Requiring the President to submit to Congress a plan for the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Iraq, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the time allocated by House Resolution 868 to the ranking minority members of four committees instead be controlled by the minority leader or her designees.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 minutes.

All of us know, all of us understand stability in Iraq is important, not only to the United States but to the world.

It is no secret that Iraq is of particular importance because of its oil. The United States consumes 20.6 billion barrels of oil per day. Yet we produce only 5.1 billion barrels of oil a day. China is the second largest consumer, with 6.9 million barrels per day, and they produce 3.6 million barrels per day. Iraq has the fourth largest oil reserve in the world. Saudi Arabia is number one, Canada number two and Iran number three. So all of us agree Iraq is important. But how do we get to a conclusion?

Let me compare Gulf War I with Gulf War II. In Gulf War I, Kuwait was attacked by Saddam Hussein. It was a brutal attack. President Bush I immediately reacted. He sent his emissary, Secretary Cheney, to Saudi Arabia. They got an agreement from Saudi Arabia to use their land to put troops in. He immediately sent in the Airborne Division, and he immediately sent in F-16 fighters to deter Saddam Hussein. All of us knew that there was a possibility at that time that he would have complete control of the oil in the Middle East. So we knew how important it was.

Then President Bush started calling up the Reserves. He called a number of Members of Congress over to the White House, and he consulted and talked to them. I do not remember if the gentleman from Illinois was there, but there were seven or eight of us went to the White House. We talked to him about calling up the Reserves and having other people pay.

This is important not only to the United States. This is important internationally. This oil supply, this stability in the Middle East is important to the whole world, and he went to work. He called every major nation. He called Egypt, and this was no easy task for these countries to come around to decide to support the United States.

Matter of fact, President Mubarak said to me that King Hussein came to him and said if you support the United States, you will cut the throat of Saddam Hussein, and yet Egypt decided that they were going to go along with us.

Then he talked about that we needed to have a U.N. resolution, which we did have. Then we had to have a resolution in the Congress of the United States. But the big thing that he promoted was he got a coalition together, and this coalition ended up with 400,000 American troops and 160,000 coalition troops.

And I remember during this debate, I remember calling Secretary Cheney, calling General Scowcroft saying, you have got 250,000 troops over there, you don't need any more. Let's get this war going. And General Scowcroft said something I have never forgotten. He said, we are going to give General Schwarzkopf whatever he wants. He wants more troops, we are going to give him more troops. And Secretary Cheney called me and said we are going to have to send another 180,000 troops. We are going to have overwhelming force when we go into Kuwait.

And they did have overwhelming force. It went on for 6 months. The troops were out in the field, they trained, and when they went in they did a magnificent thing. It was overwhelming. And it was paid for by other countries. Sixty billion dollars came from other countries. President Bush I convinced other countries that they had to help pay for this because it was not only important to the United States, it was important to them, the stability in the Middle East.

Now, let me talk about the second Gulf War. The second Gulf War we had intelligence that said there were weapons of mass destruction; there was an al Qaeda connection. I believed that. As a matter of fact, I listened to the reports, and I was hesitant about the al Qaeda connection, but I believed that they had biological weapons. Matter of fact, a week or so before the war started, Ms. Pelosi, as the new minority leader, wanted to go overseas on her first trip. She wanted to visit the troops. Even though she had been against the resolution to go to war, she wanted to tell the troops she supported the troops. And anybody that votes for the Defense Subcommittee appropriations, anybody that belongs to the Armed Services Committee shows their support of the troops.

So we went over, and on our way over we stopped in Turkey. Imagine, the 4th Division was sitting outside Turkey. It was supposed to outflank the Iraqis. And the State Department asked me, okay, talk to the Turkish government about letting us go through. Now, we had the most modern division, the most technologically advanced division in the whole world sitting there off Turkey. I talked to them and I became convinced they weren't going to let us go through, even though they had voted the very day I was there, and they voted by a majority, but not the supermajority they needed to allow the United States to go through.

I went then to Kuwait and we listened to the commanders. The commanders told us that there is a red line drawn around Baghdad and if we cross the red line they are going to use biological weapons. And I believed that. I believed. As a matter of fact, they said if you cross this red line, we have already verified this by monitoring their telephones, by monitoring their cell phones. When we monitored cell phones of Saddam Hussein's headquarters they said use biological weapons. The troops believed it. They were prepared. They felt like they could go in there with protective gear, they could go in there with what they needed and the hot air, the winds, would dissipate the weapons. And, of course, they crossed the red line and nothing happened.

But I still thought there were weapons of mass destruction. I still thought there were biological weapons. I came back and we sent a team over there.

And the team went over and the team looked for those weapons of mass destruction. Matter of fact, at first a fella named Kay, that was so strong about it, former CIA, said, we will find them. And he looked for months and couldn't find anything at all. Absolutely no evidence of any kind of weapons of mass destruction. No biological weapon, no capability, no nuclear capability, no al Qaeda connection.

When we go to war, we should go to war, first of all, if it is a threat to our national security. It was a threat to our national security when you talk about the first war, because it destabilized and he would have controlled all the oil in the Middle East, which is so important to the free world. The second time was no threat to our national security. Now, we didn't find that out, those of us who voted for it, didn't find this out until after we had gone to war.

The second thing is you go with overwhelming force. I talked to one of the commanders who was in a meeting with five officials; there was him, there was Secretary Rumsfeld, there was Secretary Wolfowitz, General Pace, and General Myers. And he said we recommended 350,000 troops. And as you know, they gave him a lot less troops than that. The coalition troops at the most were up to 30,000 and now they are down to 20,000.

The first war, 160,000. And the first war was all paid for. It cost us $5 billion. The reason I remember this so vividly is I was chairman of the committee at the time the money came through our committee, and we then sent it over, reprogrammed it over to the Defense Department itself. But the discrepancy that we have seen, the mischaracterization, the optimistic predictions are the problems that I have had.

Now, I sent a letter, with Duncan Hunter and a number of other people, and I said to the President, we need 100,000 more troops. Well, the President decided he didn't need 100,000 more troops. Now, imagine this, we are on the ground and we have won the war. The troops did a magnificent job, as we knew they would, but they completely miscalculated the problems that we were going to have afterwards.

Now, I talked to a tribal leader the other day in Anbar Province. He told me that, as far as he saw, the first 6 months we had occupied Anbar. Now, Anbar is the province we are having the most trouble right now. It is where Ramadi and Fallujah are. Those are the areas where there is the most contention. In the first 6 months there wasn't a shot fired. Not a shot fired. I said, let me ask you right now, what kind of progress have we made economically? No water, no electricity, no jobs in Anbar Province. Two million people.

And we talk about Saddam Hussein. Almost 900,000 people left when Saddam Hussein was there. They left the country as refugees. The time we have been there 900,000 people have left the country. They voted with their feet. The President went in the other day, he says he was glad to see democracy in action. You know where he went? The same place I go, in the fortress. In the Green Zone. That is where he went. They are afraid to go outside the Green Zone.

When I first went there, the first two or three trips I went, I could go anyplace. I drove around all over Iraq. The last time I landed at Baghdad Airport, they flew me to Anbar Province down in Haditha, and we flew so low because of the threat we had to come up over the wires in order to get down, and I didn't see a person the whole time. There were 2 million people in Anbar Province. Not one project. Not one.

