A joint resolution expressing the sense of Congress with respect to human rights in Central Asia.

Mr. President, I rise today to reintroduce an important piece of legislation that I worked on in the 107th Congress, the Chemical Security Act. I am proud to be joined by Senators Jeffords, Boxer, Clinton, and Lautenberg in reintroducing this bill. Senators Jeffords, Boxer, and Clinton were all strong allies in the 107th Congress, and I thank them for their continuing support. And I am pleased to have Senator Lautenberg as a cosponsor. He has a long history of working to protect communities from all types of chemical threats. I particularly want to thank Senator Jeffords for his hard work on this legislation in the 107th Congress. As Chairman of the Environment and Public Works committee, he provided critical leadership in bringing this bill through the committee successfully. I thank him and his staff for their hard work and look forward to continuing to work with them on this important issue.

I'll describe what the bill does in a minute. But first I want to briefly explain why I think this legislation is so important.

September 11 shocked us into the realization that our assets can be turned against us by terrorists. If you are a New Jersey Senator, you don't have to think about that idea for too long before you realize that chemical plants and other facilities that have hazardous chemicals would be high on a terrorists' list. The fact is, that we have a lot of those types of facilities in my State, and because we're such a densely populated State, chemical releases from these facilities pose grave risks. In fact, according to EPA data, there are eight plants in my State where a worst-case release of toxic chemicals could threaten more than a million people.

But this is not a parochial issue. The same EPA data shows that there are 110 plants nationwide where such a release could threaten more than a million people. These plants are located in 22 States. And there are 44 States that have at least one facility where such a release could threaten more than 100,000 people.

I want to be clear that I am stating these facts here today in an effort to advance a measure that would protect workers and communities, not in an attempt to vilify our nations' chemical companies. Indeed, these companies are a key part of our industrial fabric, providing jobs and producing products essential to our lives. This is certainly true of my home State of New Jersey, as I have already indicated.

But when you look at the numbers, as I have laid them out here today, you realize that we have a problem to deal with. I'm certainly not unique in recognizing this issue, EPA, the Justice Department, the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions, industry groups, and public safety groups all agree. In addition, the White House Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes the chemical and hazardous materials sector as an infrastructure protection priority. Governor Ridge amplified this point in his testimony before the Senate Environment Public Works committee on July 10 of last year. He said that:

The fact is, we have a very diversified economy and our

enemies look at some of our economic assets as targets. And

clearly, the chemical facilities are one of them. We know

that there have been reports validated about security

deficiencies at dozens and dozens of those.

I want to pick up on that last point that Governor Ridge made about security deficiencies, because it speaks to why I am putting this bill forward.

Some companies have taken actions and are continuing to work to implement security measures in light of the post-September 11 environments. Others, however, are not. That's one crucial reason why a Federal program is needed. We need to be able to assure our constituents that this major vulnerability is being addressed in a swift and effective manner. We also want to assure them that certain minimum standards are being met throughout the country.

We already do that to address certain infrastructure vulnerabilities. Most notably, we require nuclear power plants to meet extensive security standards as a condition of their operating licenses. I think we ought to tighten those standards, but the fact is that we have no standards at all for our chemical facilities.

Before I go into specifics, I want to outline the general organizational scheme of the bill. In my view, addressing the risk to communities from a terrorist-caused release of hazardous chemicals requires two fundamental components. The first is improving security, so that the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack is lowered. The second is reducing hazards so that the impact of a successful attack is minimized.

This requires two fundamentally different types of expertise and skills. That's why the bill involves both the EPA and the Department of Homeland Security. EPA has the chemical hazard expertise, and the Department of Homeland Security has the security expertise. EPA has a lead role in most of the bill, because it already has relationships with chemical facilities through its existing accident prevention programs.

As to the specifics of the bill, I think it is a common-sense approach to dealing with the issue. I want to note that this bill is nearly identical to the version of the bill that was reported out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee last July by a 19-0 vote. Two minor technical changes have been made to clarify the intent of the legislation, but it is otherwise exactly the same as the committee-reported bill that was acted on unanimously by the EPW committee last year.

The heart of the bill is section 4. This section requires EPA and the Department of Homeland Security to identify ``high priority'' chemical facilities and then require those facilities to assess vulnerabilities and hazards, and then develop and implement a plan to improve security and use safer technologies.

Section 4(a)(1) establishes the priority setting process, by which the EPA Administrator, in consultation the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, as well as States and local government entities, is directed to identify high priority chemical facilities, based on factors identified in section 4(a)(2). These factors include the severity of harm that could be caused by a chemical release, proximity to population centers, threats to national security or critical infrastructure, threshold quantities of substances of concern that pose a serious threat, and such other safety or security factors that the Administrator considers appropriate.

