Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1997) to amend title 18, United States Code, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice to protect unborn children from assault and murder, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the so-called Unborn Victims of Violence Act. Here we are again to consider a bill which has now, for three Congresses, unnecessarily mired what should be a laudable and uncontroversial effort to punish truly heinous crimes in the emotionally charged and legally suspect back allies of the abortion debate. This is regrettable, Mr. Speaker, because real people are suffering real harm, while this House has played abortion politics instead of acting to punish truly barbaric crimes.

The issue today is straightforward: Is it or is it not necessary to enact a bill making a statement endorsing the controversial and legally revolutionary notion that a fetus is a legal person from the moment of conception in order to punish these criminals with the severity that they justly deserve?

That is the heart of the issue. The proponents of this bill are taking what should be a straightforward issue and unnecessarily turning it into a controversial one.

Why does this matter? Quite simply, because if the law recognizes that a fetus is a legal person from the moment of conception, as this bill would do, when it is a zygote, a blastocyst, an embryo, a simple collection of undifferentiated cells, then the law must recognize and protect the rights of that person on a legal basis with the rights of the adult pregnant woman. If our laws recognize that, then there can be no right to choose, because, logically, terminating a pregnancy even in its earliest stages would be killing a fully legal person.

So when the proponents tell you that this is not about the right to choose, this is not about the right to have an abortion, remember that very simple and clear fact. And, remember that we have an alternative that is just as tough on these criminals: the Lofgren substitute. We do not have to choose between an assault on Roe v. Wade and permitting these heinous criminals to walk free.

That is a false choice, but I do not ask my colleagues to believe me. Take the proponents at their word.

Senator Orrin Hatch, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, a sponsor of this bill in the other body, had this to say, ``They say it undermines abortion rights. It does, but that's irrelevant.'' CNN, May 7 last year.

January 19 last year, Samuel B. Casey, executive director of the Christian Legal Society, told the Los Angeles Times, ``In as many areas as we can, we want to put on the books that the embryo is a person. That sets the stage for a jurist,'' a judge, ``to acknowledge that human beings at any stage of development deserve protection, even protection that would trump a woman's interest in terminating a pregnancy.''

May 19 last year, Dr. Joe Cook, vice president of the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists, was quoted by the Associated Press as saying, ``We have to approach this in a way that's doable, a step at a time. This bill is aimed at establishing that a fetus in utero is a human being and has human rights.''

So please do not insult our intelligence by saying this bill is not about abortion rights.

The proper question is not whether we will recognize a separate or a new crime, but how we will do so. The Lofgren substitute recognizes a special kind of evil embodied in these crimes, but would recognize the assault on the fetus as a second crime against the pregnant woman, a second, separate crime, but against the pregnant woman, not against the fetus. The distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution criticized that point of view as the ``ideology of those who are unwilling to recognize the unborn child in the law.'' Precisely. That is the threat to Roe, and despite the disclaimers in the bill and the disclaimers of the distinguished chairman a few minutes ago, that is what we are talking about today.

If a fetus is recognized as a legal person, then this bill would open the door to barring abortions, to prosecuting women or to restraining them physically for the sake of the fetus. Some courts and State governments have already experimented with this approach. The last time we had occasion to consider this bill, the Supreme Court had just struck down a practice in the then-sponsor's home State of South Carolina in which a hospital would give the result of pregnant women's blood tests to local law enforcement for the purpose of initiating legal action against those women who might take action that might in some way endanger the fetus. Once we recognize even a zygote, two cells, as having the same legal status as the pregnant woman, it would logically follow that her liberty could be restricted to protect its interests. The whole purpose of Roe is to say that her liberty interests trump the interests of the fetus. This bill says exactly the opposite.

For those of us who are prochoice, the right to choose extends not just to a woman's right to have an abortion if she wants, but also to her right to carry a pregnancy to term if she wants and to deliver a healthy baby in safety. That is why we supported the Violence Against Women Act. That is why we support programs to provide proper prenatal care and nutrition to all women. That is why we support proper health and nutrition services after a birth. That is why we support other initiatives like the Family and Medical Leave Act. We do not believe that life begins at conception and ends at birth. We have an obligation to these children and to their parents both prenatally and postnatally.

Let there be no mistake, using physical violence against a woman to prevent her from having a child that she wants is just as much an assault on the right to choose as is the use of violence against women who wish to exercise their constitutional right to choose to end their pregnancy. A woman, and only a woman, has the right to decide when and whether to bring a child into the world; not an abusive partner, not a fanatic, not even Congress.

If we are serious about this problem, and the problem of domestic violence against pregnant women, we have effective remedies at our disposal. If we want to play abortion politics, we have an appropriate vehicle, this bill, before us for that purpose.

Violence against a pregnant woman deserves strong preventive measures and stiff punishment. According to the Journal of the American Medical Association, homicides during pregnancy, and in the year following birth, are the leading pregnancy-related death among women in the United States. Among nonpregnant women, it is the fifth leading cause of death.

Mr. Speaker, it is a disgrace that while these preventable crimes continue to occur, Congress fiddles with largely symbolic legislation designed to interfere with the right to choose rather than taking affirmative steps to deal with this real problem. Why does this Republican-controlled Congress and White House continually refuse to fund fully and adequately the Violence Against Women Act? It appears that many of the Members who have signed on to this bill are the same ones who voted to divert funds from protecting women from violence to protecting stock dividends from taxation.

We owe it to these victims to enact strong penalties, ones which are not constitutionally suspect, to end these heinous crimes. I urge that we adopt the Lofgren substitute to make an assault that harms a fetus a second crime with just as severe or more severe penalties as with this bill, but a second crime against the women so as to not to get into the question of rights of the person to full personhood, which is, of course, the purpose of this bill, but would undermine Roe v. Wade, despite the disingenuous disclaimer of some of the other people on the other side. Let us not crowd the issue of fighting domestic violence, of fighting violence against women and pregnant women, by plunging a legitimate law enforcement effort into the murky waters of the abortion debate.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the distinguished chairman said a moment ago that in the Innocent Child Protection Act of 2000 we made settled law the personhood of the fetus. It is not correct. In the Innocent Child Protection Act of 2000, we simply said that a pregnant woman could not be executed, and we defined a pregnant woman as someone who had a child in utero, and then defined, as the chairman said, the words ``child in utero.''

It is not what we are talking about here. For the purpose of saying you cannot execute a pregnant woman, we have defined what a pregnant woman means. That is all that bill did.

This bill seeks to establish a fetus as a separate legal person by giving it separate legal rights in order transparently to make it a separate legal person within the meaning of the 14th amendment that says no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. That is exactly the opposite of what the Supreme Court said when it said we have never held a fetus to be a person in the full meaning of the term. This bill is an attempt to whittle away at that term.

