To authorize the President to waive the application of certain requirements under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with respect to India.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this legislation, allowing for a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. The last two administrations have forged closer ties with India. And India is a nation now of over 1 billion people. The last two administrations frankly have overcome the chilly relations of the Cold War with India.

And last July's joint statement committed each country to a global partnership which has accelerated our cooperation on many issues, including on counterterrorism. As we saw 2 weeks ago, when a series of commuter train bombings hit Mumbai, killing over 200 Indian people, India is a frontline state in the struggle against Islamist terrorism.

Congress has played a leading role promoting U.S.-India relations. There is an India Caucus which I cochaired in the 107th Congress. In 2001, I led a congressional delegation to India's earthquake-shattered Gujarat region. Other Members have focused on India. But nothing we have done is as significant as the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement that we are debating today.

As our distinguished chairman has noted, the International Relations Committee has given this agreement close and extensive review. We held five hearings, which is certainly warranted given the high stakes.

Supporters and detractors alike recognize the great significance of this policy shift that the Bush administration has engineered. I would like to commend Chairman Hyde. He took a weak administration legislative proposal, one dismissive of congressional prerogative and turned it around. I want to commend Ranking Member Lantos, too, for his detailed work on this challenging issue.

While nuclear energy is controversial in the United States, it is not in India. Like in several other countries, nuclear energy is widely viewed as a critical technology, one central to uplifting hundreds of millions of impoverished Indians. So India will develop its nuclear energy sector, not as easily or as quickly without this deal, but it will nonetheless. And India will not relinquish its nuclear weapons at this point in time, which is understandable, given its security situation.

So right now, many Indians view the United States as blocking India's technological and developmental aspirations by our opposition to their acquiring nuclear material and technology. With its growing economy, India is consuming more and more oil. It is competing on the world market, competing with American consumers for limited hydrocarbon resources.

This gives Americans an interest in helping India expand its nuclear power industry, which this legislation does. It also encourages India to move away from burning its abundance of highly polluting coal. By passing this legislation, we also take a step toward internationalizing India's nuclear industry, which I believe would make it safer.

Young Indian scientists and engineers in the nuclear field are interested in collaborating with their American counterparts. Today they are isolated. I would rather know more rather than less about India's nuclear work. Some have raised legitimate concerns about the impact of this agreement upon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Indian nuclear weapons arsenal. I am not prepared, at this point, to call this agreement a nonproliferation plus, as some do, but neither is it the clear setback some opponents describe.

For one, this agreement forces a separation between India's civilian and military nuclear programs. This is a good step. The agreement also is likely to increase India's cooperation with us in confronting countries seeking to break their NPT commitment by developing nuclear weapons.

In my view, this agreement is more likely a wash in the nonproliferation category, while its broad benefits, primarily cultivating a more influential relationship with India, are big pluses.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson).

I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

I supported the gentlewoman's amendment in committee. And while not necessarily concurring with all the views that she expressed in committee, I supported her amendment; and hers are helpful amendments which I will work to maintain in the final bill.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time for closing.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina is indeed correct. It is our intent that section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act should apply prospectively to India. Should India conduct a nuclear test in the future, one likely consequence would be the discontinuation of nuclear fuel and technology sharing by the United States with India.

That is our understanding.

Any fuel reserve should be intended to give India protections against short-term fluctuations in the supply of nuclear fuel.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).

Mr. Chairman, yes. I supported the gentleman's amendment in committee, and I will work with him to maintain it in the final bill.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I think we are all very concerned about the reports on Pakistan's programs that appeared this week. I think it was Monday in the Washington Post, but I think it is important to also note that that report stated that the construction on this facility in Pakistan to make these bombs began sometime in the year 2000. So this is not something that I think can be characterized as a reaction to this new initiative with India.

I do have concerns about a nuclear arms buildup in Asia. Again, this is something that the administration should be doing more on, working towards a fissile material cutoff treaty.

However, I would just respond by pointing out that this agreement gives us a chance to be engaged with India on their program instead of being on the outside as we have been for decades.

Mr. Chairman, I yield for the purposes of a unanimous consent request to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach), the chairman of the Asia Subcommittee.

(Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley).

Mr. Chairman, you know, while the United States is, in fact, leading the way on this agreement, it is a multilateral agreement in the sense that the NSG, 45 nations, must concur with this agreement; and Congress must approve a nuclear cooperation agreement that the administration is negotiating with India before technology is actually transferred.

So I also want to make the point here that Congress is going to have a second crack at this agreement when it comes back. But here is the choice that we face: Either we continue to try to box in India and hope for the best, or we make this move, we engage India, and we hope to use our influence to move this increasingly important country in our direction. And this will help make India a true partner, a true partner as we enter what will be a decades-long struggle, I fear, against Islamist terrorism.

This is not an ideal agreement, and the administration should be more aggressively pursuing an international fissile material cutoff. But this agreement is a good one which works through a difficult nonproliferation situation to strengthen an important relationship for us.

That is why I ask my colleagues to approve this legislation. Frankly, it is a chance to strengthen an important relationship for us at a time when we need more strong relationships, especially with regional powers such as India; and, I will remind my colleagues, it strengthens a relationship with a democracy, based on the rule of law, a democracy that has a good record on nonproliferation.

This deal is controversial in India. The coalition government of Prime Minister Singh has come under intense attack from the political extremes and from political opponents. He has been charged with selling out India, opening its nuclear facilities to international inspection, agreeing to check India's nuclear weapons production.

