Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in…
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in support of S. 3930, the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
Mr. Speaker, as we debated this bill just a few hours ago, again, I say that I can't think of any better way to honor the fifth anniversary of September 11 than by establishing a system to prosecute the terrorists who on that day murdered thousands of civilians and who continue to seek to kill Americans both on and off the battlefield.
Mr. Speaker, I think that Justice Thomas described best the backdrop against which this legislation is being considered when he said, and I quote, ``We are not engaged in a traditional battle with a nation state but with a worldwide hydra-headed enemy who lurks in the shadows conspiring to reproduce the atrocities of September 11, 2001, and who has boasted of sending suicide bombers into civilian gatherings, has proudly distributed videotapes of beheadings of civilian workers, and has tortured and dismembered captured American soldiers.''
So, Mr. Speaker, we have debated this precisely, this bill, which is precisely the same coming back over from the other body as the bill that we voted on in the full House, where I think we had a robust debate on the issues. But I would just say that this gives us a new body of law that provides a construct under which we can carry out our charge.
And this is an interesting charge to this body and to both Houses of Congress. We were not only requested to do this by the President, but the Supreme Court in the Hamdan case essentially invited, in fact said that we were an essential part of the construct of any tribunal legislation that would set up the new tribunal process; that it had to be a construct that was participated in by
Congress. So you could say, I think, Mr. Speaker, that we have been charged not just by the President but by the Supreme Court with doing our job and putting together this process.
We have pursued the terrorists across the globe. We have captured some, and we have killed many. We have pursued them literally to the ends of the earth. We have caught them at 10,000 foot elevation mountain ranges in caves where they thought they were safe, in so- called safe houses that turned out not to be safe houses. We captured some who, according to our intelligence personnel, helped to design the attack against New York and Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania. And I can think of no more important way to memorialize 9/11 than to produce a justice system that allows us to bring to justice, to bring to the courthouse and show justice to the widows and orphans of 9/11, to the American people, to our fellow citizens and to the world. This system is going to allow us to do this.
This system is a product of extensive negotiations, hundreds of provisions that have been agreed upon and worked and looked at by counsel for both this body, the other body, the U.S. Senate and, of course, the administration. I think it is sound. I think it is solid. I think it will allow for the expeditious prosecution of people who attacked our country.
It gives them a lot of rights. It gives a lot of rights to the terrorists that they would never have in their native land. It also gives them rights that American soldiers don't have. There is no American soldier that has the right to an attorney, to a combatant status review and, if he doesn't like that review, to an appellate court, like the D.C. Circuit Court, to prove that he really was not a combatant in that particular conflict.
So as the American people watch these trials unfold, Mr. Speaker, and they watch the defendants, including some of the people who hurt our country and helped to cause the death of thousands of Americans, they are going to watch them with their taxpayer-paid-for attorneys exercising their rights against self-incrimination, their right to a proof standard beyond a reasonable doubt; they are going to watch a jury system or a commission system that uses a secret ballot so that superior officers can't influence junior officers; they are going to watch all these safeguards that we put in place for justice, and I think the American people are going to say, although there will be some who will say they still didn't have enough rights, but I think the American people will come down on the side of what we have done here in the House.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 3930, the ``Military Commissions Act of 2006.'' I can think of no better way to honor the fifth anniversary of September 11th than by establishing a system to prosecute the terrorists who, on that day, murdered thousands of innocent civilians, and who continue to seek to kill Americans both on and off the battlefield.
This is vital legislation important to the national security of the United States.
Our foremost consideration in writing this legislation is to protect American troops and American citizens from harm.
The war against terror has produced a new type of battlefield and a new type of enemy. How is it different? We are fighting a ruthless enemy who does not wear a uniform. A savage enemy who kills civilians, women and children and then boasts about it. A barbaric enemy who beheads innocent civilians by sawing their heads off. An uncivilized enemy who does not acknowledge or respect the laws of war, the Geneva Conventions or any of the guarantees which are recognized by civilized nations.
Justice Thomas put it best in Hamdan. He said we are ``not engaged in a traditional battle with a nation-state, but with a world-wide, hydra- headed enemy, who lurks in the shadows conspiring to reproduce the atrocities of September 11, 2001, and who has boasted of sending suicide bombers into civilian gatherings, has proudly distributed videotapes of beheadings of civilian workers, and has tortured and dismembered captured American soldiers.''