The distinguished chairman of the subcommittee says we have to acknowledge the particularly heinous nature of the crime, and indeed, we do. The Lofgren substitute acknowledges the assault on the fetus as a separate crime to be separately punished, to be additionally punished, but a separate crime against the woman because her interest in carrying that pregnancy to term and bearing a healthy baby is assaulted.

It does not recognize it as a separate crime against a separate person, which is the object of this bill and what we are debating, and which is why this bill, despite the disclaimers of the proponents, is a direct assault on Roe v. Wade, a direct assault on abortion, and if all they are interested in is to make a separate crime when you assault a

fetus, when you harm a fetus, then the Lofgren substitute is perfectly adequate for that. But their aim is to damage the right to choose, and that is the real purpose of this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Iowa just hit the nail on the head. He said the purpose of this bill is to recognize that there are two victims, two people involved in this. That is exactly the point of this bill, and that is exactly why we should not pass this bill without the Lofgren substitute. I am glad the previous speaker and some of the other speakers on the other side stripped away the false rhetoric on this bill. This bill is not about punishing an assault on a fetus separately; the substitute as well as the bill does that. This is not about giving it an additional punishment; the substitute as well as the bill does that.

This is about saying that there are two victims, not one victim; that the fetus or the embryo or the zygote, depending on the status of the pregnancy, is a separate legal person. That is the point of the bill. That is why we must have the substitute, why we cannot agree to the bill, because the whole point of the bill is to establish legally separate fetal personhood, which would undermine the entire rationale of Roe v. Wade and undermine a woman's right to choose, because if a fetus is a separate legal person, how can she choose to terminate the pregnancy?

This is revolutionary notion going way back to Biblical law. If we look at the original Five Books of Moses, it says very plainly if you assault a woman and she dies, you should be put to death. And if you assault a woman and she miscarries, you shall pay her monetary compensation. In other words, by killing the fetus, you have damaged an interest of the woman for which she is due compensation, but you have not committed murder as you have if you kill the born person, the woman.

So we have never in our history recognized a fetus as a separate legal person. The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade specifically says we have never recognized a fetus as a separate person.

If we were to do so, then we would get into the 14th amendment question that you cannot deprive a person of life, or liberty or process, without due process of law; and that is the purpose of this bill. That is the purpose of similar bills in the State legislatures, I suspect, to give underpinning to a future Supreme Court majority to say that we recognize a fetus as a person within the meaning of the 14th amendment and, therefore, abortion is murder and, therefore, Roe v. Wade is overruled and, therefore, States have no right to legalize murder and you would need a constitutional amendment to permit abortions in this country.

That is the real point of this bill. And strip away all the disingenuous rhetoric about everything else, because everything else we agree on. We agree that there ought to be an additional penalty if you harm the fetus when you assault a woman. We agree that it should be a separate additional crime. The only question here between the bill and the substitute is should the separate additional crime for harming the fetus be a crime against the woman as we say, an additional separate crime against a woman deserving an additional separate penalty? Or should it be an additional crime against a second person, the fetus being recognized as a person?

That is the issue in this bill and this substitute. To say that it is not and to quarry the abortion debate is quite simply disingenuous. That is why the bill was introduced. That is why they are pushing it. It is why we are opposing it.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Florida mentions various polling data that large majorities of people who are polled say that someone who attacks the woman and harms the fetus, that there are two separate crimes here. There is no dispute on that point. We agree with that. There are two separate crimes. The substitute as well as the bill in chief make it two separate crimes. That is not at issue. What is at issue is who is the victim. The substitute says it is a separate crime against the woman. Two crimes, two punishments for separate crimes against the same victim. The bill says two victims. That is the distinction here. Are there two crimes? Yes, we say. Yes, they say. Are there two victims? Yes, they say from a legal point of view. No, we say, she is the victim of a second crime because the law does not recognize the fetus as a full person.

That is what this bill seeks to do. So it is not a question of two separate slaps on the wrist. We ought to punish the crime severely. The substitute punishes the crime as severely, in some cases more severely than does the bill. The question is do you recognize one victim or two victims, because there are legal consequences, there are juridical consequences, there are consequences of undermining Roe v. Wade and the right to choose based on whether you say this fetus is a person for legal purposes or simply that you say the woman is a victim twice and we will punish it appropriately. That is the question, not whether there are two crimes.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the distinguished gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the distinguished chairman, first of all, I congratulate him for endorsing the right to choose. But second of all, he talked about the woman who has chosen to bear her pregnancy to term, to have a child, and an assault which destroys her fetus or damages her fetus is an assault on her right to choose, and indeed it is. He is entirely right. That is why the substitute makes the assault on her fetus a separate crime with a separate penalty against her because it is indeed an assault on her right to choose to carry that pregnancy to term, and she is the damaged party because she has lost her right to carry the pregnancy to term. She has lost her right to bear a child, and that is why in the substitute we make it an additional crime against her.

The bill, of course, makes it a separate crime against the fetus, and that is the question here.

Also, the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns) quoted Exodus 21:22. He said it was 22:22, but it is 21:22. He misquoted what it said. Before I read it, let me be very clear: I did not raise this reference to the Bible because I think we ought to enact Biblical or religious law in this Chamber, far from it, but simply to show it has always been regarded, our civilization generally has regarded back to Biblical times the fetus as not having the status of a separate person.

Exodus 21:22 reads as follows: ``If men strive and hurt a woman with child so that her fruit depart from her,'' in other words, she has a miscarriage, they cause the destruction of the fetus, ``and yet no mischief follow, he shall be surely punished and he shall pay as the judges determine,'' monetary compensation. ``And if any mischief follow, then they shall give life for life.''

Now, I am not sure what the Bible means by ``mischief.'' I have an interpretation here from a rabbinical source that says it means if she dies.

But, in any event, if she does not die, if mischief does not follow, if she has a miscarriage, monetary compensation. It is only when mischief follows, when she dies, that he is guilty of a capital crime. That is precisely because at least the Bible did not consider the fetus to be a person for whose killing it is a capital crime, as killing a born person is.

Again, I cite this not because we are bound in enacting civil law to enact Biblical law, we are not, obviously, but simply to show, as I mentioned earlier, this bill, by trying to establish the fetus as a separate person for legal purposes, is a radical departure not only from Anglo-American legal traditions, but from all of Western legal traditions going way back to the Bible.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Solis).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Baldwin).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Woolsey).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I will read into the Record some letters that we have here. This bill has been represented as a bill on family violence. We have here a letter in opposition to the bill and in support of the Lofgren substitute from the Family Violence Prevention Fund. It says: ``If Congress is serious about stopping domestic violence against pregnant women and helping women and children who are victims, Members will quickly pass the Domestic Violence Screening, Treatment and Prevention Act, H.R. 1267.''