So far the center has held. Let's not deliver India's Marxist and xenophobic forces a victory. They would like us to kill this deal. Let's pass this legislation. As Chairman Hyde argued and as the ranking member explained, let's pass this legislation. Let the administration negotiate a nuclear sharing agreement with India, and then look again and decide whether or not to proceed.

I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the motion.

Mr. Chairman, I would make several points.

One, in terms of the program that is being laid out in the Washington Post, I think it was this Monday, explaining Pakistan's ambitions with respect to its nuclear buildup, that is clearly not something that can be characterized as a reaction to this new initiative with India. The reason I say that is because a careful reading of that Washington Post report shows that the construction of this very facility site began in the year 2000. The construction of the facility began 6 years ago.

I will also point out that the supposition that it could be used for 40 to 50 nuclear bombs a year, the information we have is that is probably two or three. Yet the very existence of the facility itself shows why a fissile cutoff is, frankly, not practical to enforce, to attempt to enforce on India, except through negotiation.

And I think, lastly, in conclusion, the attempt to equate Pakistan's efforts, now 6 years old, and tie that and say that that is in response to a deal that we are negotiating with India of less than a year old is clearly not germane to the argument that we have before us today.

So I oppose the motion of the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. Chairman, as the designee of Mr. Hyde, I offer the Hyde-Lantos amendment which is made in order by the rule.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the Hyde-Lantos amendment made in order by the rule be modified in the form which I have caused to be placed at the desk.

Mr. Chairman, the only change in this amendment is to name this bill after our distinguished chairman, Henry Hyde. The underlying amendment contains a series of technical and conforming changes which were needed to ensure the bill was properly drafted.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

It is my understanding that a member of the committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman) offered an amendment in committee that was passed on voice vote. However, upon further reflection, I understand the Member has asked that the amendment language be removed. And what is happening here is that the committee is honoring that request. I would note, however, that the heart of the section 4(b)(7), and this is the section that the gentleman is concerned about, which states that the President must determine that the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided by consensus, that remains intact, and that is the practice at the NSG.

And let me just quote from the bill: ``The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.''

So the heart of the determination remains intact. And, again, the removal of that particular language was at the request of a member of the committee, Mr. Sherman of California, who offered the original amendment that was accepted in committee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank him for his amendment.

During consideration of this agreement in committee, members expressed some of the same concerns raised by the gentleman from Florida, and we added language to the underlying bill to alleviate those concerns. I offered an amendment, a successful amendment, in committee that explicitly states that nothing in this bill shall violate our article I NPT obligation, not to, in any way, assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

Now, the gentleman's amendment further clarifies that the aiding of India's strategic program is not Congress's intent. And with that, we are quite prepared to accept the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlelady for yielding; and I just wanted to say I thank her and Mr. Burton for their amendment. I think it is very important that the United States be engaged on the subcontinent, and I think the gentlewoman from Texas and the gentleman from Indiana should be commended for their good work on this amendment. We are prepared to accept that amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.

Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished chairman of the International Relations Committee, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos).

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. I will note that the base text of this bill, in section 402, already asks for a classified report on India's domestic uranium usage. But the gentleman's amendment would make such a certification a condition for the deal.

Let me also say that people recognize that India has great demand for expanding its energy grid to create electricity for its people. Let me say that the gentleman has taken a unique approach to this issue for which he should be commended. We sympathize with his concerns.

However, I do not see the amendment as even workable. I do not know that such a determination with a high degree of confidence could even be made. So I am concerned about terminating the agreement with India on such a certification that cannot even be made with any certitude.

Mr. Chairman, for some of these reasons, this amendment was defeated in committee by a vote of 10-32 when it was offered. I urge the House to do the same.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the International Relations Committee (Mr. Hyde).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos).

Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield 1 minute to the chairman of the International Relations Committee.

Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman.

I rise in opposition to the Berman amendment. I would like to commend the gentleman from California for bringing this issue before the House today, and I know that he does so having studied this issue very closely.

The gentleman's amendment would prevent the full realization of this agreement until India has put in place a cap, either unilaterally or multilateral, on its fissile material production. That is a highly unlikely or even an implausible scenario given the dynamics in the region in South Asia.

This should, frankly, be a goal, and the administration should be doing more on that front. But it should not be a mandate for this agreement.

This amendment is not without merit. I offered a successful amendment in committee that states that nothing in this bill shall violate our Article I NPT obligation not to in any way assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. So I think Congress has made it clear that this is not the intent of the agreement.

The gentleman is right that the language in the underlying bill is not as strenuous as his proposal, but there is also an international component to this agreement. We are opening the door for this cooperation with India not only for the United States but for other countries as well, and I don't see how the gentleman's amendment would prevent the nuclear supplier group from approving such trade for other countries, excluding only the U.S.

Let me also say I do believe that fulfilling this relationship with India is in the interest of the United States. Indeed, and here is my final point, if this amendment were to pass, it could in fact be detrimental to U.S. interests from that perspective

I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

As we have noted before, the underlying bill in section 402 already asks for a classified report on India's domestic uranium usage. The gentleman from Nebraska's amendment asks for an additional report building on the report in the underlying bill. We are willing to accept that amendment

Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the motion to recommit.

Mr. Speaker, during the course of the committee's five hearings on this agreement members closely scrutinized the relationship between India and Iran, and I think it is fair to say that our committee helped influence India's thinking on Iran. And I think we should all remember that we are getting India's cooperation on Iran. We got two IAEA votes out of India, including a critical vote to get the Iran file to New York. That is the fact about cooperation.

