Jerusalem Resolution

Mr. President, I rise to day to introduce, along with my colleagues Senator Smith from Oregon,

the multiemployer Pension Plan Procedural Fairness Act of 2003. The purpose of this legislation is to provide a modest amount of procedural fairness with respect to claims filed against former employers under the multiemployer pension plan (MEPPA) rules.

By way of background, MEPPA makes an employer that completely or partially withdraws from participation in a multiemployer pension fund liable for the employer's share of the plans' unfunded vested benefits. That liability is referred to as ``withdrawal liability'' and can be collected from any member of the controlled group of employers that included the withdrawing employer. The process of collecting withdrawal liability can become quite unfair when the pension fund attempts to assert liability against a former employer or a former member of a controlled group of employers that, as a result of a legitimate business separation, such as a sale or spin-off transaction, ceased to be associated with the withdrawing employer several years before the compete or partial withdrawal occurred.

MEPPA provides that a former employer or former member of a controlled group can still be liable if ``a principal purpose'' of the business separation transaction was ``to evade or avoid'' withdrawal liability. The legislative history indicates that the ``evade or avoid'' provision was designed to prevent unscrupulous employers from dumping a distressed subsidiary in order to evade or avoid withdrawal liability. I firmly believe that unscrupulous companies that attempt to evade withdrawal liability should be held liable. However, companies that engage in legitimate transactions should be able to defend against withdrawal liability claims that arose from events which occurred many years after the business separation.

The simplest way to understand the issue is with an illustration. Assume that a parent company operates a subsidiary that makes contributions to a multiemployer plan. Assume further that, for valid business reasons, the parent company disposes of the subsidiary via a bona fide ``spin-off'' transaction. At the time of the spin-off, the subsidiary was current on all of its required contributions to the multiemployer pension fund, and the subsidiary continues to make contributions to the multiemployer plan after the spin-off. To complete the example, assume that several years after the spin-off, the spun-off subsidiary goes out of business and ceases to make contributions to the multiemployer pension fund. Under this scenario, the MEPPA rules allow the pension fund to claim that a principal purpose of the transaction was to evade or avoid withdrawal liability. Because the MEPPA rules do not provide any time restrictions for making these claims, a former parent company may be forced to defend against such a claim years, if not decades after the transaction in question. By contrast, the single- employer plan rules provide a 5-year safe harbor rule that protects employers against such claims.

While multiemployer plans should certainly be able to pursue claims against unscrupulous employers, there are two procedural rules in MEPPA that severely and unfairly hinder an employer's ability to defend itself against a claim for withdrawal liability under the evade or avoid standard when the transaction in question occurred several years before the date of a complete or partial withdrawal. The first rule is referred to as the ``pay to play'' rule, and the second rule involves the burden of proof borne by the employer.

Under MEPPA, if the pension fund makes a claim for withdrawal liability against the former parent company under the ``evade or avoid'' standard, the claim is sent to arbitration. However, the parent company must begin making payments to the multiemployer pension plan within 60 days after receiving a demand solely based upon the plan's unilateral decision to assert a withdrawal liability claim and long before any neutral third party finds that ``a principal purpose'' of the challenged transaction was to ``evade or avoid'' withdrawal liability. As a result, a company that engaged in a bona fide business transaction many years before the withdrawal occurred is forced to begin paying on the claim based on nothing more than the plan's demand.

According to the legislative history, this unique ``pay to play'' rule was enacted in response to what Congress perceived to be inefficient, cumbersome and costly procedures for collecting delinquent contributions from employers. Simple collection actions were converted into complex litigation through defenses that were unrelated to the multiemployer plan's entitlement to the contribution. However, the relevant MEPPA language is not limited to collection actions. While it may be appropriate to require a contesting employer to commence payments while the claim is being litigated, it is not fair to require prepayment in the case of an ``evade or avoid'' claim when the transaction in question occurred many years before the complete or partial withdrawal occurred.

The second procedural unfairness involves the burden of proof that an employer faces in rebutting a claim under the ``evade or avoid'' standard. MEPPA provides that a plan sponsor's determination is presumed correct, unless the contesting party shows by a preponderance of evidence that the determination is incorrect. The impetus behind Congress's decision to include such a presumption was the need to avoid a perceived potential for conflict and delay over the soundness of actuarial determinations of liability. Specifically, the presumption was crafted in order to prevent ``the likelihood of dispute and delay over technical actuarial matters with respect to which there are often several equally `correct' approaches. Without such a presumption, a plan would be helpless to resist dilatory tactics by a withdrawing employer--tactics that could, and could be intended to, result in prohibitive collection costs to the plan.'' However, the MEPPA presumption language is not limited to actuarial determinations, but reaches liability determinations as well.

