A bill to provide for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) for yielding me time.

There are a number of things that I would like to correct for the record before I begin. I apologize for not knowing the State that the gentleman is from, but the representation regarding the care of Theresa Schiavo by her husband as represented in the Chamber is totally inaccurate. Theresa's husband, and I am quoting from the guardian ad litem report, the independent guardian ad litem report that was required by Florida law during the special session in October of 2003, it says: ``Theresa's husband, Michael Schiavo, and her mother, Mary Schindler, were virtually partners in their care of and dedication to Theresa. There is no question but that complete trust, mutual caring, explicit love, and a common goal of caring for and rehabilitating Theresa were the shared intentions of Michael Schiavo and the Schindlers. Despite aggressive therapies, physician and other clinical assessments consistently revealed no functional abilities, only reflexive rather than cognitive moments, random eye opening, no communication system, and little change cognitively or functionally.''

And the gentleman referenced the percentage of the medical malpractice damage award being $486,000 going to attorneys' fees and to helping her reach her demise. That is also totally inaccurate. Also quoting from the guardian ad litem report: There was a medical malpractice case filed and pursued. Michael Schiavo and Terri Schiavo were awarded $750,000 in economic damages. The economic damages were put into a trust that was meticulously cared for according to the guardian ad litem and which was managed by South Trust Bank as the guardian and independent trustee. This fund was accounted for and Michael Schiavo had absolutely no control over its use. Michael Schiavo was awarded $300,000 for loss of consortium damages.

That is money that was awarded to him. There is not very much of that left. And there is no truth to the accusation that he would benefit financially from that damage award and there certainly was not $2 million in damages awarded.

Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record the report of the guardian ad litem.

[Dec. 1, 2003]

A Report to Governor Jeb Bush and the 6th Judicial Circuit in the

Matter of Theresa Marie Schiavo

(Submitted by Jay Wolfson, DrPH, JD, Guardian Ad Litem for Theresa

Marie Schiavo)

Theresa Marie Schiavo was born in the Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania area on 3 December 1963 to Robert and Mary

Schindler. She has two younger siblings, Robert Jr., and

Susan. Through the age of 18, Theresa was, according to her

parents, very overweight, until she chose to lose weight with

the guidance of a physician. She dropped from 250 pounds to

around 150 pounds, at which time she met Michael Schiavo.

They dated for many months and married in November of 1984.

The Schiavo and Schindler families were close and friendly.

Theresa and Michael moved to Florida in 1986 and were

followed shortly thereafter by Theresa's parents and

siblings. Theresa worked for the Prudential Life Insurance

Company and Michael was a restaurant manager.

About three years later, without the apparent knowledge of

her parents, Theresa and Michael sought assistance in

becoming pregnant through an obstetrician who specialized in

fertility services. For over a year, Theresa and Michael

received fertility services and counseling in order to

enhance their strongly held desire to have a child. By this

time, Theresa's weight had dropped even further, to 110

pounds. She was very proud of her fabulous figure and her

stunning appearance, wearing bikini bathing suits for the

first time and taking great pride in her improved good looks.

Testimony and photographs bare witness to these facts.

On the tragic early morning of 25 February 1990, Theresa

collapsed in the hallway of her apartment, waking Michael,

who called Theresa's family and 911. The lives of Theresa,

Michael and the Schindlers were to change forever.

Theresa suffered a cardiac arrest. During the several

minutes it took for paramedics to arrive, Theresa experienced

loss of oxygen to the brain, or anoxia, for a period

sufficiently long to cause permanent loss of brain function.

Despite heroic efforts to resuscitate, Theresa remained

unconscious and slipped into a coma. She was intubated,

ventilated and trached, meaning that she was given life

saving medical technological interventions, without which she

surely would have died that day.

The cause of the cardiac arrest was adduced to a

dramatically reduced potassium level in Theresa's body.

Sodium and potassium maintain a vital, chemical balance in

the human body that helps define the electrolyte levels. The

cause of the imbalance was not clearly identified, but may be

linked, in theory, to her drinking 10-15 glasses of iced tea

each day. While no formal proof emerged, the medical records

note that the combination of aggressive weight loss, diet

control and excessive hydration raised questions about

Theresa suffering from bulimia, an eating disorder, more

common among women than men, in which purging through

vomiting, laxatives and other methods of diet control becomes

obsessive.

Theresa spent two and a half months as an inpatient at

Humana Northside Hospital, eventually emerging from her coma

state, but not recovering consciousness. On 12 May 1990,

following extensive testing, therapy and observation, she was

discharged to the College Park skilled care and

rehabilitation facility. Forty-nine days later, she was

transferred again to Bayfront Hospital for additional,

aggressive rehabilitation efforts. In September of 1990, she

was brought home, but following only three weeks, she was

returned to the College Park facility because the ``family

was overwhelmed by Terry's care needs.''

On 18 June 1990, Michael was formally appointed by the

court to serve as Theresa's legal guardian, because she was

adjudicated to be incompetent by law. Michael's appointment

was undisputed by the parties.

The clinical records within the massive case file indicate

that Theresa was not responsive to neurological and

swallowing tests. She received regular and intense physical,

occupational and speech therapies.

Theresa's husband, Michael Schiavo and her mother, Mary

Schindler, were virtual partners in their care of and

dedication to Theresa. There is no question but that complete

trust, mutual caring, explicit love and a common goal of

caring for and rehabilitating Theresa, were the shared

intentions of Michael Schiavo and the Schindlers. In late

Autumn of 1990, following months of therapy and testing,

formal diagnoses of persistent vegetative state with no

evidence of improvement, Michael took Theresa to California,

where she received an experimental thalamic stimulator

implant in her brain. Michael remained in California caring

for Theresa during a period of several months and returned to

Florida with her in January of 1991. Theresa was transferred

to the Mediplex Rehabilitation Center in Brandon, where she

received 24-hour skilled care, physical, occupational, speech

and recreational therapies.

Despite aggressive therapies, physician and other clinical

assessments consistently revealed no functional abilities,

only reflexive, rather than cognitive movements, random eye

opening, no communication system and little change

cognitively or functionally. On 19 July 1991 Theresa was

transferred to the Sable Palms skilled care facility.

Periodic neurological exams, regular and aggressive physical,

occupational and speech therapy continued through 1994.

Michael Schiavo, on Theresa's and his own behalf, initiated

a medical malpractice lawsuit against the obstetrician who

had been overseeing Theresa's fertility therapy. In 1993, the

malpractice action concluded in Theresa and Michael's favor,

resulting in a

two element award: More than $750,000 in economic damages for

Theresa, and a loss of consortium award (non economic

damages) of $300,000 to Michael. The court established a

trust fund for Theresa's financial award, with South Trust

Bank as the Guardian and an independent trustee. This fund

was meticulously managed and accounted for and Michael

Schiavo had no control over its use. There is no evidence

in the record of the trust administration documents of any

mismanagement of Theresa's estate, and the records on this

matter are excellently maintained.

After the malpractice case judgment, evidence of

disaffection between the Schindlers and Michael Schiavo

openly emerged for the first time. The Schindlers petitioned

the court to remove Michael as Guardian. They made

allegations that he was not caring for Theresa, and that his

behavior was disruptive to Theresa's treatment and condition.

Proceedings concluded that there was no basis for the removal

of Michael as Guardian Further, it was determined that he had

been very aggressive and attentive in his care of Theresa.

His demanding concern for her well being and meticulous care

by the nursing home earned him the characterization by the

administrator as ``a nursing home administrator's

nightmare''. It is notable that through more than thirteen

years after Theresa's collapse, she has never had a bedsore.

By 1994, Michael's attitude and perspective about Theresa's

condition changed. During the previous four years, he had

insistently held to the premise that Theresa could recover

and the evidence is incontrovertible that he gave his heart

and soul to her treatment and care. This was in the face of

consistent medical reports indicating that there was little

or no likelihood for her improvement.

In early 1994 Theresa contracted a urinary tract infection

and Michael, in consultation with Theresa's treating

physician, elected not to treat the infection and

simultaneously imposed a ``do not resuscitate'' order should

Theresa experience cardiac arrest. When the nursing facility

initiated an intervention to challenge this decision, Michael

canceled the orders. Following the incident involving the

infection, Theresa was transferred to another skilled nursing

facility.

Michael's decision not to treat was based upon discussions

and consultation with Theresa's doctor, and was predicated on

his reasoned belief that there was no longer any hope for

Theresa's recovery. It had taken Michael more than three

years to accommodate this reality and he was beginning to

accept the idea of allowing Theresa to die naturally rather

than remain in the non-cognitive, vegetative state. It took

Michael a long time to consider the prospect of getting on

with his life--something he was actively encouraged to do by

the Schindlers, long before enmity tore them apart. He was

even encouraged by the Schindlers to date, and introduced his

in-law family to women he was dating. But this was just prior

to the malpractice case ending.

As part of the first challenge to Michael's Guardianship,

the court appointed John H. Pecarek as Guardian Ad Litem to

determine if there had been any abuse by Michael Schiavo. His

report, issued 1 March 1994, found no inappropriate actions

and indicated that Michael had been very attentive to

Theresa. After two more years of legal contention, the

Schindlers action against Michael was dismissed with

prejudice. Efforts to remove Michael as Guardian were

attempted in subsequent years, without success.

Hostilities increased and the Schindlers and Michael

Schiavo did not communicate directly. By June of 1996, the

court had to order that copies of medical reports be shared

with the Schindlers and that all health care providers be

permitted to discuss Theresa's condition with the

Schindlers--something Michael had temporarily precluded.

In 1997, six years after Theresa's tragic collapse, Michael

elected to initiate an action to withdraw artificial life

support from Theresa. More than a year later, in May of 1998,

the first petition to discontinue life support was entered.

The court appointed Richard Pearse, Esq., to serve as

Guardian Ad Litem to review the request for withdrawal, a

standard procedure.