I said on the floor of the House the most important thing in that first supplemental, in the $87 billion, was the $18 billion that went for reconstruction. And of course there are so many projects that haven't been finished. Now, after we sent the letter about the 100,000, and during that period of time, we asked a fella named Hamre, who was the former Under Secretary of Defense, who went over to Iraq and he did a study for the Defense Department. He came back and said, you have got 3 to 6 months to get this straightened out.

And what did he suggest had to be done? They weren't big projects. He suggested we had to have trash picked up, sewage taken care of, electricity, and jobs. Those are the kinds of things he talked about, and securing the border. Those are the things he said had to be done in 3 to 6 months, and if it is not done, it will go the other way. And all of us know what has happened. All of us know what has happened with the insurgency.

Now, let me go through why I get so distressed by the reports that I get about how well it is going. First of all, the number of daily attacks in Iraq have gone from in 2004, daily, 53 attacks in 2004, 70 attacks in 2005, and in 2006, 90 attacks a day.

Estimated size of the insurgency. Now, we are supposed to be making progress. That is what we hear. The estimated size of the insurgency in 2004 was 15,000. In May of 2005 it was 16,000. In May of 2006 it was 20,000.

This is the way I measure whether there is progress or not progress.

The amount of cash paid to families, this is an important point, to Iraqi civilians killed or maimed by the operation involving American troops went from in 2004, $5 million to $20 million.

Now, what does that mean? The problem is that all of us want to solve the problem, all of us want to have a satisfactory answer in Iraq. The problem is the way we have to operate as a military. The reason we won the first Gulf War is we were fighting a conventional force and we wiped them out. Nobody can match our military. They are the best in the world. But now we are fighting a guerilla war, and that is the type of problem that we have.

For instance, we went into Fallujah, we put 300,000 people outside their homes and only 100,000 have come back now. And when we put 300,000 people outside their home, every one of those are an enemy.

Abu Ghraib. Why did Abu Ghraib happen? Abu Ghraib happened because we had insufficient forces and untrained people and unsupervised people in that prison.

Now, what do I mean by untrained? We had one fella, who happened to be from my district, that had a court order against him because he had abused his family, and he couldn't carry a gun in Pennsylvania. And he said, I can't do this. This is against my nature. I don't know anything about taking care of prisoners. He is now in jail. But the point is he was untrained in that particular job, and even though he told them, they put him in the job. And of course we know the tremendous consequence, at the very time we went into Fallujah, at the very time we put 300,000 people outside their home.

And listen, I endorse this. I know we have to have, when we go into an area, we have to use overwhelming force. That is the way the military has to operate. But, you see, these payments from $5 million in 2004 to $20 million last year, that is because when we go into a place we kill them inadvertently. And when we kill people inadvertently we make enemies, and Abu Ghraib was the biggest public relations disaster we had since My Lai during the Vietnam War.

The number of complete or reconstructed projects, as I said, in al Anbar Province, imagine now, this is one-third of the geography of Iraq, and they have 2 million people, zero. Zero. Number of civilians who died in Baghdad last month, 1,400, in sectarian violence. What is the definition of sectarian violence? A civil war.

All of us want to end this thing. All of us want to find a way to prevail in Iraq. This is a civil war and we are caught in a civil war. There is less than a thousand al Qaeda in Iraq. They have diminished al Qaeda. But we are caught in this civil war between 100,000 Shiias and 20,000 Sunnis fighting with each other.

The average monthly U.S. war expenditure in Iraq: $4.4 billion in 2003, $5 billion in 2004, $6.1 billion in 2005, and $8 billion. The average monthly expenditure, $8 billion. Now, think what I am saying. The first Gulf War, and Duncan Hunter remembers this, they paid internationally. We paid $5 billion. He was on the Armed Services Committee. He knows what I am talking about. We paid $5 billion and they paid $60 billion. They had 160,000 troops in the first Gulf War.

Now, let me talk about the sentiment and talk about the polls taken. We all look at the polls to see what is going on. Now, the only poll taken of U.S. forces in Iraq, about 3\1/2\ months ago: 72 percent of the American troops serving in Iraq think the U.S. should exit the country within a year.

Now, I can understand that. Let me tell you, it is hot, they are wearing 70 pounds every day when they are out there in the field, and I can certainly understand that. Forty-two percent say they do not know what the mission is. And that is devastating when they do not understand the mission.

A public opinion Iraqi poll, a segment of 18 provinces, all 18 provinces: More than half the Iraqis say they are headed in the wrong direction, and 82 percent say the economic situation is either poor or fair. Now, these are the Iraqis. Ninety percent say the security situation is poor or fair.

And who do they trust? Who do they trust for personal security? Forty-three percent trust the Iraqi police, 35 percent trust the Iraqi army, 6 percent trust the insurgents, 6 percent trust the insurgents, 4 percent trust the armed militia, and 1 percent, 1 percent trust the multinational force. In another poll taken at the beginning of this year, 47 percent approve the attacks on the United States forces, and 87 percent of the Iraqis endorse a timetable for withdrawal.

Our global image couldn't have been higher after the first Gulf War, with 80 to 90 percent of the people in the world thinking the United States did a marvelous job. We had recovered from Vietnam, finally, in the first Gulf War.

Ten of 14 countries polled said the war in Iraq has made the world more dangerous, and most of the countries rated the U.S. troops in Iraq a bigger danger to world peace than the threat posed by Iran. Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Russia, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, and Turkey all have more favorable ratings of China than the U.S.

Now, this resolution is a restatement of the failed policy of this administration, and it is no surprise that that is what this is.

We can't win this. This cannot be won rhetorically. We cannot sit here, stand here in an air-conditioned office and say we support the troops, say we support the policy.

I visit the hospitals every week, and the only person to visit them more than I do is Bill Young and his wife. I see these young people. I am so impressed by their determination, and I am so hopeful we can end this terrible tragedy.

When I got into this 6 months ago, I got into it because of the troops and because of the fact that I felt we couldn't do anything more militarily. We had done everything we could do militarily, and, second, because of the future of the military.

The bill we are going to pass next week, and very few people are going to vote against it, if you want to really support the troops, that is what you vote for. You vote for that legislation. That will say we will run out of money for personnel for the troops because we cut $4 billion out of the base bill by September. We will take care of that. We will find a way to do it. But the point is the base bill was cut by $4 billion.

Now let me tell you the difference in what I believe is the answer. I believe we redeploy and be ready; that is what I say. I say redeploy and be ready.

We are the targets. We are causing the problem. You know who wants us to stay in Iraq right now, the al Qaeda wants us there because it recruits people for them. China wants us there. North Korea wants us there. Russia wants us there. We are depleting our resources, just like Russia depleted their resources in Afghanistan. The same thing is happening with the United States. We will have spent $450 billion by the end of this fiscal year. Now think, the first gulf war we spent $5 billion. We have spent $450 billion.

Stay and we will pay, not only pay in dollars, in money; we are going to pay long term.

I figure it took us through the Reagan administration to pay for the Vietnam War. We had 18 to 21 percent interest rates during the Reagan administration, and the reason we did was because Lyndon Johnson, the President of the United States, said we can have butter and we can have guns, and he didn't raise the taxes he should have raised when we had the war going on.

So we continue to pay with lives lost in terms of financial treasure and more than $8 billion a month. We pay in terms of international reputation. We pay in terms of the future of our military. We stay and pay. I say redeploy and be ready.

Let me tell this one last story.