We share the gentleman's concern about Iran, but our point is that India is cooperating on Iran. And as we continue to engage India, and this agreement is about India's growing energy needs, as we engage India, we move them away from states like Iran. Rejection of the agreement itself, frankly, could push India, theoretically, back towards countries like Iran.

Also, we have Mr. Markey's theme in the bill itself. The bill itself says to ``secure India's full and active participation in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability, and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.'' If India breaks this agreement, then we, the United States, will break our agreement with India.

And I think also it is important to remember that India and the administration both say that they are cooperating on Iran quietly behind the scenes. Why? Because this is the most effective way to do it. And we have seen the positive results. But diplomacy cannot be certified. The purpose of this agreement is to help establish broad cooperation, to establish a partnership between India and the United States. You do not compel a partner to cooperate. So this amendment is both unworkable and contrary to the spirit of the new relationship we are trying to establish with India.

How important is that relationship? Well, we have had two administrations, the Clinton administration and the Bush administration, forge closer ties with India and overcoming what we remember only too well, the chilly relations of the Cold War. And last July's joint statement committed each country to a global partnership which has accelerated our cooperation on many issues, including counterterrorism, including Iran.

The International Relations Committee have given this agreement close and extensive review. While nuclear energy is controversial in the United States, it is not in India. Like in several other countries, nuclear energy is widely viewed as a critical technology for their electricity, one central to uplifting hundreds of millions of impoverished Indians. So India will develop its nuclear energy sector, not as easily or as quickly without this deal, but it will nonetheless. So this deal needs to go forward.

With its growing economy, India is consuming more and more oil. It is competing on the world market, competing with American consumers, for limited hydrocarbon resources. This gives Americans an interest in helping India expand its nuclear power industry, which this legislation does. It also encourages India to move away from burning its highly polluting coal, which is in our interest.

By passing this legislation, we also take a step toward internationalizing India's nuclear industry, which I believe would make it safer. The agreement also is likely to increase India's cooperation with us in confronting countries seeking to break their NPT commitment by developing nuclear weapons, as it already has with Iran.

India must take more steps, including developing a credible plan to separate its civilians and military nuclear facilities under the agreement. Congress must approve a nuclear cooperation agreement that the administration is negotiating with the Indians before the technology is actually transferred. And as I said, should India break the conditions of the agreement, the U.S. breaks off the agreement itself.

So either we continue to try to box in India and hope for the best, or we make this move, we engage India and hope to use our influence to move this increasingly important country in our direction, making India a true partner as we enter what will be a decades-long struggle against Islamist terrorism.

That is why I ask my colleagues to please oppose this motion to recommit and please vote for the U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, this agreement pours nuclear fuel on the fire of an India-Pakistan nuclear arms race. This agreement will free up 40 to 50 bombs worth of nuclear fuel for Indian nuclear bombs, and the consequence of that will be that Pakistan will respond, and Pakistan will respond with A.Q. Khan under house arrest in Islamabad, the Johnny Appleseed of nuclear weapons spread from Iran to Libya to North Korea.

And how do we know that? We know that because in Monday's Washington Post we learned from an outside source that Pakistan is building a facility that can create 50 plutonium nuclear bombs a year. We should be debating that out here on the House floor tonight.

This House has 2 days to reject a sale of 36 F-16 bombers that can take the 50 nuclear bombs which Pakistan can make each year in a radius of 1,500 kilometers, but we are not going to debate that. We are not going to debate Pakistan's nuclear program, which Congress was not told about, the American public was not told about.

Who is in Pakistan? A.Q. Khan is in Pakistan. Osama bin Laden is in Pakistan. Al Qaeda is in Pakistan.

This agreement is going to fuel an arms race, a nuclear arms race in southeast Asia, and it is going to spread across the world, and instead of debating an F-16 bill, 36 of them to Pakistan, with this abomination of a nuclear program which they have, we are instead fueling it with this India program which Pakistan knows is cynical because it will free up 50 bombs worth of civilian domestic Indian nuclear fuel for their bomb program.

We must halt, we must stop this nuclear arms race in southeast Asia. We must vote ``no'' on this proposal. It is absurd. We should be debating Pakistan's nuclear program, Pakistan's F-16 program tonight, or else we will look back on this as an historic failure.

Mr. Chairman, we are being told that we shouldn't worry, that this won't lead to a nuclear arms race.

Now, India is not a signatory to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. This agreement is in violation of the Nonproliferation Act of 1978 here in Congress. All of their facilities are not being put under full-scope safeguards.

Experts say that when we supply the nuclear fuel for their civilian program, it is going to free up nuclear fuel for their nuclear weapons program. It makes sense. But we are told, don't worry.

Now, right now, India makes about seven nuclear bombs a year, on average. That is the magnitude. That is the scope of their program. But experts say it will free up 40 to 50 bombs' worth of nuclear material if they wanted to build more nuclear bombs. We are told, don't worry.

But here is what else is going on. This week in the world, A.Q. Khan, under house arrest in Islamabad, this nuclear merchant that should be on trial in the world court for what he has done in spreading nuclear weapons materials around the world but yet the Bush administration has turned a blind eye to him and allowed Musharraf just to keep him under house arrest in a palace. Well, A.Q. Khan and his people now have a new program, it turns out, on the front page of the Washington Post this week, that will make it possible for them to build 40 to 50 plutonium nuclear bombs per year. Now they are going to do it. They are going to do it because they only have two to three nuclear bombs capacity per day right now, and they can scale up to 40 to 50.