The American Association of University Women is opposed to this bill. The National Women's Law Center is opposed to this bill.

The National Council of Jewish Women is opposed to this bill in which they say that ``this bill defines an unborn child as a member of the species homo sapiens at any stage of development. For the first time, it gives separate legal protection to a fertilized egg, embryo, or fetus and mandates penalties for harm to an unborn child equal to those mandated for harm to the woman herself. This legal definition will set a precedent that the anti-choice movement can exploit in its ongoing efforts to equate abortion with murder. And it would establish a foundation on which to build a case that the rights of fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses are apart from and superior to the rights of the women in whose bodies they develop.

``The Unborn Victims of Violence Act is a sham designed to exploit the understandable public sympathy for a woman who loses her pregnancy or her life to violence in order to promote an agenda by which women will in fact lose control of their bodies to the State.'' That is from the National Council of Jewish Women.

The National Abortion Federation, the Religious Coalition of Reproductive Choice, the American Civil Liberties Union, NARAL, People for the American Way, the National Organization for Women, all of these groups are concerned either about abortion rights, about reproductive rights, about women's rights, about domestic violence; and they are all opposed to this bill.

Juley Fulcher of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, which is the group that for the last 25 years has led the fight for antidomestic violence legislation in the States and in the Congress, testified against this bill in our committee, and I commend her testimony to my colleagues.

Mr. Speaker, I will insert all of these letters into the Record at this time.

Family Violence Prevention Fund,

Washington, DC, January, 27, 2004.

Hon. Jerrold Nadler,

Rayburn House Office Building,

Washington, DC.

Dear Representative Nadler: On behalf of the Family

Violence Prevention Fund, I am writing to express concern

about the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, H.R. 1997, passed

by the House Judiciary Committee on January 21. We are deeply

disappointed that some are promoting this bill as a way to

end domestic violence, when better and more direct measures

to stop family violence languish in Congress year after year.

Members of Congress who want to stop abuse will put their

energy into passing the prevention and intervention measures

that offer great promise to stop violence before it starts.

The murder of Laci Peterson was an unspeakable tragedy, but

many laws designed as quick fixes have caused great harm. For

example, mandatory domestic violence health reporting laws

deter women from seeking the medical help they need. We need

to step back and consider what actually works. Our goal must

be to stop violence against all women, regardless of whether

they are pregnant.

If Congress is serious about stopping domestic violence

against pregnant women and helping women and children who are

victims, Members will quickly pass the Domestic Violence

Screening, Treatment and Prevention Act, H.R. 1267. this

essential bill would train health care providers to routinely

screen female patients for a lifetime history of abuse and

give women access to critical domestic violence services when

abuse is identified. Introduced in the House in March of 2003

by Representative Lois Capps (D-CA) and Steven LaTourette (R-

OH), this bill has the potential to prevent tragedies by

helping victims before violence escalates.

We also urge Congress to fully fund all Violence Against

Women Act programs and support legislation that would

actually prevent domestic violence before it begins. Domestic

violence prevention legislation should include services for

children who are exposed to abuse, programs that support

young families at risk of violence, and efforts to teach

young men and boys how to develop healthy, non-violent

relationships. Such legislation would do much more to stem

the tide of domestic violence than the Unborn Victims of

Violence Act.

Finally, we wish to thank you for your continued leadership

and support on this issue. As an advocate in Congress and as

one of our Founding Fathers, you truly make a difference in

the movement to end violence against women and children. If

we can be of assistance, please do not hesitate to contact

Kiersten Stewart in our Washington, D.C. office at 202-682-

1212.

Sincerely,

Esta Soler,

President,

Family Violence Prevention Fund.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I congratulate the distinguished gentleman from Illinois for the passion he brings to this discussion, but more than that, for the clarity and honesty he brings to this discussion, for he has swept away much of the rhetoric and much of the underbrush which impedes a clear view of this and defined the real issue.

This is a bill about abortion, as he quite clearly recognizes. Both the bill and the substitute have the same practical impact. They both define two crimes. They both define the same penalties. They both have the same deterrent effect. That is not the issue, as he recognizes.

The bill defines the fetus as a person from the moment of conception. The substitute does not recognize the fetus as a person, for legal purposes, from the moment of conception. That is the difference, and that is the core of the abortion debate, as the distinguished gentleman recognizes.

The people who believe abortion to be murder believe a fetus, a zygote, a blastocyst is a person, a full human person with full and equal and legal rights from the moment of conception. We do not. We do not use the euphemism ``a right to choose'' as a euphemism for abortion. We support a woman's right to choose to have an abortion if she wishes. We support a woman's right to bear a pregnancy to term if she wishes. That is why we say we support the right to choose.

Abortion is clearly troubling emotionally and intellectually to many people. I, for one, and I can only speak personally, would find an abortion of a 9-month pregnant fetus, that is to say, a 9-month-old fetus, a horror, and I believe it is, in fact, illegal, except to save the life of the mother. On the other hand, I do not believe that a two- cell zygote after conception is a human being. I do not believe that. I believe that it has the potential. It obviously has the potential to become a human being, but it is simply two cells, and I have no compunction about an abortion of a group of cells. I do not believe it to be a human being.

That question, whether a small clump of cells or an embryo is a human being or not, is not a question that we are ever going to agree on. The chairman said the abortion debate is going to be with us forever, and I think he may be right, certainly a long time. We are not going to disagree on that question.

The difference is I respect everyone's right to their opinion, whether informed by physiology, by religion, by morality, by their concept of morality, to make that decision for themselves as to how they regard a blastocyst or a zygote. Some religions declare it a human; some religions say no. I do not think it is the job of Congress to dictate to people how to make that very personal, moral decision. I believe that decision is one which must be left to a woman.

If a woman says that, to me, as the woman, the embryo at early stage of development is a human being, and I will not have an abortion even if it risks my life, I will respect that decision. She is entitled to it. I would not support Congress coming in and saying we will save her life despite her will if she is competent because we do not agree with her moral decision. On the other hand, if she says, my moral decision is that I do not believe an early embryo or fetus is a human being and I want to have an abortion, that is her decision. I will not want Congress or the State legislature or the President to say, you are wrong morally, my moral conviction is superior to yours, and therefore, I will use the power of the State, the power of compulsion to put my moral conviction over yours. That is the debate here.

This bill is mostly a sham. The distinguished gentleman from Illinois takes the sham away and says what is really at stake, what is really the issue, and the real issue is are we going to say, which we have never said before, we had that Biblical passage

which I brought, as I said before, I do not think Congress ought to enact Biblical or religious law into civil law, but I brought it to show that in the Biblical times they did not regard a fetus as a person, because if you killed the fetus, you had monetary compensations. If the woman died, there was a capital punishment because the fetus is not regarded as a full person. That brought back, we have not regarded an Anglo-Saxon law, a Roman law up until now, a fetus as a full person.