When I came out of Vietnam, they gave me this small bullet. It is a 45 caliber without any powder in it. It says: ``First Marines, everything is going to be all right.''

A month after I came out of Vietnam in 1967, Lyndon Johnson said, and I believed in the Vietnam War. I thought we were fighting communism. But Lyndon Johnson said, and they had an election, one month after I came out of Vietnam, everything was going to be all right. Do you know how many people we lost from 1967 until we pulled out? 37,000.

Rhetoric does not answer the problem. Only the Iraqis can solve the problem in Iraq. They are fighting with each other, and our troops are caught in between. I say it is time to redeploy and be ready.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Let me comment on a couple of things the distinguished gentleman from Illinois said.

He talks about early exit. This war has gone on, Mr. Chairman, this war has gone on longer than the Korean War. It has gone on longer than World War I, and it has gone almost as long as the European War.

If I believed we were making progress, we can't win this militarily. What I am saying is to redeploy, to get our troops out of harm's way is the key. I see no progress at all in this operation. I see the opposite.

When I see, you talk about al Qaeda being encouraged by what we say. Al Qaeda has gone from 15,000 to 20,000. Incidents have gone from 50 a day to 90 a day. That is the thing that worries me. And we are not making progress. We are losing progress.

I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton).

Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I believe we send them a message when we vote on the armed services bill. Very few people voted against it. I believe we voted, in the defense subcommittee of appropriations, only 15 or 16 people voted against it. But Theodore Roosevelt said, ``If you disagree with a policy and you do not say anything, you are actually treasonous.''

I disagree with the policy. I do not disagree with supporting the troops. There is no one that supports the troops better than the Members of this Congress. And that is shown by the few people that vote against the bill.

One other thing: I think the gentleman made a mistake when he said we are for the war, against the war on terror. We are actually fighting for the war on terror is what we are doing. But I appreciate what the gentleman is saying.

I appreciate the fact that he and I both asked for more troops at one point. He was the lead sponsor at that particular time.

I recognize the gentleman from California for 13 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

This all sounds good. It is all rhetoric. It is rhetoric. The number of daily attacks in Iraq have gone from 2004, 53 attacks per day; May 2005, 70 attacks per day; May 2006, 90 attacks per day. Electricity is less than prewar level. No water available to all, only 1 hour a day, Mr. Speaker, and the oil production which was supposed to pay for the war is less than prewar production.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. George Miller).

(Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

I yield myself 1 minute.

One of the Members said, ask Spain about the threat. Fifty-six percent of the population of Spain believes the U.S. in Iraq is the most dangerous threat to world peace. They rank Iran lesser of a threat than the United States.

And one other thing. When we look back at the intelligence cuts, President Bush I felt it was a peace dividend and started to cut the intelligence budget years ago. So we have to make sure we don't let our rhetoric get ahead of the facts.

I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Emanuel).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

This is rhetoric. It is not getting better. I spoke out November 17, and things have gotten worse than it was 6 months ago. They are worse today than they were then.

When I left Vietnam in August of 1967, they gave me this bullet, and they said in this bullet that everything is going to be all right. The President of the United States said we just had an election, and we have a new election in Vietnam, and this was a month after I got out of Vietnam, and everything is going to be all right. We lost 37,000 people.

It is not a matter of whether we want to prevail in this operation, it is a matter of how we are going to do it, and I disagree with the way we do it. I disagree with the policy. That is what I disagree with. I think our troops have become the targets. Incidents have increased every day, and more Americans are being killed every day. And we are going to pay a heavy price in people being killed and also we are going to pay a heavy price for the individuals in the future with the debt increasing at $8 billion a month.

I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes. I was in Beirut the day after the attack, and I recommended to President Reagan, I recommended to the President of the United States, get out of Beirut because we didn't have enough troops; 2 months later he got out of Beirut because he didn't have enough troops.

I know what rhetoric is, and I know what fighting on the front lines are. I know the difference between them. I know that standing here does not solve the problem, and it has gotten better, it has gotten worse. That's the problem. And you are not talking about Iraq. The gentleman up there was talking about the war on terror. I am talking about Iraq. That's what I am talking about.

Mr. Speaker, I recognize the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Clyburn) for 4 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

The problem is that the opposite is happening. That is the problem we have. We can stand here and say we want to fight the terrorists in Iraq. Actually, al Qaeda we think is less than 1,000.

We think we are caught in a civil war. It is the way that we are doing it. The military cannot win this war. The military commanders, even General Pace admits we cannot win this militarily.

What we are caught in, we have become the target of the insurgency of the sectarian violence. It is the way that we are doing it is what I disagree with.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Larson).

Mr. Speaker, I recognize the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for 30 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentlewoman from California control the 30 minutes and yield to people.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might consume.

The legislative branch bill, Mr. Chairman, provides for $2.870 billion, an increase of only 1.7 percent over the fiscal year 2005. The bill represents a $270 million reduction from the budget request.

Mr. Chairman, although we did not agree on every item on this bill, we worked very closely with the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) to produce a bipartisan bill for the legislative branch. I want to thank all the committee members for their contributions in putting this bill together.

While small in size, this is the bill that funds the work of the Congress, and it is a bill that we all can be very proud of.

The bill includes funding for the operations of the House and several joint items, the Capitol Police, the Compliance Board, the Congressional Budget Office, the Architect of the Capitol, the Library of Congress, the Government Printing Office, the General Accountability Office, and the Open World Leadership Program.

There will be no reductions in the current workforce.

The bill provides for all personnel cost-of-living increases and all other pay-related costs.

The bill also was reported out of the full committee on a voice vote.

The Capitol Visitor Center is funded at the cost-to-complete level of $36.9 million. The bill does not include funding for CVC operating expenses.

The bill establishes an Inspector General for the Capitol Police. The bill terminates the mounted horse unit and transfers the horses and equipment to the U.S. Park Service.

As part of an amendment in the full committee, I offered, and the committee adopted, the Continuity in Representation Act at the Speaker's request. This bill has passed the House twice, and just recently, the vote in March was 329 to 68.

Mr. Chairman, this is a good bill and one that benefits the entire legislative branch. Ultimately, this is the bill that reflects the work of the House. We are all in this together, Mr. Chairman, and because of that, I feel very strongly that this legislation should have the support of the entire House.

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Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood).

(Mr. LaHOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

I appreciate very much the gentleman having this colloquy with me and raising this important issue. As we have discussed, the smoking policy in the House office buildings is under the jurisdiction of the House Office Building Commission. That commission is made up of leaders on both sides of the aisle; and, frankly, I am very hesitant to interfere with their responsibility or their work. But I think it is very important that the gentleman is raising this issue today, and I am happy to have this discussion with him.

I would be very happy to join with the gentleman in that discussion. I think I probably will discuss it with my wife as well; but in the meantime, you and I work together on the committee, and I am happy to work with you on almost any issue you might raise.

Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Peterson).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Price).

If the gentleman will yield, I would be pleased to do so.

Mr. Chairman, let me tell the gentleman that I am very appreciative of his interest in the institution's history. As he is aware, the Speaker controls the placement of plaques on the House side of the Capitol. Their placement is very restricted, and we attempt to achieve recognition of events and places normally through other means.

The Capitol Visitors Center is being designed to provide our visitors with a much fuller understanding and history of the House and Senate. Included in the CVC is a 16,000 square-foot exhibit hall. In this exhibit hall, the architectural and legislative history of the institution are highlighted.