Mr. Pearse's report, submitted to the court on 20 December

1998 contains what appear to be objective and challenging

findings. His review of the clinical record confirmed that

Theresa's condition was that of a diagnosed persistent

vegetative state with no chance of improvement. Mr. Pearse's

investigation concluded that the statements of Mrs.

Schindler, Theresa's mother, indicated that Theresa displayed

special responses, mostly to her, but that these were not

observed or documented.

Mr. Pearse documents the evolving disaffections between the

Schindlers and Michael Schiavo. He concludes that Michael

Schiavo's testimony regarding the basis for his decision to

withdraw life support--a conversation he had with his wife,

Theresa, was not clear and convincing, and that potential

conflicts of interest regarding the disposition of residual

funds in Theresa's trust account following her death affected

Michael and the Schindlers--but he placed greater emphasis on

the impact it might have had on Michael's decision to

discontinue artificial life support. At the time of Mr.

Pearse's report, more than $700,000 remained in the

guardianship estate.

Mr. Pearse concludes that Michael's hearsay testimony about

Theresa's intent is ``necessarily adversely affected by the

obvious financial benefit to him of being the sole heir at

law . . .'' and ``. . . by the chronology of this case . .

.'', specifically referencing Michael's change in position

relative to maintaining Theresa following the malpractice

award.

Mr. Pearse recommended that the petition for removal of the

feeding tube be denied, or in the alternative, if the court

found the evidence to be clear and convincing, the feeding

tube should be withdrawn.

Mr. Pearse also recommended that a Guardian Ad Litem

continue to serve in all subsequent proceedings.

In response to Mr. Pearse's report, Michael Schiavo filed a

Suggestion of Bias against Mr. Pearse. This document notes

that Mr. Pearse failed to mention in his report that Michael

Schiavo had earlier, formally offered to divest himself

entirely of his financial interest in the guardianship

estate. The criticism continues to note that Mr. Pearse's

concern about abuse of inheritance potential was directly

solely at Michael, not at the Schindlers in the event they

might become the heirs and also choose to terminate

artificial life support. Further, significant chronological

deficits and factual errors are noted, detracting from and

prejudicing the objective credibility of Mr. Pearse's

report.

The Suggestion of Bias challenges premises and findings of

Mr. Pearse, establishing a well pleaded case for bias. In

February of 1999, Mr. Pearse tendered his petition for

additional authority or discharge. He was discharged in June

of 1999 and no new Guardian Ad Litem was named.

Actions by the Schindlers to remove Michael as Guardian and

to block the petition to remove artificial life support took

on a frenetic quality at this juncture. More external parties

on both sides made appearances as potential interveners.

On 11 February 2000, consequent to hearings and the

presentation of competent evidence, Judge Greer ordered the

removal of Theresa's artificial life support. The Schindlers

aggressively sought means by which to stop the removal of

Theresa's feeding tube. Most of the motions in these efforts

were denied, but not without apparent careful and detailed

review by the court, often involving hearings at which

considerable latitude was afforded the Schindlers in their

efforts to proffer testimony and admit evidence.

The motion and hearing process continued through 2000. Then

the Schindlers sought to introduce new evidence that was

believed to be of a sufficiently substantial nature as to

change the court's decision regarding the removal of the

feeding tube. The hearings and testimony before the trial

court leading to the decision to discontinue artificial life

support included admitted hearsay from Theresa's brother-in-

law (Michael Schiavo's brother) and his wife (Michael

Schiavo's sister-in-law) along with testimony from Michael.

The testimony of these parties referenced specific

conversations in which Theresa commented about her desire

never to be placed on artificial life support. The testimony

reflected conversations at or proximate to funerals of close

family members who had been on artificial life support. The

context and content of the testimony, while hearsay, was

deemed credible and consistent and was used by the court as a

supporting basis for its decision to discontinue artificial

life support.

The Schindlers' new evidence ostensibly reflected adversely

on Michael Schiavo's role as Guardian. It related to his

personal romantic life, the fact that he had relationships

with other women, that he had allegedly failed to provide

appropriate care and treatment for Theresa, that he was

wasting the assets within the guardianship account, and that

he was no longer competent to represent Theresa's best

interests.

Testimony provided by members of the Schindler family

included very personal statements about their desire and

intention to ensure that Theresa remain alive. Throughout the

course of the litigation, deposition and trial testimony by

members of the Schindler family voiced the disturbing belief

that they would keep Theresa alive at any and all costs.

Nearly gruesome examples were given, eliciting agreement by

family members that in the event Theresa should contract

diabetes and subsequent gangrene in each of her limbs, they

would agree to amputate each limb, and would then, were she

to be diagnosed with heart disease, perform open heart

surgery. There was additional, difficult testimony that

appeared to establish that despite the sad and undesirable

condition of Theresa, the parents still derived joy from

having her alive, even if Theresa might not be at all aware

of her environment given the persistent vegetative state.

Within the testimony, as part of the hypotheticals presented,

Schindler family members stated that even if Theresa had told

them of her intention to have artificial nutrition withdrawn,

they would not do it. Throughout this painful and difficult

trial, the family acknowledged that Theresa was in a

diagnosed persistent vegetative state.

The court denied the Schindlers' motions to remove the

guardian, allowing that the evidence was not sufficient and

in some instances, not relevant. It set a date for the

artificial life support to be discontinued, as of 24 April

2001.

The decision was appealed to the Florida 2nd District Court

of Appeals (DCA), and was affirmed in January 2001. The

requested appeal to the Florida Supreme Court was denied on

23 April 2001, one day before the

scheduled removal of Theresa's feeding tube. On 24 April

2001, Theresa Schiavo's artificial feeding tube was clamped,

and she ceased receiving nutrition and hydration. Under

normal circumstances, Theresa would die naturally within a

week to ten days.

Two days after the clamping of Theresa's feeding tube, the

Schindlers filed a civil action in their capacity as

``natural guardians'' for Theresa. The trial court, in

emergency review, granted a temporary injunction and the tube

was unclamped. Michael Schiavo filed an emergency motion to

vacate the injunction. This led to the second review and

appeal to the 2nd DCA.

The 2nd DCA found that the intention of Florida Statute 765

with respect to matters such as Theresa's, is to help

expedite proceedings of the court when decisions have been

made by the bona fide guardian. The 2nd DCA also noted that

the Court had acted independently as proxy decision maker

regarding the removal of artificial life support.

In October 2001, the 2nd DCA concluded that the Schindlers

``have presented no credible evidence suggesting new

treatment can restore Mrs. Schiavo.'' The injunction was

lifted and plans moved forward to discontinue artificial

nutrition.

Fresh and exhaustive motions regarding new evidence were

again crafted and proffered to the trial court by the

Schindlers resulting in a lengthy hearing. Affidavits from

medical doctors and others alleged that Theresa's condition

could be improved.

In particular, the sworn statement of a single, osteopathic

physician, Dr. Webber, claimed that he could improve

Theresa's condition and had done so in like and similar

cases.

The quality of evidence in this affidavit was marginal, but

the court allowed it to create a colorable entitlement to

additional medical review. The case was remanded to the trial

court with the charge that each side would select two expert

physicians (a neurologist or a neurosurgeon, according to the

court) and agree between them regarding a fifth, and if they

could not agree on the fifth, the court would select it.

By May of 2002, the physicians were selected by both sides,

but no agreement could be reached about a fifth, so the court

selected one. Curiously and surprisingly, Dr. Webber, who had

served as the basis for this entire process at the 2nd DCA,

did not participate in the exams or the procedure.

Each of the physicians was afforded access to Theresa for

the purpose of conducting a thorough examination. Video tape

recordings were made of some of the examinations along with

segments in which family members interacted with Theresa. The

physicians were deposed and proffered testimony regarding

their findings. Written reports of the examinations were

prepared by all five physicians, and a very detailed hearing

was held in October of 2002.

The clinical evidence presented by the five physicians

reflected their examinations and reviews of the medical

records. Four of the physicians were board certified in

neurology, as suggested by the court, and one physician was

board certified in radiology and hyperbaric medicine. All of

the physicians had excellent pedigrees of medical training.

The scientific quality, value and relevance of the testimony

varied. The two neurologists testifying for Michael Schiavo

provided strong, academically based, and scientifically

supported evidence that was reasonably deemed clear and

convincing by the court. Of the two physicians testifying for

the Schindlers, only one was a neurologist, the other was a

radiologist/hyperbaric physician. The testimony of the

Schindler's physicians was substantially anecdotal, and was

reasonably deemed to be not clear and convincing.

The fifth physician, chosen by the court because the two

parties could not agree, presented scientifically grounded,

academically based evidence that was reasonably deemed to be

clear and convincing by the court.

Following exhaustive testimony and the viewing of video

tapes, the trial court concluded that no substantial evidence

had been presented to indicate any promising treatment that

might improve Theresa's cognition. The court sought to glean

scientific, case, researchbased foundations for the

contentions of the Schindler's physician experts, but

received principally anecdotal information.

Evidence presented by Michael Schiavo's two physicians and

the fifth physician selected by the court was reasonably

deemed clear and convincing in support of Theresa being in a

persistent vegetative state with no hope for improvement.

Simultaneous appeals of this decision and renewed actions to

remove Michael Schiavo as Guardian were initiated based upon

new evidence.

The June 2003 appeal to the 2nd DCA was Schiavo IV. The 2nd

DCA panel of judges engaged in what approximated a de novo

review of all of the facts, testimony and video tapes

presented at trial. The appellate court affirmed the trial

court's ruling and its conclusions, and in addition, ordered

the trial court to set a hearing date for removal of the

artificial life support.

The trial court set 15 October 2003 as the date for the

removal of Theresa's artificial nutrition tube.

The Schindler's renewed efforts to remove Michael Schiavo

as Guardian, and to disqualify judges, were not successful.