Now, because of the abortion debate that erupted 30 years or so ago, the last 30 years, people have tried to change the law to say that we should give legal recognition to the assertion that a fetus or an embryo from the moment of conception is a person for legal purposes. We do not agree with that. This bill would do that. Therefore, we are opposed to this bill.

Some people have that opinion. Some people have that conviction. I respect the conviction. Some religions say so. I respect that. Others disagree. We should not use the power of law to impose that opinion, that theological opinion, that physiological opinion, that moral opinion on people who do not share it and wish to have abortions or other acts that may flow from that.

That is the distinction here, and this bill is an abortion bill despite not what the gentleman from Illinois said, but some other people said, because, as I said before, the consequences of the defining a second crime, the substitute would do, giving a severe penalty, giving additional penalties, are the same in the bill and the substitute. The difference is the legal underpinning, and the only reason we care about the legal underpinning is because of what it says about the key distinction underneath the legal right to an abortion and the underpinning for Roe v. Wade.

I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I understand, and I am not an expert in probate or estate law, but I do understand that as the fetus gets older, our law gives it more recognition. In fact, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade said in the first trimester the interest of the woman and her choice completely prevails, you cannot regulate abortion. In the second trimester there is more of an interest, and, therefore, you can regulate; and in the third trimester after viability, you can prohibit abortion. That is in Roe v. Wade because it recognizes that there is more interest that attaches. I do not deny that, and exactly how much attaches and so forth we can debate in a lot of contexts.

What I am saying is that the definition of the fetus or the embryo as a human being, as a person, for purposes of law in all respects, which is what this bill would do, we have never done. We do not do now, we have never done, and in my opinion we should not because it is one conception. It is a defensible proposition, but it is not a proposition that many people and religions agree with, and it is not a proposition that we should impose by Congress pro or con. I urge adoption of the substitute, not the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Watson).

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 529, I call up the bill (H.R. 1997) to amend title 18, United States Code, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice to protect unborn children from assault and murder, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous materials on H.R. 1997 currently under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, on January 7, 18-year-old Ashley Lyons and her unborn son, Landon, were murdered in Scott County, Kentucky. Current Kentucky law regards this crime as having only a single victim. But Carol Lyons, Ashley's mother and Landon's grandmother, said, ``Nobody can tell me that there were not two victims. I placed Landon in his mother's arms, wrapped in a baby blanket that I had sewn for him, just before I kissed my daughter good-bye for the last time and closed the casket.'' We are here today to tell Carol Lyons she is right. There were two victims that day.

The Kentucky legislature has recently acted to recognize Landon as a victim under Kentucky law, and Kentucky's Governor is going to sign that legislation. But today, Congress has yet to pass legislation recognizing unborn victims of violence under Federal law. The House has done so twice by large margins, but the Senate has failed to act.

The Unborn Victims of Violence Act provides that if an unborn child is injured or killed during the commission of crimes of violence already defined under Federal law, prosecutors can bring two charges, one on behalf of the mother and the second on behalf of the unborn victim. Indeed, the House of Representatives in the 106th Congress, by a unanimous 417 to nothing vote, passed the Innocent Child Protection Act, a bill only two sentences long, that banned the Federal execution of a woman while she carries a ``child in utero.'' ``Child in utero'' is defined in that bill exactly, to the word, as it is in this bill, namely, as ``a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.''

Now, opponents of H.R. 1997 will argue that harm to an unborn victim should simply be considered an additional harm to the mother, not an independent harm to another human being. Yet, a vote for the Innocent Child Protection Act two Congresses ago cannot be defended on the grounds that executing a pregnant woman would cause her to suffer additional harm because there can be no additional harm exceeding the ultimate and final punishment of death. Since the only logical rationale for the support of the Innocent Child Protection Act was to prevent the killing of an innocent unborn child, H.R. 1997, which also recognizes unborn victims, should have similarly overwhelming bipartisan support. We shall see.

The legislation before us now requires us to reflect on the goals and purposes of the criminal law. Ultimately, the criminal law is not a schedule of punishments. It is an expression of society's values. It is an expression of society's values. Anything less than the legislation before us today simply does not resonate with society's sense of justice. The tragic murders of Laci and Conner Peterson in California have drawn national attention to unborn victims and the American people have overwhelmingly responded with more than 80 percent support for bringing two separate charges against their murderer.

The Unborn Victims of Violence Act protects the right of a mother to choose to bring her wanted and loved child to term, safe from the violent hands of criminals who would brutally deny her that right. This bill, however, has nothing to do with abortion. Let me repeat that. The bill has nothing to do with abortion. That fact could not be expressed more clearly in the legislation which explicitly excludes abortion- related conduct. Further, the Supreme Court, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, has already refused to strike down Missouri's unborn victims of violence law, stating that it ``does not by its terms regulate abortion.'' Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1997, just like the Missouri law that the Supreme Court refused to strike down, does not by its terms regulate abortion and, indeed, H.R. 1997 includes provisions that specifically exclude abortion-related conduct.

Both before and since the Webster decision, every single unborn victims law passed by State legislatures that has been challenged in court has been upheld. Anyone who claims this bill has anything to do with abortion and opposes it on those grounds is inviting this body to focus not on unborn child victims, but on red herrings.

Tracy Marciniak, whose unborn child was murdered by her husband, has told Congress, ``Please don't tell me that my son was not a murder victim.'' The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, I hope, will pass this body overwhelmingly today if only each Member opens their eyes to the photo of the dead body of Tracy Marciniak's murdered child and opens their hearts to the mothers who have implored Congress to give their unborn babies the status they deserve under the criminal law. I urge my colleagues to do so by supporting this legislation before the House today.

Mr. Speaker, at this time I will include for the Record two letters that the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, and I have exchanged regarding the two committees' jurisdictional claims on this legislation.

Committee on Armed Services,

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, February 9, 2004.

Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,

Chairman, House Judiciary Committee, Rayburn HOB, Washington,

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes to make 3 points.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from New York seems to imply that this bill has to do with tax cuts and appropriation levels. It does not. It has to do with the criminal law, and as an aside, the criminal law is an expression of the sense of values of the legislative body that puts the criminal law on the books.

Secondly, the gentleman from New York seems to think that we are plowing new ground in making a definition of what a child in utero is and giving the child in utero the protections that are contained in this bill. That is a settled issue, and on July 25, 2000, with the gentleman from New York's support, we passed the Protection of Innocent Children Act which defined a child in utero as meaning a member of the species Homo sapiens at any stage in development who is carried in the womb, and that means a two-cell zygote.

Thirdly, the gentleman from New York seems to want to interject the abortion debate in this bill. That is not the case at all, and I would refer him to page 7 of the bill as reported that says nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the prosecution of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman or a person authorized by law to act on her behalf has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law.