As part of the currently proposed CVC exhibits are detailed sections on the history of the Capitol and included in this is the fact that when the Capitol was originally built, it was used for more than legislative meetings. It was commonly used as the community center for the citizens of Washington, D.C. During that time, there were few places for meetings or church services. Thus, it is correct that such religious services were held here.

All these facts are included in the CVC exhibits, and I would encourage that the education of citizens be pursued in this venue so that a more complete history beyond a plaque can be presented.

There have been, and I very much appreciate the gentleman's interest in this matter. He and I will be pursuing it as we go forward in the months and, indeed, the years ahead.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I must say I understand the points that the gentleman is making. I believe he has a constitutional amendment that proposes an alternative approach. I must say the Speaker has been most concerned, and he asked me to put this in this bill, because a constitutional amendment takes so long to accomplish. We could be out there for Lord knows how long if it is ever accomplished. In the meantime, he has a proposal that will go forward and will be altered significantly as we go forward in order to expedite the process. That is what the Speaker is asking us to do here.

Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield further, he does have a constitutional amendment proposed. He knows how long and how risky constitutional proposals are. They hardly ever happen. And, therefore, the Speaker wants to make sure this proposal goes forward, and that is what we are suggesting.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mica).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Kingston).

Mr. Chairman, I rise to yield time to the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier); but before doing so, I just want to mention that the previous speaker had a constitutional amendment regarding the issue of continuity in the last Congress, and on that constitutional amendment the vote was 63 yeas and 353 nays. To say the least, the constitutional approach is difficult.

Mr. Chairman, I am glad to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time.

Mr. Chairman, it was not my intention to speak in these closing moments.

I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I think it is important for the public to know that all of us are concerned about continuity of government in the event of a tragedy. We certainly would not be having this discussion if it had not been for 9/11.

But, indeed, there are differences in the approach that one might take. Some prefer a constitutional amendment; and yet we have tried that on more than one occasion. We have had the debate, and very few in this House have supported that proposition. So the Speaker has asked us to go forward with an idea that will be worked on carefully between now and the time we finish our work with the Senate.

But from that point forward, let me talk a bit about the Capitol Visitors Center. My colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey), and I, early on in this Congress, were not active supporters of a CVC. But, indeed, his leadership and my leadership, at a higher pay grade, made a different decision; so we are carrying forward their work in this process.

I have looked at the visitors center very carefully. It is rather a fabulous addition to the Capitol, the greatest addition that has been made in this century, I believe. Indeed, within the mix of that, while I might change some things, I prefer not to suggest what the details ought to be that the Architect moves forward with. I am critical of the Architect; but in the meantime, I am not one. Therefore, we are going to add this major change whereby visitors can enter the Capitol, and it will have a very significant piece of our future history in the Capitol complex. It is going to be a fabulous addition. Indeed, it will be a very high-quality addition that we will all be proud of, but I think it would be a mistake for me to try to be the architect between now and then.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, this has been a very interesting debate about the work of the people's House. I am very happy to participate in this with my friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to the amendment, and I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) control 2\1/2\ minutes of that time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I consider myself to be a horse person. As a matter of fact, at one time in my life I thought I might be a veterinarian because I loved horses and ducks so much. In the meantime, I watch them parade around the Capitol, and I have wondered from time to time about their relative value. The GAO has cited that the Capitol Police have difficulty quantifying the benefit the unit provides. GAO was not able to substantiate the claim of one horse doing the work of 10 people.

I do not see how the elimination of five horses is going to impact the patrol. We have scout cars, motorcycles, and mountain bikes all patrolling the same area. The real point is here I was concerned about the horses myself, but when the staff came up with the thought that perhaps we could transfer them to the Park Service and make sure they are well taken care of and used for meaningful activity, I felt very comfortable with this change. So, frankly, I think we ought to proceed with the language that is in the bill.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I found one other reason to love the gentlewoman from Virginia (Mrs. Jo Ann Davis). Her caring for horses as much as I do is a thrill to me. The problem is I have studied this material

and cannot find that this is the best way to use our funding, especially when these horses will have a new home where they might be used more effectively.

Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood).

Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to yield 2\1/2\ minutes of that time to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) for purposes of control.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the fiscal year 2006 appropriations has been held at the fiscal year 2005 level. This is a decrease of $2.5 million below the 2004 level.

The Record is distributed in accordance with title 44, chapter 9 of the U.S. Code; and within that there are 3,000 copies that go to Members, of the House and Senate, 153 copies to the Library of Congress, et cetera. I can provide the balance of this in the Record.

3,018 copies to Members, House 1,479 copies, Senate 1,539 copies; 153 copies to the Library of Congress; 754 copies to public agencies and institutions designated by Senators; 698 copies to Federal agencies that pay for the copies; 521 copies to subsribers who pay for the copies; 692 copies to Federal Depository libraries nationwide.

I would say to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey), that it is my feeling that an amendment like this where people are kind of reacting to the Congressional Record, et cetera, will likely pass overwhelmingly. And if I am correct in that, I would be inclined for us to stand back in this discussion, if the gentleman agrees with me, and perhaps discuss this further as we go to conference.

What would be the gentleman's reaction to that?

And I do as well.

Reclaiming my time, the gentleman is always a gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might consume.

Mr. Chairman, since 1999 we have appropriated over $170 million to the Capitol Police specifically for security enhancement. In addition, we have provided $84 million for the Architect for perimeter security. In addition to the $2,345,000 provided in this bill for general expenses, the Capitol Police have $32,653,000 in unobligated balances, for a total of almost $62 million.

This $2 million amendment is interesting, but the police, in this instance, do not need an additional $2 million, and because of that, I strongly oppose the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I appreciate very much my colleague's comments. Mr. Chairman, during the markup of this bill, we pared down the total requests considerably from roughly $3 billion to $2.8 billion, a 9 percent reduction from the requested amount.

The bill is currently only 1.7 percent over fiscal year 2005. This increase barely sustains services. It provides for cost-of-living increases, some inflationary items, and a minimal number of projects to keep our buildings and grounds in reasonably good order.

A further reduction of 1 percent will adversely impact the operation of the legislative branch during the fiscal year ahead.

The amendment would reduce the total bill to a level that is less than 1 percent over current services.

The reduction will severely impair the ability of the House and legislative branch agencies to provide the full cost-of-living increases for all of our employees.

This is a good bill that has received balanced consideration. It is nice to say we will cut 1 percent across the board, but frankly, that is really not the way to legislate, and because of that, I strongly oppose the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey), my colleague.

Mr. Speaker, by way of suggesting that the leadership on both sides of the aisle made the decision about building our visitors center and that process has gone forward, and many a fit and start, but nonetheless it is going to be the largest expansion of the Capitol in modern time. It is going to be a fabulous visitors center when it is all completed.

The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) and I have been on the other side of that issue in the past; but, nonetheless, like the visitors center, the Speaker has suggested we include the continuity of government item in this package. That too is at a pay grade that is above mine, and I feel very strongly we should have some mechanism to make certain that in times of a real tragedy the House can get its work done.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the rule, I call up the resolution (H. Res. 861) declaring that the United States will prevail in the Global War on Terror, the struggle to protect freedom from the terrorist adversary, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on H. Res. 861.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois, the Speaker of the House (Mr. Hastert).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I can't help but comment on my good friend Mr. Murtha's eulogy for the first gulf war. The problem we have had there is we quit too soon. We quit before the victory was secure. We left the Republican Army, we left Saddam Hussein, we just washed our hands and left. I hope we learned a lesson from that, what a mistake it was and it led to later difficulties.