Multiple amicus briefs and affidavits from parties supporting

the Schindlers were submitted through the Schindler's actions

and in some instances, independently to the court.

By mid 2003, the landscape and texture of Theresa Schiavo's

case underwent profound changes. National media coverage,

active involvement by groups advocating right to life, and

the attention of the Governor's office and the Florida

Legislature, catapulted Theresa's case into a different

dimension.

The Schindlers, acting on behalf of Theresa, filed a motion

in federal district court seeking a preliminary injunction to

stay the removal of the artificial life support from Theresa,

scheduled to occur on 15 October 2003. On 6 October 2003,

Florida Governor Jeb Bush filed an Amicus brief in support of

the motion for a preliminary injunction. The brief argues

that removal of artificial nutrition, resulting in death,

should be avoided if that person can take oral nutrition and

hydration. The Governor predicates his memorandum on the

pivotal question as to whether Theresa could ingest food and

water on her own. That Theresa is in a diagnosed, persistent

vegetative state is explicitly recognized.

On 15 October 2003, Theresa Maria Schiavo's artificial

feeding tube was disconnected, for the second time.

The Florida legislature, in special session, passed HB 35 E

on 21 October 2003, authorizing the Governor to stay the

disconnection of the artificial feeding tube and required,

among other things, the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem to

produce this report.

On that same day, 21 October 2003, the artificial feeding

tube was re-inserted per the stay ordered by Governor Bush.

Other suits and actions were initiated immediately the

governor became a named party in the matters involving

Theresa Schiavo.

I just wanted to correct some of those facts for the record, Mr. Speaker. The circumstances that bring us here today are horribly tragic. No matter where you may fall on this issue, the details of Terri's case are heart-wrenching. No one in this Chamber questions the pain, heartache, and personal struggles that every member of Ms. Schiavo's family has had to deal with over the last 15 years. But heartbreaking decisions like this are deeply intimate, personal, and private matters; and the Federal Government and this body, in particular, should not inject itself into the middle of this private family matter.

This very personal matter should not be politicized as it is being here today. Just a few hours ago, I had an opportunity to sit down with Ms. Schiavo's brother, Bobby Schindler. I know that he speaks with great sincerity as I told him about his sister. Indeed, it is important to emphasize that this type of gut-wrenching, angst-ridden decision happens every day across the country among families dealing with the tragic circumstances of a loved one. And I know the pain that this causes families only too well because it happened in my own family not even 5 weeks ago. My husband's family had to make the identical decision to withdraw sustenance to disconnect the feeding tube of my husband's aunt.

Her children came together to make that very difficult decision, and no one in my family felt it was essential that I or any other Member of Congress file legislation to stop it. This type of decision happens every single day to thousands of families across America. Where will we stop if we allow this to go forward? Today will be Terri Schiavo. Tomorrow it will be someone's brother or a constituent's uncle or next week a family member, God forbid, of one of my colleagues or another constituent.

Do we really want to set the precedent of this great body, the United States Congress, to insert ourselves in the middle of families' private matters all across America?

If we do this, we will end up throwing end-of-life decisions into utter and complete chaos; and we cannot and should not do that. We are Members of Congress. We are not doctors. We are not medical experts. We are not bio-ethicists. We are Members of Congress.

When I ran for Congress, I did not ask my constituents for the right to insert myself in their private, personal families decisions; and they do not want me to make those for them. They do not want you to make those for them either. That is the bottom line.

I cannot get into the kind of questions that we are getting into being asked here because we do not know. I have never met Michael Schiavo or Terri Schiavo or the Schindlers and the vast majority of people in this body have not either.

We do not have the expertise or the facts in enough detail to get into these kinds of decisions and make decisions on these kind of cases. We are not God and we are not Terri Schiavo's husband, sister, brother, uncle or relation. We are Members of Congress. We make

laws and we uphold the law and we swore to uphold and protect the Constitution and we are thumbing our noses at the Constitution if we do this here tonight.

Now, I have heard a lot of things said about this legislation and about the very proceeding that we are engaging in this evening. I have heard accusations that because this body is debating this legislation, we are threatening somehow the life of Ms. Schiavo. I think it is really important to note that this is a legislative body created by our forefathers for the express purpose of deliberations and representation.

The accusation that because we have 3 hours of debate on an unprecedented piece of legislation that seeks to insert the Federal Government in between a family while overruling State courts and circumventing the Constitution, that is an outrageous accusation and not worthy of a representative elected to craft and debate legislation.

I notice today that President Bush has returned from Crawford hoping to sign this legislation if it is passed by Congress. I think it is important to note that President Bush when he was Governor of Texas in 1999 signed a Texas law that is on the books today that was just used a few days ago to allow a hospital to withdraw, over the parents' objections, the life support of a 6-month-old boy, over the parents' objections.

President Bush signed a law called the Texas Advanced Directives Act, when he was Governor of Texas. This law, that has been used several times and as recently as a few days ago, liberalized the situations under which a person in Texas can avoid artificial life support. Under it, life support can be withheld or withdrawn if you have an irreversible condition in Texas from which you are expected to eventually pass away.

Indeed, this law, signed by then Governor Bush, allows doctors to remove a patient from life support if the hospital's ethics committee agrees, even over the objections of a family member, only allowing the family 10 days to find another facility that might accept the patient, barring any State judicial intervention.

It appears that President Bush felt, as Governor, that there was a point at which, when doctors felt there was no further hope for the patient, that it is appropriate for an end-of-life decision to be made, even over the objections of family members. That was a law that President Bush did not just allow to become law without his signature, he came back from a campaign trip to sign it.

There is an obvious conflict here between the President's feelings on this matter now as compared to when he was Governor of Texas, so I thought that was an important conflict that should be raised here this evening in our discussion.

Let me just close my remarks by reiterating there is no room for the Federal Government in this most personal of private angst-ridden family matters, in which a family has to make the most personal of decisions when dealing with the course of care of a loved one. We should not politicize this very personal family matter.

Ms. Schiavo made it clear, as opposed to what the gentleman from Wisconsin said, that she would not have wished to remain in a persistent vegetative state, and the guardian ad litem report well documents that. In fact, it documents it to such a degree that it cites the specific conversations referenced by her family members when she attended funerals of loved ones who were in similar situations when they had life support removed; and she had stated that if, God forbid, she was ever in this situation, that she would not have wished to remain on life support.

The court heard that testimony not from Terri Schiavo's husband, not from her parents, but from other family members and friends who heard her say these things. They said that there was enough evidence to render the belief that she had made those statements. She made it clear that she wished not to remain in a persistent vegetative state, which she is in today. And this U.S. Government should not step in to circumvent the wishes of one dying woman.

Mr. Speaker, our colleagues have spent this evening reiterating factually inaccurate information, and I want to make sure we clear it up.

The independent guardian ad litem appointed to represent Terri Schiavo has said in his report that, despite the facts cited by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who have said that Terri felt pain and laughs and cries, that that is factually inaccurate; that her cerebral cortex has been liquefied, and that is the area of the brain that responds to emotion and reason. So that is impossible what they have detailed here tonight.

Additionally, they talk about six neurologists and eight physicians that have said that she is not in a persistent vegetative state. Also factually inaccurate. Those physicians to which they refer have only viewed Terri via videotape. The five court-appointed physicians that have examined Terri, two appointed on Michael Schiavo's side, two on the Schindlers' side, and one court-appointed physician, who have all examined her, the board certified neurologists who had scientifically- based academically-researched testimony, their testimony was deemed to be clear and convincing by the court that she was and is in a persistent vegetative state. The other physicians' testimony was discounted as anecdotal only.

In addition to that, I want to just close with the commentary from the guardian ad litem. He spent 20 of 30 days with her. He put his face up close to hers and tried to make eye contact, pleading desperately, trying to will her into giving him any kind of sign. He said, I would beg her, please, Terri, help me. You want to believe there is some connection. You hope she is going to sit up in bed and say, ``Hey, I'm really here, but don't tell anybody.'' Or, ``I'm really here, tell everybody.''

But Schiavo never made eye contact. When Wolfson visited her when her parents were there, she never made eye contact with them either, he said. And for all of Wolfson's pleadings and coaxings, he never got what he most wanted: A sign. He said, I felt like there was something distinctive about whoever Terri is, but I was not clear it was there, inside the vessel.

During those 30 days, Wolfson was plagued by nightmares. He concluded that the medical and legal evidence behind Schiavo's diagnosis of being in a persistent vegetative state was credible, but he still felt that for all their expertise, those medical experts would never truly know where Schiavo was.

He was dismayed to learn Friday that Barbara Weller, an attorney for the Schindlers, claimed Schiavo tried to speak. He said, Terri does not speak. To claim otherwise reduces her to a fiction.''

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the order of the House of today, I move to suspend the rules and pass the Senate bill (S. 686) for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on S. 686.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 686, For the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo. As the House convenes this Palm Sunday, the Florida courts are enforcing a merciless directive to deprive Terri Schiavo of her right to life.

Terri Schiavo, a person whose humanity is as undeniable as her emotional responses to her family's tender care-giving, has committed no crime and has done nothing wrong. Yet the Florida courts have brought Terri and the Nation to an ugly crossroads by commanding medical professionals sworn to protect life to end Terri's life. This Congress must reinforce the law's commitment to justice and compassion for all Americans, particularly the most vulnerable.

On March 16, the House passed legislation to avert the tragedy now unfolding in Florida. The House bill, H.R. 1332, The Protection of Incapacitated Persons Act of 2005, passed the House by voice vote. Earlier today, I introduced H.R. 1452, For the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo. The Senate-passed legislation now before us is identical to that bill.

Mr. Speaker, while our federalist structure reserves broad authority to the States, America's Federal courts have played a historic role in defending the constitutional rights of all Americans, including the disadvantaged, disabled, and dispossessed. Among the God-given rights protected by the Constitution, no right is more sacred than the right to life.

