Gulf Coast Emergency Water Infrastructure Assistance Act

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in strong support of H.R. 3199, the USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2005.

Mr. Chairman, the attacks of September 11, 2001, tragically affirmed the urgency of updating America's laws to address the clear and present danger presented by international terrorism. On that day, foreign terrorists maliciously and without provocation attacked the United States, murdered thousands of our citizens, and destroyed symbols of our freedom in a failed effort to break the spirit and resolve of the American people.

We must also recall that these terrorists exploited historic divisions between America's law enforcement and intelligence communities that had limited the dissemination of vital and timely information and increased America's vulnerability to terrorist attack.

In the wake of the 9/11 atrocities, broad bipartisan majorities in both Houses of Congress passed the PATRIOT Act that lowered the wall that prohibited our law enforcement and intelligence communities from effectively sharing information, and to enhance investigatory tools necessary to assess, detect, and prevent future terrorist attacks. U.S. law enforcement and intelligence authorities have utilized the expanded information sharing provisions contained in the PATRIOT Act to gain critical knowledge of the attentions of foreign-based terrorists before they occur, while preempting gathering terrorist threats at home.

While the PATRIOT Act and other anti-terrorism initiatives have helped avert additional attacks on our soil, that threat has not receded. Exactly 2 weeks ago, innocent citizens in London were murdered in a series of ruthlessly coordinated attacks. Earlier today, it appears, the London subway system came under renewed attack. Last year, the Madrid bombings brought unprecedented terror to the people of Spain, and ongoing terrorist operations around the globe demonstrate the imperative for continued vigilance.

When the House Committee on the Judiciary reported the PATRIOT Act in October 2001, I pledged to rigorously examine its implementation and the conduct of the war against terrorism. In my words and in my actions as committee Chair, I have maintained this commitment and emphasized the importance of better protecting our citizenry from terrorist attack while, at the same time preserving the values and liberties that distinguish us as Americans. The legislation we consider today reflects this careful balance.

H.R. 3199 is based upon 4 years of comprehensive bipartisan oversight consisting of hearing testimony, Inspector General reports, briefings, and oversight letters. Since April of this year alone, the committee has received testimony from 35 witnesses during 12 hearings on the PATRIOT Act. This extensive hearing and oversight record has demonstrated that the PATRIOT Act has been an effective tool against terrorists and other criminals. Of no less importance, and notwithstanding the vague and general suspicion expressed by some of its detractors, the record shows that there is no evidence whatsoever that the PATRIOT Act has been abused to violate Americans' civil liberties. None whatsoever.

To further allay concerns expressed by some, this bill makes important revisions to section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which pertains to business records obtained through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA. I would note that section 215 is probably the most misunderstood and deliberately misrepresented provision of the PATRIOT Act. H.R. 3199 clarifies that the information likely to be obtained through a FISA warrant must relate to foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person, or must be information pertaining to an ongoing international terrorism investigation or clandestine intelligence activities. The legislation also explicitly clarifies that a section 215 order will issue only ``if the judge finds that the requirements have been met,'' and provides a judicial review process to authorize the court to set aside a section 215 order that has been challenged. Contrary to the unfounded allegations of some, there is no evidence that a single section 215 order has been served on any library since the PATRIOT Act was passed in October of 2001.

The Committee on the Judiciary last week conducted a nearly 12-hour markup of this legislation, at which 43 amendments were offered and debated. The reported version of this legislation extends for 10 years the sunset on sections 206 and 215 of the PATRIOT Act.

Section 206 pertains to roving wiretaps under FISA. This crucial provision updates the law to reflect contemporary communications technology by making a suspected terrorist, rather than a communications device, the proper target of a wiretap. This sunset provision was approved by the committee by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 26 to 2. However, while the legislation sets expiration dates on certain provisions of the PATRIOT Act, congressional oversight of the entire PATRIOT Act must be perpetual.

Let me conclude with the following point: For too long opponents of the PATRIOT Act have transformed it into a grossly distorted caricature that bears no relationship whatsoever to the legislation itself. The PATRIOT Act has been misused by some as a springboard to launch limitless allegations that are not only unsubstantiated but are false and irresponsible. Our constituents expect and deserve substantive consideration of this vital issue, and I hope that today's debate reflects the bipartisan seriousness that this issue demands.

Mr. Chairman, the security of the American people is the most solemn responsibility of all entrusted to the Congress. Passage of the USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2005 is vital to maintaining the post-9/11 law enforcement intelligence reforms that have reduced America's vulnerability to terrorist attack. We must never return to the pre-

9/11 mindset that ignores the painful lessons of that day as well as the tragic experiences of our friends and allies.

I would urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support this vital legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) is sincere in his opposition to this bill, and I respect that. However, neither the national security letter scheme nor the delayed notification scheme were authorized for the first time by the PATRIOT Act. That was legislation that was in place prior to October 2001 when the original PATRIOT Act was passed and signed into law by the President.

What the PATRIOT Act did in both national security letters as well as in delayed notification warrants was simply to extend to anti-terrorism investigations authorities that already existed and up until that time had been found constitutional in investigations such as Mafia investigations, racketeering investigations, and drug-trafficking investigations.

So these complaints were not caused by the PATRIOT Act. They were caused by existing legislation, and we should deal with that, not in the context of this bill but elsewhere.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Feeney).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence).

(Mr. PENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I yield to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Schwarz).

Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I am pleased that this bill and the USA PATRIOT Act will continue to protect civil liberties, while also providing law enforcement the tools they need to fight terrorists intent on harming Americans.

I yield further to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, yes, that is an accurate reading of the bill.

I further yield to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Schwarz).

Mr. Chairman, further reclaiming my time, again, that is an accurate reading of the bill. I further yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gohmert).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Michigan (Mrs. Miller).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Chairman, I rarely disagree with my friend from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), but I want to take some time to correct the record.

The delayed notification or so-called ``sneak-and-peek'' warrants were authorized in the late seventies for purposes of racketeering and drug-trafficking investigations and were held constitutional by the Supreme Court in the early eighties as not violative of the fourth amendment.

What the PATRIOT Act did was expand this previously existing authority to terrorism investigations. So if the PATRIOT Act never existed, the 18 instances where the delayed-notification warrants were used for terrorism investigations would have been illegal. But all of the other investigations that the gentleman from North Carolina referred to would have been legal under existing practice which have been held constitutional.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes to rebut my good friend from California.

Mr. Chairman, effective oversight is a function of effective congressional leadership and not as a result of legislative sunsets. If we restricted oversight to legislative sunsets, only about 5 percent of the laws that we pass are sunset, and most of those are appropriations bills.

Now, the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) is the chairman of an oversight subcommittee on the Committee on International Relations. I do not see any sunsets coming on bills coming out of the Committee on International Relations because I have faith in the gentleman from California's (Mr. Rohrabacher) being able to do effective oversight.

The Committee on the Judiciary has done a huge amount of oversight. We have had extensive hearings. There has been more process and more hearings and more witnesses on more sides of the issue on the PATRIOT Act than practically any other piece of legislation that I have faced in my 26-plus years as a Member of Congress.

Thirty-five witnesses, 12 hearings, oversight letters, responses, inspectors general reports. I wish I had brought all of the paper that has come about as a result of the Committee on the Judiciary's oversight, because it would stack this high off the table here in the House Chamber.