Mr. Speaker, so much of what we do in this Chamber is inconsequential; but the subject of this debate is anything but trivial. Let us then be serious as life and death are serious.

The capacity to reproduce that fearful mushroom cloud which first terrorized the world in 1945 is multiplying and becoming the deadly plaything of rogue nations across the globe.

Partisans have charged the President with misleading us into war, ``misleading'' being a pale euphemism for lying. The acquisition is made more grave by the assertion that he concocted the war for purely political purposes.

By any measure this is a monstrous charge, but questions persist that must be answered if we are to honestly examine the President's rationale for intervention. It is essential to first understand the context in which the decision was made.

President Bush has cited two factors for his decision to intervene in Iraq: the first, his belief that Saddam was reconstituting his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction; and, secondly, that the Iraqi dictator was cooperating with al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

The threat from Saddam Hussein stretches back much further than many of today's critics care to remember. Saddam's effort to develop a nuclear weapon began in the 1970s, centered around the nuclear reactor being constructed at Osirak.

Despite the alarming evidence of its purpose, the world casually contemplated what it saw as a distant, perhaps even benign, development.

But the luxury of inaction was not available to Israel because her leaders knew that the country was certain to be among Saddam's first targets. They also knew that the responsibility for Israel's safety was theirs alone, and that the world would do nothing to save their country if they failed to act.

So act they did, launching a bold attack in 1981, destroying the reactor complex and setting Saddam's nuclear quest back many years. But far from praising this heroic act that benefited humanity, the world community responded with condemnation, even outrage. Yet, in hindsight, is anyone so foolish as to assert that Israel should have waited for the United Nations to confirm that a threat existed, that Israel should not have taken action to destroy the reactor, even in defiance of the international community?

Had Israel not acted, the future of the Middle East and the West would likely have unfolded quite differently and far more tragically.

Unchastened by this setback, Saddam continued his aggressive campaign to dominate the region and control the world's oil supply, launching a decade-long war against Iran in 1980 during which over a million people were killed and in which he used poison gas and other means of mass slaughter.

After being beaten back from Iran, his attention then turned to Kuwait,

which he invaded and annexed in 1990, assuming the world would meekly accept this fait accompli.

Many forget that for a time that outcome was a real possibility. Much of the initial response in the world community, and in this country, was one of let's look the other way and hope for the best.

Only when the United States decided to forcefully eject Saddam from Kuwait and to assume the principal burden for doing so was the international community finally persuaded to go along. We refused to allow our fate and that of the world to be shaped by a dictator, and all sensible people are glad of it.

What we providentially discovered after that war astonished the entire world. Despite years of inspections and the best efforts of numerous intelligence services, Saddam had managed to secretly construct a massive program to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The experts estimate that he was only 6 months from an operational nuclear device. Had he postponed his invasion of Kuwait by half a year, the world would now be a much darker place.

This record of unrelenting aggression and implacable menace was the only context in which a reasonable person could view Saddam's future designs. This was the background in which the events of 9/11 occurred.

Imagine yourself as President, confronting the fact that an unknown group of terrorists had incinerated 3,000 Americans in an attack carried out by individuals who gladly committed suicide to create this horror. We had no idea how extensive their resources were, how global the threat was, who were their allies, how massive were the hidden terrorists to come.

In this context, let us consider the alternative to our intervention in Iraq: The President is presented with evidence that once again Saddam Hussein has developing weapons of mass destruction, that he once again refuses to cooperate with international arms inspectors, that he has had contact with al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, that he is even harboring terrorist organizations. And yet the President decides not to act. He decides to wait, to see if those same inspectors who had previously been deceived by Saddam will again give him a clean bill of health months or years in the future, to wait until our allies or the United Nations grudgingly grant us a narrow warrant to act. To wait until Saddam perhaps gives to some terrorist organization a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon to detonate in some U.S. city.

To trust our fate to those who would destroy us is to die and leave no descendants.

Is it possible to imagine the storm of condemnation that would justifiably fall on a President who, by not acting, allowed Saddam to arm himself once again with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons? To allow the possibility that these might be made available to a terrorist organization, to acquiesce in the death of thousands, tens of thousands, perhaps of millions of Americans simply because the available evidence was not 99 percent, no, 100 percent certain?

For if al Qaeda had had a nuclear device, there can be no doubt it would have used it on 9/11 and we would be mourning the death of 3 million Americans, not a tragic 3,000.

Which then was the greater risk in the face of decades of evidence? To act or not to act? To trust Saddam? Who in this body is willing to assert that it is ever wise, that it is ever moral to risk the destruction of the American people? That is the context in which the decision to intervene in Iraq was taken.

Was our intelligence imperfect? In retrospect, that is obvious. But when is it ever perfect? Nor was this shortcoming uniquely ours. Every intelligence service in the world assumed that Saddam was once again engaged in developing weapons of mass destruction. After the invasion, we learned the astonishing fact that even Saddam's own generals believed he possessed them and was prepared to use them.

It is certainly worth noting that among the shrillest voices condemning our intelligence failure are many who once devoted their efforts to weakening our intelligence capabilities, who employed their energies towards imposing restrictions, cutting budgets, sounding alarms about imaginary ``rogue elephants.''

Permit me to quote from some of the most strident critics of this administration and its campaign against the terrorists.

The first is a United States Senator now serving with great distinction in the other body. And on September 23, 2001, 12 days after the events of 9/11 this Senator stated: ``The tragedy is at this moment that the single most important weapon for the United States of America is intelligence.

``We are weakest, frankly, in that particular area. So it is going to take us time to be able to build up here to do this properly.'' You will find that on CBS's Face the Nation, September 23, 2001.

But this same Senator, in 1995, introduced a bill, S. 1290, that would have reduced the intelligence budget by $300 million in each of the fiscal years, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000.

Then we have a gentlewoman serving with distinction in this body, from sunny California, and in 1998 she stated, ``it is time to totally eliminate the CIA.'' Congressional Record, March 18, 1997.

On several occasions in the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet empire, a majority of Democrats in the House voted to cut the U.S. intelligence budget. Yet, following the horrific events of September 11, the chorus of voices that had previously advocated reducing our intelligence capabilities quickly reversed their theme. Even they must thank God that they had been unsuccessful in their efforts. But on this subject we hear nothing but deafening silence.

One inescapable lesson of history is that passivity in the face of a threat is an invitation to strike. The desire to run away only encourages pursuit. We are seeing that fatal approach gather strength elsewhere in the world manifested in efforts to bind the hands of those who would attack terrorism at its source. The hope is that, as with the passing of a storm, the threat will move on and blue skies reappear and that the nightmare will at last be over. But the terrible reality is by succumbing to the fear of terrorism, by doing too little in the fear that we are doing too much, we condemn ourselves to a future of unending assaults.

Other countries have learned that, however meager their contribution to their own and the world's security, however ineffectual their actions, in the end the United States will rescue them. We will make the world right again. We will defend against all threats. We, however, no longer have that luxury. If we do not take action to defend ourselves, then we are lost because no one exists to rescue us if we fail.

So, aware of its responsibilities, aware of the horrific consequences that might occur from indecision and a reliance on trust and hope, President Bush acted to remove the threat posed by Saddam. What he did is called leadership. And for doing his duty for all of us, he has been denounced by many of the same people who would have denounced him had he not acted, denounced by people who bear no responsibility, who take no responsibility, even for their own actions.