Because of the way the bill is structured, this means that EPA and the Department of Homeland Security are directed to start with the facilities that are subject to EPA's Risk Management Program requirements. This program applies to approximately 15,000 facilities in the United States that use, produce or store large quantities of hazardous chemicals. By applying the factors I mentioned, the priority setting process is meant to shorten this list of 15,000 facilities considerably. But the bill leaves it up to the Administration to determine exactly how many facilities within this universe ought to be covered by the bill.

So that's step one, setting priorities, and that has to be done within one year of enactment.

At this point, I want to mention the first of the clarifying technical changes that I have made to the bill. It was never the intent, nor I believe the effect, of the bill to include propane retailers as potentially regulated entities under this bill. But there was some confusion about the point after the bill was marked up last July. So last fall, I worked with the National Propane Gas Association on language that eliminates this confusion, and it is included in this bill. So I again want to make clear that the same propane retailers who are not subject to the EPA Risk Management Program requirements will not be ``high priority'' facilities under this bill, and therefore will not be subject to its requirements.

In addition to identifying high priority facilities within the first year, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security must also promulgate regulations to require the high priority facilities to take the following steps: conduct a vulnerability and hazard assessment within one year after the regulations are promulgated; prepare and implement a response plan that addresses those vulnerabilities within 18 months after the regulations are promulgated.

I want to say more about the assessments and response plans, because these requirements are really the core of the amendment.

First, the amendment requires chemical facilities to work with local law enforcement and first responders, such as firefighters, in developing the assessments and plans. The second of the clarifying technical changes that I referred to in the opening part of my statement is simply to make clear the firefighters are among the first responders that the bill is referring to.

September 11 showed us how brave and important these our first responders are. Every day, they are willing to risk their lives to respond to terrorist attacks if they need to. So it makes sense that they ought to be a part of the process of developing vulnerability assessments and response plans, as this bill would require.

The same goes for employees of the high priority chemical facilities. They're on the front lines, which means two things. First, they are most at risk in case of a terrorist attack on their plants. Second, because they work in the plants every day, they will have ideas about how to secure the facilities and reduce hazards. So employees are part of the process as well.

As to the assessments and plans themselves, the requirements in the bill are fairly general. There are a variety of vulnerability assessment tools that have already been developed by groups such as Sandia laboratories and the Center for Chemical Process Safety. I would expect that EPA and DHS would take advantage of existing methodologies such as these, but the bill leaves it up to the experts to decide what types of approaches make the most sense. And that probably won't be the same for everyone, I'm not advocating a one-size-fits-all approach here. But I do want to be sure that all of the high priority chemical facilities do a credible vulnerability assessment.

The response plan requirements are also fairly general. Each facility is required to prepare prevention, preparedness and response plan that incorporates the results of the assessments. The plan must include actions and procedures, including safer design and maintenance, to eliminate or significantly lessen the potential consequences of a release.

What this means in simple terms is that each facility has to develop a plan and take steps to reduce both the likelihood of a successful attack and to the harm that would occur if an attack were successful. In other words, they have to look at traditional security measures, such as fences, alarms, and guards. But they also have to look at whether they can make the plant safer. In other words, can less hazardous chemicals be used? Can containment technology such as fans or scrubbers be improved or employed to contain chemicals that may be released? Chemical facilities ought to evaluate the full range of options, look at the tradeoffs among them, and go forward with the best mix of security and technology options.

Facilities are then required to send their assessments and plans to the EPA. EPA and DHS must review those assessments and plans, and certify compliance with the regulations. Any deficiencies identified by EPA and DHS can be remedies by issuance of an order. But the order can only be issued after a deliberate process that includes notification, compliance assistance, and an opportunity for a hearing.

The certification process is there to ensure the public that facilities are complying the law. Those certifications will be the only information

from the assessments and plans that is publicly available. The bill exempts all other information produced under the bill, most importantly, the assessments and plans themselves, from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. I don't take FOIA exemptions lightly. I believe strongly that, in general, the public has a right to information collected by the government. But I think it's pretty obvious that in the case of the information that would be submitted to the government under this bill, the vulnerability assessments and response plans, we simply can't allow the security details in these plans to be publicly available. But I think it does make sense that people who live near a chemical plant be able to find out from EPA and the DHS whether or not that plant has complied with the law.

The bill goes even beyond FOIA exemptions to protect the assessments and plans. To ensure that the assessments and plans are properly safeguarded, the bill includes a requirement for EPA and Homeland Security to develop protocols to prevent unauthorized disclosure of those documents. And it attaches penalties to unauthorized disclosure.

That's the essence of the bill.

First, identify ``high priority'' chemical facilities.

Second, require those facilities to assess vulnerabilities and hazards, and then develop and implement a plan to improve security and implement safer technologies.

Third, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security review the assessments and plans, and they have the authority to require changes if deficiencies are identified.