Now what is interesting about these two charts about India and Pakistan, they are each now going to be capable of going from between two and seven up to 40 to 50.

We are told, don't worry. Well, I am worrying; and I think we should all worry. The Bush administration has not made public at all the fact that they have known for at least 2 years that Pakistan has this clandestine plutonium nuclear bomb program. It is the place where we should all be concerned that that al Qaeda operative buys a nuclear bomb and moves it into the Middle East, moves it to New York City, moves it to Washington, D.C. And instead we are told, don't worry.

Well, what kind of signal are we sending to the world when Iran, which is a signatory to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, is on trial at the Security Council to comply with the nonproliferation treaty because they are violating it, and we are turning a blind eye to what India and Pakistan, nonsignatories to the nonproliferation

treaty, are doing or will do if this deal goes through? We will make a mockery of the nonproliferation regime in the world.

And we know that President Bush doesn't care about it. Otherwise, we would know more about this Pakistani program which they have had satellite evidence of its existence for the last 2 years. We know that he doesn't care about it. Otherwise, he would be forcing India to put the full nuclear program in India under safeguards. He would be extracting a ban on the production of fissile material in India, in the same way that the United States and Russia and China and England and France now don't produce any more fissile material.

But, no, the President is allowing an exemption. This deal is like throwing a tinder onto an already raging fire in the most dangerous part of the world and pretending that there is no relationship between what we do here today and the response of Pakistan and Iran and other nations around the world.

Mr. Chairman, I object.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my objection.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

If all that the manager's amendment included was the naming of this legislation after Henry Hyde, then I would be at the front of the line to ensure that I would be praising him to the heavens. And I want the gentleman from Illinois to understand that because he does deserve all the accolades which he is receiving.

But there is just a little bit more in this manager's amendment than naming it after the distinguished gentleman from Illinois.

The reason that I am opposed to this amendment is that it would strike part of one of the seven conditions being placed on the India nuclear deal.

Here is the full language of the condition. It is No. 7: ``The Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG and such decision does not permit civil nuclear commerce with any other non- nuclear weapon state that does not have IAEA,'' International Atomic Energy Agency, ``safeguards on all nuclear materials within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.''

The manager's amendment would strike the words ``and such decision does not permit civil nuclear commerce with any other non-nuclear weapon state that does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear materials within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.'' The impact of that change in the language is that it would free the

Nuclear Suppliers Group to also allow nuclear commerce with other nations that have not agreed to full-scope IAEA safeguards on their nuclear facilities, such as Pakistan.

I see absolutely no justification for opening the door to China to come into the Nuclear Suppliers Group with a proposal to give Pakistan the same deal that the administration is proposing to give India. That is a bad idea. It invites a further weakening of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and an expansion of commerce with countries that do not allow full-scope international safeguards. We should be very careful here. We should be very cautious.

The ostensible justification for the initiation of the war in Iraq is that we did not want the next terrorist attack to come in the form of a mushroom cloud. As we make these changes, they seem slight. They are not. They are historic in terms of the safeguards that we have in place to ensure that we are securing these nuclear materials, that proper procedures are in place to make sure that countries and subnational groups that should not have them in their possession are denied them.

This is a weakening amendment, and I urge the Members to oppose it.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, this is a great amendment. Because right now this is how much nuclear material is needed by India to produce nuclear electricity in their country. It is used for electricity. However, once we provide them all of this nuclear material for their nuclear electricity, it is going to free up the same amount to make nuclear bombs.

So they can go from 7 a year to 40 to 50 nuclear bombs a year. Well, they are saying they do not want to do that. And the proponents of this treaty are saying, they are not going to do that. What the Sherman amendment says is, the President must certify each year that they do not do that. That is why the Sherman amendment is the deal maker, because it proves what is being said is actually the truth.

Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.

In its current form, I am opposed to the bill.

Mr. Speaker, this recommittal motion requires that nuclear cooperation with India can only commence after the President has determined that India is fully and actively participating in United States' efforts to dissuade, isolate and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability, including the capability to enrich or process nuclear materials and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

The motion does not kill or delay this bill in any way. If the House approves this motion, the Committee on International Relations will report the amended bill back to the House forthwith, meaning immediately. We will go to final passage of the legislation.

As the Members know, the U.S. Government has made a determination that Iran's nuclear program is a cover for a military program; and the International Atomic Energy Agency has found Iran to be in violation of their international safeguards commitments. The U.N. Security Council is about to consider what action to take in response.

Even Russia and China have now said that they would support action at the Security Council, potentially even sanctions, a position that could not have been imagined previously. India is now the only global power that has yet to get on board with the United States policy on Iran.

Clearly, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is a paramount U.S. national security goal. A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat to our national security; and it is a threat to the security, indeed, the very survival of our closest ally in the Middle East, the State of Israel.

Let me at this time, Mr. Speaker, yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Upton).

I thank the gentleman.

I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos).

I thank the gentleman.

Could I ask the Chair how much time is remaining.

I yield myself the remainder of my time.

As the gentleman from Michigan and the gentleman from California have pointed out, there has been a series of statements made by the Indian government that have left a great deal of ambiguity with regard to how strong they will stand with us in our effort to take Iran to the Security Council to ensure that Iran does not use its uranium and plutonium programs in order to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

The recommittal motion that I am propounding here this evening just follows up on the statements that have been made out of the Indian government so that they can understand what we expect from them, and we will send a signal from this Congress to our negotiators as to what we expect from them in eliciting from the Indian government. So I hope on a bipartisan basis we can all agree that this Iranian nuclear program is the very top foreign policy and defense threat not only to our country but to countries throughout the Middle East.