So what we are dealing with here is wanted children, children that the mother has every intention of bringing to term to have, to give birth and to give that child a nurturing and loving household and a nurturing and loving upbringing. These are the children that we wish to provide protection for under this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot), who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Hart), the principal author of the bill.

(Ms. HART asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. King).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, let us get back to the Innocent Child Protection Act, which passed the House unanimously on July 25, 2000. The purpose of that bill, which is law today, was to prevent the killing of a child in utero because of the mother's crimes causing the death penalty to be imposed. There the legislation, again which was signed into law, defined the child in utero as a human being at any stage of development who is carried in the womb. So that we decided and we made law 3\1/2\ years ago when the Innocent Child Protection Act was passed.

I would note that the three Members on the other side of the aisle who have spoken against the current bill all voted in favor of the Innocent Child Protection Act and the definition that I have just repeated for, I believe, the third time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrey).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Lewis).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Garrett).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence), a member of the committee.

(Mr. PENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, the women who are the victims of the violence that has caused death or harm to their babies have already made their choice, and their choice was to carry their babies to term and to give birth and to raise those children in hopefully a nurturing and loving household. To say that this legislation takes away the choice of a woman is just flat-out wrong. Maybe some people disagree with the choice that that woman made, but that is a personal choice; and we ought to recognize that this legislation respects that personal choice.

And then to hear that this legislation is an assault on the Constitution is completely missing the point. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld fetal homicide laws, two-victim crime laws. The Webster case, I think, was the most emphatic upholding of that, and that is a Supreme Court that has also consistently refused to modify Roe v. Wade or to overrule it. So the Court has been able to make a distinction which apparently some of the Members on the other side of this argument have not been able to make, that fetal homicide laws are constitutional, two-victim crime laws are legal as well.

Now, I hope that more Members would have been able to hear the arguments that were advanced by the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrey),

who was an obstetrician by profession before he was elected to Congress. He has said that in some instances a minor bruise on the abdomen of a pregnant woman can result in the death of the child. If all that someone can be prosecuted for is that minor bruise, then the full force of the law against someone who has caused the death of another would not be able to be imposed against that defendant without a two-victim bill. And that is why two victims is so important. It is important, it is constitutional; but, most of all, it respects the right of the women who have decided that they do not want an abortion, that they want to give birth, and they want to raise the child with all the love that a newborn child deserves.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Aderholt).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Kennedy).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite of Florida).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett).

(Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Ferguson).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), who will close the general debate on this side.

(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the substitute amendment should be soundly defeated as it would throw salt into the wounds of those parents who have implored this Congress to recognize under Federal law the loss of their loved, unborn child.

These mothers are not seeking recognition of the violence they have suffered alone. They are seeking recognition of the violence their unborn children have suffered as well. They are seeking recognition of the loss of their unborn child.

H.R. 1997 recognizes that loss; the substitute does not. This House has defeated this substitute amendment each time it has been brought up, with increasing margins during the 106th and 107th Congresses. We should increase that margin today.

A recent Fox News poll asked, ``If Scott Peterson is convicted of killing his pregnant wife, Laci, do you think he should be charged with one count of homicide for murdering his wife, or two counts of homicide for murdering both his wife and his unborn son?'' An overwhelming 84 percent of the American people responded that two counts, not one, should be brought.

These results are confirmed by two other recent polls that show support for two separate charges for violent criminals who harm mothers and their unborn children. Support for a separate charge for an unborn victim is 84 percent, according to a Newsweek poll, and 79 percent, including 69 percent of those who describe themselves as prochoice, according to another Fox News poll conducted in July. Each poll found that less than 1 in 10 Americans disagree.

I would ask my colleagues to join with the overwhelming majority of Americans who have responded to these polls, including those who describe themselves as being prochoice, to reject this amendment and not join with the very small minority, less than 1 in 10 of those who are polled, who would support the one-victim approach.

This substitute amendment embodies the extreme ideology of those who are unwilling to recognize an unborn child in the law in any context whatsoever. The term ``unborn child'' as used in H.R. 1997 has been widely used and accepted by judges, including the Supreme Court, and Justice Blackmun, the author of the Roe v. Wade decision itself. The term ``unborn child'' has been widely tested in court and has sustained all constitutional challenges in terms of a fetal homicide law. Removing that term and replacing it with the vague and untested language of the substitute would accomplish nothing, while risking grave confusion and jeopardizing the conviction of violent Federal criminals. The abstract language in the substitute, which points to injuries to a ``pregnancy,'' ignores the fact that violent criminals can and do inflict injuries on a real human being in his or her mother's womb. If an assault is committed on a Member of Congress and her unborn child subsequently suffers from a disability because of the assault, that injury cannot accurately be described as an abstract injury to a pregnancy. It is an injury to an unborn child. The bill recognizes that. The substitute does not.

Also, unlike the language of H.R. 1997, the substitute contains no exceptions for abortion-related conduct, for conduct of the mother, or for medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her unborn child. This omission leaves

the substitute amendment bare to the charge that it would permit the prosecution of mothers who have abortions who inflict harm upon themselves and their unborn children or doctors who incidentally kill or injure unborn children during the provision of medical treatment. For that reason, the substitute amendment will certainly be subject to a successful constitutional challenge. The underlying bill has been tested and proven constitutional.

Today's debate is not about penalties. It is about victims. H.R. 1997 recognizes unborn victims of violence. The substitute does not. In the name of unborn victims, including Conner Peterson, Heaven Lashay Pace, Zachariah Marciniak, Landon Lyons and the others who are not named today but are known and loved and missed by their surviving family, the substitute should be soundly defeated and the bill passed.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot), the distinguished subcommittee chairman.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Hart).

Mr. Speaker, I have one more speaker to close on this side. Does the gentlewoman from California have any further speakers?

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).

Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), the majority leader.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time, and I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) for his leadership on this issue. I also want to commend and thank the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Hart), the principal sponsor of this bill, for her leadership.

Sadly, recent studies in Maryland, North Carolina and New York City and Illinois indicate that homicide is the leading cause of death of pregnant women in those parts of the country. Those homicides are often inspired by the desire to kill a woman's unborn child. Yet due to gaps in the Federal criminal law, an unborn child can be killed or injured during the commission of a violent Federal crime without any legal consequences.

These gaps are appalling to the American people. Recent polls have shown that upwards of 80 percent of registered voters, including 69 percent of voters who consider themselves to be prochoice, believe that prosecutors should be able to separately charge the violent attacker of a pregnant woman that kills her unborn child. Yet today, for example, if a man stalks his pregnant wife across State lines and attacks her, injuring her but killing the unborn child, that man could not be prosecuted under Federal law for the loss of the baby's life.