Fourth, assessments and plans are protected from unauthorized disclosure through a FOIA exemption and penalties that apply to unauthorized disclosure.

The bill also includes an early compliance section that is designed to address concerns that the bill might slow ongoing voluntary security efforts. This provision enables companies to submit assessments and plans prior to promulgation of the regulations and have them judged by the standards in the Act. So companies don't have to wait for the regulations to come out to continue work or to submit plans.

In conclusion, I think this is a balanced bill that puts common-sense requirements in place to deal with a significant problem. I think the bill has moved a long way from the introduced bill. It has accommodated many of the concerns that industry raised about the bill I introduced in the 107th Congress. It reflects intensive bipartisan negotiations, and I think it's a good bill.

At the same time, I recognize that some of my colleagues have continuing concerns about the legislation. Last fall, I worked with Senators Inhofe, Breaux, Landrieu and Lincoln on these issues. I want them to know that I remain open-minded and committed to working with them, the rest of my colleagues and the Administration to resolve these issues so we can move quickly to protect Americans from the threat of attack on chemical facilities. And I want to extend the same commitment not only to the environmental and labor organizations that have supported the bill in the past, but also to the various industry groups that have worked on this bill. It's vital that we all find common ground quickly, and I stand ready to work with all interested parties.

I want to close by expressing both my sense of urgency about this issue and my optimism that we will be able to move legislation quickly. Last fall, Governor Ridge and Administrator Whitman wrote to the Washington Post expressing their support for bipartisan legislation to deal with the chemical security threat. I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in the Record.

I believe the letter was sincere, but the Administration has not yet engaged the Congress on this issue. I urge President Bush to provide leadership to ensure that his Administration works with us as the process moves forward.

I am also encouraged that Senator Inhofe has identified chemical security as a legislative priority as he assumes the Chairmanship of the Environment and Public Works committee. I congratulate him on his new post, and again express my willingness to work with him on this important issue.

With that, I yield the floor and urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise along with the distinguished Senior Senator from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter, to introduce the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003, a bill that guarantees prompt justice to victims of sexual assault crimes through DNA technology. This bill is not new to my colleagues. Last session, I introduced the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act with Senators Specter, Cantwell, Clinton, and Schumer. The bill was voted favorably out of the Judiciary Committee with the key support of my good friend across the aisle, Senator Specter. And in September, with twenty co-sponsors, Republicans and Democrats, the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act unanimously passed the Senate. Regrettably, our House counterparts were not able to act so quickly or decisively on a DNA bill, so I am back to re-introduce the bill and to urge quick passage of the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003. I am pleased that, once again, this bill has strong bipartisan support and I look forward to working with my good friend from Utah, the distinguished Senior Senator, Senator Hatch, in acting promptly in marking up this bill when he assumes chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee.

Promoting and supporting DNA technology as a crime-fighting tool is not a new endeavor for me. A provision of my 1994 Crime Bill created the Combined DNA Index System, called ``CODIS'', which is an electronic database of DNA profiles, much like the FBI's fingerprint database. CODIS includes two kinds of DNA information, convicted offender DNA samples and DNA from crime scenes. CODIS uses the two indexes to generate investigative leads in crimes where biological evidence is recovered from the scene. In essence, CODIS facilitates the DNA match. And once that match is made a crime is solved because of the incredible accuracy and durability of DNA evidence.

99.9 percent--that is how accurate DNA evidence is. 1 in 30 billion, those are the odds someone else committed a crime if a suspect's DNA matches evidence at the crime scene. 20 or 30 years, that is how long DNA evidence from a crime scene lasts.

Just ten years ago DNA analysis of evidence could have cost thousands of dollars and taken months; now testing one sample costs $40 and can take days. Ten years ago forensic scientists needed blood the size of a bottle cap, now DNA testing can be done on a sample the size of a pinhead. The changes in DNA technology are remarkable, and mark a sea change in how we can fight crime, particularly sexual assault crimes.

The FBI reports that since 1998 the national DNA database has helped put away violent criminals in 6,257 investigations in 40 States. How? By matching the DNA crime evidence to the DNA profiles of offenders. Individual success stories of DNA ``cold hits'' in sexual assault cases make these numbers all too real.

Just last month, Alabama authorities charged a man in the rape of an 85-year-old woman almost ten years ago after he was linked to the case by a DNA sample he was compelled to submit while in prison on unrelated charges.

In Colorado Springs, CO, a trial will soon begin of a man accused of at least fourteen rapes and sexual assaults. Due to the national DNA database, prosecutors were able to trace the defendant to rapes and assaults that occurred in Colorado, California, Arizona, Nevada and Oklahoma between 1999 and 2002.

In Florida, Kellie Green was brutally attacked and raped in the laundry room of her apartment complex. Because of lack of funds, her rape kit sat on the shelf for three years until a persistent detective had it analyzed. The evidence matched the profile of a man already incarcerated for beating and raping a woman 6 weeks before Kellie.