I urge an ``aye'' vote on the recommittal motion.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. With the receding of the Cold War's global divisions and the new realities of globalization and trans-national terrorism, for more than a decade there has been increasing recognition in both countries of the significant benefits to be obtained from closer cooperation across a broad spectrum. To that end, on July 15, 2005 President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement announcing a ``global partnership'' between the two countries that embraces cooperation across a wide range of subjects.

I am in support of this bill because this legislation reflects broad agreement consensus among Members of Congress that peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S. foreign policy objectives, but must be approached in a manner that minimizes potential risks to the nonproliferation regime. Among the most important considerations are ensuring that Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines and consensus decision-making are upheld and that a U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement and subsequent U.S. nuclear exports are consistent with decisions, policies, and guidelines of the NSG. Equally important is the need to ensure that U.S. cooperation does not assist the Indian nuclear weapons program directly, or indirectly, in order to avoid contributing to a nuclear arms race in South Asia and because of U.S. obligations under the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

There are two other noteworthy provisions in this bill which I consider very crucial in the United States' relationship with India regarding nuclear weapons. The bill contains reporting requirements and a provision that calls for termination of exports in the event of violations of certain commitments and seeks to uphold existing statutory Congressional oversight of U.S. nuclear cooperation and exports. At a time when the world appears to be considering nuclear energy as a viable and desirable alternative to carbon-based energy sources, oversight of its expansion is crucial.

The President took a bold step by cutting a deal with India on nuclear cooperation and it is now up to Congress to make the necessary fixes without undermining the deal. India has proven itself deserving of an understanding of cooperation with the United States regarding nuclear weapons. India has been punished for the last thirty-two years, but over that time they have shown a responsible foreign policy, and a commitment to democracy and rule of law. This deal would also provide India with some of its energy needs to continue to grow her economy and lower the use of coal burning power plants.

We cannot forget about our Indian American citizens during our talks of a nuclear cooperation with India. There are about two million Indian Americans living in the United States and the majority of them support this nuclear deal. We must let the Indian American community know that we hear them, we stand with them, and are both working towards the mutual goals of democracy. This deal will strengthen our long term relationship with India in hopes that they will continue to be one of our strongest allies in the War on Terrorism. This agreement will benefit the United States as well as India in monitoring nuclear weapons in helping to stabilize our world's economy and safety and I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

I will be introducing an amendment that urges Congress to continue its policies of engagement, collaborations, and exchanges with India and Pakistan. My bipartisan amendment is consistent with many U.S. foreign policy objectives. It will also draw the United States closer to this vitally important and strategic democracy.

Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I am proud to offer this amendment, along with my distinguished colleague, Mr. Burton of Indiana. Might I say that I also add my support for the manager's amendment which draws upon the change that focuses on naming the bill after Chairman Hyde. I add my appreciation for his service as well.

Mr. Chairman, I also rise to speak on behalf of H.R. 5682 as I offer my amendment and offer the amendment with Mr. Burton, and that is that this particular legislation, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act, is an opportunity. It is an opportunity for further negotiation. It is an opportunity for friendship and the continuation of that friendship. It is a recognition that even though India has not signed the nonproliferation agreement, it has peacefully utilized nuclear energy for the many years of its utilization. It is a democracy.

So my amendment speaks to the whole concept of the importance of South Asia; and it says that former President Clinton got it right when we traveled with him to that region, Members of Congress, a small delegation of eight. We went to India and we went to Pakistan because we believed in the cohesion and the importance of that particular region.

Might I note that in particular, as it relates to this legislation, the Nuclear Supply Group, NSG, still is maintained in this bill, and the guidelines and consensus decisionmaking are upheld. So, again, I emphasize that it is an opportunity.

My amendment builds on that opportunity. Its language is direct. What it says is that South Asia is an important region and that it is in our national interests to continue our policy of engagement, collaboration, exchanges with and between India and Pakistan, particularly since this has served the Nation well. It goes on to emphasize the importance of that relationship.

Why is that relationship important? Because we have seen in these latter years the working relationship between them and the United States. Pakistan has been a loyal and unwavering ally in our global war on terror and has played a decisive role in helping to remove the Taliban regime from Pakistan and the capture of hundreds of wanted al Qaeda terrorists. Pakistan has suffered thousands of casualties and has been a victim of numerous terrorist acts.

In addition, the founder of Pakistan, Dr. Jinnah, premised the basis of this country on democratic principles. The alliance of the United States with the nation in South Asia should continue and the U.S. should emphasize in its foreign policy the importance of the region, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh. South Asia is important to the United States and the amendment further supports the need for encouraging celloboration and engagement with and between India and Pakistan by the

I yield to the gentleman from California.

I yield to the distinguished ranking member from California.

Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank the distinguished gentlemen.

Just for the record, I know there has been mention of an arms race. We don't see an arms race with India. The recent comment of a spokesperson from Pakistan indicated they do not want an arms race in the region.

So I would say that this is an important step. We need to engage. We need to work with India and Pakistan together. I ask my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the United States' relationship with India and Pakistan is of paramount importance to our nations' political and economic future. With the receding of the Cold War's global divisions and the new realities of globalization and trans-national terrorism, we have embarked on a new era of promise, possibility and uncertainty. This means the United States, the world's only superpower, bears an especially heavy responsibility to remain engaged in all regions of the world, with all nation-states.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment is simple. My amendment is important. My amendment is necessary. And my amendment is bipartisan. Due to the strategic political and economic importance of the South Asia region, it is imperative to our national interest to continue our policy of engagement collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan, particularly since this has served the nation well in the past.