The legislation we will consider today will ensure that Terri Schiavo's constitutional right to life will be given the Federal court review that her situation demands. Unlike legislation passed by the Senate a day after House passage of H.R. 1332, the legislation received from the Senate today is not a private bill. Also, and of critical importance, S. 686 does not contain a provision that might have authorized the Federal court to deny desperately needed nutritional support to Terri Schiavo during the pendency of her claim.

Unlike earlier Senate legislation, S. 686 also contains a bicameral and bipartisan commitment that Congress will examine the legal rights of incapacitated individuals who are unable to make decisions concerning the provision or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Broad consideration of this issue is necessary to ensure that similarly situated individuals are accorded the equal protection under law that is both a fundamental constitutional right and an indispensable ingredient of justice.

It is important to note that this legislation does not create a new cause of action. Rather, it merely provides de novo Federal court review of alleged violations of Terri Schiavo's rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Furthermore, Senate 686 makes it clear that ``nothing in this act shall be construed to create substantive rights not otherwise secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States or of several States.''

In addition, the legislation does not reopen or direct the reopening of a final judgment; it merely ensures that opportunity for the review of any violation of Terri Schiavo's Federal and constitutional rights in a Federal court. As a result, the legislation is clearly consistent with both the separation of powers envisioned by our Founders and the weight of judicial precedent on point. As the Supreme Court held in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, ``While legislatures usually act through laws of general applicability, that is by no means their only legitimate mode of action.''

Finally, S. 686 presents no problems regarding retrospective application. As the Supreme Court held in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, ``A statute does not operate `retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment.'' Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. S. 686 does not attach any new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment; it merely changes the tribunal to hear the case by providing Federal court jurisdiction to review alleged violations of Terri Schiavo's Federal and constitutional rights.

Mr. Speaker, the measure of a Nation's commitment to the sanctity of life is reflected in its laws to the extent those laws honor and defend its most vulnerable citizens. When a person's intentions regarding whether to receive lifesaving treatment are unclear, the responsibility of a compassionate Nation is to affirm that person's right to life. In our deeds and in our public actions, we must build a culture of life that welcomes and defends all human life. The compassionate traditions and highest values of our country command us to action.

We must work diligently not to not only help Terri Schiavo continue her own fight for life, but to join the fight of all those who have lost capacity to fight on their own. As millions of Americans observe the beginning of Holy Week this Palm Sunday, we are reminded that every life has purpose, and none is without meaning. The battle to defend the preciousness of every life in a culture that respects and defends life is not only Terri's fight, but it is America's fight.

I commend the other body for passing this legislation without objection, and urge my colleagues across the aisle to join us in this fight by passing S. 686 to affirm the sanctity of life and to permit Terri to continue hers.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a supplemental legislative history on this bill and a letter addressed to me dated today from Professor Robert A. Destro, who is the attorney for Robert and Mary Schindler, who is next friend of their daughter Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo and is a professor of law at the Columbus School of Law in the Catholic University of America.

The Catholic University of America Columbus School of

Law, Office of the Faculty,

Washington, DC, March 20, 2005.

Hon. James Sensenbrenner,

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

Re S. 686 (identical to H.R. 1452)--A Bill for the Relief of

the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo

Dear Mr. Chairman: You have asked me to comment on the

proposed ``Bill for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa

Marie Schiavo'' (to be brought up in the House today, which

is the same bill the Senate passed earlier today) in my

capacity as co-counsel in the Federal litigation filed by

Robert and Mary Schindler on behalf of their daughter,

Theresa Marie Schiavo. On behalf of the legal team and the

family, we thank you and your colleagues in both the House

and the Senate for your efforts, and those of your respective

staffs, on behalf of Terri Schiavo.

Terri Schiavo's Federal Claims

This case has attracted worldwide attention--including that

of the United States Congress and the political branches of

the State of Florida--for two reasons. The first is that the

situation in which the members of Terri Schiavo's family find

themselves is a human tragedy with ``real-time'' life and

death consequences. The second reason is the one that brings

us before Congress and the federal courts. Terri's parents,

Robert and Mary Schindler, allege that neither they nor their

daughter got a fair trial in the Florida courts. Terri

Schiavo is the first incapacitated person in the history of

the State of Florida to have been involved in a ``substituted

judgment'' proceeding where there is a significant difference

of opinion over both the nature of her condition (i.e. ``Is

Terri actually in a persistent vegetative state [PVS]?'') and

her wishes (i.e. ``What would Terri say about continued

nutrition and hydration if she could speak to us today?''

Getting accurate answers to both of these questions is

critical. Not only does Terri's life hang in the balance, so

too does the Nation's understanding of how a society

committed to both individual rights and the rule of law

should determine the wishes of persons with severe brain

injuries. The Florida courts spent many years trying to

figure out what to do in such a case. Unfortunately for Terri

Schiavo--and for the nation--they did not apply the Florida

statutes that usually govern such cases. They created new

constitutional laws.

Terri's parents have alleged that the law created by

Florida courts in Terri's case violated both Terri's rights

and theirs because:

1. The guardianship court compromised his judicial

independence when the he appointed himself, rather than an

independent guardian ad litem, to serve as Terri Schiavo's

health care proxy.

2. The Florida courts permitted Terri's husband, Michael

Schiavo and his attorney to represent Terri's interests

notwithstanding the Florida courts own admission that his

interests were adverse to hers.

3. The Florida courts did not appoint a guardian ad litem

for Terri, nor did they provide her with counsel to argue and

protect her interests. The result was a situation in which

Terri herself had no assistance of counsel in a case in which

her life hangs in the balance.

4. The way the Florida courts applied the state's law and

constitution to incapacitated persons with severe cognitive

disabilities violated her rights under the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteen Amendment. After Terri's case, the

only persons in the State of Florida who are not entitled to

an independent judiciary and effective representation are

incapacitated persons who cannot speak for themselves.

5. The state court order for under which Terri's nutrition

and hydration is currently being withheld was entered after a

proceeding tainted by ``structural defects'' that call the

integrity of the entire fact finding process in to question.

As a result, we simply do not know either ``what Terri

wants'' or what her current medical condition actually is.

6. The state court order violates the standards set out in

both federal and state precedents that recognize the right to

self-determination in health-care decisionmaking. Cruzan v.

Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280

(1990) and Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4, 12 (Fla.

1990). Both of those cases recognize that accuracy, not

finality, is essential in any case where a guardian has asked

for a judicial decree authorizing the death of the a person

with a severe disability such as Terri's.

The Need for the Proposed Legislation

Review of Terri's federal claims by a federal court is an

essential step in protecting her right to privacy. We have

argued in federal court that Terri's federal rights were

violated by the state courts, and that her continued custody

in the guardianship violates her constitutional rights.

Generally speaking, such reviews can take place in only two

ways: 1) direct review by the Supreme Court of the United

States by Petition for Certiorari; or 2) a federal writ of

habeas corpus.

Because Terri will die within two weeks from starvation and

dehydration, the traditional option of a petition to the

Supreme Court of the United States is not an option. It

simply takes too long. We did try an emergency motion for a

stay, but the Court denied it on Thursday, March 17, 2005. As

a result, Mr. and Mrs. Schindler's only option was a petition

to the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Florida asking for a writ of habeas corpus.

Unfortunately for Terri, the habeas corpus statutes are

focused almost exclusively on prisoners. Getting the courts

to understand that people in Terri's situation are also

entitled to habeas relief is both difficult and time

consuming. On Friday, March 18, 2005 the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed

Mr. and Mrs. Schindler's attempt to get a fair trial for

Terri because Judge Moody believed: (a) that Terri is not a

``person in custody'' entitled to habeas relief; (b) that

Mr. and Mrs. Schindler do not have standing to argue that

Terri did not get a fair trial; and (c) that the federal

courts are duty bound to respect the findings of the

Florida courts concerning her wishes.

Because we believe that federal law is to the contrary, we

asked for, and received, a ``Certificate of Appealability''

from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit, which is currently considering our request that the

District Court give Terri and her parents a hearing on their

federal claims.

S. 686 (which is identical to H.R. 1542) is absolutely

necessary to guarantee a federal hearing of Terri's claims.

This law is absolutely necessary to cut through the

procedural barriers that were designed by Congress to make it

difficult to litigate the claims of convicted criminals.

Terri, however, is no criminal. She is a person with a severe

brain injury whose only ``crime'' is that she is

incapacitated.

Section 5 guarantees that this law protects only Terri's

existing rights under federal law. It neither creates new

rights, nor any power for federal courts that does not

already exist. This provision also resolves any problems that

I may have had with prior drafts of the legislation proposed

in the Senate. Since the law will not change any law already

applicable to Terri, it should eliminate any claim that the

law is designed to overturn either a state or federal

judicial decree, see Plant v. Spendthrift Farm.

Section 1 gives the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida specific jurisdiction to hear

Terri's federal claims. We believe that it has that

jurisdiction already, but Judge Moody disagreed. Since we do

not have time to appeal to the Supreme Court if the Eleventh

Circuit agrees with Judge Moody, we need this law if Terri's

rights are to be vindicated before she dies from starvation

and dehydration.

Section 2 resolves any questions concerning the right of

Terri's parents to argue in court on Terri's behalf. Judge

Moody questioned their standing. This bill eliminates that

procedural hurdle.

Section 3 allows the court to grant an injunction against

further interference with Terri's rights should we prevail in

our claim that she did not get a fair trial. This provision

guarantees that Terri will have the same remedies as a

condemned criminal.

Section 4 is both a ``sunset provision'' and a guarantee

that we have the time we need to bring her case to court.

Rest assured, the case will be filed as soon as the President

signs this bill.

Section 6--Terri's case has nothing to do with ``assisted

suicide'' or ``the right to die.'' This case is about one

thing: Did Terri get a fair trail?