How is the battlefield new? First, it will be a long war. We don't know if this enemy will be defeated this decade, the next decade, or even longer than that. Second, in this new war, where intelligence is more vital than ever, we want to interrogate the enemy. Not to degrade them, but to save the lives of American troops, American civilians, and our allies. But it is not practical on the battlefield to read the enemy their Miranda warnings. On the battlefield we can't have battalions of lawyers. Finally, this is an ongoing conflict and sharing sensitive intelligence sources, methods and other classified information with terrorist detainees could be highly dangerous to national security. I am not prepared to take that risk.
So what we have done is to develop a military commission process that will allow for the effective prosecution of enemy combatants during this ongoing conflict. Without this action, United States has no effective means to try and punish the perpetrators of September 11th, the attack on the USS Cole and the embassy bombings.
We provide basic fairness in our prosecutions, but we also preserve the ability of our warfighters to operate effectively on the battlefield.
I think a fair process has two guiding principles:
First, the government must be able to present its case fully and without compromising its intelligence sources or compromising military necessity; and
Second, the prosecutorial process must be done fairly, swiftly and conclusively.
Who are we dealing with in military commissions? We are dealing with the enemy in war, not defendants in our domestic criminal justice system. Some of them have returned to the battlefield after we let them out of Guantanamo. Our primary purpose is to keep them off the battlefield. In doing so, we treat them humanely and if we choose to try them as war criminals we will give them due process rights that the world will respect. But we have to remember they are the enemy in an ongoing war.
In time of war it is not practical to apply to rules of evidence that we do in civilian trials or court-martials for our troops. Commanders and witnesses can't be called from the frontline to testify in a military commission. We need to accommodate rules of evidence, chain of custody and authentication to fit the exigencies of the battlefield. If hearsay is reliable we should use it. If sworn affidavits are reliable, we should use them. I note that the rules of evidence are relaxed in international war crime tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia.
The Supreme Court has suggested that Congress act here to fill the legal void left by the Hamdan decision, but in doing so let's not forget our purpose is to defend the nation against the enemy. We won't lower our standards, we will always treat detainees humanely, but we can't be naive either.
This war started in 1996 with the al Qaeda declaration of jihad against the United States. The Geneva Conventions were written in 1949 and the UCMJ was adopted in 1951. These documents were not written to address the war we are now fighting. In that sense, what we are required to do after Hamdan is broader than war crimes trials, it is the start of a new legal analysis for the long war. It is time for us to think about war crime trials and a process that provides due process and protects national security in the new war.
So what do we do with these new military commissions? We uphold basic human rights and state what our compliance with this standard means for the treatment of detainees. We do this in a way that is fair and the world will acknowledge as fair.
First, we provide accused war criminals at least 26 rights if they are tried by a commission for a war crime. While I will not read them all, here are some of the essential rights we provide.
Right to Counsel, provided by government at trial and throughout appellate proceedings;
Impartial judge;
Presumption of innocence;
Standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
The right to be informed of the charges against him as soon as practicable;
The right to service of charges sufficiently in advance of trial to prepare a defense;
Mr. Speaker, since I am inserting my entire text in the Record, I will not read them all at this point.
The right to reasonable continuances;
Right to peremptory challenge against members of the commission and challenges for cause against members of the commission and the military judge;
Witness must testify under oath; judges, counsel and members of military commission must take oath;
Right to enter a plea of not guilty;
The right to obtain witnesses and other evidence;
The right to exculpatory evidence as soon a practicable;
The right to be present at court with the exception of certain classified evidence involving national security, preservation of safety or preventing disruption of proceedings;
The right to a public trial except for national security issues or physical safety issues;
The right to have any findings or sentences announced as soon as detennined;
Right against compulsory self-incrimination;
Right against double jeopardy;
The defense of lack of mental responsibility;
Voting by members of the military commission by secret written ballot;
Prohibitions against unlawful command influence toward members of the commission, counselor military judges;
\2/3\ vote of members required for conviction; \3/4\ vote required for sentences of life or over ten years; unanimous verdict required for death penalty;
Verbatim authenticated record of trial;
Cruel or unusual punishments prohibited;
Treatment and discipline during confinement the same as afford to prisoners in U.S. domestic courts;
Right to review of full factual record by convening authority; and
Right to at least two appeals including to a federal Article III appellate court.
We provide all of these rights, and we give them an independent judge, and the right to at least two appeals, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and access to the Supreme Court. No one can say this is not a fair system.