Saddam is no longer a threat to anyone. That is a salutary lesson for those around the world who watch and wait for opportunities for unopposed aggression. They now know that their invulnerability has vanished. Even more important, and almost entirely unnoticed amid the torrent of criticism focused on President Bush, is that his actions have greatly enhanced the credibility of the United States. For the next time this or any President warns a foreign despot to cease actions we believe are threatening to us, there can be little doubt that we will take decisive and forceful action, no matter how great the opposition of the world community.

No one can credibly question that this greatly enhanced credibility paid off with Libya's decision to abandon its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Qaddafi understood what President Bush's critics still refuse to acknowledge, that this administration is determined to eliminate threats to our country, both actual and potential, and if necessary, will use force to do so.

That is in sharp contrast to the passivity of the previous administration, whose failure to react to the repeated attacks on the United States only encouraged our enemies to make further attacks. What other conclusion could al Qaeda and others have reached from our baffling inaction and response to their assaults on our embassy, on our military, on us? They were taught the false lesson that they were free to slaughter us and we would do nothing.

Incredibly, senior officials from the administration now shamelessly criticize this President for taking decisive measures to address the threat that they themselves could not be brought to contemplate. By acting first in Afghanistan, and then Iraq to remove Saddam, President Bush has rendered the need for future interventions much less likely.

It is unfortunate that the quest for political advantage and a high decibel partisanship have intruded into the national discussions of how best to address the problems we face in Iraq. But there can be no doubt that the more we appear disunited, and the more voluble our dissent into weakness, dissension and inaction, the greater the aid and comfort we give to our enemies.

The world of predictability and relative safety we once knew is gone. We are now engaged in a cruel, brutal struggle with those who would destroy us, one unprecedented in its challenge to our perseverance and courage, and one that will be fought not just in foreign lands but on our own soil.

To insist that decisions must await perfect intelligence, that the risk of action is to be more feared than the risk of inaction, that others will save us, is to guarantee our defeat. But defeat in this new and more dangerous world means annihilation. The smoking gun that some critics insist on might well be some of our cities.

We in this Chamber, our country, the entire world, owe this President not condemnation but our thanks for acting in Iraq, for refusing to wait for an avowed enemy to strike, for not temporizing and letting the forces of destruction wage unopposed their pitiless war to destroy everything we believe in.

To those faint of heart from temporary setbacks in Iraq or who seek to benefit politically from our differences there, permit me to quote from Thomas Paine. Thomas Paine wrote, ``These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will in this crisis shrink from the service of their country. But he that stands by it now deserves the love and thanks of men and women. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered. Yet, we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.''

Charles De Gaulle once said, ``France would not be true to herself if she weren't engaged in some great enterprise.'' Our great enterprise is the defense of freedom, and may we be worthy of the challenge.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I know this seems a strange thing to say on a bill as small as the bill to fund the congressional budget, but I honestly believe, because of the attachment of the proposal for the continuity of Congress, that this bill is by far the worst bill to come to the floor in this session of Congress.

I believe that that continuity of representation provision attached to this bill is an assault on constitutional government. I believe it is an assault on checks and balances. It is an assault on the rule of law. It is an invitation to one-man rule and dictatorship. I think it is profoundly misguided, profoundly misgotten, and I think a profound disservice is done in not having months and months of hearings with constitutional scholars before such a drastic proposal is brought before the House.

I think there is a very good reason that the Senate has not taken it up. It is because it is a turkey of a proposal. It could leave us literally with 75 and 80 percent of the congressional districts in this country unrepresented in a time of crisis, at a time of terrorist attack, and unrepresented in the halls of Congress, and I think that is a bad way to do business.

What I would like to do now is to talk about another problem in this bill. That is the Congressional Visitors Center. I really believe that the Congressional Visitors Center has been mismanaged in such spectacular fashion that it is really sort of a metaphor for the way that the entire Federal budget deficit has been mismanaged, and let me explain what I mean.

This project originally started as a $95 million project to have a modest expansion of the Capitol, to give tourists an opportunity to come in and see a movie about what the Congress was all about before they visited the Capitol. But the security assault on this Capitol and 9/11 has, in my view, been used as an excuse to expand this operation. We have also had other efforts from the Library of Congress and other institutions to further expand this proposition; and so as a result, today, this project is a $500 million-plus project. It is more than a year behind schedule, and I think it is wasting taxpayers' money and wasting an opportunity that we had to provide much-needed usable space for the Congress at the same time.

What is happening out on the East Front is that over 2 acres of underground space is being added to the Capitol. Some of that is being added for purposes of a visitors center and some of the other space is being added for the purpose of expanding space under control of the Senate and the House to do their work.

We all know that this Congress needs more working space. In my view, the number one need of the Congress for working space is the need for additional rooms for conference committees between the Senate and the House because most of our hearings, especially on the Committee on Appropriations. When I came here, they were held behind closed doors. The press was not in, the public was not in. So there was plenty of room for a few people to get behind closed doors and work out deals and that is not the way government is supposed to work today.

Today, when we have a conference committee, the press has a right to be there. We need our staffs there, and the public has the right to be there, too. We have no real room in the Capitol for that kind of facility.

This is an opportunity to create that kind of room. Instead, what has happened? Instead, the only appreciable room of any quality in the new House space is what is called the House hearing room, but in plain language, that room is really a media center. That is going to be where the press focuses whenever there is a hearing in that room because it will have all of the creature comforts for the press. That room will have ample room for one hearing, one presentation, and whoever runs the Congress will be able to decide what subject it is that gets that attention. If you are trying to hold another public hearing on another subject in the Capitol, you are going to be stuck in tiny rooms that are worthless in terms of public access.

When I visited the visitors center, I asked the Architect why, with these vaulted ceilings that you have set aside for this hearing room, why could you not simply reduce the height of those rooms and at least provide two rooms of approximately the same size so that we had enough overflow room for the committees to do our work and to have conference committees? I have yet to get an answer from the Architect's office.

That is my problem. My problem is that with all of this space being created, much of it is not usable for the purpose that we need it used for.

Then we come to the other portion of the add-on, which is the portion devoted to the visitors center. Originally, that visitors center was supposed to have two media theaters so that the public could come in, see a short film about the Congress, and then be on its way.

Here is the problem. We have those two small orientation theaters, but in addition to that, we have this huge congressional auditorium, which is going to seat 450-plus people. I asked the Architect, and this is a vaulted theater, I asked why do we need another theater in the Capitol? What I was told by the Architect is, ``Well, you can bring in large constituency groups.'' I would like to know how many Members of the House have ever brought 500 people into the Capitol. I do not think there are going to be many people would raise their hands.

The second thing the Architect told me is that, ``Well, we need a place for where the House of Representatives can meet when the House Chamber is being remodeled.''

That I found a might strange, because we have just redecorated the Committee on Ways and Means room in the Longworth Building. That room was originally created to serve as an alternative meeting place for the House of Representatives when we had to repair this Chamber. So we have already got a spare room.

In addition, we have another spare room I cannot talk about because it is classified, but it is being built off campus somewhere. So in essence we will have three spare rooms. I do not know how much the off- campus room is costing the taxpayers or how much the Committee on Ways and Means room cost the taxpayers, but this room is going to cost a bundle.