My amendment, which is endorsed and co-sponsored by Congressman Burton, and which is not opposed by either the Majority or Minority of the Committee on International Relations, simply states that the ``South Asia region is so important that the United States should continue its policy of engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan.''

Peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S. foreign policy objectives so long as it is undertaken in a manner that minimizes potential risks to the nonproliferation regime. This will be best achieved by sustained and active engagement and cooperation between India and the United States.

Similarly, Pakistan has been a critical ally in the global war on terror. Pakistan has been a good friend to the people of the United States. Although H.R. 5682 signals no change in this country's relationship with Pakistan, it is not difficult to understand why it may give pause to some supporters of Pakistan. This is another reason why it is vital for the United States to continue to engage both Pakistan and India in ongoing political engagement, economic and technological collaborations, and personal exchanges, which will bring the United States closer to these two vitally important democracies in the South Asia region and will bring India and Pakistan closer to each other.

As a founding Co-Chair of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus, I am wholeheartedly committed to the political, economic, and social amelioration of Pakistan for the Pakistani people and the ascendancy of Pakistan in the international community. Pakistan has been a loyal and unwavering ally in our global war on terror, which has played a decisive role in helping to remove the Taliban regime from Afghanistan and the capture of hundreds of wanted al-Qaeda terrorists. Pakistan has suffered thousands of casualties and has been a victim of numerous terrorist acts on their own soil because of their steadfast alliance with our nation in the global war on terror.

In order to get a proper perspective on Pakistan, I believe we must take a look back at the luminary individual who is singularly responsible for its creation. Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim states in the world, is a living and exemplary monument of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Becoming an architect of a dream first articulated by poet- philosopher Muhammed Allama Iqbal, a brilliant young lawyer named Muhammad Ali Jinnah valiantly dedicated his life to achieving an independent Pakistan for Indian Muslims. Revered as the father of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah inspired the adulation of his people through his eloquence, perseverance and dauntless courage. For over 30 years, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the prominent leader of Indian Muslims who articulately gave expression, coherence, and direction to their legitimate aspirations and transformed their dreams into a concrete reality. A visionary leader who was ahead of his time, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was a great constitutionalist and nation-builder who called for the equal rights of all Pakistani citizens without regard to their religion.

In the past six decades, the people and nation of Pakistan has come a long way. The bonds of friendship which began with Muhammad Ali Jinnah continue today with President Musharraf. I am grateful to the people and government of Pakistan, who in the aftermath

of the devastation and loss of innocent life which occurred on 9/11, and on the eve of the 5 year anniversary of 9/11, continue to support our efforts to stamp out international terrorism. Similarly, I think it is critical that we continue our policy of engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and between the people and the governments of Pakistan and India.

I urge my colleagues to support my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the legislation. This is no ordinary vote. Historians will regard what we do today as a tidal shift in relations between India and the United States. This will be known as the day when Congress signaled definitively the end of the Cold War paradigm governing interactions between New Delhi and Washington.

A few weeks ago, by a vote of 37-5, the International Relations Committee resoundingly approved this legislation backing the civilian nuclear accord with India. This was nothing short of a vote of confidence in the long-term future of relations between India and the United States.

President Clinton laid the foundation for this process with his historic trip to India 6 years ago. He demonstrated that the United States was launching a new era of mutual respect and cooperation.

A year ago, this vision was brought to full realization as the President and Prime Minister Singh issued a joint statement on an array of new initiatives spanning the fields of high technology, space exploration, counterterrorism, defense cooperation and energy security.

Today, Mr. Chairman, the House of Representatives steps forth into the spotlight to offer its judgment on one critical element of this new relationship, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006, the first key step to create the statutory authority to expand nuclear research, civilian nuclear power and nonproliferation cooperation New Delhi.

Our legislation represents a nonproliferation victory for the United States. As part of the agreement, India has committed to continue its moratorium on its own nuclear tests. It will also adhere to international nuclear and missile control restrictions, and India has agreed to place its civil nuclear facilities for the first time under international safeguards.

Mr. Chairman, this, of course, is not a perfect agreement. No agreement between two sovereign nations can ever

be perfect, because the agreements arise from hard negotiations. Compromise was necessary on all sides. But we must not let the siren song of perfection deafen us to this chance for dramatically strengthening an important and valued ally.

Mr. Chairman, I understand the criticisms of this agreement on nonproliferation grounds. But I would like to assure the House that the International Relations Committee has thoroughly examined these issues during our five extensive hearings since last September on this initiative.

And, Mr. Chairman, our bill addresses those concerns thoroughly. It requires the President to make several determinations to Congress. Among these, the President must determine that India has concluded a credible plan to separate civilian and military nuclear facilities; that India has concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency that will apply safeguards in perpetuity to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs; that India is harmonizing its export control laws and regulations to match those of the so-called Nuclear Suppliers Group, and that India is actively supporting U.S. efforts to conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty.

It is worth repeating, Mr. Chairman, that the International Relations Committee came to the determination that this agreement advances our Nation's nonproliferation goals, and our committee approved the bill by an overwhelming, bipartisan vote of 37-5.

Mr. Chairman, this legislation has been carefully crafted to protect our nonproliferation interests, and to ensure direct congressional oversight. Members will recall that the administration wanted Congress to approve the India deal in advance, without seeing the details of a still-to-be-negotiated nuclear cooperation agreement.