Even if this presumption is appropriate when withdrawal liability is triggered shortly after a transaction occurs, it is unfair to apply the presumption when the transaction in question occurred several years before the withdrawal took place. In this situation, a company that engages in a bona fide transaction may be forced to prove a negative-- namely that a principal purpose of a transaction that occurred many years ago was not to evade or avoid withdrawal liability.

To summarize, under the MEPPA rules, an employer may find itself in a position where it has to respond to claims regarding a legitimate business transaction that occurred many years earlier. Furthermore, in defending against the claim, the employer must 1. prove that a principal purpose of the transaction was not to evade or avoid withdrawal liability, and 2. prepay the contested amount of the liability well in advance of any final determination of liability. This is patently unfair. Our legislation is a modest attempt to inject some notions of procedural fairness in this situation.

Our bill does not change the present-law rules regarding the determination of liability with respect to a complete or partial withdrawal from a multiemployer pension plan. However, it does change the procedural rules applicable to such a determination, but only with respect to a transaction that occurred five years or more before the date of the complete or partial withdrawal.

Under our bill, when a determination of an employer's withdrawal liability is based on a finding by the plan sponsor that a principal purpose of a transaction was to evade or avoid liability, and the transaction in question occurred five years or more before the date of the complete or partial withdrawal, the following rules would apply: 1. the determination by the plan sponsor is not presumed to be correct, and the plan sponsor has the burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, each and every element of the claim for withdrawal liability, and 2. if an employer contests the plan sponsor's determination either through arbitration or through a claim brought in court, the employer is not obligated to make any withdrawal liability payments until a final decision in the arbitration, or in court, upholds the plan sponsor's determination. Our bill would apply to any employer that receives a notification after October 31, 2003.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Sanctions Policy Reform Act.

The fundamental purpose of my bill is to promote good governance through thoughtful deliberation on those proposals involving unilateral economic sanctions directed against other countries. My bill lays out a set of guidelines and requirements for a careful and deliberative process in both branches of government when considering new unilateral sanctions. It does not preclude the use of economic sanctions nor does it change those sanctions already in force. It is based on the principle that if we improve the quality of our policy process and public discourse, we can improve the quality of the policy itself.

Numerous studies have shown that unilateral sanctions rarely succeed and often harm the United States more than the target country. Sanctions can jeopardize billions of dollars in U.S. export earnings and hundreds of thousands of American jobs. They frequently weaken our international competitiveness by yielding to other countries those markets and opportunities that we abandon. They also can undermine our ability to provide humanitarian assistance abroad.

Unilateral sanctions often appear to be cost-free, but they have many unintended victims--the poor in the target countries, American companies, American labor, American consumers and, quite frankly, American foreign policy. Sanctions can weaken our international competitiveness, lower our global market share, abandon our established market to others and jeopardize billions in export earnings--the key to our economic growth. They may also impair our ability to provide humanitarian assistance. They sometimes anger our friends and call our international leadership into question. In many cases, unilateral sanctions are well-intentioned, but impotent, serving only to create the illusion of U.S. action. In the worst cases, unilateral sanctions are actually undermining our own interests in the world.

Unilateral sanctions do have a place in our foreign policy. There will always be situations in which the actions of other countries are so egregious or so threatening to the United States that some response by the United States, short of the use of military force, is needed and justified. In these instances, sanctions can be helpful in getting the attention of another country, in showing U.S. determination to change behaviors we find objectionable, or in stimulating a search for creative solutions to difficult foreign policy problems.

But decisions to impose them must be fully considered and debated. Too frequently, this does not happen. Unilateral sanctions are often the result of a knee-jerk impulse to take action, combined with a timid desire to avoid the risks and commitments involved in more potent foreign policy steps that have greater potential to protect American interests. We must avoid putting U.S. national security in a straight- jacket, and we must have a clear idea of the consequences of sanctions on our own security and prosperity before we enact them.