I keep asking ``What is the real purpose for this room?'' You finally go back 10 years and look at the original plans, what do we find out. We find out that this was originally included in the plans at the request of the Library of Congress because they wanted another theater to show movies and give presentations. That might be nice for them to have, but this project is already 400 percent over original cost. I do not think it makes any sense. I think this is the last chance that we are going to have to reconfigure this center so we have some additional working space instead of the Taj Mahal show space we are going to have.

Another thing I do not like, we have been told we are likely to have three congressional seals in the new visitors center. Those seals, I have been told, will cost up to a million bucks. Does any Member really want to take the political heat when taxpayers find out that somebody is talking about spending $1 million on three congressional seals? Do Members remember the Cain that was raised when marble floors were put in four of our elevators in the Capitol? Does anybody have any memory? I would like to think so, but I guess not.

Mr. Chairman, I consider myself to be an institutional man. I usually support this piece of legislation; but out of frustration, I am not going to support it today because I think this Capitol Visitors Center, when it is finally built, is going to draw flies in terms of bad stories about waste of taxpayer money, misuse of space, and we are going to wind up not having enough room for the principal function of government. If this is, indeed, supposed to be a working Capitol, then we ought to be able to do better than this floor plan.

I really believe this package has been brought to us by staff who do not really understand how committees work and do not really understand the principal needs of this institution. This is the last time we are going to have a chance to repair this package and

make it more usable for the 100 years at least that it will be used. I urge Members to vote against this bill so we can start over.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

I want to simply say I congratulate the gentleman from California. I agree with the gentleman from California. I would be perfectly willing to vote for this proposition today if we had a constitutional amendment going at the same time, so that the solution in this bill would be only a temporary solution until we got a real one.

Without the Rohrabacher approach, or something similar, and I happen to prefer the one he introduced in the last Congress, but without something like that, we guarantee that we can have the President governing with literally a handful of people in the Congress. We could have hundreds of districts with no representation whatsoever. That is not continuity. That is chaos. That is martial law. That is one-man rule.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Baird).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 seconds to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Baird).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time.

Mr. Chairman, with respect to the Congressional Visitors Center, we are not saying there should not be one; all we are saying is that the one that is being proposed is screwed up and spectacularly wasteful and needs to be changed.

With respect to the assertion of my friend from Illinois that we do not have to worry about not having a Congress for 45 days because there will not be anything for Members of Congress to do, all I can tell my colleague is, if that is the case, then I wonder why it is that the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Bill Young) and I negotiated a $20 billion supplemental appropriation just a few days after 9/11; and I wonder why it is we were sitting in the office of the gentleman from Illinois (Speaker Hastert) until 12:30 at night hammering out differences with people on the Senate side who did not agree with what we had done; and why it is that the President made a commitment of $10 billion to New York; and why we had to spend a lot of time backing him up.

I would also remind the gentleman we had a debate on the House floor when the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure tried to slip into that bill an extra $10 billion appropriation for the airlines.

There was plenty for us to do after 9/11; and thank God, in contrast to the proposition being set out today, thank God that then we had a Congress around to do it.

If you want to vote for a situation in which we can have no Congress whatsoever for 45 days, then by all means vote for this provision. If you do not, if you think we ought to have some kind of balance and check on the Presidency during that period by having somebody here to do the Nation's business, then my colleagues will reconsider and listen to what the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Baird) have to say.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, just one point. We did that 3 days after 9/ 11, 3 days.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).

If the gentleman will yield, could the gentleman share with us the names of these horses?

My understanding is that their names are Justice, Honor, Patriot, Freedom, and Tribute. Great names, but still not much of a purpose for their use.

Mr. Chairman, I would simply say that passing this amendment will not eliminate the distribution of the Record. It will simply create a financial shortfall which will have to be dealt with in the future. I personally prefer to use the printed Record than I do the online Record.

I do my work in lots of places besides the office, and I do not

use a computer. I use a pencil. So I would just suggest that I think the amendment is outrageous and misbegotten; but if the gentleman wants to accept it, we can deal with it in conference. We will work it out.

Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman is willing to stop talking, I am willing to stop talking. I will vote for whichever side stops talking first.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

As someone considerably more famous once said, The world will little note nor long remember what we either say or do here today on this matter.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, let me simply say that while I am opposed to this bill because I think it wastes too much money on the visitors center, I agree that an across-the-board cut is not a responsible way to approach budgeting. If all of this cut came out of the visitors center, I would vote for it in a flash.

Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

I certainly am, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the motion to recommit be debatable for 4 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. Speaker, I will only take 1 minute.

This is a straight motion to recommit so that we can fix the out-of- control visitors center, which is as out of control as the Federal deficit. It is also the last chance we will be able to have to remove the assault on constitutional government by removing the nongermane continuity provision, and it also is the last chance to establish a Truman-like committee to investigate waste and fraud in Iraq.

I urge an aye vote. And I will ask for a roll call vote.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, the media just reported the sad news that we have just reached a sad milestone: 2,500 Americans have lost their lives in the Iraq war. Mr. Speaker, I respectfully ask at the outset of this very important debate that the House observe a moment of silence for all those who have given the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of our country.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to speak on this issue today, this important issue for so many Americans across the country, from my home State of Missouri. So many families such as mine have young people in uniform. But this resolution before us today is not what we requested, nor is it what we were told we would have before us to debate. We expected a resolution confined to the country of Iraq and the conflict there. That is not what the resolution is. This resolution covers the Middle East waterfront, trying to blend together the Iraqi war and the war against terrorism, which has its genesis in Afghanistan.

Mr. Speaker, these are two separate and distinct wars. We did the right thing by going into Afghanistan, toppling the Taliban, which supported and protected the al Qaeda terrorists. And then came along the discussion, the international discussion about Iraq and Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass destruction.

We made the decision, as a country, to go into Iraq. At that time, Mr. Speaker, knowing the history and the culture of the Middle East, I sent two letters to the President of the United States, one on September 4, 2002, and one on March 18, 2003, before we went into Iraq. My letters warned against the aftermath.

They sent an Assistant Secretary of State and an Assistant Secretary of Defense over to see me and said, ``Ike, it will be all right.''

We know what happened in the aftermath insurgency because we allowed the looting, we sent the Iraqi Army home, rather than give them a paycheck and a shovel, and didn't have enough troops to quell any insurgency. And it arose. And here we are, some 3 years later.

Despite the fact that this resolution is a broad one, let's talk about Iraq, which should be the complete subject of the resolution before us.

Mr. Speaker, this Nation is at a strategic crossroads. We are spending $8 billion a month, over $300 billion on this war. And more strikingly, we are losing, Mr. Speaker, a battalion's worth of casualties killed or injured between Iraq and Afghanistan. By far, most of them are, sadly, in Iraq. And there are increasing insurgent inspired attacks.

Now, what makes this resolution so interesting is the fact that it flies in the face of the law that we passed here in the Congress of the United States and the President signed. The bill, the defense bill of 2005 said this: ``Calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating conditions for the phased redeployment of the United States forces from Iraq.'' That is the law of our land. That is what the defense bill said last year. ``Thereby creating conditions for the phased redeployment of the United States forces from Iraq.''