Mr. Chairman, the following is a listing of the oversight activities so that the American public and everybody can see that this committee has done its job. It has done its job effectively, and it has made sure that the civil liberties of the people of this country have not been infringed upon.

Hearing Chronology: House Judiciary Committee Consideration of the USA

Patriot Act, As of June 21, 2005

full committee consideration

June 10, 2005: Full Committee--Oversight Hearing on the

Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act: Carlina Tapia-Ruano,

First Vice-President of the American Immigration Lawyers

Association (Minority witness); Dr. James J. Zogby, President

of the Arab American Institute (Minority witness); Deborah

Pearlstein, Director of Human Rights First (Minority

witness); and Chip Pitts, Chair of the Board of Amnesty

International USA.

June 8, 2005: Full Committee--Oversight Hearing on the

Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act: Deputy Attorney

General James B. Corney.

April 6, 2005: Full Committee--Oversight Hearing on the

Department of Justice, The Use of the Law Enforcement

Authorities Granted under the USA PATRIOT Act: Attorney

General Alberto Gonzales.

subcommittee consideration

May 26, 2005: Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

Subcommittee--Oversight Hearing on Material Witness

Provisions of the Criminal Code and the Implementation of the

USA PATRIOT Act: Section 505 that Addresses National Security

Letters, and Section 804 that Addresses Jurisdiction over

Crimes Committed at U.S. Facilities Abroad: Chuck Rosenberg,

Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General of the

Department of Justice (Majority witness); Matthew Berry,

Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General of the Department

of Justice (Majority witness); Gregory Nojeim, Acting

Director of the Washington Legislative Office of the American

Civil Liberties Union (Minority witness); and Shayana

Kadidal, Staff Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights

(Minority witness).

May 10, 2005: Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

Subcommittee--Oversight Hearing on the Prohibition of

Material Support to Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist

Organizations and on the DOJ Inspector General's report on

Civil Liberty Violations under the USA PATRIOT Act: Honorable

Glenn Fine, Inspector General of the Department of Justice

(Majority witness); Honorable Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy

Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division of the Department

of Justice (Majority witness); Barry Sabin, Chief of the

Counterterrorism Section of the Criminal Division of the

Department of Justice (Majority witness); and Ahilan

Arulanantham, Staff Attorney for the American Civil Liberties

Union of Southern California (Minority witness).

May 5, 2005: Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

Subcommittee--Oversight Hearing on Section 212 of the USA

PATRIOT Act that Allows Emergency Disclosure of Electronic

Communications to Protect Life and Limb: Honorable William

Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative

Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice (Majority witness);

Willie Hulon, Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism

Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Majority witness);

Professor Orrin Kerr, Professor of Law at the George

Washington University Law School (Majority witness); and

James X. Dempsey, Executive Director of the Center for

Democracy and Technology (Minority witness).

May 3, 2005: Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

Subcommittee--Oversight Hearing on Sections 201, 202, 213,

and 223 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Their Effect on Law

Enforcement Surveillance: Honorable Michael J. Sullivan, U.S.

Attorney for the District of Massachusetts (Majority

witness); Chuck Rosenberg, Chief of Staff to the Deputy

Attorney General (Majority witness); Heather Mac Donald, John

M. Olin fellow at the Manhattan Institute (Majority witness);

and the Honorable Bob Barr, former Representative of

Georgia's Seventh District (Minority witness).

April 28, 2005: Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

Subcommittee--Oversight Hearing--Section 218 of the USA

PATRIOT Act--If it Expires will the ``Wall'' Return?:

Honorable Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney for the Northern

District of lllinois (Majority witness); David Kris, former

Associate Deputy Attorney General for the Department of

Justice (Majority witness); Kate Martin, Director of the

Center for National Security Studies (Minority witness); and

Peter Swire, Professor of Law at Ohio State University

(Minority witness).

April 28, 2005: Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

Subcommittee--Oversight Hearing--Have sections 206 and 215

improved FISA Investigations? (Part II): Honorable Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia

(Majority witness); James Baker, Office for Intelligence

Policy and Review, U.S. Department of Justice (Majority

witness); Robert Khuzami, former Assistant United States

Attorney in the United States Attorney's Office for the

Southern District of New York (Majority witness); and Greg

Nojeim, the Associate Director and Chief Legislative Counsel

of the American Civil Liberties Union's Washington National

Office (Minority witness).

April 26, 2005: Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

Subcommittee--Oversight Hearing--Have sections 204, 207, 214

and 225 of the USA PATRIOT Act. and Sections 6001 and 6002 of

the Intellience Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,

improved FISA Investigations? (Part I): Honorable Mary Beth

Buchanan, United States Attorney for the Western District of

Pennsylvania (Majority witness); James Baker, Office for

Intelligence Policy and Review, U.S. Department of Justice

(Majority witness); and Suzanne Spaulding, Managing Director,

the Harbour Group, LLC (Minority witness).

April 21, 2005: Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

Subcommittee--Oversight Hearing on Crime, Terrorism, and the

Age of Technology--Section 209: Seizure of Voice-Mail

Messages Pursuant to Warrants; Section 217: Interception of

Computer Trespasser Communications: and Section 220:

Nationwide Service of Search Warrants for

Electronic Evidence: Laura Parsky, Deputy Assistant Attorney

General of the Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice

(Majority witness); Steven M. Martinez, Deputy Assistant

Director of the Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of

Investigation (Majority witness); James X. Dempsey, Executive

Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology (Majority

witness as a favor to Minority); and Peter Swire, Professor

of Law, Mortiz College of Law, the Ohio State University

(Minority witness).

April 19, 2005: Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

Subcommittee--Oversight Hearing on Sections 203 (b) and (d)

of the USA PATRIOT Act and their Effect on Information

Sharing: Barry Sabin, Chief of the Counterterrorism Section

of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice

(Majority witness); Maureen Baginski, Executive Assistant

Director of FBI Intelligence (Majority witness); Congressman

Michael McCaul (Majority witness); and Timothy Edgar, the

National Security Policy Counsel for American Civil Liberties

Union (Minority witness).

Witnesses (alphabetical)

1. Arulanantham, Ahilan T.--Staff Attorney, American Civil

Liberties Union

2. Baker, James A.--Counsel for Intelligence Policy,

Department of Justice *testified twice

3. Baginski, Maureen--Executive Assistant Director for the

Office of Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation

4. Barr, Bob--Former Member of Congress, Atlanta, Georgia

5. Berry, Matthew--Counselor to the Assistant Attorney

General, United States Department of Justice

6. Buchanan, Mary Beth--United States Attorney, Western

District of Pennsylvania

7. Comey, James B.--Deputy Attorney General, United States

Department of Justice

8. Dempsey, Jim--Executive Director, Center for Democracy

and Technology *testified twice

9. Edgar, Timothy--National Security Policy Counsel,

American Civil Liberties Union

10. Fine, Glenn A.--Inspector General, United States

Department of Justice

11. Fitzgerald, Patrick--U.S. Attorney, Northern District

of Illinois

12. Gonzales, Alberto--Attorney General of the United

States

13. Hulon, Willie T.--Assistant Director of

Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

14. Kadidal, Shayana--Staff Attorney, Center for

Constitutional Rights

15. Katsas, Gregory--Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

United States Department of Justice

16. Kerr, Orin S.--Associate Professor of Law, The George

Washington University

17. Khuzami, Robert S.--Former Assistant U.S. Attorney,

Southern District of New York

18. Kris, David--Vice President for Corporate Compliance,

Time Warner Corporation

19. Mac Donald, Heather--John M. Olin Fellow, The Manhattan

Institute

20. Martin, Kate--Director, Center for National Security

Studies

21. Martinez, Steven M.--Deputy Assistant Director of Cyber

Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

22. McCaul, Michael--U.S. Representative & former Chief of

Counterterrorism and National Security for the U.S.

