a legally manufactured product that they obtained legally, and it is used properly within the laws of this country, that a gun manufacturer will be held harmless. It is as simple as it is. I think it makes sense. We support what we are doing here with this underlying legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The previous speaker just hijacked the intent of this law, and he misled people who are listening in this body today. The fact of the matter is that any gun manufacturer who is negligent for their product by what they produce would be held responsible under this bill, and for any person to assume otherwise means they have not read the bill. They would be incapable of understanding, and they choose not to, they choose not to.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman was allowed his opportunity to speak, and I am sure that the minority has lots of time left.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the Speaker's help. Regular order, please.

So, Mr. Speaker, what happens is that anyone who chooses to mislead those people that are in this body today, that they would not be held liable, is simply not true. That is not what this bill is about. The bill that we know and the underlying legislation makes perfect sense, and that is why we are here.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns), the original author of this bill. I, as an original cosponsor, am pleased to have him.

(Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Rules took a lot of time yesterday. We heard a lot of testimony. The gentleman is correct, he did come and approach the Committee on Rules, as well as other Members of this great body.

I think the Committee on Rules, through the leadership of the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), heard the testimony and, in fact, Mr. Speaker, made in order several amendments, five, and two from the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt). That gives him the ability today to have two amendments for a total of 40 minutes. Three others are allowed for a total of 60 minutes, 20 minutes each. I think that is pretty good. I think that does allow debate on the floor of this House, more than almost 2 hours of debate, to talk about these issues.

Best of all, they are going to get their own vote. They are going to get their vote that they asked for up on the board, and every single Member will be here, so they have a chance to tell their story. I think that this process, while it may not always work the way every single Member wants, the Committee on Rules did the right thing.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Linder) from the Committee on Rules.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman makes some points. They are that he felt that these amendments were denied through the process. But the way we operate here is that the Committee on Rules operates in the daylight. We come and tell people when they may file amendments. Either those amendments may or may not have ever seen the light of day in another committee.

This Speaker and this Committee on Rules chairman want to make sure that we are open for business, that we tell people when we will be there; that we have, in my opinion, an appropriate number of people who sit through the hearings, as I have done, as I did in this case again; and responsible people listen to the arguments and the debates about the merits of those things which they wish to have placed in order.

We then hear the deliberation, we hear the debate, and then we go back

and make a decision about it. Then there is a vote. The votes are in the open where everybody can see them happen.

Mr. Speaker, my chairman allows many times more debate than what I probably would think would be reasonable, but he does it. It is a fair and open process. We know what this bill is about. We know where there is disagreement. We know why we are doing this. It is the right thing to do.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I have one additional speaker. Mr. Speaker, what is the time remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I will close after this speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble).

Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this is the very end of the debate about a very, very important commonsense piece of legislation.

The amendments that were before the Committee on Rules would have done a lot of things. I disagree with us having the Federal Government print a list of all the people who have a gun in this country. I think that is dangerous. I think that is dangerous precedent for us as consumers to think that we would purchase a product and then someone would print our name about a product that we buy. But that is what we were asked to do yesterday, and we denied them. We did allow the minority the chance to have its debate on five amendments. That is what is going to take place today.

This legislation is common sense. The process has been open and fair. The Committee on Rules was available yesterday. The Speaker, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert), and the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the chairman, intentionally went out of their way to make sure that we would have a vigorous debate today because we think the light of day is the best disinfectant there is to fairness.

The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns), the original sponsor of this bill, the author of this bill, showed up on the floor and offered a hardy debate. We have had others that have done the same. So I think America is free. I think we are using this body for what it was intended, as a sharing of issues and ideas. And most of all I would like to applaud the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), who is the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary. The gentleman has been to the Committee on Rules, placed himself available before each and every Member to answer questions. I think that the commonsense legislation that he brings forward at this time with respect to what we are going to do on floor debate is important and good.

Mr. Speaker, I would ask that Members would support this bill, this rule, and of course, all the underlying legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions), for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to the base bill, H.R. 1036. In my view, this is a cynical, political bill that like other so- called tort reform bills that the majority has brought to the floor this year, would protect and favor wealthy businesses and campaign contributors at the expense of those victimized by irresponsible conduct.

I advocate a decent society. My strong opposition to H.R. 1036 does not reflect a broad opposition to gun ownership. I own a gun. I am for sensible gun laws that do not take away the legal rights of individuals to have guns for recreational purposes and personal protection. Gun ownership can further American values, but H.R. 1036, instead, usurps them.

I said to someone earlier today that since I was a child I have had, family and others, BB guns to single shot .22 rifles, that are sports persons and are involved at some degree in having owned a gun. I have no family member that has ever caused a criminal problem because of a gun. That does not mean that my family is any better than anyone else's, and I believe that I would go to my grave fighting for the right of Americans' values, which include owning a gun.