Or take, for example, a 1996 case in St. Louis where two young girls were abducted from bus stops and raped at opposite ends of the city. The police were unable to identify a suspect. In 1999, the police decided to re-run the DNA testing to develop new leads. In January 2000, the DNA database matched the case to a 1999 rape case, and police were able to identify the perpetrator.

Last spring, the New York Police Department arrested a man linked to the rape of a woman years ago. In 1997, a woman was horribly beaten, robbed and raped, there were no suspects. Five years later, the perpetrator submitted a DNA sample as a condition of probation after serving time for burglary. The DNA sample matched the DNA from the 1997 rape. Crime solved, streets safer.

Undoubtedly, DNA matching by comparing evidence gathered at the crime scene with offender samples entered on the national DNA database has proven to be the deciding factor in solving stranger sexual assault cases--it has revolutionized the criminal justice system, and brought closure and justice for victims.

In light of the past successes and the future potential of DNA evidence, the reports about the backlog of untested rape kits and other crime scene evidence waiting in police warehouses are simply shocking. It is a national problem, plaguing both urban and rural areas, that deserves national attention and solutions. One woman, in particular, has reminded State and Federal lawmakers that we cannot ignore even one rape kit sitting on a shelf gathering dust, Debbie Smith. In 1989, Mrs. Smith was brutally taken from her home and raped. There were no known suspects and Mrs. Smith lived in fear of her attacker's return. Six years later, the Virginia crime laboratory discovered a DNA match between the rape scene evidence and a State prisoner's DNA sample. Mrs. Smith had her first moment of real security and closure and since then, she has traveled the country to advocate on behalf of assault victims and champion the use of DNA to fight sexual assault. I am pleased that the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003 bears a provision entitled, ``The Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grants.''

Today I am introducing legislation, ``The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003'', to strengthen the existing Federal DNA regime as an effective crimefighting tool. My bill addresses five pressing issues.

First, exactly how bad is the backlog of untested rape kits nationwide? A

1999 government report found over 180,000 rape kits were sitting, untested, on the storage shelves of police department and crime laboratories all across the country.

While recent press reports estimate that the number today is approaching 500,000 untested rape kits, I am told that there are no current, accurate numbers of the backlog. Behind every single one of those rape kits is a victim who deserves recognition and justice. Accordingly, my legislation would require the Attorney General to survey law enforcement agencies nationwide to assess the extent of the backlog of rape kits waiting to undergo DNA testing. To combat the problem of rape kit backlogs, it is imperative to know the real numbers, and how best to utilize Federal resources.

Second, how can existing Federal law be strengthened to make sure that State crime labs have the funds for the critical DNA analysis needed to solve sex assault cases? To fight crime most effectively, we must both test rape kits and enter convicted offender DNA samples into the DNA database. There has been explosive growth in the use of forensic sciences by law enforcement. A government survey found that in 2000 alone, crime labs received 31,000 cases--a 47 percent increase from almost 21,000 cases in 1999. In addition, the labs received 177,000 convicted offender DNA samples, an almost 77 percent increase from 100,242 samples in 1999.

The backlog in DNA testing is found all across the country. Last month a Michigan newspaper reported that its State police forensic unit is expected to have a 10-year backlog of items in need of DNA testing. Similar news reports are elsewhere. The Florida crime lab system is facing a backlog of more than 2,400 rape, murder and assault and burglary cases with DNA evidence waiting for testing. In North Carolina, up to 20,000 rape kit tests sit on evidence shelves because the lab does not have the resources to conduct timely DNA testing.

Many crime laboratories report personnel shortages in the face of this overwhelming work. According to a government survey, on average, there are 6 employees in a State crime lab, a lab that must not only conduct DNA testing for hundreds of cases, but also run forensic tests on blood, footprints or ballistic evidence.

The bill I'm introducing would: 1. Increase current funding levels to both test rape kits and to process and upload offender samples; and 2. allow local governments to apply directly to the Justice Department for these grants. I thank my colleagues Senators Kohl and DeWine who began this effort with the DNA Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 and acknowledge their ongoing interest in this area.

Third, what assistance does the FBI need to keep up with the crushing number of DNA samples which need to be tested or stored in the national database? I am told that the current national DNA database, ``CODIS'', is nearing capacity of convicted offender DNA samples. My bill would provide funds to the FBI to 1. Upgrade the national DNA computer database to handle the huge projections of samples; and 2. process and upload Federal convicted offender DNA samples into the database.

Efforts to include more Federal and State convicted offenders in our database just makes plain sense to fight crime. We know that sexual assault is a crime with one of the highest rates of recidivism, and that many sexual assault crimes are committed by those with past convictions for other kinds of crime. Their DNA samples from prior convictions help law enforcement efforts enormously. We cannot wait; the 2001 FBI crime records show that one forcible rape occurs every 5.8 minutes, and the most recent reports from the first six months of 2002 indicate a 1.8 percent increase in the number of rapes as compared to 2001 statistics.