Attorney's Office in Western Judicial District of Texas

23. Moschella, William--Assistant Attorney General, United

States Department of Justice

24. Nojeim, Gregory T.--Associate Director/Chief

Legisaltive Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union

*testified twice

25. Parsky, Laura H.--Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

Department of Justice

26. Pearlstein, Deborah--Director, U.S. Law and Security

Program

27. Pitts, Chip--Chair of the Board, Amnesty International

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard another attack on delayed notification or sneak-and-peek warrants. Let me tell you what has happened earlier this month. A U.S. district judge in Washington State executed or authorized a delayed-notification warrant to look into a building on the U.S. side of the northern border. And what was discovered but a rather sophisticated tunnel between Canada and the United States to smuggle contraband, and perhaps terrorists, through the border and into this country without being detected by our border patrol.

Using a delayed-notice search warrant, the DEA and other agents entered the home on July 2 to examine the tunnel. Shortly thereafter, a U.S. district judge authorized the installation of cameras and listening devices in the home to monitor the activities in the home.

Using these twice, Federal, State and local law enforcement officials observed multiple trips by three defendants through the tunnel carrying large hockey bags or garbage bags. These bags were loaded into a van on the U.S. side and driven south for delivery.

Ninety-three pounds of marijuana were found in these bags when the Washington State Patrol stopped the car. That never would have happened without a delayed-notification warrant. And if they can bring 93 pounds of marijuana in, they can bring terrorists in as well.

These warrants are good. They protect us. They ought to be kept.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

After listening to the speech of the distinguished minority leader, I have reached the conclusion she has not read the bill. She has not looked at the oversight that the Committee on the Judiciary has done over the last 3\1/2\ years.

We have an oversight record of bipartisan letters sent to the Justice Department, Inspector General's reports, and hearings that have a stack of paper that is about 2 feet high. In this bill we have had 12 hearings with 35 witnesses, people who have come from all over the spectrum; and 13 of the 16 sections of the PATRIOT Act that are sunsetted are not controversial. The three controversial sections, two of them are sunsetted; the third one, as a result of some of the testimony, has been amended, and that is the delayed notification warrants.

The fact of the matter remains that no federal court has found that any of the 16 sunsetted sections are unconstitutional, and the Inspector General, who is required by the PATRIOT Act itself to report to the Congress twice a year, has not found any civil liberties violations.

Let us stick to the facts. Let us stick to the result of the oversight. Let us stop the hyperbole. And let us stop the scare tactics that seem to surround the debate of those who are opposed to this law for whatever purpose.

Mr. Chairman, I believe this amendment is a good one because it centralizes responsibility in the hands of the Director of the FBI in signing off on 215 applications for bookstore and library records.

But in the context of the overall debate, what I think is missing from this debate is not whether there is a potential for abuse by the Justice Department, but whether there is an actual record of abuse. And there has been no record of abuse by the Justice Department with bookstores and libraries. They have publicly responded repeatedly that they have not used the 215 order to look at the records of people checking out books or buying books at either bookstores or libraries.

Now, what this bill does is it makes an improvement to the law where there is a specific method of contesting a 215 order by the recipient. But to say that all of these records should be exempt from law enforcement scrutiny is to turn our bookstores and libraries into a sanctuary. We cannot allow that to happen.

I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of his amendment. And let me say first that the amendment that was made by the PATRIOT Act to allow a Federal judge, and only a Federal judge, to authorize a roving wiretap simply brought the law up to where the technology has gone because before the PATRIOT Act was passed you could not get an effective wiretap order on a cell phone. So the terrorists and the drug smugglers and the racketeers simply conducted their business on cell phones because you could not determine whether or not the cell phone was actually being used within the district in which the Federal court that issued the roving wiretap order sat.

So by passing the PATRIOT Act we were able to get the Justice Department the authority to ask a Federal judge to give a wiretap order against the cell phone or any communications device that might be used by the target. And that gets around the disposable cell phone issue.

The Issa amendment merely states that the judge has to be notified at the earliest reasonable time, but no later than 15 days after a roving wiretap order directs surveillance at a location not known at the time when the wiretap order was issued. And this increases judicial supervision and accountability and protects the civil liberties of the American people.

Now, earlier today both the minority leader and her deputy, the minority whip, were talking about the fact that there has been no oversight done by the Judiciary Committee over the PATRIOT Act. That, frankly, insults what both Democrats and Republicans have done on oversight of the PATRIOT Act on a bipartisan basis. Right here is the result of the oversight that the Judiciary Committee has done in the last 3\1/2\ years on this law. This is a stack of paper that is almost 2 feet high. I doubt that any other committee of Congress has done as much oversight on a single law as my committee has done on the PATRIOT Act.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to support the gentlewoman's amendment and believe that it is an important consolidation in the criminal law relative to attacks against mass transportation systems.

First, we should not have different crimes and different penalties depending upon which type of mass transportation system is attacked. We should have uniform penalties and uniform definitions of criminal activity so someone who attacks a railroad will get the same penalty as someone would in a similar attack against a subway system or a bus or an airplane.

Secondly, I think we have to broaden the definition of what is ``attacked'' to make sure that attacks against support systems for mass transportation systems are treated the same way as an attack against the transportation system itself. We should not have a lesser penalty if you put a bomb in the station than if you blow up a train while it is crossing a bridge over a big gorge.

And I also think we ought to ensure that terrorists who attack these systems are punished with appropriate severity. The gentlewoman's amendment does all of these things, and I would urge its support and unanimous adoption by the House.

Mr. Chairman, I hope we can characterize this debate in the manner that it should be, particularly as we rise in the backdrop of the tragedy of London, England.

Might I say that even though we would have preferred, many of us as Democrats, a lengthier time for debate in committee, I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) for the ongoing debate and allowing for amendments over a period of time to discuss the PATRIOT Act.

It should be commented on that this is not a definition of patriotism, of who is more patriotic than the next person, for the underlying bill exists. But there also should be some concerns about limiting overreach and overbroadness, with Americans understanding one of the issues that we are debating today, and that is the very premise of civil liberties juxtaposed against the responsibility of fighting the war on terror.

I would have hoped my colleagues could have fought the war on terror by enhancing and making sure that the agencies responsible for sharing intelligence are really doing that. We find that that is not the case. Whether it is the FBI, the CIA, or other counterterrorism groups, they can do a better job. That certainly helps to stop terrorist acts.

Then, I would have hoped my colleagues would have supported an increased funding, which has not been done by the majority, on rail security and port security and, of course, the idea of insuring our buses and other public transportation modes. These are also components of making sure that we are safe.

But the reason why we raise the question today about the PATRIOT Act is that 14 provisions are being made permanent. Mr. Chairman, even though it is a different story, the Voter Rights Act in 1965, which goes to the core of our democracy, was sunsetted; and it has to be reauthorized. We only argue that it is important to reauthorize or to sunset so that we can have these debates, so that the American people can understand the limitation of their rights or the enhancement of their rights.