The Unborn Victims of Violence Act fills this glaring gap in Federal law with a simple expression of basic understanding, namely, that the loss of an unborn child to an act of violence deserves separate recognition under Federal law. This bill provides that if an unborn child is injured or killed during the commission of crimes of violence already defined under Federal law, prosecutors can bring two charges, one on behalf of the mother, the other on behalf of the unborn victim.

H.R. 1997 recognizes that the loss of an unborn child at any stage of development is a unique and separate loss both to society and to the mother who carried and loved that child. This bill, for the first time under Federal law, treats an unborn victim of violence as something more than a torn spleen or a bruised appendix or other physical injuries incurred during the course of a violent attack that might warrant enhanced penalties but not separate charges under Federal law now. H.R. 1997 treats such unborn victims with the respect and dignity under the law that their loving mothers and the American people rightfully demand for them.

We must all ask ourselves, is an injury to an unborn child the same thing as a broken bone? If the answer is no, as I think we all know that it is, then the only appropriate response is to treat harm to an unborn victim as a distinct and separate offense under Federal law.

This legislation has been called merely symbolic by its opponents, but I wonder how many women in America would view the loss of their unborn child through violent means as merely symbolic. Certainly not Tracy Marciniak, whose unborn child was murdered by her husband. She told the Subcommittee on the Constitution, referring to the substitute amendment which we will be dealing with later, ``Please don't tell me that my son was not a real murder victim,'' and, ``Please remember Zachariah's name and face'' when you vote on a substitute amendment that refuses to allow a separate charge for the killing of a wanted, unborn child.

Shiwona Pace, whose unborn child Heaven Sashay was brutally murdered by three hired hitmen, has also testified that, ``It seems to me that any Congressman who votes for the `one-victim' amendment,'' in other words, the substitute, ``is really saying that nobody died that night. And that is a lie.''

Indeed, because unborn victims are distinct victims, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act is also referred to as Laci and Conner's Law, for Laci and Conner Peterson, two recent victims of terrible violence.

Opponents of the legislation before us today claim it will open the door to all manner of terrible imagined future legislation, but the only door this legislation opens is the door to a distinct room in the edifice of the Federal Code in which unborn victims of violence can be granted the distinct respect they are owed. Just as expecting mothers reserve space in their home for wanted and loved unborn children, we in Congress should reserve for unborn victims of violence a distinct place under the protective shield of criminal law by providing for a separate offense when they are violently killed or injured. The American people consider the murder of an unborn child distinctly offensive, and they demand that the murder of an unborn child be a distinct offense under Federal law, and I urge its passage.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. This substitute amendment should be soundly defeated. The substitute amendment appears to operate as a mere sentence enhancement authorizing punishment in addition to any penalty imposed for the predicate offense. That is most unfortunate. No sentencing enhancement can adequately express society's disapproval for the distinct loss that occurs when a mother's unborn child is harmed or killed by a violent criminal. A loss that is both unique and uniquely offensive to both a loving expectant mother and to the vast majority of Americans warrants a unique and separate offense under the criminal law. H.R. 1997 provides for a separate offense. The substitute does not.

Indeed, the witnesses we heard from in committee supporting H.R. 1997, this bill, have told us that they are not Republicans or Democrats, they are not lawyers, they are people who have lost unborn children to violence, and they want those children treated appropriately under the law. That is precisely what H.R. 1997 does. The substitute does not.

Sharon Rocha, the mother of Laci Peterson and the grandmother of unborn victim, Conner Peterson, has written that ``the Lofgren proposal would enshrine in law the offensive concept that such crimes have only a single victim, the pregnant woman.''

Shiwona Pace, whose unborn child, Heaven, was brutally murdered by three hired hitmen, has said, ``It seems to me that any Congressman who votes for the one victim amendment is really saying that nobody died that night. And that is a lie.''

Those who focus this debate on penalties and abstract terms such as harm to a pregnancy rather than to an unborn child misunderstand the purposes of the criminal law. The criminal law does not exist only to punish criminals; it exists to lend dignity to victims, including unborn victims. It is an expression not only of society's disapproval of certain conduct, but of its recognition of the victims of such conduct and the manner in which such victims should be recognized. Creating a separate offense for harm to an unborn child forces all of us, including potential criminals, to consider the act of harming an unborn child as an independent evil.

A Newsweek poll found that only 9 percent of those surveyed, less than one in 10 Americans, oppose a separate offense for killing an unborn child. Those 9 percent of Americans should be heard, of course; and they have been heard through this substitute amendment. But they must not win, as the law exists in large part to reflect America's overwhelmingly shared values, and those shared values support separate charges for the killing and injuring of wanted, unborn children.

I ask, looking at this picture, this is Tracy Marciniak that we have talked about. This is her unborn child here, Zachariah. Tracy was attacked by her husband when she was 8 months pregnant with this child. Tracy survived her physical injuries. The child died that night. I ask you, this is the funeral of this child. There is Tracy holding her child. How many victims do we see in this photograph? I think it is clear, there are two victims in that photograph. This legislation that we are addressing here today recognizes two victims. The substitute amendment does not.

The terminology in the substitute amendment is hopelessly confusing; and if adopted, it will almost certainly jeopardize any prosecution involving the injuring or killing of an unborn child during the commission of a violent crime. The substitute amendment provides an enhanced penalty for ``interruption to the normal course of the pregnancy resulting in prenatal injury, including termination of the pregnancy.'' The amendment then authorizes greater punishment for an interruption that terminates the pregnancy than it does for a mere interruption of a pregnancy. What exactly is

the difference between an interruption of a pregnancy and an interruption that terminates the pregnancy? The substitute does not say. Does any interruption of a pregnancy not necessarily result in a termination of the pregnancy? Or have the supporters of this amendment somehow succeeded in mastering the science of suspended animation? By defining an interruption to the normal course of the pregnancy, the substitute is either science fiction or simply impossible for Federal prosecutors to decipher and apply.

The substitute amendment is a moral failure in that it refuses to recognize that unborn children can be victims of violence. It is a drafting failure in that its ambiguous terminology would leave prosecutors at a loss as to how to administer it. And it is a constitutional failure in that it contains no exceptions for abortion- related conduct. The substitute should be soundly defeated.

In my view, it all comes down and this entire debate is best summed up in a single photograph. Whether or not there are two victims in this photograph or only one is the issue that is at hand. The majority in this House, as we have had it here twice before and it has passed with pretty overwhelming numbers, the majority of us see the clear indication in this picture that there are two victims. The substitute amendment, and it is craftily worded, but ambiguous enough that prosecutors have indicated that successfully prosecuting an offense under the substitute is virtually impossible; but the people that support that particular substitute amendment are indicating in essence that there is only one victim here. I think common sense should prevail. There are two victims.