Fourth, what additional tools are needed to help treat victims of sexual assault? One group that understands the importance of gathering credible DNA evidence are forensic sexual assault examiners, who are sensitive to the trauma of this horrible crime and make sure that patients are not revictimized in the aftermath. These programs should be in each and every emergency room and play an integral role in police departments to bridge the gap between the law and the medicine.

I first recognized the importance of sexual assault nurse examiners in solving rape cases when I authored the Violence Against Women Act. A key provision in the Violence Against Women Act requires the Attorney General to evaluate and recommend standards for training and practice for licensed health care professionals performing sexual assault forensic exams. So I knew that any DNA bill aimed at ending sexual assault must include resources for sexual forensic examiners, and not just one type. My bill ensures that sexual forensic nurses, doctors, and response teams are all eligible for assistance.

Tapping the power of DNA requires well-trained law enforcement who know how to collect and preserve DNA evidence from the crime scene. Training should be a matter of course for all law enforcement. No rape kit evidence will lead to the perpetrator if the DNA evidence is collected improperly.

The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act would create a new grant program to carry out sexual assault examiner programs and training. And it would train law enforcement personnel and prosecutors in the handling of sexual assault cases, including drug-facilitated assaults, and the collection and use of DNA samples for use as forensic evidence at trial.

Fifth, what can be done to ensure that sexual assault offenders who cannot be identified by their victim are nevertheless brought to justice?

Profound injustice is done to rape victims when delayed DNA testing leads to a ``cold hit'' after the statute of limitations has expired. For example, Jeri Elster was brutally raped in her California home, and for years the police were unable to solve the crime. Seven years later, DNA from the rape matched a man in jail for an unrelated crime. Yet the rapist was never charged, convicted or sentenced because California's statute of limitations had expired the previous year.

The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003 would change current law to authorize Federal ``John Doe/DNA indictments'' that will permit Federal prosecutors to issue an indictment identifying an unknown defendant by his DNA profile within the five year statute of limitations. Once outstanding, the DNA indictment would permit prosecution at anytime once there was a DNA ``cold hit'' through the national DNA database system.

John Doe/DNA indictments strike the right balance between encouraging swift and efficient investigations, recognizing the durability and credibility of DNA evidence and preventing an injustice if a cold hit happens years after the crime. Criminal law must catch up with DNA technology without the wholesale eradication of prevailing statutes of limitations.

I started looking at the issue of improved prosecution of sexual assault crimes almost two decades ago when I began drafting the Violence Against Women Act. The DNA Sexual Justice Act of 2003 is the next step, a way to connect the dots between the extraordinary strides in DNA technology and my commitment to ending violence against women. We must ensure that justice delayed is not justice denied.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I come to the floor today with my colleague from Montana to introduce legislation to provide tax incentives to accelerate the deployment of ``broadband'' high-speed Internet access across the country. Broadband is an issue about which I feel very strongly, and upon which I will be very focused this year as chairman of the telecommunications subcommittee of the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee.

Although many urban and suburban areas now have access to a broadband connection, many rural areas still do not. And that places rural areas at a disadvantage in a number of ways in terms of economic development, educational opportunities, health care and numerous other applications. By creating a financial incentive to encourage broadband providers to extend their networks into rural and other underserved areas, we can help overcome that disadvantage.

The bill will create a temporary tax incentive for providers in the form of ``expensing,'' allowing an immediate deduction of a capital expenditure in the first year of service rather than depreciating that investment over time. In the case of ``current generation'' broadband investments in rural and underserved areas, the bill will allow 50 percent expensing of the investment, with the rest to be depreciated according to normal depreciation schedules. And where providers build out ``next generation'' broadband networks, which are typically more expensive, the bill will provide for 100 percent expensing.

This legislation generally mirrors the broadband tax credit legislation introduced by my friend from West Virginia, Senator Rockefeller, in the last Congress. I want to thank the Senator from West Virginia for his leadership on this issue. The only difference in that bill and the one we are introducing today is the form of the incentive, expensing rather than tax credits.

I am proud to tell you that the first broadband tax incentive in the Nation occurred in great State of Montana. In 1999, Montana enacted a broadband tax credit, which was in effect for 2 years. In those 2 years it had very positive results. Here is a quote from one of our public utility commissioners, Bob Rowe, in one of our State newspapers, The Missoulian, in June 2001, describing the effect of the Montana broadband credit:

The results are impressive. Dozens of projects were awarded

tax credits, most of them in rural Montana, places like

Circle, Crow Agency, Superior and Big Timber. Projects

included DSL, cable modems, and wireless. They also included

projects to provide ``redundant'' access that is critical to

many technology businesses in case service goes out.