But I cannot have anyone make sense for me how AK-47s can be sold on the open market at a gun show. Nobody can make that make sense to me, that anyone other than the military and law enforcement should be endowed to hold those guns in their possession. I see no reason for them.

The majority, encouraged by a forceful and wealthy industry, is pushing Congress to enact a disastrous bill to give gun makers and dealers extraordinary shelter from liability suits. I do not wish to prey on the misery of one family that has suffered immensely at the hands of a gun, but several Members in this body represent the area of Palm Beach County, four of us do, and in our constituency are people who suffered a few years ago, none more than Ms. Pamela Grunow, the widow of a schoolteacher killed by gun violence.

Pamela Grunow deserves to have her day in court, and I am appalled that some representatives of the people have the contempt to propose legislation that would deny her this right.

On May 26, 2000, a 13-year-old student, a young man named Nathaniel Brazil, shot and killed his language arts teacher, Barry Grunow, at Lake Worth Middle School, that is in my district and the district of three other Members, two Republican and two Democrat.

The gun used to kill Mr. Grunow was a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol, which is commonly known as a junk gun, or ``Saturday night special.'' Such handguns have little or no sporting or self-defense use, and are disproportionately used by criminals and juveniles to commit murder and other violent offenses. Pamela Grunow is seeking to hold the distributor of this gun responsible for selling an unreasonably dangerous and defective product.

Under Florida law, a distributor or dealer who sells a defectively designed product can be held liable, just as the manufacturer can be held liable. But some congressional colleagues of mine have the audacity to challenge the federalist and legal systems of the United States. Their hubris is infinite. You do not know better than the State governments legislating on this issue or the judges listening to these lawsuits.

Pamela Grunow deserves her day in court. She may not win, but, under Florida law, she should have that opportunity to lose or win.

An identical bill was reported out of committee last October, but the majority leaders decided not to put the measure on the floor after a series of sniper attacks in the metropolitan Washington area. Those sniper attacks made even the bill's sponsors squeamish. But less than a year later, even before the suspects in that particular atrocious crime are prosecuted, the majority is pushing an identical antivictim bill to be enacted. Less than a year later, H.R. 1036 would bar legal action filed by victims of the sniper shootings against the gun dealer, where the sniper suspects, two federally prohibited purchasers, allegedly obtained their Bushmaster assault rifle.

At a time when America needs more corporate responsibility, Congress should not give one industry a free pass. Gun makers and dealers act as though their industry was being treated unfairly. That is absurd. The gun industry wants to receive special legal protection that no other industry in America enjoys. Gun makers and dealers want to be free from the accountability of their negligent or dangerous conduct, regardless of how many people they injure or cause to be killed.

I want to make this clear: Absent legal immunity, gun makers would simply be treated like any other industry. Pharmaceutical companies must design medicine bottles that are childproof. Car manufacturers must design automobiles that withstand crashes. But those in the majority party are prepared to exempt gun makers from the responsibility of designing their products to protect against misuse that is reasonably foreseeable.

Robert A. Ricker, former Executive Director and Director of Government Affairs of the American Shooting Sports Council and former Assistant General Counsel for the NRA, recently revealed that the gun industry has long known its practices aid criminal access to guns, yet has done very little about it. In light of Mr. Ricker's declarations, it would be the height of irresponsibility for Congress to pass H.R. 1036.

America cannot afford for Congress to act irresponsibly on this issue. In 1999, firearm homicide was the number one cause of death for black men ages 15 to 34, as well as the leading cause of death for all black 15- to 24-year-olds. Former Surgeon General Satcher even saw fit to declare this an epidemic.

As a representative of the American people, I am sickened that those culpable of causing pain and devastation may be immunized from liability due to their political clout.

My dear colleagues, blood money is guiding this bill. Those supporting H.R. 1036 are pushing ill-conceived and reckless legislation through Congress, motivated by the wrong priorities.

This bill is not only a gift to the gun lobby, its timing, with floor consideration coming just a few weeks before the April 24, 2003, National Rifle Association's annual meeting, is particularly suspect. In my view, some politicians are more concerned about satisfying the priorities of contributors than in seeking justice under our American values.

The cold barrel of the gun industry is pushing on its victims' throats. The majority is proposing that Congress pull the trigger. H.R. 1036 will shoot down the fundamental right to a day in court, even retroactively. It is scandalous that this anti-American, antivictim, anti-American values, prointerest group bill is being brought to the People's House.

I oppose the bill.