I would strongly urge my colleagues to defeat the substitute amendment and pass the underlying bill.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, let us be clear, on its face, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act appears to be a tool to prevent assault against pregnant women and nonconsensual termination of pregnancy. Upon closer examination, it is obvious that the purpose of the bill is to conflict with the core principles of Roe v. Wade.

The Unborn Victims of Violence Act focuses on, legally recognizes a fetus, an embryo, a blastocyst, a fertilized egg as a person with rights and interests separate from and equal to those of the woman.

Today I offer a substitute that my colleagues and I hope can unify Members on both sides of the debate over choice to achieve a very important goal, the deterrence and punishment of violent acts against pregnant women.

According to the purported goals of H.R. 1997, that is our common ground, but it is clear that the purpose of H.R. 1997 is not actually to achieve the purported common goal of protecting pregnant women from assault. If that were the case, we would all vote today

for the Lofgren substitute and begin to ensure that women across the country are safe from violence.

The Lofgren substitute does not threaten Roe v. Wade, but instead creates a new separate offense for any violent or assaultive conduct against a pregnant woman that interrupts or terminates her pregnancy. The substitute provides that any termination in the pregnancy is punishable by a fine and imprisonment of up to 20 years, and if the pregnancy is terminated, even if unintentionally, the assailant can be sentenced to life in prison. These penalties are even tougher than those provided for in the Unborn Victims of Violence Act.

Those of us who have experienced a miscarriage understand a very essential truth: The loss is something you never forget. Whether the woman is 6 weeks pregnant or 6 months pregnant, the loss is acutely felt by that woman, and it deserves the full penalty that the law can provide.

Penalties under H.R. 1997, however, vary depending upon the underlying crime resulting in inconsistent penalties for the same horrific crime. In fact, under H.R. 1997, if a postal worker was assaulted and there is a resulting injury to her pregnancy, there is only a maximum penalty of 3 years; but if the same assault happened to another Federal employee, her assailant could get up to 8 years in prison under H.R. 1997. Why should the penalty for injury to one pregnant woman over another depend upon where she works? It defies logic and reason.

Unlike the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, the Lofgren substitute has tough, consistent penalties for the same horrific crime, regardless of irrelevant circumstances like the place of employment. A loss or injury to a pregnancy is the same loss to a woman no matter where she works.

Mr. Speaker, advocates for H.R. 1997 say their bill is about protecting women from violence. In fact, the bill ignores women. H.R. 1997 does not address the woman nor the assault committed against her. Under H.R. 1997, there is a possibility that the crime against the woman could go unpunished because there is no conviction requirement for the underlying crime. How can the other side say they are preventing crime against pregnant women when you ignore her and the crime against her?

Mr. Speaker, the bottom line is the Lofgren substitute does not needlessly interject the abortion debate and exploit what is concededly a matter of a pregnant woman's right to a safe, healthy and free from horrific acts of violence pregnancy.

Although many have said that the underlying bill has nothing to do with abortion, I think it is important to look at what some of the proponents of the antichoice movement have said about the bill, and I would like to quote Samuel Casey, the executive director of the Christian Legal Society, who said last year, ``In as many areas as we can, we want to put on the books that the embryo is a person. That sets the stage for a jurist to acknowledge that human beings at any stage of development deserve protection, even protection that would trump a woman's interest in terminating a pregnancy.''

Joe Cook, vice president of the American Association of Pro Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists, said last year, ``We have to approach this in a way that is doable, a step at a time. This bill is aimed at establishing that a fetus in utero is a human being and has human rights.''

Finally, Senator Orrin Hatch said last year, ``They say it undermines abortion rights; it does, but that is irrelevant.'' Irrelevant perhaps in the other body, but not to me.

Mr. Speaker, I support legislation that has the goal of protecting a pregnant woman from violence. I cannot do so through legislation that would also undermine other extremely important rights of women, like the right to choose. That is antithetical to the protection and safety of women.

I hope we can come together on this substitute. Last Congress there were a number of antichoice Members of the House that voted for the substitute, understanding that the penalties are more severe and would provide more complete protection for women. I urge those individuals to do so again to show this country that Congress is serious about protecting pregnant women from violence.

We have in this country and in this House strong disagreement about who gets to decide whether a pregnancy will be brought to term or not, the Congress or the woman. That debate is going to go on for a long time, but it does not have to be part of this discussion. We can come together to protect women against violence without having the argument about abortion involved in that effort. I hope that we can come together to embrace common ground on what I think could be a moment of triumph for this Congress and for the American people in standing against violence against women.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would note that on line 6 on page 1 of the amendment, it notes that whoever engages in any violent or assaultive conduct against a pregnant woman resulting in the conviction of the person so engaging does not include an abortion that is legal because of Roe v. Wade.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Woolsey).

Mr. Speaker, I would just note that just for corrective purposes, the Lofgren substitute does provide for a separate offense, not a sentence enhancement.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Baldwin), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton).

Mr. Speaker, may I ask how much time remains?

Do I have the right to close, Mr. Speaker?

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Linda T. Sanchez), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the substitute that I have offered creates a separate Federal criminal offense for assaulting a pregnant woman resulting in injury or termination of her pregnancy, without entangling the issue in our disagreement about abortion and the woman's right to choose.

In addition to recognizing the horrendous underlying crime of assault on a pregnant woman, it recognizes the horrific crime of assault on a pregnant woman that results in the interruption or termination of a pregnancy. It creates an offense that protects pregnant women and punishes violence without conflicting with the core principles of Roe v. Wade.

The substitute provides consistent penalties for the same horrific crime. It provides for a consistent maximum 20-year sentence for injury and a consistent maximum life sentence for causing the termination of a woman's pregnancy. It requires a conviction for the underlying criminal offense, ensuring the crime against the woman is also punished, and it focuses on the assault of violence committed against the pregnant woman, providing a deterrent effect for violence against women.

I am sure that the Members of this body who oppose a woman's right to choose also oppose violence against women. There is no disagreement on that score. All I am saying with my substitute is that we have the ability to come together in this substitute against violence against women without engaging in our very serious disagreement about choice.

I think it has been made clear by the proponents of this bill that it is about choice. That is why this bill, the underlying bill, was referred and considered by the Subcommittee on the Constitution, not the Subcommittee on Crime, in the Committee on the Judiciary, because it is about the Constitution.

The point of the underlying bill is to undercut Roe v. Wade. I think Roe v. Wade provides important protections for the women of this country. I am 56 years old, and I remember as an undergraduate in college young women who had to seek abortions from illegal providers or go to another country. I know women who almost lost their lives. Thankfully, because the Supreme Court has now recognized that women have the right to make choices about their own reproduction, women now do not have to seek illegal or dangerous health care solutions when they have made a decision that they cannot have a child.