That is the kind of effect which a broadband tax incentive can have. Circle, Crow Agency, Superior and Big Timber are not large metropolitan areas. They are small communities of a few hundred people. If a broadband incentive can have that kind of effect in those places, it can have that kind of effect anywhere.

Now, what has happened to the Montana broadband credit? Like many other State tax breaks all across the Nation, it has been suspended, not repealed, but suspended, because of the current budget shortfall which the state is facing, which is exactly why we should consider a Federal broadband incentive at this time, when we are beginning the process of crafting a package of growth measures to put our economy back on a solid footing.

And I firmly believe that broadband can have a positive effect on our economy. A number of very solid studies lead me to this conclusion. A study conducted by economists at the Federal Reserve Board concluded that information technology accounted for over 60 percent of the productivity growth occurring from 1995 to 1999.

During the first half of the 1990s, the average productivity increase was only 1.5 percent per year. Then, when the Internet began to be widely used, average annual productivity jumped to 2.8 percent in the second half of the decade. That is a very significant increase, and it occurred largely from the ``network effect'' of linking our computers. Now, what broadband will do is allow us to use those linked computers for much more advanced applications, video conferencing, real-time collaboration on large computer files, telemedicine, distance learning, etc.

And, for those of us from agricultural States, we should be aware of the applications that our farmers and ranchers might use: Remote livestock sales, remote monitoring of irrigation facilities, tele- veterinary, etc. Anyone who thinks farmers don't care about technology should spend some time on today's modern farm, and they will learn that American agriculture is one of the most innovative industries in the world.

Let me give you an example. Deere and Company, the farm equipment maker, has supported legislation of this type. Others may dismiss this company as they just make tractors. However, if you were to talk to them, you would learn that the tractor of tomorrow, indeed of today, has a lot of high-tech equipment on board that, as it drives through the fields, gathers information on plant conditions and soil conditions and moisture content and so forth.

And that is incredibly valuable information to a farming operation. But to really use that information, you need a broadband connection to send it from the tractor to, say, a plant specialist a hundred miles away. Without that broadband connection, it will take a very long time to transmit the data, which makes it a lot less useful.

One economist, Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institute, has estimated that accelerated deployment of broadband will generate up to $500 billion in economic growth annually. Talk about an economic stimulus. I think we would all be delighted to have that happen, and I believe we should take steps to allow it to do so. This legislation is an important step in that direction.

And one important reason for us to encourage more broadband investment is international competitiveness. A number of other countries, like Japan and China, are now making much greater investments than the United States in optical fiber and other advanced telecommunications infrastructure. Japan is now the world's largest purchaser of fiber, much of which is going to deploy fiber-to-the-home. In 1 month last year, they wired more homes with fiber than we did in the entire year.

And although China has been playing catch up on building out their Internet backbone, they are doing so at a very fast pace and could soon overtake Japan as the world's biggest fiber market.

It is also happening in Europe. The Government of Sweden has dedicated

$800 million for broadband deployment in rural areas of the country, while they have already wired much of Stockholm with fiber-to-the-home. Last year, France announced that it would invest $1.5 billion on broadband infrastructure over the next 5 years.

I believe it is extremely important that the United States not fall behind in telecom and Internet technology, and a financial incentive of the type provided by this legislation will help ensure that we do not.

Let me briefly describe the specifics of the bill. As I said earlier, it provides 50 percent expensing for investments in rural and underserved areas of ``current generation'' broadband technologies, which are defined as those delivering at least 1.0 megabits per second of information downstream to the subscriber, and at least 128 kilobits per second upstream from the subscriber.

It provides 100 percent expensing for investments in ``next generation'' broadband technologies, which are defined as those delivering at least 22 megabits per second of information downstream to the subscriber, and at least 5 megabits per second upstream from the subscriber. It is technology neutral, it makes no difference if you are using as your medium copper wire, coaxial cable, optical fiber, terrestrial wireless, satellite or something else. If you deliver the threshold speeds, you are eligible for the benefit. And it sunsets in 5 years. The intent is not to provide a permanent benefit to the telecom sector, but rather to provide incentive to build out new infrastructure within a short time period.

And so that my colleagues and the public can read the specifics themselves, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the bill be printed in the Record.

Let me just conclude by saying that I believe this is important legislation, and I hope that my colleagues will join in supporting it. I look forward to working with my home State colleague, Senator Baucus, and also Senator Rockefeller and others to ensure that we push it through the Congress this year and send it to the President for signature.

Mr. President, I rise to reintroduce the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act along with Senator Kyl, Senator Grassley, Senator Sessions, and Senator Craig.

I first introduced this bipartisan legislation last June with the full support of the Justice Department. The bill will make it easier for prosecutors to target those identity thieves who, as is so often the case, steal an identity for the purpose of committing one or more other crimes.