What does this mean to us in the long run? Well, farmers in Missouri know that the quality of the corn that they plant will bring about the quality of the corn that grows. And we find ourselves militarily eating our seed corn in the country of Iraq. Sadly, a few moments ago we had a moment of silence for the 2,500th American that sacrificed a life in that sad country. But it means eating up the equipment, and we are using equipment right and left and it is going to take 3 years to refurbish the United States Army if the war would stop today equipment- wise. There are challenges in recruiting and retention. But I have to tell you how proud I am of those young people in uniform today. But if we do not take serious thought about the phraseology that is in the law creating the condition for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq, I think that we may be eating our military seed corn. And what does this mean? It means that the United States of America will be less prepared to either deter or defend an attack that might come at some future date.

This is serious business. We need to remain strong militarily. That is the way you deter problems. Should North Korea, somewhere in Asia, somewhere in Latin America, somewhere in Africa that would cause us to be involved, the question is, Mr. Speaker, would we be prepared militarily to meet that challenge?

That is why it is very important that we do our very best to take seriously the law regarding transition this year, the significant transition.

And what will it take? It will take the Iraqi government to stand up on its own, and it is on its way there, to transfer the security problem and situation to their police force and to their military, and we have some 250,000 Iraqi military either fully trained or nearly fully trained. We have to hand the baton over to them. We as a country, whether militarily or not, cannot determine the fate of Iraq. The Iraqis have to do it themselves, their own government, their own military, and their own police force. We can be of help. We have been of help. We have been there some 3 years. I think it is time for us to seriously look at where we are, where we are going, and do our very best to keep ourselves militarily strong for those days that are bound to happen.

And, Mr. Speaker, let me remind the Members I have been in Congress 29 plus years thanks to those wonderful folks in Missouri. During that time, we have had 10 military confrontations with other countries. History being what it is reflects that, and the future may hold something similar. We hope not. But the question is will we be militarily prepared when the time comes?

The Iraq adventure needs to be looked at in light of the law that we passed last year. The calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq. That is the law. That is what the Congress passed. That is what the President signed. And that is where we are.

Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record at this point my letters in full to the President, dated September 4, 2002, and March 18, 2003.

Committee on Armed Services,

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, September 4, 2002.

The President,

The White House,

Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. President: Thank you for inviting me to the

briefing this morning. I share your concern about the

continuing threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his efforts to

produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I would like to

offer my assistance as the administration considers how to

deal with this threat.

Before Congress can authorize any military action that

might be part of the administration's plan, we must have

answers to more questions than were able to be raised. at

today's meeting. Our constitutional duty requires us to

ensure that all implications of such action are considered in

advance. The case has not yet been fully made as to what the

threat is, why military force is an appropriate way of

addressing the threat, and why action must occur now. In

short, Congress and the American people must be clear on your

strategic vision before we can authorize a specific course of

action. I believe, like Clausewitz, that in strategy there is

an ``imperative . . . not to take the first step without

considering the last.''

Your strategy for dealing with Iraq must address the

fundamental questions of the threat, the method of acting,

and the timing. Furthermore, any strategy to eliminate Iraqi

WMD must also address several component issues, each of which

raises critical questions.

1. How to manage Iraq's transition to a stable post-Saddam

regime:

As I mentioned to you this morning, this is a crucial

question for administration strategy to answer in advance of

any military action. I have no doubt that our military would

decisively defeat Iraq's forces and remove Saddam. But like

the proverbial dog chasing the car down the road, we must

consider what we would do after we caught it.

As Sun-Tzu said in the classic strategic treatise, The Art

of War, ``To win victory is easy; to preserve its fruits,

difficult.'' Military planners and political leaders alike

knew this in World War II. Planning for the occupation of

Germany and Japan--two economically viable, technologically

sophisticated nations--took place well in advance of the

end of the war. The extreme difficulty of occupying Iraq

with its history of autocratic rule, its balkanized ethnic

tensions, and its isolated economic system argues both for

careful consideration of the benefits and risks of

undertaking military action and for detailed advanced

occupation planning if such military action is approved.

Specifically, your strategy must consider the form of a

replacement regime and take seriously the possibility that

this regime might be rejected by the Iraqi people, leading to

civil unrest and even anarchy. The effort must be to craft a

stable regime that will be geopolitically preferable to

Saddam and will incorporate the disparate interests of all

groups within Iraq--Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd. We must also plan

now for what to do with members of the Baath party that

continue to support Saddam and with the scientists and

engineers who have expertise born of the Iraqi WMD program.

All these efforts require careful planning and long-term

commitment of manpower and resources. The American people

must be clear about the amount of money and the number of

soldiers that will have to be devoted to this effort for many

years to come.

2. How to ensure the action in Iraq does not undermine

international support for the broader war on terrorism:

In planning for military operations in Iraq, we cannot

ignore the lack of international support to date. Pre-emptive

action against Iraq is currently vocally opposed by many of

our allies and friends throughout the world and particularly

in the Middle East.

When we are seen as acting against the concerns of large

numbers of our friends, it calls into question the ``humble''

approach to international relations you espoused during the

presidential campaign. More than that, it has several

potentially damaging long-term consequences. First, it risks

losing the large number of partners needed to prosecute the

global war on terrorism. To ferret terrorist groups out of

their many hiding places, we must have broad allied support.

Second, it risks seriously damaging U.S. moral legitimacy,

potentially providing states like India and Pakistan with a

preemptive option that could drive long-standing conflicts

beyond containable bounds.

Finally and perhaps most dangerously, actions without broad

Arab support may inflame the sources of terrorism, causing

unrest and anger throughout the Muslim world. This dynamic

will be worse if Iraq attacks Israel--perhaps with weapons of

mass destruction--and draws them into the conflict. Iran,

which has the potential to seize a reformist path, may well

move away from the United States in the face of attacks that

could next be taken against them. Together, these dynamics

will make achieving peace in the Middle East more difficult

and may well provide the rationale for more terrorist attacks

against Americans.

These concerns do not make military action in Iraq

untenable. They do, however, highlight the depth and

importance of the issues to be addressed before we strike. We

need to ensure that in taking out Saddam, we don't win the

battle and lose the war.

3. How to ensure that the United States can execute this

operation successfully as well as its other military

missions:

As you are well aware, Mr. President, the consideration of

military action against Iraq comes at a time when U.S. forces

are actively engaged throughout the world in a range of

missions. Given the operational pressures these forces

currently face, we must ask what the risks and trade-offs

will be of defeating Iraq, particularly if Iraqi forces mass

in Baghdad for urban operations. How many casualties must the

American people be prepared to take in a worst-case scenario?

What will the impact of sustained operations be on so-called

high-demand, low-density assets? What military operations

might we have to forego because of continued demands in Iraq?

Will we still be prepared for the range of other threats that

might emerge throughout the world? With little allied support

and contributions, will we still be able to maintain military

spending on transformational technologies and on sound

quality of life for our forces if we are bearing a huge

wartime cost alone? What will be the impact on the domestic

economy of these resources drains and of the long-term costs

of reconstructing Iraq? These questions must be answered

before any military action commences so that the American

people understand the risks and the sacrifices involved.

I ask these questions only to highlight the complexity of

the undertaking and the need for Congress, the American

people, and our friends around the world to understand

exactly what is at stake and why we must act now. Only such a

comprehensive strategic approach will ensure that we commit

U.S. troops consciously and with full knowledge of the range

of challenges we face--both in the initial campaign and in

the long aftermath to follow. Even a strategy that has

military action as its centerpiece will require great

diplomatic efforts to ensure its success. I look forward to

hearing the administration's answers and to working with you

to find the best course of action.

Sincerely,

Ike Skelton,

Ranking Democrat.