There would have been no effective subsequent review by the Congress. We rejected that approach. Our agreement ensures that Congress will have the final word on whether or not the agreement for cooperation with India can become law. Under our approach, Congress must vote a second time before there can be any civilian nuclear cooperation with India.

Congress must approve the completed cooperation agreement. But congressional oversight does not end there, Mr. Chairman. Our legislation also requires that the President make detailed annual reports on U.S. nonproliferation policy with respect to South Asia and the implementation of the U.S.-India agreement. And it includes certain guarantees that India will adhere to international standards for maintaining a safe civilian nuclear program.

Mr. Chairman, it is my deep pleasure to see the United States and India finally emerging from decades of distrust and aloofness. Today, we are at the hinge of history, as we seek to build a fundamentally new relationship based on our common values and our common interests.

Our legislation, which is before this House, is a concrete and meaningful element of this new and dynamic relationship. I urge my colleagues to give their full support to this legislation and to help usher in a new day in U.S.-India relations.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Davis) for the purpose of making a unanimous consent request.

(Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) our distinguished colleague who has made invaluable contributions to the development of this legislation.

(Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to distinguished Democratic whip, my good friend from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to my good friend from New York (Mr. Ackerman), a distinguished colleague and valued member of the International Relations Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to my good friend from Nevada (Ms. Berkley) so she may engage in a colloquy.

I want to thank the gentlewoman for her excellent work on this legislation. I will do my utmost to work to keep this provision in the legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to my good friend from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), the distinguished ranking member on our Budget Committee.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I agree with my friend, Congressman Royce. Nuclear tests by India would put the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement in serious jeopardy.

And I agree with that interpretation.

I agree with Mr. Royce on this point.

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 2\1/4\ minutes to our distinguished colleague from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega), my good friend.

(Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for his excellent work on this legislation, and I intend to work to keep this provision in the legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), my very dear friend and our most distinguished colleague.

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the distinguished Democratic leader, my friend and neighbor.

Mr. Chairman, before yielding time, I want to express my regret to all of my colleagues that the stringent requirements will enable me to yield no more than 1 minute to each of our speakers.

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 1 minute to a distinguished member of the committee, my good friend from California (Mr. Sherman).

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks), our distinguished colleague.

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield the balance of my time to my good friend from California, Congresswoman Barbara Lee.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly support naming this historic legislation after our distinguished chairman as a small token of our respect and appreciation for his enormous contributions to the national security of the United States and to the sound conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to accept the gentleman's amendment.

This amendment restates longstanding U.S. policy that the United States will not support the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. This is, of course, longstanding U.S. policy. And we all agree that it should continue.

I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my good friend from California, distinguished former ambassador of the United States, Congresswoman Diane Watson.

Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).

Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend my good friend from Texas for yet another constructive step. She makes so many in this body. I am strongly in support of her amendment and urge my colleagues to do likewise.

Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding me time.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment. Mr. Chairman, this amendment was presented to the Committee on International Relations and was overwhelmingly defeated because it is a killer amendment. It would kill the entire nuclear cooperation agreement with India.

Legislation already provides that we should be proceeding with a multilateral moratorium or treaty to ban the production of fissile material. The legislation before us already states this. The underlying legislation requires detailed reporting on the steps India and the United States are taking to complete such a ban. It also requires reports on India's production of fissile material, so that we can try to conduct oversight over this important issue.

The Fortenberry amendment that the House is considering today will strengthen this reporting even further. In reality, however, this amendment is intended as a deal killer. I urge all of my colleagues to rely on the underlying text, and I firmly oppose this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I regret but I must strongly oppose this amendment offered by my good friend from California. This amendment was carefully considered by the International Relations Committee and was overwhelming defeated on a bipartisan vote.

It is a killer amendment, which would destroy this historic piece of legislation, and I think it would be irresponsible for us to hazard that strong probability.

Mr. Chairman, I urge all of my colleagues to oppose this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend my friend from Nebraska. We are pleased to accept his amendment. It strengthens the underlying legislation. I urge all of my colleagues to support it.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this motion. In committee deliberations, we have made it clear to India that they must make a choice between Tehran and Washington. They have done so twice at votes in Vienna at the International Atomic Energy Agency. This recommittal motion dramatically strengthens the underlying legislation. I urge all of my colleagues to vote for it.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset I would like to recognize Chairman Hyde and the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos, for their leadership in improving the Administration's draft proposal for facilitating civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India.

In particular, I appreciate their efforts to lessen the nonproliferation risks inherent in this initiative and to ensure that Congress remains a full partner with the Executive Branch as we move forward with this endeavor.

Nonetheless, while the issue at hand is a close call, in my judgment this particular initiative does not strike the right balance between two competing American national security interests: the important goal of improving relations with a rising India and the critical priority of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and fissile material in an era hallmarked by the global threat of terrorism. Let me explain why.

There is nothing more difficult than to attempt to put perspective on events of day because so many issues can only be understood clearly, if at all, with the passage of time. For example, if we ask what is new on the Asian landscape over the last several years there is a tendency to emphasize troubling developments: the scourge of terrorism, North Korea, tensions over Taiwan, and America's growing trade deficit with China. But on the positive side little is more consequential than America's deepening ties with India.

The growing warmth between our two countries has its roots in the common values and the increasingly congruent interests of democratic societies committed to the ideal of liberty, social tolerance, representative government and the fight against terrorism, as well as other transnational threats--such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction, illicit narcotics, and the scourge of HIV/AIDS. In this regard all Americans condemn the recent horrific bomb attacks in Kashmir and Mumbai, and we stand with the people and government of India in their opposition to anarchistic acts of terror.