To this end, I am offering this bill to reform the U.S. sanctions decision-making process. The bill will establish procedural guidelines and informational requirements that must be met prior to the imposition of unilateral economic sanctions. For example, before imposing unilateral sanctions, Congress would be required to consider findings by executive branch officials that evaluate the impact of the proposed sanctions on American agriculture, energy requirements, and capital markets. The bill mandates that we be better informed about the prospects that our sanctions will succeed, about the economic costs to the United States, and about the sanctions' impact on other American objectives.

In addition, this sanctions policy reform bill provides for more active consultation between the Congress and the President and for Presidential waiver authority if the President determines

it is in our national security interests. It also establishes an executive branch Sanctions Review Committee, which will be tasked with evaluating the effect of any proposed sanctions and providing appropriate recommendations to the President prior to the imposition of such sanctions.

The bill would have no effect on existing sanctions. It would apply only to new sanctions that are enacted after this bill became law. It also would apply only to sanctions that are unilateral and that are intended to achieve foreign policy goals. As such, it excludes trade remedies or trade sanctions imposed because of market access restrictions, unfair trade practices, or violations of U.S. commercial or trade laws.

Let me suggest a number of fundamental principles that I believe should shape our approach to unilateral economic sanctions: unilateral economic sanctions should not be the policy of first resort. To the extent possible, other means of persuasion and influence ought to be exhausted first; if harm is to be done or is intended, we must follow the cardinal principle that we plan to harm our adversary more than we harm ourselves; when possible, multilateral economic sanctions and international cooperation are preferable to unilateral sanctions and are more likely to succeed, even though they may be more difficult to obtain; we ought to avoid double standards and be as consistent as possible in the application of our sanctions policy; to the extent possible, we ought to avoid disproportionate harm to the civilian population. We should avoid the use of food as a weapon of foreign policy and we should permit humanitarian assistance programs to function; our foreign policy goals ought to be clear, specific and achievable within a reasonable period of time; we ought to keep to a minimum the adverse affects to our sanctions on our friends and allies; we should keep in mind that unilateral sanctions can cause adverse consequences that may be more problematic than the actions that prompted the sanctions--a regime collapse, a humanitarian disaster, a mass exodus of people, or more repression and isolation in the target country, for example; we should explore options for solving problems through dialogue, public diplomacy, and positive inducements or rewards; the President of the United States should always have options that include both sticks and carrots that can be adjusted according to circumstance and nuance; the Congress should be vigilant by insuring that his options are consistent with Congressional intent and the law; and in those cases where we do impose sanctions unilaterally, our actions must be part of a coherent and coordinated foreign policy that is coupled with diplomacy and consistent with our international obligations and objectives.

An unexamined reliance on unilateral sanctions may be appropriate for a third-rate power whose foreign policy interests lie primarily in satisfying domestic constituencies or cultivating a self-righteous posture. But the United States is the world's only superpower. Our own prosperity and security, as well as the future of the world, depend on a vigorous and effective assertion of our international interests.

The United States should never abandon its leadership role in the world, nor forsake the basic values we cherish. We must ask, however, whether we are always able to change the actions of other countries whose behavior we find disagreeable or threatening. If we are able to influence those actions, we need to ponder how best to proceed. In my judgment, unilateral economic sanctions will not always be the best answer. But, if they are the answer, they should be structured so that they do as little harm as possible to our global interests. By improving upon our procedures and the quality and timeliness of our information when considering new sanctions, I believe U.S. foreign policy will be more effective.

Mr. President. I rise to introduce with my colleagues, Senators Biden and Grassley, ``The Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2003.'' This bill is a forward-looking measure which will strengthen the Office of National Drug Control Policy as we face the new challenges posed by illegal drugs.

I want to thank my colleagues Senators Biden and Grassley for working with me to draft this important legislation. Senator Biden has a long and impressive record in addressing the problem of illegal drugs. He is considered the father of ONDCP. He had the vision, the commitment, and the dedication to make it a reality. I thank him again for his work on this proposal that we are introducing today.

I also want to thank Senator Grassley for his work on this important legislation. Senator Grassley has been a tireless advocate in fighting illegal drugs. As the chair of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Senator Grassley has demonstrated leadership and commitment in addressing issues relating to domestic and international drug trafficking.

The bipartisan legislation we are introducing today reauthorizes ONDCP for 5 years and provides ONDCP with the necessary tools and resources to: Develop national drug control policy; coordinate and oversee the implementation of the national drug control policy; assess and certify the adequacy of national drug control programs and the budget for those programs; evaluate the effectiveness of National Drug Control Program agencies' programs; and develop specific goals and performance measurements needed to assess the effectiveness of the national drug control policy and the programs of the national drug control program agencies.