I know some of my colleagues are concerned about the issue of reciprocity. I ask them to look at the list of rights I just summarized. And also keep in mind, that these are rights for terrorists. If we are talking about true reciprocity, then we are only concerned about how the enemy will treat American terrorists. These are not our rules for POWs. We treat the legitimate enemy differently and expect them to treat our troops the same.
How do we try the enemy for war crimes? In this Act, Congress authorizes the establishment of military commissions for alien unlawful enemy combatants, which is the legal term we use to define international terrorists and those who aid and support them, in a new separate chapter of Title 10 of the U.S.C. Code, Chapter 47A. While this new chapter is based upon the Uniform Code of Military Justice, it creates an entirely new structure for these trials.
In this bill we provide standards for the admission of evidence, including hearsay evidence and other statements, that are adapted to military exigencies and provide the military judge the necessary discretion to determine if the evidence is reliable and probative.
I want to talk a little bit about how we handle classified evidence. We had three hearings on this bill in addition to briefings and meetings with experts. I asked every witness the same question. If we have an informant, either a CIA agent or an undercover witness of some sort, are we going to tell Kalid Sheik Mohammad who the informant is? This legislation does not allow KSM to learn the identity of the informant. After several twists and turns in the road, after meeting with the Senate and the White House in marathon sessions over the weekend, we have crafted a solution that does not allow the KSM to learn the identify of the informant, yet provides a fair trial. How do we do this? We address this in Section 949d(f) of Section 3. Classified evidence is protected and is privileged from disclosure to the jury and the accused if disclosure would be detrimental to national security. The accused is permitted to be present at all phases of the trial and no evidence is presented to the jury that is not also provided to the accused.
Section 949d(f) makes a clear statement that sources, methods, or activities will be protected and privileged and not shown to the accused, however, the substantive findings of the sources, methods, or activities will be admissible in an unclassified form. This allows the prosecution to present its best case while protecting classified information. In order to do this, the military judge questions the informant outside the presence of the jury and the defendant. In order to give the jury and the defendant a redacted version or the infornant's statement, the just must find: (1) that the sources, methods, or activities by which the U.S. acquired the evidence are classified and (2) the evidence is reliable. Once the judge stamps the informant as reliable, the informant's redacted statement is given to both the jury and the accused. It removes the confrontation issue, yet allows the accused to see the substance of the evidence against him. I think these rules protect classified evidence and yet preserve a fair trial.
Unauthorized disclosures, not only of classified information, but also of our interrogation techniques, are extremely damaging to our intelligence efforts. Our personnel have encountered enemy combatants trained to resist disclosed interrogation techniques thanks to leakers in our media. I'm pleased that with the current Military Commission legislation moving forward, we have reaffirmed our strict adherence to the U.S. anti-torture laws, while at the same time allowing our CIA to move forward with an effective interrogation program whose techniques will not be published in the Federal Register, or God forbid, in another newspaper disclosure. This legislation preserves the necessary flexibility for the President and the CIA to utilize all lawful and effective methods of interrogation. Let me be clear: the bill defines the specific conduct that is prohibited under Common Article 3, but it does not purport to identify interrogation practices to the enemy or to take any particular means of interrogation off the table. Rather, this legislation properly leaves the decision as to the methods of interrogation to the President and to the intelligence professionals at the CIA, so that they may carry forward this vital program that, as the President explained, serves to gather the critical intelligence necessary to protect the country from another catastrophic terrorist attack.
One other point I want to make for the record. As I mentioned earlier, we have modified the rules of evidence to adapt to the battlefield. One of the principles used by the judiciary in criminal prosecutions of our citizens is called the ``fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.'' The rule provides that evidence derived from information acquired by police officials or the government through unlawful means is not admissible in a criminal prosecution. I want to make it clear that it is our intent with the legislation not to have this doctrine apply to evidence in military commissions. While evidence obtained improperly will not be used directly against an accused, we will not limit the use of any evidence derived from such evidence. The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is not something that our soldiers consider when they are fighting a war. The theory of the exclusionary rule is that if the constable blunders, the accused will not suffer. However, we are not going to say that if the soldier blunders, we are not going to punish a savage terrorist. Some rights are reserved for our citizens. Some rights are reserved for civilized people.
Mr. Speaker, this is a complicated piece of legislation. In addition to establishing an entire legal process from start to finish, we address the application of common Article 3 of the Geneva conventions to our current laws.
Section 5 clarifies that the Geneva Conventions are not an enforceable source of rights in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding by an individual in U.S. courts.