Section 7--We read this as a promise that Congress will

give serious attention to the rights of persons with severe

cognitive disabilities. We applaud its sponsors for making

that promise.

The House Bill Does Not Violate Either Separation of Powers or

Federalism

I raised questions concerning the federal court's

unwillingness to undertake a review of state court

proceedings, not only because of the respect that federal

courts owe the Florida courts, but also because two cases

urge caution in framing private legislation. We cannot afford

to create a problem that would make this private relief bill

unconstitutional.

The changes Congress proposes to make in the House bill to

be brought up in the House today provide an even more

effective means that attempted by Governor Bush and the

Florida Legislature in ``Terri's Law,'' Laws of Florida,

Chapter 2003-418. Governor Bush has conceded that Terri did

not get a fair trial, and urged the Supreme Court of the

United States to review the proceedings in the Florida

courts. There is no violation of either separation of powers

or federalism here.

Finally, I concur with the legal analysis Chairman

Sensenbrenner will be submitting into the Congressional

Record regarding the constitutionality of the House bill to

be brought up today.

conclusion

We hope that this answers the questions that Members and

Senators may have. We thank you, once again, on behalf of the

family and on behalf of our client, Terri Schiavo.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Destro,

Attorney for Robert and Mary Schindler, as next friend of

their Daughter, Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, Federal courts have always reviewed whether or not a person's Federal constitutional or legal rights have been violated, and that is all this bill does. It gives a Federal Court the opportunity to review the Federal questions that are presented here.

Now, if we accepted the position that has been made by the opponents of this legislation, we would not have had a civil rights revolution in this country if rural courts in the South decided Federal questions that were opposed by those who were petitioning to have their civil rights protected. That required Federal judicial action. And this country is better because of that Federal judicial action. That is all that is being proposed here today, and that is why the bill ought to pass.

Now, secondly, I would like to correct some of the representations my colleague from Florida has made. Terri Schiavo is not on life support. She is not on a ventilator. She is not on any kind of artificial heart pump. All she has is a feeding tube, or had a feeding tube until it was removed 2 days ago, and that is not life support. That is simply requiring somebody to have the nutrition and the hydration they need as a living human being.

To starve someone to death or to have them die of dehydration slowly is one of the most cruel and inhumane ways to die, and what this bill does is it requires the reinsertion of the feeding tube for so long as it takes for a Federal Court to determine whether or not her Federal constitutional or statutory rights are violated. And that is reasonable, because she should not be allowed to die while the courts are determining what her legal rights are and whether anybody has violated them.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, in 1995, my friend from Massachusetts said, in a habeas corpus bill, ``I want judicial review in a reasonable way. I want people who may have had their rights interfered with to be able to sue in reasonable fora.''

That is what this bill does. He was right then. I think this bill is right now.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks), a member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Miller).

(Mr. MILLER of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. Foxx).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, this bill does not make a decision on whether or not the feeding tube should be reinserted. It does not make a final decision on the issues that are being decided in Florida. What it does do is that it says that a Federal court, a judge, will review the Federal constitutional and legal rights that belong to Terri Schiavo, and that Federal judge will make a decision on Federal issues, and that is all the bill does.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrey).

(Mr. GINGREY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Fortenberry).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Aderholt).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Tennessee (Mrs. Blackburn).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Kingston).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Price).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, I am a little bit puzzled, listening to my friend from New York. At 151 Congressional Record, page H1599, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) said, ``If a person thinks a court in a State is depriving someone of civil rights, they can go into Federal Court.'' And at volume 150 Congressional Record at page H6580, the gentleman from New York noted that without Federal courts, ``Obviously, the progress we have witnessed in the area of civil rights would have been, at the very least, stymied, and most likely prevented altogether.''

Now, all this bill does is to allow the parents of Terri Schiavo to go into Federal Court to adjudicate her Federal constitutional and legal rights. No more, no less.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Schwarz).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. Musgrave).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Renzi).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Conaway).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the distinguished whip.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Beauprez).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute to correct the record.

There have been statements made on the actions of then-Governor George W. Bush of Texas. I would like to correct the record on this.

In 1997, then-Governor Bush vetoed an advanced directives bill precisely because it would have given specific legal sanction to such involuntary denial of lifesaving treatment. An effort in the Texas legislature to amend the bill to require treatment pending transfer to a health care provider willing to provide the lifesaving treatment had been defeated.

With no legal protections at all under Texas law, and ongoing programs in Texas hospitals denying treatment with no opportunity to even seek

transfer, pro-life groups entered into negotiations with medical groups that finally resulted in the bill that, one, formalized more protections for in-hospital review; two, gave patients 10 days of treatment while seeking transfer; and, three, authorized court proceedings to extend the 10 days for reasonable additional periods of time to accomplish transfer. That is what the Governor signed.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Cole).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. McHenry).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Kennedy).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I have listened to this debate intently; and the complaints that I have heard from people who are opposed to this bill, feelings that are sincerely held and emotions that are sincerely held is why are we picking on this one case, the case of Terri Schiavo?

That was not my desire in the beginning, and it was not the desire of the entire House of Representatives either.

Wednesday night the House passed H.R. 1332, which was a bill which I introduced that applied to everybody who is in an incapacitated state, a major protection for people who are disabled. Everybody who is disabled could get a Federal review of their Federal constitutional and legal rights, including that under the Americans With Disability Act.

We had a debate on the floor, and it passed unanimously. And there was a move in the other body to bring it up, and it was objected to; and that is why this issue was not resolved with a general law of general application. I hope we revisit that issue some time in the future so that we do not have to deal with a specific case again. But we are here because we could not get H.R. 1332 passed in the other body.

I also think this is an issue of priorities, priorities of what we put a higher priority on in terms of how we provide food and nourishment to living human beings. In Florida they have a statute number 828.12 that says if you do not feed an animal you can go to jail for a year and be fined $5,000. So in Florida an animal has a higher right than this woman, and that is a wrong priority, and this bill attempts to correct it.

No Federal court has agreed to hear Terri Schiavo's Federal claims while her State court remedies were not yet exhausted. Now that her State courts remedies are exhausted, she has only two means of obtaining Federal court review under current law.

The first means is in the lower Federal court through the habeas corpus statute, and the second is by petitioning the Supreme Court directly. First she can try to obtain habeas relief under the current Federal law. On Friday she was denied that relief by the Florida Federal District Court. That denial has been appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals which requested the briefs of her husband's lawyers by seven o'clock tonight. No one knows when the 11th circuit will make a final decision, and they may yet deny her habeas relief. So time is of the essence.

In any case, even if she is granted a habeas review of her case, she faces a major obstacle in that the Federal habeas corpus statute essentially requires the Federal court to defer to the State court's determination regarding the facts of this case. So even if the habeas petition is granted, the deck is stacked against her.

Second, Terri Schiavo's lawyers can try to obtain relief in the Supreme Court. So far her lawyers have petitioned for and been denied an emergency hearing. Her lawyers are currently pursuing an ordinary appeal directly to the Supreme Court, but that appeal process will extend for weeks at least; and in any case, her appeal will likely be denied because the Supreme Court will generally not take a case without a lower Federal court's first establishing a record.

The bottom line is that first, the 11th circuit may yet deny Terri Schiavo her habeas petition. Second, even if they granted it, she would likely lose her case under the very difficult procedural hurdles any habeas petitioner faces. Third, she has already been denied an emergency review by the Supreme Court. And, fourth, the ordinary review process in the Supreme Court will take far too long. She will probably die in the interim.

Consequently, Terri Schiavo's only hope is the current bill which will guarantee a fresh review of her case in the lower Federal court immediately, without any deference to State court determination and with the lower Federal court issuing a stay of the State court order until it can determine the Federal claims the court is required to hear under this bill on its merits.

That is what Terri Schiavo needs, and that is what this bill will get her, and that is why it should pass.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), the majority leader.

Mr. President, opponents of free speech and debate claim that, during my tenure as majority leader in the United States Senate, I established precedents that now justify a proposal for a misguided attempt to end debate on a judicial nomination by a simple majority vote, rather than by a three-fifths vote of all Senators duly chosen and sworn as required by paragraph two of Senate rule XXII. Their claims are false.

Proponents of the so-called nuclear option cite several instances in which they inaccurately allege that I ``blazed a procedural path'' toward an inappropriate change in Senate rules. They are dead wrong. Dead wrong. They draw analogies where none exist and create cock-eyed comparisons that fail to withstand even the slightest intellectual scrutiny.

Simply put, no action of mine ever denied a minority of the Senate a right to full debate on the final disposition of a measure or matter pending before the Senate. Not in 1977, not in 1979, not in 1980, or in 1987--the dates cited by critics as grounds for the nuclear option. The Congressional Research Service confirms that only six amendments have been adopted since the cloture rule was enacted in 1917, and ``each of these changes was made within the framework of the existing or `entrenched' rules of the Senate, including rule XXII.''

In none of the instances cited by those who threaten to invoke the nuclear option did my participation in any action deny the minority in the Senate, regardless of party, its right to debate the real matter at hand.

Let us examine each of these so-called precedents in greater detail.

October 3, 1977--Enforcing Senate Rule XXII Against Improper Post- Cloture Delay: In 1977, the Senate invoked cloture on S. 2104, described as ``a bill to establish a comprehensive natural gas policy.'' Shortly thereafter, two Senators began a postcloture ``filibuster by amendment,'' after a supermajority of the Senate had already chosen to invoke cloture (under the Senate rules) and had made clear its desire to bring debate on the bill to close. Though the Senate had voted to invoke cloture by an overwhelming vote of 77 to 17, two Senators nonetheless continued to offer amendments, to request quorum calls, and to offer amendments to amendments to preserve and extend time on the bill post-cloture. Their efforts, as confirmed by the Chair, ran directly contrary to the purpose of rule XXII, which is to limit debate.