The legislation includes a number of reforms which will enhance ONDCP's ability to serve as the coordinator of Federal, State, and local policies aimed at reducing the availability of, and demand for, illegal drugs. The bill: 1. expands ONDCP's role and authority in overseeing the performance of federal agencies' drug control programs, and requires ONDCP to develop specific goals and measurements to assess the performance of Federal agencies; 2. requires ONDCP to develop a new performance measurement system which includes annual and 5-year objectives for assessing the National Drug Control Strategy; 3. expands and increases authorized funding for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program designed to reduce illegal Drug trafficking and drug production activities in designated areas; 4. creates a new emerging threat fund for ONDCP to allocated to individual HIDTAs to respond to emerging drug trafficking threats in specific HIDTAs; 5. improves the Counter-Drug Technology Transfer program to provide increased technologies for State and local law enforcement agencies, and reforms the program to ensure timely delivery of such technologies; and 6. reauthorizes and enacts reforms to the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign to ensure responsible use of Federal funds used to support the campaign.

I want to take a moment to address several specific issues. First, I am a strong supporter of the HIDTA program. The HIDTA program brings together Federal, State, and local law enforcement, promotes intelligence sharing among these law enforcement agencies, and ensures coordinated and effective law enforcement strategies. The HIDTA program has proven successful, and is even more important today because of the FBI's need to reallocate resources from drug enforcement to terrorism. Given this reality, it is critical that we support the HIDTA program as an important resource in the fight against illegal drug traffickers.

Second, I want to express my continued support for the National Youth Anti-Drug Medical Campaign. While I know the campaign has suffered from some management problems in the last few years, I am confident that the campaign is on the right track. I want to commend ONDCP Director John Walters and The Partnership for a Drug-Free America President Roy Bostock

for their commitment to working together, and for the steps they have taken to ensure that the campaign operates effectively.

The legislation includes specific reforms which will support the campaign and make sure that it operates in a cost-effective manner. Specifically, the bill: 1. Delineates the specific roles and responsibilities of ONDCP, the Partnership and a media buying contractor; 2. restricts the use of funds for creative development of advertisements, except for advertisements intended to reach a minority, ethnic or other special audience that cannot be otherwise obtained from the Partnership; 3. requires the Director to obtain no-cost matches of advertising broadcast times, print space or in-kind contributions which directly relate to substance abuse prevention and specially promote the purposes of the campaign; 4. disqualifies any corporation, partnership or individual from bidding on a media buying contract if such entity, within the last 10 years, in connection with the national media campaign has been convicted of any Federal criminal offense, subject to any Federal civil judgment or penalty in a civil proceeding involving the United States; or settled any Federal civil proceeding or potential proceeding; and 5. provides financial and performance accountability requirements for the campaign.

I also wanted to highlight title VII of the bill--Drug Abuse Education, Prevention, and Treatment. These provisions, which Senators Biden, Grassley, Leahy and I authored in the 107th Congress as part of S. 304, provide much-needed education, prevention and treatment resources which are so critical to reducing the demand for illegal drugs. As I have said before, our national drug strategy must embrace a comprehensive policy that reduces the demand for, as well as the supply of, drugs. To reduce the demand for drugs, we must redouble our efforts at prevention and treatment. This Nation's battle with substance abuse can be successful only through a balanced approach--one that supports law enforcement but at the same time promotes education, prevention and treatment.

Title VII of the bill includes a proposal to establish residential drug treatment facilities for drug-addicted women who have young children. Such facilities are in short supply in this the country, and the problem has grown worse with an ever increasing number of women with children who are abusing drugs.

Treatment is even more imperative for our troubled juveniles, the vast majority of whom will go on to lead productive lives if we can just break the addiction cycle. This bill provides substantial resources to States for juvenile residential treatment facilities and to Federal, State, and local agencies and private service providers to coordinate the delivery of mental health and substance abuse services to children at risk.

Finally, the bill eliminates a restriction in the Controlled Substances Act and will permit medical practitioners to provide drug addiction treatment in group practices. This provision will expand treatment options for thousands of patients who have been denied access to critical addiction treatments.