For example, I think my colleagues would be troubled by the fact that we know that the FBI could get any tangible record by a rubber stamp by what we call FISA and that the showing would only be relevance. I have signed probable cause warrants as a judge, and you have to ask hard questions when a policeman comes in late at night to go into your home.

We also know that these items can be used against Americans, not just a foreign power, or the national security letters that the FBI can get financial, telephone, Internet, and consumer

goods records relevant to intelligence investigations, not just against agents of foreign powers, but against Americans. Or what about the sneak-and-peek provision that allows someone to come into your home and take anything, of course, called search and seizure, without notice, suggesting that it is involved in an investigation, and most of you would not know, most of America would not know that this is not limited to terrorism. But it is far-reaching; it could be anyone.

So the question on debate today, I hope that we can center it around the question of restraint, but yet be vigorous in our fight for the war on terror. I hope that we will have that opportunity, and I hope as well that in the amendment that I offer that we will be able to say that if you are impacted by a terrorist act, that you can sue and enforce your civil judgement, and I hope to have mutual support on that. 3

Mr. Chairman, I join my many colleagues, many victims of terrorism, and many victims of racial and religious profiling in opposing this legislation, H.R. 3199, for several reasons. First, we never have been given the facts necessary to fully evaluate the operation of the underlying bill, the USA PATRIOT Act. Second, there are numerous provisions in both the expiring and other sections of the PATRIOT Act that have little to do with combating terrorism, intrude on our privacy and civil liberties, and have been subject to repeated abuse and misuse by the Justice Department. Third, the legislation does nothing to address the many unilateral civil rights and civil liberties abuses by the administration since the September 11 attacks. Finally, the bill does not provide law enforcement with any additional real and meaningful tools necessary to help our Nation prevail in the war against terrorism. Since 2002, 389 communities and 7 States have passed resolutions opposing parts of the PATRIOT Act, representing over 62 million people. Additionally, numerous groups ranging the political spectrum have come forward to oppose certain sections of the PATRIOT Act and to demand that Congress conduct more oversight on its use, including the American Civil Liberties Union, American Conservative Union, American Immigration Lawyers Association, American Library Association, Center for Constitutional Rights, Center for Democracy and Technology, Common Cause, Free Congress Foundation, Gun Owners of America, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, People for the American Way, and numerous groups concerned about immigrants' rights. I sit as Ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. Of particular concern to me are a number of immigration-related provisions that cast such a broad net to allow for the detention and deportation of people engaging in innocent associational activity and constitutionally protected speech and that permit the indefinite detention of immigrants and non-citizens who are not terrorists.

Among these troubling provisions are those that:

Authorize the Attorney General (AG) to arrest and detain non-citizens based on mere suspicion, and require that they remain in detention ``irrespective of any relief they may be eligible for or granted.'' (In order to grant someone relief from deportation, an immigration judge must find that the person is not a terrorist, a criminal, or someone who has engaged in fraud or misrepresentation.) When relief from deportation is granted, no person should be subject to continued detention based merely on the Attorney General's unproven suspicions.

Require the AG to bring charges against a person who has been arrested and detained as a ``certified'' terrorist suspect within 7 days, but the law does not require that those charges be based on terrorism-related offenses. As a result, an alien can be treated as a terrorist suspect despite being charged with only a minor immigration violation, and may never have his or her day in court to prove otherwise.

Make material support for groups that have not been officially designated as ``terrorist organizations'' a deportable offense. Under this law, people who make innocent donations to charitable organizations that are secretly tied to terrorist activities would be presumed guilty unless they can prove they are innocent. Restrictions on material support should be limited to those organizations that have officially been designated terrorist organizations.

Deny legal permanent residents readmission to the U.S. based solely on speech protected by the First Amendment. The laws punish those who ``endorse,'' ``espouse,'' or ``persuade others to support terrorist activity or terrorist organizations.'' Rather than prohibiting speech that includes violence or criminal activity, these new grounds of inadmissibility punish speech that ``undermines the United States' efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activity.'' This language is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and will undeniably have a chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech.

Authorize the AG and the Secretary of State to designate domestic groups as terrorist organizations and block any noncitizen who belongs to them from entering the country. Under this provision, the mere payment of membership dues is a deportable offense. This vague and overly broad language constitutes guilt by association. Our laws should punish people who commit crimes, not punish people based on their beliefs or associations.

In addition, the current administration has taken some deeply troubling steps since September 11. Along with supporting the USA PATRIOT Act, it has initiated new policies and practices that negate fundamental due process protections and jeopardize basic civil liberties for non-citizens in the United States. These constitutionally dubious initiatives undermine our historical commitment to the fair treatment of every individual before the law and do not enhance our security. Issued without Congressional consultation or approval, these new measures include regulations that increase secrecy, limit accountability, and erode important due process principles that set our Nation apart from other counties.

I co-sponsored the Civil Liberties Restoration Act (CLRA), reintroduced from the 108th Congress by Representatives Howard Berman (D-CA) and William Delahunt (D-MA), that seeks to roll back some of these egregious post-9/11 policies and to strike an appropriate balance between security needs and liberty interests. The CLRA would secure due process protections and civil liberties for non-citizens in the U.S., enhance the effectiveness of our nation's enforcement activities, restore the confidence of immigrant communities in the fairness of our Government, and facilitate our efforts at promoting human rights and democracy around the world.

While every step must be taken to protect the American public from further terrorist acts, our government must not trample on the Constitution in the process and on those basic rights and protections that make American democracy so unique.

My ``safe havens'' amendment that was made in order by the Committee on Rules relates to the civil forfeiture provision of 18 U.S.C. 981 and would add a section that would allow civil plaintiffs to attach judgments to collect compensory damages for which a terrorist organization has been adjudged liable.

It seeks to allow victims of terrorism who obtain civil judgment for damages caused in connection with the acts to attach foreign or domestic assets held by the United States Government under 18 U.S.C. 981(G). Section 981(G) calls for the forfeiture of all assets, foreign or domestic, of any individual, entity, or organization that has engaged in planning or perpetrating any act of domestic or international terrorism against the United States, citizens or residents of the United States.

The legislation, H.R. 3199, as drafted, fails to deal with the current limitation on the ability to enforce civil judgments by victims and family members of victims of terrorist offenses. There are several examples of how the current Administration has sought to bar victims from satisfying judgments obtained against the government of Iran, for example.

In the Sobero case, a U.S. national was beheaded by Abu Sayyaf, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, leaving his children fatherless. The Administration responded to this incident by sending 1,000 Special Forces officers to track down the perpetrators, and the eldest child of the victim was invited to the State of the Union Address. Abu Sayyaf's funds have been seized and are held by the U.S. Treasury at this time. The family of the victim should have access to those funds, at the very least, at the President's discretion.

Similarly, the Administration barred the Iran hostages that were held from 1979-1981 from satisfying their judgment against Iran. In 2000, the party filed a suit against Iran under the terrorist State exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. While a federal district court held Iran to be liable, the U.S. Government intervened and argued that the cause should be dismissed because Iran had not been designated a terrorist state at the time of the hostage incident and because of the Algiers Accords--that led to the release of the hostages, which required the U.S. to bar the adjudication of suits arising from the incident. As a result, those hostages received no compensation for their suffering.