I am hopeful that we can build on the momentum generated by this legislation in the 107th Congress. The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information conducted a hearing on the bill on July 9, 2002.

The Judiciary Committee subsequently passed the legislation out of Committee on November 14, shortly before the Senate went out of session.

As we enter the 108th congress, there remains a compelling need to stiffen the penalties for identity thieves.

A little more than a month ago, the largest single identity theft case in U.S. history was uncovered. Federal authorities arrested Philip Cummings who, along with two accomplices, allegedly sold the credit reports and other personal information of 30,000 victims for as little as $30 each. Investigators have confirmed $2.7 million in losses so far, and the totals are expected to be much greater. This case is an example of the tremendous damage that an identity thief can cause.

Moreover, many serious crimes, even including terrorism, are aided by stolen identifies.

Lofti Raissi, a 27-year old Algerian pilot from London who is believed to have trained four of the 9/11 hijackers, was identified in British court papers as having used the Social Security number of Dorothy Hansen, a retired factory worker from Jersey City, NJ, who died in 1991.

Last year, the Department of Justice filed charges against an Algerian national who stole the identifies of 21 members of a health club in Cambridge, MA. He then transferred those stolen identities to one of the individuals convicted in the failed plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport in 1999.

Joseph Kalady of Chicago was charged with trying to fake his own death using the identity of another. Kalady, who was awaiting trial on charges of counterfeiting birth certificates, Social Security cards and driver's licenses, allegedly suffocated a homeless man and sought to have him cremated under Mr. Kalady's identity in order to fake his own death and avoid prosecution.

The stories go on and on, and it is those stories that make the legislation we introduce today so vital. Identity theft has become the major escalating crime of the new millennium, and Congress needs to give law enforcement the tools to prosecute these crimes.

Let me just outline what this bill would do.

First, the bill would create a separate crime of ``aggravated identity theft'' for any person who uses the identity of another person to commit certain serious, Federal crimes.

Specifically, the legislation would provide for an additional two- year penalty for any individual convicted of committing one of the following serious Federal crimes while using the identity of another person: Stealing another's identity in order to illegally obtain citizenship in the United States; stealing another's identity to obtain a passport or visa; using another's identity to remain in the United States illegally after a visa has expired or an individual has been ordered to depart this country; stealing an individual's identity to commit bank, wire or mail fraud, or to steal from employee pension funds; and other serious Federal crimes, all of them felonies.

Furthermore, the legislation would provide for an additional five- year penalty for any individual who uses the stolen identity of another person to commit any one of the enumerated Federal terrorism crimes found in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B). These crimes include: The destruction of aircraft; the assassination or kidnapping of high level Federal officials; bombings; hostage taking; providing material support to terrorism organizations; and other terrorist crimes.

Under the legislation, aggravated identity theft is a separate crime, not just a sentencing enhancement. And the two-year and five-year penalties for aggravated identity theft must be served consecutively to the sentence for the underlying crime.

This bill also strengthens the ability of law enforcement to go after identity thieves and to provide their case.

First, the bill adds the word ``possesses'' to current law, in order to allow law enforcement to target individuals who possess the identity documents of another person with the intent to commit a crime. Current Federal law prohibits the transfer or use of false identity documents, but does not specifically ban the possession of those documents with the intent to commit a crime.

So if law enforcement discovers a stash of identity documents with the clear intent to use those documents to commit other crimes, the person who possesses those documents will now be subject to prosecution.

Second, the legislation amends current law to make it clear that if a person uses a false identity ``in connection with'' another Federal crime, and the intent of the underlying Federal crime is proven, then the intent to use the false identity to commitment that crime need not be separately proved.

This simply makes the job of the prosecutor easier when an individual is convicted of a Federal crime and uses a false identity in collection with that crime.

This legislation also increases the maximum penalty for identity theft under current law from three years to five years.

And finally, the legislation we introduce today will clarify that the current 25-year maximum sentence for identity theft in facilitation of international terrorism also applies to identity theft in facilitation of domestic terrorism as well.

Identity theft is a crime on the rise in America, and it is a crime with severe consequences not only for the individual victims of the identity theft, but for every consumer and every financial institution as well.

Identity theft comes in many forms and can be perpetrated in many ways, and that is why I have worked for many years now with Senator Kyl and others to put some safeguards into the law that might better prevent the fraud from occurring in the first place, and to crack down on identity thieves.

And other legislation I have introduced would put into place certain procedural safeguards to protect credit card numbers, personal information, and other key data from potential identity thieves.

The legislation we introduce today is meant to beef up the law in terms of what happens after an identity theft takes place. In seriously enhancing the penalties for identity thieves who commit other Federal crimes, we mean to send a strong signal to all those who would commit this increasingly popular crime that the relatively free ride they have experienced in recent years is over.