The proposed legislation we are introducing today will ensure that Congress provides the required oversight--and support of--ONDCP as it continues its critical role of coordinating our National Drug Control Strategy to ensure that we reduce the availability of, and demand for, illegal drugs in our country. I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

I ask unanimous consent that a section-by-section analysis be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to add my comments to those of Senator Hatch and Senator Biden on the re-authorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Drug use in America may not be on the front page of the New York Times or Washington Post, but remains a deep concern for many people in small towns and local neighborhoods where the effects of drug abuse are painfully felt. Drugs pose an immediate threat to their lives, and the lives of their children.

The re-authorization of ONDCP is about the leadership role we expect the Federal government to play in confronting the issue. I want to take a moment to highlight a few revisions we have proposed in an effort to strengthen the leadership role that ONDCP should play.

The legislation we are introducing today will improve the capacities of the Office to coordinate our Federal efforts against drug use. We have strengthened the role of the Deputy Director of State and Local Affairs, because we recognize that the coordination of activities, information sharing, and resource allocations between Federal, State, and local law enforcement is increasingly critical.

As everyone is this body knows, there isn't enough money to go around to fully fund all of the worthy causes that are out there, and part of our job is making these tough choices. By increasing the coordination between resources that are already deployed, we can increase the effectiveness of these efforts without having to reinvent how business gets done. ONDCP is an ideal place to play broker over these efforts and move this forward.

We have also included provisions clarifying the authorities and responsibilities of the offices of Demand Reduction and Supply Reduction. Much of ONDCP's responsibilities involves coordinating the activities and focus of other Departments. There is no one simple solution to our drug problem, and ONDCP has a responsibility to ensure that Federal prevention, law enforcement, treatment, and interdiction initiatives cover the full spectrum of opportunities available. Accordingly, our bill clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the various Deputies at ONDCP to strengthen their ability to coordinate the counterdrug activities both within ONDCP and those of other Departments.

The Office of National Drug Control Policy also has responsibility for the execution and effectiveness of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program, or HIDTA program. The HIDTA program has proven to be an effective

mechanism for getting multiple law enforcement agencies from multiple levels of government to work together. For a relatively modest amount, participating law enforcement agencies have benefited tremendously from the increased information sharing and coordination that HIDTAs generate.

However, there was legitimate concern over the lack of performance measures for the HIDTA program. In addition, there seemed to be some confusion over what the overall purpose of a HIDTA designation was. finally, funding for the HIDTA program has been stifled because of a fear that ONDCP may cut the amount for one particular HIDTA in favor of another. Our legislation addresses these concerns in ways we believe will improve the effectiveness, accountability, and transparency of the program.

First, this legislation establishes that the purpose of the HIDTA program is fourfold: facilitating cooperation among Federal, State, and local law enforcement; enhancing intelligence sharing; providing reliable intelligence to law enforcement agencies for the design of effective enforcement strategies and operations; and supporting coordinated strategies designed to reduce the supply of illegal drugs within a designated area. By focusing the purpose of a HIDTA on improving the capabilities and capacities of those within the HIDTA, we will strengthen the effectiveness of these designated areas to go after drugs.

Second, the legislation creates an evaluation mechanism which requires ONDCP to first establish specific purposes and measures for each HIDTA, and then evaluate the performance of each HIDTA based on the purposes and measures that were established. Because threats each HIDTA faces are unique, the performance of each HIDTA will be evaluated against the goals which are established for that particular HIDTA, rather than an undefined National standard. Not only should this give Congress a better understanding of the performance of this program, but it should give ONDCP a mechanism to better evaluate and support the particular needs of individual HIDTAs.

Third, this legislation requires ONDCP to itemize how much it believes each HIDTA should be funded when the budget request is submitted, rather than waiting until after the appropriations process is complete. Combined with the previous two changes, these changes will combine to give ONDCP the flexibility it needs and the HIDTA program the credibility it needs to expand its leadership and funding for the coordination of law enforcement counterdrug operations.

The final section of this legislation that I would like to mention is the National Media Campaign. I will be honest: I am still not convinced that this program makes the best possible use of drug prevention dollars. But I am in the minority here. Almost everyone I've talked to believes our prevention efforts will be better with the campaign than without it--even if the evidence that the campaign makes a difference is questionable, at best. If the campaign is going to continue, and this legislation does extend the Campaign, I think it's important that it get back to the parameters that were established when it was initially pitched to and authorized by congress.