I wish to end, Mr. Speaker, by saying what I said when I began: Let the NRA and all people who own guns know that one Congressperson stands here for their right to own their gun, so do not misunderstand my opposition to this scandalous bill that will do detriment to the fundamental premise of a person's right to sue someone that has caused foreseeable harm.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

I want my friend from Texas to catch my voice as it thunders in his direction. I am not antigun. I am prosensible gun legislation, and I am in favor of American values that allow for people to own guns legally. And I do not believe any of my colleagues that are opposed to this legislation would argue that under the Constitution a person has a right to bear arms. But under that same aegis that gives us a system that has served us well these number of years, a person has a right to sue.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern), who serves on the Committee on Rules with distinction.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern) to respond to our colleague.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6 minutes to my very good friend, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), the ranking member of the relevant subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).

Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers. Does my friend from Texas (Mr. Sessions) have additional speakers?

Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to yield back after closing.

Mr. Speaker, I have had one additional speaker show up.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Van Hollen), my friend, who was a leader in the State senate in Maryland on this particular issue.

Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close if the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions) is prepared to close.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Texas (Mr. Sessions), and I also thank my friend from Florida (Mr. Stearns), who is still here, for reminding me that Florida has a law that is similar to this that I do not think ought to be preempted. But at the very same time, Florida under the aegis of a previous Attorney General did in fact sue gun manufacturers too. So we have been a leader on both fronts.

Mr. Speaker, let me say this in closing. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns) and I live very close to Orlando. I was born and raised in Alta Mont Springs that is 10 miles north of Orlando. I will not be in Orlando when the National Rifle Association meets there 3 weeks from now. I will not be receiving contributions from some of their members, interestingly. I am sure that there are some of their members who agree with me.

Gun dealers and owners who illegally sell or use guns are subject to prosecution under Federal laws, as my friend from Texas pointed out at the Committee on Rules yesterday, such as Brady. That is not what we are talking about here today. Today we are talking about the civil damages these actions cause, the innocent victims of gun violence. This bill, in my opinion, would eviscerate this possibility; and I think in that regard that it is wrong.

Let me says that with my warm live hands I will protect the right of American citizens and American values to legally own guns. In that place where I was born in the halcyon days of segregation, be assured that almost every family member and everybody there had a gun, and I can assure you they needed them. And, therefore, when we talk about the right to bear arms, know that there were many of us that believe in that right. So the National Rifle Association should know that with these warm live hands I will defend their right to own a gun, but none of them can make sense of AK-47s being sold in the street. None of them can make sense of Saturday night specials that have caused devastating damage to this overall society, such that one Surgeon General declared an epidemic because of gun violence against our children and their community.

None of them can make sense for the gun manufacturers and gun dealers, who may be few, of being exempted from legislation that rightly ought be considered if it were not exempting certain people and giving them special conditions that so many on the majority side rail about all the time saying others are seeking special conditions. If car manufacturers have to meet standards that avoid liabilities, if drug manufacturers, and I can go on and on and on through the product liability phase of this discussion, then be assured gun manufacturers, if they do something that is foreseeably wrong, should be held to the same standards as everybody else.

Mr. Speaker, I urge this body to vote against this bill and for each one of them to use their warm live hands to protect American values.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, the bill has a number of technical problems which we have already heard discussed, including one for which I will have an amendment later in the debate. But the point I want to make here is, on page 3 of the bill, under findings, the findings have as the number one finding, citizens have a right protected by the second amendment to the United States Constitution to keep and bear arms.

It is interesting that the word is ``citizens,'' plural, not an individual has a right. Just so there is no confusion, I think it is important to get the record straight on what the second amendment says, particularly in light of the fact that the supporters of the bill on numerous occasions in committee hearings have been unable to cite a single final judgment which supports the idea that an individual has the right to bear arms under the second amendment.

This goes back to the United States v. Miller case in 1939, where the court held that for the proposition, in the beginning of the second amendment, mentioning well-regulated militia. It says that the possession of a weapon must be reasonably related to a well-regulated militia. The circuit courts have ruled on this.

The First Circuit held that the second amendment applies only to firearms having a ``reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.'' That is a 1939 case.

In 1996, in the Third Circuit, defendant's possession of machine guns did not have a connection with militia-related activity required for second amendment protections to apply.

The Fourth Circuit, a 1995 case, stated that courts have consistently held that the second amendment only confers a collective right of keeping and bearing arms which bear a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.

The Sixth Circuit, in 2000, held that the lower courts have uniformly held that the second amendment preserves a collective rather than an individual right.

The Seventh Circuit, the second amendment establishes no right to possess a firearm apart from the role possession of the gun might play in maintaining a State militia. That is a 1999 case.

The Eighth Circuit stated that the purpose of the second amendment is to restrain the Federal Government from regulating the possession of arms where such regulation would interfere with the preservation or efficiency of the militia. That is a 1992 case.

The Ninth Circuit in 2002 stated that it is this collective rights model which provides the best interpretation of the second amendment.