The tactics employed were sufficiently egregious that the Senate spent 13 days and 1 night debating the bill, which included 121 rollcalls and 34 live quorums. Cloture having been invoked by an overwhelming vote, I then made the point of order that:

when the Senate is operating under cloture, the Chair is

required to take the initiative under rule XXII to rule out

of order all amendments which are dilatory or which on their

face are out of order.

Critics have alleged that my actions in this instance ``cut off debate'' and somehow constitute a precedent for ending a filibuster of a judicial nominee by 51 votes before cloture has been invoked. But that argument is erroneous.

The Senate was operating postcloture. The Senate had voted 77 to 17 to end debate. I didn't do that; the Senate took that action.

If anything, my actions clarified that rule XXII means what it says. The text of rule XXII provides explicitly that, once cloture is invoked, ``no dilatory motion, or dilatory amendment, or amendment not germane shall be in order.'' Therefore, once Members have voted to invoke cloture, dilatory amendments or actions are simply out of order. Senators still retain their hour of postcloture debate. Senators still have the right of appeal.

Some have falsely alleged that I even acted to impede debate on that appeal,

but they are mistaken yet again: Under the provisions of rule XXII, appeals from rulings of the Chair were not and are not debatable postcloture.

Nothing that was done in 1977 changed rule XXII or sent a shock wave through the Senate. Nothing that was done restricted the right of Senators to wage a filibuster against a nominee or legislation before cloture is invoked. No action taken affected the fundamental right of Senators to debate the natural gas deregulation bill; they had already debated the bill and, of their own volition, had decided to end their debate by an overwhelming vote. Instead, I sought to end dilatory tactics postcloture, when such tactics were, and remain today, prohibited by the plain text of paragraph two of rule XXII. I simply sought a ruling from the Chair to enforce Senate rule XXII.

In fact, when, in 1977, my point of order was sustained, the Chair in so doing noted that the point of order was consistent with the purpose of rule XXII, which ``is to require action by the Senate on a pending measure following cloture within a period of reasonable dispatch.'' When the Chair's ruling in support of my point of order was thereafter appealed, that appeal was tabled in the Senate by another overwhelming vote of 79 to 14.

No Member of the minority in the Senate lost his right to debate the natural gas deregulation bill. Their ability to debate the bill was not tampered with or impeded in any way. Each Senator retained the right to debate, under the Senate rules, the bill both precloture and in the hour that was provided to each Senator under rule XXII postcloture.

Thus, contrary to current assertions, in 1977, a strong, bipartisan, supermajority of the Senate, supported by, among others, Minority Leader Howard Baker and myself, endorsed this necessary effort to halt postcloture dilatory tactics consistent with Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate. That is completely unlike the so-called nuclear option that is currently being discussed by some in the Senate. I sought to enforce rule XXII; not to destroy it.

January 15, 1979--Enforcing Rule XXII Against Improper Post-Cloture Delay: At the beginning of the new Congress in 1979, I, as Senate majority leader, introduced a resolution to make various changes to Senate rule XXII, the bulk of which addressed circumstances postcloture. Recently, on March 10, 2005, a Senator spoke on the Senate floor and stated that this resolution serves as a precedent for the nuclear option. However, my resolution served to enforce rule XXII, not to destroy it. My introduction of S. Res. 9 was influenced by the postcloture dilatory tactics that were suffered by the Senate during its consideration of the natural gas deregulation bill during the preceding Congress.

My efforts in that regard were supported, on a bipartisan basis, by Minority Leader Howard Baker who stated in response to my introduction of S. Res. 9:

I point out, as I am sure most of our colleagues are aware

and will recall, that in the case of the most recent post-

cloture filibuster, it was the majority leader and the

minority leader, with the distinguished occupant of the

chair, the Vice President, in the chair at the time, who

managed to establish a line and series of precedents that

created the possibility to at least accelerate the

disposition of the controversy and conflict.

The point of the matter is that this is not, nor has it

been, a matter that is purely partisan in its character. . .

.

He added:

I share with the majority leader the belief that the post-

cloture filibuster, a creature of fairly young age and recent

development, is one that the Senate has not focused on

adequately. I am prepared to do that and I want to do that.

As the minority leader in the Senate recognized at the time, the text of rule XXII provides explicitly that, once cloture is invoked, ``no dilatory motion, or dilatory amendment, or amendment not germane shall be in order.'' Therefore, once Members vote to invoke cloture, dilatory amendments or actions are impermissible. No proposal of mine in 1979 restricted the right of Senators to filibuster a nominee or a piece of legislation prior to the invocation of cloture, consistent with Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate. And the position I took at the time enjoyed support on both sides of the aisle.

November 9, 1979--Strengthening Rule XVI Against Legislation on Appropriations Bills: Opponents of free speech and debate in the Senate cite a third event as a supposed basis for their proposed ``nuclear option.'' In November 1979, during consideration of a Department of Defense Appropriations bill, Senator Stennis raised a point of order that an amendment to change the rate of pay for military personnel, which had been offered by Senator Armstrong, constituted legislation on an appropriations bill and was therefore out of order under the express terms of Senate rule XVI. Legislative amendments to appropriations bills violate Senate rule XVI. However, by precedent, the ``defense of germaneness'' arose. According to this practice, which evolved outside the text of rule XVI, if the House has acted first to ``open the door'' to legislate on an appropriations measure, a Senator could respond with a legislative amendment, provided that it is germane to some House legislative language. If a point of order were made that an amendment constituted legislation, a ruling by the Chair on that question would be preempted by a vote on the germaneness of the amendment to the House language. This practice was justified only if the House had included legislative language in its bill. But this practice made a mockery of the rule if the House had not included any legislative language.

When Senator Stennis raised the point of order that the Armstrong amendment constituted legislation on an appropriations bill, Senator Armstrong asserted the defense of germaneness, meaning that his amendment was germane because it was relevant to the House bill. At that point, I made the following point of order:

I make the point of order that this is a misuse of the

precedents of the Senate, since there is no House language to

which this amendment could be germane and that, therefore,

the Chair is required to rule on the point of order as to its

being legislation on an appropriation bill and cannot submit

this question of germaneness to the Senate.

I was concerned that, as a threshold matter, the amendment should not be considered because there was no House language to which the proposed amendment could possibly be germane. The Chair noted that while this was a case of first impression, my point was ``well taken,'' and he sustained my point of order. Senator Armstrong then appealed the ruling of the Chair, and I moved to table that appeal. My motion was adopted by the Senate.

Critics claim that my actions in this instance were contrary to the plain language of rule XVI, because rule XVI at paragraph four states, ``all questions of relevancy of amendments under this rule, when raised, shall be submitted to the Senate and be decided without debate.'' But their assertion that I acted in a manner contrary to rule XVI is false.

My point of order went not to the issue of legislating on an appropriations bill, but to a different issue: The concept of ``defense of germaneness.'' Nowhere in rule XVI is there a reference to the concept of ``defense of germaneness.'' The source and subsequent application of defense of germaneness and its threshold test is not rooted in any Senate rule. Instead, it dates back to a precedent, which is identified by Riddick's Senate Procedure as a ``theory,'' which was ``enunciated'' by Vice President Marshall in 1916, that, ``Notwithstanding the rule of the Senate . . . when the House of Representatives opens the door and proceeds to enter upon a field of general legislation . . . the Chair is going to rule, but of course the Senate can reverse the ruling of the Chair, that the House having opened the door the Senate of the United States can walk through the door and pursue the field.''

Second, my efforts were to avoid the misuse of precedent and thereby enforce the express provisions of Senate rule XVI, which prohibits legislation on an appropriations bill. It is only by precedent that germaneness justified a legislative amendment on an appropriations bill, and only if the House opened the door. My goal was to preserve proper precedent and strengthen rule XVI; not to weaken it, as the nuclear option would do to rule XXII. My actions did not establish any precedent to destroy the right of extended debate in the Senate. In fact, the Senate's action affected only the ability to offer certain amendments to particular legislation, and, even then, the Senate minority's rights to appeal a ruling of the Chair were fully preserved.

March 5, 1980--Enhancing the Right of Debate of Nominations on the Executive Calendar: Critics of extended debate also reference a motion I made in 1980 to proceed directly to a nomination on the Executive Calendar. They claim that this created a precedent making a motion to proceed to any nomination on the Executive Calendar nondebatable. It did no such thing.

At the time, a nondebatable motion to go into executive session automatically put the Senate on the first treaty on the Executive Calendar. This meant that moving to the Executive Calendar required consideration of treaties before nominations, simply because the Senate's Executive Calendar prints both treaties and nominations in the order in which they are reported out of their respective committees of jurisdiction, and treaties are then printed in the first section of the Calendar.

But the placement of treaties and nominations on the Senate Calendar was not and is not based on any great precedent or legal requirement that would elevate treaties to a position of prominence greater than nominations. Instead, the placement of treaties and nominations on the Senate Executive Calendar is simply the result of a clerical printing convention. There has never been a logical reason for the Senate to distinguish between a motion to proceed to a nomination and a motion to proceed to the first treaty. Because there is no substantive reason that the Senate should have to go to treaties before being able to consider a nomination, it seemed logical that the Senate should be able to proceed directly to a nomination on the Executive Calendar.

My motion to proceed directly to the first nomination, rather than a treaty, did not inhibit or frustrate Senate debate in any way. The Chair explicitly confirmed that it did not contravene any precedent or Standing Rule of the Senate. Moreover, it also did not restrict the ability of the Senate to filibuster the nomination itself. In fact, disposition of the nomination remained, as it is today, fully debatable in several respects. A nomination remains fully debatable when it comes before the Senate, and motions to proceed from one nomination to another are also fully debatable when the Senate is in executive session.