I think what we have here is a good start in this direction, and I appreciate my colleagues' willingness to take my concerns into consideration. The legislation we have drafted refocuses the campaign toward its initial, buy-one-get-one-free hypothesis. We've proposed enhancing the capacity of the campaign to measure its effectiveness, in an effort to move beyond the 6-month time lag that has hampered past measurements of performance. We have also included a clearer outline of what should, and should not, be paid for by the campaign. And we have created a clear role for the Partnership for a Drug Free America, who has been working on this effort for much longer than Congress has funded it.

All in all, I think we have a good bill. Not a perfect bill, but a good bill. I look forward to continue working with the Committee, our colleagues in the House, and the Administration with the hope that we can re-authorize ONDCP expeditiously.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to reauthorize the so-called ``Drug Czar's'' office with Senator Hatch, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and Senator Grassley, the Chairman of the Caucus on International Narcotics Control.

This bipartisan legislation will, I hope, result in speedy action to reauthorize the drug director's office for 5 years. No matter what perspective any of us have on a specific drug policy, this legislation is about whether we will have a drug director and a drug office to be responsible for developing, coordinating and enacting a national drug policy.

Some twenty years ago I began fighting to create the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) because I believed then, as I believe now, that we needed a Cabinet-level official who would coordinate Federal drug policy. I argued that Cabinet-level status was necessary because this individual needed to have the clout to stop interagency feuding, fight for necessary budgetary resources and decertify inadequate agency drug budgets. But just as important, I believed that the public needed to have one high profile person to hold accountable for developing and implementing an effective national strategy.

In 1982 my bill creating a national drug director passed as part of a larger crime bill, but the President vetoed it. He, like all Presidents--both Democrats and Republicans did not like the idea of being held accountable for what was seen as an intractable problem. But I kept at it and six years later the bill became law.

Before we had a drug czar's office there was no official in charge of the Administration's drug effort. And because there was no one Cabinet official in charge, other members of the President's Cabinet could duck responsibility to talk about tough drug policy issues. And that meant no Administration talked enough or did enough about the drug problem and no Administration was held accountable on drug policy. I'm glad that those days are behind us.

As the person responsible for coordinating Federal drug policy, the drug czar deals with almost every federal agency, from the Department of Justice on drug courts to the Department of Homeland Security on interdiction issues to the State Department and the Department of Defense on Plan Colombia to the Department of Health and Human Services on groundbreaking research on how drug use changes brain chemistry. It is the drug director's job to make sure that all of these wide ranging issues are addressed in the annual drug strategy so that our national policy is a balanced one, giving proper attention to drug enforcement, drug treatment, drug prevention and research.

That is why the bill that Senator Hatch, Senator Grassley and I are introducing today retains the provision in current law requiring the Drug Director to submit to Congress an annual drug strategy, detailing how he proposes to address all aspects of our national drug problem. We also ask him to reach out to state and local officials not only to get their input but also to get their support to advance the national goals on the local level.

And just as with my original drug czar legislation, the reauthorization bill retains as its central goal holding every Administration and every President accountable on the drug issue by requiring ONDCP to evaluate the effectiveness of drug policy and programs and develop specific performance measurements and goals.

The bill also includes a number of changes to strengthen current drug control policies and programs. In the area of law enforcement, the bill reauthorizes and increases the funding for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program which helps to coordinate federal, state and local efforts to reduce drug trafficking and production in designated areas. The bill also requires an evaluation of each individual HIDTA to monitor the program's effectiveness and requires ONDCP to report to Congress on intelligence sharing among HIDTAs and other law enforcement entities.

In terms of prevention and treatment efforts, the legislation includes a number of important provisions. First, it reauthorizes the National Youth Anti Drug Media Campaign and modifies the program so that it will be more accountable. Second, it includes a number of provisions that the Senate passed unanimously last Congress as part of the Drug Abuse Education, Prevention and Treatment Act to expand drug treatment for rural states, economically depressed communities, juveniles and women with children as well as to create a demonstration project to fund drug treatment alternatives to prison programs administered by state and local prosecutors. And finally, the bill amends the Higher Education Act to clarify that those convicted of drug offenses are not prohibited from receiving federal student aid unless they commit a drug felony while they are receiving the grant, loan or work assistance.

I want to thank Senator Hatch and Senator Grassley for their cooperation in crafting a bipartisan bill to reauthorize the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Both Senators have been leaders on drug policy issues and I am glad to work with them on this important matter. I hope that the rest of my colleagues will support this legislation and that we can pass it without delay.