Similarly, American servicemen who were harmed in a Libyan sponsored bombing of the La Belle disco in Germany were obstructed from obtaining justice for the terrorist acts they suffered. While victims of the attack pursued settlement of their claims against the Libyan government, the Administration lifted sanctions against Libya without requiring as a condition the determination of all claims of American

victims of terrorism. As a result of this action, Libya abandoned all talks with the claimants. Furthermore, because Libya was no longer considered a state sponsor of terrorism, the American servicemen and women and their families were left without recourse to obtain justice. The La Belle victims received no compensation for their suffering.

In addition, a group of American prisoners who were tortured in Iraq during the Persian Gulf war were barred from collecting their judgment from the Iraqi government. Although the 17 veterans won their case in the District Court of the District of Columbia, the Administration argued that the Iraqi assets should remain frozen in a U.S. bank account to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq. Claiming that the judgment should be overturned, the Administration deems that rebuilding Iraq is more important than recompensing the suffering of fighter pilots who, during the 12-year imprisonment, suffered beatings, burns, and threats of dismemberment.

Finally, the World Trade Center victims were barred from obtaining judgment against the Iraqi government. In their claim against the Iraqi government, the victims were awarded $64 million against Iraq in connection with the September 2001 attacks. However, they were rebuffed in their efforts to attach the vested Iraqi assets. While the judgment was sound, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's finding that the Iraqi assets, now transferred to the U.S. Treasury, were protected by U.S. sovereign immunity and were unavailable for judicial attachment.

While the PATRIOT Act may not deserve all of the ridicule that is heaped against it, there is little doubt that the legislation has been repeatedly and seriously misused by the Justice Department. Consider the following:

It's been used more than 150 times to secretly search an individual's home, with nearly 90 percent of those cases having had nothing to do with terrorism.

It was used against Brandon Mayfield, an innocent Muslim American, to tap his phones, seize his property, copy his computer, spy on his children, and take his DNA, all without his knowledge.

It's been used to deny, on account of his political beliefs, the admission to the United States of a Swiss citizen and prominent Muslim Scholar to teach at the Notre Dame University.

It's been used to unconstitutionally coerce an internet service provider to divulge information about e-mail activity and web surfing on its system, and then to gag the provider from even disclosing the abuse to the public.

Because of gag restrictions, we will never know how many times its been used to obtain reading records from library and book stores, but we do know that libraries have been solicited by the Department of Justice--voluntarily or under threat of the PATRIOT Act--for reader information on more than 200 occasions since September 11.

It's been used to charge, detain and prosecute a Muslim student in Idaho for posting Internet website links to objectionable materials, even though the same links were available on the U.S. Government's web site.

Even worse than the PATRIOT Act has been the unilateral abuse of power by the Administration. Since September 11, our government has detained and verbally and physically abused thousands of immigrants without time limit, for unknown and unspecified reasons, and target tens of thousands of Arab-Americans for intensive interrogations and immigration screenings. All this serves to accomplish is to alienate Muslim and Arab Americans--the key groups to fighting terrorism in our country--who see a Justice Department that has institutionalized racial and ethnic profiling, without the benefit of a single terrorism conviction.

Nor it is helpful when our government condones the torture of prisoners at home and abroad, authorizes the monitoring of mosques and religious sties without any indication of criminal activity, and detains scores of individuals as material witnesses because it does not have evidence to indict them. This makes our citizens less safe not more safe, and undermines our role as a beacon of democracy and freedom.

Right now, H.R. 3199 is the most appropriate and timely vehicle in which to address this issue and allow U.S. victims of terrorism to obtain justice from terrorist-supporting or terrorist-housing nations. Mr. Chairman, I oppose this legislation and ask my colleagues work to negotiate real fixes to the sunsetted provisions.

Mr. President, I seek recognition to introduce, along with my colleagues Senator Feinstein and Senator Kyl, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of

2005, a bipartisan bill to reauthorize provisions of the landmark anti- terrorism legislation we adopted in the wake of September 11, 2001. We continue to give tools to law enforcement to protect our security; and, at the same time, we make important improvements to the law to ensure greater protection of civil liberties and to require greater accountability through enhanced reporting and oversight.

In recent months, the political rhetoric about the PATRIOT Act has reached a fever pitch. Not surprisingly, however, the reality fails to match the rhetoric. As the Washington Post has editorialized, ``[a]lthough the PATRIOT Act has become a catch phrase for civil liberties anxieties, it in fact has little connection to the most serious infringements on civil liberties in the war on terrorism.'' At the same time, it would be unwise to credit the act with all of our hard-won successes in the effort to combat terror. As evidenced by the grisly attacks in London last week, no law or surveillance regime can prevent every terrorist attack.

Nevertheless, as last week's attacks remind us, the danger of international terrorism remains real, and has not abated in the years since 9/11. So, we must remain vigilant, and we must be cautious not to recreate the legal circumstances that arguably contributed to significant intelligence failures before 9/11. Reauthorizing the PATRIOT Act, while incorporating improvements designed to safeguard our liberties and enhance oversight, is the right thing to do. To quote the Post again, ``there is little evidence of abuse--and considerable evidence that the law has facilitated needed cooperation. Based on what's known, it merits reauthorization with minor modifications.''

The bill we introduce today is the result of careful consideration. We have listened both to the concerns of critics and the arguments of the administration. We have probed and prodded both for information. And, we have consulted with both sides of the political aisle to fashion language designed to maintain the Government's ability to effectively investigate--and hopefully preempt--terrorist attacks, while making changes to reassure the American people that the law will be used responsibly, consistent with the rights enshrined in our Constitution.

Mr. President, I would like to focus on the changes we have made to those PATRIOT Act provisions that have generated the most controversy.

The PATRIOT Act modified electronic surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, or FISA, to permit multipoint wiretaps of suspected terrorists or spies; but only upon a judicial finding of probable cause to believe the target is an agent of a foreign power and a further finding that the target's actions could thwart efforts to identify a single phone company or similar communications provider upon whom to serve the order. The principle behind this authority, which parallels similar authority in the criminal law, is that surveillance of a suspected terrorist or spy should be permitted to continue, uninterrupted, when the target changes phones. By definition, a multipoint wiretap order does not identify the specific phone to be tapped, because the order allows the Government to track the person not a single device. This was a change made necessary by the advent of cell phones, which are easily purchased and then discarded. After passage of the PATRIOT Act, however, this authority was further modified, so that a FISA surveillance order only had to specify the identity of the target ``if known.'' If the identity was unknown, the order had to include a ``description of the target,'' but there was no further requirement about how detailed the description of such ``John Doe'' targets had to be--raising concerns that the Government could conduct roving surveillance of a broadly described target. Our bill corrects this shortcoming and makes other improvements to the roving authority under FISA.

First, the bill responds to concerns that so-called John Doe roving wiretaps could be used against someone described generically as a ``Middle Eastern male'' or ``Hispanic female'' by requiring such orders to include ``sufficient information to describe a specific target with particularity.'' This makes it clear that, although such orders may ``rove'' from one phone to another when the target changes devices, the Government cannot ``rove'' from one investigative target to another, seeking to identify the right person. Through this change, we avoid rewarding terrorists or spies who successfully conceal their identities, but we also protect innocent Americans from unwarranted surveillance.