May 13, 1987--Enforcing Rule IV Against Improper Debate of a Motion To Approve the Journal: In 1987, a Republican minority led a filibuster seeking to prevent the Senate from considering a defense authorization bill. Prior to moving to the bill, I sought unanimous consent that the Journal of the preceding day ``be approved to date,'' a routine request in the course of Senate business. The Journal is the official record of the proceedings of the Senate, and under Senate rule IV, the Journal of the preceding day must be read following the prayer by the Chaplain unless, by nondebatable motion, the reading of the Journal is waived.

In this instance, Senator Dole objected to my request that the Journal be approved by unanimous consent, and the question of whether the Journal should be approved was put to a vote. Under Senate rule XII, if a Senator declines to vote during a rollcall, he or she must, at the time his or her name is called, give a reason for not voting. In an unusual occurrence, Senator Warner advised the Chair that he ``decline[d] to vote for the reason that I have not read the Journal.'' Rule XII requires that if a Senator declines to vote, the Presiding Officer must put a nondebatable question to the Senate on whether it is ``permissible for the Senator to decline his right to vote on the issue.''

The Chair called for the vote to determine whether Senator Warner should be excused from voting on the Journal. However, before that vote was completed, Senator Dan Quayle stated that he, too, declined to vote, because he said, ``I do not believe a Senator should be compelled to vote.'' The Chair asked the clerk to call the roll on whether to excuse Senator Quayle from voting, when Senator Symms stated that he, too, declined to vote for the same reason. At this point, there were four Senate votes pending. if additional Senators in the Chamber similarly chose to decline to vote, seriatim, the process could have continued forever.

Recognizing that, just a bit over a year previously, the Senate had deliberately amended rule IV to make the motion to approve the Journal a nondebatable motion, I made a point of order that the requests of the Senators to decline to vote were not in order. I stated:

that in amending rule IV, the Senate intended that a majority

of the Senate could resolve the question of the reading of

the Journal. I make my point of order that a request of a

Senator to be excused from voting on a motion to approve the

Journal is, therefore, out of order and that the Chair

proceed immediately, without further delay, to announce the

vote on the motion to approve the Journal.

Through a series of subsequent motions and votes, I prevailed in rectifying what I observed at the time was an extraordinary situation illustrated by a series of, in essence, ``votes within a vote.''

Contrary to erroneous allegations by some, my actions in this regard did not set a precedent that ``changed Senate procedure to run contrary to the plain text of a Standing Senate Rule.'' In fact, the action I took achieved exactly the opposite result: It ensured that Senate procedure would conform more closely to both the intent and the plain text of Senate rule IV.

At the time, one Senator mistakenly stated that the Chair could not entertain a unanimous consent request to suspend the application of rule XII in this instance. But that is an incorrect understanding by a Senator who was referring to rule XII, paragraph 1--where Senators cannot seek to be added to a vote that they missed, and the Chair may not do it or entertain a request to do so, a rule that was not in question and has always been strictly enforced by the Chair--not rule XII, paragraph 2, which was in dispute at the time.

Again, the actions I took were to enforce both rules IV and XII. Should I, instead, have endorsed a procedure whereby one Senator after another could simply decline to vote and put each Senator's reasons for declining to vote to another vote? Should Senators have been permitted, one after another, to decline to vote, then force a vote on each one's reason for not voting, on what is a nondebatable question in a nondebatable posture? Had I not raised a point of order against this abusive practice, it could have been used in innumerable future circumstances, and the Senate would not be able to complete a vote on any measure or matter, ever. It would, again, have made a mockery of the Senate's rules. Keep in mind that, if the tactic were ever legitimized, it could be employed to prevent a judicial nominee from ever receiving a vote.

It should be further noted that the point of order I made applies only to proceedings on motions to approve the Journal. Both the Presiding Officer and I confirmed this specifically in response to a question from Senator Alan Simpson. As I then stated:

where Senators decline to vote on other rollcall votes in

other situations--this point of order does not go to those.

This point of order only goes to the unusual situation, the

extraordinary circumstances, in which the Senate found itself

today, when it was trying to act on a motion to approve the

Journal to date, and when three Senators in succession stood

to say, ``Mr. President, I decline to vote on this rollcall

for the following reasons.''

Elsewhere, I also expressly stated that, ``for the legislative history,'' the precedential value of my point of order was ``confined only to that situation in which the Senate is trying to complete a vote on a motion to approve the Journal to date . . . It is confined to that very narrow purpose.''

The Senate's decision on that day was fully consistent with the text of rules IV and XII, which provides expressly that the question of whether a Senator could decline to vote, ``shall be decided without debate.'' The decision, once again, further enforced the existing rules of the Senate. This stands in stark contrast to the proposed nuclear option, which would contravene, by a simple majority vote, the express text of rule XXII, which applies to ``any measure, motion, or other matter pending before the Senate,'' and which requires an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn.

Let me state, once again, that no action of mine cited by the proponents of the nuclear options has ever denied a minority in the Senate its right to full debate on the final disposition of a measure or matter pending before the Senate.

The steps discussed here have all gone toward strengthening or enforcing

Senate rules, or clarifying the application of Senate precedents--not undermining them. The Senate has been the last fortress of minority rights and freedom of speech in this Republic for more than two centuries. I pray that Senators will pause and reflect before ignoring that history and tradition in favor of the political priority of the movement.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz), who both as a Member of this body and previously as a member of the Florida legislature has a rare commodity on the floor today, genuine knowledge on the subject of which we are speaking.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 6 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, it is never a good recommendation for a bill when its proponents deny its plain meaning. The gentleman from Wisconsin said this is not a private bill. Well, perhaps in the technical and irrelevant terms of the House calendar it is not a private bill. It is in fact a very private bill. It is so private that it deals only with the Schiavo case and her parents.

And in an admission that it is not a very good idea, a provision of this bill, really quite unusual, says by the way, we hope no one will pay attention to this in the future. In legal language, that is, this is not to be precedent setting. Well, if this is such a good idea, if Congress acting as the super Supreme Court of Florida is the right thing to do for Ms. Schiavo, why go to such pains, those of you who wrote the bill, to say it should not be a precedent?

By the way, anyone who thinks it will not be a precedent, of course, is not paying attention. What you will do today, if this bill passes, is invite every family dispute of this terrible, painful, heartrending nature to come to the Congress. When brothers and sisters disagree, when parents disagree, the courts of the States will have no relevance; probably the Federal courts will not. Every single dispute will come here.

Now, here is what we are doing here, and it is not the Federalism argument that bothers me as much as it is the separation of powers. We have already heard debates. What was the fee in the legal case? What about the hospice? Does she or does she not, this poor woman who was so terribly hurt, does she or does she not have brain function? Does she or does she not respond?

Nobody in here knows. Nobody in here has any way of knowing. What we have are Members choosing a side based on their ideologies. There are people who believe, in what is described as pro life, that nothing that terminates a life is ever justified. In fact, people have said, well, if she had said so, but many of those who hold that do not think you have a right to say that. There are others of us who believe, and I must tell you, from what I have read, if I were a member of the Schiavo family, if a member of my family were involved, I would have made the same decision. But I haven't made the decision. I have no right to make that decision, and I have no information for it.

Separation of powers. When they wrote the Constitution, they were not kidding around. They made some sensible distinctions. We legislate on broad policy. When you get to individual ajudications, when you get to the case, people have said, well, we disagree with the medical report. We had the eminent Dr. Frist looking at it on television and making his diagnosis. We have people making specific judgments about her wishes. We have people making specific judgments about her medical condition. We have not spent very much time on that. Judges have done that, lawyers have done that, in adversarial proceedings they have done that.

Now, I know we heard a disparagement of the Supreme Court of Florida. People did not like the way they voted 4 years ago, but what does that have to do with whether or not the husband's wishes and wife's wishes are carried out in this case? That is why we should not be making this decision.

If you listen to the debate, this is confirmation of what the writers of the Constitution did when they said separation of powers. Congress deals with broad policy. Individual adjudications are made by judges, with cases of lawyers and presentations and evidence. None of that has happened here. You are asking to make a decision based on most of us knowing very little, if anything, at all. Ideology is driving this, and that is why we have a separation of powers.

This is not a bill, by the way. This is a court decision. What happened has been that this has been very well litigated in Florida, litigated on a number of occasions, with lawyers on all sides. Because the majority, for their ideological reasons, do not like the decision of the Florida courts, we have now a new principle; that the Congress of the United States will be the super Supreme Court of a State.

In lawyers terms, we can vacate a judgment and then remand it. But not even remand it. Not send it back to the court that decided it, to a better court. Talk about forum shopping. People wanted to get rid of forum shopping. This is the grandparent of all forum shops. We dislike what the courts in Florida have done, so we cancel their decision and we send it elsewhere.

The gentleman from Wisconsin said this does not create any new rights. Well, it gives standing by its own terms to the parents. And, by the way, if it does not create any new rights, why is it necessary? If in fact without this bill no new rights have been created, why could they not have gone to court without us? The answer is they could not. Because that is not what American jurisprudence has said.

I believe, as I said, if I were making this decision for myself or anyone close to me, I would make the same decision Michael Schiavo made. But I would not try to defend my judgment in this case. I do not know her medical condition. I do not know what her wishes were. But neither do any of you.

This is as difficult a decision as human beings can make. I am proud to be a politician, but I think we would all agree that you should not make this kind of a decision, this kind of a decision about life, in these terribly emotional circumstances. It should not be made politically. I think we would all agree to that. But then let us look at the corollary. If you do not want a decision to be made politically, why in the world do you ask 535 politicians to make it?

Does anyone think that this decision will be made without consideration of electoral support or party of ideology? Of course not. And again, this is not the only case. People should understand that, those who are watching what we do. Despite your argument that this is not setting a precedent, every aggrieved party in any similar litigation can now come to Congress and ask us to make a series of decisions.

This is the point. This is a terribly difficult decision, which we are institutionally totally incompetent to make.