The Tenth Circuit, a 1977 case, to apply the amendment so as to guarantee an appellant's right to keep an unregistered firearm which has not been shown to have any connection with the militia, merely because he is technically a member of the Kansas militia, would be unjustifiable in terms of either logic or policy.

The Eleventh Circuit, a 1997 case concerning motivating the creation of the second amendment, convinces us that the amendment was intended to protect only the use or protection of weapons reasonably related to a militia actively maintained and trained by the States.

I want the Record to reflect, in case someone has read the second amendment, that our record is replete with what the second amendment means.

[From the Legal Action Project]

A Sampling of Court Decisions that Support the Militia Interpretation

of the Second Amendment

u.s. supreme court

U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980).

u.s. courts of appeals

U.S. v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 1007 (1997).

U.S. v. Baer, 235 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 2000)

U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,

435 U.S. 926 (1978).

U.S. v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).

U.S. v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.

denied, 121 S. Ct. 1641 (2001).

U.S. v. Finitz, 234 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.

denied, 121 S. Ct. 833 (2001).

Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 519

Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 2.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the underlying right for redress would apply if the defendant transfers a firearm in violation of the law and is convicted of that crime. In other words, if the defendant has been convicted of an illegal transfer of a firearm, he loses the benefits of the bill.

This amendment eliminates the requirement under the bill for a conviction before a defendant can be sued, and substitutes the requirement that the defendant actually committed the crime. Requiring a conviction before a defendant can be sued for civil consequences of his unlawful acts would constitute an extraordinary change in traditional civil liability standards. Moreover, such a requirement would create bizarre results based on what a prosecutor decides to do in a particular case and when he decides to do it.

The prosecutor may choose not to prosecute a particular case for various reasons. This would preclude a claim, regardless of how egregious the injuries are or how clear the liability; or even if a case is prosecuted, the prosecutor may decide to plea bargain a case, allowing a defendant who has illegally transferred many guns to plead guilty to one transfer and drop the other cases. It would be absurd to suggest that only the victims in the case pleaded to can sue while the others cannot.

Of course, there is always a possibility the case can be thrown out because of an unlawful search or seizure, because of a coerced confession, or simply because the prosecutor is unable to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. The case might be lost because a jury was pretty sure the defendant was guilty, but not beyond a reasonable doubt.

Even where there is a conviction, the timing of the conviction alone might be dispositive of the claim because there is nothing in the bill or the law which tolls the statute of limitations in a civil claim pending prosecution and appeals.

Mr. Chairman, this is a dramatic departure from traditional civil proceedings. In an automobile accident, for example, one can be successful if one can prove that the defendant went through the red light. We do not lose our case because the police officer did not give the defendant a ticket, or gave him a ticket but did not get a conviction. Say one brings the witnesses to court and proves the defendant, in fact, went through the red light. Under the theory under this bill, that person would lose his case if the police officer failed to successfully prosecute the defendant.

If this amendment is adopted, even without the conviction, the unlawful transfer would still have to be proven in order to pursue the case. Under traditional civil law, we would still have to prove the defendant violated the law and that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury.

If someone's criminal activity causes injury, he should not escape civil liability merely because he was not technically convicted of that crime. So I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I would just point out that without this amendment, this bill protects criminals. Without the amendment, we could have a criminal actually admitting to the crime, but unless there was a conviction, we could not use that admission in a civil case.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman if he could state any other civil statute that requires a criminal conviction as a predicate. And I would point out on page 9 of the bill ``in an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly and willfully violated,'' but it does not say anything about a conviction. So the manufacturer or seller is not afforded any of those rights we just heard of. And I just want to know if there is any other civil law that requires a criminal conviction as a predicate to your right to get civil remedies.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, since the gentleman is defending the bill, I would ask him on page 8 of the bill, lines 17 through 22, whether or not the word ``transferee'' on line 22 and ``transferor'' on lines 17 and 18, whether that is a typographical error.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the question; and, frankly, Mr. Chairman, I do not know. You would have someone who has filed his lawsuit, gets a judgment. The underlying conviction is overturned. I do not know. Maybe the gentleman from Colorado can help answer the question. In my opening remarks I made a point that pending prosecution and all the appeals, if you start off with an acquittal, with a case thrown out and then reinstated on appeal, maybe after the statute of limitations. There is no other situation where you have to get a conviction before the civil lawsuit can go forward; and I would ask the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, in the bill we have the action of a manufacturer who willingly and knowingly violates a State or Federal statute and can be sued. You do not have to have a conviction.

You have to have a conviction in this situation. The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt) has revealed a bazaar situation. Some people can bring a case and not bring a case depending upon whether their case was part of a plea bargain or not.

This is a major departure from any civil procedure, and if the gentleman can advise us if there is any other civil lawsuit that requires a conviction as a predicate rather than knowingly violated the statute, we would like to hear it.

Mr. Chairman, I hope we would adopt the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Feeney).

Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.