The bill further minimizes the chance that ``roving'' wiretaps could be used indiscriminately against multiple devices by requiring the Government to notify the court every time it begins surveillance of a new device. This notice must be made within 10 days of the initiation of surveillance, and must include a description of the new device, as well as the ``facts and circumstances'' indicating that each new phone or similar device is ``being used, or is about to be used,'' by the target. The notice must also update the techniques being used to minimize the interception and retention of unrelated communications. Finally, the bill adds new reporting requirements and extends the sunset date until December 31, 2009, allowing Congress to revisit the need for this surveillance tool.

I would next like to turn to the bill's modification of section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, perhaps the most controversial provision of the act, and one that is frequently misidentified as the ``library'' provision.

Prior to the PATRIOT Act, FISA authorized the FBI to obtain orders for the production of certain types of business records, including those of hotels, car rental agencies and storage facilities, in limited circumstances. Under the pre-PATRIOT standard, however, the FBI could not even seek the records of someone observed in the presence of a suspected spy or terrorist, unless it had specific reasons to suspect the associate was himself a spy or terrorist. Strangely, this standard was significantly higher than the standard applicable to similar records requests in criminal cases. Accordingly, section 215 of the PATRIOT Act amended FISA to permit orders for any records or tangible things sought in connection with an authorized investigation to obtain foreign intelligence not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.

As enacted, however, section 215 did not require the FBI to establish the factual basis for the requested order. According to critics, section 215 rendered the FISA court little more than a rubber stamp for the Government's requests. Moreover, section 215 included no explicit right for recipients to confer with legal counsel. And, despite oft- repeated comparisons to grand jury subpoenas, orders under section 215 included no explicit right to judicial review akin to a motion to quash a subpoena. Indeed, in testimony before the Judiciary Committee earlier this year, Attorney General Gonzales conceded these shortcomings in the law, and expressed a new willingness to consider modifications of section 215.

Our bill addresses these issues, and adds still more protections to ensure the provision is used responsibly. First, the bill eliminates the mere certification of relevance required by current law and enhances the factual showing that must be made by the Government to obtain records. It also requires the court to agree with the adequacy of the Government's factual showing, and adds several procedural protections including heightened approval requirements and increased reporting for orders seeking sensitive materials, like library or medical records. Specifically, the bill requires the Government to submit ``a statement of facts'' showing ``reasonable grounds to believe that the records or other things sought are relevant'' to an authorized investigation. The bill then addresses concerns about the FISA judge acting as a ``rubber stamp'' by requiring the court to find that the facts establish ``reasonable grounds to believe'' the items sought are relevant. The bill also adds an explicit right to consult counsel; provides for judicial review; requires approval of the FBI Director or Deputy Director for orders concerning library records and other sensitive materials; and adds annual reports to Congress regarding use of the provision to obtain library records, book sales records, firearms sales records, health information or tax information. This reporting feature is important because it enables

the Congress to monitor the Justice Department's activities.

In addition to the foregoing, the bill also requires an annual report on the number of times FISA orders for records and tangible things have been issued, modified, or denied. At our April 5 hearing, the Attorney General declassified the fact that, as of March 30, 2005, the FISA court had ``granted the department's request for a 215 order 35 times.'' He further noted that section 215 had not been used to obtain library or bookstore records, medical records or gun sale records. According to the Attorney General, section 215 had been used only to obtain driver's license records, public accommodation records, apartment leasing records, credit card records and subscriber information, such as names and addresses for telephone numbers captured through court-authorized pen register devices. It is our hope that regular public reporting, together with enhanced congressional reporting, will bolster public confidence in the law without compromising sensitive investigations. Finally, as with the multipoint surveillance authority, we have extended the sunset date for section 215 of the PATRIOT Act until December 31, 2009, so Congress must revisit the continuing need for this tool.

Another PATRIOT Act provision that has inspired significant criticism is section 213 of the act, which authorized delayed notice or so-called sneak & peek search warrants. Unlike the other sections I have discussed, section 213 is not scheduled to sunset later this year. Nevertheless, in recognition of the concerns raised about this provision, we have made several changes to this authority as well.

Prior to the PATRIOT Act, three Federal circuits had approved the practice of delayed notice search warrants. Supreme Court precedent also supported the legality of judicially authorized covert entries. Indeed, in Dalia v. United States, a 1979 case involving the analogous situation of a covert entry to install a listening device, the Supreme Court described as ``frivolous'' the argument that ``covert entries are unconstitutional for their lack of notice.'' Nevertheless, in the 1995 case of Wilson v. Arkansas, which focused on whether officers must ``knock and announce'' their presence before serving a warrant, the Court held that, ``in some circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'' But, the Court did not address sneak and peek warrants directly, and it left ``to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.''

The PATRIOT Act sought to create a unified standard for delayed notice searches. Under the PATRIOT Act, notice of a search may be delayed if a court finds reasonable cause to believe immediate notice may have an adverse result, including: (A) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C) destruction of, or tampering with, evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial. Notice must be provided within a ``reasonable period'' of time, which may be extended for good cause. As noted by critics, however, the period of delay could be indefinite. And, in at least six instances reported by the Department of Justice, courts have authorized unspecified periods of delay--such as delays until the conclusion of an investigation.

Over the last 3 months, at the Judiciary Committee's request, the Department of Justice has furnished new information about its use of delayed notice search warrants. This data shows that delayed notice warrants account for less than 0.2 percent of the warrants handled by Federal district courts. Moreover, delayed notice warrants based solely on seriously jeopardizing an investigation account for less than 1 in every 1,500 warrants--mitigating concerns that the ``catch-all'' provision is being overused. DOJ has also now supplied summaries of 15 cases--out of a total of 22 where the delay was based solely on the ``catch-all.'' In these cases, the delay was based on the substantial risk of comprising a title III wiretap or frustrating efforts to identify the full scope of a complex criminal enterprise. Accordingly, the draft bill does not eliminate seriously jeopardizing an investigation as a basis for delay. Instead, the bill enhances reporting requirements--including the addition of new public reporting requirements--to ensure that DOJ continues to use this authority responsibly. The bill also requires the court to set a ``date certain'' for notice to be provided, eliminating concerns about indefinite delays. The bill permits extensions of the delay period, but requires that extensions be granted only ``upon an updated showing of the need for further delay.'' Finally, the bill limits extensions to 90 days each, which parallels the notice requirements for criminal wiretaps and ``bugs'' which are arguably more invasive that a one-time search, because they may require covert entries and they continue to collect personal data for extended periods of time.

As these changes illustrate, while reauthorizing the PATRIOT Act, we have emphasized enhanced oversight through reporting. This bill adds reporting requirements to several PATRIOT provisions, including the aforementioned public reporting on delayed notice search warrants and FISA business records orders. The bill also adds public reporting on FISA pen registers and the emergency authorization of FISA electronic surveillance. Moreover, throughout FISA, the draft bill adds the Senate and House Judiciary Committees to reporting provisions currently limited to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees.

In addition, we have made adjustments to other provisions of the PATRIOT Act. These include:

Section 203, sharing criminal information with intelligence agencies: The bill requires notice to the authorizing court when foreign intelligence information gathered via a court-authorized criminal wiretap is disclosed to intelligence agencies.

Section 207, Duration of FISA surveillance of non-U.S. persons: The bill extends surveillance periods for non-U.S. persons under FISA, 120 days for original orders, and up to 1 year for extensions. Also, it extends the duration of FISA pen registers for non-U.S. persons, up to 1 year.