Section 6 of the bill amends 18 U.S.C. Section 2441, the War Crimes Act to criminalize grave breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. As amended, the War Crimes Act will fully satisfy our treaty obligations under common Article 3. This amendment is necessary because currently Section (c)(3) of the War Crimes Act defines a war crime as any conduct which constitutes a violation of Common Article 3. Common Article 3 prohibits some actions that are universally condemned, such as murder and torture but also prohibits ``outrages upon personal dignity'' and ``humiliating and degrading treatment,'' phrases which are vague and do not provide adequate guidance to our personnel. Since violation of Common Article 3 is a felony under the War Crimes Act, it is necessary to amend it to provide clarity and certainty to the interpretation of this statute. The surest way to achieve that clarity and certainty is to define a list of specific offenses that constitute war crimes punishable as grave violations of Common Article 3. This is something we need now, because of the Hamdan decision.
Section 6 of the bill also provides that any detainee under the custody or physical control of the United States will not be subject to ``cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'' prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as defined by the U.S. reservations to the UN Convention against Torture. This defines our obligations under Common Article 3 by reference to the U.S. constitutional standard adopted by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.
Section 7 of the bill addresses the question of judicial review of claims by detainees by amending 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 to clarify the intent of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to limit the right of detainees to challenge their detention. The practical effect of this amendment will be to eliminate the hundreds of detainee lawsuits that are pending in courts throughout the country and to consolidate all detainee treatment cases in the D.C. Circuit. However, I want to stress that under this provision detainees will retain their opportunity to file legitimate challenges to their status and to challenge convictions by military commissions. Every detainee under confinement in Guantanmo Bay will have their detention reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Mr. Sensenbrenner and my other colleagues are going to speak on the rest of the bill, but before I finish I want to make one point very clear. This legislation does not condone or authorize torture in any way. In fact, we make it a war crime, punishable by death, for one of our soldiers or interrogators to torture someone to death. Let me emphasize this again. In Section 6 of this bill, we amend 18 U.S.C. 2441, the War Crimes Act. In this amendment we explicitly provide that torture inflicted upon a person in custody for the purpose of obtaining information is a war crime for which we may prosecute one of our own citizens. While most of this legislation deals with how we handle the enemy, I want to make it crystal clear that nothing in what we are doing condones or allows torture in any way.
There is more to this bill than military commissions, however. H.R. 6166 addresses an issue that Supreme Court created in the Hamdan case. The Court in Hamdan decided that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions--a article that many assumed only applied to regular armies--applies to terrorist organizations, like al Qaeda. As a result of this decision, our brave personnel in the military and other national security agencies are faced with an unpredictable legal landscape because the meaning of certain elements of Common Article 3 are vague.
For example, would a female interrogator of a male Muslim detainee be guilty of violating Common Article 3 because the mere scenario constitutes an outrage upon personal dignity? Such a situation is untenable. It is unfair to our personnel out in the field trying to protect lives here at home. It is Congress' responsibility to draw the lines of what conduct will be criminal.
As a result, we need to amend the War Crimes Act to make clear that only grave breaches of Common Article 3 constitutes a war crime under U.S. law. Let me be clear, under international law a party to the treaty is responsible for incorporating only grave breaches of Common Article 3 in its penal code. My point is simple: Today the Congress is complying with our treaty obligations under Geneva Conventions and today the Congress is following the guidance of the Supreme Court in Hamdan (even though many believe that the Court's decision was ill construed).
Now, some have suggested that H.R. 6166 condones torture or that this bill implicitly permits ``enhanced torture techniques''. These suggestions are absolutely false and they fly in the face of the very words that appear on the pages of this bill.
First--it is illegal under U.S. law to torture. This was true before H.R. 6166 and it will remain true. Moreover, H.R. 6166 makes torture a war crime that can result in the death penalty. This means that under the War Crimes Act, any U.S. personnel that engages in Torture will be subject to prosecution for committing a war crime. Additionally, in the context of military commissions, a statement obtained through torture is not admissible.
Second--this bill makes clear that the way we treat our detainees is guided by treatment standards set by the Congress--last year--in the Detainee Treatment Act, also known as the McCain amendment. This standard is based upon the familiar standards of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, ``cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment'' under this section means the cruel, unusual, inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as defined by the U.S. reservations to the UN Convention Against Torture.