No longer will prosecutors decline to take identity theft seriously. No longer will identity thieves get off with just a slap on the wrist, if they are prosecuted at all. Under this legislation, penalties will be severe, prosecution will be more likely, and cases against identity thieves will be easier to prove.

Every day in this country serious criminals and criminal organizations are stealing and falsifying identities with the purpose of doing serious harm to common citizens, government officials, or even our Nation itself. It is time we did something about it, and this bill is an important step in that process.

I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I ask unanimous consent that the text of this legislation be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, today I rise to introduce and present to my colleagues the Jumpstart Broadband Act of 2003. I am happy to be the lead Republican sponsor of this legislation and I want to thank my colleague from across the aisle, Senator Boxer, for working with me on this positive important issue.

The goal of the Jumpstart Broadband Act is to create an environment that embraces innovation and encourages the adoption of next-generation wireless broadband Internet devices. Most important, our legislation will build confidence among consumers, investors and innovators in the telecommunications and technology industries to eventually make the broadband dream a reality.

Unfortunately, we are all too familiar with the recession in the telecom sector. Analysts estimate that over the last 24 months approximately 500,000 jobs have been lost. Debt loads in the telecommunications sector range from anywhere between $500 billion to $1 trillion dollars. Since 1999 approximately $2 trillion dollars in market value has been lost in the telecom sector.

We know that promises of the Internet doubling every 100 days were never realized. Fanciful expectations like these have left this country with Internet bandwidth capacities that no levels of demand can sustain. Unfortunately for investors and the industry the ``if you build it, they will come'' business model did not materialize and is the primary reason the telecom and technology sectors are in a weak economic state.

Over this past few years Congress, and specifically the Senate, have been locked in debate over the best approach to promote and encourage widespread broadband adoption. There is no doubt that consumers, businesses and government officials fully recognize the importance of broadband to our communications capabilities and the economy. Indeed, the proliferation of next-generation broadband Internet connections will reinvigorate growth in the technology and telecommunications industries and improve our lives.

Economists at the Brookings Institution estimate that widespread, high-speed broadband access would increase the national GDP by $500 billion annually by 2006. Full deployment of broadband will substantially change and significantly impact every aspect of our society. Whether in education, healthcare, commerce, entertainment or government services; broadband deployment is a key aspect to improving this nation's overall economy and competitiveness.

However, the current debate over broadband has focused only on two platforms, Digital Subscriber Line, DSL, and cable and the regulatory treatment of those services. This perspective fails to consider that alternative modes or other technologies are available that can jumpstart consumer driven investment and demand in broadband services. I think it is beneficial to shift the policy discussion away from this debate and focus on something positive Congress can do that fosters innovation, stimulates the technology and telecom sectors, and encourages the adoption of broadband services.

The Jumpstart Broadband Act seeks to create an environment where alternative modes of broadband communications can be created and deployed into homes, schools, public places and businesses by making more spectrum available for exciting, new unlicensed wireless technologies. In doing so, the legislation directs the Federal Communications Commission, FCC, to set aside an additional 255 megahertz of spectrum in the 5 gigahertz band for unlicensed broadband devices. This allocation will harmonize wireless devices in the United States with the international allocation in countries like Japan, Brazil, Canada and Europe. The 5 gigahertz band also contains favorable propagation and power levels to provide reliable wireless service. Our legislation also directs the FCC to establish minimum rules of interference protection for devices in that spectrum and to ensure that Department of Defense systems operating in that spectrum are not compromised.

Our legislation complements and encourages the exciting work being done in the area of Wireless Local Area Networks, WLANs. Also known as Wireless Fidelity or WiFi, this technology provides wireless broadband service operating in the unlicensed spectrum bank with up to 10 megabits of capacity and an always-on connection. WiFi is a technology driven platform, viewed by many as a possible answer to wire-line

limitations and obstacles that exist in the current marketplace. WiFi however is only the beginning and this legislation will create an environment where cognitive radios and dynamic frequency selection of technologies can grow and innovate to offer services that are unimaginable today.

While I support a competitive telecommunications environment and have been an advocate for federal deregulation, the Jumpstart Broadband Act of 2003 moves the policy discussion away from this stagnant maginot line battle and offers an alternative invigorating approach that encourages innovation and creates confidence in the market.

Providing a way to jump start high speed broadband Internet access through the adoption of wireless broadband devices is vital to helping us keep pace with the new global economy. The benefits to Americans would include more jobs, increased productivity, improved health care delivery, and more accessible education. Our economy needs it, our technology sector needs it, and the American people will benefit from these new and innovative technologies.

I have been working together in a bipartisan fashion with Senator Boxer, and I am hopeful by also working with technologists, the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of Defense, we can move forward to create an alternative that promotes broadband adoption using advances in technology and spectrum efficiency.