Section 212, emergency disclosure of electronic communications: The bill adds new reporting requirements to ensure the government is using this authority appropriately. The bill also makes technical corrections to harmonize the language permitting the emergency disclosure of contents and records.

Section 505, national security letters: The bill incorporates legislation introduced by Senator Cornyn to address a 2004 Federal district court decision holding a national security letter, or NSL, served on an Internet service provider unconstitutional. This legislation permits disclosure to legal counsel; allows court challenges; and permits judicial enforcement of NSLs.

Sunsets: As I have noted, the bill retains sunsets for PATRIOT sections 206, multi-point wiretaps, and 215, FISA orders for business records and tangible things. The bill also extends the sunset date for the ``Lone Wolf'' provision added to FISA by last year's Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act until December 31, 2009.

Taken together, these changes provide important checks on the governmental authorities contained in the PATRIOT Act. At the same time, these amendments honor President Bush's call for Congress to reauthorize the act without weakening the tools used to combat terrorism. I am pleased to be joined by Senators Feinstein and Kyl in introducing this measure, and I look forward to securing the support of other Judiciary Committee members as we move to consider this bill.

Mr. President, I would ask that the Washington Post editorial mentioned in my remarks, as well as three letters from the Department of Justice on the use of delayed notice warrants, be printed in the Record.

Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged resolution (H. Res. 324) as to a question of the privileges of the House and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, it is with regret that I must rise again to invoke the privileges of the House and to defend the rules and the spirit of simple courtesy and cooperation. I do not enjoy taking the time of this House away from our important business to do so; but recent events, the willful and repeated disregard for the rules of the House, the persistent abuse of power by the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and the flagrant abuse of the rights of the minority make this resolution necessary.

As I said the last time I came to the floor for this purpose, it is my fervent hope that this will be the last time it will ever be necessary for me or any other Member to offer such a resolution or to rise on a question of personal privilege. We should be spending our time dealing with the problems and concerns of the American people; but when a chairman abuses his power to stifle debate, Members of this House, both Republicans and Democrats, have a duty to defend the honor of this institution and the integrity of its proceedings. So long as power is abused, rules are ignored and broken and the rights of Members who represent millions of Americans are violated, this House cannot do its job properly. The American people are cheated of their right to an honest, open, fair, and democratic debate on issues affecting the future of our Nation. That is why we are here again today.

These are the facts: the minority is entitled by the rules to a day of hearings. It is a right rarely exercised, but it guards against the majority abusing its power to exclude competing views. Call it the fair and balanced rule. It is not the chairman's right to determine whether we deserve, in quotes, a hearing. It is not the chairman's right to decide whether his prior hearings were sufficient. It is not the chairman's right to decide whether what we say or think is acceptable or relevant. And it is certainly never the chairman's right to violate the rules in order to interfere with our right to conduct the hearing guaranteed to us by the rules.

The chairman is entitled to his opinions. He is not entitled to break the rules, to abuse his power and to impose his will. The chairman as a general rule permits only one minority witness in each committee or subcommittee hearing of the Judiciary Committee. I know of no other committee with this sort of restrictive rule. No matter what the issue, no matter how complex, no matter how many perspectives there might be, the chairman does not allow more than one minority witness.

On that basis alone, we have every right to insist on a day of hearings every time, a day of minority hearings, but we do not. Of course, that is when he allows hearings at all. In this Congress alone, the chairman has decided that we do not need hearings on such important issues as amendments to the Constitution, alleged mistreatment of detainees, and a rewrite of our bankruptcy code. These are hardly isolated cases. Is that the way we are supposed to do our job? No need for a hearing, the chairman wants to do it, so let's just do it. We do not need a hearing to look at the facts.

Members under the rules have the right to question each witness for 5 minutes apiece. We checked with the Parliamentarian. That is 5 minutes for each member for each witness. Yet the chairman repeatedly refused to recognize members. He consistently and abusively cut off members and witnesses in mid-sentence. It is the chairman's custom, to which we have not objected, to be fairly strict and after the 5 minutes are over to say, finish your thought or make your answer brief. That is fine.

In this hearing, because it was a minority-called hearing, he consistently cut off members and witnesses in mid-sentence, and rather rudely. In one case, when a member of the majority accused a witness of endangering American lives, the chairman refused the witness the opportunity to respond. Of course, the chairman did not limit himself to 5 minutes. He recognized himself for an additional 5 minutes toward the end of the hearing in order to deride the witnesses and the minority members of the committee without allowing any response.

Every Member of this House, Mr. Speaker, serves on committees and every Member of this House knows that this kind of abusive behavior is virtually unheard of. Witnesses should be treated with respect. So should colleagues. I thought we all knew that. The chairman refused to recognize members who were seeking recognition. He refused to recognize members who were attempting to raise points of order. Unacceptable. A clear violation of the rules. A plain abuse of power.

The chairman simply ended the hearing unilaterally. While members were seeking recognition and attempting to raise points of order, he simply ignored

them and banged the gavel and got up from his seat. The rules require a motion to adjourn because hearings are not normally ended unilaterally by a chairman. We consulted with the House Parliamentarian who confirmed that an adjournment motion must be approved by the members of the committee unless there is unanimous consent. The fact that adjournment is not normally contested because it is not necessary because everybody agrees does not change the rules.

After the chairman unilaterally adjourned the hearing, while members were seeking recognition, while he refused to recognize those members seeking to raise points of order, the committee staff, either on the chairman's instructions or acting on their own accord, switched off members' microphones while we were attempting to speak, instructed the stenographer to stop recording the hearing and turned off the electronic transmission of the hearing. Again, the hearing was still proceeding because it had not been legally adjourned because there had been no vote and no unanimous consent. Thanks to C-SPAN, the rest of the hearing was recorded and broadcast so the chairman was unable to censor the minority and hide our thoughts from the American people, although he tried.

Can any Member recall a time when a member's microphone was turned off while he or she was speaking in a committee meeting? Mr. Speaker, it is fair to ask, why should a member of the majority or the public care about adherence to the rules in these respects or about the rights of the minority? The answer is simple. Every Member represents more than half a million American citizens. Every one of those Americans is entitled to a voice in our government. No one should ever be allowed to abuse the power of his office to silence opposing views or to disenfranchise millions of Americans from having their views represented simply because they chose representatives of the minority party.

The greatness of our Nation is our freedom to stand up for what we believe and to have everyone's voice heard in the halls of government. The arrogance of power, the abuse of power, the silencing of minority voices, is a direct threat not only to our rules but to our democracy and to our freedom. The rules of this House exist to protect our democracy. Every Member of this House, regardless of party, must stand up for this institution, for its rules, and for the democracy it represents.

That is why I urge the adoption of this resolution and why I hope such a resolution will never again be necessary in this House.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the distinguished ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, we are not here discussing the substance or the merits of the PATRIOT Act or the manner in which it was adopted 4 years ago or the sufficiency of the oversight of the PATRIOT Act by the Committee on the Judiciary. We will have plenty of time to discuss that on the floor in coming weeks. We are discussing the abuse of power and flouting of the rules by the chairman of the committee at the minority hearing on June 10.

What the chairman said today did not contest or dispute a single point or a single allegation or assertion in the resolution. He did not deny that he rigidly cut off witnesses, every witness, in mid-sentence, a practice unheard of normally in the Committee on the Judiciary.