Our deepening government-to-government relationship is complemented by a rich mosaic of expanding people-to-people ties. In many ways, the more than 2 million Indian-Americans have become a living bridge between our two great democracies, bringing together our two peoples, as well as greatly enlarging our understanding of one another.

From a Congressional perspective, it should be underscored that America's commitment to this robust and multi-faceted relationship is fully bipartisan. As underscored by the debate on this measure, there is virtually no dissent in Washington from the precept that India and the United States should become increasingly close strategic partners with compelling incentives over time to develop convergent perspectives on a host of regional and global policy concerns.

By any objective measure, U.S.-India relations have never been on more solid footing. From new agreements on defense cooperation to expanded high technology trade and space cooperation, the relationship has been moving forward in an impressive fashion. On the economic front, America is India's largest trading partner and largest foreign investor. In many ways, however, what is impressive is how marginal, not how significant, is our trade. Economic and commercial ties between the U.S. and India are at an incipient, not end stage, and arguably deserve priority emphasis at this point in our relationship.

In this context, many in Washington and elsewhere around the world were caught by surprise with the Administration's offer last July to extend full civilian nuclear cooperation to India; a proposal which presented Congress with a fait accompli, notwithstanding the fact that implementation would require legislative action.

By background, when Prime Minister Singh was set to visit Washington last summer, the Administration was weighing two policy options to help ensure maximum success for this important summit with the President.

One option would have been to announce unequivocal U.S. support for India's claim to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council; a stance clearly in the interest of India and also compatible with the interests of the United States. Bizarrely, however, the Administration position then and now has been that Washington is unprepared to take a firm position in support of Indian membership until the U.S. achieves certain goals related to UN administrative and management reform, none of which are as critical as the case for Security Council enlargement to reflect the new balance of power in world affairs.

Frankly, I am flabbergasted by the Administration's ideological rigidity, as well as its lack of preparation to support India on this issue. I regard the U.S. position as awkward philosophically, illogical, and incompatible with sound strategic judgment.

Instead of supporting India's aspirations for Security Council membership, the Administration instead chose to peremptorily re-write the rules of the global nonproliferation that have well-served U.S. interests for over three decades.

To be sure, I acknowledge that there are a number of credible rationales for this agreement: to earn trust and goodwill with policymakers in Delhi, and the Indian public; to help accelerate the development of a strategic partnership between our two countries; to promote the use of nuclear power as an environmentally-friendly alternative to the use of coal and other scarce fossil fuels; and to emulate an Eisenhower-style atoms-for-peace initiative.

Nevertheless, as strong as the case for this initiative may be, I remain deeply concerned that the agreement negotiated by the Administration fundamentally undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the linchpin of U.S.led international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons.

Administration officials assert that the exceptional treatment being accorded to India is unique and un-replicable. Once an exception to treaty law is made, however, the door is opened for a whole spectrum of governments, including close friends and alliance partners, to come forward to make comparable claims for special treatment--whether they be Brazil, Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Pakistan, and even Taiwan.

If India were the only consideration, it would be a no-brainer to support this agreement. Unfortunately, at issue is the rule of law as it applies to us and others as well.

In particular a number of other countries, with whom we currently do not have amicable relations, such as Iran and North Korea, can be expected to similarly press the international community to recognize their legitimacy as nuclear weapons states. And if we unilaterally declare the right to ignore international law, other countries, including nuclear weapon states, can not be expected to go along with an exclusive American right to take exception to treaties.

This agreement thus creates opportunity for countries to use commercial or geopolitical rationales to expand forms of nuclear cooperation otherwise prohibited by existing international norms (such as the NPT) or procedures (such as those developed by the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group).

For example, in the immediate wake of the President's announcement of a policy shift, before either the Congress or the multilateral NSG could consider the proposal, Moscow moved to preempt Washington by announcing it would provide New Delhi with uranium reactor fuel in contravention of NSG guidelines.

In other words, the mere announcement of an Executive Branch- initiated proposal has had the effect of undercutting the NPT and precipitated another nation-state to implement key aspects of Washington's initiative.

Similarly, the government of Pakistan announced it would be obligated to match any expansion in India's nuclear weapons program.

The reason we have an NPT is to restrain nuclear weapons development. Based on news reports this past week from Pakistan, it is clear that one of the consequences of breaking international law is the precipitation of an arms race on the Indian Subcontinent. But as unfortunate as this arms race is, the consequence of the U.S.-led unraveling of the NPT is the spiraling of nuclear weapons development elsewhere.

Mr. Chairman, in a philosophical context this agreement is a reflection of an Administration approach to foreign policy rooted in the so-called doctrine of American Exceptionalism, which neo-cons do not define as refining a shining city on a Hill but as the right of a superpower to place itself above the legal and institutional restraints applied to others.

In the neo-con world, values are synonymous with power. The implicit assumption in that American security can be bought and managed alone, in many cases without allies, and without consideration of contrasting international views or the effect of our policies on others. Treaties like a Comprehensive Test Ban, which every President since Eisenhower has propounded, have been rejected, as have negotiations to strengthen the verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Now the Administration proposes to weaken the NPT, perhaps fatally, which despite its weaknesses has helped limit the number of nuclear weapon states to a relative handful instead of 20 or 30 or even more.

As much as I support the Administration's desire to more rapidly advance a warming of relations with India, I cannot in good conscience support a weakening of the global nonproliferation regime or the breaching of United States obligations under international law. I therefore cannot support the legislation in its current form.