To allow ideology to triumph in that context is a shame.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

The gentleman from Wisconsin in an effort to find an inconsistency quoted me as being for habeas corpus so people can have their day in court. I am. I do not ever remember supporting a bill in Congress where we decided person by person who got the right of habeas corpus and who did not. My argument is a separation-of-powers argument. Yes, I believe a general right to go to court when you have claimed there has been an error in your criminal procedure makes sense, but we are not talking about that here. We are talking about, despite his claim that this is not a private bill, a private bill, a bill that names one individual and allows this individual to do it. So if the question is would I be in favor of this House deciding who got the right to bring habeas petitions and in what circumstances on a case-by-case basis, the answer is, I would not. It would be a failure to understand the separation of powers, what is an appropriate function for a legislative body and what is an appropriate case-by-case adjudication for the court system.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Wu).

(Mr. WU asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Davis), again someone who has worked on this for quite some time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, the previous impassioned speech from a gentleman who legitimately and genuinely holds a very strong opinion here is exactly why we should not, as a Congress, be deciding this issue. He made a number of statements about her medical condition. None of us are in a position to know what her medical condition is. There are procedures in the State of Florida which have been gone through exhaustively to determine that. Doctors have testified one way or another. Doctors have examined her, some doctors have not examined her. That is precisely the point. The arguments the gentleman is making exemplify why this needs to be a case-by-case decision, not a legislative decision.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

The caption tonight ought to be ``We are not doctors. We just play them on C-SPAN.'' The point is this: The gentleman is making specific medical arguments. He has said, in strong criticism of the entire judicial system of the State of Florida, that they did not give her a fair chance; that the entire judicial system, all of those appeals, all of those trials, all of that litigation, that that did not give her a fair chance and we will now vacate the judgment of Florida. And why? Not because any of us know one thing or another, but because many Members here genuinely have a strong ideological interest, and that is precisely why this ought to be a judicial decision and not a legislative decision.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).

Mr. Speaker, I reserve my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington, D.C. (Ms. Norton).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1\1/4\ minutes to deal with two arguments that have been presented here as precedents.

This is an unprecedented piece of individual case decision. One, we are told, well, we did this previously with civil rights. After years of determining and establishing that there was a discriminatory pattern, we made an exception. The rule remains that States decide these kinds of decisions; but because there was an overwhelming showing of a pattern of discrimination based on race, outlawed specifically by an amendment to the Constitution, we made an exception. There is no showing here of any such pattern of discrimination.

Secondly, we are told this is just a general principle like habeas corpus. I have to ask people on the side who are pushing this, if this is such a good idea, why is it limited to this case and why do you say it is not to be a precedent? If, in fact, it is to be the rule that people should have this appeal, why do you limit it to only one individual?

That suggests that this is a response to a particular dispute. You are responding to a particular dispute because it did not come out ideologically and for whatever reason you say you wanted. But if it is a principle, why is it written as a bill applying only to these individuals, and it specifically says it cannot be a precedent?

Clearly, this is an individualized response to a controversy that attracted attention, and if you believed in the principle, you would have made it uniform.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis), someone who knows something about Federal intervention when it is called for.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 45 seconds.

The gentleman's remarks again emphasize that this is a judicial and not a legislative case. He says there are aspects of this case that call for judicial review. That is why we have courts.

Yes, other people can get other Federal review by general statutes. None of the other cases he mentioned are in Federal courts because a particular bill was passed in a particular situation to send them there based on a review of those facts.

The gentleman is entitled to his view of the facts as he said. There are aspects of this case that lead him to think that it should go back into court. That is what courts are for. He has just described the antithesis of a legislative decision, particularly since almost none of the Members have either as much information as he does.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Baird).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

It is true that the Constitution gives Congress the right to provide the jurisdiction of the courts. This bill does that for one individual, which, as the gentleman from Georgia's comments make clear, it is based on the facts of the one case.

This is not an act of legislation, this is a case-by-case adjudication because Members here genuinely dislike the outcome of the Florida court system.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott).

(Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.

We just heard what would have made an excellent summary in the legal case in this matter, but not a legislative argument. We heard very specific allegations and arguments which are hotly contested about the individual case. The Americans with Disabilities Act was a general law. It has nothing to do with this individual case here.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Capuano).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin).

(Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 20 seconds.

The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) earlier implied that I was being inconsistent because I said I was for habeas corpus. He quoted something. He has just cited the inadequacy of habeas corpus in this case. Yes, I am for habeas corpus. This goes, as he just acknowledged, far beyond it.

Secondly, he acknowledged our objections to this individual private bill on one case by blaming the Senate. In other words, he has acknowledged that this is an inappropriate bill and that is all we have said.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Cleaver).

Mr. Speaker, I yield for purposes of a unanimous-consent request to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin).

(Mr. CARDIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Indiana (Ms. Carson).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/4\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).

Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), our whip, the ranking member on our side who is here tonight, to close on our side. The minority leader, who is traveling overseas, is unable, obviously, to be here.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, this has been an extraordinarily serious debate. It has been in many ways a real debate, with each Member rising and understanding the seriousness of the issues which we consider. On the one hand, we consider the life of one young woman, a young woman struck by tragedy, shared by her family and by her friends and by her country.

One of the striking facts of American life and American culture is the great importance that America puts on the individual: One life, one swallow that God cares for and plans for. We are here as colleagues who have almost to a person experienced the same kind of pain and trauma that the Schiavo family now faces.

The gentlewoman from Ohio correctly stated that Terri is loved by her husband, by her parents, by her brother, by others in her family. Those of us who have been in that place know how difficult it is.

I had not expected, as my colleagues had not expected, to be back in this House to consider this legislation. When we were called back by the Speaker, and the leader and I discussed the circumstances under which the call would come, trying to accommodate Members as best as possible, I did what I presumed many of you did. I referred to the facts that I could find.

On the one hand, my reaction was that I am concerned that we appear to be a Congress that is flexible on the jurisdiction of courts. When we agree with the decisions that courts make, we leave them jurisdiction. When we think they may make a decision that we want, we try to give them additional jurisdiction. But when we disagree with the courts, we have had legislation on this floor in recent months to take from them jurisdiction. If we pursue that course as a country, I suggest to you that we will become a Nation of men and of politicians, not a Nation of laws.

The fact that we are a Nation of laws has distinguished us very greatly from many other nations of the world, and we have held up that distinction as a critically important one. We now have troops arrayed in Iraq to support that principle, of the individual, of freedom, and of law.

So I believe tonight, Mr. Speaker, that every Member will vote on behalf of Terri Schiavo tonight, but they will see their responsibility in that act differently. I believe, Mr. Speaker, they will see it honestly and sincerely, and realizing the duty they have by lifting their hand and swearing an oath to our constitution and to our country.

So, Mr. Speaker, I did, as I said what I suppose many have done, I went to the proceedings that have occurred in the Terri Schiavo case, caused by the absence of a written directive. I have three daughters, Mr. Speaker. They are all adults. They do not live with me now, but I see them regularly and I love them dearly. And since the loss of their mother, we have become even more close. And I heard the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite) speak, and as I heard her speak I felt a tear when she referred to Mr. Wolfson, whom I do not know, but whose report I have read.

Mr. Wolfson was asked not by the mother and father, not by the husband, but by the State to try to determine as best he could what the medical evidence led him to conclude. He was not an advocate of the parents or of the husband. He perceived himself correctly as the advocate of Terri Schiavo. His report is a compelling one.

The gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite) said that she knows Mr. Wolfson, and knows him to be a man of wisdom and deep compassion and with a sense of responsibility. Then she spoke of her own daughter and such a condition, and the discussion she had with her daughter, and I hope many of you heard her say this, that her daughter said to her that if she was in that state she would not want to be left in that state by her mother, and she said, ``No, Mom, if you really loved me, you would let me go to my rest and be with God.''

If I thought the Florida courts had dealt with this in a superficial and uncareful way, perhaps, perhaps I would feel that we ought to interpose our view. But no fair reading of the court's decision at the lower court, no fair reading of the disposition by the District Court of the United States, in which they said in quoting Judge Altobrand of the Supreme Court of Florida, ``Not only has Mrs. Schiavo's case been given due process, but few, if any similar cases, have ever been afforded this heightened level of process.''

This report is approximately 50 pages long that was issued by Mr. Wolfson. I urge my friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt) to read this. He said he had not. All of us ought to read it. This case, tragically, is not alone in the circumstances that have occurred. The report says that the Schindler family members stated that even if Theresa's family had been told of her intention, the family members, mom and dad, had been told of her intention to have artificial nutrition withdrawn, they would not do it.

All of us can understand that, hopefully. The wrenching decision that it would be for a parent to take an action which would inevitably lead to the loss of life of their daughter. Throughout this painful and difficult trial, Mr. Wolfson went on, the family acknowledged that Teresa was in a diagnosed persistent vegetative state.

The report seems to indicate to me that any fair reading of it would say that very careful consideration had been given. I know that there are some doctors among us who have looked at reports and perhaps looked at tapes and concluded, contrary to the doctors who have examined her, that this was not the case.

The court, however, in an evidentiary hearing and after due consideration said clear and convincing evidence at the time of trial supported a determination that Mrs. Schiavo would have chosen in February 2000 to withdraw the life-prolonging procedures, so that it has been concluded by all of the fact finders in the court systems of the United States, in the State of Florida, under the statutes, as the chairman has pointed out, established by the State of Florida to deal with this extraordinarily difficult human issue because, like birth, death will come to us all.

To some of us it will come in a way that will not raise such wrenching questions, but some few of us will individually and with our families have to face this decision; and properly the system should be followed to protect us so that neither a husband nor a mother nor a father nor anybody else can make that decision in a manner that is not fair, that does not have due process and does not protect us as individuals.

In reading the record, Mr. Speaker, I have concluded that the State of Florida in its wisdom provided for that process and accomplished that end. Because of that and because I care about our Federal system and because I care about our Constitution and, yes, because I care not knowing her individually but because I care for her as a child of God, I believe that this legislation should not pass.