He did not deny that he made several false and disparaging comments about members of the minority in violation of the rules.

He did not deny that he refused on numerous occasions throughout the hearing to recognize members of the minority party attempting to raise points of order.

He did not deny that he violated the rules by adjourning unilaterally and peremptorily the committee hearing while members were seeking recognition and seeking points of order.

He did not deny that his staff cut off our microphones and even the lights when we were attempting to continue the hearing that he had illegally attempted to cut off.

He says that I said that he chaired the hearing with an attitude of total hostility. Watch the C-SPAN tape, not the tape on the committee website, the entire tape on the C-SPAN website. You will see the accuracy of what I said.

This was unforgivable, it was undemocratic, it was tyrannical. It was demeaning to the House and it should not occur again. Regardless of how he normally chairs hearings, regardless of whatever may happen about the PATRIOT Act in the future, this was an exercise in tyrannical disregard of the rights of the members of the minority and the millions of Americans we represent.

It is intolerable, it is abusive, and, therefore, this resolution should be passed and it should not happen again.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Ladies and gentlemen of the House, let me say from the outset that every Member of this body wants to make sure that law enforcement officials have the tools they need to protect the American people from terrorism. I also know that all of us want to make sure that we protect our civil liberties and freedoms as we fight terrorists anywhere in the world and in this country as well.

I support the majority of the 166 provisions of the PATRIOT Act. In fact, in the first original PATRIOT Act, I helped write many of them in a version of the bill that passed the Committee on the Judiciary 36-0, but a bill we never saw after it left the Committee on the Judiciary. It was replaced in the middle of the night in the Committee on Rules.

I did it, I wrote the provisions because I believe as technology changes, our laws need to keep up and change as well. I believe our law enforcement officials need to be able to talk with one another and connect the dots to prevent terrorist attacks.

In some sense this is not really about the PATRIOT Act, the debate that is going on here, or even most of the 16 provisions scheduled to sunset this year. It is about four areas that are subject to abuse and need greater checks and balances, and I would like to suggest what they are.

First, the business records, 215, allows the FBI to obtain any record considered relevant to an investigation. This includes library books, medical records, and bookstore purchases. The provision has been difficult to oversee since targets of FBI investigations under the law are not permitted to tell anybody about it, even their lawyer. The Department of Justice and the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary say that this provision has never been used on libraries and bookstores. However, the American Library Association has reported that more than 200 requests for library records have been made since September 11.

Now, concerning national security letters, the second very serious issue here, which allows the FBI to obtain financial, telephone, Internet and other records relevant to any intelligence investigation without judicial approval. Again, this is for any intelligence investigation, which means it does not even have to deal with terrorism, or even a crime. Like section 215, recipients are forever prevented from telling anyone they received a letter under penalty of law. Thank goodness a New York Federal court struck down this provision as unconstitutional. Shame on an administration that keeps using it anyway.

Third, under section 213, the government can sneak and peek into your business, your office, your car, your home, anywhere, even if there is no emergency. This means the government can break into your home and search it without telling you. It was not in the bill originally reported by the Committee on the Judiciary and was slipped in by the Department of Justice or the administration when the bill was first written a few years back. This provision has been subject to exceedingly widespread abuse. It has been used more than 240 times, and it has been delayed sometimes for over a year before anybody can be told what happened, that they were broken into, they were burglarized, they had things taken out of their home.

Worse yet, only 10 percent of these uses had anything to do with terrorism, which is the whole purpose of the PATRIOT Act.

Finally, it is clear to me that we need to have additional sunsets in this legislation. What is wrong with sunsets? That is why we are here, because the bill is being sunsetted in more than a dozen ways. If we have learned anything over the last 4 years, the only thing that makes the administration give us any information on oversight on the use of these new powers was the sunset provision.

We have also learned of abuses during our oversight that has led to us making modifications. Given this history, it simply makes no sense to make these provisions permanent or near permanent. And 10 years is not a sunset; 10 years is semi-permanent.

The lessons of September 11 and London, and even today in London, are that if we allow law enforcement to do their work free of political interference, give them adequate resources and modern technologies, we can protect our citizens without intruding on our liberties.

We all fight terrorism, but we need to fight it the right way consistent with our Constitution and in a manner that serves as a model for the rest of the world. I believe that the committee-passed legislation that is on the floor right now does not meet that test. As such, it does not warrant passage until it is corrected.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher), a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

(Mr. BOUCHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), who has headed the Constitution Subcommittee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, to the gentleman from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren), I am preparing a list of 10 instances of where there have been abuses that have been reported.

Abuses of the USA Patriot Act

(Prepared by the House Judiciary Democratic Staff)

While some have suggested that no abuses have occurred

under the USA PATRIOT Act, the simple truth is that it

appears that abuses have indeed occurred. The following are

examples:

section 215, seizure of records or ``any tangible thing''

Since 9/11, the American Library Association found that

libraries have received over 200 formal and informal requests

for materials, including 49 requests from federal officers.

section 218, coordinating criminal and intelligence investigations

Abuse in the Brandon Mayfield case: The FBI used Section

218 to secretly break into his house, download the contents

of four computer drives, take DNA evidence and take 355

digital photographs. Though the FBI admits Mr. Mayfield is

innocent, they still will not divulge the secret court order

to him, or allow him to defend himself in court. It is

unclear how the search was for any reason but to find

evidence incriminating Mr. Mayfield.

section 805, material support for terrorism

Section 805 has been found UNCONSTITUTIONAL by three

separate courts. The 9th Circuit found the provision

prohibiting ``personnel'' and ``training'' was overly vague.

The Central California District Court found the provisions

prohibiting ``expert advice and assistance'' was overly

vague. A New York District Court found the provisions

prohibiting ``personnel'' and acting as a ``quasi-employee''

overly vague. In each instance, the courts found COMPLETELY

LEGAL ACTIVITIES would violate Section 805.

Abuse in Lynne Stewart case: A District Court threw out

charges of materials support against Lynne Stewart, holding

that the law makes ANY action by a lawyer in support of an

alleged foreign terrorist client illegal, including providing

legal advice.

Abuse in Sami Al-Hussayen case: A federal jury in Idaho

acquitted University of Idaho graduate student Al-Hussayen on

all charges of providing material support for a terrorist

organization by running a website for the Islamic Assembly of

North America. Importantly, this group is NOT on the list of

foreign terrorist organizations, and the links

posted by Al-Hussayen were available on the GOVERNMENT'S own

website.

section 213, ``sneak and peek'' searches

In a July 5, 2005 letter to Rep. Bobby Scott, DOJ said

Section 213 had been used 153 times as of 1/31/2005; ONLY

EIGHTEEN (11.8%) uses involved terrorism investigations.

Thus, ALMOST 90% of ``sneak and peek'' warrants were used in

ordinary criminal investigations: 97 warrants were used in

drug investigations and 38 were used in other criminal

investigations.

Abuse of delays: In April 2005, DOJ said 90-day delays are

common, and that delays in notification have lasted for as

long as 180 days. In May 2003, DOJ said its longest delay was

90 days.

Abuse of delays for ``unspecified times'': Delays may be

sought for an unspecified duration, including until the end

of the investigation. In one such case, the delay lasted 406

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), a subcommittee ranking member.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Zoe Lofgren), a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), a senior member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), a former prosecutor and a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters), a distinguished member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus and a distinguished member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Baldwin), a former member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Meehan).