I believe that the Constitution, which provides the fundamental, underlying protections for the citizens of the United States, provides more than sufficient protections for unlawful enemy combatants. Why should accused terrorist enjoy protections that exceed what the Constitution provides to United States citizens?
Mr. Speaker, in summary, I believe that this legislation is the best way to prosecute enemy terrorists and to protect U.S. Government personnel and service members who are fighting them.
I urge my colleagues to support this vital legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I will yield myself such time as I may consume to say, first, that I appreciate the gentleman's participation in the hearings and the briefings and the markup that we had on the initial bill that came out of the Armed Services Committee 52-8, and I would remind my colleagues that, in fact, the appellate route in this particular bill provides for the court of military review, a new court to be set up as a first appellate stop; and secondly, the D.C. Circuit Court. And in channeling all of the actions to the D.C. Circuit Court, we are going to a court that has lots of experience, is building a body of experience in this type of work, and that will keep us from rifle- shooting actions out throughout the country.
I think that makes for an efficient process, and it provides now two appellate reviews, whereas the Democrat substitute had only one appellate review before you would apply for final review by the Supreme Court, which might or might not occur. So instead of one review, we have two reviews. And I think that that is a strengthening, if you will, of this bill that is one more measure to ensure that as we move forward on this process of bringing to justice those who attacked our country, we give them a robust right of appeal.
Having said that, Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Buyer), who is the chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee and a former JAG officer himself.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Buyer).
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, let me just go to the Detainee Act. It says that review is done by the District of Columbia relating to any aspect of the detention of an alien, and we have expanded it from Guantanamo Bay to anywhere, who has been determined by the United States District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 1405. So there is a process whereby the review is made with respect to the status of that alien.
Let me go to a second point. The gentleman spoke about hearsay evidence being allowed. That is true. Hearsay evidence is allowed, with certain restrictions. The judge has to find that it is probative, that it is relevant and that it is reliable.
The war crimes tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda allow hearsay evidence. As I recall, the bill that was offered by Mr. Skelton, that was voted on in the HASC, in the Armed Services
Committee, also allowed for the use of hearsay evidence.
So hearsay evidence, I would say to my friends, is not excluded and has not historically been excluded in war crimes trials in Rwanda, in Yugoslavia.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, let me just make a comment about the fact that we enumerate the crimes that might be committed, what we call the grave offenses under article III.
I think that it accrues to the benefit of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines and our intelligence agents that they know what the crimes are when they have people in custody, and the fact that those grave crimes, and they are enumerated, are defined, gives clarity to our folks so they know what the offenses are. I think that serves the purpose. It does not disserve the purpose.
But the idea that we have also reserved to the President on nongrave offenses, and again, one of the examples that was given by expert testimony was if you use the term ``degrading,'' you could charge that a female colonel JAG officer interrogating a Muslim male is in and of itself degrading, because it is a female interrogating a male, and in their culture that would be considered to be degrading.
I think it is important not to expose that female JAG officer to liability. And it is important, therefore, when you have what you might consider to be minor infractions to not label that person, that American, a war criminal, but to allow the President as Commander in Chief to put forth regulations.
So I think this is a good fit, and it gives the thing that is most important to personnel, and that is clarity.
I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
I yield myself such time as I may consume, Mr. Speaker. And let me make five points here.
First, there is nothing in this language that directs people to pick up or not pick up people. This is the language. This bill designs and constructs military commissions. On page 8 of the bill it gives the jurisdiction of the commission, and it says: ``A military commission under this chapter shall have
jurisdiction to try any offense made punishable by this chapter or the law of war when committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September 11, 2001.'' That would allow us also to try those folks from the Cole and the Embassy bombings.
With respect to habeas, there is no soldier in the world, no POW in the world from our research who has a habeas right.
And let me go to Mr. Wu's point. Mr. Wu said, when we pointed out the Detainee Treatment Act provided for review, he said that he thought it expired because it was attached to an appropriations bill and expired annually. That is not so. It is a permanent code. So the Detainee Treatment Act is in place. And if the gentleman can show me where it is expired, we will be happy to entertain that.
Secondly, the gentleman also said that it was procedural only. I am referring to the Detainee Treatment Act that says that the court has the jurisdiction to review relating to any aspect, and I am quoting, any aspect of the detention of the person in question, relating to any aspect. And, of course, that would go as to whether he was a combatant. So it was not as you stated, it is not simply a procedural review.
So I just want to go over those points.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the distinguished chairman of our Veterans Committee and former JAG officer, Mr. Buyer, for our closing remarks.