I think that Roe v. Wade, by allowing women to make decisions about their own lives, is an important principle and an important defense for the freedom of American women, and I do not think American women should give up their freedom in order to get protection from violence. That is what I think the underlying intent of H.R. 1997 is. I think that is why the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, which represents organizations and domestic violence shelters in all 50 States, opposes

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. Speaker, while it is the independent duty of each branch of the Federal Government to act constitutionally, Congress will likely continue to ignore not only its constitutional limits but earlier criticisms from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, as well.

The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001, H.R. 1997, would amend title 18, United States Code, for the laudable goal of protecting unborn children from assault and murder. However, by expanding the class of victims to which unconstitutional, but already-existing, Federal murder and assault statutes apply, the Federal Government moves yet another step closer to a national police state.

Of course, it is much easier to ride the current wave of federalizing every human misdeed in the name of saving the world from some evil than to uphold a constitutional oath which prescribes a procedural structure by which the Nation is protected from what is perhaps the worst evil, totalitarianism. Who, after all, wants to be amongst those Members of Congress who are portrayed as soft on violent crimes initiated against the unborn?

Nevertheless, our Federal Government is constitutionally, a government of limited powers. Article one, section eight, enumerates the legislative areas for which the U.S. Congress is allowed to act or enact legislation. For every other issue, the Federal Government lacks any authority or consent of the governed and only the State governments, their designees, or the people in their private market actions enjoy such rights to governance. The 10th amendment is brutally clear in stating ``The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.'' Our Nation's history makes clear that the U.S. Constitution is a document intended to limit the power of central government. No serious reading of historical events surrounding the creation of the Constitution could reasonably portray it differently.

However, Congress does more damage than just expanding the class to whom Federal murder and assault statutes apply--it further entrenches and seemingly concurs with the Roe v. Wade decision--the Court's intrusion into rights of States and their previous attempts to protect by criminal statute the unborn's right not to be aggressed against. By specifically exempting from prosecution both abortionists and the mothers of the unborn--as is the case with this legislation--Congress appears to say that protection of the unborn child is not only a Federal matter but conditioned upon motive. In fact, the Judiciary Committee in marking up the bill, took an odd legal turn by making the assault on the unborn a strict liability offense insofar as the bill does not even require knowledge on the part of the aggressor that the unborn child exists. Murder statutes and common law murder require intent to kill--which implies knowledge--on the part of the aggressor. Here, however, we have the odd legal philosophy that an abortionist with full knowledge of his terminal act is not subject to prosecution while an aggressor acting without knowledge of the child's existence is subject to nearly the full penalty of the law. With respect to only the fetus, the bill exempts the murderer from the death sentence--yet another diminution of the unborn's personhood status and clearly a violation of the equal protection clause. It is becoming more and more difficult for Congress and the courts to pass the smell test as government simultaneously treats the unborn as a person in some instances and as a nonperson in others.

In his first formal complaint to Congress on behalf of the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist said ``the trend to federalize crimes that have traditionally been handled in state courts . . . threatens to change entirely the nature of Federal system.'' Rehnquist further criticized Congress for yielding to the political pressure to ``appear responsive to every highly publicized societal ill or sensational crime.''

Perhaps, equally dangerous is the loss of another constitutional protection which comes with the passage of more and more Federal criminal legislation. Constitutionally, there are only three Federal crimes. These are treason against the United States, piracy on the high seas, and counterfeiting--and, because the constitution was amended to allow it, for a short period of history, the manufacture, sale, or transport of alcohol was concurrently a Federal and State crime. ``Concurrent'' jurisdiction crimes, such as alcohol prohibition in the past and federalization of murder today, erode the right of citizens to be free of double jeopardy. The fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution specifies that no ``person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . .'' In other words, no person shall be tried twice for the same offense. However, in United States v. Lanza, the high court in 1922 sustained a ruling that being tried by both the Federal Government and a State government for the same offense did not offend the doctrine of double jeopardy. One danger of unconstitutionally expanding the Federal criminal justice code is that it seriously increases the danger that one will be subject to being tried twice for the same offense. Despite the various pleas for federal correction of societal wrongs, a national police force is neither prudent nor constitutional.

Occasionaly the argument is put forth that States may be less effective than a centralized Federal Government in dealing with those who leave one State jurisdiction for another. Fortunately, the Constitution provides for the procedural means for preserving the integrity of State sovereignty over those issues delegated to it via the tenth amendment. The privilege and immunities clause as well as full faith and credit clause allow States to exact judgments from those who violate their State laws. The Constitution even allows the Federal Government to legislatively preserve the procedural mechanisms which allow States to enforce their substantive laws without the Federal Government imposing its substantive edicts on the States. Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 makes provision for the rendition of fugitives from one State to another. While not self-enacting, in 1783 Congress passed an act which did exactly this. There is, of course, a cost imposed upon States in working with one another rather than relying on a national, unified police force. At the same time, there is a greater cost to centralization of police power.

It is important to be reminded of the benefits of federalism as well as the cost. There are sound reasons to maintain a system of smaller, independent jurisdictions--it is called competition and, yes, governments must, for the sake of the citizenry, be allowed to compete. We have obsessed so much over the notion of ``competition'' in this country we harangue someone like Bill Gates when, by offering superior products to every other similarly-situated entity, he becomes the dominant provider of certain computer products. Rather than allow someone who serves to provide value as made obvious by their voluntary exchanges in the free market, we lambaste efficiency and economies of scale in the private marketplace. Curiously, at the same time, we further centralize government, the ultimate monopoly and

one empowered by force rather than voluntary exchange.

When small governments becomes too oppressive with their criminal laws, citizens can vote with their feet to a ``competing'' jurisdiction. If, for example, one does not want to be forced to pay taxes to prevent a cancer patient from using medicinal marijuana to provide relief from pain and nausea, that person can move to Arizona. If one wants to bet on a football game without the threat of government intervention, that person can live in Nevada. As government becomes more and more centralized, it becomes much more difficult to vote with one's feet to escape the relatively more oppressive governments. Governmental units must remain small with ample opportunity for citizen mobility both to efficient governments and away from those which tend to be oppressive. Centralization of criminal law makes such mobility less and less practical.

Protection of life--born or unborn--against initiations of violence is of vital importance. So vitally important, in fact, it must be left to the States' criminal justice systems. We have seen what a legal, constitutional, and philosophical mess results from attempts to federalize such an issue. Numerous States have adequately protected the unborn against assault and murder and done so prior to the Federal Government's unconstitutional sanctioning of violence in the Roe v. Wade decision. Unfortunately, H.R. 1997 ignores the danger of further federalizing that which is properly reserved to State governments and, in so doing, throws legal philosophy, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the insights of Chief Justice Rehnquist out with the baby and the bathwater.